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UKRAINIAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR OF 1812

In article the key moments of participation of the Ukrainian people in war of 1812 are shown principles of mobilization of Russian army on the Ukrainian earths Are opened. War wasn't reflected in the Ukrainian folklore. Value of war was reflected by short revival of the Cossacks. For Ukrainians it there was an unpatriotic war, after all they were at war for promised by Alexander I an autonomy what and haven't given to the Ukrainian people.

At the beginning of the 19th century most of Ukraine was under Russian rule, but this country of 7 to 8 million people was still a very distinct part of the Tsar's Empire. Integration proceeded slowly. The introduction of *gubernii* (provinces) did not eliminate all the differences, which distinguished Ukraine from the rest of the empire, nor did it erase regional peculiarities in Ukraine itself. The Right Bank *gubernii* were inhabited mainly by Ukrainian serfs and Polish nobles. In the Left Bank, Russian and Russified Ukrainian gentry owned only a part of the peasant population as serfs, while a sizeable and distinct social group of peasants called Cossacks still retained personal freedom. True Cossacks existed only on the fringes of the Steppe Ukraine where they formed free Cossack communities stretching from the Danube to the Kuban. Together with the demographic differences between the overpopulated North and the empty steppes, the distance from the front prevented the formation of a uniform Ukrainian attitude toward and participation in the war.¹

If there was a psychological common denominator shared by the three regions it must be sought in the deeply entrenched memories and persistent hopes associated with the tradition of the Ukrainian Hetman state and the idealized Cossackdom.² The common people expressed this feeling in the countless *dumy* (Cossack songs) and tales of Cossack exploits. Their hope that somehow they would once more become free Cossacks is expressed in the following lines taken from an early 19th century song: "They destroyed the Sich then, But they will need it again."³

When Napoleon's armies crossed the Niemen on 12 June 1812 they passed through Lithuania and Belorussia, thereby skirting Ukraine. Only a small area of Volyn *guberniia* was occupied for a short time by Polish and Austrian troops. Under enemy pressure General Tormasov's Third Army, whose duty was to protect the Ukraine from the West, pulled back to the Styra River where the front was stabilized. Napoleon's interest in Ukraine at this time was limited to procuring supplies for the army. For this purpose he dispatched small detachments but the Russian forces repelled them. Towards the end of the year a stronger "defense chain" was thrown up on Ukraine's northern border and was reinforced with the newly formed Cossack and militia regiments. Only small enemy bands succeeded in penetrating short distances into Ukrainian territory and their activity was limited to pillaging and vandalism.

Behind the defence line the Ukraine experienced no disruption of governmental authority and relative calm was maintained throughout the war. Before the outbreak of war Russian authorities had taken precautions to maintain peace and order in the country. A special effort was made to capture the enemy agents supposedly recruited among the Poles, Jews and resident foreigners. They were held responsible for the numerous fires, which had plagued Ukrainian cities, since 1811.⁴ Governors had order to make lists of unreliable persons, especially foreigners, for possible deportation into the interior of Russia. In areas threatened by invasion the authorities evacuated not only the suspects but also all those who by their wealth, knowledge or prestige could be useful to the enemy.⁵ Food, provisions and military supplies were brought further into the country, first to Kiev and when that city was felt to be in danger, to Poltava and Pereiaslav."⁶ That which could not be saved was either destroyed or given to the peasants for safekeeping. In two Volyn counties, which eventually fell to the enemy, Tormasov ordered the distribution of grain to the peasants on the understanding that they would return it after the harvest.⁷

Certain military units were also assigned duties in regard to the civilian population. Admiral Chichagov, bringing the Moldavian army to Tormasov's aid, sent a vanguard

under Lt.-Colonel Poler. One of the officer's assignments was to "sonder l'esprit des habitants et leur degré d'empressement à nous fournir de nouveaux moyens de résistance, si besoin sera."⁸ Later, Lt.-Colonel Klemovskii was sent to Ovruchi in North-Eastern Volyn with the 3rd Bug Cossack Regiment plus a grenadier battalion, and "the reason for this military reinforcement was primarily to bring fear *to* the local residents, whose action had shown them to be of questionable loyalty to Russia".⁹ Ukrainian troops serving in the Ukraine were expected to serve as a stabilizing influence on the Ukrainian population. In a report to Alexander, Chichagov explained the reason for taking with him one Black Sea Cossack regiment. Besides being excellent soldiers they were also a valuable political tool:

étant de la même extraction que les cosaques de la petite Russie, on pourra les employer aussi pour répandre et propager l'esprit qu'il sera convenable de cultiver parmi les habitants.¹⁰

The Russians' task of maintaining order in the Ukraine was facilitated by Napoleon's unwillingness to raise the standard of national and social liberation.¹¹ Napoleon refused to rouse his two potential allies in Russia: the enslaved peasants and the oppressed nationalities. Napoleon's nebulous plans to set up a republic on the Dnieper were not known to the Ukrainians and therefore could not win them over to his side. On the other hand, his public promise to give western Ukraine to Austria and Poland, and his patronage of Polish national ambitions, could hardly endear him to the Right Bank Ukrainians. French agents and proclamations sent into Ukraine were considered to be working for the benefit of the Polish gentry and not the Ukrainian peasants.

Unchallenged by the enemy in its claim on Ukraine's loyalty, the Russian government was left only with the task of choosing the most convenient and efficient way of utilizing Ukrainian manpower. At this time Ukrainians were considered good soldiers and because of their military tradition and good horsemanship were readily recruited for the Russian cavalry. Occasionally Russian military thinkers suggested that the fullest use of the military potential of Ukraine could be made only by general recruitment into

Ukrainian Cossack units. One such project was prepared by Senator M.P. Miklashevskiy, a rich Ukrainian aristocrat, and consisted of a plan for the conversion of the state peasants in Little Russia into Cossacks. Together with the existing free "Cossack class" they would number 170,000 adult males and could provide a standing army of 42,000 men. This project was sent by Miklashevskiy to Arakcheev, the Minister of War, apparently with the approval of Tsar Alexander himself.¹² Similar plans for the peasants of his *guberniia* were elaborated by Santi, the Civil Governor of Kiev.¹³ In the summer of 1812, Genen-Bagratiun wrote to the Emperor:

Little Russia has had Cossack regiments since time *immemorial*. Through time and circumstances these repeatedly destroyed and Cossacks who served in them turned into serfs . . . This type of service has always been beneficial and especially now, the advantages of such regiments would be generally felt.¹⁴

The only inconvenience in reviving Cossack regiments was the image of Cossackdom as defender of the masses and a refuge for fleeing serfs. This made the Cossacks an unreliable tool of Tsarist policy and the authorities had to study the matter closely if they wished to profit from the Cossack military prowess without running the risk of social turmoil.¹⁵

The measures taken by the government when the war broke out took into consideration the proposed revival of Cossack units but implemented them only partially. Of the one hundred thousand or more Ukrainian troops which served in the Russian forces during the war only a fraction were organized in Cossack units. The rest saw service in the militia or levy troops (*opolchcnie*), special guards, and the regular army.¹⁶

The special guard units were not numerous. Forest guards were organized at the outbreak of the war in the Kiev, Podillia and Volyn *gubernii*. They numbered about one thousand men in all and were assigned convoy and police duties. They also served as reserve units for Tormasov's Western Army. Of equal numerical strength was the cavalry guard mustered in Kiev for the protection of the city.¹⁷

The first order for the formation of Cossack regiments came before the outbreak of hostilities. On the 5th of June, one week before Napoleon crossed the Niemen, Alexander ordered the formation of four Cossack cavalry regiments, which were to reinforce General Tormasov's Third Western Army. Colonel de Witte given for the occasion the rank of Brigadier Commander of the Ukrainian Cossack Regiments, was instructed that: "these troops should be raised in the [Right Bank Ukraine] from people capable of Cossack service and by tradition and disposition favorable to it for a long time."¹⁸ There were no restrictions of age or size and the only criterion was the candidate's ability to fight. Three regiments were to be recruited from the Kiev *gubernia* and one from Podillia. Each regiment would number 1,200 men recruited among the burgers and the various categories of dependent peasants. Attractive offers were made to the gentry in order to encourage them to surrender their serfs for service and to join the regiments themselves as officers. Each Cossack would replace two regular recruits in the forthcoming conscription. Retired officers who joined the regiments would receive the same status as officers in the regular cavalry regiments, acquire noble status if they did not already have it, and retain these privileges and connections with the regiments after the termination of hostilities.

Following the outbreak of the war, while the Ukrainian Cossack Regiments were being formed, Alexander sent a second rescript, dated 25 June 1812, to Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky, the Governor-General of Little Russia, ordering him to form 15 Cossack cavalry regiments—nine in the Poltava *guberniia* and six in the Chernihiv *guberniia*. These regiments were to be formed according to the directives given to de Witte and when ready they were to be sent to Kaluga and Tula for redistribution among the Russian army units.¹⁹ Lobanov-Rostovsky forwarded transcripts of the order with a covering letter to all the land commissars. Unlike the Right Bank Ukraine, where only serfs and townsmen were available for the new regiments, the Left Bank Ukraine had a free Cossack population of 454,983 souls and it was they who were expected to assume the burden of the new formations.²⁰ To make the service attractive to these Cossacks,

Lobanov-Rostovsky made promises which did not fail to attract volunteers. The Cossacks were promised life membership in the newly formed Ukrainian Army even after being discharged from active service at the end of the war. They would also continue to enjoy the privileges now acquired, such as exemption from conscription and reduction of taxes.²¹

The required units were raised smoothly and quickly. Although some Cossack communities refused to send the 4 men per 100 souls necessary to meet the fixed total, most communities sent more than their quota. Ivan Kotliarevsky, by then a well-known Ukrainian writer, was charged with forming the 5th Poltava regiment. In one of his reports to Lobanov-Rostovsky Kotliarevsky wrote: "the people taken by me are good; there are no old men and no juveniles. By and large they join the Cossack ranks with satisfaction, willingness and without the slightest aversion."²² Numerous examples of Cossacks submitting to extortion by recruiting officers in order to be listed in the regiments show to what degree the revival of Cossackdom was popular among the people.²³ The authorities had no difficulty in raising the nineteen regiments to their total effective strength of 22,000 men in a short space of time.

Traditionally Cossack forces were staffed with officers who came from the ranks after acquiring experience and distinguishing themselves in battle. This system was alien to the Russian tradition and unfeasible in the existing context. Cossack regiments were to draw their officers from the gentry and the result was a continuous shortage of officers. Kotliarevsky himself refused to serve in the regiment he had raised. He wrote to Lobanov-Rostovsky on the 20th of August, that he had already enlisted 760 men but that "due to lack of officers [I] could not begin to form squadrons, even though there were enough men and horses to do so."²⁴ When efforts were made to transfer officers from the militia to the Cossack regiments the situation did not improve, because these units were also understaffed. The Marshal of Nobility of the Poltava *gubemiia* was beyond himself when he wrote to Lobanov-Rostovsky:

I cannot reconcile myself with the fact that noble people can be so indifferent in as grave a matter as the defence of the Fatherland. Every day I receive notices that

delegated nobles, on the pretext of sickness or other excuse shamelessly shy away from military service.²⁵

The situation did not improve and the regiments were sent to the front lacking officers. At the end of October Kutuzov complained to Lobanov-Rostovsky that, "in all Little Russian Cossack regiments which arrive under my command there is almost a complete lack of officers and even the number of non-commissioned officers is inadequate."²⁶ Since the regiments could not function without officers, regulars had to be appointed in their place.

The surplus of volunteers and the lack of officers cannot be explained as an upsurge of patriotism in one class of the population and a lack of it in the other. The simple truth is that both the serfs in the Right Bank Ukraine and the Cossack group in the Left Bank Ukraine had much to gain from their association with the army. It was the government's promise of escape from encroaching serfdom which drove the peasants into the army. The gentry on the other hand, free from compulsory service, had little to gain from the venture. Those to whom military service appealed were already serving in the regular army; as for the others, the rewards offered were too insignificant.

To complete the picture of the Ukrainian Cossack regiments mention should be made of the Buh and Kuban Cossacks. Threatened with extinction in 1807, during the war with Turkey, the Buh Cossacks nevertheless survived and four regiments of 500 men each were available for the French war. One regiment was left behind to cordon the plague-swept Odessa region while the others were sent to the northern borders of the Ukraine.²⁷ Far from the theatre of war the Kuban or Black Sea Cossacks, were left in the northern Caucasus. However, one cavalry regiment, one infantry regiment, and a squadron of guards were sent to the northern front.²⁸

The inability of Russian armies to stop Napoleon's advance forced Alexander to issue the July 6 Manifesto calling for a "concerted general uprising" against the invaders.²⁹ The resulting militia raised by the zemskoe opolchenie, levee en masse, was to be organized and staffed by the gentry, Moscow reserving for itself the task of

appointing the Commander-in-Chief. In response to this appeal Ukrainian *gubernii* like their Russian counterparts took the necessary steps to implement the order. The plans for raising Cossack regiments were temporarily suspended and all efforts were devoted to maximizing the involvement of the gentry. The nobles responded with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Skarzhinskii, a noble from the Kherson *guberniia*, organized and equipped a battalion from his own serfs and himself led it to the front.³⁰ In the Kiev *guberniia* the gentry felt less generously inclined and spent many hours in heated debates as to the number of serfs they should send.³¹ In Kharkiv the very idea of the levee was resented.³²

On the 18th day of July Alexander issued a second manifesto limiting the militia to the 17 central Russian *gubernii*. Ukraine was to revert to the previously planned Cossack regiments and regular conscription. Eventually, two Ukrainian *gubernii*, Chernihiv and Poltava, did participate in the land levee and gave a total of 42,182 men: 26,059 and 16,123 respectively.³³ This meant that about one out of every 15 serfs was drafted. In the other *gubernii* the government ordered conscription in proportion of 2 men for every 100 souls and the serfs already recruited for the militia were transferred into the regular army. This led to protests and passive resistance on the part of the militiamen. The Vice-Governor of the Kherson *guberniia* reported to the Governor of New Russia that a group of militiamen appeared before him and "besieged to be kept as Cossacks, in Cossack uniforms and to be assigned to Cossack regiments."³⁴ To the serfs the militia was preferable to the regular army not only because of the limited duration of the expected service but also because the peasants identified the militia with the new Cossack regiments and even called themselves "Cossacks". Lobanov-Rostovsky felt obliged to dispel the militiamen's illusions and assure them that there was no question of their being promoted to the status of Cossacks.³⁵

The cancellation of the militia in the Ukrainian *gubernii* was opposed not only by the peasants but also by some nobles. Santi pleaded with St. Petersburg for militia in the Right Bank Ukraine, arguing that the volunteers would provide good guards for the

prisoners of war. Stressing the fact that the peasants were of Ukrainian origin and hated the Polish Republic, he went on to argue that, "if they were given their old name of Cossacks [we would be able] not only to prevent them from deserting but to inspire in them excellent attitudes and zeal to serve Russia."³⁶ The officer further warned that if the front should pass through the Kiev *guberniia* and if the men were not by then absorbed by Russian military formations then they would be drafted by the Poles to fight against Russia.³⁷ In Kharkiv a small group of nobles led by their marshal tried in vain to persuade the government to allow them to go through with their plans for a levee.³⁸

The two Little Russian *gubernii* alone mustered over 60,000 men for the Cossack and militia regiments. The other *gubernii* were included in the general conscriptions. Several such conscriptions were ordered in 1812. In March the quota was set at 2 men per 500 souls.³⁹ This was increased to 5 per 500 in the summer and to 8 per 500 in November.⁴⁰ It has already been mentioned that after the abolition of the militia in some *gubernii* the recruits were simply transferred to the regular array. The shortage of horses prompted the authorities to substitute the recruitment of horses for men in some *gubernii*. Podillia, for example, was allowed to replace each recruit with 4 horses and this provided the army with 3,500 new mounts.⁴¹

Besides being recruited for military service, Ukrainians were also drafted in large numbers for transport and construction duties. The evacuation of Volodymyr-Volynsky⁴² alone required 5,500 wagon-loads, and there were evacuations from other northwestern cities, including a partial transfer of stores from Kiev. The army was not self-sufficient in transportation and when Chichagov's units had to be moved from the Moldavian border to Volyn much of the work was done by peasants. It is estimated that in the Right Bank Ukraine alone the authorities mobilized 5,204 men plus thousands of oxen and wagons.⁴³ Large fortifications begun around Kiev employed over 11,000 serfs from several *gerubernii* working in shifts day and night.⁴⁴ War came as a heavy burden for the civilian population as well as the military.

The Russian government had assigned to Ukraine the role of providing food supplies, horses, fodder, and ammunition. Ukraine supplied over 50% of the army's needs in grain and fodder.⁴⁵ It sent thousands of head of cattle and quantities of fish, fruit and salt, provided over 80% of the empire's saltpetre and one third of its gunpowder. To clothe the army a "uniform tax" of 1.5 rubles was levied on the servile population, while the Cossack communities had to provide their recruits with a sword, a lance and a pistol.⁴⁶ On top of these contributions the Ukraine gave over 10 million rubles in personal donations.⁴⁷

The war put a heavy strain on the Ukrainian economy. A Russian merchant resident in the Left Bank Ukraine wrote in his diary that all trade stopped on Ukrainian markets while the more enterprising speculators were hoarding money.⁴⁸ A Kharkiv nobleman opposed the levy for economic reasons: new recruits meant fewer workers and more consumers.⁴⁹ Any enthusiasm, which might have existed among the nobility, at the outset of the war, was noticeably dampened by the increased economic burdens imposed on them. The repeated demands on the Little Russian gentry for new contributions in serfs, horses and money are given by one historian as the reason for their reluctance to serve as officers in the Cossack and militia regiments.⁵⁰

Enemy troops are normally expected to abuse the civilian population and war propaganda makes capital of the people's apprehension in inciting them to active resistance. General Bagration was aware of this when he wrote to General Rostopchin: "For God's sake, we must rouse the peasants. We must tell them that the enemy desecrates churches and rapes women."⁵¹ Numerous instances of acts of vandalism and maltreatment have been amply documented by official reports and private memoirs.⁵² However, cases of friendly relations are also known. Sulima describes how the citizens of Kyiv clothed and fed not only their own wounded but also the French prisoners of war. Some of these men were immediately engaged as tutors for the young.⁵³ Volyn church documents show the exemplary behaviour of a Saxon unit which asked for permission before holding a Protestant service in an Orthodox church and then left the

premises in perfect order.⁵⁴ Xenophobia was certainly not the dominating sentiment determining the Ukrainian attitude towards the enemy. Nor was there as much need for it as in Russia; here another sentiment, the quest for personal freedom, was the motive which drove the peasants into the army.

The positive corollary of xenophobia is patriotism. Soviet historians made much of the patriotism of the masses defending their Fatherland from the French invaders. This tendentious generalization is not borne out by the documentary sources on Ukraine. There was never any question for the Ukrainians that they were fighting for their national survival or glory, as was the case for many Russians.

Marakuev, the patriotic Russian merchant mentioned above, provides valuable personal testimony on popular reactions to the war both in Russia and in the Ukraine. He was very critical of the way the authorities conducted the war and of the credulity of the Russian masses who fled the Kremlin and the capital frightened by rumours of conscription. As for Ukrainians who wanted to buy from him on credit he stated that they were:

far from the theatre of war and behaved as if they were not in Russia. They were indifferent to the troubles of the Fatherland. Their love for risk, common to all vagabonds who populate the New Russian land, made them real foreigners.⁵⁵

When news reached Kharkiv of the fall of Smolensk and of the conditions of the Russian army, Marakuev noticed that:

all were convinced that Russia was lost. The Little Russian rabble took the French success with inner satisfaction: the seditious Polish spirit had not yet died within them. But the nobles did not separate themselves from us; they thought and acted like true sons of our Fatherland.⁵⁶

Marakuev's observations on the state of loyalty, or lack of same, of the gentry and the masses in Ukraine contradict the Soviet historians' interpretations of the events. Soviet historiography erred in not recognizing that the heavy burdens placed on all segments of the population could hardly make the war a popular one. Furthermore, it

failed to see that the Ukrainian population did not feel threatened by Napoleon's armies, which by and large bypassed Ukraine. Nor could the Ukrainians be expected to rise with enthusiasm in defence of a state, which had deprived them of their national autonomy and personal liberties. The war of 1812 was not, and could not be a "Patriotic War" for the Ukrainians as it was, to a certain extent, to the Russians. Ukrainians peasants flocked to the Cossack and militia regiments, not to save Russia but in order to regain their lost Cossack liberties. The significance of 1812 in Ukrainian history is the revival of Cossackdom, but, as this revival was short-lived, the event left little trace in Ukrainian literature or folklore and is generally ignored by Ukrainian historiography.

¹ No standard work has yet been written on Ukraine's participation in the War of 1812, but various aspects of the event have been studied by both pre-Revolutionary and Soviet Ukrainian scholars. Besides the works referred to below, mention should also be made of the following: V. I. Strel'skyi, H. Iu. *Herbil's'kyi, Ukrains'kyi narod u vitchezniannii viini 1812 roku. Zbirnyk dokumentiv*. Kiev, 1948; L. G. Beskrovnyi, *Narodnoe opolchenie v otechestvennoi voine 1812 gada. Sbornik dokumentov*, Moscow, 1962; B. S. Abalikhin, "Isloriografiia Ukrains'koho opolchennia vitchyznianoï viiny 1812 g.", *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, No. 5, 1962, pp. 99-103.

² An interesting account of how Cossack traditions were cultivated in the homes of the Ukrainian aristocracy is contained in the memoirs of Semen Sulyma, "Zametki starogo Kievlianina", *Kievskaiia Starina*, Vol. 4, 1884, pp. 614-624.

³ Esaul, "Peshie bozaky", *Voennyi Sbornik*, Vol. 2, 1860, p. 114.

⁴ The biggest fire was in Kiev in July 1811. It destroyed the Podil' or the lower, waterfront district of the city. Cf. O. Levytskii, "Trevozhnye gody", *Kievskaiia Starina*, October, 1891, pp. 1-21.

⁵ "Akty, dokumenty i materialy dlia politicheskoi i bytovoi istorii 1812-goda", (Hereafter cited as "Akty, dokumenty i materialy...") *Sbornik imperatorskogo russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, (Hereafter cited as S.I.R.I.O.) Vol. 128, 1909, p. 504.

⁶ B. S. Abalikhin, *Ukrains'kyi narod u vitchyznianoï viini 1812 g.* (Hereafter cited as *Ukrains'kyi narod...*) Kiev, 1962, p. 15.

⁷ "Akty, dokumenty i materialy...", S.I.R.I.O., Vol. 128, 1909, p. 505.

⁸ Bogdanovich M. I., "Pisma Admirala Chichagova k Imperatoru Aleksandru", *S.I.R.I.O.*, Vol. 6, 1871, p. 1.

⁹ "Zapiski Volynskogo Grazhdanskogo gubernatora D. S. S. Zvegentseva, ot 10 apreliia 1837 goda, o sostoianii gubernii v 1812 godu", *S.I.R.I.O.* Vol. 128, 1909, p. 492.

¹⁰ M. I. Bogdanovich, *S.I.R.I.O.*, Vol. 6, 1891, p. 27.

¹¹ On Napoleon's policies see O. Borshchak, *Napoleon i Ukraina*. Lviv, 1937

¹² A. L. "Mysl' Imperatora Aleksandra I ob uchrezhdenii v Malorossii kozachykh polkov", *Kievskaiia Starina*, January 1890, pp. 119-120. The *general-guberniia* of Malorossii consisted of the *gubernii* of Chernihiv and Poltava.

¹³ M. Svidzins'kyi, "Do istorii kozachchyny 1812 roku", *Naukovyi zbirnyk*, Kharkiv, 1926, p. 8ff.

¹⁴ Quoted by B. S. Abalikhin in *Ukrains'kyi narod...*, p. 19.

¹⁵ The authorities still remembered how in 1807 a Kiev militia brigade mutinied, refusing to be conscripted into the regular army and demanding to be enrolled as Cossacks Cf. B. S. Abalikhin, "Z istorii antyfeodal'noho povstannia ratnykiv Kyivs'koi militsii v hrudni 1807 r.", *Arkhivy Ukrainy*, No. 5 (91), 1968, pp. 55-66.

¹⁶ B. S. Abalikhin gives statistical tables which show that the Cossack and militia regiments together numbered over 70,000 men. Unfortunately the author gives no figures for Ukrainians serving in the regular army. Cf

his "Ukrainskoe opolchenie 1812 g. *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, No. 72, 1962. pp. 95-96.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

¹⁸ *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov*, 1st Series, Vol. 32, No. 25,129 (5 June 1812), p. 339. (Hereafter cited as *P.S.Z.*).

¹⁹ N. Storozhenko, "Malorossiiskoe opolchenie 1812 goda", *Chteniia v istoricheskom obshchestve Nestora Letopistsia*, Kn. 5, 1819, pp. 103-104.

²⁰ M. I. Bogdanovich, "Istoriia otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda po dostovernym istochnikam sostavlena po vysochaishem poveleniiu", *Voennyi sbornik*, Vol. 13, 1860, p. 453.

²¹ N. Storozhenko, pp. 104-105. "

²² I. F. Pavlovskii, "Uchastie I. P. Kotliarevskogo v formirovanii malorossiiskikh kozachykh polkov v 1812 g.", *Kievskaiia Starina*, June, 1905, p. 315.

²³ I. F. Pavlovskii, "Malorossiiskoc kozache opolchenie v 1812 g. po arkhivnym danym" (Hereafter cited as "Malorossiiskoe kozache..."), *Kievskaiia Starina*, September-October, 1906, pp. 16-20.

²⁴ I. P. Kotliarevskii, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, Kiev. 1969, pp. 322-323.

²⁵ Quoted by N. Storozhenko, p. 109.

²⁶ Quoted by I. F. Pavlovskii, "Malorossiiskoe kozache...", pp. 106-108.

²⁷ "Gerzog Armand-Emmanuel Richelieu: 1766-1822", *S.I.R.I.O.*, Vol. :4. 1886, pp. 345, 369-370.

²⁸ M. H. Nersisian, *Otechestvennaia voina 1812 goda i narody Kavkaza*, Erevan, 1965, p. 14.

²⁹ *P.S.Z.*, Vol. 32, no. 25,176 (6 July 1812), p. 388.

³⁰ "1812 god. Podvig Novorossiiskogo pomeshchika Skarzhinskogo", *Russkii arkhiv*, Vol. 44, Part 3, 1906, pp. 467-470.

³¹ O. Levitskii, "Trevozhnyc gody", *Kievskaiia Starina*, December, 1391, pp. 337-338.

³² I. A. Hornovskii, "K istorii Kharkovskogo opolcheniia u 1812 g.", *Russkaia Starina*, Vol. 121, 1905, pp. 576-598.

³³ Ia. Lobanov-Rostovskii, "Obozrenie Malorossii v leto 1812 goda". *Kievskaiia Starina*, October, 1906, p. 145.

Slightly different figures are given by V. Babkin, *Narodnoe opolchenie v Otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 78-79.

³⁴ Quoted by B. S. Abalikhin, *Ukrains'kyi narod...*, pp. 22-23. from A Florovskii, *Otechestvetinaia voina i Novorossiiskii krai*, Odessa, 1913.

³⁵ B. S. Abalikhin, "Ukrainskoe opolchenie 1812 g.", p. 98

³⁶ O. Levitskii, pp. 341-342.

³⁷ An instance of two regiments raised by Polish nobles from the petty nobility and serfs (probably Ukrainians) is recorded in "Volynskaii byvalshchyna", *Kievskaiia Starina*, April 1886, p. 820.

³⁸ I. A. Hornovskii, p. 580 ff.

³⁹ *P.S.Z.*, Vol. 32. No. 25,051 (23 March 1812), p. 241.

⁴⁰ "Akty, dokumenly i materialy...", *S.I.R.I.O.*, p. 533.

⁴¹ "Zapiska grafa Arakcheeva — A. D. Balashovu", *Russkaia Starina*. Vol. 102, 1900, p. 260.

⁴² "Akty, dokumenty i materialy...", *S.I.R.I.O.*, p. 494.

⁴³ H. Iu. Herbil's'kyi, "Uchastq Ukrain'skoho narodu u vitchyzniani; viini 1812 roku". *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi Zhurnal*, No. 5, 1962, p 27.

⁴⁴ B. S. Abalikhin, "Ukrainskoe opolchenie 1812 g.", p. 100.

⁴⁵ B. S. Abalikhin. "Rol' Ukrainy v obespechenii armii v otechestvennci voine 1812 goda", in V. I. Shunkov (ed.), *Voprosy voennoi istorii Rossii (XVIII i pervaiia polovina XIX vekov)*. Moscow, 1969, pp. 193ff.

⁴⁶ B. S. Abalikhin, *Ukrains'kyi narod...*, p. 20.

⁴⁷ K. K. Dubyna, et al, *Istoriia Ukrainy*. Vol. I, Kiev, 1967, p. 369.

⁴⁸ "Zapiski Rostovtisa M. I. Marakueva", *Russkii Arkhiv*, Vol. 45, Pan 2,1907, p. 114.

⁴⁹ I. A. Hornovskii, p. 586.

⁵⁰ N. Storozhenko, "K istorii Malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIIE i nachale XIX stoletii", *Kievskaiia Starina*, Vol. 57, 1897, p. 475.

⁵¹ K. Seleznev, "O voine 1812 goda", *Istoricheskii Zhurnal*, No. 6. 1936, p. 22.

⁵² "Volynskaia buvalshchyna", p. 819.

⁵³ Semen Sulyma, p. 616.

⁵⁴ "Soiuznyky Napolcona na Volyni v 1812 g.", *Kievskaiia Starina* January 1894, pp. 134-135.

⁵⁵ "Zapiski Rostovtса M. I. Marakueva", p. 112.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

**Сербин Роман
(Монреаль, Канада)**

УЧАСТЬ УКРАЇНСЬКОГО НАРОДУ У ВІЙНІ 1812 р.

У статті показано рушійні моменти участі українського народу у війні 1812 р. Розкрито принципи мобілізації російської армії на українських землях. Війна не відобразилась в українському фольклорі. Значення війни відобразилось недовгим відродженням козацтва. Для українців це була непатріотична війна, адже вони воювали за обіцяну Олександром I автономію котра так і не була надана українському народу.

**Сербин Роман
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УЧАСТИЕ УКРАИНСКОГО НАРОДА В ВОЙНЕ 1812 г.

В статье показаны ключевые моменты участия украинского народа в войне 1812 г. Раскрыты принципы мобилизации русской армии на украинских землях. Война не отразилась в украинском фольклоре. Значение войны отразилось недолгим возрождением казачества. Для украинцев это была непатриотическая война, ведь они воевали за обещанную Александром I автономию какую так и не предоставили украинскому народу.