In Memoriam:
Raphael Lemkin [1900-1959]

Raphael Lemkin on the Ukrainian genocide

Memories of Communist and Nazi Crimes

Polish Diplomats on the Holodomor

Red Cross Documents on the Great Famine
HOLODOMOR STUDIES

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Harvard Ukrainian Studies (HUS), the journal of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, serves as a forum for new scholarship in Ukrainian studies. It deals primarily with history, language, and literature; at times related disciplines are included. HUS encourages scholars specializing in Ukrainian studies, as well as scholars working in related areas, to investigate and analyze issues important to the field. The journal publishes articles, documents with analysis, and reviews. Current subscription prices for individuals are: $30.00 per volume for domestic and Canadian addresses, $35.00 for all other addresses. PDFs of back issues and an index of volumes through volume 20 are available free of charge at our website (www.huri.harvard.edu/pubs.html).

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The *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* is the leading Canadian scholarly journal in Ukrainian studies, published semi-annually by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies since 1976. It publishes articles in the fields of history, literature, ethnography, folklore, archeology, art, language, politics, economics, society, and religion. Special issues have been devoted to early modern Ukraine, Ukrainian literature, Ukrainians in Canada, the first decade of independent Ukraine, Hryhorii Skovoroda, and Alexander Dovzhenko’s cinema. The forthcoming special issue (vol. 34), to be published in 2009, will be a Festschrift in honour of Dr. Frank E. Sysyn, with over twenty articles in Ukrainian history and a book-reviews section.

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Last year was the 75th anniversary of Holodomor the Ukrainian genocide 1932-1933. Many books, documents and articles appeared to commemorate this event I published a special issue of my journal Canadian American Slavic Studies/Revue Canadienne Américaine d'études Slaves, Volume 42, No. 3 (Fall 2008) that contained articles and illustrations.

The execution of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union was accomplished by means of forced starvation, imprisonment, deportation and shooting. These activities were the culmination of the collectivization process begun by the Bolshevik government in 1929 and concluded in 1933 that eliminated private agriculture and transferred it to collective farms and state farms under close supervision. Overall about 14.5 million people died during this period and its immediate aftermath. While some private Russian, ethnic German and Kazakh agricultural activities were also destroyed, the Soviet government concentrated its major attacks upon the Ukrainian populace. Even after former private Ukrainian farms were collectivized, the government demanded that they provide food to urban areas via unreasonable quotas. The year 1929 also witnessed the instigation and expansion of forced labor/concentration camps now named Gulags throughout the Soviet Union.

Major genocidal activities in Eurasia took place during the first and second quarters of the twentieth century. In 1915 during World War I the Ottoman Turks killed 1.5 million Armenian Christians and continued to kill more until the early 1920s. In 1932 and 1933 the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union killed as many as 10 million Ukrainians. From 1939 to 1945 during World War II the Nazi government killed 6 million Jews and gypsies.

The Armenian and Jewish genocides have garnered much attention and activity throughout the world. The Ukrainian genocide, however, has remained in comparative obscurity. Recent studies now have brought it forward. At the same time there have been denials and cover-ups by individuals and governments. The post-Soviet Russian government, while admitting to many deaths during the collectivization era, has steadfastly denied specific attacks upon and killings of Ukrainians. (Every Turkish government has denied genocidal activity against the Armenians.)

I decided to launch this journal for two reasons: first to document and explain genocidal acts against Ukrainians; and second to counteract and expose "Holodomor denial." I look forward to such publication activities.

Charles Schlacks
Idyllwild, California
EDITOR'S FOREWORD

I am pleased to present the inaugural issue of the first and only journal dedicated primarily to the study of the Ukrainian genocide. Holodomor Studies is intended to be a scholarly, peer-reviewed, semi-annual publication. It seeks to promote and stimulate research and reflection on all the aspects and facets of one of the great human tragedies of the twentieth century. This periodical will provide a forum for new research, innovative analyses and rigorous conceptualizations. It will be a convenient venue for the dissemination of newly revealed Soviet and Western documents. The primary language of the journal is English but other languages shall be used, when necessary, especially in the reproduction of documents.

At the publisher’s suggestion we are calling the new journal Holodomor Studies. Although the term “Holodomor” is rapidly gaining currency, it may be convenient to briefly explain its origin and state it’s usage in this publication. The term was coined from two words: the noun “holod,” meaning “hunger, famine, starvation,” and the transitive verb “moryty,” which can be variously translated as “to waste, debilitate, exhaust, kill.” The expression “moryty holodom” (“to exhaust somebody by food deprivation”) is found in the complaints by Ukrainian peasants, recorded in official Soviet documents of the Stalin era. The neologism “holodomor,” in the sense of “artificially organized starvation” and imposed specifically on Ukrainian victims, began to be widely used only in the 1980s. “The Holodomor” (capitalized and preceded by the definite article “the”) is now commonly employed as a synonym for “Ukrainian genocide.” For some people the notion of that genocide is limited to the starvation of the peasants, but for a growing number of Ukrainians it now connotes the destruction of the Ukrainian nation, a genocide in accordance with the UN definition. It is in this latter sense of the expression that the journal’s title Holodomor Studies should be understood.

The first issue of Holodomor Studies is dedicated to the memory of Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959), to honor the first Western scholar to approach the analysis of the Ukrainian genocide with the same conceptual framework as this journal. A Polish Jew, who studied law in the Jan Casimir University of Lviv, Lemkin became a recognized expert in international criminal law, with particular interest in the prevention of mass exterminations. In 1943 he coined the term “genocide” and then popularized it with his book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, published the following year. It was mainly due to Lemkin’s perseverance in lobbying the delegates to the United Nations, that the

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General Assembly passed the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, on December 9, 1948. While in the United States Lemkin maintained friendly relations with members of the Ukrainian community, and in 1953 was invited to speak at the commemoration of the Great Ukrainian Famine, held at New York’s Manhattan Center. Lemkin’s address remains to this day one of the most perceptive analysis of the Ukrainian genocide.

Lemkin’s notion of genocide was much broader than the definition of that crime retained by the UN Convention. In particular, Lemkin’s victims of genocide included groups targeted because of their social and/or political identities. However, the Genocide Convention recognizes only four groups of victims: national, ethnic, religious and racial. Aware of this limitation of the UN document, Lemkin examined the destruction of the Ukrainian population as a national/ethnic group, paying particular attention to that specific characteristic of that victim group. It is very clear from his arguments, that Lemkin saw the partial annihilation of the Ukrainian people, both by starvation and by other means, as intended to destroy the Ukrainian national group, as such. To honor Lemkin’s memory and recognize his invaluable contribution to the understanding of genocide in general, and of the Ukrainian genocide in particular, we are take great pride and pleasure in featuring his insightful paper “Soviet Genocide in the Ukraine.”

The five articles assembled in this issue treat the Ukrainian genocide from various perspectives. Yuriy Shapoval and Robert Kusnierz examine the knowledge of the Ukrainian famine in neighboring countries, in particular Poland, as the information was relayed by foreign diplomats. Hennadii Ye-fimenko traces the national dimension in the Soviet regime’s policies during the early 1930s. Heorhii Papakin gives a detailed account of the notorious blacklisting of collective farms which was one of the most atrocious forms of genocidal repression. Roman Serbyn shows the problems connected with the integration of Soviet and German mass crimes into Ukraine’s scholarly history and collective memory. Mykola Riabchuk provides a critical analysis of a recent monograph by a Canadian historian on the problems of constructing a national history in Ukrainian state-building. Thirty documents from the Archives of the International Committee of the Red-Cross (Geneva) show the efforts of the Ukrainian diaspora to get the Red-Cross and the League of Nations to organize famine relief for starving Ukraine in 1933.

Roman Serbyn
Université du Québec à Montréal

LEMKIN ON THE UKRAINIAN GENOCIDE

Raphael Lemkin’s essay, “Soviet Genocide in Ukraine,” is one of the earliest writings on the subject by a non-Ukrainian scholar. A note “Begin here,” scribbled in before the second paragraph, which begins with the words “What I want to speak about,” suggests that the text was originally composed for Lemkin’s address at the 1953 Ukrainian Famine commemoration in New York. Later Lemkin added it to the material he was gathering for his elaborate History of Genocide which was never published.1 Lemkin’s views on the Ukrainian tragedy are virtually unknown and hardly ever figure in scholarly exchanges on the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933, or on genocides in general.2 Yet his holistic approach to the Soviet regime’s gradual destruction of the Ukrainian nation is enlightening and makes a valuable, if belated, addition to scholarly literature on the subject.

Rafael was born in 1900 to a Jewish farming family in the village of Bez-wodne, near the Old Rus’ town of Volkovysk, now part of the Grodno region of Belarus. Before World War I the territory belonged to Russia, but after the break-up of the Tsarist Empire it was incorporated into Poland.3 Lemkin studied philology and law at the University of Lviv, where he became interested in the Turkish massacres of the Armenians, during World War I. After studying on a scholarship in Germany, France and Italy he returned to Poland and pursued a career in the Polish courts of law, mainly in Warsaw. He continued his preoccupation with the problem of legal sanctions against perpetrators of mass exterminations and developed his ideas, which he later presented at various international conferences. Lemkin was appointed assistant prosecutor, first at the District Court of Berezhany, Ternopil Province of Eastern Galicia (Western Ukraine), and then he obtained a similar position in Warsaw, where he also practiced law and continued his writings on international law. He must have been quite aware of the collectivization, dekulakization and the eventual Great Famine devastating Soviet Ukraine.

After the invasion of Poland by German and Soviet troops in 1939, Lemkin fled to Vilnius and then to Sweden where he lectured at the University of Stockholm. In early 1941 he managed to obtain a visa to the USSR, and then via Japan and Canada came to the United States. In April 1941 he was appointed “special lecturer” at the Duke University Law School in Durham, North Carolina. In 1944 he published *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, which he had started writing in Sweden.\(^4\) The study is a thoroughly documented exposé on German crimes in Europe. The book contains the first mention of the term “genocide,” which has become a generic name not only for the Nazi atrocities but of all mass destructions. The author’s relentless lobbying, backed by the prestige of his book, finally succeeded in swaying the United Nations Organization to adopt the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”

After the war, Lemkin devoted his life to the further development of legal concepts and norms for containing mass destructions and punishing their perpetrators. After the fall of Nazism, Lemkin saw the main threat in Communism, which had overrun his native Poland. Towards the end of his life he had close relations with the Ukrainian and Baltic communities in the United States. In 1953 he took part in the commemoration of the Great Famine by the New York Ukrainian community. His essay on the Ukrainian genocide shows his empathy for the plight of Ukrainian victims of Communism and Russian imperialism, not only of the Great Famine of the early thirties but of the periods that preceded and followed the tragic event. Lemkin’s essay, based on personal observations and supplemented with emotionally charged testimony provided by the Ukrainian community may appear sketchy and naïve today. Yet his comments offer an insight that is often lacking in present-day literature, whose authors have access to documentation, unavailable to Lemkin. Lemkin rightly extends the discussion of Ukrainian genocide beyond the starving peasants of 1932-1933 and speaks about the destruction of the intelligentsia and the Church, the “brain” and the “soul” of the nation. He put the emphasis on culture, beliefs and common ideas, all of which made Ukraine “a nation rather than a mass of people.”

Lemkin’s essay is reproduced here with the correction of obvious typographical errors, minor updating of terminology (Ukraine instead of “the Ukraine,” Romanian instead of “Rumanian,” Tsarist instead of “Czarist”) and the transliteration of Ukrainian names from Ukrainian.

*Université du Québec à Montréal*

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RAFAEL LEMKIN

SOVIET GENOCIDE IN UKRAINE

Sosyura. “Love Ukraine”
You cannot love other peoples
Unless you love Ukraine.¹

The mass murder of peoples and of nations that has characterized the advance of the Soviet Union into Europe is not a new feature of their policy of expansionism, it is not an innovation devised simply to bring uniformity out of the diversity of Poles, Hungarians, Balts, Romanians – presently disappearing into the fringes of their empire. Instead, it has been a long-term characteristic even of the internal policy of the Kremlin – one which the present masters had ample precedent for in the operations of Tsarist Russia. It is indeed an indispensable step in the process of “union” that the Soviet leaders fondly hope will produce the “Soviet Man,” the “Soviet Nation,” and to achieve that goal, that unified nation, the leaders of the Kremlin will gladly destroy the nations and the cultures that have long inhabited Eastern Europe.

What I want to speak about is perhaps the classic example of Soviet genocide, its longest and broadest experiment in Russification – the destruction of the Ukrainian nation. This is, as I have said, only the logical successor of such Tsarist crimes as the drowning of 10,000 Crimean Tatars by order of Catherine the Great, the mass murders of Ivan the Terrible’s “SS troops” – the Oprichnina; the extermination of National Polish leaders and Ukrainian Catholics by Nicholas I; and the series of Jewish pogroms that have stained Russian history periodically. And it has had its matches within the Soviet Union in the annihilation of the Ingerian nation, the Don and Kuban Cossacks, the Crimean Tatar Republics, the Baltic Nations of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. Each is a case in the long-term policy of liquidation of non-Russian peoples by the removal of select parts.

Ukraine constitutes a slice of Southeastern USSR equal in area to France and Italy, and inhabited by some 30 million people.² Itself the Russian bread

¹. Verse by Volodymyr Sosiura added in pencil. Sosiura wrote the patriotic poem in 1944, during the German-Soviet war. At first it was praised by the authorities, but in 1948 it was condemned for Ukrainian nationalism. The two verses in the Ukrainian original:
не можна любити народів других
коли ти не любиш Україну! . .

². According to the 1959 census there are a little over 40 million people.
basket, geography has made it a strategic key to the oil of the Caucasus and Iran, and to the entire Arab world. In the north, it borders Russia proper. As long as Ukraine retains its national unity, as long as its people continue to think of themselves as Ukrainians and to seek independence, so long Ukraine poses a serious threat to the very heart of Sovietism. It is no wonder that the Communist leaders have attached the greatest importance to the Russification of this independent [minded – R.S.] member of their “Union of Republics,” have determined to remake it to fit their pattern of one Russian nation. For the Ukrainian is not and has never been, a Russian. His culture, his temper­ament, his language, his religion – all are different. At the side door to Mos­cow, he has refused to be collectivized, accepting deportation, even death. And so it is peculiarly important that the Ukrainian be fitted into the procrus­tean pattern of the ideal Soviet man.

Ukraine is highly susceptible to racial murder by select parts and so the Communist tactics there have not followed the pattern taken by the Ger­man attacks against the Jews. The nation is too populous to be exterminated completely with any efficiency. However, its leadership, religious, intellectual, political, its select and determining parts, are quite small and therefore easily eliminated, and so it is upon these groups particularly that the full force of the Soviet axe has fallen, with its familiar tools of mass murder, deportation and forced labor, exile and starvation.

The attack has manifested a systematic pattern, with the whole process repeated again and again to meet fresh outburst of national spirit. The first blow is aimed at the intelligentsia, the national brain, so as to paralyze the rest of the body. In 1920, 1926 and again in 1930-33, teachers, writers, artists, thinkers, political leaders, were liquidated, imprisoned or deported. According to the Ukrainian Quarterly of Autumn 1948, 51,713 intellectuals were sent to Siberia in 1931 alone. At least 114 major poets, writers and artists, the most prominent cultural leaders of the nation, have met the same fate. It is conservatively estimated that at least 75 percent of the Ukrainian intellectuals and professional men in Western Ukraine, Carpatho-Ukraine and Bukovina have been brutally exterminated by the Russians. (Ibid., Summer 1949).

Going along with this attack on the intelligentsia was an offensive against the churches, priests and hierarchy, the “soul” of Ukraine. Between 1926 and 1932, the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, its Metropolitan (Lyp­kivsky) and 10,000 clergy were liquidated. In 1945, when the Soviets established themselves in Western Ukraine, a similar fate was meted out to the Ukrainian Catholic Church. That Russification was the only issue involved is clearly demonstrated by the fact that before its liquidation, the Church was offered the opportunity to join the Russian Patriarchate at Moscow, the Kremlin’s political tool.

Only two weeks before the San Francisco conference, on April 11, 1945, a detachment of NKVD troops surrounded the St. George Cathedral in Lviv and arrested Metropolitan Slipyj, two bishops, two prelates and several
priests. All the students in the city’s theological seminary were driven from the school, while their professors were told that the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church had ceased to exist, that its Metropolitan was arrested and his place was to be take by a Soviet-appointed bishop. These acts were repeated all over Western Ukraine and across the Curzon Line in Poland. At least seven bishops were arrested or were never heard from again. There is no Bishop of the Ukrainian Catholic Church still free in the area. Five hundred clergy who met to protest the action of the Soviets, were shot or arrested. Throughout the entire region, clergy and laity were killed by hundreds, while the number sent to forced labor camps ran into the thousands. Whole villages were depopulated. In the deportation, families were deliberately separated, fathers to Siberia, mothers to the brickworks of Turkestan, and the children to Communist homes to be “educated”. For the crime of being Ukrainian, the Church itself was declared a society detrimental to the welfare of the Soviet state, its members were marked down in the Soviet police files as potential “enemies of the people.” As a matter of fact, with the exception of 150,000 members in Slovakia, the Ukrainian Catholic Church has been officially liquidated, its hierarchy imprisoned, its clergy dispersed and deported.

These attacks on the Soul have also had and will continue to have a serious effect on the Brain of Ukraine, for it is the families of the clergy that have traditionally supplied a large part of the intellectuals, while the priests themselves have been the leaders of the villages, their wives the heads of the charitable organizations. The religious orders ran schools, took care of much of the organized charities.

The third prong of the Soviet plan was aimed at the farmers, the large mass of independent peasants who are the repository of the tradition, folklore and music, the national language and literature, the national spirit, of Ukraine. The weapon used against this body is perhaps the most terrible of all—starvation. Between 1932 and 1933, 5,000,000 Ukrainians starved to death, an inhumanity which the 73rd Congress decried on May 28, 1934. There has

3. The Charter creating the United Nations was signed by the delegates of 50 countries, including the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, at the Conference held on April 25-26, 1945.

4. The Curzon Line proposed by the British as a border between Poland and the Soviet state after the First World War eventually served as the basis for the post-World War II border between Poland and the USSR. The border left a large Ukrainian minority in the Polish state.

5. On May 28, 1934 Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York introduced a resolution (H. Res. 309) in the House of Representatives in Washington. The document stipulated that “several millions of the population of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic” died of starvation during 1932 and 1933.” The Resolution further proposed:

“that the House of Representatives express its sympathy for all those who suffered from the great famine in Ukraine which has brought misery, affliction, and death to millions of peaceful and law-abiding Ukrainians”;

“that . . . the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . take active steps to alleviate the terrible consequences arising from this famine”;

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Soviet Genocide in Ukraine
been an attempt to dismiss this highpoint of Soviet cruelty as an economic policy connected with the collectivization of the wheat lands, and the elimination of the kulaks, the independent farmers was therefore necessary. The fact is, however, that large-scale farmers in Ukraine were few and far-between. As a Soviet writer Kosior declared in Izvestiia on December 2, 1933, “Ukrainian nationalism is our chief danger,” and it was to eliminate that nationalism, to establish the horrifying uniformity of the Soviet state that the Ukrainian peasantry was sacrificed. The method used in this part of the plan was not at all restricted to any particular group. All suffered—men, women, children. The crop that year was ample to feed the people and livestock of Ukraine, though it had fallen off somewhat from the previous year, a decrease probably due in large measure to the struggle over collectivization. But a famine was necessary for the Soviet and so they got one to order, by plan, through an unusually high grain allotment to the state as taxes. To add to this, thousands of acres of wheat were never harvested, were left to rot in the fields. The rest was sent to government granaries to be stored there until the authorities had decided how to allocate it. Much of this crop, so vital to the lives of the Ukrainian people, ended up as exports for the creation of credits abroad.

In the face of famine on the farms, thousands abandoned the rural areas and moved into the towns to beg food. Caught there and sent back to the country, they abandoned their children in the hope that they at least might survive. In this way, 18,000 children were abandoned in Kharkiv alone. Villages of a thousand had a surviving population of a hundred; in others, half the populace was gone, and deaths in these towns ranged from 20 to 30 per day. Cannibalism became commonplace.

As C. Henry Chamberlain, the Moscow correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, wrote in 1933:

The Communists saw in this apathy and discouragement, sabotage and counter-revolution, and, with the ruthlessness peculiar to self-righteous idealists, they decided to let the famine run its course with the idea that it would teach the peasants a lesson.

“that . . . the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Government will place no obstacles in the way of American citizens seeking to send aid in form of money, foodstuffs, and necessities to the famine-stricken region of Ukraine.”

The Resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. (From the Ukrainian Quarterly, no. 4 [1978], pp. 416-17.)

6. In fact, Stanislav Kosior was the First Secretary of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine. In a speech delivered at the joint session of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, on November 27, 1933, he stated that “at the present moment, local Ukrainian nationalism poses the main danger.”

Relief was doled out to the collective farms, but on an inadequate scale and so late that many lives had already been lost. The individual peasants were left to shift for themselves; and much higher mortality rate among the individual peasants proved a most potent argument in favor of joining collective farms.

The fourth step in the process consisted in the fragmentation of the Ukrainian people at once by the addition to Ukraine of foreign peoples and by the dispersion of the Ukrainians throughout Eastern Europe. In this way, ethnic unity would be destroyed and nationalities mixed. Between 1920 and 1939, the population of Ukraine changed from 80 percent Ukrainian to only 63 percent. In the face of famine and deportation, the Ukrainian population had declined absolutely from 23.2 million to 19.6 million, while the non-Ukrainian population had increased by 5.6 million. When we consider that Ukraine once had the highest rate of population increase in Europe, around 800,000 per year, it is easy to see that the Russian policy has been accomplished.

These have been the chief steps in the systematic destruction of the Ukrainian nation, in its progressive absorption within the new Soviet nation. Notably, there have been no attempts at complete annihilation, such as was the method of the German attack on the Jews. And yet, if the Soviet program succeeds completely, if the intelligentsia, the priests and the peasants can be eliminated, Ukraine will be as dead as if every Ukrainian were killed, for it will have lost that part of it which has kept and developed its culture, its beliefs, its common ideas, which have guided it and given it a soul, which, in short, made it a nation rather than a mass of people.

The mass, indiscriminate murders have not, however, been lacking – they have simply not been integral parts of the plan, but only chance variations. Thousands have been executed, untold thousands have disappeared into the certain death of Siberian labor camps.

The city of Vinnitsa might well be called the Ukrainian Dachau. In 91 graves there lie the bodies of 9,432 victims of Soviet tyranny, shot by the NKVD in about 1937 or 1938. Among the gravestones of real cemeteries, in woods, with awful irony, under a dance floor, the bodies lay from 1937 until their discovery by the Germans in 1943. Many of the victims had been reported by the Soviets as exiled to Siberia.

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8. There was no census in 1920. The official figures from the 1926 and 1939 census are somewhat different from Lemkin’s. In 1926 there were 22.9 million ethnic Ukrainians in Ukrainian SSR and the falsified 1939 figure showed 23.3 million, or an increase of 435,000 ethnic Ukrainians. However, the rise in over-all population of Ukrainian SSR by 3.3 million reduced the ethnically Ukrainian portion from 80 percent to 73 percent.
Ukraine has its Lidice too, in the town of Zavadka, destroyed by the Polish satellites of the Kremlin in 1946. Three times, troops of the Polish Second Division attacked the town, killing men, women and children, burning houses and stealing farm animals. During the second raid, the Red commander told what was left of the town’s populace: “The same fate will be met by everyone who refuses to go to Ukraine. I therefore order that within three days the village be vacated; otherwise, I shall execute every one of you.”

From *DEATH AND DEVASTATION ON THE CURZON LINE* by Walter Dushnyck

When the town was finally evacuated by force, there remained only 4 men among the 78 survivors. During March of the same year, 2 other Ukrainian towns were attacked by the same Red unit and received more or less similar treatment.

What we have seen here is not confined to Ukraine. The plan that the Soviets used there has been and is being repeated. It is an essential part of the Soviet program for expansion, for it offers the quick way of bringing unity out of the diversity of cultures and nations that constitute the Soviet Empire. That this method brings with it indescribable suffering for millions of people has not turned them from their path. If for no other reason than this human suffering, we would have to condemn this road to unity as criminal. But there is more to it than that. This is not simply a case of mass murder. It is a case of genocide, of destruction, not of individuals only, but of a culture and a nation. Were it possible to do this even without suffering we would still be driven to condemn it, for the family of minds, the unity of ideas, of language and customs that forms what we call a nation constitutes one of the most important of all our means of civilization and progress. It is true that nations blend together and form new nations – we have an example of this process in our own country, – but this blending consists in the pooling of benefits of superiorities that each culture possesses. And it is in this way that the world advances. What then, apart from the very important question of human suffering and human rights that we find wrong with Soviet plans is the criminal waste of civilization and of culture. For the Soviet national unity is being created, not by any union of ideas and of cultures, but by the complete destruction of all cultures and of all ideas save one – the Soviet.

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9. On June 10, 1942, 173 males over the age of 14 were shot, the women and children deported and the village of Lidice razed to the ground in reprisal for the assassination of the Nazi dictator of Moravia, Reinhard Heydrich. Zavadka Morokhivs'ka, Sianik povit, Lemkivshchyna, now Zawadka-Morochowska, Powiat Sanok, Poland.
10. Lemkin has in mind the United States.
ARTICLES

ROMAN SERBYN (Montréal, Québec, Canada)

COMPETING MEMORIES OF COMMUNIST AND NAZI CRIMES IN UKRAINE

The most destructive periods in modern Ukrainian history were the Great Famine of the 1930s and the German-Soviet War of the 1940s. Both disasters ravaged the country and destroyed millions of human lives. Stalin's Communists perpetrated the first calamity. Hitler's Nazis were responsible for the larger part of the second catastrophe, even though the part of the Soviet authorities was not negligible. Both ills were inflicted upon Ukraine by outside governments in pursuit of imperialist ambitions, but while the two totalitarian powers imposed repressive measures on the whole country, their genocidal policies were directed against selected segments of the population. Both regimes elicited fear and hatred and were thoroughly detested by the population, particularly during the waves of mass killings. The crimes were concealed from the outside world and even obscured from that part of the native population that was not directly affected by them. Yet it was with the help of willing accomplices and coerced assistants from among the local people that the crimes were accomplished. Those turbulent and confusing times left deep impressions and conflicting memories. The purpose of this paper is to examine these memories, trace their fate in Soviet and independent Ukraine and analyze their reception by the outside world.

To hide the Holodomor from the outside world, the Soviet authorities barred bona fide foreign journalists from the famine areas and gave foreign writers and politicians luxury tours of Potemkin style villages.\(^1\) A few honest journalists and intellectuals did report the truth,\(^2\) but the Soviet Union and its admirers abroad attacked this testimony as malicious propaganda against the proletarian state. Western governments were well aware of what was happening in the USSR, and in Ukraine in particular,\(^3\) but preferred to keep silent.

1. For a vivid report on the "prospering" Ukrainian peasants by Bernard Shaw and Edouard Herriot, see the documentary film *Harvest of Despair.*

2. Articles by Malcolm Muggeridge, William Chamberlain and others. The articles by Garreth Jones have been collected by Margaret Siriol Colley, "The Soviet Articles of Gareth Richard Vaughan Jones written between 1930 and 1935" (N.p., n.d).

because of the economic crises in their own countries. The International Committee of the Red Cross, which helped publicize the 1921-1923 famine, made half-hearted enquiries on behalf of the League of Nations, but its offer of aid was scorned and rebuffed, as was that of other ad hoc relief organizations. Missing was an intervention from the international Jewish community, similar to the one of 1921, when it played a key role in opening Ukraine to Western aid and providing most of the relief funds. There were no foreigners to film the 1932-1933 famine as there had been for that of 1921-1923. On the other hand, the belated publicity given to the famine by the Nazi media in Germany and the Conservative press in the United States did more to undermine its credibility in the West than to secure it in Western conscience. The imperceptible amount of aid that came from the West went to a few German and Jewish agricultural settlements and some Ukrainians who received money vouchers through the Torgsin. Soviet denial and Western disinterest combined to prevent the Ukrainian tragedy from finding a place in world history and making an impression on humanity's consciousness.

Soviet authorities could not conceal the starvation of millions of its citizens from the rest of its population, but it could force the latter to act in an oblivious way to it, and later it could prevent the post-famine Soviet society from integrating the tragedy into its collective memory. During the famine, Stalin never made any references to it in public, and when he rebuked Roman Terekhov, the boss of the Kharkiv oblast', in front of party dignitaries for "inventing stories" about the famine, the General Secretary sent a clear message that the famine did not exist. Starvation could not be discussed in public, deaths could not be recorded as famine-related, and no information or photographs of starving people could appear in the papers. It did not mean that the party was ignorant of the stark reality, for in addition to various euphemisms, the term was used in secret party and OGPU reports and in communications between party leaders. Hryhorii Petrovsky, the nominal head of the Ukrainian republic, and Vlas Chubar, the head of the Ukrainian government, mentioned the famine when they pleaded with Moscow for reduction in grain procurement for their republic, and even Stalin used the term in...
a letter to Kaganovich, in reference to Ukraine. Typically, the famine appears in reports sent up the hierarchical ladder, but not in instructions directed down the line of command.

Many factors made the population succumb to public myopia during the famine, and accept general amnesia after it. The Soviet mass media set the urban population against the peasants by blaming the kulaks, real and imagined, and their “lackeys” for selfishly withholding agricultural products from the state and the undernourished industrial workers. The destruction of Ukraine’s national elites removed the leadership necessary to conduct resistance of the targeted population and to record and preserve the memory of the catastrophe. The famine was peasant-oriented, and only that part of the population, which collaborated with the authorities and profited from the upheaval, could accept the Communist regime’s interpretation of the events. Disregard for the famine was cultivated in the party and state administration, the OGPU and other repressive organs, and the activists sent from the RSFSR and the Ukrainian industrial centers. Peasantry in the Ukrainian republic overwhelmingly belonged to the Ukrainian ethnos; Russians and Jews were predominantly urban dwellers and only a small percentage of their community suffered from starvation. Imposing Stalin’s make-believe world on the Soviet society, the Soviet regime diligently expurgated the “non-existent” tragedy from the collective memory that it molded for its people. Gradually, even the survivors pushed the unpleasant and dangerous recollections to the back of their minds. However, as surveillance reports on the attitudes of the Ukrainian population reveal, at the outset of the German-Soviet war Ukrainians had not completely forgot the famine.

From the perspective of Ukrainian history, the tragic events of World War II began with the occupation of Transcarpathian Ukraine by Hungary and the forced annexation of Western Ukraine by the USSR. Much of the subsequent German-Soviet War was fought on Ukrainian soil, resulting in colossal loss of human life and material destruction, as both belligerents evacuated or deported millions of Ukrainians, practiced scorched-earth policy during their retreat, and used Ukrainian population as slave labor or cannon fodder. The famine, the reign of terror (Ezhovshchyna), and the two years of repression in the newly annexed Western Ukraine made the German attack on the Soviet Union seem like a deliverance from Stalinist tyranny. Many


9. According to the 1926 census there were over a million and a half Jews in Ukraine; 77 percent of them lived in urban centers. Mordechai Altshuler, “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in the Soviet Milieu in the Interwar Period,” in Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective (Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), p. 294.

Ukrainians in the Red Army deserted or voluntarily surrendered; draft dodging was rampant. The advancing German army was welcomed by the Ukrainian civilian population not only in Western Ukraine but also in many Central and Eastern parts of the country. It was only after the maltreatment of Soviet POWs and the atrocities of the Nazi administration became widely known that Ukrainians realized that they had only exchanged one tyrant for another. Many Ukrainians had remained loyal to the Soviets from the beginning; over two million were evacuated into the interior of the USSR while others joined the Soviet partisans. Eventually, many millions, from all regions of Ukraine, served in the Soviet armed forces where they underwent intensive indoctrination about the war. Still, millions of Ukrainians refused to be reconciled with the Stalinist regime. They wanted Ukrainian independence and supported the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), joined or aided the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), or backed the creation of the Waffen SS Division “Halychyna” within the German armed forces. Events and forces originating outside Ukraine split the Ukrainian population into two hostile camps, not over ideological allegiance to Nazi Berlin or Communist Moscow, but over loyalty or hostility to the state entity called the Soviet Union. Divided consciousness generated and nurtured conflicting memories of the war. That division of the Ukrainian society during the war was accompanied by another split, this one regarding the Jewish minority.

World War II was particularly murderous on Germany’s Eastern front. Nazi ideology viewed Ukraine as a much needed Lebensraum for German expansion in the East. The country was prized for its location and natural resources more than for its population, which eventually was to be replaced by the Germans. Jews who had not been evacuated by the Soviet authorities and did not flee by themselves were the first to be gotten rid of and their extermination began immediately. A part of the Holocaust took place on Ukrainian soil. Ethnic Ukrainians, as members of the inferior Slavic race, were to be kept alive in debilitating conditions as long as their services were useful to the German master race. Some historians have argued that Germans applied genocidal policies in Ukrainian cities. Germany’s defeat prevented the Nazis from completing the extermination of Jews and Ukrainians, but the crimes they accomplished left an indelible mark on both victim communities. But the content of the memories varied and had different inferences for each. The Ukrainians were divided in their views of the war; the Jews were not given a pro-German option and were left with a single pro-Soviet interpretation. Unitary Jewish and split Ukrainian memories of Nazi and Soviet atrocities at first competed for world attention and later clashed, especially when the focus moved from the victims to the perpetrators and their accomplices.

11. Remembering the cultured Germans of 1918, many Jews did not suspect Nazi policies.
After the war, judiciously engineered memory became a vital transmission belt for Soviet ideology. With regards to the Ukrainian famine its task was to maintain collective amnesia so that eventually all personal memory of that horrendous crime, and general interest in it, would be lost. On the other hand, the glorified account of the German-Soviet conflict, was to provide an image of the war that would give new justification to existence of the Soviet empire. The notion of the “Great Fatherland War,” coined by the party on the first day of the German invasion, provided the basis for a rapidly growing political myth stressing Soviet patriotism, valor and dedication. The Russian-led union of Soviet nations liberated the common “fatherland” from the “fascist” invader and gained a great victory over the enemy. “Victory Day” (May 9) elevated by Stalin to a state holiday in 1945, and abandoned three years later, was reinstated by Brezhnev in 1965 with the intention of strengthening Soviet self-confidence, somewhat shaken by Khrushchev’s erratic experiments. An intensive campaign was launched to fill the Soviet empire with war memorials (museums, statues, plaques). Eventually the 9th of May replaced the 7th of November as the most popular civic holiday while the “Great Patriotic War” pushed out the “October Revolution” as the main consolidating myth of the Soviet empire. The mythologized memory of the war was not without appeal. Ukrainians from all corners of the republic shared in the tragedies of German occupation and had served in the Soviet armed forces.13

Post-war generations of Soviet Ukrainians were brought up in ignorance of the famine and repressions of the 1930s. Information about the German-Soviet war and the behavior of different segments of the Ukrainian population was ideologically tailored for intended effects on the younger generation. Ukrainian nationalist organizations (OUN and UPA), their supporters, and those who served in the Ukrainian SS Division “Halychyna” and in various other German military and police formations, were lumped together as “fascist” and condemned as traitors and collaborators with the murderous German occupation authorities. Persistent Soviet indoctrination bore fruit. A growing number of ethnic Ukrainians succumbed to Soviet amnesia on the famine and Communist war crimes while regarding the German atrocities as the greatest evil suffered by Ukraine. A declining number continued to regard the famine and Soviet repressions as Ukraine’s greatest tragedy. Alternative views could only appear in the clandestine dissident literature, which was not voluminous and reached a small number of readers. At the same time, returning Jewish refugees and a growing population of ethnical Russians stood firmly behind the Soviet interpretation: the Soviet Union and the Red Army were their saviors and Ukrainians who opposed the Soviet state and its armed forces were automatically relegated to the enemy camp. From their perspec-13. For a more detailed analysis of the GFM, see “‘Velyka vitchyzniana viina’: sovets’kyi mit v ukrains’kykh shatakh,” in Roman Serbyn, Za iaku spadshchynu? (Kyiv: n.p., 2002), pp.13-61.
tive, Soviet atrocities of the 1930s as well as those of the war and after-war years paled before the crimes of the Axis powers. This situation prevailed in Ukraine up to the last years of Gorbachev’s glasnost, when interest was rekindled in the truth about the Stalin era, the famine and the war.

The West was oblivious to Ukrainian and Jewish suffering under both Soviet and German rule until post-war Jewish and Ukrainian immigrants began to vehemently promote before the World the information about the Holocaust and the Holodomor. However, in each case the reception was quite different. Defeated Nazi Germany had been caught red-handed annihilating the Jews. The crime was exposed and the main perpetrators that were captured were put on trial and executed. The Jewish victims of Nazi atrocities, for which the new term “genocide” was coined, could expect understanding and sympathy in the West and in the USSR. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was the West’s “valiant” and victorious ally, and when Ukrainian refugees accused it of war crimes the allegations were viewed with suspicion. The West did not care to be reminded about Moscow’s starvation of millions of Ukrainian farmers, a crime of which the capitalist world had not been properly apprised when the communist state was still its archenemy. The Soviets accused the refugees of inventing the famine as a screen to hide their own criminal collaboration with the “fascists” during the German occupation of Ukraine. Rather than get involved in these uncertain recriminations, Western media and scholars simply preferred to ignore the issue, while politicians referred to them only when it suited their purpose in the ensuing cold war altercations.

After overcoming the initial reluctance of many survivors to delve into their recent past, research on the Holocaust and diffusion of information about the Jewish genocide rapidly became a priority for the Jewish diaspora and the new Jewish state. By contrast, work on the Holodomor was slow, stymied by the Ukrainian diaspora’s limited resources and the attacks against Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalists” from the Soviet Union and its few but vocal supporters in the Ukrainian diaspora. Both genocides had their deniers who proffered a range of arguments, from outright denial of the mass killings to a more refined opposition to the notion that the crimes should be regarded as genocide. The main struggle against the negation of the Holocaust took place in the 1970s; by the 1980s historical revisionism regarding Jewish genocide was pretty much discredited in the West. For the Ukrainian diaspora, the most dynamic years were the 1980s when the 50th anniversary of the Holodomor, the Chornobyl catastrophe, and the ultimate recognition for the Holocaust galvanized the community into a renewed effort to make its genocide known to the world. At the same time the Ukrainian diaspora had to counter a new onslaught of Soviet propaganda, which took advantage of the hunt for Nazi war criminals in the USA and Canada, and to discredit the Ukrainian diaspora’s testimony on the famine.
Up to the 1980s, Jewish and Ukrainian diasporas explored and publicized their respective genocides in isolation of each other, while competing for the wider public opinion. There were some efforts to establish a dialogue between the two communities, to find common ground for joint action, especially against current human rights abuses in the Soviet Union. However, with respect to the Holocaust and Holodomor, each community developed its own interpretations and pursued its own agenda. These eventually clashed in the 1980s. The bone of contention was each community’s view of the other’s role during the two genocides. Jews reproached Ukrainians with collaboration with the Nazis during the war, and Ukrainians blamed Jews for helping the Communists during the famine. But the conditions under which the two communities expressed their interpretations were different. The Jewish diaspora was united in recognizing the Holocaust, on condemning Ukrainian collaboration and on rejecting or minimizing Jewish implication in Communist crimes against the Ukrainians. The mainstream Ukrainian diaspora had a mirror-image of this attitude: they recognized the Holodomor, condemned Jewish participation in Communist crimes against the Ukrainians, and rejected or minimized Ukrainian implication in Nazi crimes against the Jews. But a pro-Soviet minority, mainly from the pre-war Ukrainian diaspora, denied the famine and rejected any wrongdoing (by Jews or Ukrainians) on the Soviet side. The accusation against “Ukrainian nationalists” of collaboration with the Nazis thus provided a common focus for a tripartite rapprochement of Jewish organizations dedicated to hunting war criminals, Ukrainian Sovietophiles, and the moribund Soviet state. For the Soviet regime, the hunt for the alleged Nazi war criminals presented a new opportunity to discredit the “Ukrainian nationalists” and sabotage their effort to revive the memory of the famine in Ukrainian and world consciousness.

With the approach of the 50th anniversary of the Holodomor the Ukrainian diaspora undertook a massive campaign to research, document and disseminate information about the famine. The first task was to bring its own members up to date on the tragedy, since most of the Ukrainian diaspora originated from Western Ukraine, which did not experience the Soviet genocide and had only fragmentary knowledge of the tragedy. Several projects were launched, some of which took the better part of the rest of the decade to complete. Beginning in 1983 a series of conferences and lectures were organized at various cultural and academic institutions. Newly declassified documents on the famine, held in British, Italian and other Western archives

14. Some of the papers from the first international conference on the famine, held in March 1983 at the Université du Québec à Montréal, were published in Roman Serbyn & Bohdan Krawchenko, *Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933* (Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986).
were examined and published.\textsuperscript{15} A Famine Research Center was created in Toronto to conduct interviews of Ukrainian survivors and foreign eyewitnesses produced in 1984 a documentary film titled \textit{Harvest of Despair}. In 1986, the first comprehensive study of the famine, \textit{The Harvest of Sorrow} by Robert Conquest, was published in Canada and in other countries.\textsuperscript{16} Through the efforts of Ukrainian Americans, the US Congress appointed the Commission on the Ukraine Famine in 1985, which published a three volume report.\textsuperscript{17} Three years later the International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932-1933 Famine in Ukraine was set up on the initiative of the World Congress of Free Ukrainians. Both commissions eventually concluded that the famine was man-made and that the Soviet leadership bore the responsibility for it.\textsuperscript{18}

The Soviets could not ignore this new ideological threat coming from the “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.” Soviet diplomatic and cultural missions were charged with the rebuttal and “Ukraina” (society for contacts with the diaspora) with providing the weapons and ammunition for the counterattack. The minutes of the year-end meeting of the “Ukraina” executive show that in 1983 the organization sent abroad 45,000 copies of various publications, 256 reels of 17 different films, and so on.\textsuperscript{19} Until the re-emergence of the famine issue, Soviet propaganda had two goals with regards to the Ukrainian diaspora: a) to prevent an alliance between the “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” and the “Jewish Zionist internationalists”, in defense of Ukrainian dissidents and Jewish refuseniks, and b) to discredit the main-stream Ukrainian community as Nazi collaborators.\textsuperscript{20} To this end the Society “established relations with a number of research centers, organizations and academic institutions in the U.S.A, Canada and Israel, which investigate the crimes of the fascists and their collaborators – the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists – during World War II.” The Society provided these people with “specially edited version of the film \textit{Babyn Yar – Lessons of History} and a photo-display ‘This Must not

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Robert Conquest. \textit{The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine} (Melbourne, Auckland, Johannesbourg: Hutchinson, 1986).
\item \textsuperscript{19} TsDAVOU. f. 4629, op. 1-1, sp. 319.
\item \textsuperscript{20} The cover of the satirical magazine \textit{Perets} (Pepper), no. 12 (1981) shows an unlikely team, made up of a hook-nosed bearded zionist and a Ukrainian nationalist in a swastika embroidered shirt, pulling together the “lady of cold war” seated on a cart labeled “anti-Sovietism”.
\end{itemize}
Competing Memories of Communist and Nazi Crimes in Ukraine

Happen Again,’ which relate the crimes of Nazism and Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism on Ukrainian territory during the war.”

For precisely the opposite reasons, namely in order to enhance the lines of communication between their communities, two Canadian scholars from Hamilton’s McMaster University authored a brochure on Jewish-Ukrainian relations, which they characterized as that of “two solitudes”, and published it in 1983. To overcome mutual isolation, they organized that year an international conference at their University. The meeting turned out to be of exceptional academic caliber, but the gathering of scholars did not resolve any historical controversies, nor did it ease the growing antagonism between the Jewish and Ukrainian communities. Nevertheless, the Potichnyj-Aster brochure caught the eye of the Soviet ambassador. In a confidential letter (April 16, 1984) to CC CPU, Rodionov characterized the brochure as an example of the current discussions between “the Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalist and Zionist ringleaders and ideologues with the intention of overcoming the traditional discord in the Ukrainian-Jewish community [v ukrainsko-evereiskoi obshchine] and to knock-together an alliance with an anti-Soviet agenda.”

The ambassador suggested that the booklet be used in Ukrainian educational institutions specializing in “criticizing and exposing the theory and practice of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism and international Zionism.” He further urged the “republican” (i.e., Ukrainian) organizations and departments to prepare “information-propagandistic material, exposing the collaboration of the Ukrainian nationalist hirelings with Hitlerite fascism during the Second World War, in mass extermination of Jewish population on the temporarily occupied territory of the Ukr.S.S.R. This should be done because one of the main goals of Ukrainian emigrant propaganda at the present time is to endow the Ukrainian mercenaries (landsknecht), who got refuge in the USA and Canada, with an image of ‘savers’ of Jews. The Embassy could make good use of such material in its information-propagandistic work, including discussions with the representatives of the ‘Canadian Jewish Congress’.”

Relations between the Ukrainian and Jewish diasporas in the 1980s were dominated by conflicting memories, ferociously competing for the attention and sympathy of the Western world. The creation in 1979 of the American Office of Special Investigation (OSI) in the U.S.A., and the establishment in 1985 of the Deschenes Commission in Canadian, titled the playing field in favor of the Jewish community. In Ottawa, the two communities requested and received standing before the Deschenes Commission, which cleared the

21. TsDAVOU, f. 4629, op. 1-1, sp. 319.
23. Peter Potichnyj and Howard Aster, eds., Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective (Edmonton, Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988).
24. TsDAVOU, f. 1, op. 25, s. 2720, ark. 101.
25. Ibid.
Waffen SS Division “Halychyna” of war crimes, in its report presented to the Government at the end of 1986.26 The mass media, however, was more sympathetic to the accusations brought by the Jewish side than the defense offered by the Ukrainians. The latter considered their community unjustly singled out by the very terms of reference imposed by the Mulroney government on the Deschenes Commission. War crimes committed on the Soviet side were simply ignored by the Commission. Ukrainian scholars organized a conference on “Ukraine during the war” at the University of Toronto and invited Jewish colleagues.27 In another project, two Jewish scholars examined the impact of the commission on the Jewish and Ukrainian communities and the relations between them by interviewing members of both communities.28

A Canadian commission focusing only on war crimes committed by the Nazis and their collaborators was a windfall for Soviet anti-Ukrainian propaganda. Ukrainian diaspora’s claims of Soviet man-made famine could be undermined by discrediting its proponents. It was only necessary to put together suitable material and present it with a convincing argument to show that the promoters of the famine yarn were criminals and that their stories were a fabrication. The Soviets would provide the “expertise” on the history of the 1930s, if Canadian Communist (especially Ukrainians and Jews) would help put it together in a presentable form. Canadian Communists seem to have developed the same strategy. In September 1985 A. Cherniaev, assistant director of the International department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, sent a manuscript to A. Kapto, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, with the following message: “In connection with the anti-Soviet campaign unfolding in the West regarding the so-called ‘artificial famine in Ukraine in 1932-1933,’ Canadian communists have prepared counter-propagandistic material, which exposes that falsification. We request your opinion on the enclosed manuscript.”29

The enclosure was sent to the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, where it was reviewed by the Institute of History and minor changes were suggested.30 The recommendation for publication was signed by A. Shlepakov, V. Yurchuk, and Yu. Kondufor, directors of the Institute of Social and Economic Problems in Foreign Countries, of Party History, and of the Institute of History.31

29. TsDAVOU, f.1, op.25, s.2859.
30. This was probably the original manuscript, entrusted to the head of the section on the history of socialist construction. The text contained 182 pages and was titled “Hearst’s Russian Famine” (retranslated here from the Russian).
31. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 25, spr. 2859, ark. 121-23.
The Communist Party of Canada expected the Canadian Ukrainian Kobzar Publishing Company to publish the book, but by this time the leadership of the Ukrainian communists was divided on the issue of the famine and the demand was rejected. It was finally printed in 1987 by Progress Books, under the authorship of Douglas Tottle, a communist trade unionist. Whatever the part played by this self-styled “jack of all trades” in writing the book, the richly illustrated and abundantly footnoted diatribe was a masterpiece of propaganda. The cover carried a slick alliterated title *Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard.* Its cover was illustrated with a photo of an emaciated child sitting in a woman's lap and hovering over the picture was a hand dipping a painter’s brush into a blob of paint pouring out of a swastika adorned tube. To enhance the book's credibility, blurbs on the back cover from two history professors praised Tottle for exposing “the ways and wiles of anti-communist propaganda” and “the viciousness surrounding the theory of the Ukrainian genocide.”

The book's argument was one of ingenious simplicity: Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists, who had collaborated in Nazis extermination of Jews and others during the war, accuse the Soviet authorities of starving Ukrainians to deflect attention from their own crimes. To prove their genocide, Ukrainian nationalists pass off photographs of the *Russian famine of 1921-1922* caused by drought, for a deliberate starvation against the Ukrainians in 1932-1933. These photographs, argued Tottle, were first used by the Nazis and the Hearst publications and then were picked up by the Ukrainian nationalists. The chapters on “Collaborators and Collusion” and “War Criminals, Anti-Semitism and the Famine-Genocide Campaign” attacked the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), the Waffen SS Division “Halychyna” and other alleged Ukrainian “criminals” who stood behind the famine-genocide “mythology”. The book attacked *Harvest of Despair* and *The Harvest of Sorrow* for relying on fraudulent testimonies and anachronistic photographs. Tottle became a forceful spokesman against the *Harvest* film and book in the Canadian mass media. Eventually Tottle’s book lost credibility in all but the fringe Stalinist circles, but in the late 1980s material from it appeared in the American *Vil-

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34. Blurbs, respectively, by Clarence J. Munford of the University of Guelph and David Whitefield of the University of Calgary.

35. In fact, most of the photos were from the 1921-1923 famine in Ukraine. See Roman Serbyn. *Holod 1921-1923 i ukraïns'ka presa v Kanadi* (Toronto-Kyiv, n.p., 1992; republished in 1995), pp. 676-88. Some of the photos are in the ARA collection in the Hoover archives at Stanford University, other can be seen on Ukrainian web site: http://ukrlife.org/main/evshan/famine.htm
lage Voice and various student newspapers in Canada, and did irreparable damage to Ukrainian-Jewish relations in North America. The Soviet Embassy in Ottawa took advantage of the situation to court Jewish organizations. An Embassy meeting, on October 20, 1987, hosting 70 members of a Jewish organization was an occasion for the distribution of 70 copies of “information-propaganda literature, including [...] 4 copies of ‘History warns’ about the treacherous collaboration of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists with the fascists during the years of World War II – all in the English language.”

The shadow of suspicion cast on the Ukrainian diaspora by the hunt for Nazi war criminals and the need to help the victims of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster divided the resources of the Ukrainian community and diverted its attention away from the Holodomor. This in turn prevented the Ukrainian diaspora from taking full advantage of Gorbachev’s glasnost. Only after the implosion of the CPSU, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the independence of Ukraine was the trend reversed in the approach to the famine. The opening of Soviet archives and publication of secret documents made it impossible to deny the horrendous loss of life due to starvation, or to ignore the responsibility of the Stalinist regime. Yet Western scholars and public was not as interested in Communist crimes as it was preoccupied with Nazi crimes. Nazi Germany left a uniformly negative impression in Western psyche, but the Soviet experience continues to be viewed in more ambivalent terms. Heinous crimes are juxtaposed with great achievements like the “liberation” of Eastern Europe from Hitler. An illustration of this was the controversy sparked in the academic circles by the publication, on the 70th anniversary of the “October Revolution,” of a collective work entitled Le livre noir du Communisme, later translated into a dozen languages.

Writing about the Ukrainian famine in his introduction to the Black Book of Communism Stéphane Courtois, the editor of the volume, states:

As for the great famine in Ukraine in 1932-33, which resulted from the rural population’s resistance to forced collectivization, 6 million died in a period of several months. Here, the genocide of a “class” may well be tantamount to the genocide of a “race” – the deliberate starvation of a child of a Ukrainian kulak as a result of the famine caused by Stalin’s re-

38. TsDAHOU, f. 1, op. 25, spr. 3207. ark. 43.
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The regime “is equal to” the starvation of a Jewish child in the Warsaw ghetto as a result of the famine caused by the Nazi regime.”

Courtois was inspired by the comparison of Jewish and Ukrainian starvation in Vasily Grossman’s *Forever Flowing*, and the French definition of Genocide, which recognizes the destruction of any group “that has been determined on the basis of any arbitrary criterion.” Courtois believes that “genocide comes in many shapes and sizes – it can be racial (as in the case of the Jews), but it can also target social groups.” Courtois’s social approach is similar to the “peasantist” interpretation of Terry Martin, except that the latter does not recognize the Holodomor as genocide. I have discussed elsewhere the social/peasantist interpretation of the famine, suffice it to say here that it does not satisfy the Ukrainian diaspora’s insistence on the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainians, and not just against the peasants.

In the same book, Nicolas Werth analyzed the Soviet experience in more detail. He admitted that “the Ukrainian peasantry were the principal victims in the famine of 1932-33,” and that “the ‘assault’ was preceded in 1929 by several offensives against the Ukrainian intelligentsia, accused of ‘nationalist deviation’.” But he did not recognize this as genocide, because “the famine was just as severe in the Cossack territories of the Kuban and the Don and in Kazakhstan.” New documents persuaded him that the Great Famine was a genocide against the Ukrainians: “As the famine decimated the Ukrainian peasantry, the regime condemned the entire policy of Ukrainization underway since the early 1920s: The Ukrainian elites were rounded up and arrested. [. . .] This specifically anti-Ukrainian assault makes it possible to define the totality of intentional political actions taken from late summer 1932 by the Stalinist regime against the Ukrainian peasantry as genocide.” In line with his new views on the Ukrainian genocide, Werth revised the Ukrainian translation of the *Black Book*. Regrettably, the publisher left the old text in the body of the book and printed the updated text in “Addenda.”

After independence, Ukraine was left with the task of reconciling two overlapping sets of conflicting feelings of its citizens towards their recent past, when their country was ruled by two totalitarian regimes. First, there were the lingering memories of the famines (of the twenties, thirties and forties), the Great Terror, and the war crimes committed by the Soviet regime. Then there was the keener awareness of the Nazi atrocities and the extermination of Jews and Ukrainians during the German occupation. The dominant crime theme, well rooted in Ukraine’s collective consciousness since the Brezhnev days, and taken over without question by the independent Ukrainian state, was associated with the reality and the myths of the “Great Fatherland War,” in which the praise of Soviet glory overshadowed the condemnation of Nazi infamy. The main promoters of the cult of the GFW were the Organization of Soviet Veterans and the Communist Party of Ukraine, but it was also popular among the ethnically Russian and Russified citizens of Ukraine and the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. These people wished to preserve the old Soviet cult of Victory Day and maintain the extensive array of “places of memory” (from elaborate museums to simple plaques), that Ukraine inherited from the Soviet period. They accept with mistrust and apprehension a Ukrainian state which asserts its identity by stressing its distinction from Russia and integrates into its collective memory elements which expose the atrocities of the Soviet state. They are also reluctant to recognize the atrocities of the communist regime, such as the killing fields of Bykivnia, where the Soviet regime put up a monument to the victims of Nazism over the victims of communism executed in Kyiv prisons. The information about Soviet crimes is only slowly becoming available.

Independence and the fall of communism brought to the fore the question of OUN and UPA, and to a lesser degree that of the Ukrainian Division “Halychyna” and Ukrainians who served in the armed forces of the Axis powers. Former members of UPA and the Divizia claimed veteran status and demanded parity with veterans of the Red Army. Such recognition was vehemently opposed by the leaders of the pro-Communist Organization of Ukrainian Veterans. General Ivan Gerasimov, a member of the Verkhovna Rada from the Communist Party insisted that the UPA only fought against the USSR and demanded that it must beg forgiveness from the Ukrainian people. While support for UPA is concentrated in the Western regions of Ukraine, its historical role has been undergoing reevaluation in the academic

48. See, for example, Fedir Pihido-Pravobereznyi, “Velyka vitchyzniana viina” (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2002).
circles and it is presented in a positive light in the new history textbooks. As a result, the younger generation of Ukrainians receives a more balanced view of war-time Ukraine and the idea of replacing the ideological “Victory Day” with a more conciliatory “Remembrance” or “Memorial” Day has been gaining support, mainly from the younger generation. Ukraine’s third president, Victor Yushchenko, tried to bring the former belligerents to gather around reconciliation tables on the Khreshchatyk, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, but the effort was scuttled by mutual recriminations by the antagonistic veterans’ organizations.

The famine of the 1930s was one of the main “blank spots” of Soviet historiography that Ukrainians demanded to be informed about during Gorbachev’s glasnost’. In 1990 the Communist Party of Ukraine published a collection of documents on the famine from its archives. The following year appeared the first major study devoted to the subject. For several years the public showed great interest in the famine, and numerous articles appeared in the press. Ukrainians demanded to know the whole truth about the starving of millions of their relatives. After the election of Leonid Kuchma to the presidency in 1994, a favorable view of Ukraine’s Soviet heritage prevailed, and the famine was downplayed. The inclusion of the Holodomor in history textbooks was hotly contested by the Communists. Ukraine still does not have a Holodomor research center, worthy of its mission, and no museum at all. The most significant achievement has been the inclusion of the Holodomor in school textbooks (but not curriculum) and the publication of documents. The question of the designation of the famine remains problematic. The expression “terror famine” has become popular with some Ukrainian and Western scholars, even though its focus on starvation of the peasants tends to deflect attention from other aspects genocide. “The Holodomor”, has not be-

52. Roman Serbyn, “‘Velyka vitchyzniana viina’: soviets’ki mit v ukrainskykh shatakh,” in Za iaku spadshchynu?, p. 61.
56. Borrowed from the subtitle of Conquest’s Harvest of Sorrow, the term has been popularized in Ukraine by S. Kulchytsky and is now used by Yu. Shapoval, V. Marochko and others.
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come fully synonymous with “Genocide against the Ukrainians,” as “the Holocaust” has come to be known as “Genocide against the Jews.”

In 2003 a resolution to recognize the famine as genocide was presented to the Verkhovna Rada. It passed, but only by a majority and not the unanimity of votes that such a resolution merited from Ukraine’s Parliament. President Yushchenko set himself the goal of integrating the Holodomor into the collective memory of the world community and securing for it international recognition as genocide. In November 2006, over the opposition of the Communist party, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a law recognizing the Holodomor as genocide against the Ukrainian people. On May 27, 2008, the Holodomor was recognized as genocide by the Canadian Parliament.

Ukraine is a country with the unique task of having to integrate into its collective memory not just one, but two genocides committed on its territory. The Ukrainian Jewish community is taking advantage of the existing political, social and religious freedoms in Ukraine to bring to the fore the memory of the Holocaust. National and international conferences on Holocaust are organized by various centers. Several organizations are involved in preparing educational material on the Holocaust for public schools and actively engaged in the introduction of Holocaust into the school curriculum. The TKUMA Ukrainian Holocaust Research, Education and Memorial Center presently under construction in Dnipropetrov’sk will surpass the smaller museums in Kharkiv and elsewhere. Jewish massacre at Babyn Yar are yearly commemorated with the participation of the President of Ukraine and other state dignitaries. The Holocaust is being integrated into Ukraine’s collective memory. Since the Communists have no political reasons to negate the crime committed by the Nazis, Ukraine is in the curious position where there is more consensus for the recognition of the Holocaust than the Holodomor. The sense of exclusiveness still persists with regards to the two genocides and there are no efforts to develop a common commemoration of the two genocides.

More than half a century has passed since the two most hideous crimes were committed on Ukrainian territory. Most of the survivors are gone and with them personal memories and recollections. What remains is what is being preserved by history, whose vocation is to give a truthful account of the past, and the collective memory, which is a social construct, fashioned in the image of the collectivity’s interests. As such it is a reflection of the society’s present and future goals, rather than its past successes and failures. The great divides that existed in the past with regards the interpretation of Communist

and Nazi crimes were more a function of collective memories than historical knowledge. These divisions will fade with time because the advantages gained from continuing them are outweighed by the benefits of establishing a true understanding of history and fostering a collective memory in line with common interests.

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THE SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY
CHANGE OF 1933, OR WHY "UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM" BECAME THE MAIN THREAT TO STALIN IN UKRAINE

On November 22, 1933 the combined plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CC and CCC CP(B)U) completed its work, having passed a resolution declaring Ukrainian nationalism to be the main threat in the national question on the territory of Soviet Ukraine. No such resolution was passed in any other republic of the USSR either before or after that date; Ukraine was the sole exception. What brought about the resolution, and what was the essence of its decisions? What were the consequences of this new course of the nationalities policy in Ukraine, which formally contradicted the Bolshevik party’s earlier resolutions on the national question? The answer to these questions should help us to better understand the fundamental nature of those changes that took place in Ukrainian society in the 1930s and which are directly affecting the situation in Ukraine today.

The revolutionary experience of 1917 and the struggle for control over the territory of the former Russian empire in 1917-1920 forced the Bolshevik leaders to pay more attention to the national question. The Bolsheviks' formal acknowledgement of the Leninist theoretical right of nations to self-determination and permission to create pseudo-independent Soviet statehood on the territory of Ukraine, which had Ukrainian national forms, allowed the Kremlin to gain control over the republic. However, the formal recognition of Ukraine’s rights turned out to be insufficient: the native population of Ukraine, which consisted mostly of ethnic Ukrainians, was inadequately represented in the organs of Bolshevik power, and the majority of the population did not regard the Soviet government as its own. There was a similar situation in other non-Russian regions of the Bolshevik-controlled territory, which on July 6, 1923 began to be officially called the “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” (USSR). In order to acquire the goodwill of the non-Russian population and enlist the local population in the work of the government’s

administrative bodies, in April 1923 the Bolshevik leadership proclaimed the so-called policy of “korenizatsiia” – indigenization – which in Ukraine mostly took the form of “Ukrainization.” However, for the Bolshevik leadership the fostering of the Ukrainians’ cultural and educational development, which took place during the implementation of this policy, was not a goal but a means to preserve and strengthen its power in Ukraine, as well as to resolve the main tasks in the socioeconomic sphere.

The Kremlin granted the Soviet Ukrainian leadership the maximum possible concessions for implementing the republic’s national-cultural policies while restricting as much as possible the autonomy of the Ukrainian SSR in the economic sphere. Already on April 5, 1918, five years before the introduction of indigenization, Joseph Stalin, who was then People’s Commissar for Nationalities of Soviet Russia, declared in a conversation with Volodymyr Zatonsky, the head of the Central Executive Committee of Soviet Ukraine, the republic’s representative body: “Enough with playing at being a government and a republic.” It should be emphasized that these words were spoken after the government of the RSFSR formally recognized the independence of Soviet Ukraine on April 3, 1918. The harsh tone of Stalin’s declaration was caused by the Ukrainian government’s attempts to introduce its own currency: such a step could foster the real, not just formal, separation of Ukraine from Russia, and the Communist Party leaders could not allow this. Without Ukraine’s material and human resources it would be impossible to overcome Russia’s industrial backwardness. It should also be emphasized that from the very beginning of their rule the Bolshevik leaders considered tight administrative centralization as the only possible scenario for the successful development of the communist state. They categorically rejected private ownership of the means of production, inasmuch as it made people more independent of the government. Industrialization and the strengthening of power were the Kremlin’s main tasks in the modernizing processes that it had launched.

Everything that helped the Soviet leaders to carry out these tasks was welcomed; by the same token, everything that stood in the way was to be combated. Thus, Ukrainian-language education and propaganda were approved because they helped draw the majority of Ukraine’s population into the modernizing processes as quickly as possible and enhanced the image of the Soviet government. Successes in the sphere of education were also used as a mighty propaganda tool in the struggle against the Ukrainian national movement. While defending the necessity of fostering the cultural and educational

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2. Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of Power and Administration of Ukraine (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv Vyzhchykh orhaniv vladiv Ukrainyi [henceforth TsDAVO Ukrainyi], fond 1, list 1, file 7v, fol. 64.
development of the non-Russian peoples in the early 1920s and explaining the government’s heightened attention to this question, Stalin proclaimed that the Bolsheviks’ strategic goal remained unchanged — the merging of nations. But this could be achieved solely on the basis of voluntary basis and only after the flowering of nations on the global scale.⁴

Such formulation of the question, as well as the Soviet leaders’ efforts to rely, in all the Union republics, on local cadres resolved a key problem: it raised social mobility and directed the energy of the masses toward the channel required by the Bolshevik leadership. Indeed, for Ukrainians their social and national origins were no longer an impediment, as they had been earlier, but an advantage enabling them to move up the power ladder. However, the Kremlin did not desire the national revival of Ukraine because its leaders understood that, if this happened, Ukraine would become more independent not only in the national-cultural but also the administrative and economic spheres. In other words, the strategic goals of the policy of indigenization fundamentally differed from the ideas about this policy by Ukrainians (even pro-communist ones) who were nationally minded. However, for the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (AUCP(B)) it was vitally important that a significant proportion of Ukrainians consider themselves masters in the Ukrainian SSR, and at the same time that they be active and (preferably) voluntary executors of Stalin’s will.

The Kremlin leaders understood perfectly well that it was impossible to achieve “everything at once.” Thus, despite its intentions to unify and centralize all spheres of life, the Stalinist leadership was forced to make concession. In order to lessen discontent with the socioeconomic policy during the period of the “great turning-point,” first and foremost in the countryside, Stalin gave carte blanche to the Ukrainian national communists led by Mykola Skrypnyk, who headed the People’s Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR from March 1927 to February 1933 and was responsible for implementing Ukrainization throughout the republic, to implement measures aimed at providing all manner of support to the development of Ukrainian culture and education.

Characterizing the Bolsheviks’ views of the further paths of the society’s development and comparing them to those that were dominant in Russian imperial society in the last decades of its existence, the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington noted correctly: “The Slavophiles and the Westernizers had debated whether Russia could be different from the West without being backward compared to the West. Communism brilliantly resolved this issue: Russia was different from and fundamentally opposed to the West because it was more advanced than the West. It was taking the lead in the proletarian revolution which would eventually sweep across the

world." In other words, according to the new ideology, after the revolution it was not Russia that was supposed to overtake the West but the opposite — the West would have to overtake Russia. The basis of the Bolsheviks’ views of the future development was not the thesis that “you are different, but we will become like you,” as the Westernizers claimed, not the thesis that “you are different, but we will not become like you,” as the Slavophiles argued, but the notion that “we are different, and soon you will become just like us.” It was precisely this idea, mirrored primarily in the expectations of a swift world revolution, which became the founding imperative in the implementation of the nationalities policy in the 1920s and was most clearly reflected in it. In one way or another, it satisfied both the higher party leadership and the local communists.

Analyzing Skrypnyk’s activities one can say with assurance that he completely agreed with the idea that the Soviet society’s was outperforming others and did everything possible to embody it in the sphere of the nationalities policy. First of all, this had to do with his understanding of internationalism and the ways for achieving the Bolsheviks’ end goal with regard to the national question — the “merging of nations.” Skrypnyk made skilful use of this theory that was formulated by the “Father of Nations,” according to which the flowering of nations and their native languages would take place first, then their convergence — at which point some kind of common language was supposed to be used along with the native language — and only then the third stage: the merging of all nations into one and, concomitantly, the creation of a single global language. The Ukrainian Commissar of Education and his supporters accepted this theory, but they viewed the second and third stages as feasible only under the conditions of achieving the flowering of nations, i.e., the completion of the first stage on the global scale. Therefore, they sought to foster the cultural development of the non-Russian peoples of the Ukrainian SSR — not just of Ukrainians but also Jews, Poles, Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians, Tatars, and others. This was supposed to serve as an example to other countries. Skrypnyk considered this attitude genuine internationalism.

With the development of national-cultural autonomy, some Ukrainian communists began to realize that, in order for Ukraine to occupy an important place in the future world Soviet republic, along with the realization of national-cultural needs it was necessary to resolve the problem of economic development. Above all, this pertained to the eradication of industrial backwardness. This was precisely the reason why the national communists not only did not oppose collectivization and the liquidation of the “kulaks as a class,” but, on the contrary, they themselves were the most active proponents.

of this policy in the countryside. They believed that it would help make the cities Ukrainian and then foster the development of Ukrainian statehood. If they were dissatisfied with anything, it was not the excessive exploitation of Ukrainian villages but the fact that a significant proportion of Ukraine’s revenues was flowing out of the republic. Thus, for example, an anonymous letter written by a “group of delegates” to the XII All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets (the formal supreme legislative body of the Ukrainian SSR), held in early March 1931, to the presidium of the congress emphasizes: “We are starving now. In the name of what? You say socialism? Yes. But should it be built exclusively in Russia? Why is everything that is available sent there?”

However, it was one thing not to have enough to eat or to starve, but it was quite a different thing to starve to death. After the bad harvest of 1931 and the unlimited grain requisitions that took place during the state grain delivery campaign of 1931-1932, by spring 1932 people were beginning to starve to death en masse. Some local Ukrainian communists were perturbed by the Kremlin’s socioeconomic policies and protested against the excessive grain deliveries. According to eyewitnesses, even Skrypnyk emphasized: “Right now, ostensibly in the interests of the workers but sooner for the sake of personal prestige, a blow has been struck at the incentive of millions of peasants.” During a conversation that took place in spring 1933 with the heads of collective farms in Sloviansk raion, Donetsk oblast’, Skrypnyk acknowledged his shortcomings (and those of the entire party leadership), which had led to the formation of “egalitarianism” in the countryside and destroyed any kind of stimulus for work: “I did not think this question through and did not present it incisively in the CC. [That was] a mistake.” The situation was becoming truly dangerous for Stalin.

But Moscow’s greatest displeasure was caused by the fact that political sympathies in the Ukrainian countryside were shifting back to the ideological opponents of the Bolshevik regime, primarily to the Ukrainian national forces of the revolutionary era. Stalin understood that further encouragement for the development of Ukraine’s national-cultural selfhood was no longer helping – as it had in 1929-1931 – to improve the image of Bolshevik power among the Ukrainian masses. In fact, it was leading to the intensification of national self-awareness, which in turn could bring about a desire to separate from the Kremlin.

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7. Central State Archive of Civic Associations of Ukraine (Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obiednan Ukrainy [henceforth TsDAHO Ukrainy], fond 1, list 20, file 4171, fol. 19.
8. TsDAHO Ukrainy, fond 59, list 1, file 970, fol. 31. This archival file, like the following one, consists of the reminiscences of Emanuil Nolsky, a factory-level party organizer in the Donbas. His memoirs concern the final year of Mykola Skrypnyk’s life and were written and placed in the archive in the late 1960s-early 1970s.
9. Ibid., file 971, fol. 28.
Through their efforts to create a communist Ukraine, Skrypnyk and his associates sought to carry out a task that was unattainable. After all, concurrently with the introduction of school instruction in the Ukrainian language and its enrootment in state structures, the communist government, through its social and economic reforms, was destroying the ethnic mentality, daily life, and spiritual culture of the Ukrainian population, i.e., it was destroying precisely those national traits that were preserved in the language. The forcible introduction of large farms in villages and the simultaneous liquidation of even the most minor form of private ownership, as well as the eradication of the peasants’ material interest in the results of their work and the antireligious campaign, which was accompanied by the mass closures of churches and the forcible change of traditional holidays and the foundations of world perception, could not have served to bolster the government’s authority in Ukrainian society. At the same time, many leading exponents of the nationalities policy, including Skrypnyk, began to realize the fallibility of the Bolshevik government’s socioeconomic measures. Stalin saw all this and understood that the events that were developing in this direction could lead to what he said in his letter to Lazar Kaganovich, dated August 11, 1932: “We may lose Ukraine.”

Stalin was not a priori a Ukrainophobe, but he was an unparalleled master of preventive repressions. In 1932 the greatest threat to the Kremlin came from the Ukrainian peasants, intelligentsia, and national communists, i.e., the majority of the Ukrainian nation. Stalin feared that mass dissatisfaction with the government’s socioeconomic actions could lead to their united opposition to the Bolshevik center. For that reason, the entire Ukrainian nation was subjected to preventive repressions in 1932-1933.

The Holodomor primarily affected Ukrainian villages, the mass of which were Ukrainian in Soviet Ukraine. But there were many city residents who were also dissatisfied with Stalin’s policies. Their numbers rose in 1932-1933 as a result both of the close links between some urban residents and rural areas and the realization of the criminality of the Bolshevik government’s actions, and as a result of the significant deterioration in the material situation of city residents. Thus, in keeping with a resolution approved by the Central Committee of the AUCP(B) on January 24, 1933, Pavel Postyshev was dispatched to Ukraine, where this non-Ukrainian communist official had already occupied responsible posts in the latter half of the 1920s. He became the official Second Secretary of the CC CP(B)U, but in fact was its head because he retained the post of Secretary of the CC AUCP(B). His main task was not to starve to death the Ukrainian countryside (everything fundamental had been done before his arrival) but to carry out ultimate reprisals against “the Ukrainian spirit,” against those hallmarks of autonomy in Ukraine’s national

and cultural life that were hindering the strengthening of totalitarianism and which thus represented a real danger to the Stalinist regime. It is no surprise, therefore, that one of the first decisions issued by the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U after Postyshev had mastered the situation in the Ukrainian party was the March 1933 resolution “About Textbooks.”\(^\text{11}\) This was the first step in the accelerated unification of Ukrainian teaching programs and textbooks with Russian ones, which, until that time, had little in common with each other.

A brilliant plan was issued from “upstairs,” which helped Postyshev become the victor in his struggle against Skrypnyk. In addition to the real changes in the economic principles governing life in Ukraine’s rural areas (a resolution passed by the CC AUCP(B) on January 19, 1933 abolished the existing unlimited state grain deliveries and instituted a large but fixed tax on the peasantry), once Postyshev arrived in Ukraine the termination of the state grain deliveries was announced, and part of the grain that had been stored up earlier was returned to Ukraine. As the representative of the CC AUCP(B), Postyshev was proclaimed the “savior” of the Ukrainian countryside. Blame for all the troubles in the countryside was laid on “nationalists” and “national deviationists,” who were operating primarily in the branch of national-cultural construction and, one would think, had no direct connection to the agricultural campaign. The propaganda of the time frequently repeated the thesis that the Secretary of the CC CP(B)U, Mykola Popov (he returned to Ukraine in February 1933), had emphasized in 1935 during a meeting with foreign-based communists: “The dispatching to Ukraine of the current Secretary of the CC AUCP(B), Comrade Postyshev, the militant mobilization of Ukraine’s Bolsheviks, and the rout of the nationalistic counter-revolution led to the situation where the lag in Ukraine’s agriculture was already liquidated in 1933.”\(^\text{12}\)

On the surface, this logic seemed rather plausible: after all, with the arrival of the Kremlin’s emissary in Ukraine, fields were sown in spring 1933 and the harvest was gathered in the summer precisely thanks to the material and cadre assistance from the Moscow center. However, it must be emphasized that the gathering of the harvest was the only goal of the Kremlin’s “assistance” to Ukraine, which included the rescue of some peasants from death by starvation. Someone had to sow and harvest the grain. Otherwise the situation in 1933, when – as noted in the preliminary version of the report presented by the CC CP(B)U to the XII Congress of the CP(B)U held in January 1934 – militia personnel in three oblasts, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa, completed 177,000 work days “at Postyshev’s call,” would not have been the exception but the rule. It should be noted that in 1933 the personnel of the Uni-

\(^{11}\) TsDAHO Ukrainy, fond 1, list 6, file 282, fol. 66.

fied State Political Directorate (OGPU) and Red Army troops completed an equal amount of work in collective farm fields.\(^{13}\)

In order to convince Ukrainians that "Ukrainian nationalists" were to blame for the Holodomor, the Kremlin leaders even held open trials of national communists. For example, Andrii Richytsky, a former member of the Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP), who during the Holodomor was a member of the CC CP(B)U and diligently carried out the center's orders, was publicly condemned for his inhumane treatment of peasants in the village of Arbuzynka in the Odesa region during the state grain deliveries of 1932-1933. On March 27, 1934 he was sentenced to death. Stalin closely monitored the progress of Richytsky's case: Zinovii Katsnelson, the Deputy Head of the OGPU of the Ukrainian SSR, reported on its course directly to the General Secretary of the AUCP(B).\(^{14}\) At the same time it should be noted that in the December 1932 informational report of the CC CP(B)U, Richytsky's actions (the requisitioning of the homesteads and plots of land from twenty collective farmers) were praised as those that had "given a boost to the state grain deliveries."\(^{15}\)

Like no one else, Stalin understood the importance of the nationalities policy. It was not for nothing that in 1917-1922 he had headed the People's Commissariat of Nationalities of the RSFSR. Therefore, in order to avoid mistakes in the future, he decided to personally direct the destruction of "Ukrainian nationalism." However, Stalin's plans were changed by the death of Skrypnyk, who shot himself in his office on July 7, 1933, following Postyshchev's latest attacks on him.

Skrypnyk's suicide wrecked the Kremlin's plans to organize a baiting session targeting the former education commissar of Ukraine at the forthcoming plenum of the CC CP(B)U, which would also have featured Skrypnyk confessing his errors. Nevertheless, in the late summer and early autumn of 1933 the Kremlin was preparing to summarize some results of the struggle against "Ukrainian nationalism." But it was not possible to do this by the planned deadline. Initially, the combined plenum of the CC and CCC CP(B)U, where the question of the party's nationalities policy was supposed to be discussed, was slated for September 25.\(^{16}\) Later, owing to the fact that this question was not ready for discussion, the plenum was delayed to October 10.\(^{17}\) The plenum was finally convened on November 18-22, 1933.

During this brief period of time a few rather important changes had taken place. Whereas in their July speeches to leading party activists on the oblast and municipal levels the members of the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U had ac-

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13. TsDAHO Ukrainy, fond 1, list 20, file 6199, fols. 50-54.
14. Ibid., file 6431, fol. 46.
15. Ibid., file 5249, fols. 53-54.
16. Ibid., list 6, file 285, fol. 49.
17. Ibid., fol. 64.
cused Skrypnyk mostly of errors and miscalculations in implementing the nationalities policy, at the combined plenum in November there was already talk of a national deviationism that had been headed by Skrypnyk. Furthermore, blame for "the lags in agriculture," i.e., the Holodomor, was laid on "Ukrainian nationalists."

In order to prove to both Ukrainian party members and to friends and enemies abroad that nothing had cardinaly changed in Ukraine, the General Secretary of the CC AUCP(B) decided to have Stanislav Kosior, arguably the member of the Ukrainian Communist Party leadership who had been closest to Skrypnyk, give the main speech on issues pertaining to the nationalities question at the November plenum of the CC CP(B)U. The members of the Ukrainian Politburo had not expected such a step because, after Skrypnyk's death, they had tried to turn Kosior into the main guilty party in the "excesses" of Ukrainization. In response to this, Stalin sent a letter in which he stressed: "The attempt of the other members of the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U to divest themselves of responsibility for the errors that the Politburo in general had committed is completely incorrect... Comrade Kosior's dismissal may be interpreted as disagreement with the nationalities policy of the AUCP(B), and in the best case it may be interpreted within the party as a retreat at the most difficult time, when a serious, developed ideological-political struggle against nationalistic and chauvinistic elements is required."18

Still current among historians today is the idea that the thesis of the above-mentioned plenum about the "close connection between national deviationism and the imperialist interventionists" was "suggested by the Moscow center,"19 while concrete formulations were already being developed in Ukraine. Until recently, this author was able to counter such notions only by logically analyzing those events. In particular, the various deferments of the plenum led to the conclusion that the Ukrainian Communist Party leaders had not fully understood the Kremlin's directives and were thus forced to change certain accents. Today, however, new documents have been introduced into scholarly circulation, which incontrovertibly confirm Stalin's personal control over the nationalities policy in Ukraine at this time. Stalin's corrections to Kosior's theses on the national question and the text of his full speech at the plenum shed new light on this question.

It should be recalled that even before the plenum the struggle against Skrypnyk's "national deviationism" was being conducted with extraordinary zeal. However, the Ukrainian party leaders had not forgotten that, in keeping with the party's instructions, the principal danger in the national question was

18. Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii [henceforth RGASPI], fond 81, list 3, file 131, fol. 127.
officially considered to be great power chauvinism. That is why Kosior’s thesis on the struggle against “national deviations” was formulated in the following manner: “Great power Russian chauvinism continues to be the main danger throughout the entire Soviet Union and the entire AUCP(B). However, this in no way contradicts the fact that in certain republics of the USSR, particularly in Ukraine, in recent times we have seen a significant increase in local nationalism grounded in the kulaks’ desperate resistance to the victorious socialist offensive, which demands that the party intensify the struggle against it.”

Crossing out the italicized part in the above passage, Stalin inserted in his own hand several words that defined the essence of the Kremlin’s nationalities policy not only for the near future but to the end of the USSR’s existence. The “Father of Nations” added: “However, this is no way contradicts the fact that in certain republics of the USSR, particularly in Ukraine, at the present moment the main danger is represented by Ukrainian nationalism, which is closely connected with the imperialist interventionists.” There is a cardinal difference between the two versions: it appeared that an active struggle against everything that was national-Ukrainian was simply not enough for Stalin. It was vitally important to show that the destruction of Ukraine’s national “separateness” was, at the given stage, the chief task of the communists in Ukraine.

Now that resistance in the countryside had been overcome, the time had come to unify and centralize national-cultural life. This did not contradict the main postulates of the policy of indigenization, whose chief task lay in proposing members of the local population for state (formally: Communist Party and Soviet) posts. Therefore, after amending Kosior’s theses, Stalin emphasized that the nationalities policy was and continued to be a tool of internationalism (and not of the “strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat,” as Kosior had written). At the same, instead of Kosior’s rather soft formulation that “Skrypnyk had excessively exaggerated the importance of the national question,” Stalin explicitly added that the former People’s Commissar of Education had sought to exploit “the Leninist nationalities policy in order to strengthen Ukrainian nationalism, to subordinate Ukraine to foreign capitalists and landowners.” It should be emphasized here that Stalin methodically crossed out the word “bourgeois” in Kosior’s phrase “bourgeois nationalism.” How can this be explained?

In the 1920s, when there was a certain pluralism in the national question and the main danger was officially defined as great power (Great Russian)
chauvinism, in the Kremlin’s eyes the danger lay first and foremost in the fact that, as noted in the resolution passed at the XII Congress of the Russian Communist Party (RKP(B)) held in 1923, it “feeds and cultivates the above-described deviation towards nationalism [to local nationalism – H.Y.], complicating the struggle against it,” i.e., it spurs the non-Russian peoples to intensify their resistance to Russification. In reality, the main danger to the Kremlin was precisely “local” nationalism, particularly Ukrainian nationalism in the Ukrainian SSR. Indisputable proof of this is the fact that already by 1928 three entire propaganda campaigns had taken place in Ukraine in connection with the struggle against Ukrainian nationalism (the deviations known as “Khvylovism,” “Shumskism,” and the “Volobuiev phase,” whose “leaders” championed greater autonomy for Ukraine and independence for its leadership in taking decisions in the cultural, administrative, and economic spheres), while the struggle against the “main danger” did without propaganda campaigns and noisy accusations.

Back in 1926, during his polemic with Oleksandr Shumsky, the General Secretary of the CC CP(P)U Lazar Kaganovich had emphasized one essential difference between local (i.e., non-Russian) and great power (i.e., Russian) nationalism: “No matter how erroneous the theory of two cultures, which was supported in particular by Comrade Lebed and decisively condemned by the party, it is absolutely impossible to draw an analogy between Lebed and Khvylovy’s positions because Lebed’s position under no circumstances meant support for counterrevolution.” The essence of the “theory of two cultures” lay in the acknowledgment that Russian culture was a proletarian and leading culture, while Ukrainian culture was a backward, peasant one. Naturally, the adherents of this theory emphasized the futility of supporting a “backward” culture.

As evident from the above quotation, these two “nationalisms” lay in absolutely different planes. “Counterrevolutionary” and hence “bourgeois” in nature, there could only be Ukrainian nationalism in Ukraine. There are no grounds for supposing that Stalin had a different opinion, especially after the Ukrainian peasantry’s vigorous resistance to his policies in 1929-1933. It would appear that for Stalin the words “Ukrainian” and “bourgeois” were synonymous: in the eyes of the Kremlin an indulgent attitude toward both could trigger the collapse of the Bolshevik empire. In other words, in Stalin’s way of thinking, the definition of nationalism as “Ukrainian bourgeois” was a tautology, and for this reason he crossed out the word “bourgeois.”

Since the Kremlin represented the destruction of everything that was national Ukrainian as a struggle against capitalists and landowners in the Ukrainian SSR, Stalin’s accusations that Skrypnyk had a friendly attitude to

24. RGASPI, fond 81, list 3, file 135, fol. 74.
the non-socialist world are completely logical. Thus, on the margins of Kosior's theses Stalin emphasized: "It must be stated that: 1) Skrypnyk's position is a reflection of the dissatisfaction with the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat on the part of those classes that are dying out; 2) Skrypnyk's position signifies a call to secede from the USSR, where socialism is being built, and to turn toward Galicia, where the landowners and capitalists are oppressing the Ukrainian people." In other words, the "Father of Nations," who had a real fear of losing control over Ukraine, was accusing the former education commissar of the most grievous sins. In order to make the words "to secede from the USSR" sound "more terrible," he combined Skrypnyk's activities, which were aimed at championing Ukraine's national selfhood, with the phrase "bourgeois influence," which was so hateful to the communists.

A considerable role in preserving and developing everything that was national-Ukrainian was played by Galician Ukrainians, quite a few of whom had immigrated to Soviet Ukraine by 1933. They were in no way adherents of cultural unification or the complete "merging" of Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, in Eastern Galicia itself, the non-communist Ukrainian forces had devoted considerable attention to exposing the Holodomor of 1932-1933. Whereas Stalin had succeeded in concealing the Holodomor from the entire world, he had not managed to hide it from the Ukrainians of Galicia. Therefore, the Galician Ukrainians — both as émigrés and those who remained on the territory of Poland — became enemies of the Kremlin. In his theses, however, Kosior did not even mention the Galicians. This could not have pleased the "Father of Nations," who wrote the following notes on the margins of Kosior's speech: "[Talk] About the Galicians, some of whom are being pulled toward the German landowners and others, to Polish ones! Besmirch all the Ukrainian anticommunist parties, including the S[ocial] D[emocrats] and the S[ocialist] R[evolutionaries] as traitors of the Ukrainian people." These lines were successfully added to the speech that Kosior delivered at the plenum.

Another of Stalin's important corrections was to distinguish "Petliurite" (i.e., pro-Ukrainian) Ukrainization from the Bolshevik one, the implementation of the latter having been allegedly hindered by Shumsky, and in 1931-1932 — by Skrypnyk. On December 14-15, 1932 the CC AUCP(B) approved two resolutions that shed light on the Kremlin's strategic plans vis-à-vis Ukraine. Ukrainization outside the borders of the Ukrainian SSR was abolished and all educational institutions outside Soviet Ukraine with Ukrainian as the language of instruction were ordered to convert into the Russian lan-

25. TsDAHO Ukrainy, fond 57, list 6, file 273, fol. 6.
26. Ibid., fol. 3.
language.\textsuperscript{27} As of May 1, 1931, in the Central Chernozem \textit{oblast} of the RSFSR alone, 78 percent of all Ukrainian children residing on this territory were being taught in the Ukrainian language.\textsuperscript{28} In the North Caucasus territory, which included the Kuban, this figure stood at 60 percent.\textsuperscript{29}

In the Ukrainian SSR, however, the Kremlin did not dare take similar measures, as evidenced by Stalin's corrections to Kosior's speech, and no official rejection of the policy of Ukrainization took place there. On the one hand, this was a kind of camouflaging of the change in course of the nationalities policy. On the other, there were certain grounds for this because Skrypnykite Ukrainization had indeed exceeded the bounds of the policy of indigenization proclaimed in 1923, the goal of which was the "enrooting" of Bolshevik power in Ukrainian society, not the independent development of Ukrainian culture outside the Kremlin's control.

It should be emphasized that Kosior used every last one of Stalin's suggestions. The finished speech, which was sent to the Kremlin in fall 1933, elicited a nervous reaction from Stalin, who was incensed by the fact that someone else besides him had tried to formulate a theory of the national question. His pride injured, Stalin could not refrain from adding his own arguments to Skrypnyk's "faults": "It turns out that Lenin did not work through the problem of the national question to the very end, and Skrypnyk set about adding to it and correcting Lenin. The source of his fall is found in this inflated arrogance."\textsuperscript{30} Stalin made other additions to Kosior's speech, which intensified the degree of criticism aimed at Skrypnyk and paved the way for a decisive struggle against Ukrainian nationalism. But nothing conceptually new was added to the speech.

The above-cited facts clearly indicate that Stalin personally controlled the course of the struggle against "Ukrainian nationalism." The essential formulations that triggered the brutal destruction of Ukrainian national culture and Ukrainian selfhood were his. Without a doubt, the main one is his characterization of Ukrainian nationalism as the fundamental threat in the national question in Ukraine. For Stalin, this threat lay in the counteraction to the strengthening of totalitarianism and in the danger of Ukraine's imminent or future secession. Stalin's pronouncements on the danger of "Ukrainian nationalism" have never been discarded by the leadership of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

Together with his circle of associates, the General Secretary of the CC AUCP(B) was able to discover a reliable method for maintaining complete

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[29.] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 72.
\item[30.] TsDAHO Ukrainy, fond 57, list 6, file 275, fol. 53.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
control over Ukraine – the myth of “Ukrainian nationalism,” called the greatest danger in the national question. Thereafter, the Kremlin tenderly cared for this myth, like a favorite child that was protected from all propagandistic and ideological attacks. To a significant degree this myth was helped by the mass propaganda, which laid the blame for the Holodomor on “Ukrainian nationalists.” From that time onward, the theoretical postulates of the nationalities policy were noticeably changed, and the merging of nations in one country became theoretically possible.

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FOREIGN DIPLOMATS ON
THE HOLODOMOR IN UKRAINE

In 1933 Mendel Khataevich, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CC CP(B)U), told an activist: "A ruthless struggle is going on between the peasantry and our regime. It's a struggle to the death. This year was a test of our strength and their endurance. It took a famine to show them who is master here. It has cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system is here to stay. We've won the war."¹

In this war Ukraine suffered the highest number of human losses of all the "Union republics" in the former USSR. Thus, questions emerge as to why this happened precisely that way? Was it accidental? In the quest for answers to these questions, researchers from many countries (and not just researchers) are still engaged in debates, but one thing is certain: it is impossible to ignore or keep silent about the Holodomor in the historical chain of humanitarian catastrophes that afflicted humankind in the twentieth century.

Scholarly research is continuing, knowledge about the Holodomor is expanding, and access is slowly being gained to documents that reflect the activities of the highest Soviet leadership in 1932-1933 and the conduct of regional leaders, particularly the party-state nomenklatura of the Ukrainian SSR. These documents are allowing scholars to gain an understanding of the technology of the crime per se, whose mechanisms helped the Stalinist regime to extract grain, justifying this by the need to modernize. The lives of millions of people were swallowed by this Moloch. These documents are helpful in attaining a clearer understanding of the doctrinal and situational motives that governed the communist establishment, as well as in recreating the situation in those times at the macro- and micro-levels, which is crucially important in the formulation of general, realistic conclusions and judgments. Among other things, new research is repudiating claims about the absence of specific features of the government's actions in one region or another in the former USSR in 1932-1933.

In recent years, documents and other materials housed in numerous archives in Ukraine have become accessible. Among them are the Branch State Security Service Archives of Ukraine (HDA SBU). In the summer of 2006 a number of archival sources, access to which was forbidden for a long time, were declassified. The employees of the Soviet security service unintention-

ally turned out to be rather good historians, recording in their documents the situation in the countryside, the demands of the government and its own efforts to carry them out, the mood of the population and the repressive measures that were applied to it, and actions to block the leakage of truthful information about the essence and scale of the Holodomor. Some of these documents and materials were included in the scholarly collection of documents entitled *The Declassified Holodomor of 1932-1933 in Ukraine in GPU-NKVD Documents.*

However, the Soviet security service left behind another category of extraordinarily interesting and important documents. These materials not only relate to the situation in the Ukrainian SSR, but also show how events in Ukraine were being recorded by foreign diplomatic bodies, specifically the information and assessments drafted by Polish, German, Italian, Turkish, and Japanese diplomats about the Holodomor. Through various channels these materials fell into the hands of the Chekists, who were diligently tracking the members of foreign diplomatic missions. These documentary testimonies, together with already published documents written by foreign diplomats about the famine in the early 1930s in the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, are a unique and important source for further research, which, I am convinced, have never been studied by scholars.

The approaching famine

Stalin’s "great breakthrough" (i.e., accelerated industrialization and forcible collectivization) was such a breakneck change of policy that dissatisfaction and resistance among the broadest strata of society was inevitable. This led to the emergence of an opposition within ranks of the Bolshevik party it-

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self, even among its leaders. It is not surprising that the peasants launched the most active resistance to the regime.

The representatives of foreign missions recorded all this. According to the opinion of one Italian diplomat, which he voiced in July 1930, even before 1928 "it was possible to consider that the Government will be able to overcome the crisis, but today, in connection with the latest failed collectivization measures that have sparked powerful resistance on the part of the population, it is evident that the Soviet government will not be able to cope with the tasks that it is facing."

However, the Stalinist regime viewed terror and the merciless crushing of uprisings as an effective means of subduing the disgruntled population. In a memorandum on the political situation among the peasants of Ukraine, which was written in connection with the "policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class," during the period from January 20 to February 12, 1930 the head of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, Vsevolod Balytsky, reported that a total of 12,000 people had taken part in 37 mass peasant protests in January; as of February 9, 1930, 11,865 people had been arrested, and peasants had carried out 40 terrorist acts in response to the policy of "dekulakization." Balytsky was even forced to head an "operational headquarters" for the struggle against peasant protests and was in charge of crushing these protests in various regions of Ukraine.

In order No. 74, issued by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR on March 31, 1930, Balytsky emphasized that "on March 19, 1930 the organs of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, with the active participation of poor peasants and leading rural activists, completed an operation to expel kulaks from districts of all-out collectivization in Ukraine. Despite the exceptionally tight deadlines for the preparation of this operation, the lack of experience in conducting this kind of mass work, as well as the significant complexity of the work itself, the entire operation to expel the kulaks in Ukraine was successfully carried out: the work was finished on time, the control figure of expulsions of kulak farmsteads, as outlined in the plan, was exceeded on the whole. . ." As of June 1, 1930, 90,000 farmsteads were "dekulakized," the total figure reaching more than 200,000 during the years of collectivization. This is a clear-cut illustration of the war that the Bolshevik government had unleashed against the peasantry.

Tracking these dramatic events, the personnel of various diplomatic missions noted the rise in the agricultural crisis. For example, Japanese consular

6. HDA SBU, Kyiv, file 2174, fol. 31.
officials, who traveled to certain regions of the Ukrainian SSR in 1929, mention a "food crisis" and the fact that, despite the Civil War and the devastation that had already been experienced, the "material situation of the majority is not improving but deteriorating." As early as 1928 officials of the Italian Consulate, who were analyzing the situation of the peasants and the government's policies toward them, say that famine is to be expected, and that the communists' own actions "are building up the counter-revolution." In 1930 officials of the Turkish Consulate noted that the USSR was exporting food with the goal of obtaining hard currency instead of feeding its own people, and that the government "is forcing its working class and the entire population to starve." Foreign diplomatic missions were also constantly reporting to their superiors about disturbances caused by food shortages, which were taking place in large Ukrainian cities, including Kyiv.

Specific to Ukraine was the fact that this republic, together with the North Caucasus, supplied more than half the grain produced in the entire USSR. Speaking about Ukraine in 1931, Stalin noted that "a number of grain-producing districts are in a state of devastation and famine." Nevertheless, the Kremlin leaders assumed that Ukraine had huge supplies of grain that collective farms and independent farmers were supposedly concealing from the state. For this reason the government resorted to pressure methods in order to complete the state grain deliveries. Already in 1931 the grain delivery plans had to be reduced for a number of oblasts in the Ural and Middle Volga regions, as well as Kazakhstan, yet such reductions were practically not instituted in Ukraine and the North Caucasus.

Compared to the previous year, in 1931 Ukraine supplied less grain, and already that year more than 150,000 people had died in the republic. All the same, on January 3, 1932 a meeting of the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U discussed Stalin and Molotov's telegram, which contained an order to unswervingly carry out the state grain delivery plans. Eighty-three top officials then dispersed throughout Ukraine in order to organize the plans' implementation. A special resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (CC AUCP(B)) proclaimed February 1932 a militant shock month for the completion of the state grain deliveries. By March-April 1932 there were large numbers of starving people in Ukrainian villages, while

children abandoned by their parents roamed the cities. This was an obvious sign of a calamity, but it in no way stopped the government.

Foreign diplomats were observing, analyzing, and reflecting all this in their documents. On May 11, 1932 the Polish consul in Kyiv writes:

I report that every day I received increasingly more news about the famine in Right-Bank Ukraine, which is felt particularly acutely in the province. According to the latest reports, almost every day there are cases of people who are collapsing from weakness and exhaustion being collected from the streets of such cities as Vinnytsia and Uman. The situation may even be worse in the countryside, where, according to information from a reliable source, robberies and murders as a result of starvation are daily occurrences.\(^\text{13}\)

Foreign diplomats were quite well informed about the state of affairs, and this level of informedness influenced the quality of their assessments of the agricultural situation both in the USSR as a whole and the Ukrainian SSR in particular. With good reason, therefore, the cover letter from the OGPU of the USSR, accompanying the copy of a report drawn up by the German consul in Odesa about the state grain deliveries, which arrived at the counterintelligence division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in January 1930, demanded to know the sources of the consulate’s information about Soviet grain exports that were being channeled through the Port of Odessa.\(^\text{14}\)

In 1932-1933 the Stalinist leadership de facto clearly designated two main opponents. The first one was the peasants, who were refusing to work on collective farms and die in the name of modernization. In the USSR the peasantry had been turned into an object of constant expropriation, a resource for modernizing transformations. The second opponent was the none-too-reliable party-state leadership of Ukraine, which, to a certain degree, was conducting a “flexible” line in the “tension field” between the Kremlin’s demands and the tragic local realities.

Stalin issued a clear signal in his now widely publicized and fundamentally important letter to Lazar Kaganovich, dated August 11, 1932. In it he questions the loyalty of the entire party organization of the Ukrainian SSR, while simultaneously demanding that allegedly concealed grain be squeezed out of Ukraine regardless of sacrifices (which could be justified by the lofty goals of modernization) and that a repressive “purge” of society be carried out in order to eradicate “Ukrainian nationalists.”\(^\text{15}\) Stalin then dispatched his

\(^\text{13. Central Military Archive (Tsentralnyi Viiskovy Arkhiv, henceforward: TsVA), Warsaw, Department II of the Chief Command, file 1.303.4.3043, fol. 64.}\)

\(^\text{14. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 13, file 22, fol. 234.}\)

loyal associates to Ukraine, who introduced punitive practices that were di-
verse in form but universal in their fatal result.

Particularly dangerous to the Stalinist regime was the fact that the peasants
were trying to escape from the places where they were starving. In one of his
letters to Kaganovich, dated June 1932, Stalin expresses his dissatisfaction
with the fact that “several tens of thousands of Ukrainian collective farmers
are still traveling all over the European part of the USSR and demoralizing
the collective farms for us with their complaints and whining.”

A document prepared by Polish intelligence in September 1932 states:
“Nearly all of Ukraine is traveling in search of bread, the trains are packed to
the rafters; to get on a train [people] have to stand in lineups for several
days.” This situation quickly changed after so-called food blockades of
Ukraine’s borders were erected in the fall and winter of 1932-33. The block-
ades were manned by interior troops and the militia, who prevented peasants
from leaving the country and, hence, spreading information about the famine.
Also instituted at this time was a ban on what was known as a food “reverse,”
which meant that private individuals were not permitted to bring food into
Ukraine from Russia and Belarus without the state’s permission, with the
volume of food products entering the republic restricted by a special decision.

On January 22, 1933 Stalin and Molotov circulated a directive to party and
state organs, in which they emphasized that the migration processes which
had begun as a result of starvation among the peasants had been organized by
the “enemies of Soviet power, SRs, and agents of Poland with the goal con-
ducting agitation ‘through the peasants’ in the northern districts of the USSR
against the collective farms and generally against the Soviet government.” In
connection with this directive, the government organs and the GPU of the
Ukrainian SSR and the North Caucasus were ordered to prevent the mass de-
parture of peasants to other districts. Instructions were issued to the transport
divisions of the OGPU of the USSR. The Soviet regime thus transformed
Ukraine into a starvation ghetto, which was not done in any other Soviet re-
public.

“The situation in Ukraine is worsening day by day, starvation is staring
people in the face, each time in a more brutish and stronger form…” Polish
diplomats write in February 1933. On March 12, 1933 the Kyiv oblast’ divi-
sion of the GPU informed the head of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR about
the critical food situation in Kyiv, noting in particular that 400 corpses had
been picked up in the city in January, 518 in February, and 248 over a period

16. Ibid., p. 179.
17. TsVA, file I.303.4.5424, p. 28.
18. Ibid., file I.303.4.1985 (without pagination).
of eight days in March.\textsuperscript{19} The Chekists added that every day 100 or more children are abandoned in the city.\textsuperscript{20}

Another document that was prepared by Polish diplomats in March 1933 reports mass dismissals of office workers and laborers in Kyiv. "Bread ration cards are taken away without exception from all those who have been dismissed. In the future, the loss of employment will result in the necessity to leave the city in connection with the system of passports that is being introduced. The number of thefts and robberies is increasing along with the growing number of unemployed people. In many cases, dismissed laborers and state officials are invited to leave for the countryside. However, owing to the famine reigning there and the dissatisfaction of the urban population, those who are unemployed try at any cost to remain in the city."\textsuperscript{21} During a private conversation, one of the leaders of Kyiv oblast' admitted that the supplies of necessary seeds did not even meet 60 percent of the required amount, and "therefore, regardless of the official announcement of the free trade in grain, constant searches and grain requisitions are continuing to take place, and the ban on transporting grain and the complications that make it difficult for peasants to travel are still in force at railway stations."\textsuperscript{22}

A document issued by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in February 1933 states that Kyiv oblast' is the leading Ukrainian region with respect to the number of peasants who have left to escape death by starvation.\textsuperscript{23} Were Ukrainian peasants under the illusion that the situation was better in Russia? No, they were not. This is what is recorded in a report by the Polish consul, who took a trip from Kharkiv to Moscow in May 1933.

During my entire journey I was most struck by the difference in the appearance of the villages and fields of Ukraine in comparison with the neighboring TsChO (Central Chernozem oblast') and even with the non-grain-producing vicinities of Moscow. Ukrainian villages are in significant decline; emptiness, desolation, and destitution waft from them; houses are in a semi-collapsed state, often with [missing] roofs that have been torn off; new homesteads are nowhere to be seen; children and elderly people resemble skeletons; there is no sign of livestock. . . . When I later ended up in the TsChO (at first, in the vicinities of Kursk and Orel), I had the impression that I had arrived in Western Europe from the Country of soviets. There are significantly more plowed and sown fields, the villages are clean, more decent, the houses are restored, and rela-

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} TsVA, file l.303.4.1867, fol. 130.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., fol. 131.
\textsuperscript{23} HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 68, file 228, fol. 140.
tively greater well-being is evident among the people; you can see cattle grazing..."24

In June 1932 the Japanese consul in Odesa undertook a long journey through various regions of the USSR. He reported that “in comparison with the peasants of other republics, Ukrainian peasants make a pitiful impression with their ragged clothing, their emaciated bodies, and their begging: even in large railway stations peasants and their wives and children stretch out their hands for alms and beg for bread..."25

It is extremely interesting to note that already in 1933 foreign diplomats were trying to ascertain the technology of the Holodomor. This question is fundamentally important. Certain contemporary Western researchers reproach their Ukrainian colleagues for ignoring the fact that Ukrainians also took part in the grain deliveries. Some even write that the “Soviet leadership partially depended on the hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians who occupied state positions on the most varied levels.”26

Yes, there were Ukrainians in the governing structures. However, no serious researcher would dare write about “hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians,” who, in the conditions of Stalinist dictatorship, have a say in the government’s decisions. They simply did not exist. In connection with this, we find a more accurate analysis in an announcement issued on November 18, 1933 by the Polish vice-consul in Kyiv, Petr Kurnicki. Convinced that the secret of the Bolsheviks’ successes lies in “the complete disregard of means and victims,” the Polish diplomat states:

The realization of all this took place through the deployment of huge cadres of newly educated communists who, first and foremost, are not bound by anything to the local population or [who have been] imbued with theoretical conclusions to such a degree that they have practically become fanatics, who carry out all kinds of orders while turning a blind eye to all consequences that will affect the population.27

According to some data, more than 54,000 people starved to death in Kyiv in 1933.28 That same year the German Consulate in Odesa reported: “The horrors of last spring have passed and for the most part forgotten. The com-

24. TsVA, file 1.303.4.1867, fols. 32-34.
25. HDA SBU, Odesa, file 66, vol. 4, fol. 2241.
27. TsVA, file 1.303.4.1993 (without pagination).
munist rulers are not letting the peasants remember their misfortunes for long, and this is being achieved by the fact that, on the heels of one misfortune they are already preparing others, and willy-nilly the old horrors are being forgotten.”

Reverberations of the Holodomor

The Soviet leadership was engaged in what may be called lies for export. As early as January 14, 1933, when he was replying to numerous queries from abroad, Maxim Litvinov, People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, issued a special declaration in which he claimed that there was no famine in the Soviet Union whatsoever, and that all talk of one was nothing but fabrications. Meanwhile, in the international arena Ukrainians were making efforts to informing the world community about the real situation.

Oleksander Shulhyn, the representative of the government in exile of the Ukrainian National Republic, contacted the Grain Commission that was established by the London Economic Conference of 1933. He writes:

At the time when the committee of advisers should be establishing the volume of grain that the USSR will export abroad, we are asking you, in the name of humaneness, to object to any kind of exports of food products, particularly grain, from the USSR. This grain belongs by rights to those who sowed it and who today are starving to death – the peasants of Ukraine and the Kuban. On our part, we strenuously protest against this export, which we cannot qualify as anything other than criminal.

It is generally known that after dispatching Pavel Postyshev to Ukraine in late 1932 and officially confirming him in January 1933 as the second secretary of the CC CP(B)U, Stalin ordered him to liquidate what was euphemistically called “economic difficulties” and the “failure in the agriculture” of the Ukrainian SSR. Postyshev, who virtually controlled Ukraine until early 1937 (Stanislav Kosior, the weak leader of the CC CP(B)U notwithstanding), accused the Ukrainians themselves of organizing the famine, that is to say, “Ukrainian nationalists” and “Petliurites.” Postyshev and his “team” (people from his milieu, as well as party workers who had come from Russia to reinforce the cadres) implemented the policy of pumping grain out of Ukraine and simultaneously “purging” the party and all social spheres.

29. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 13, file 161, vol. 1, fol. 42.
31. For a more detailed discussion, see Yuri Shapoval, Ukraina 20-50-kh rokov: storinky ne-napysanoi istorii (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1993); Robert Kusnierz, Ukraina v latach kolekty-wizacji i Wielkiego Głodu (1929-1933) (Torun: GRADO, 2005); and Rozsekrechena pamiat.
The GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by Balitsky, was enlisted to carry out this work. A “massive operation to inflict an operational blow on the class enemy” began already in the fall of 1932. Its goal was also to uncover “counter-revolutionary centers that are organizing sabotage and the disruption of the state grain deliveries and other economic-political measures.” At this point, the Chekists significantly escalated the scale of their actions.

In Soviet Ukrainian agriculture a “counter-revolutionary organization” was uncovered, in which agrarian specialists were implicated and which was soon “linked” with similar organizations in Moscow, Rostov, and Minsk. In Moscow arrested Ukrainian specialists were also implicated in some kind of all-Union organization whose goal, according to official claims, was “to wreck agriculture and cause a famine in the country.” Arrests throughout the regions had a mass character, and the thirty-five members of that mythical organization headed by the former Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the USSR, a Ukrainian named Fedir Konar, were sentenced to death by the Collegium of the OGPU of the USSR on March 11, 1933. Between November 1932 and January 1933 alone, the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR liquidated 1,208 “counter-revolutionary” collective farm groups. In 1933, nearly 200,000 people were “purged” at 24,191 collective farms.32 The inspections affected Soviet state farms, the Zagotzerno (Grain Procurement) system, and the system of food cooperatives. It should be noted that a “purge” of the CP(B)U itself was also proclaimed. A significant contingent of individuals who could be easily blamed for organizing the famine was thereby formed.

While the Soviet government hunted for guilty parties, the consequences of the famine were making themselves felt. They were quite conspicuous not only in rural areas but also in cities. In July 1933 a female Polish consular official based in Kharkiv noted that the epidemic had not abated in the summer but instead had grown, affecting increasingly wider strata of the population. She writes: “The mortality rate is rising every day. There are very many beggars on the streets; lately, small children have been seen with greater frequency.”33 In the same month, July 1933, the Italian consul in Kharkiv notes: “Some doctors have confirmed to me that the mortality rate in villages often reaches 80 percent, and it is never lower than 50 percent. Worst affected are Kyiv, Poltava, and Sumy oblasts, where one can already speak of depopulation.”34

On November 2, 1933 the German consul in Kyiv records the following:

In the last few weeks the typhus epidemic has once again grown very significantly in Kyiv. Every day around 11 people are delivered to hospita-
tals throughout the city. This number includes only residents of Kyiv. Together with non-locals – people from the countryside – the number of hospitalized individuals is significantly higher and reaches nearly 200.35

During his speech at the XVII Congress of the AUCP(B) in 1934, Stalin issued a statement about the population increase in the USSR in 1933. After this declaration, all mentions of the famine disappeared – even from secret documents. The government named those who were responsible for the famine, but the famine itself became a taboo subject. In information items prepared on the food situation in the Soviet Union, officials at the German Embassy comment: “The government’s victory has been achieved: the peasant has been brought to his knees.”36

But, as newly discovered documents attest, the famine did not disappear. In April 1934, Jan Lagoda, the deputy trade counselor at the Polish Embassy in Moscow, went on a trip around the Ukrainian SSR, visiting Kyiv, Korosten, Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, Koziatyn, and Uman. In his report about his journey he writes:

I became convinced that in the oblasts which I visited the rural population is starving. There are very many people who are clearly starving, there are very many abandoned children at railway stations, who are feeding themselves any which way they can. . . . As a result of my observations, I can say that the famine in Right-Bank Ukraine is a very widespread phenomenon. . . . Against this background an epidemic of malignant influenza, like the one in the West in 1918, has spread; it is immeasurably dangerous. Very many people are dying of influenza. The phenomena associated with last year’s famine have still not faded from people’s memories, on trains they talk exclusively about the famine.37

Meanwhile, the Soviet government was doing everything to erase all memories of the tragedy. This was done in various ways, including scare tactics, with the aim of forcing people not to discuss the famine. In October 1933 Kurnicki, the Polish vice-consul, insisted that “the news about the possibility of famine are in no way exaggerated,” noting the “government’s concrete efforts to create and strengthen patriotism and state ambitions.” According to his observations, “now, when you speak with those doctors, who one year ago had gladly taken advantage of every opportunity to eat breakfast or lunch at the Consulate, readily complaining about all sorts of shortcomings,

36. HDA SBU, Kyiv, fond 13, file 161, vol. 11, fol. 22.
today you notice a complete change in their attitude: they are trying to bluff, [saying] that everything is wonderful, even better than anywhere else. . . .38

In November 1936 German diplomats compiled information about how Soviet propaganda was counteracting the spread of truth about the tragic events of 1932-1933 and continuously seeking to contradict the very existence of the famine. This was the goal of a Soviet film entitled *Harvest*. According to information prepared by the German diplomats, this film “is being sent abroad in thousands of copies. It is screened everywhere that the truth about the famine catastrophe of 1932-1933 and subsequent times has become a matter of public knowledge.”39 The film shows an area located in the lower Dnipro region where the famine had raged. It was now supposedly a well-to-do collective farm employing happy peasants, who are wonderfully fed. “The propaganda in this film,” the Germans’ information emphasizes,

should be contrasted with the fact that individual highlights from the collective farm shown on screen have been craftily cobbled together, that the majority of collective farms are far from achieving the profitability of the old, independent farmsteads, that the forcible collectivization which was achieved only meant that millions of rural residents were evicted from their buildings and deported to forced labor camps, and – above all – with the fact of the famine catastrophe of 1932-1933 and the subsequent period. These catastrophes, which show not only the Soviet government’s inability to overcome the problem of supporting its people but also its exceptional diabolic desire to destroy certain strata of the population (“the organized famine”), are historical facts, the details of which are explained today by the testimonies of reliable witnesses. . . . In addition, it must be emphasized that with the state of Soviet food production as it is, one can reckon on a repeat famine.”40

On January 18, 1934 the plenum of the CC CP(B)U confirmed the agenda of the XII Congress of the Ukrainian party. It was decided to submit a proposal for confirmation by the XII Congress of the CP(B)U about transferring the capital of Ukraine to Kyiv.41

Already by January 31, 1934 the Italian consul Sergio Gradenigo drew up a report in which he attributed great significance to this decision. He even concluded that the most fertile areas of Left-Bank Ukraine would be annexed to Russia:

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40. Ibid., fol. 45.
41. The official transfer of the higher party and state institutions from Kharkiv to Kyiv took place on June 24, 1934.
With the help of the famine, this territory, which has already been de-populated, has been settled by a new population – for the past two months Russians have been brought here by the trainload from Siberia . . . . The transfer of the capital to the border is obviously entirely aimed at concealing the persecutions of the Ukrainian people, which will escalate even more after the capital is returned to its historic place. This return of the capital to Kyiv . . . is launching the process of territorial decapitation at the same time as national decapitation is already taking place on a broad scale. and will continue further; it will inevitably be accompanied by famine in the nearest future.42

In his report of May 3, 1933 Gradenigo revisits the question of the Ukrainian capital’s transfer to Kyiv. He writes that repressions of the Ukrainian intelligentsia are increasing.

In recent months, the suppression of any kind of Ukrainian nationalist activity is taking place steadily; its episodes are unfolding in Moscow, Kyiv, [and] Kharkiv.

On the other hand, parallel with this action of destroying even the slightest attempt to manifest Ukrainian separatism, the policy of laying emphasis on the Ukrainian national character is gaining greater momentum, which I predicted the minute when it was decided to make Kyiv the capital of Ukraine again. That is to say, there is an intention to supplant Ukrainian nationalism of a separatist orientation, which looks toward Poland, with centripetal nationalism, which would incline the Ukrainians of Poland toward possible or desirable unification with the Ukrainians of the USSR.43

After conducting infernal trials by famine and repressions everywhere, the Soviet government once again made Kyiv the capital at the very time when the consequences of these tragic events were still fully felt.

In conclusion, I cannot stress enough the need for further research on the history of the Holodomor and its specific features in one region or another of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR, not only in the countryside but cities as well. Such research, based on previously unknown documentary and factual material and on the eradication of obsolete historiographic stereotypes and perceptual pigeonholing, is extremely pressing not just in terms of analyzing the totalitarian past. It is also important for gaining an understanding of the true nature of the Soviet regime, which is, regrettably, still veiled in various kinds of myths and propagandistic stereotypes. An important role in mapping out the real situation during the Holodomor can and should be played by

42. Cited in Upokorennia holodom, p. 96
43. Lysty z Kharkova, p. 225.
documents and materials that were created by foreign diplomats who were based in Ukraine in those years. Furthermore, although most of these documents and materials from the 1930s were never made public by the leaders of these foreign countries owing to certain political motives (e.g., Italy was buying fuel from the USSR and did not believe it necessary to "quarrel" with the Kremlin), and despite the fact that some of these sources contain certain inaccuracies, they are nonetheless valuable and important.

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“BLACKLISTS” AS A TOOL OF THE SOVIET GENOCIDE IN UKRAINE

The 1932-1933 Holodomor, the famine genocide of the Ukrainian people, was meticulously planned by the communist regime in Moscow. It had nothing to do with climate conditions, the size of the harvests on collective farm and independent farmers’ fields, pests, and other factors that are readily cited by Russian historians and politicians, as well as those who sing their tune in Ukraine. The planned nature of the Holodomor in Ukraine is unambiguously attested by the well-thought-out strategy of repressive measures that targeted Ukrainian peasants with the goal of creating intolerable conditions for them.

The first of these repressive measures was the enlistment of the repressive-punitive and control organs in the completion of the established tasks - an unprecedented decision even for the Soviet state. The activity of the central and local organs of the OGPU, NKVD, public prosecutors’ offices, the courts, and party-state control commissions (e.g., the Central Control Commission [CCC]; the People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection [NK RSI]) in 1932-1933 became an integral component of the “struggle for bread,” but, more precisely, a weapon against the Ukrainian nation.

From the purely organizational and propagandistic angle, the anti-peasant campaigns were organized in a primitive chronological manner: the “struggle for the grain deliveries” took place until February 1932; the creation of seed reserves fell in February-March; April saw the beginning of the “struggle for sowing”; the “struggle for the grain deliveries” was slated again for the month of June and lasted until February of the following year. At any stage it was enough for the Soviet authorities to wield the accusation of “non-fulfillment of the plan” (sowing, grain deliveries) to have an opportunity to apply one of the many types of repressions from the arsenal of punitive measures.

The author is interested in those methods that the Soviet government used in order to create conditions in the [Ukrainian] countryside that were incompatible with life – one of the hallmarks of genocide. In addition to the use of repressive, legal, and control bodies in the implementation of the state grain delivery plans, as early as January 1932 the Communist Party leaders sought to apply such administrative-punitive measures as the “liquidation of collective farms.” As a result of this purely bureaucratic operation all the property and reserves of a liquidated collective farm were transferred to the raion col-
ollective farm union, with the sowing funds shipped out as grain deliveries, while the former collective farmers – now independent farmers – were taxed on the property that they had owned before joining the collective farm. In other words, by depriving the peasants of everything they had accumulated, the Soviet authorities also sought to strangle them with taxes. The first collective farm to be liquidated in Ukraine in 1932 was the “Nezamozhnyk,” located in Ustymivka raion in Odesa oblast’. According to a report issued by the Ukrainian Collective Farm Center (Ukrkolhosptsentr), the “Red Progress” collective farm was also liquidated “for the non-fulfillment of state obligations of the grain delivery plan.” There is no data on the total number of “disbanded” collective farms, but it is clear that local activists initially considered this a rather effective measure.

Nevertheless, it was impossible to introduce this type of repression against the peasantry everywhere, if only from the point of view of propaganda. The mass liquidation of collective farms – the foundation of the Soviet-party system governing the organization of agriculture – meant, on the one hand, acknowledging the failure of the Communist Party’s agrarian policy and, on the other, being deprived of an effective weapon in the struggle against the Ukrainian peasantry. Therefore, in the April [1932] report of the Ukrainian Collective Farm Center the disbandment of collective farms was proclaimed as “administration by mere injunction” and a “violation of the party’s directives,” and a resolution issued on March 28, 1932 by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine (CC CP(B)U), which included a summary of the activity of collective farms for 1931, banned the disbandment of collective farm administrations as a repressive instrument “for any kinds of shortcomings” in their work. This was permitted in exceptional cases, provided a decision was handed down by a raion administration, but even then only “by means of general assemblies of collective farmers.”

In addition, a broad movement of departures from collective farms took place in the summer of 1932. The total number of peasants who wanted to return to individual farming and had submitted applications in connection with this comprised between 20 and 50 percent of all collective farmers in various oblast’s. Foremost among them were Vinnytsia, Kharkiv, and Kyiv oblast’s. In these circumstances, the liquidation of collective farms was ultimately suspended, inasmuch as the Ukrainian Collective Farm Center was reporting

2. Speech given by the Ukrkolhosptsentr during a republican radio meeting about the fulfillment of the grain deliveries from the 1931 harvest, ibid., p. 48.
3: Ibid., pp. 103-04.
that the number of Soviet collective farms had shrunk to 4,800, or nearly 16 percent of the total number.

The system of measures aimed at "administrative-financial pressure on malicious non-deliverers of grain" (as defined by the Kherson oblast' party committee of the CP(B)U in one of its resolutions dated March 1932) continued to be perfected while it was being implemented.

The second half of 1932 was proclaimed as the most important phase in the harvesting of crops. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) (CC AUCP(B)) and the Council of People's Commissars (SNK USSR, or Sovnarkom) proclaimed their dissatisfaction with the pace of the state grain deliveries. Exhausted by the starvation that they had endured before, the peasants simply could not work normally, nor did they want to give up all their harvested grain to the Soviet state. This was the pretext for applying a variety of repressive measures, including the complete ban on trading grain, the suspension of issuing grain in the form of advances or for communal feeding, and so on.

One of the means for spurring the population to deliver grain promptly was to supply "leading" collective farms with scarce manufactured goods. Already on October 30, 1932 the resolution passed by the CC CP(B)U on measures to step up the state grain deliveries mentioned that raions and collective farms that "are successfully struggling to complete the plan" would be supplied with such goods, while the "delivery of manufactured goods to raions and collective farms that are not ensuring the fulfillment of the state grain delivery plan" would be reduced. This was the very lever that was seized by Stalin's emissary to Ukraine, Viacheslav Molotov, who informed his Moscow patron: "We are using manufactured goods as a tool of encouragement, and the deprival of some manufactured goods as a repression against collective farms and particularly with respect to independent farmers." In one of his proposals concerning the stimulation of the state grain deliveries, the other "commander of the great famine," Mendel Khataevich, the secretary of the CC CP(B)U, suggested the following: "Implement a reduction in the delivery of manufactured goods to raions that are poorly fulfilling the state grain delivery plan – in Odesa oblast' as well as in seven raions of Dnipropetrovsk [oblast'] – the delivery of goods to the latter is suspended. Cotton, footwear, window glass are sold only to conscientious grain deliverers. . . ."

In time, the party leaders made what they considered to be another effective move. In their struggle against "malicious enemies" who were refusing

4. Ibid., p. 359.
5. Telephoned telegram dated October 20, 1932 from Viacheslav Molotov to Joseph Stalin about the measures for fulfilling the state grain deliveries in Ukraine, ibid., p. 360.
to deliver their food supplies to the state, the party-Soviet organs of the USSR began to institute a system of “blacklists,” one of the Soviets’ most brutal repressive measures.

The concept of blacklists and its very essence were formed gradually during all of 1932. On November 6 a decision passed by the CC CP(B)U announced the “goods blockade of raions that are not fulfilling the state grain delivery plan.” Included on this blacklist were eight raions in Dnipropetrovsk oblast’ (Apostolove, Vasylkiv, Vasyliv, Velyka-Lepetykha, Mykhailivka, Nykopil, Nyzhni Strohozy, Solone); two in Donetsk oblast’ (Artemivsk [as stated in the document; however, there was no such raion at the time, only the Artemivsk city soviet – HP] and Staro-Mykolsky); three in Kyiv oblast’ (Baryshivka, Makariv, Malyn); seven in Odesa oblast’ (Andriievo-Ivanivka, Velyka Oleksandrivka, Zinovievsk, Kryve Ozera, Liubashivka, Troitske, Frunze); eight in Kharkiv oblast’ (Balakliia, Bryhadyrivka, Valky, Izium, Kobeliaky, Novo-Heorhiivske, Onufriivka, Sakhnivshchyna; and two in Chernihiv oblast’ (Bobrynets, Nosivka) – 28 raions out of the total of 357 administrative units that existed within the administrative bounds of the Ukrainian SSR (or 8 percent). The goods blockade was based on the crucial reduction of deliveries of manufactured goods and foodstuffs (with the exception of salt, matches, and gas) to the residents of raions that had managed to complete no more than 30 percent of the fixed grain delivery plan. Thus, the entire population of the above-mentioned administrative units ended up outside the bounds of normal life because it could neither sell nor purchase anything.

The next step closer to the introduction of the blacklists consisted of measures that were adopted in the struggle against independent farmers, who still comprised up to 20 percent of the entire peasant population of Ukraine and who were expecting to survive thanks to their own food surpluses, which theoretically should have been left in their hands after fulfilling their obligations to the state. But the Bolshevik state did everything to prevent this. The resolution passed on November 11, 1932 by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR (RNK URSR, or Radnarkom), entitled “On the Organization of the State Grain Deliveries in the Independent Farming Sector,” contained an instruction on the application of the following repressive-forcible measures: the expulsion of independent peasants—“non-deliverers” from rural soviets and other self-governing bodies, rural consumer societies, evictions, court prosecutions, and so on. Such actions were aimed at compelling the peasants to give up all their grain and other food surpluses that were available on their farms, in keeping with the plan issued from above (in Bolshevik newspeak this was called kontraktatsia (contracting), self-obligation, or tverdozdavannia (fixed delivery). The following was stated

7. Telegram from the CC CP(B)U to oblast’ party committees about the goods blockade, ibid., pp. 374-75.
with regard to one of these methods: "The delivery of manufactured goods to all independent farmsteads that are shirking the fulfillment of the state grain delivery plan must be immediately suspended pending the complete fulfillment by them of the state grain deliveries. Lists of such independent farmsteads must be hung in shops belonging to Rural Consumer Societies, state trading and community organizations in the countryside. [. . .] At the same time, with regard to independent farmsteads that are shirking their obligations, the work concerning the collection of mandatory cash payments, like the agricultural tax, state insurance, self-taxed, agricultural credit payments from villages must be stepped up, in necessary cases applying measures of incontestable exactions." And although the instruction mentioned pro forma that such measures "should, by no means, however, take on the character of mass, indiscriminate repressions, mass searches, etc.," the real directives of the Soviet government consisted of this: "... the most brutal and harshest measures from among those enumerated here must be immediately applied ... ."8

The switch from purely prescriptive and restrictive measures to more active ones, involving the collection of payments and debts, was thus initiated. At the same time, they had a brutal form because the phrase "incontestable collections" meant the forcible confiscation of debtors' entire property. Exactly within one week these harsh measures were supplemented by even more brutal ones: the resolution passed by the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U on November 18 described the use of fines in kind "with regard to independent farmers who are maliciously sabotaging the grain deliveries (according to contracting or self-obligation)" "in the form of establishing additional targets for meat deliveries equal to a 15-month meat delivery quota," as well as an "annual quota of potato deliveries."9

But it quickly became obvious that even these government actions were inadequate for completing the established target: the creation of inhumane living conditions for the entire Ukrainian peasantry. Both independent farmers and members of collective farms, who had already acquired bitter experience in the period between late 1931 and the spring of 1932, were resorting to their own measures in order to ensure their survival in these extreme conditions: they began hiding some of their surplus for the hungry winter.

At that point the party and Soviet administrators instituted one of the levers of the agrarian policy dating to the period of "war communism" in 1917-1920: the system of blacklists, i.e., the deprival of certain populated areas, because of their "offenses" against the state (primarily their unwillingness to surrender their grain to the authorities), of the right to obtain scarce manufactured goods, together with the publication of such lists in the press. There was a distorted logic to this: in the fifteenth year of Soviet rule, just like during

8. Ibid., pp. 384-86.
9. Ibid., pp. 393-94.
the first, the authorities had to break the peasants’ resistance by repressive means and to destroy “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists.”

To this day there is no agreement about the exact date when the blacklists were introduced. But certain data allow us to confirm that these repressions began to be applied significantly earlier – in early 1932 or even 1931. According to the data contained in a composite list of populated areas and collective farms in Ukraine that were placed on blacklists, which was compiled by the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory on the basis of data from various regions, the chronology and geography of the introduction of these repressions are as follows:

**Donetsk oblast**: the information on the blacklisting of eight collective farms and raion organizations in Bilovodske raion is dated March 1, April, June, and September 1932.10

**Kyiv oblast**: The Oleksandriia rural soviet of the Bila Tserkva city soviet was already blacklisted in August 1932, and the Zarichany and Rotok rural soviets of the same city soviet – in September.11

**Odesa oblast**: On January 15, 1932 the Frunze collective farm of the Dmytrivka rural soviet in Znamianka raion (today: part of Kirovohrad oblast) was placed on the blacklist; in August 1932 – the Dolynivka, Zhyvanivka, Kozyrivka, Komshuvatska, Lozovatka, Nazarivka, Fedorivka, and Cherniakhivka rural soviets; in September – the Hannivka and Hermanivka rural soviets; on October 16 populated areas on the territory of today’s Kherson oblast (the villages of Babyne, Velykyi Bolhrad, Petrivka, Smidovychi) were blacklisted.14

In **Chernihiv oblast** (the territory of today’s Sumy oblast) the blacklisting of the town of Buryn and various suburban collective farms, as well as the Holovne, Kupetske, Mykolaivka, and Mykhailivka rural soviets took place in October 1932,15 although the first such case in this region – concerning the Lushnyky, Pyrohivka, and Tymonivka rural soviets in Shostka raion – is dated early June.16 The “Molotov,” “Shevchenko,” “Ukrainets,” “Dniprova khvylia,” “Petrovsky,” “Stalin,” “First of May,” and “Red Donbas” artels in the village of Popova Sloboda were blacklisted on August 10, 1932.17

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10 See the newspaper *Chervonyi kolhospnyk* (Voroshylovhrad), March 1, May 14, June 29, and September 30, 1932.
11. See the newspaper *Radianska nyva* (Bila Tserkva), August 27 and 31; September 8, 10, 22, 1932.
12. See the State Archive of Kirovohrad Oblast’, fond P-68, list 1, file 5, fol. 5.
13. See the newspaper *Sotsialistychni nastup* (Zinovievsk), August 17, October 2, 1932.
14. See the newspaper *Komuna stepu*, October 16, 1932.
15. See the newspaper *Kolektyvist Buryshchyny*, October 22, 1932; and *Zoria* (Shostka), October 28, 1932.
16. See the newspaper *Zoria*, June 9, 1932.
17. See the newspaper *Kolektyvist Buryshchyny*, August 8, 1932.
Independent farmers in twelve villages of Chernihiv raion were blacklisted in October.\(^{18}\)

In Dnipropetrovsk oblast' (today: Zaporizhia oblast') the first information on the use of blacklists also appeared in October, when the Bilenke, Kuprianivska, Malokaterynivka, Mar’ivka, Matviiv, Novokaterynivka, Rozumivka, Smolianka, and Stepne rural soviets were added to the blacklist by a decision of the local authorities.\(^{19}\)

Thus, this compiled information about the blacklists allows scholars to confirm that by the summer of 1932 this type of repression was being applied sporadically; it became more widespread by the summer, and from the month of October it was applied quite broadly. Of the then current administrative units of the Ukrainian SSR, it seems that only Vinnytsia and Kharkiv oblast’s avoided this fate.

The concrete circumstances surrounding the announcement of this type of repressive measure even before the adoption of the all-republican resolution may be traced on the basis of examples of several local party organizations. Thus, on the territory of today’s Sumy oblast’ (formerly: Chernihiv oblast’), on November 15, 1932 the bureau of the Seredyna-Buda raion party committee of the CP(B)U passed a secret resolution about blacklisting the village of Chernatske in connection with “the disgraceful state of fulfilling the state grain deliveries (56.6 percent has been completed as of November 15, 1932).” The following measures were applied to its inhabitants: all the merchandise was removed from the village of Chernatske and transferred to the leading village of Pyharivka; the resolution was widely covered by the raion press; and the raion newspaper Konopliar Seredyno-Budy was ordered to cover the state grain deliveries by organizing an away editorial board. The raion leadership was subjected to repressions “for [its] opportunistic attitude to the state grain deliveries, for the tardy completion of the plan with respect to each deliverer, which wrecked the plan for the village of Chernatske; the head of the rural soviet, c[omrade] Okopsky, is to be removed from his post in the village of Chernatske and transferred to lower-level rural work; the secretary of the party center, c[omrade] Sydorenko, is to be given a severe reprimand with a warning advising him that if there is no breakthrough in the state grain delivery in the next ten days, the question of his membership in the party ranks will be posed.”\(^{20}\)

The next day the bureau of the Konotop raion party committee in Sumy oblast’ discussed a similar question. A characteristic feature of this resolution

18. See the newspaper Chervonyi stiah (Chernihiv), October 13, 20, 23, and 25, 1932.
19. See the newspaper Chervone Zaporizhia, October 23, 27, and 29, 1932.
20. Minutes of an extraordinary meeting of the bureau of the Seredyna-Buda raion party committee of the CP(B)U held jointly on November 15, 1932 with leading raion party activists about blacklisting the village of Chernatske. See the State Archive of Sumy Oblast’, fond P-33, list 1, file 211, fols. 106-107.
was the simultaneous blacklisting of several villages (Bochechky, Kozatske, Malyi Sambir, and Khyzhky); a warning about blacklisting that was issued to a group of “candidates” (Velykyi Sambir, Sosnivka, Semianivka, Yurivka, Shevchenkove) with a trial deadline of December 1; and the absence of a list of repressive measures targeting the above-mentioned villages. The resolution only mentioned that “all measures against villages that appear on the blacklist” will be applied to them. This could mean only one thing: the existence and universal expansion of this list of measures. Also noteworthy is the involvement in these repressions of the head of the raion GPU division, the prosecutor, and the judge, who were relieved of their duties as plenipotentiaries of the raion party committee in individual villages so that they could focus on examining grain delivery cases.21

There is a simple explanation for the intensification of repressive measures during the autumn season: according to Stanislav Kosior, the general secretary of the CC CP(B)U, “[w]e began to enhance the party organization with regard to the state grain deliveries” only in November. In normal language this meant that in the fall of 1932, after the harvest had already been gathered and there were no other sources of food left, the time had come to make life intolerable for the people and to throw all the forces of the Communist Party apparatus, from the highest echelon to the lowest-level party centers, into the struggle against the peasantry.

At this very time the higher party-Soviet leadership decided to support a local “initiative” that completely dovetailed with the strategy of escalating the struggle for the physical destruction of the Ukrainian peasantry. The initiator of its all-Ukrainian application as a means of creating unbearable conditions for survival in a certain area was the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U. The very term “blacklists” and its tragic substance on the all-Ukrainian level appeared for the very first time in the above-mentioned resolution of the Ukrainian republic’s party headquarters, dated November 18, 1932, as one of the “measures for intensifying the state grain deliveries,” which were applied in order to overcome “kulak influence.” The substance of these repressive actions, which were clearly directed at the physical destruction of the Ukrainians, was the following: the immediate suspension of all trade (both state and cooperative); the delivery of any kind of merchandise, with the confiscation of all existing goods; the suspension of the collective farm trade; the suspension of any form of crediting and the pre-deadline collection of credits and other financial obligations, which had been issued earlier; and a thorough “purge” of “counter-revolutionary elements” among the members of collective farms.22 The official state act introducing this policy was the resolution passed on November 20, 1932 by the RNK of the Ukrainian SSR, entitled

“On the Struggle against the Kulak Element on Collective Farms” and the Instruction to it (which has still not been published by Holodomor researchers). The instruction declared “that in order to overcome kulak resistance to the state grain deliveries, collective farms that are maliciously sabotaging the delivery (sale) of grain according to the government plan are to be placed on a blacklist.” This was followed by the entire verbatim text of the party resolution, the sole difference being that the resolution of the republican party headquarters was written in Russian while the RNK resolution was in Ukrainian. Oblast’ executive party committees were granted the right to blacklist collective farms.23

Immediately after the adoption of these party-Soviet decisions, a campaign was unfolded to circulate them to local bodies and stimulate the formation of appropriate lists. Already on November 21 the Chernihiv oblast’ party committee of the CP(B)U sent a directive to raion party committees immediately to submit lists of farmsteads that are “sabotaging the state grain deliveries” so that they could be placed on blacklists.24

Within a few days after the official announcement, these repressions began to be applied in an extraordinarily broad manner. On November 26, 1932, O. Serbychenko, the deputy head of the RNK of the Ukrainian SSR, sent the republican party headquarters a summary of information compiled on the basis of data from various oblast’s pertaining to blacklisted collective farms (unpublished to date). In his cover letter Serbychenko directed the attention of the CC CP(B)U to local “excesses,” among which he included the excessively broad application of the system of blacklists (eight raions in Vinnytsia oblast’); the use of repressions targeting not only collective farms but also entire villages and rural soviets (in the Autonomous Moldavian SSR [part of the Ukrainian SSR until 1940], Donetsk oblast’); and excessive fines (an average of up to 1,000 karbovantsi per farmstead in Dnipropetrovsk oblast’, an average of 382 karbovantsi per farmstead in Chernihiv oblast’). In connection with these excesses, Serbychenko requested instructions.25 It is not known whether he received any, but it is clear that the deputy head of the Ukrainian government was demonstrating “political short-sightedness,” according to the terminology of the day: Serbychenko had not understood the party’s policy and had not kept track of its “general line.” Meanwhile, the republican contingent of the AUCP(b) was demanding that all possible and unfeasible means be used in order to depopulate the territory of Ukraine. Information compiled (less than a week after the Ukrainian RNK passed its resolution) contained the following data as of November 26:

23. See the uncertified collotype copy of the resolution in the Central State Archive of the Higher Organs of Power and Administration of Ukraine (TsDAVO Ukrainy), fond 806, list 1, file 22, fol. 532.
Vinnytsia oblast*: 8 raions (all villages and collective farms in Bratslav, Lypovets, Liubar, Nemyriv, Stanislavchyk, Chudniv, Khmelnytsky, and Tulchyn raions), 39 villages, 33 collective farms.

Dnipropropetrovsk oblast*: 85 collective farms.

Donetsk oblast*: 4 villages and 4 rural soviets.

Chernihiv oblast*: 13 collective farms, 38 villages, and 1,646 independent farmsteads.

Kharkiv oblast*: as of November 23 not one village or collective farm had been blacklisted.

Autonomous Moldavian SSR: 2 collective farms and 1 village.

Since Kyiv and Odesa oblast’s had not sent their information on time, they did not figure in the data, although, as we have seen, blacklists had already appeared there in the summer (no later than August). In addition, the information sent by the RNK of the Ukrainian SSR mentions the proposals made by two oblast' executive committees with regard to the inclusion in the all-Ukrainian blacklist of the villages of Horiachivka in Kryzhopil raion, Liubar Station in Liubar raion, Karpivtsi in Chudniv raion, Mazurivka in Khmelnytsky raion, Turbiv in Lypovets raion of Vinnytsia oblast’; the villages of Astakhove in Rovenetske raion and Hurzuf in Mariupil raion, and the “Vladyka” collective farm in Staro-Mykolskyi raion in Donetsk oblast’.

According to the data submitted by the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (Narkomzem), as of December 2, 1932 the situation had already changed significantly, and the distribution of blacklists throughout the republic was as follows:

Vinnytsia oblast*: the same 8 raions; in other raions there were an additional 44 collective farms and independent farmsteads in 42 villages.

Dnipropropetrovsk oblast*: 228 collective farms in 44 raions.

Donetsk oblast*: 12 collective farms, 6 villages, 2 rural soviets, and independent farmsteads in 25 villages.

Kyiv oblast*: 51 collective farms in 48 villages in 19 raions.

Odesa oblast*: 12 collective farms in 9 raions.

Kharkiv oblast*: 23 collective farms in 16 villages in 9 raions.

Chernihiv oblast*: 13 collective farms, 38 villages, 1,646 independent farmsteads.

AMSSR: 2 collective farms and 1 village.

The information supplied by the Narkomzem noted the same shortcomings in the application of blacklists that were mentioned in Serbychenko’s letter: the inclusion not only of collective farms but entire raions, rural soviets, villages, and independent farmsteads; and their blacklisting not only by oblast-level government bodies but also by raion-level ones. It was an irony of fate

26. Central State Archive of Civic Associations of Ukraine (TsDAHO Ukrainy), fond 1, list 20, file 5394, fols. 8-10.

that very soon such “shortcomings,” inasmuch as they were part and parcel of the party’s general policy, were transformed into quotidian practice. The logic of the Bolsheviks’ anti-peasant struggle led to the mass application of these types of repressive measures. They were directed against administrative and agricultural units, institutions, enterprises, and even individual people. They were applied by central and oblast’-level party-Soviet organs, although this question was frequently decided also on the raion level. Furthermore, oblast’ party committees had broached the question of creating an all-Ukrainian blacklist and even tapped candidates for it: 5 villages in Vinnytsia oblast’, 12 in Kyiv oblast’, and 4 in Odesa oblast’.

The central Ukrainian government willingly supported such local initiatives, which sped up the pace of repressions. Thus, on December 6, 1932 the CC CP(B)U and the RNK of the Ukrainian SSR passed a joint resolution “On the Blacklisting of Villages That Are Maliciously Sabotaging the State Grain Deliveries.” As a result, six populated areas in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kharkiv oblast’s were subjected to complete restrictions on the delivery of goods, trade, and crediting “for manifest wrecking of the grain delivery plan and malicious sabotage,” and both state and cooperative activists as well as collective farmers from the above-mentioned villages were “purged.”

It is interesting to note that this resolution contradicted the previous one (dated November 18), since the entities that were blacklisted were not collective farms, as single units of “socialist” agriculture, and not even rural soviets, as individual administrative-agricultural units, but individual villages, i.e., a certain locale complete with all its inhabitants – collective farmers, independent farmers, craftsmen, workers, teachers, et al. Without a doubt, this resolution once again underscored that the goal of the Bolsheviks’ policy was not the fulfillment of the state grain delivery plan (this was only the pretext) but the destruction of the peasantry and of all those who lived in the countryside. For that reason the Ukrainian party headquarters was not troubled by the contradiction between the two resolutions. It may be assumed that it was precisely this way – unofficially – that the latest “local initiative” concerning the expansion of the system of blacklists to include any kind of entity, not just collective farms, was approved. It should also be noted that subsequently the personnel of Machine-Tractor Stations (MTSs), forestry enterprises, the staff of raion institutions (even juridical consultations that did not have any connection whatsoever to agriculture), and individual collective farmers were blacklisted for not showing up to work, and so on. The blacklists became a universal weapon directed against all rural residents.

The first phrase in the party resolution, which substantiates the need for such repressions, is striking. It reads: “In view of the particularly disgraceful failure of the state grain deliveries in individual raion’s of Ukraine . . .” This creates the impression that the republican contingent of the AUCP(B) had deliberately laid it on thickly, having reduced the indices concerning the fulfillment of the state grain delivery plan in order to have a free hand in apply-
ing repressions and creating conditions that were incompatible with life. Even in his speech at the CC CP(b)U plenum held on January 24, 1934 Kosior declared that, in reality, instead of the declared 356 million poods of grain that were harvested in 1932, only 255 million poods had been delivered (although the Ukrainian SSR’s target had been officially reduced by 138 million poods, and it was therefore necessary to deliver 218 million poods). The propagandistic goal of the resolution on the blacklists was also transparent: to frighten, to make other peasants compliant, and to spur local organs to engage in more intensive work to fulfill the party’s directives. This becomes obvious from an analysis of the text of a telegram sent by the CC and RNK to the leaders of the above-mentioned three oblast’s, which contained an instruction to implement the resolution. Stanislav Kosior and Vlas Chubar insisted on the “decisive and ultimate” implementation of repressive measures and the use of all forms of political work, and so on. The following was indicated with regard to repressed villages: “In villages that have fallen under the kulak’s sway [and] been placed on the blacklist in keeping with the resolution of the CC and the RNK, it is essential to wrest the better part of the collective farmers and individual farmers by appropriately structuring organizational-political work, and with their active participation not only to make short work of the kulaks and their accomplices, but also to liquidate their influence on collective farms and among independent farmers, [and] achieve the completion of the state grain delivery plan.”

Clearly, the expression “to make short work of the kulaks” was in fact a direct order. If the issue at hand was not their physical destruction, then at the very least it meant the implementation of an entire set of other repressions: confiscations of property, evictions, and prosecution in the courts. This was actually cloaked encouragement of mob law targeting the “kulaks,” because the party leadership sought to proclaim their very existence as the primary reason for the creation of the inhumane living conditions in repressed villages.

Information about such “reprisals” is contained in a newspaper report about the state of affairs in the blacklisted village of Pisky (the A. Marti collective farm) in Bashtanka raion in Odesa oblast’. One month from the day that the repressions were announced, the warehouse man at this collective farm was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, and the residents of 30 farmsteads were deported from Ukraine. But the agricultural affairs correspondent named another seven “kulaks” who were allegedly sabotaging the state grain deliveries, emphasizing that they were not the only ones. In his report the writer urges the authorities “not to treat them with kid gloves” but “to fight to cleanse the black stain” with tons of grain shipped out of the village.

In addition to all the repressions mentioned above, the republican blacklist meant that the central and local government bodies also carried out other sig-

28. Ibid., pp. 450-51.
29. The newspaper Pid praporom Lenina (Bashtanka), January 19, 1933.
significant actions. Although the author does not have a list of these measures, it is reasonable to assume that they were applied, bearing in mind the final point of the resolution adopted by the CC CP(b)U and the RNK of the Ukrainian SSR on October 17, 1933 with regard to the removal of the village of Kamiani Potoky from the blacklist. It talks about the rescinding of “all resolutions and orders of people’s commissariats, the Kharkiv oblast’ executive committee, and other central, oblast’, and raion organs with regard to the application of any kinds of repressions or restrictions against the village of Kamiani Potoky in connection with its inclusion in the blacklist.”

Clearly, each organ, depending on its competence and level, added something to make life intolerable in a particular area.

The peak of the blacklisting measures was recorded in late November and December 1932, by which time more than 80 percent of all populated areas, collective farms, rural soviets, and raions had been placed on blacklists, concerning which there is documentation about the implementation of this type of repression. A letter sent from the CC CP(b)U to the CC AUCP(b), dated December 8, cites the figure of 400 collective farms that were subjected to this repressive measure, but this is clearly not the final tally because in early December 1932 Dnipropetrovsk oblast’ alone comprised more than half of this total. The question of arriving at accurate estimates today is complicated by the lack of coordination: it is impossible to tally how many collective farms were in each raion, rural soviet, or individual village.

The question of the authority to draw up blacklists was practically not on the agenda. For the most part, the Soviet authorities followed the proclaimed system whereby such a list was the responsibility of the oblast’. An example of this activity is the resolution passed by the Donetsk oblast’ executive committee on December 5, 1932, which blacklisted the collective farms “Nove zhyttia,” “Voroshilov,” “Chervonyi partyzan,” “Peremoha,” “Povna derevnia,” and “9 sichnia,” which were located in various raions; the collective farm in the village of Zvirivka in Hryshyne raion, the village of Nova Derevnia in Starokaran raion, the collective and independent farmers of the Dubrovka rural soviet in Chystiakove raion, and so on. There is also a resolution that was adopted by the bureau of the oblast’ party committee of the CP(B)U and the oblast’ organizational bureau (like in Chernihiv oblast’).

The classic model of the procedure for adopting resolutions on blacklists is reflected in documents stored in the State Archive of Vinnytsia oblast’. On November 19 the oblast’ executive committee adopted a resolution entitled “On the Course of the State Grain Deliveries in the Oblast’s Raions,” the real content of which is revealed in the very first point: “The raions, villages, collective farms, [and] independent farmsteads in villages, mentioned below,

which under the influence of kulak and grabber elements have stepped onto the path of sabotaging the state grain deliveries – by not fulfilling their duty to the proletarian state – are to be placed on the blacklist [followed by a lengthy list: H.P.]."³² A few days earlier, on November 17, the bureau of the Vinnytsia oblast’ party committee of the CP(B)U passed a resolution with a nearly identical title, which notes the following: “Within a 24-hour period the [communist: H.P.] fraction of the oblast’ executive committee is to issue a resolution about blacklisting those raions, villages, and collective farms that are maliciously sabotaging the state grain deliveries. The draft of the resolution (appended) is to be confirmed.”³³ With a delay of one day the oblast’ executive committee obediently carried out the party directive, and its decision duplicated the draft resolution of the oblast’ party headquarters.

However, intensive activity was frequently found in both party and Soviet raion-based organs, such as, bureaus of raion party committees and presidiums of raion executive committees, i.e., a streamlined membership of these local bodies (as a rule, consisting of up to 10 people). This type of resolution was passed on October 29, 1932 by the raion executive committee of Buryn raion in Sumy oblast’; on November 15, by the Seredyna-Buda raion party committee; and on November 16, by the bureau of the Konotop raion party committee of the CP(B)U.³⁴ A mixed system of designating candidates for death by starvation functioned in Dolyna raion of Dnipropetrovsk oblast’ (today: the territory of Kirovohrad oblast’). Thus, the village of Ivanivka was blacklisted by a decision passed by the bureau of the raion party committee of the CP(B)U on December 3, 1932, while the villages of Hurivka and Oleksandrivka ended up on the blacklist as a result of a decision handed down on November 12 by the presidium of the raion executive committee, with the raion party committee supporting it somewhat later, on November 21.³⁵ Traditionally, such decisions – no less than a death sentence for the inhabitants of specific locales – were widely covered by the party-Soviet press. Not even the impediment of a “Top Secret” stamp that usually accompanied such decisions stood in their way. The party headquarters would adopt a special resolution on the publication in the press of certain points from its resolution.

The cynicism of the party-Soviet leadership resided in the fact that it demanded a full-blown propaganda campaign to trumpet its repressions: not simply to make a broad announcement about them, but to enlist “popular support.” But its greatest arrogance lay in the organization of approval for these repressive actions on the part of the very population that was being de-

³². State Archive of Vinnytsia Oblast’, fond R-2700, list 1, file 1, fols. 175-76.
³³. Ibid., fond P-136, list 1, file 17, fols. 20-23.
³⁴. See State Archive of Sumy Oblast’, fond P-2303, list 1, file 23, fol. 5; fond P-33, list 1, file 211, fol. 106; fond P-42, list 1, file 168, fol. 83.
prived of any chances for survival. Thus, on December 25, 1932 a general meeting of women took place at the Chernatske rural soviet, which had been blacklisted on November 15. Under the keen eye of the party, it adopted a unanimous resolution supporting the application of repressive measures against those who were "sabotaging" the state grain delivery.36

Very soon the party-Soviet organs acknowledged the negligible effect of their measures. It turned out to be impossible to halt trade entirely. As noted in the information prepared by the Ukrainian agriculture ministry on December 2, 1932, "the residents of such raions and villages have not been deprived of the possibility to purchase goods in neighboring villages or raions." A declaration issued by the CC CP(B)U states that "the countryside is already quite saturated with goods," noting that those that were needed on a daily basis could still be purchased at higher prices. Greater effectiveness was attributed to fines that were actively used in the future, as well as to pre-deadline collections of fines in kind.

At the local level, repressive measures were even more brutal, taking the form of a struggle against relatives of peasants working in industry and transport; a reduction of the acreage of collective farms; the dispatching of brigades of "plenipotentiaries"; the confiscation of farm animals, and so on. Thus, locales that were placed on blacklists ended up being outside the law, and additional measures that were not covered by normative acts were applied against them. In keeping with a decision passed on December 28, 1932 by the Berdiansk raion executive committee of Dnipropetrovsk oblast', the following measures, in addition to the ban on trade, was applied against the blacklisted collective farms "Shevchenko" (Novooleksiivka rural soviet) and "Chervonyi stiah" (Nohai rural soviet): the urgent (by December 28) collection of all debts; the levying of fines in kind on meat, with delivery by January 5, 1933; a ban on all kinds of grinding; and the dispatching of brigades that were supposed to ensure all this.37 On January 21, 1933 the (female) secretary of the Melitopil raion party committee and head of the raion executive committee in what was then Dnipropetrovsk oblast' sent a secret directive to Soviet and party centers of the Kostiantynivka rural soviet about the blacklisted "Radianskyi steppe" collective farm, with the demand that the following measures be applied: the removal of all grain that was previously issued to the collective farmers; the extinguishment of all debts within 48 hours and afterwards – on account of debts, the meat tax, and fines in kind – the confiscation of cattle, domestic fowl, and other valuable property from each collective farmer; the order to all collective farms to return 200 tons of grain (allegedly pilfered and concealed) by January 24. Otherwise, they would face

36. Minutes of the general meeting of women from the "Chervonyi zhovten" collective farm of the Chernatske rural soviet of Seredyna-Buda raion, dated December 25, 1932. See the State Archive of Sumy Oblast', fond P-33, list 1, file 227, fols. 15-16.
prosecution in the courts. By January 25 all advances in kind were to be returned. If this directive were not carried out, members of the Communist Party and the Komsomol would be expelled, and collective farmers would be banished from their collective farms.\textsuperscript{38}

In Sumy oblast' the Soviet authorities devised another step in order to exert influence on the peasants through their worker-relatives: they ordered the party centers at factories in Shostka "to carry out efforts among the workers with a connection to agriculture by forcing them immediately to fulfill the grain delivery targets, [and] applying such measures as dismissal from work [and] expulsion from professional unions to individual malicious non-deliverers."\textsuperscript{39}

The list of repressive measures connected with the blacklists, which was conveyed to the general public, was constantly being expanded. There is evidence indicating that the State Bank of the Ukrainian SSR had a hand in this. The head of the bank's Trostianets branch issued an order to close all the accounts of collective farms and to institute the pre-deadline collection of all types of loans held by these farms. The head of the bank branch himself went to the village of Boromlia in order to implement these exactions from the repressed collective farms.\textsuperscript{40}

The example of the village of Horodyshche in Voroshilov raion of Donetsk oblast', which was blacklisted in November 1932, proves that the local authorities, who were terrified by the directions issued from above, tried to save their own skins and positions by creating appalling conditions for the residents of blacklisted villages. Since that village was located near Debaltseve Station, which was a factor in encouraging illegal trading in and around the station, and a significant part of the population worked in mines and cottage craft industries, and owned substantial garden plots, the Soviet regime's usual repressive blacklisting measures did not produce the desired results. So the Voroshilov municipal party committee of the CP(B)U devised the following: a closed list was drawn up for the delivery of goods, from which were removed more than 1,000 members of families of collective farmers and independent farmers, who worked in various industries; the pre-deadline collection of more than 23,500 karbovantsi worth of credits; and the confiscation of a collective farm's sowing fund on account of the state grain deliveries. In addition, the municipal party committee requested permission from the oblast' party committee to levy a meat fine equal to a 15-month quota, the confiscation of the finest plots of land for the coalminers' warehouse, the dismissal from industrial enterprises of a minimum of 150 members of fami-

\textsuperscript{38} The State Archive of Zaporizhia Oblast', fond P-233, list 3, file 2, fol. 16.

\textsuperscript{39} Resolution dated November 16, 1932. See the State Archive of Sumy Oblast', fond P-25, list 1, file 24, fols. 162-64.

lies living in Horodyshche, who had been accused of wrecking the grain delivery, and, in the event of further “sabotage,” the deportation of the guilty parties to the Soviet Far North.41

The local leaders’ fear for their lives was not unjustified. For example, the Kharkiv oblast’ party committee of the CP(B)U adopted a very harsh stance toward the officials dispatched from the oblast’, who were mandated to ensure that the grain delivery plans were carried out on blacklisted collective farms. For their “criminal inactivity [and] the absence of a struggle against kulak sabotage,” four of them were recalled from raions and placed under investigation by the party, while the secretaries of raion party committees were supposed to painstakingly examine the work of all the others. Within 24 hours the oblast’ party committee was supposed to dispatch other, “steadfast,” plenipotentiaries to replace those who had been dismissed. As for the local leaders, they were ordered to assume personal control and responsibility over the state of affairs on the named collective farms.42

In January 1933, when the raion authorities blacklisted the village of Herasymivka in Romen raion, Chernihiv oblast’, for “malicious sabotage of the state grain deliveries,” it was decided to “take legal action against [the head of the rural soviet, the head of the collective farm, and his board members], requesting the prosecutor’s office to indict them, with the proviso that the investigation be completed urgently and a show trial held in the village.”43 The words concerning prosecutorial control over blacklisted villages were no empty threat. This control was quotidian and all-encompassing; the fullest of all existing lists of repressed collective farms in Dnipropetrovsk oblast’ has been located in the archival collection of the regional prosecutor’s office.44

But even this broad understanding and application of repressive measures did not satisfy the higher party leadership. This question was raised at a meeting of the Politburo of the CC CP(B)U on December 20, 1932, during Kosior’s speech, which was based on materials relating to his trip to the Dnipropetrovsk region. According to the journal kept by Lazar Kaganovich, Kosior said: “The blacklists are not being implemented. That is why they are barely producing any results. Where there is a ban on trade, people are actively trading. Only between 25 and 30 percent of the designated amount of cash fines are being levied. For the most part, the organizers of sabotage still have not been exposed.”45 A few days later, Kaganovich spoke at a meeting

42. Resolution dated January 14, 1933, ibid., p. 603.
43. Resolution dated January 29, 1933. See the State Archive of Sumy Oblast’, fond R-4549, list 1, file 345, fols. 17-17verso.
44. See the State Archive of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast’, fond R-1520, list 1, file 9.
45. From Lazar Kaganovich’s journals of his trip to Ukraine on December 20-29, 1932. See Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini, p. 497.
held at the bureau of the Odesa oblast’ party committee, during which he pushed to increase pressure on the peasants. Resorting to a card-playing term, he said: “We have to up the ante so much in the countryside that the peasants themselves will be digging up holes.”

The ante was organized under the party’s meticulous control. The state of affairs in blacklisted populated areas and collective farms was constantly monitored. In early January 1933 the Kharkiv oblast’ party committee devoted a special discussion to the question of intensifying the state grain deliveries at such collective farms. There were 25 of them, yet only 3 had completed 100 percent of the grain deliveries (in Zinkiv, Novo-Heorhiivske, and Orzhysia raions). Therefore, the leaders of the Kharkiv communists put out a call to its activists “in no way to restrict themselves to half-measures in applying repressions.”

Naturally, the most attention was paid to those areas that had been proclaimed illegal.

Theoretically, the only way to be removed from a blacklist was to complete the state grain delivery plan. Indeed, out of all the populated areas of the three oblast’s mentioned in the resolution of the CC CP(B)U, only 2 villages – Havrylivka in Dnipropetrovsk oblast’ and Liutenky in Kharkiv oblast’ – were officially removed from the blacklist on January 25, 1933. This move was motivated by “serious shifts in the completion of the state grain delivery plan.” However, there is no additional information about other places being de-listed. Even the 3 collective farms in Kharkiv oblast’ that had reached their grain delivery targets in January 1933 were not formally removed from the blacklist. For its successes in the grain delivery campaign during the current year, the village of Kamiani Potoky (Kharkiv oblast’) was removed from the all-Ukrainian blacklist only in October 1933. The impression was being created that the government was in no rush to do this and was seeking to prolong the inhumane conditions that had been created in certain locales.

It is crucially important to carry out a comparative analysis of the list of blacklisted areas and the register of Ukrainian villages that suffered the most during the Holodomor. Regrettably, we still do not have the materials to conduct such a complex and all-encompassing analysis. For now, Vinnytsia and Dnipropetrovsk oblast’s will be cited as examples. A comparison between the information contained in a memorandum prepared by the Vinnytsia oblast’ health commission about starvation throughout the oblast’’s raions as of May 17, 1933 and the register of blacklisted raions tells a shocking story. The commission divided all the raions in the oblast’ into four categories: 1) raions that were almost completely overwhelmed by starvation; 2) raions that were significantly affected; 3) raions in which an insignificant number of villages were affected by the famine; and 4) raions where an insignificant num-

47. Ibid., p. 620.
ber of farmsteads in individual villages were starving. The first and second groups consist nearly entirely of blacklisted villages (with the exception of a single raion in the first category and one in the second); in the second and third categories there are 2 and 3 raions, respectively. There are also 13 raions concerning which there is information about the existence of populated areas that were blacklisted, but which are not mentioned among those where starvation was officially recorded. According to these far from complete official data from the Vinnytsia region, in May 1933 more than 90,000 people were starving in blacklisted raions.49

There is a different source of information about the starving population of Dnipropetrovsk oblast': this consists of operational logs of the OGPU of the Ukrainian SSR as of early March 1933. An analysis of the data confirms that all 14 raions in the oblast' (Akymivka, Apostolove, Velyka LepeTkha, Vysokopillia, Henicheske, Kaminske, Melitopol, Mezhova, Nyzhni Sirohozy, Novovasylivka, Pavlohrad, Piatykhatchky, Nykopil, and Sofivka),50 where the "most grievous situation" had been registered, are among the 48 raions/city soviets in which populated areas had been blacklisted. According to the OGPU's official information, 5,315 people were starving there, and 1,564 had already starved to death.

An even more interesting picture emerges from a comparative analysis of the blacklist and the plan for the raion-by-raion distribution throughout the oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR of resettlers from other regions of the Soviet Union, which was sent to Moscow by the People's Commissar of Agriculture, O. Odintsov. The plan called for settling 14 raions of Dnipropetrovsk oblast' (all of which were blacklisted), 13 raions of Odesa oblast' (8 of which were blacklisted), 10 raions of Donetsk oblast' (half of which were blacklisted), and 5 raions of Kharkiv oblast' (one of which was on the blacklist). From this we may conclude that the operation to destroy the Ukrainian countryside was in the final stage, and that following such effective repressions the area was ready to be settled by people from the RSFSR, the Belarusian SSR, and other regions of the Soviet Union.

According to current estimates, which have not been finalized yet, the scale of this artificially engineered calamity is as follows:

Vinnytsia oblast' (10.8 percent of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR with a rural population of 4,300,000): out of a total of 64 raions and 2 city soviets, 31 raions (including 5 entire raions and 1 city soviet) were blacklisted.

Dnipropetrovsk oblast' (16.5 percent of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR with a rural population of 2,770,000): out of 44 raions and 4 city soviets, 44 raions and city soviets were blacklisted.

49. Ibid., pp. 843-44.
50. Ibid., p. 726.
Donetsk <em>oblast</em> (11.8 percent of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR with a rural population of 1,841,000): out of 16 <em>raions</em> and 13 city soviets, 22 raions and city soviets were blacklisted.

Kyiv <em>oblast</em> (16.9 percent of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR with a rural population of 5,141,000): out of 74 <em>raions</em> and two city soviets, 11 <em>raions</em> and city soviets were blacklisted (incomplete data).

Odesa <em>oblast</em> (15.6 percent of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR with a rural population of 2,442,000): out of 56 <em>raions</em> and 4 city soviets, 29 <em>raions</em> and city soviets were blacklisted.

Kharkiv <em>oblast</em> (16.9 percent of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR with a rural population of 4,784,000): out of 60 <em>raions</em> and 4 city soviets, 31 <em>raions</em> and city soviets were blacklisted.

Chernihiv <em>oblast</em> (9.6 percent of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR with a rural population of 2,634,000): out of 35 <em>raions</em> and 1 <em>raion</em> soviet, 22 <em>raions</em> were blacklisted.

AMSSR (1.9 percent of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR with a rural population of 525,000): data missing.

Thus, the repressions that were associated with the system of blacklists targeted the inhabitants of nearly one-half of all <em>raions</em> and city soviets in Ukraine, with the exception of Dnipropetrovsk <em>oblast</em>, where such a system was in effect in almost every administrative unit of this region.

Certain standard features allow one to affirm that all of Ukraine ended up on Moscow’s blacklist or was, at the very least, subjected to one of its “soft” variants – the goods blockade. The final clause of the notorious resolution that was approved on December 14, 1932 by the CC AUCP(B) and the SNK of the USSR about the state grain delivery plan in Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus, and the Western <em>oblast</em> contains authorization to deliver goods to Ukrainian villages “in supplantation of the old decision” (it is not known what old decision is meant, as historians of the Holodomor have not come across such a decision) and grants specifically Kosior and Chubar the right to halt the delivery of goods “to the <em>raions</em> that are most in arrears.” This implies that a resolution had been adopted earlier about an all-out goods blockade of the entire Ukrainian countryside, as a result of which it was impossible to acquire a single nail, any kind of tool, salt, gas, and so on. The abatement of this system led to a situation where local representatives of the Moscow government were granted permission, at their own discretion, to further regulate this process aimed at crushing the Ukrainian peasantry.

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51. The author’s estimates are based on data submitted by <em>oblast</em>-based working groups involved in the National Memorial Book of the Victims of the 1932-1933 Holodomor and the publication <i>Administratyvno-terytorialniy Podil USSR za stanom na 1 hrudnia 1933 roku</i> (Kharkiv: VUTsVK Radianske budivnytstvo i pravo, 1933), pp. 6-7.

52. <i>Ibid.</i>, p. 475.
Based on the data compiled from various sources on the system of blacklists during the Holodomor genocide of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, the following conclusions may be reached. The system of blacklists was an important tool of the genocide engineered in the Ukrainian lands by the All-Union Communist Party. It is not enough to regard it only as a manifestation of "artificial isolationism." The issue was not so much the isolation of blacklisted populated areas as the creation in such blacklisted areas of conditions that were incompatible with life. The Soviet party leaders ordered the removal of all manufactured goods from these areas, even items used in everyday life; the closing of all bank accounts; the pre-deadline collection of advances; and the levying of excessive taxes and fines from the population, which took the form of the confiscation of cattle, domestic fowl, and personal property. Individual people were subjected to legal and administrative repressions; deportations and forcible confiscations of plots of land were widely practiced, and so on. In other words, an entire territory of catastrophe was being created, from which it was completely impossible to escape. Thus, all its residents were doomed to death by starvation.

The chronological introduction of the system of blacklists can in no way be restricted to the Communist Party resolutions that were issued between November 18 and December 6, 1932. These repressions were launched significantly earlier (at least from the spring of 1932), and they became widespread starting in October-November, i.e., the directives of the CP(B)U merely somewhat “standardized” a practice that had come into effect earlier, but did not initiate it. The system of blacklists lasted a long time, at least until the end of 1933, and, according to unconfirmed data, until the early part of 1934. The peak months of the repressions were November-December 1932 and January-March 1933, i.e., the period marked by the greatest starvation among the population, and the system of blacklists was an integral part of its causes.

Ukrainian Institute of National Memory
Translated from the Ukrainian by Marta D. Olynyk


54. There is information about the blacklisting on January 14, 1934 of the Yablunivka MTS in Pryluka raion of Chernihiv oblast’. See the State Archive of Chernihiv Oblast’, fond P-470, list 1, file 133, fol. 58.
THE QUESTION OF THE HOLODOMOR IN UKRAINE OF 1932-1933 IN THE POLISH DIPLOMATIC AND INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

The Holodomor in Ukraine of 1932-1933 is one of the greatest European tragedies of the twentieth century. It is also the greatest crime committed by the Bolshevik regime against the Ukrainian nation. As a result of the artificial famine at least three million people died. For years this tragedy in the Soviet Union and in other countries under the communist system (also in Poland) was "a non-existent phenomenon." The situation changed with Gorbachev's "perestroika". However in the Western countries this issue was researched from the beginning.

Apart from materials from Russian and Ukrainian archives, very important sources for this subject matter are the British, German, and Italian diplomatic reports published in 1988. Poland, also like Germany and Italy, had its own diplomatic posts in Ukraine. However, the Polish diplomatic and intelligence materials were unknown for the researchers until recently.


2. According to the Canadian historian Marco Carynnyk, more than 10,000 publications about the question of the Great Hunger were published up to the beginning of the 1990s in the West. See: Kollektivizatsiya i golod na Ukraini 1929-1933. Zbirnyk dokumentiv ta materialiv, red. C. Kulchyts'kyj ta iis. (Kiev: Naukova dumka, 1993), c. 14.


6. In 2007 the author of this article published in the Warsaw contemporary history quarterly Dzieje Najnowsze for the first time 17 Polish diplomatic and intelligence documents on the Great Famine (R. Kuśnierz, "Głód na Ukrainie w latach 1932-1933 w świetle zbiorów Archiwum Akt Nowych oraz Centralnego Archiwum Wojskowego w Warszawie," Dzieje Najnowsze, no. 2 [2007], pp. 129-59). In May 2008 – 70 documents (R. Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim." Głód na Ukrainie w latach 1932-1933 w świetle polskich dokumentów dyplomatycznych i doku-
The Polish consulates in Kharkiv and Kyiv and the legation (later: the embassy) in Moscow were a very credible source of information about the situation beyond the Zbruch River. Not only documents from the Polish state archives confirm this, but also published materials from other countries. On August 31, 1933 the German consul in Kyiv, Andor Henke, informed the German embassy in Moscow about the preparations in the town for a visit of the French politician Édouard Herriot. He stressed that the information was obtained from a “Polish colleague.” Polish vice-consul in Kyiv, Piotr Kurnicki, related on August 31, 1933, that the day before an office worker from the German consulate had reported to him and asked about some details connected with a stay of the French visitor in the town. Walter Duranty, The New York Times’ journalist in Moscow mentioned to the British embassy (unofficially he told that the population of Ukraine decreased by four to five million) about his meeting with the Polish consul from Kharkiv. The diplomat told him that his friend who had worked in the control commission was surprised by the fact that he did not get any reports from a certain locality. He decided to go there to check personally what had happened. Coming to the place he found an abandoned village, most of the houses were standing empty, while others contained only corpses.

The information about the famine did not have any influence on Polish-Soviet relationship. Other European countries and the United States due to economic and political reasons (e.g., rising danger from Hitler’s Germany) also did not want to worsen their relations with the Bolsheviks. Famine was regarded by the “civilized world” as “an interior problem” of the Soviet Union and nobody wanted to interfere in it. The president of the Ukrainian Club in Geneva, Yevhen Bachynsky, showed this problem very accurately in a letter to the Ukrainian Relief Committee in Lviv (ukr. Громадський комітет рятунку України) on April 14, 1934: “In Geneva reigns political indifference to the starving Ukrainians. They do not believe in it and they do not want to interfere in it. The diplomatic circles deal with the great politics where the most important issue is joining of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations. These politicians do not care about the death of millions of peasants.”
Piotr Kumicki in a letter to the Second Department of the General Staff of Polish Army (intelligence) accurately noticed that in the Western countries there is a kind of trend toward the Soviets and the rush into establishing “cultural” and general relations with this country. Furthermore, the statements of the “new experts” of the Soviet’s life, even without the Soviet propagandists, did a great favor to the regime.13

The materials from Polish diplomatic outposts in Ukraine as well as from the embassy in Moscow are stored in Warsaw: in the Central Archives of Modern Records (Archiwum Akt Nowych – AAN) and in the Central Military Archives (Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe – CAW). Most of the documents from AAN were destroyed during World War II. There had been left only a few dispatches presenting the tragic plight in the Ukrainian countryside during the famine of 1933 and also showing the situation in the next “post-famine” year, i.e., 1934. They are collected in groups: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych); Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Moscow (Ambasada RP w Moskwie) and Military Attaché in Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Moscow (Attaché Wojskowy przy Ambasadzie RP w Moskwie). The more complete materials are in CAW in a group: the Second Department of the General Staff (Oddział II Sztabu Głównego). There are diplomatic reports that were addressed to “dwójka”14 as well as reports of agents and co-workers of Polish intelligence.

It is necessary to emphasize that the great number of intelligence agents and co-workers were from the consular staff. During the mass starvation at Polish consulate in Kyiv (division “N”) the following intelligence outposts were operating:

- “Ku” – headed by vice-consul Piotr Kurnicki (pseud. Napoleon Nalewajko);
- “L. 11” – headed by Lucjan Giżycki (pseud. Norbert Neuman);
- “Z. 14” – headed by Maria Polońska (pseud. Nina Nowicka);

In Kiev a co-worker of the Second Department was also the consul Stanisław Sośnicki (pseud. Norman Nagel).

However, at Kharkiv consulate (division “O”) the next outposts were functioning in this period:

- “Z” – headed by Adam Stebłowski (pseud. Wariat; Zet);
- “Kpl” – headed by consul Tadeusz Pawłowski;

The auxiliary outpost of “M. 13” was outpost “H. 23” directed by Miłoszewski’s wife, Zofia Miłoszewska (pseud. Olga Oberman);
- “X. 22” – headed by Józefina Pisarczykówna (pseud. Ola Osmolska);
- “O-19” – headed by Stefan Mroszkiewicz (pseud. Adam Stefański and Antoni Lasocki);
- “Karsz” – headed by Jan Karszo-Siedlewski (pseud. Mikado);


Lieutenant Jerzy Niezbrzycki, the head of the Eastern Section (referat "Wschód") in the Second Department of the General Staff (in order to make contact with the intelligence outposts he used the following pseudonyms: Nora Nikiels; Nal Niemirowicz; Olgierd Orłowski; Wiktor Prawdzic, Narbut Nering), who ruled the above mentioned posts on June 10, 1933 entrusted Władysław Mitkiewicz (pseud. Nepomucyn Niewiarowski; Nazar Niewiemyj – outpost "B. 18") with the task ruling the outposts “Ku”; “L. 11”; “Z. 14”; “M. 13”; “H. 23”; “X. 22”. Mitkiewicz was soon assisted by Wiktor Zaleski (pseud. Nal Niger, outpost “B. 41”).

Polish diplomats could quite often watch on their own the terrible misery of the inhabitants of the Bolshevik state. On March 16, 1933 the head of the Polish Consulate General in Kharkiv, Jan Karszo-Siedlewski informed that the civil workers bringing the wood, coal and other products for consulate were grabbing peelings from potatoes and other scraps found in the bin, and the workers who throw rubbish away had eaten the food prepared for dogs on the consulate backyard.

One of the sources where Polish diplomats had taken information about the famine were the consulate’s petitioners. Their number was growing with the intensifying poverty and hunger. Jan Karszo-Siedlewski in his report from February 4, 1933 wrote that people came to the outpost who did not want to hear about Poland or who did not appear there for a long time. “But when the famine appeared – wrote Karszo-Siedlewski – everyone wants to return to Poland, everyone is finding real or imaginary claims to Polish citizenship, everyone is complaining of the unbearable poverty and famine. Often the clients, adult men, cry telling about their wives and children who died or swelled from the famine.”

The day before he wrote: “Each day the situation in Ukraine is getting worse and worse. The famine is staring people in the face in a vulgar and rapid way. There are lots of thefts and murders. During the last two months the number of our consulate clients multiplied by three times. Despairing letters are coming, even men cry in our office telling about their misery. The craftsmen who work for us do not want to get payment in rubbles, but they beg for flour, groats, etc., or else, they do not want to work at all.”

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A similar situation was in the Kyiv consular district. On October 13, 1933 vice-consul Kurnicki wrote that in the last few days three delegations of Poles from Markhlewk region had arrived to the outpost begging for help and care.\(^{19}\) Plenty of people were applying to leave the Bolshevik state, but only a few managed. Their departure depended on the local authorities who did not want to agree to let anybody leave from “the Bolshevik paradise.”\(^{20}\)

Some peasants asked Polish diplomats for intervention and protection against the communists. They mistakenly believed that the Polish consulate authorities could give orders to the Bolsheviks.\(^{21}\) However, the visit in Polish consulate and the contacts with “the representative of bourgeois” were extremely dangerous for petitioners. Often those who did so were arrested and charged with espionage. During only one night on March 14/15, 1933 in Kyiv, Vinnitsa and Fastiv several hundred of Poles who visited Polish consular offices asking for help and return to Poland were arrested. Soviet methods like those mentioned above became so arduous that the Polish ambassador in Moscow, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, had to intervene in the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (rus. Narkomindel), explaining that this practice makes normal functioning of the Polish posts impossible.\(^{22}\)

Polish diplomatic offices received much correspondence describing the tragic plight of the peasants suffering great hunger. In one of such letters a student called Buczak wrote: “The population is dying. It is not always possible to bury the deceased [peasants] because the starving people die browsing through the fields or wandering from one village to another. In the summer during the harvest lots of the dead were found in the grain fields (Uman, Bila Tserkva, Shevchenko regions). In the spring 20-30 corpses were buried in one hole every day. Black ravens are flying over former fertile and rich Ukraine picking eyes of the unburied deceased.”\(^{23}\)

Apart from letters addressed directly to Polish consular staff there are letters written by inhabitants of the “Bolshevik paradise” to their families in Poland transferred by Polish posts. This kind of correspondence was chosen because of the fear of the Soviet censorship and consequences which could be taken for presenting “counterrevolutionary messages” and blackening “the homeland of all workers and peasants.” The “counterrevolutionary messages” were naturally the information about the famine and poverty of Soviet society. A letter of D. Maszin to his brother Anton living in Poland shows how huge was the fear: “You cannot realize what could have happened if somebody had

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19. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Attache Wojskowy przy Ambasadzie RP w Moskwie (AAN, AW), sygn. 94, p. 32; Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . . , p. 126.
seized this letter. Do not publish it. God forbid if you sent this letter to a newspaper. They can find out that I have written it."24 

Diplomats also obtained information about the situation in the Soviet Union during consular and business trips. Jan Karszo-Siedlewski from Kharkiv’s consulate had the possibility to observe the situation in Ukraine and then to compare it to the conditions outside the republic. At the beginning of May 1933 when the famine reached its greatest peak, he traveled from Kharkiv to Moscow to a consular conference. He was astonished at the difference between the Ukrainian countryside and the neighboring Central Black-Earth Oblast’ (rus. Центрально-черноземная область) or even infertile suburbs of Moscow. Karszo-Siedlewski noticed that the Ukrainian villages were in a state of decay; they seemed to be abandoned and miserable. The huts were half-devastated, often without the roofs. There were no new farmsteads anywhere. Children and the elderly looked like skeletons. There was no livestock anywhere. Something was growing barely on 20 percent of area, 40 percent has just been ploughed and the rest was a wasteland. Nevertheless, during the highest season of sowing only a few workers and tractors were on the fields. Sowing was done by the most primitive methods, mostly by hands.

Arriving to Central Black-Earth Oblast’ (mainly the outskirts of Kursk and Orel), the diplomat emphasized that he had the impression he came from the Soviet state to Western Europe. There were much more ploughed and sowed fields. The villages were clean, huts renovated, greater prosperity was visible among the inhabitants and you could see grazing livestock. However, on the whole area between Kharkiv and Moscow the most striking thing was the disastrous condition of the horses which, according to Karszo-Siedlewski’s estimate, were at 70-80 percent unfit to work.25

The acting Military Attaché in Moscow, Captain Władysław Harland, also paid attention to the difference between Ukrainian and Russian districts. On June 28, 1933 he informed the head of the Second Department of the General Staff that in comparison with Moscow region and Central Black-Earth Oblast’ the situation in Ukraine at first sight is horrible. “Worse crops, abandoned villages, small groups of cattle and horses on the pastures” – he concluded.26 Harland could personally observe the conditions in Ukraine during his business trip in August 1933.27

Observations made by the deputy trade counselor of the Polish Embassy in Moscow, Jan Łagoda, during his tour around Ukraine in the first days of April 1934 are also very interesting. Łagoda stressed that the chosen trip destination was the railway area from Kyiv to Korostyn and then to Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, Kazatyn and Uman, i.e., administrative districts that were affected by the famine. Łagoda traveled in a third-class carriage to get direct contact with the “plain, rural population.” He noticed that people still suffered from lack of

24. CAW, Oddział II Szt. Gl., sygn. 1.303.4.2094, unpaginated; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim"..., p. 79-80.
25. CAW, Oddział II Szt. Gl., sygn. 1.303.4.1867, pp. 34, 134; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim"..., p. 86.
26. AAN, AW, sygn. 94, p. 124; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim"..., p. 95.
food. "You encounter a lot of starving people. The railway stations are full of waifs and strays who feed on anything they could find. Not only children, but also adults look at the people eating. At the Uman station I counted 23 abandoned kids at the age between 5 and 12" – he related.²⁸

However, the famine of 1934 was much milder than in the previous year. Łagoda stated: "People still remember last year's famine, they talk only about the famine on the train. Women are more resistant than men so there is a lack of men everywhere. One of the vendors present at the carriage boasted that in the period of the famine he could bury up to 50 dead bodies. They also talk about last year's murders [caused by food shortage]. [Murders] take place this year as well. Last month a mother killed her two sons and ate them. She was sentenced by the court to death by lethal injection. According to the opinion of Ukrainian populace at least half of the population died of the famine in the last year. Nowadays the number of population has been complemented, in some degree, by the newcomers from central Russia. At this moment the Belorussians from Mozyrz are arriving in Ukraine. Uninhabited areas become populated. The authorities support this movement giving the newcomers moral and material help."²⁹

Łagoda mentioned relocations in Ukraine. In August 1933 a special office was created by the Soviet government (All-Union Committee for Resettlement) to transport people from other Soviet republics and lesser affected hunger Ukrainian districts to the deserted lands.³⁰ Despite the success at the beginning, the operation failed. Most of the newcomers seeing the misery of the Ukrainian post-famine countryside went back. The hostility of the local populace to the Russian and Belorussian peasants also had an important impact in this case. The Polish consulate in Kyiv noticed it in the report from August 11, 1934.³¹

Among the Polish diplomatic and intelligence documents are numerous descriptions of thriftlessness of the state and collective farms (the sovkhoz and the kolkhoz), lack of interest of the peasants in working on the fields, the disastrous condition of livestock, especially horses. The head of Consulate General in Kharkiv, Adam Stebloñski, in May 1932 wrote that "the horses are so weak that they need to be supported by the planks on the pastures, otherwise, they cannot stand on their legs."³² One year later Jan Karszo-Siedlewski on the basis of his own observations in one of the reports noticed that on the whole area between Kharkiv and Moscow around 70-80 percent of horses were incapable of work.³³

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²⁸. AAN, MSZ, sygn. 9513, p. 200; 208-11; Kuśnierz, *Pomór w "raju bolszewickim"*, . . . , pp. 161-64.
²⁹. Ibid.
³⁰. For more about the relocations during and after the Great Famine in Ukraine, see Kuśnierz, *Ukraina*, . . . , pp. 198-202.
In the documents you can also find lots of information on catastrophic situation of starving people. At the beginning of May 1932 the Polish consul in Kyiv, Henryk Jankowski, reported to the Polish ambassador in Moscow that he receives more and more information about the famine in Right-Bank Ukraine, which was especially severe in the provinces. According to dispatches, in such towns as Vinnitsa or Uman almost every day there were incidents of cases weakened and exhausted people from the streets.34

In the spring of 1933 the famine reached its climax. On April 12, 1933 Jan Karszo-Siedlewski was alarmed that due to growing famine and poverty of the town and village inhabitants the situation in Ukraine with every passing day was getting very tense. The Polish diplomat writes: "All diseases, first of all typhus, are spreading through the country claiming many lives. People couldn't be treated properly because there is a complete lack of the most needed disinfectants and medicines such as quinine, aspirin, etc., even in the capital city of Kharkiv. . . . The doctors say that the patients' stomachs shrank to the sizes of the stomachs of small children. Some villages, e.g., in the vicinity of Sumy, which earlier had about 1,000 inhabitants have shrunk completely and now consist of only around 150-200 people. People feed themselves usually on "makukhy" (extract from rape) and peelings from potatoes. They also eat dogs, cats, dead horses. There are cases of cannibalism as well."35

On June 2, 1933 the head of the intelligence outpost "B. 18," Władysław Mitkiewicz, emphasized that nothing remained from the former wealth of the Ukrainian countryside; death from hunger and cases of cannibalism were a daily occurrence.36 A female employee of the Polish consulate in Kharkiv and the head of intelligence outpost "X. 22," Józefina Pisarczykówna, had a similar impression and on June 13, 1933 stated that the famine has affected plenty of people. "You can hear about the cases of cannibalism more and more frequently. There are many dying people and dead bodies on the streets. Police cars drive around the town and catch all beggars and the suspects."37

The chief of the Eastern Section in the Second Department of the General Staff, lieutenant Jerzy Niezbrzycki, on the basis of the information given by his informant, described the situation in the period between May 15 and June 25, 1933:

There is a great famine in Ukraine. The main center of the hunger is Poltava region. The villages with 5-6 thousands dwellers before are settled by 20-30 families nowadays (June 15). In one village of approximately 1,000 inhabitants about 50 young people at the age of 16-20 died in May. In one of the kolkhozes where about 350 people were working, in

34. CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.3043, p. 64; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim" . . . , p. 36-37.
35. CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.2995, p. 145; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim" . . . , p. 81.
36. CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.1928, unpaginated; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim" . . . , pp. 89-89.
37. CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.2094, unpaginated; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim" . . . , p. 93.
May and June 10 people a day have been dying. A great part of those dying at work in the fields weren’t buried. The houses in villages stand empty. In the last weeks (in July) the Soviet authorities announced in the towns that they give the houses in the countryside for those who would go there to work.

Because of a lack of gravediggers in some villages the corpses were thrown into the basements of abandoned houses. But when the people who were throwing dead bodies into the basements also vanished, the corpses were left unburied at homes.

The cases when the corpses remain unburied for 3-4 days are a daily occurrence. That is why the unbearable stink is in some almost completely died out villages.

Except for the typhus epidemic in Ukraine no one else was noticed. Dozens of bodies of people who have died of typhus were taken by cars from the Alexander hospital in Kharkiv in June. In a special hospital for infected with typhus in Kharkiv’s district Kholodna Hora (Cold Mountain) (in a former school building) dying people were thrown to the concrete cellar and then they were taken away. . . . Dead bodies from this hospital, as well as from the Alexander hospital are taken away by cars at night. In mid-June citizens of Kharkiv could see dying people on the city’s main streets and wild looking people-shadows aimlessly wandering around the town. On June 22, 1933 during half an hour walk on Sumska Street (the main street of Kharkiv) I saw one dead body and one dying person.

The corpses have been collected very fast for three weeks there. The homeless have also been collected. After washing they are sent to the sovkhozes.

At the end of June in Kharkiv we saw roundups of homeless children (“besprizorny”) every day. We have learned from a familiar female doctor that exhausted people are killed by poison injection.

Children are abandoned very often. A talkative 8 or 9 years old girl who lay a few days in April in front of the Italian consulate in Kharkiv and then was taken by the consulate to bring her up, now, after the 3-month stay in the consulate during eating she doesn’t pay attention to anything and doesn’t say anything. . . .

The famine destroys the rural community. There are plenty of cannibals in the prisons. . . . Dying people are still lying on the city’s streets, first of all there are young persons who usually are taken to the hospitals in the evenings. An alarming situation is in the countryside. Our petitioners from all parts [of Ukraine] agree that the crops are better than last year but they cannot imagine how the harvest will be done. In a village named Cherkasy, near Bila Tserkva only 80 men and 250 women among from 2,500 dwellers before remained alive. In villages Zhydovchyk, Budzenivka in a Tetyiv region over 80 percent of people passed away. In a village of Dubrovka in the same region half of the population died. Many villages
where the fields have been sowed are unable to gather relatively good crops because of the death of hundreds of people in the meantime. . . .  

In the documents you can find information concerning the most awful consequences of the famine – the acts of cannibalism. The first cases of anthropophagy were recorded in the early spring of 1932.39 However, in that period some of the Polish diplomats could not believe that these cases could happen. Trade counselor of Polish Embassy in Moscow, Antoni Żmigrodzki, wrote on May 7, 1932 to the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Warsaw that “there are many rumors of cannibalism here,” adding right away that “it is nonsense, of course.”40 The Polish consul in Kyiv, Henryk Jankowski, was less skeptical. Four days later, on the base of a “reliable source,” he informed Poland’s ambassador in Moscow that famine-related robberies and murders in the countryside are a daily occurrence.41

As the famine was growing, there were more and more cases of cannibalism. All of this was recorded by Polish diplomacy and intelligence.42 Jan Karszo-Siedlewski noticed in his report that on February 21, 1933 a railway watchman in a station of Pechenowska (Berdychov region) was caught eating human flesh. He was denounced by his wife who was forced to cook dinners from the murdered people whom he brought to house on the pretext of putting them up for the night. The watchman was also selling the flesh of slaughtered people more than once.43 One of the reports of the Second Department of the Polish General Staff dated June 1933 states that in some Ukrainian districts (Tsvetkov, Zvenyhorod, Uman, Buky, Tarashchansk, Berdychiv regions) “cannibalism has become a kind of addiction and mortality has reached such heights that there are cases of entire villages that died out completely or from 2,000-3,000 dwellers only 300-400 remain alive.”44

The Holodomor claimed millions of lives,45 however, as the Polish vice-consul in Kyiv, Piotr Kumicki, precisely emphasized that there were no circumstances from which the Bolsheviks could not derive advantages for themselves. Moreover, they skillfully have used the famine of 1933 to subordinate

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40. CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.3043, p. 129; Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . ., p. 35.
41. CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.3043, p. 64; Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . ., p. 37.
42. See for example: CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn., sygn. 1.303.4.2995, p. 145; 150; sygn. 1.303.4.5424, p. 50; 65; AAN, AW, sygn. 94, p. 124; AAN, MSZ, sygn. 9513, pp. 210-11. Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . ., pp. 75, 81, 89, 91, 93, 95, 164.
43. CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.2995, s. 150; Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . ., p. 75.
44. Ibid., sygn. 1.303.4.5424, s. 65; Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . ., p. 91.
45. Documents contain different numbers of famine victims. Jan Karszo-Siedlewski claimed that at least 20 percent of the population died from the hunger and diseases. In a report of captain Wiktor Harland there is a number of 5 million famine victims. In others documents you could find a number of 10 millions victims. See CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.3043, p. 304; sygn. 1.303.4.5424, p. 55; AAN, AW, sygn. 94, pp. 62; 145-47.
the peasants. By the famine the Bolsheviks "forced a peasant to do all field-work giving him only scraps like for a starving dog" – writes Kurnicki.46

After the highest wave of the famine mortality the Ukrainian countryside sank into a state of despair, hopelessness and apathy. Farmers did not believe in improvement of their lives expecting that sooner or later they will also die from the famine. It was noticed by Piotr Kurnicki. On October 20, 1933 he stated that complete resignation is among the peasantry. Remembering the grain procurement campaign" of 1932-1933, people doubted if ever they will fulfill all the grain procurement plans, they will be allowed to keep at least some grain for their own. "The current state is hopeless and resigned" – reports Poland’s vice-consul – “a peasant obediently obeys orders, lifts all the burdens but makes all of this in an apathetic way, only that what is ordered. That is why there is plenty of cases of bad or careless grain storing, leaving agricultural machines on the fields, low efficiency of the tractors power, wrong picking up the beets, wrong way of sowing, bad roads etc.”47

Afterward Kurnicki emphasized that he was talking to many families that did not have any reserves of food for winter. Asking them how they are going to survive during winter, they were saying that they have no hope to last till spring, they are sure they will die of famine. Moreover, there were no protests or rebellion in these statements. The peasants accepted that as a divine dispensation.48 Wiktor Zaleski, the head of the intelligence outpost “B. 41,” noticed that phenomenon as well.49

As it was mentioned above, the “civilized world” regarded the famine as the “interior problem” of the Soviet Union. Poland’s government, as other Western countries, was aware of what was going on in Ukraine. Despite possession of very reliable information on the terrible poverty of the peasantry, Polish politicians did not publicize the information in order not to provoke the Bolsheviks (in July 1932 Poland had signed a Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union). Jan Karszo-Siedlewski in his report on March 6, 1933 recommended to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to familiarize the Polish populace – first of all the citizens of the eastern districts who did not always realize the real situation of Poland’s eastern neighbor and were not always aware of the danger from this country – with the question of the famine. However, this initiative remained answered. The Polish authorities had been doing everything not to destroy the relationships with the Soviets, especially at that time an official of the Soviet consulate in Lviv, Aleksei Mailov, was assassinated by Mykola Lemyk, a member of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). During the Lemyk trial the court for political reasons did not allow any mention about “the current facts on the situation in Ukraine.”50

47. AAN, AW, sygn. 94, pp. 52-55; Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . . , pp. 128-29.
48. Ibid.
50. For more about this, see Kuśnierz, Ukraina . . . , pp. 216, 220-21.
It is worth drawing attention to the conversation between the Soviet diplomat Karl Radek and the Moscow journalist of Gazeta Polska Jan Otmar Ber­
son. Radek said that any Polish activity concerning Ukraine, for example the support for Poland’s Ukrainians in their protest against “starving policy,” would be treated by the Bolsheviks as a conscious or unconscious carrying out of Germans plans in the East.51 Also, in October 1933 Jan Karszo-Siedlewski gave information to Jerzy Niezbrzycki about a special Bolshevik sensitiveness on the so-called “intensified anti-Soviet campaign”52 of the Ukrainians living in Poland.53

The note of the Polish embassy from January 24, 1934 taking an attitude to the report of Kyiv’s consulate on the famine in Ukraine (the report was not found) is also meaningful. In this note the consular report was criticized for “generalizing” information obtained by the outpost about the hunger, poverty and persecutions. The post was accused of being hypnotized by petitioners coming and asking for help, “who could give many interesting details but which could not be truthful for the assessment of the general situation because only miserable and aggrieved persons come to the consular office who deliber­ately exaggerate their stories to get greater relief.” Moreover, the embassy recommended that the consulate in Kyiv should avoid talking about whole Ukraine but limit itself only to the Right-Bank according to territorial conditions of the consular district.54

The Bolsheviks made all possible efforts to hide the truth on the famine from the world. Just tales about the famine were a serious “anti-soviet counterrevolutionary activity” in the Soviet state, all the more, collecting and registering data about the tragedy. In one of the letters to the Polish consulate in Kyiv mentioned above, a student Buczak wrote that the OGPU arrested and executed 20 students of the Kyiv Institute of Fine Arts for painting and taking photos of starving people in Kyiv.55 But the truth was getting through a “curtain of silence” outside the “Bolshevik paradise.” After the arrival to famine-stricken areas by American journalists Ralph Barnes and William Stoneman, in February 1933 the Soviet authorities banned foreign correspondents staying in Moscow to go to the provinces.56 A Moscow reporter of Gazeta Polska, Jan

51. AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6748 A, pp. 57-58; Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . . , pp. 87-88.
52. During the famine the Ukrainian community in Poland created various committees dealing with organizing help for starving people in Ukraine, collecting donations, organizing memorial services for the people who died of famine, and so on. For more about this, see: Kuśnierz, Ukraina . . . , pp. 214-22; idem, “Участь української громадськості Польщі в допомогових та протестаційних акціях проти голодомору в Україні,” Український Іstorичний Журнал, no. 2 (2005), pp. 131-41; idem, “Львівська українська преса про голодомор в УСРР,” ibid., no. 3 (2006), pp. 199-209.
54. AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6710, pp. 64-65; Kuśnierz, Pomór w „raju bolszewickim” . . . , pp. 142-43.
56. See, for example, S. Taylor, “A Blanket of Silence: The Response of the Western Press Corps in Moscow to the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-33,” in Famine-Genocide in Ukraine, 1932-
Otmar Berson was ordered not to leave the capital as well. However, the Polish diplomats did not worry about this. The Polish embassy’s chargé d'affaires Henryk Sokolnicki after a proposal from an Austrian diplomat to petition together in this case to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, advised him claiming that it is not necessary going to the famine-stricken areas to realize what is going on. In addition, he stressed that “nowadays Polish newspapers aren’t interested in such bright news.”

It is worth mentioning about one more aspect on the subject, namely very cynical Soviet propaganda. Throughout the time of famine, Ukraine and the Soviet Union as a whole were officially presented as free of hunger; moreover, Bolshevik propaganda praised the “magnificent life” enjoyed by members of state farms and honestly working peasants in the Soviet state. These “socialist achievements” did not come close to reality, of course. Piotr Kurnicki brought up this subject. On November 18, 1933 he informed the Second Department of the General Staff that after reading Trybuna Radziecka (a Soviet newspaper for the Polish community in the Soviet Union) that contained lots of information about the kolkhozes of Markhevsky raion where the collective workers have received per “trudoden” hundreds of kilos of grain, he decided to find the following collective farms. However, after searching for them very carefully on the map as well as asking people, nobody could say where they were. Moreover, he underlined in the earlier report from October 20, 1933 that the information given by the press about kolkhozes providing their members with large quantities of grain had no effect because everyone, even the best “udarnik,” can sell this grain only on the kolkhoz markets and at the price imposed by the state. The state prices, naturally, were much lower than the prices on the free markets, and for a year’s work payment a farmer could quite often purchase, for example, only a pair of boots, and nothing else.

One of the favorite motives of Soviet propaganda apart from glorifying “the increasing prosperity of the kolkhoz workers” was emphasizing that agriculture is mechanized and it is close to surpassing the Americans in tractor production. However, the truth was completely different. Ukrainian authorities, for example, due to the lack of tractors or their poor quality and because of the fatal condition of horses, had to issue directives ordering to use even cows in field work.


57. AAN, MSZ, sygn. 6748 A, pp. 89-90; R. Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . . , pp. 102-03.
60. AAN, AW, sygn. 94, p. 54; Kuśnierz, Pomór w “raju bolszewickim” . . . , p. 129.
61. See: Kuśnierz, Ukraina . . . , p. 94.
Polish observers reported many times about the terrible condition of the so-called "mechanization of agriculture." On May 21, 1933 Adam Steblowski wrote that 20-25 kilometers around Kharkiv you could find 2-3 working tractors even during fine weather.\textsuperscript{63} Jan Karszo-Siedlewski on May 31, 1933 informed that the tractors were not seen on the fields and the sowing was made by the most primitive ways.\textsuperscript{64} Józefina Pisarczykówna confirmed that. On July 31, 1933 she related: "There were a few tractors working on the fields. More often you could see people using scythes and reaping the grain with hands."\textsuperscript{65} Stanisław Sośnicki, the Polish consul in Kyiv, stated that during his tour around the consular district in the area of 1,500 kilometers he counted only 50 tractors operating on the fields, and did not notice any combine harvester. One of the peasants told the consul he heard about one combine harvester working at this place but he did not see it.\textsuperscript{66}

The Soviets agitators, except for presenting the "socialist achievements," took a great delight in describing the "tragic plight of the peasants and workers" in capitalist states. One of the Kharkiv's consulate petitioners who wanted to send a letter to his brother living in Poland by means of the Polish post remarked about the content of Soviet newspapers. He stated:

I subscribe to a Polish newspaper issued in Kharkiv to learn the Polish language. The newspaper is, as all are issued here, communistic. In the winter I was reading in this newspaper that allegedly in Poland in Volynia on the market (I do not remember the name of the town now) a mother was selling her children because she could not feed them. Just think! They write such lies, only a fool or a child can believe that. You will not find any word about cannibalism about people who are dying of hunger in the newspapers. Everything is all right, only people abroad are dissatisfied and die from hunger – there are our disgusting newspapers, and all of them are the same.\textsuperscript{67}

The Institute of National Remembrance, Kraków, Poland

\textsuperscript{63} CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.3043, p. 181; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim"..., p. 39.

\textsuperscript{64} CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.1867, pp. 32-34; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim"..., p. 86.

\textsuperscript{65} CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.2094, unpaginated; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim"..., p. 98.

\textsuperscript{66} AAN, AW, sygn. 94, s. 37-45; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim"..., p. 118.

\textsuperscript{67} CAW, Oddz. II Sz. Gł., sygn. 1.303.4.2094, unpaginated; Kuśnierz, Pomór w "raju bolszewickim"..., p. 80.
Ukrainians living outside the Soviet Union responded to news of the famine in Soviet Ukraine with condemnation of Moscow’s deliberate destruction of the Ukrainian nation and offers to aid the victims. The potential for famine relief from the several million Western Ukrainians, living under Polish, Czechoslovakian and Romanian rule, and the sizeable Ukrainian diaspora in Western Europe and North America, was not negligible. However, unlike the famine of 1921-1923, which, after initial denial, Lenin eventually admitted, and for which he solicited Western help,¹ the Great famine which broke out ten years later was denied by Stalin’s regime and all offer of aid was denounced as anti-Soviet propaganda. Thwarted in their efforts to deal directly with the Soviet authorities, Ukrainians took their humanitarian concerns to international organizations, the most prominent of which were the League of Nations (the League) and the International Committee of the Red-Cross (ICRC). Documentation on the efforts of Ukrainian and other organizations to lobby the League and the ICRC, and the subsequent correspondence between the ICRC and the Alliance of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies of the USSR (ARCRCS), has been preserved in the ICRC Archives in Geneva. After the demise of the Soviet Union, this material has become available for scholarly research.²

¹ Research for this project in the ICRC Archives was made possible by a travel grant from the Ukrainian-Canadian Documentation Center (Toronto).

We have selected the most significant of these documents for publication in two parts. The first group begins with the first letter asking the ICRC to intervene with humanitarian aid and ends with the ICRC requesting information from the ARCRCS on the famine conditions in Ukraine. The second set of documents will be published in the next issue of our journal; it will cover the correspondence between the ICRC and the ARCRCS and the ICRC's communications with its representative in Moscow and the concerned organizations in the West. All documents are reproduced in the original languages. Since the ICRC functioned in French, most of the material is in that language; several items are in German and English. To place the documents in their historical context, we deem it appropriate to provide a synopsis of the main events.3

On July 7, 1933, Mykola Skrypnyk took his own life, and this desperate act of a prominent Soviet Ukrainian politician finally convinced Western Ukrainians that in order to save Ukraine from total destruction they must seek aid in the West. On July 16, Ukrainian Deputies in the Polish Seim consulted with various Ukrainian organizations of Poland, and nine days later, together with representatives from forty-four political, academic, economic and social groups formed the Ukrainian Civic Committee for the Salvation of Ukraine (UHKRU), presided by Dr. Dmytro Levycky, head of the Ukrainian Parliamentarian Representation. An Executive Committee was appointed with Zenon Pelensky as secretary and Milena Rudnycka as one of the vice-chairpersons. Pelensky and Rudnycka would soon be charged with missions abroad. The UHKRU established working relations with Ukrainian organizations in Western Ukraine and the Ukrainian diaspora. The latter already had contacts with the ICRC and the League, dating from the time of Ukraine's independence. On July 20, Alexandre Choulguine (O. Shulhyn), formerly Ukraine's Minister of External Affairs, and now President of the High Council of Ukrainian Emigrants, wrote to Max Huber, President of ICRC, to draw his attention to the famine in Soviet Ukraine. Shulhyn complained that Ukraine's borders were closed with Poland, Romania, and even Russia. Since aid from Western Ukraine was blocked, he urged that efforts to organize famine relief be undertaken by the ICRC (Doc. 1). Four days later, Metropolitan Andrej Sheptyckyj, head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, and six bishops issued an appeal to "Christians of the world" to join in protest against the murderous famine in Soviet Ukraine, and to organize aid for its starving population (Doc. 2). The prelates' call was widely publicized in Ukrainian and foreign press and attracted considerable attention. Meanwhile, the German organization "Bruder in Not" (Brother in Need) was responding with aid

Great Famine of 1933 and Ukrainian Lobby at League of Nations and International Red-Cross

...to an exhibit in Germany of letters from starving German farmers in Russia and Ukraine. On August 2, the Swiss Red Cross in Bern informed the ICRC of the German campaign and asked if the ICRC would initiate similar action in which the national Red-Cross societies could participate (Doc. 3).

During August, the Ukrainian diaspora intensified its effort to inform the West about the catastrophic conditions in Soviet Ukraine. Panas Fedenko, an old Ukrainian socialist, took the message to the International Conference of the Labour and Socialist International, while O. Shulhyn and Mykola Livytsky went to the meeting of the Ligue des Anciens Combattants, both held in Paris. A delegation of Ukrainian students spread the word at the 13th World Congress of the Catholic student movement Pax Romana, held in Luxembourg. Ukrainian women’s organization contacted their Western counterparts. The Ukrainian message was getting into Western newspapers. All this would eventually create additional pressure on the ICRC. The Ukrainians’ effort was helped by the publicity given to the concerns of prominent Western spiritual leaders. On August 19, in response to Sheptyckyj’s request, and supported by eyewitness reports of the British journalist Garreth Jones, and the German economist Dr. Ewald Ammende, Cardinal Theodor Innitzer of Vienna issued his own appeal “To the Christian World” (Doc. 4). The Primate of the Austrian Catholic Church spoke of starvation in the Soviet Union of Ukrainians, Russians and other nationalities but stressed the threat of repeated grain confiscations especially in Ukraine and North Caucasus. The Cardinal’s appeal for aid was addressed especially to the International Red-Cross.

On August 23, the Austrian Red-Cross sent a copy of Innitzer’s plea, published in the Vienna newspaper Reichspost and asked for more information. The same day, Dr. Ewald Ammende, secretary of the European Congress of Nationalities, an organization representing the national minorities of Europe, transmitted to Dr. Huber the appeals of Metropolitan Sheptyckyj and Cardinal Innitzer, and added his own memorandum on the famine conditions (Doc. 5). The German consul in Kyiv recently told Ammende that 1.5 million people had already starved to death and millions more would die in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Ammende urged the ICRC, as the most prestigious relief organization, to organize aid for the USSR. A week later, the League of the Red-Cross Societies (LRCS), a federation of national Red-Cross organizations, asked the ICRC about the rumors circulating in the press about an “alleged” famine in the USSR and an appeal by Cardinal Innitzer, with pretensions to the ICRC (Doc. 6).

The famine took the ICRC by surprise and gradually became a trying issue for an organization which had its representative in Moscow and was keen on maintaining good relations with a difficult regime. In 1921-1923, the organization had been active in the Soviet famine relief and Mlle Ferrière, who was a member of the Committee, had then organized soup kitchens in Ukraine.
But at that time, the West was asked for aid. No request for famine relief came from the Soviets in 1932-1933. What was the ICRC to tell its suppliants? The Committee discussed the issue at its meeting on August 24, and identified four obstacles to launching a relief campaign: 1) the Soviet Union did not solicit foreign aid, 2) customs duties would have to be paid; 3) money could be found elsewhere to feed the starving; 4) famine seemed to be the result of Soviet economic policy. On September 6 the Committee met with Woldemar Wehrlin, the ICRC's representative to Moscow. Back in July Shulhyn was told that the ICRC was waiting for clarification from its representative in Moscow. Now Wehrlin's report on his work in the USSR during the 1928-1933 years only strengthened the Committee's reluctance to get involved in any Soviet famine relief campaign. That day the ICRC answered the Swiss and Austrian Red-Crosses, in all confidentiality, that after examining the question for a second time it decided (evoking the reasons mentioned above), that it would not be possible to organize any collective relief action, but only transfers of individual aid. (Doc. 7). There is no record of the ICRC's reply to Ammende's letter, but it undoubtedly repeated the same arguments.

Because the ICRC's negative decision was kept secret, appeals continued to arrive from various organizations and private citizens. A plea dated September 15 and sent in the name of a group of Russian organizations in Warsaw, pleaded for famine relief for Russia (Doc. 8). The next day, the European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad (EFUA) not only requested the ICRC to organize international aid, but also announced that a Ukrainian Red-Cross would be started to raise funds for famine relief (Doc. 9). The ICRC answered the Russian organization on September 28, using the same arguments against collective action that it had sent to the Swiss and Austrian Red-Crosses and, while accepting to deliver individual aid, requested that this information be kept confidential. A similarly negative letter was sent to the EFUA. In addition, the Ukrainian organization was warned that it did not have the authority to set up a Ukrainian Red-Cross organization and that the ICRC could not recognize an organization by such name, unless it was "officially recognized by its government" (Doc. 13).

Ukrainians had more success outside the narrow walls of the Red-Cross organizations. The Congress of European Nationalities (CNE) held its annual meeting in the Swiss capital on September 16-19. Several Ukrainians, including two parliamentarians from Poland, and two from Romania took active part in the conference. The Soviet famine was raised by the first two main speakers at the beginning of the conference. Dr. M. Kurtschinsky, representing the Russians of Estonia spoke about Russia, not once mentioning Ukraine, but his reference to the terrible famine especially in "Southern Russia" obviously pointed to Ukraine. With the help of Dr. Ammende and the German delegation from Latvia, Milena Rudnytska was allowed to speak next and to do so without constraint. The Ukrainian delegate described the
economic tragedy in Ukraine, explained the national persecution of Ukrainians by the Communists and criticized Western powers' hobnobbing with the Soviet regime and closing their eyes on its crimes in Ukraine. Rudnycka's speech and the lobbying of the Ukrainians had its reward. The press picked up the story and the Congress passed a special resolution on the famine and charged the Presidium with the task of personally delivering the message to the League of Nations. It is possible, however, that the resolution never reached Mowinckel for it was not among the materials that he later sent to the ICRC. Rudnycka, notes in her book that both the President of the CNE and the Secretary of the League were opposed to the Ukrainians' criticizing of the Soviet Union.

Seeing the reluctance of the ICRC to get involved in Soviet famine relief, the Ukrainians now focused their attention on the League of Nations, whose Council was to meet at the end of September. The delegates to the CNE conference left Bern for Geneva, and joined the envoys from Ukrainian organizations in Western Europe. Milena Rudnycka succeeded in bypassing the Secretariat of the League headed by the Frenchman Avenol, whose hostile attitude to the Ukrainians' demands she explained by the French rapprochement with the Soviet Union. She had previously established good relations with Rolf Andword, Norway's representative to the League who had an understanding for the Ukrainians' plight and arranged an audience for Rudnycka with the Norwegian Prime Minister. Johan Ludwig Mowinckel was then serving as the President of the League of Nations. A persuasive speaker, Rudnycka must have presented the Ukrainian case in a very convincing manner, for she was able to solicit a most supportive response from the head of this world organization. Mowinckel soon received letters from Milena Rudnycka and Zenon Pelenskyj, representing the Ukrainian Central Committee of Lviv (Doc. 10), Oleksander Shulhyn, for the Ukrainian National Government in Exile (Doc. 11), and Dr. Dmytro Andriewskyj of European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad (Doc. 14). There were also many other letters and telegrams, and the Ukrainians also supplied the League with memoranda and other material on the tragedy.

According to Rudnycka, Mowinckel personally helped prepare the case for the Council's meeting by obtaining supporting letters from important international organizations. Once more personal friendships came in handy; Rudnycka turned to Margery Corbett Ashley, President of the International Alliance for Suffrage and Equal Rights, whom she knew well, and who was then in Geneva presiding over a meeting of the Liaison Committee of Women's International Organizations. Miss Corbett Ashley invited her to address the meeting. As a result, the Liaison Committee voted unanimously to "beg" the League to aid Ukraine (Doc. 12). The International Conference of War Veterans and other Western and Ukrainian organizations also sent supporting letters. The International Harmony against the III International sent
Mowinckel a number of documents on the Soviet famine. (Doc. 15). To counter the growing support for the Ukrainian appeal, Soviet press agents in Geneva distributed materials denying the famine, provoking Shulhyn to draw Mowinckel’s attention to this latest effort at disinformation (Doc. 16). In spite of the Secretariat’s opposition, Mowinckel used his prerogative to put the problem of the Ukrainian famine on the agenda of the Council’s closed meeting on September 29. The opinion of the participants as to what the League should do was divided and it was finally decided to entrust the matter to the ICRC. The next day, Mowinckel personally turned over a selection of fourteen letters and telegrams, from various Ukrainian and international organizations, to the International Red Cross, and in a personal appeal to the ICRC pleaded that the starving people of Ukraine be given the attention they deserve (Doc. 17).

The ICRC could not ignore a formal request from the League of Nations, especially since it had become public knowledge that the League had requested the International Red-Cross to handle the Soviet famine relief. On October 3, Georges Werner, Vice-President of the ICRC, wrote Mowinckel that the Committee would meet in two days to examine the issue, and promised to keep him posted (Doc. 18). Two days later, the Parisian daily *Le Matin* informed its readers about the latest developments in Geneva with regards to the Ukrainian famine and, on the basis of a telephone interview with the ICRC president, conjectured that before taking any decision the Geneva organization would probably want to contact the ARCRCS in Moscow (Doc. 21). The Red-Cross Committee met that same afternoon, presided over by the Vice-President Werner, in the absence of Dr. Huber. The minutes of the meeting let transpire a high degree of displeasure with the League’s “unloading” of this problem in the ICRC’s lap (Doc. 22). Should the ARCRCS admit the existence of famine and accept foreign aid, the ICRC would be faced with the problem of raising the needed capital and at the same time expose itself to the accusation of playing into the hands of the Soviet authorities by bringing in foreign currency into the country. More likely the Soviets would refuse foreign since Edouard Herriot, the French politician, had claimed that Ukraine had a magnificent harvest. ICRC risked losing credibility and the position of its envoy in Moscow would be jeopardized. Allowed to assist at the meeting, Wehrlin questioned the validity of the documents sent over to the ICRC by Mowinckel and upon Warner’s reply that they were “more than suspect,” declared that the whole thing was a political maneuver. The Committee decided to meet in a week, to finalize the draft of ICRC’s letter to the ARCRCS and to plan further action. A short press release to that effect was put out the same day (Doc. 23), and the next day the story was carried by *Le Matin* (Doc. 24) and other newspapers.

The Ukrainians once more turned their attention to the ICRC. On September 4, Georges Yakovliv, President of the Brussels based Ukrainian Commit-
tee to Aid Starving Ukraine and the Kuban, wrote in the name of all the Ukrainian immigrant organizations of Belgium (Doc. 19). From October 6 to 12 seven Ukrainian associations sent telegrams and three wrote letters. Telegrams were sent by the Ukrainian Students Union of the University of Louvain (Doc. 25), the Ukrainian Association of Luxembourg, the European Federation of Ukrainians (Brussels), the Ukrainian Union of Seraing (Belgium), the Ukrainian Union of Liège and two Ukrainian organizations from Vienna. The telegrams thanked the ICRC for taking up the cause of Ukrainian famine relief and wished it success. The letters came from the Women’s Association and Ukrainian Student Association “Sich,” both based in Vienna, and from the Ukrainian Committee of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. There were also two letters from non-Ukrainians, one from Portsmouth, England and the other from a Greek living in Paris. The Russian emigration sent one telegram from Paris in which eleven political and intellectual leaders requested the ICRC to save the starving population of Russia, and especially the hardest hit areas: Ukraine, North Caucasus, Kuban, Oural, Western Siberia and Lower Volga (Doc. 26). A similar telegram from the same Russian group was received by Mowinckel and was sent over to ICRC together with a letter from Elisabeth Skoropadsky, the widow of the Ukrainian Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky (Doc. 20).

The newspapers continued to publish information about the famine, referring in general terms to the famine location as “Russia”. It should be noted, however, that the terms often designated not only Russia proper, but the Soviet Union, including Ukraine. Thus on October 9 the Gazette de Lausanne printed a letter from a reader, who related what he read in German-language periodicals: there were good crops but after feeding the army and the industrial centers, and exporting grain abroad, the regime left the country to starve (Doc. 28).

It was in this atmosphere that the Committee met on October 12 to finalize the ICRC’s letter to the ARCRCS. The minutes of the meeting (Doc. 29) show a certain division of opinion and the domineering presence of Wehrin, the ICRC’s representative in Moscow, who was invited to participate. Max Huber who was absent, would have liked a direct reference in the letter to the ways and means of an eventual relief action. Werner, who chaired the meeting, explained that the sentence (on ICRC’s good relations with the ARCRCS) was added to calm Wehrin’s fears. Wehrin found the idea of a letter itself very unpleasant and tried to soften its impact. It was decided to stress the humanitarian side of ICRC’s interest and the “excellent relations” between the two organizations. Most of the members preferred a noncommittal message both with regards to the discussion of the famine and of the eventual famine relief.

The same day, Dr. Max Huber, President of the ICRC, signed a formal letter addressed to Abel Enoukidze the President of the ARCRCS. Huber en-
quired about the allegations of a famine which seemed to rage in certain re-
gions of the USSR, notably Ukraine and the North Caucasus. He added that a
request for clarification in this matter had come from Mr. Mowinckel, Presi-
dent of the League of Nations, and that ICRC decided to ask its Soviet coun-
terpart if the worry was well-founded (Doc. 30). Carefully worded so as not
to offend the sensibilities of the addressee, the letter was a meager success for
the three-month campaign pursued by the Ukrainian (and to a lesser degree
the Russian) organization to prevail upon the League of Nations and the In-
ternational Committee of the Red-Cross to organize Western aid for the fam-
ished population of the USSR. Still, the news of the ICRC’s letter drew atten-
tion to the tragedy and renewed hope of humanitarian action. Everyone now
waited for the answer from Moscow.

*Université du Québec à Montréal*
No 1: July 20, 1933

Alexandre Choulguine, President, High Council of Ukrainian Emigrants, Paris, to Max Huber, President, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva.

Haut Conseil des Émigrés Ukrainiens
42, rue Denfert-Rochereau, Paris (5e)
Tél. : Danton 80-03

Paris, le 20 Juillet 1933

Monsieur Max Huber,
Président du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge,
Genève.

Monsieur le Président,

Nous avons l'honneur d'attirer tout spécialement votre attention sur la situation terrible de notre pays. Chaque jour les nouvelles sont de plus en plus alarmantes : dans différentes villes les hommes meurent quotidiennement par dizaines, dans d'autres plus grandes comme Kiev par centaines. Telles sont les récits de ceux qui viennent actuellement de l'Ukraine.

Les paysans sont aussi misérables que les citadins. Les frontières de l'Ukraine sont fermées non seulement du côté de la Pologne et de la Roumanie, mais encore du côté de la Russie. La riche Ukraine est devenue un immense camp de concentration condamné à la famine et à la mort.

Nous sommes impuissants d'aider à nos malheureux frères et nous vous supplions, Monsieur le Président, de mettre sur l'ordre du jour du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge le problème de la résolution de ces terribles malheurs qui se sont abattus avec une force incroyable sur notre fertile pays.

Ne peut-on pas organiser une aide internationale à l'Ukraine mourante de fain ? Peut-être que les maîtres actuels de notre pays accepteront cette aide à moins qu’ils ne veuillent bien eux-mêmes sous la pression des organes humanitaires du monde civilisé venir en aide aux affamés.

Cette demande est dictée par une détresse profonde, par l’angoisse terrible que nous avons pour nos proches, pour tout le peuple ukrainien.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’assurance de notre très haute considération.

A. Choulguine [signature] Le Président
A. Udoviezenko [signature] Le Vice-Président
Dorossenko [signature] Le Secrétaire Général
DIE UKRAINE IN TODESZUCKUNGEN

Die Feststellungen der Denkschrift des Generalsekretärs der Europäischen Nationalitäten-Kongresse, der, wie bekannt, mit dem Vorschlage der Durchführung einer internationalen Hilfsaktion für die in Russland Hungers sterbenden Menschen hervortrat, werden jetzt auch durch den folgenden Appell, den der Fürstmetropolit von Lemberg und alle ukrainischen Bischöfe an die Öffentlichkeit der Welt richten, bestätigt.

Der Aufruf des ukrainischgriechisch-katholischen Episkopats von Galizien hat folgenden Wortlaut:


Selbst ausserstande unseren sterbenden Brüdern irgendwie materiell zu helfen, wenden wir uns an die Gläubigen unserer Kirche mit der heissen Bitte, ihnen in Gebet, Opfer und anderen guten Taten christlicher Liebe beizustehen und die erbetene Hilfe vom Himmel zu erflehen, wenn auf Erden Ruine Hoffnung auf Beistand sichtbar wird.

Vor der ganzen Welt protestieren wir, gegen die Unterdrückung der Kinder, der Armen, der Schwachen und der Unschuldigen, und die Unterdrücker klagen wir vor dem Gerichte des Allmächtigen an.

Das Blut der Arbeiter, die hungern die schwarze Erde der Ukraine bestellten, ruft zum Himmel um Sühne und die Stimme der hungernden Schinder erhebt sich zu Gott.

An alle Christen der Welt, vor allen an unsere Landsleute, geht unsere Bitte, sich diesem Proteste des Schmerzes anzuschliessen und ihn in der ganzen Welt zu verbreiten.

Die Radiostationen, ersuchen wir ihn in den blauen Aether zu senden, vielleicht dringt er in die Hütten unserer armen sterbenden Brüder. Es sei, dass sie in den entsetzlichen Hungerqualen und vor dem fürchtbaren Tod die Kunde davon erhalten, dass ihre Brüder, von ihrem Schicksal unterrichtet, mit ihnen trauern, für sie leiden und zu Gott beten. Das wird sie in ihrem Schmerze stärken und trösten.

Unsere Hoffnung in Gott.
Gegeben zu Lemberg, den 24 Juli 1933.

Andrej Scheptyckyj, Metropolit
Hryhorij Chomyschyn, Bischof zu Stanislau
Josaphat Kocylowskyj, Bischof zu Peremyschl
Nykyta Budka, Bischof zu Patras
Hryhorij Latoka, Auxiliar-Bischof, Peremyschl
Ivan Butschko, Auxiliar-Bischof, Lemberg
Ivan Latyschewsky, Auxiliar-Bischof, Stanislau.

No. 3 : August 2, 1933

Dr. Scherz of Swiss Red-Cross, Berne, to ICRC, Geneva

Schweiz. Rotes Kreuz
Bern, Taubenstrasse 8
Tel. 21.474
Croix-Rouge Suisse
Croce Rossa Svizzera

Berne le 2 Août 1933

Monsieur le secrétaire,

Nous vous serions très reconnaissants si vous voulez bien avoir l’amabilité de nous faire savoir, si le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge a l’intention d’organiser une action générale des sociétés nationales de la Croix-Rouge, en faveur des Russes affamés. De différents côtés on nous rend attentif sur une collecte effectuée en Allemagne par le Reichsausschuss « Bruder in Not ». Il paraît même qu’à Berlin une exposition de lettres et de photographies des affamés avait été organisée, et il y a de personnes qui nous recommandent de la faire venir en Suisse.

Pour répondre à cette demande d’organiser une collecte etc., il nous serait fort utile de connaître l’opinion de votre comité. Nous ne croyons pas qu’à l’heure actuelle l’organisation d’une telle collecte soit bien accepté par le peuple suisse. Il nous paraît même que cette organisation en Allemagne se borne d’aider aux sujets allemands se trouvant en Russie.
Nous serions bien heureux d’être renseignés par vous sur ces questions avant de prendre une décision définitive.

Veuillez agréer, cher Monsieur le secrétaire, l’assurance de nos sentiments distingués.

Dr. Scherz [signed]

No. 4: August 19, 1933
Appeal of Cardinal Innitzer of Vienna in Austrian Press.

AN DIE CHRISTLICHE WELT!
Ein Aufruf des Kardinal-Erzbischof von Wien für die hungernden in Sowjetrußland


Schon heute steht fest, dass die Katastrophe sich auch jetzt, zur Zeit der neuen Ernte, weiter fortsetzt. Um die Vorsorgung der Industriezentren zu ermöglichen, wird, wie die Sowjet presse offen eingesteh, unter Anwendung aller Zwangsmittel den Bauern in der Ukraine, im Nordkaukasus und ander-

Im Interesse der ewig gültigen Gesetze der Menschlichkeit und der Nachstenliebe erhebt daher der Unterzeichnete seine Stimme und appelliert an alle, insbesondere an jene Organisationen und Kreise der Welt, deren Arbeit im Dienste der Humanität und Gerechtigkeit steht, damit sie, ehe es zu spät wird, in wirkungsvoller Weise auf übernationaler und interkonfessioneller Grundlage ein allgemeines Hilfswerk für die in Russland vom Hungertode bedrohten Menschen in die Wege leiten. Dieser Ruf gilt vor allem dem internationalen Roten Kreuz und seinen die ganze Erde umspannenden Organisationen, er ergeht aber auch an alle jene Faktoren, die heute über einen Ausbau der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen mit der Sowjet-Union verhandeln, damit der Grundsatz gewahrt bleibe, diese Verhandlungen von einer umfassenden Klärung der Hilfsbedürftigkeit in den verschiedenen Gebieten Russlands und von der Annahme einer sogenannten Humanitätsklausel seitens der Sowjet-Union abhängig zu machen.

Um diese Hilfsaktion auch von Wien aus zu fördern, werde ich Vertreter der verschiedenen Konfessionen zur Bildung eines Komitees einladen. Diese Einladung wird bereits in den nächsten Tagen erfolgen. Auf zur gemeinsamen brüderlichen Tat, ehe es zu spät ist! Gott will es!

Theodor Kardinal Innitzer
Erzbischof

No. 5 : August 23, 1933
Dr. Ewald Ammende, Secretary General of the Congress of European Nationalities to Dr. Max Huber, President of ICRC.

Congrès des Nationalités Européennes
Comité exécutif
Président : Dr. Josif Wilfan, ancien Député-Slovène au Parlement italien.
Membres : Prof. Dr. M. Kurtschinsky, Député Russe au Parlement esthonien, Reval.
Dr. D. Lewickij, Député Ukrainien au Sejm polonais, Lwow.

In der ganzen Welt gibt es keine Organisation, die eine größere moralische Autorität besitzen würde, um an die Auflöllung der Frage einer internationalen Hilfeleistung für die in Russland umkommenden Menschen zu gehen, als Ihre Organisation – zumal gerade unter Ihrer Führung. Gewiss könnte eingewendet werden, es wäre nicht sicher, ob eine solche Aktion mit Rücksicht auf die Haltung der Russen usw. zu Durchführung gelangen könnte. Doch mir scheint, dass alle solche Bedenken uns nicht vor der moralischen Pflicht befreien, jetzt wenigstens den Versuch zur Durchführung einer Hilfeleistung zu machen, einer Hilfeleistung, die im Grunde nur darin bestehen würde, die Überschüsse an Getreide und Lebensmitteln, an denen die überseeischen, ja die europäischen Produktionsgebiete im Augenblick ja geradezu ersticken, den hungernnden in Russland zu Verfügung zu stellen, wobei es ja zweifellos auch möglich wäre, eine Basis zu finden, wie diese Getreidemengen künftig sogar verrechnet werden könnten.

Hochachtungsvoll
Ihr stets ergebener
Ewald Ammende [signed]

No. 6: August 30, 1933

L. de Guilgud, Under-Secretary General, League of the Red Cross Societies, Paris, to Secretary of the ICRC, Geneva.

Ligue des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge
2, Avenue Velasquez
Paris (VIIIe)

30 août 1933

Monsieur E. Clouzot,
Comité International de la Croix-Rouge
122 rue de Lausanne,
Genève

Cher Monsieur,

Notre attention a été attirée dernièrement sur les bruits qui courent dans la presse au sujet d'une prétendue famine en U.R.S.S., et notamment sur un appel qui aurait été lancé par le Cardinal Innitzer à Vienne – appel dans lequel le Cardinal aurait mis directement en cause la Croix-Rouge internationale, d'après un article paru dans le « Reichspost » de Vienne. Ceci m'amène à vous demander si le Comité international a été saisi directement ou sous une forme quelconque de cette question. De notre côté, nous n'avons aucun renseignement excepté par la foi de la presse.

Veuillez agréer, cher Monsieur, l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

L. de Gielgud [signed]
L. de Gielgud
Sous-Secrétaire Général

No. 7: September 6, 1933

E. Clouzot, Secretary General, ICRC, Geneva, to Dr. Steiner, Secretary General of the Austrian Red Cross, Vienna.

6 septembre 1933

Monsieur le Dr STEINER
Secrétaire général de la
CROIX ROUGE AUTRICHIENNE
Milchgasse, 1
VIENNE

Monsieur le Secrétaire général,

Vous nous avez écrit en date du 23 août 1933 GS. Nr.1229/2, confirmant votre lettre du 2 août GS.Nr.1229 et nous transmettant l'appel lancé par son Eminence le Cardinal Archevêque de Vienne, en faveur des affamés en Russie.
Nous avons tardé à vous répondre parce que nous voulons recueillir toutes les précisions nécessaires. La question a été examinée ce matin pour la seconde fois en séance par le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge qui, tout en rendant hommage aux sentiments élevés de Monseigneur Innitzer, ne croit pas possible d’organiser une action de secours collective.

La règle de conduite que s’est fixé depuis longtemps la Croix-Rouge internationale et qui a trouvé sa consécration dans la Convention du 12 juillet 1927 constituant l’Union internationale de secours, est qu’on ne saurait organiser une action de secours en faveur d’un pays sans le consentement et même une demande formelle de son Gouvernement.

L’Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétistes n’a pas, que nous sachions, fait appel en faveur des populations se trouvant sur son territoire.

Quant à l’Union internationale de Secours, elle n’est pas en cause puisque l’Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétistes n’est pas partie à la Convention du 12 juillet 1927.

En définitive, le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge reste à la disposition des personnes et des Sociétés nationales de la Croix-Rouge qui désiraient faire parvenir des secours individuels en U.R.S.S., mais ne prendrait en considération, en aucun cas, un secours collectif.

Des secours en argent laissés à la discrétion du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge ou à remettre à des personnes déterminées peuvent être adressés au Comité International de la Croix-Rouge, 122, rue de Lausanne à Genève, qui se chargerait de les faire parvenir à leurs destinataires.

Veuillez considérer cette lettre comme réservée à votre Comité seul et évitez de lui donner aucune publicité.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Générale, l’expression de mes sentiments les plus distingués.

(E. CLOUZOT)
Chef du Secrétariat

No. 8: September 15, 1933

Russian Organizations of Warsaw to Dr. Max Huber, President, ICRC

Les organisations russes de la ville de Varsovie
Marszalkowska 68 m. 4.
Varsovie.

Varsovi, le 15 septembre 1933

Monsieur le Professeur Max Huber,
Président du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge.
Genève.
Monsieur le Professeur,

Les représentant de toutes les organisations russes à Varsovie, ayant délibéré sur les moyens, auxquels il serait le plus opportun de recourir pour porter secours aux affamés en Russie Soviétique, sont arrivés à la conclusion que les dimensions sans précédent de la catastrophe qui a atteint le pays, en menaçant de mort des milliers de malheureux, sont telles que l’effort de toutes les organisations russes, même agissant de concert, serait insuffisant, pour conjurer le fléau. Afin que le secours aux affamés soit efficace, il est indispensable que tous ceux qui voudraient lutter avec le fléau et soulager les souffrances de nos malheureux frères, soient réunis dans une seule organisation, dont l’action s’étendrait sur tous les pays, et à laquelle pourraient s’adresser non seulement les organisations russes, mais aussi les organisations étrangères et les personnes privées, qui jugeraient qu’il est de leur devoir de participer à l’œuvre générale de secours aux affamés en Russie.

Nous considérons, que l’unique organisation, qui pourrait avec succès accomplir cette tâche est la Croix-Rouge Internationale, cette organisation jouissant d’une confiance générale et d’une autorité incontestable.

Étant donné ce qui précède nous avons l’honneur de vous transmettre, Monsieur le Président, le texte complet de la résolution qui a été votée le 28 août de cette année par l’Assemblée Générale des organisations de minorité russe et de l’émigration russe de la ville de Varsovie et nous nous prenons la liberté de vous prier respectueusement de vouloir bien nous informer de la suite qui pourra être donné à notre requête.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’assurance de notre très haute considération.

Au nom des organisations russes de la ville de Varsovie :

Le Président du Comité de Protection des émigrés russes de Pologne

N. Plemiannikoff [signed]

Le Président du Comité social russe en Pologne

P. Simansky [signed]

Le Président de la Société de secours aux émigrés en Pologne

A. Léliukhine [signed]

Le Président de la Société russe de bienfaisance en Pologne

Sanin [signed]
No. 9: September 16, 1933

European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad, Bruxelles to ICRC

Fédération Européenne des Ukrainiens à l’Étranger
European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad
Europäische Federazion der Ukrainer in der Fremde
Federazione Europea degli Ucraini all’ Estero

Bruxelles, le 16 septembre 1933
18, rue Kindermans.
Tél. 48.90.84

A Monsieur le Président de la
Croix-Rouge Internationale
GENEVE

Monsieur le Président,

Comme suite à la famine et aux épidémies, une grande misère sévit actuelle-lement dans la République Soviétique de l’Ukraine et dans d’autres pays peuplé d’Ukrainiens et englobés par l’U.R.S.S. (le Caucase du Nord p. ex.)

Les journaux d’Europe et d’Amérique sont pleins d’information qui ne permettent aucun doute à ce sujet. D’autre part, la situation politique, économique et sanitaire de l’U.R.S.S. ne laisse aucun espoir de voir le fléau efficacement combattu par les autorités soviétiques. Dans ces conditions l’hiver prochain s’annonce aussi meurtrière que le précédent.

Pour faire face à ces conjonctures, réellement tragiques pour leur pays, les émigrés de l’Ukraine font de grands efforts pour soulager les souffrances de leurs frères. Dans ce but la «Fédération Européenne des Organisations Ukrainiennes à l’Étranger» a décidé de mettre sur pied une Croix-Rouge Ukrainienne qui s’occupera de l’assistance aux victimes de la famine.

Or les ressources matérielles et les moyens d’action des émigrés sont fatal-lement insuffisants, voire, même insignifiants à l’égard à la situation extrê-mement grave.

Il existe des raisons d’ordre politique qui interdisent aux émigrés tout rapport avec les autorités soviéques. Une intervention étrangère serait, par conséquent, absolument nécessaire pour que des secours puissent être portés à la population éprouvée de l’Ukraine Soviétique.

Nous voudrions espérer que la Croix-Rouge Internationale qui a tant de fois prodigué ses soins aux populations éprouvées de tant de pays, ne refusera pas non plus son assistance aux affamés et aux malades de l’Ukraine.

Une organisation internationale de grande envergure serait nécessaire pour secourir l’Ukraine et sauver des milliers de vies humaines, voire des millions
d'êtres humains. La Croix-Rouge Internationale est certainement le mieux placée pour prendre l'initiative d'une pareille organisation et diriger son activité.

La Fédération Européenne des Organisations Ukrainiennes à l'Étranger serait très heureuse de pouvoir collaborer à une œuvre qui s'occuperait de l'assistance aux affamés et aux malades de l'Ukraine Soviétique.

Vous nous oblieriez beaucoup, Monsieur le Président, en voulant bien faire état de nos suggestions à qui de droit et de nous aviser de la décision et de l'initiative éventuelle qui pourrait être prise dans la question de secours à l'Ukraine par la Croix-Rouge Internationale.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'expression de notre respect et l'assurance de notre considération la plus distinguée.

Dm. Andriewsky [signed]
Secrétaire Général.

No. 10: September 25, 1933

Milena Rudnycka and Zenon Pelenskyj, Ukrainian Central Committee, Lviv, to J. Mowinckel, President, League of Nations, Geneva.

Genève, le 25 septembre 1933

Son Excellence
Monsieur le Ministre Mowinckel
Président du Conseil de la Société de Nations

Excellence !

Les représentants soussignés du Comité Ukrainien Central de secours pour l'Ukraine Soviétique s'adressent à vous en vous priant ardemment de bien vouloir porter la question de la famine qui sévit dans l'Ukraine Soviétique devant le forum de la Société des Nations et d'amener la Société des Nations à organiser une action internationale en faveur de la population ukrainienne qui meurt de faim.

Les faits de famine sont incontestables, malgré les efforts déployés par le Gouvernement des Soviets de voiler la vérité et de nier l'existence de cette véritable catastrophe causée par la famine. Ce fait est attesté par des milliers de lettres que nous recevons de nos compatriotes d'au-delà de la frontière soviétique, par des dépositions de centaines de refugiés-ukrainiens dressées en procès-verbaux, par des dépositions de personnages neutres, surtout de journalistes étrangers, qui réussirent malgré la défense des autorités soviétiques à visiter le territoire ukrainien ravagé par la famine.
Des noms aussi connus et respectés comme celui de Son Éminence M. le Cardinal Innitzer à Vienne et les noms des évêques ukrainiens grec-catholiques avec Son Éminence M. le Métropolite Comte Scheptytzkyj en tête sont là pour affirmer que cette famine catastrophique, sans pareil dans l'histoire, est vraiment un péril.

Nous n'avons pas l'intention de compliquer une action internationale par des considérations politiques et nous ne parlerons pas des raisons qui ont amenées cette effroyable catastrophe dans l'Ukraine; ces raisons sont connues du monde entier. Ce n'est un secret pour personne que l'Ukraine, pays doté par la nature de grandes richesses, a été poussée dans ce malheur par la politique économique néfaste des Soviets. Laissant à côté les considérations d'économie politique de cet anéantissement de l'Ukraine, nous appelons à la Société des Nations pour qu'elle vienne en aide aux affamés, car ceci est une affaire de solidarité humaine.

Nous avons pleine confiance en la Société des Nations, qui a déjà accordé au cours des années précédentes son aide dans des cas pareils, qu'elle organisera une action pour venir en aide à la population malheureuse, triomphera de tous les obstacles et amènera le Gouvernement des Soviets à admettre une action internationale.

Les Ukrainiens de l'Ouest, qui se trouvent en dehors du territoire de la République des Soviets, ainsi que des Ukrainiens citoyens canadiens et citoyens des États-Unis d'Amérique sont prêts de mettre à la disposition de leurs frères affamés du grain et toute autre nourriture, si la Société des Nations rend possible le transport jusqu'à l'Ukraine Soviétique et la distribution sous contrôle international.


Le Comité est composé des représentants parlementaires pour l'Ukraine occidentale au Parlement polonais, de 36 organisations centrales ukrainiennes culturelles, économiques et humanitaires, parmi lesquelles se trouvent les organisations des émigrants de l'Ukraine Soviétique. Le comité ukrainien de secours pour les parties roumaines de l'Ukraine, qui a son siège à Czerniwci (Cernauti), travaille en contact étroit avec nous, de même que tous les autres comités qui se trouvent dans différentes parties de l'Europe et de l'Amérique.

Pour le Comité Ukrainien Central de secours pour l'Ukraine Soviétique,

Milena Rudnycka [signed] Z. Pelenskyj [signed]
La Députée Mme. Milena Rudnycka Le Député Zenon Pelenskyj
Présidente remplaçante du Comité Central Secrétaire du Comité Central

Adresse : Comité Ukrainien Central de secours, Lwow, Podwale 7.
Alexandre Choulguine
Chef de la Mission Ukrainienne en France
A. Représentant de la République Ukrainienne
Auprès de la Société des Nations
6. rue Michel Chauvet, Genève
Tél. 54-418

Genève, le 25 septembre 1933.

Son Excellence Monsieur Mowinckel
Président du Conseil de la S. d. N.
Genève.

Monsieur le Président,

Depuis 1920 j’ai dû défendre auprès de la Société des Nations, comme représentant du Gouvernement de la République Démocratique Ukrainienne devenue en 1921 victime de l’agression de Moscou, des intérêts politiques de mon pays parfois très graves. Cette fois j’ai l’honneur de m’adresser à votre Excellence pour défendre une cause qui est au-dessus de toute politique. C’est un grand problème qui touche à la conscience humaine : en plein paix des centaines de mille, des millions d’hommes meurent de famine, souffrent atrocement sans aucun secours presque qu’centre de l’Europe. L’existence même d’une grande nation est menacée.


Ici même à Genève plusieurs représentants ukrainiens sont accourus pour témoigner par leur présence ou par leur appels leur solidarité avec la cause que je relève ici. Les délégués des comités ukrainiens de secours aux affamés qui se sont constitués à Lwow, à Tzernovtzi (Bucovine), à Prague et à Bruxelles, la société des émigrés dite l’union européenne, ont tenu à se faire représenter à Genève en ce moment tragique pour l’Ukraine, afin de défendre auprès de la S.d.N. en ce qui concerne la famine la cause qui est également la notre.

Je suis informé que les députés ukrainiens au parlement de Pologne, qui représentent le comité de secours aux affamées de Lwow, ont présenté à votre Excellence aujourd’hui même un mémoire dont le texte grâce à l’amabilité de ses signataires m’a été communiqué. Je m’associe donc intégralement à ce
mémoire et j’y associe les organisations que je préside : le Haut Conseil des réfugiés ukrainiens (fédération des organisations centrales des réfugiés se trouvant en Belgique, en Bulgarie, en France, à Luxembourg, en Pologne, en Roumanie, en Tchécoslovaquie, en Turquie et en Yougoslavie) et l’Association ukrainienne pour la S.d.N. Ainsi la solidarité de notre activité pour sauver l’Ukraine de la famine est absolue.

En terminant cette lettre permettez-moi, Excellence, de vous prier de faire ce qui est possible pour soulever au sein du Conseil de la S.d.N. la question douloureuse de la famine en Ukraine que j’envisage de soumettre également à l’Assemblée en présentant une lettre ouverte à son Président.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’assurance de ma profonde considération et de mon dévouement très sincère.

Choulguine [signed]

No. 12: September 26, 1933


Liason Committee of Women’s International Organizations
26, Eccleston Street,
London, S.W.I.

[letterhead lists ten member organizations]

September 26th, 1933

His Excellency Monsieur Joh. L. Mowinckel
President of Council,
League of Nations.

Excellency,

On behalf of the above Committee of Women’s International Organisations may I beg you to bring to the notice of the Council of the League the desperate condition of the famine stricken population of Soviet Ukraine?

Again and again the League has rendered invaluable services to the cause of humanity and we entreat Your Excellency as President to submit to the Council the present need for League action in any form which you may think wise.

The Committee was unanimous in their decision to appeal to you.
I append certain notes on the situation.
On behalf of the Committee I have the honour to remain,
Your Obedient Servant,

**Margery Corbett Ashley** [signed]
President of one of the Organisations
[Added in handwriting: *Int. Alliance for Suffrage & Equal Citizenship*]

[Appended note without a title:]

There appears to be a very serious famine in the Ukraine. Details are hard to obtain as it is almost impossible for a visitor to Russia to obtain permission to visit the Ukraine, but the inhabitants are escaping in large numbers in spite of the efforts of the frontier guard, recently re-enforced, to prevent them.

Last year there was a famine. The consequent result was that seed grain for this year was eaten and in spite of this the population became so weak physically that they were unable to prepare the ground adequately and this year the famine is far worse. Orders were given that whatever the yield of the harvest the same amount of corn was to be delivered by the Ukraine and troops were sent to guard the crops and prevent the starving peasants from stealing the half ripe corn for food. There have been and will be no rebellions as the peasants are too weak to organise.

The following figures give some idea of the extent of the calamity. In the village of Zalywanschschyna in the central Ukraine 2,000 inhabitants died out of a total population of 3,500. In the village of Kumaniwka 1,200 died out of a total of 3,000. These figures could be multiplied indefinitely. Cannibalism is rife in all parts and such is the state of despair that regardless of consequences to the writers letters are openly being sent abroad describing the state of the country and appealing for help.

The best proof that conditions are really serious is the appeals for assistance being made by Ukrainians domiciled in other countries.

1) The appeal of the Greek-Catholic Church in Polish Ukraine signed by the Metropolitan and bishops.

2) The appeal of "Le Comité ukrainien de secours aux affamés de l'Ukraine et du Kouban", Bruxelles.

3) In Germany a joint relief committee has been formed by the Red Cross, the Roman Catholics, the Lutherans, the Mennonites and others, called "Brüder in Not".
No. 13: September 28, 1933

E. Clouzot, Chief of Secretariat, ICRC, Geneva, to Dm. Andriewsky, General Secretary, European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad, Bruxelles.

28 septembre 1933

Monsieur le Secrétaire général
De la Fédération Européenne des Ukrainiens à l’Étranger
18, rue Kindermans
Bruxelles

Monsieur le Secrétaire général,

Vous nous avez écrit en date du 16 c[ou]r[an]t, au sujet de la famine et des épidémies sévissant actuellement dans la République Soviétique de l’Ukraine et dans d’autres parties de l’U.R.S.S.

Nous avons tardé à répondre à votre lettre, parce que nous voulions recueillir toutes les précisions nécessaires. La question a été examinée jeudi dernier pour la seconde fois en séance par le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, qui, tout en rendant hommage aux sentiments de la Fédération ЕигорЄеппе des Ukrainiens à l’Étranger, ne croit pas possible d’organiser une action de secours collective.

La règle de conduite que s’est fixée depuis longtemps la Croix-Rouge internationale, est qu’on ne saurait organiser une action de secours en faveur d’un pays sans le consentement et même sans la demande formelle de son Gouvernement. Or, l’Union des Républiques socialistes soviétistes n’a jamais fait appel en faveur des populations se trouvant sur son territoire. Et nous nous trouvons, de ce fait, dans l’impossibilité de lancer un appel en faveur des populations en question.

D’autre part, le Comité international reste toujours à la disposition des personnes et des organisations qui désireraient faire parvenir des secours individuels en U.R.S.S. mais ne prendrait en considération, en aucun cas, un secours collectif.

En ce qui concerne le passage de votre lettre au sujet de votre décision de mettre sur pied une « Croix-Rouge ukrainienne » qui s’occuperait de l’assistance aux victimes de la famille, nous nous permettons de vous mettre en garde que le Comité international ne pourra reconnaître d’organisation de ce nom que si elle est approuvée et reconnue officiellement par son gouvernement, ce qui, dans votre cas, nous semble impossible.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire général, l’expression de mes sentiments les plus distingusés.

Chef du Secrétariat.
No. 14: September 28, 1933

Dm. Andriewskyj, General Secretary, European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad, Bruxelles, to J. Mowinckel, President, League of Nations.

Fédération des Ukrainiens à l’Étranger
European Federation of Ukrainians Abroad
Europäische Fedearazion der Ukranier in der Fremde
Federazione Europea degli Ucrainini all’ Estero

Bruxelles, le 28 septembre 1933
18, rue Kindermans.
Tél. 48.90.84

A Son Excellence Monsieur Mowinckel
Président du Conseil de la Société des Nations
GENEVE

Monsieur le Président,

Nous prenons la respectueuse liberté de vous communiquer ci-joint le texte du memorandum remis par la Fédération aux gouvernements de divers pays ainsi qu’à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général de la Société des Nations.

En nous référant à notre lettre du 16 courant, adressée à la Société des Nations, de même qu’à la pétition des représentants de l’Ukraine Occidentale et aux autres requêtes de nos compatriotes, nous nous permettons de solliciter de votre bienveillance que la question de l’organisation du secours international à la population éprouvée de l’Ukraine fasse l’objet des délibérations de la Société des Nations lors de la présente session.

Le fait que, dans le cas de l’Ukraine comme dans celui des guerres, l’origine des calamités se trouve dans des circonstances sociales et non dans des phénomènes physiques, ne change rien à la question de secours au point de vue humanitaire.

Quelque soit la cause, ses conséquences sont telles que des millions d’êtres humains sont menacés de mort, qu’un pays si proche des principaux foyers de la civilisation moderne est en proie à la plus grande misère.

Nous vous serions infiniment obligés, si vous vouliez bien user de votre grande influence dans les milieux de la Société des Nations pour que la question de secours à l’Ukraine y soit posée et résolue favorablement. La réalisation de l’œuvre pourrait être confiée à l’Union Internationale de Secours ou à un autre organisme International similaire.

Nous vous prions d’agréer, Monsieur le Président, avec nos remerciements anticipés, l’assurance de notre considération la plus distinguée.
No. 15: September 28, 1933

Entente Internationale Contre la IIe Internationale à Mowinckel, League of Nations

Entente Internationale Contre la IIe Internationale (Entente Internationale Anticommuniste)
Bureau Permanent: 14 Prom. St. Antoine, GENÈVE

Genève, le 28 septembre, 1933

Son Excellence
Monsieur Mowinckel
Président du Conseil de la Société des Nations
GENEVE

Monsieur le Président,

J’ai l’honneur de vous remettre ci-joint les documents suivants concernant la famine en U.R.S.S. :

2. Le № des « Anglo-Russian News » du 25 septembre 1933 contenant des informations sur la situation actuelle ;
3. « Bruder in Not » publié à Berlin en 1933 ;
4. Deux diagrammes montrant la diminution des récoltes et du cheptel en U.R.S.S.

Notre Bureau possède encore un grand nombre d’autres informations sur la famine en Ukraine et les tient à la disposition du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’assurance de ma haute considération.
Le Président du Bureau Permanent de l’Entente Internationale Contre la III Internationale :

Th. Aubert [signed]
(Th. Aubert)

No. 16: September 29, 1933
Alexandre Choulguine, Representative of the Ukrainian Republic [in Exile], Geneva, to J. Mowinckel, President, League of Nations, Geneva.

Alexandre Choulguine
Représentant de la République Ukrainienne
Auprès de la Société des Nations
6, rue Michel Chauvet

Genève, le 29 septembre-1933.

Monsieur le Président,

Je viens d’apprendre qu’en réponse à nos demandes de secours à l’Ukraine affamée, les agents de la presse soviétique ont distribué à Messieurs les Délégués, certains diagrammes statistiques qui affirment que la prospérité de l’agriculture est très grande et nient par conséquent l’existence de la famine en Ukraine.

En réponse à ces affirmations, j’ai honneur en ma qualité de représentant du Gouvernement National ukrainien se trouvant en exil ainsi qu’au nom des organisations ukrainiennes dont je préside, de présenter à votre Excellence des objections suivantes :

1. Les Ukrainiens n’affirment pas que la récolte soit mauvaise ; ils disent que l’exportation des céréales enlevées par force armée à la population, condamne l’Ukraine à une famine catastrophique.

2. La statistique est faite en U.R.S.S. par le Gouvernement soviétique lui-même qui est notamment accusé par les Ukrainiens de vouloir affamer leur pays.

3. Si le Gouvernement soviétique prétend avoir raison et veut sincèrement tranquilliser la conscience humaine, bouleversée par les terribles nouvelles venant de l’Ukraine, qu’il s’associe à notre demande d’envoyer dans le pays une Commission internationale qui établirait la vérité.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’assurance de ma très haute et profonde considération.

A. Choulguine [signed]
No. 17: September 30, 1933

J. Mowinckel, President, Council of the League of Nations, Geneva to Max Huber, President, ICRC, Geneva

LA DÉLÉGATION DE NORVÈGE.

[Note in ink: « fait 2 copies, dont 1 env. à la Ligue le 5/10/33 ]

Genève, le 30 septembre 1933
14 annexes

Monsieur le Président,

En ma qualité de Président du Conseil de la Société des Nations j'ai reçu les documents suivants :

1) Lettre du 25 septembre 1933 du Comité Ukrainien Central de Secours pour l'Ukraine Soviétique ;

2) Lettre du 25 septembre 1933 de M. Alexandre Choulguine, Chef de la Mission Ukrainienne en France et représentant de la représentant de la République Ukrainienne auprès de la Société des Nations, Genève ;

3) Lettre du 26 septembre 1933 de la « Liaison Committee of Women's International Organizations », Londres, avec 1 annexe ;

4) Télégramme du 26 septembre 1933 du sénateur Zaloziecky et du député Serbeniuk ;

5) Télégramme du 27 septembre 1933 du Comité des Citoyens Ukrainiens, Lwow ;

6) Télégramme du 27 septembre 1933 des Députés et Sénateurs Ukrainiens, Lwow ;

7) Télégramme du 27 septembre 1933 de la Fédération Ukrainienne Catholique, Lwow ;

8) Télégramme du 27 septembre 1933 de la « British Section of Women's International League ;

9) Lettre du 27 septembre 1933 de la Conférence Internationale des Associations de Mutilés de Guerre et anciens Combattants, Genève, avec 1 annexe ;

10) Lettre du 28 septembre 1933 de l'Entente Internationale contre la IIIe Internationale, Genève, avec 4 annexes ;

11) Lettre du 28 septembre 1933 de la Fédération Européenne des Ukrainiens à l'Étranger, Bruxelles, avec 1 annexe ;

12) Télégramme du 28 septembre 1933 de l'Alliance des Femmes Ukrainiennes, Lwow ;
13) Télégramme du 28 septembre 1933 de l’Union Démocratique Ukrainienne, Lwow ;


Ces documents ont été soumis aux Membres du Conseil. Après des délibérations consciencieuses sur la question de savoir quelles sont les suites qu’il faudrait donner aux pétitions contenues dans les dits documents, les Membres du Conseil ont convenu que la meilleure manière de procéder dans cette affaire sera de transmettre les documents au Comité International de la Croix Rouge – cette institution étant la plus grande et la plus influente institution de secours et ayant dans son sein aussi des représentants de l’Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes.

En conformité avec ce qui précède, j’ai l’honneur de vous faire parvenir ci-inclus les documents ci-dessus énumérés, en vous priant de bien vouloir faire examiner cette affaire avec tout l’intérêt qu’elle mériterait.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Johan Ludwig Mowinckel [signed]

No. 18: October 3, 1933


3 octobre 1933.

Son Excellence
Monsieur MOWINCKEL
Premier Ministre de Norvège
Président du Conseil de la société des Nations
GENÈVE

Monsieur le Président,

Nous avons l’honneur de vous accuser réception et de vous remercier de votre lettre du 30 écoulé, ainsi que des 14 documents qui y étaient annexés.

Votre lettre ainsi que les documents en question seront soumis à l’examen du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge dans la séance du 5 octobre, et nous aurons l’honneur de vous tenir au courant des suites que nous serons amenés à donner à cette affaire.
Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de notre haute considération.

Georges Werner, Vice-Président

No. 19: October 4, 1933

G. Yakovliv, President, Ukrainian Aid Committee for the Starving of Ukraine and the Kuban, Bruxelles, to Max Huber, President, ICRC, Geneva.

Comité Ukrainien de Secours
Aux Affamés de l’Ukraine et du Kuban.
39 rue Aviateur Thieffry, Bruxelles.
Présidence :
Georges Yakovliv, Ingénieur
61, rue de Dave
Jambes-Namur

Jambes, le 4 octobre 1933.

A Monsieur le Président
du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge.
Genève.

Monsieur le Président,

Notre Patrie se meurt. Des millions d’Ukrainiens meurent de faim. Une famine effroyable et les épidémies dépeuplent l’Ukraine. Le désastre sera complet si le secours international n’arrive pas avant cet hiver.

Le Comité Ukrainien de Secours aux affamés de l’Ukraine et de Kouban, constitué par les organisations des émigrés ukrainiens en Belgique, appuie l’appel adressé par le Gouvernement de la République Démocratique Ukrainienne, se trouvant en exil, à Son Excellence Mr le Président de l’Assemblée de la S.d.N., et supplie par votre intermédiaire la Croix-Rouge Internationale de porter une aide immédiate à nos compatriotes mourants.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l’assurance de notre haute considération.

Le Président :
G. Yakovliv [signed]
No. 20: October 4, 1933


4.X.33

An das Mitglied des Völkerbundes
Ministerpräsident von Norwegen
Excellenz Mowinckel.

Euer Excellenz,

Das soeben ins Leben gerufene Hilfskomitee für die Hungernenden in der Ukraine möchte Ihnen herzlich danken für Ihre humanitäre, großzügige Art, mit der Sie sich in Völkerbund für die Ukraine eingesetzt haben.

Trotz der Dementierungsversuche offizieller Stellen kann man sich durch Hilfskomitees und hauptsächlich durch die wahrheitsgetreuen ecclesiastischen Informationen überzeugen, dass in diesem Winter in der Ukraine viele MILLIONEN den Hungerstod sterben werden.

Die Not und das Elend in unserem Vaterland sind viel größer als man im auslande erwart.

Es ist schnelle Hilfe nötig, da sonst das ganze Volk zugrunde geht.

Wir hoffen, dass Ihre vorbildliche, edle Anteilnahme an der Not unseres Volkes im Völkerbund Widerhall findet und so Ihr Name einst in der ukrainischen Geschichte mit grossem Dank genannt wird.

Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung

Das Hilfskomitee für die Hungernenden in der Ukraine.

Die Vorsitzende: Elizabeth Skoropadsky [signed]

No. 21: October 5, 1933

Le Matin [Paris daily]: Mowinckel requests ICRC look into Famine in Ukraine.

LA FAMINE EN UKRAINE

M. Mowinckel saisit de la question le Comité International de la Croix-Rouge et lui remet les pétitions de quatorze associations.

[De notre correspondant particulier]
Genève. 4 octobre. – Par téléphone. – Avant de quitter Genève, M. Mowinckel, président du conseil de Norvège et président en exercice de la Société des nations, a fait transmettre à M. Max Huber, président du comité international de la Croix-Rouge, le dossier qu’il a réuni sur la famine en Ukraine soviétique. Celui-ci comprend quatorze pétitions émanant de différentes associations qui demandent, d’une façon pressante, une intervention internationale en faveur des malheureux souffrant de la famine en Ukraine, ainsi que la lettre du comité central ukrainien de secours pour l’Ukraine soviétique et celle de M. Choulguine, ancien président du gouvernement démocratique d’Ukraine que le Matin a déjà signalée. Au dossier est jointe une lettre d’envoi du président en exercice de la Société des nations annonçant qu’il communique ces pièces au Comité international de la Croix-Rouge.

Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge prendra connaissance de tous ces documents dans une séance extraordinaire convoquée pour jeudi après-midi.

M. Max Huber, qui présida avec tant d’autorité la Cour permanente de justice internationale de la Haye, est actuellement en villégiature à Ossingen, près de Zurich. Par téléphone, il nous a dit, ce soir, toute l’importance qu’il attache au dossier que le conseil de la Société des nations vient de lui transmettre :

– C’est une affaire délicate qu’il faudra peut-être examiner à plusieurs reprises. Quelques jours seront probablement nécessaires avant que l’on puisse prendre une décision, étant donné les divers éléments dont il y a lieu de tenir compte.

On comprendra que M. Max Huber ne puisse pas donner une opinion avant d’avoir étudié à fond les documents qui lui ont été confiés. C’est au comité international seul qu’il appartient de prendre les décisions nécessaires, car ce serait contraire aux traditions de la Croix-Rouge qu’un problème aussi important ne soit pas traité par le comité siégeant in pleno. Il se peut, d’ailleurs, qu’on juge utile de faire des démarches préalables, notamment, auprès de l’alliance des sociétés de la Croix et du Croissant-Rouges de l’U.R.S.S. à Moscou, et que l’on décide de prendre des mesures préliminaires avant toute décision définitive.
No. 22: October 5, 1933.

Minutes, Plenary session of the ICRC, Werner presiding.

Séance du 5 octobre 1933

Présents : M. G. Werner, président
"Mme Chapponière-Chaix"
Colonel Favre
"M. Des Gouttes"
Mlle Odier
M. Boissier
M. de Haller
M. Burckhardt
Dr Audeoud

Excusés : M. Max Huber
"Dr Patry"
M. P. Logoz
M. B. Bouvier
Mlle Ferrié

FAMINE EN UKRAINE :

Le PRÉSIDENT donna lecture d’une lettre du président du Conseil de la SdN M. Mowinckel transmettant un dossier de 14 pièces au pétition sur la question de la famine en Ukraine.

Cette lettre a motivé la réunion de ce jour.

Le président demande s’il faut a l’occasion de cette lettre entrer en communication avec l’Alliance des Croix et Croisants Rouges de l’URSS. L’avis de M. Max Huber, consulté par téléphone, est positif à cet égard.

LE SECRÉTARIAT rappelle la décision prise le 6 septembre par le CI et la lettre qui a été adressée aux Croix-Rouges autrichienne et suisse en conformité avec la décision prise par le CICR.

M. CLOUZOT fait connaître l’opinion de M. Swift qui considère que la CR internationale doit rester en dehors de cette question aussi longtemps qu’elle le pourra.

LE CICR considère que la CR internationale n’est pas en cause, c’est à lui seul que le président du Conseil de la SdN s’est adressé.

M. BROWN a vu un secrétaire de M. Mowinckel lequel a manifesté le regret de n’avoir pu voir M. Huber avant sa rentrée en Norvège. M. Mowinckel a eu peur qu’une demande émanant d’un corps politique comme le Conseil de la SdN ne fut considérée par le gouvernement de l’URSS comme une démarche politique et non comme une démarche humanitaire.

Lecture est donnée du projet de lettre préparé par le secrétariat.

Le col. FAVRE croit qu’avant de faire une démarche il faut considérer la suite qu’elle recevra. Si la réponse est qu’il n’y a pas de famine, la situation est claire, mais si la réponse est positive, le CI envisage-t-il de lancer un appel et d’organiser de s secours? Le CI risque de se rendre complice d’une po-
litique soviétique qui serait de faire rentrer des devises étrangères sur le territoire de l’URSS.

M. de HALLER croit que pour qu’une œuvre de secours soit efficace il faudra des millions. Le CI serait dans l’impossibilité d’y faire face. M de Haller signale le témoignage d’Herriot parlant des récoltes magnifiques de l’Ukraine dans les articles qu’il publie. Le CR perdra toute autorité s’il se lance dans cette aventure.

Le PRESIDENT reconnaît qu’il faudrait modifier les termes de la lettre.

M. BOISSIER ne croit pas que le CI puisse rester dans l’inaction. Il faut faire une démarche auprès de l’Alliance des Croix et Croissant Rouges de l’URSS, mais sans affirmer que cette famine existe, ni prendre aucun engagement d’aucune sorte, il est prématuéré de songer à rassembler des fonds et à les distribuer. Si les événements prenaient ce cours les distributions devraient être contrôlées par le CI.

M. DES GOUTTES croit qu’il n’est pas question d’organiser l’action de secours – dans ce cas il faudrait consulter la LSCR – mais il faut prendre des renseignements auprès de l’Alliance.

Le col. FAVRE demande s’il n’est pas possible de demander à l’Alliance les éléments d’une réponse au président du Conseil.

M. de HALLER croit qu’il faut répondre au président du Conseil : 1) en relevant le fait qu’il n’y a pas dans le soin du CI de représentants des Sociétés nationales, 2) que le CI ne peut pas intervenir sans l’aveu de la Société nationale ou du gouvernement du pays intéressé, 3) qu’il va s’adresser à l’Alliance pour savoir quelle est la situation.

Si la réponse est positive – ce qui est invraisemblable – le CI retournera vers la SdN pour qu’elle prenne en main la ravitaillement de la Russie.

Le PRÉSIDENT reconnaît qu’il faut modifier la lettre pour souligner le fait qu’il y a deux temps : information d’abord, action éventuelle ensuite.

Mlle ODIER rappelle les déclarations de M. Wehrlin qu’il n’y a pas urgence. La famine ne se déclarera guère qu’en décembre.

Le col. FAVRE déclare que le tiers de la récolte 1932 est seul resté à la disposition du consommateur.

M. de HALLER croit qu’il faut que notre délégué doit être tenu à l’écart de ces démarches pour ne pas lui nuire. Le Conseil de la SdN s’est déchargé sur le CI d’une affaire très désagréable.

Le PRÉSIDENT propose que le texte soumis au CI soit amendé, modifié à la lumière des observations du CI, soumis à M. Wehrlin et à M. Max Weber, que le mode de remise de cette lettre fut examiné avec M. Wehrlin (envoi direct ou remise par M. Wehrlin).

M. de HALLER demande que le CI soit convoqué à huitaine pour examiner la nouvelle rédaction de la lettre.

M. Wehrlin est introduit. Le président résume le débat à son intention.

M. WEHRLIN demande la valeur du dossier transmis par la SdN.
Le PRÉSIDENT répond que ce dossier est plus que suspect.

M. WEHRLIN constate qu'il s'agit d'une manœuvre politique. Il craint d'être accusé d'avoir fourni les éléments de cette campagne. Il rappelle la coïncidence de 1928 où à son retour à Moscou, il a été l'objet d'accusations de ce genre.

M. DES GOUTTES ne voit pas comment on pourra empêcher M. Wehrlin d'être l'objet d'une suspicion.

M. WERNER croit que M. Wehrlin devrait rentrer à Moscou avant que la lettre du CI y arrive.

LE CICR décide de répondre aux journalistes qu'il a commencé l'étude de la question qui sera reprise dans une séance ultérieure.

M. WERNER verra M. Wehrlin le vendredi 6 à 9h.

Le CI s'ajourne au jeudi 12 octobre à 1h1/2. Séance levée à 16 h 20.

No. 23: October 5, 1933

ICRC : press release concerning Mowinckel's request to the ICRC.

COMMUNIQUÉ [de CICR]


Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge a examiné cette question dans sa séance du 5 octobre et a décidé de prendre à cet égard toutes informations utiles auprès des autorités compétentes.

No. 24: October 6, 1933

Le Matin [Paris daily] : ICRC takes up question of famine in Ukraine

Le Matin. 6 octobre 1933

Le comité international de la Croix-Rouge s'occupe de la famine en Ukraine

Dans une séance plénière convoquée spécialement, le comité international de la Croix-Rouge a pris connaissance, cet après-midi, du document lu par M. Mowinckel et dont le Matin a publié les principales lignes. En l’absence du président, M. Max Huber, retenu à Zurich où il réside, la séance s’est tenue dans le bâtiment récemment donné à la Croix-Rouge par la ville de Genève et qui fut longtemps l’habitation du président du comité international.

Elle était présidée par M. Georges Berner [=Werner. R.S.], professeur de droit public à l’université de Genève et président du conseil d’administration de l’office international Nansen pour les réfugiés. Après un long débat dans lequel tous les problèmes internationaux juridiques et financiers furent passés en revue on en vint à la question d’une action de secours : ce problème a été âprement pesé. Le comité international de la Croix-Rouge était d’avis qu’il convenait de prendre en considération le dossier de la famine en Ukraine, mais ce n’est qu’après avoir procédé à un examen approfondi des possibilités pratiques de l’intervention que le comité pourra prendre une décision.

No. 25: October 6, 1933

Todoriv, President, Ukrainian Students Union of Louvain to ICRC

SOLLICITONS SECOURS UKRAINE AFFAMEE REMERCIONS AVANCE = UNION ETUDIANTS UKRAINIENS LOUVAIN TODORIV PRESIDENT ++

No. 26: October 6, 1933

Eleven Russian Political Leaders in Paris, to the International Red Cross

SOMMES HEUREUX APPRENDRE CROIX ROUGE INTERNATIONALE CHARGEE PAR SOCIETE NATIONS VENIR AIDE AUX PEUPLES DE RUSSIE EPROUVE FAMINE STOP ENQUETE OBJECTIVE PROUVERA URGENCE SECOURS STOP RECEVONS JOURNALLEMENT APPELS DESESPERES NOS COMPATRIOTES TOUTES REGIONS RUSSIE STOP SONT PARTICULIEREMENT FRAPPEES UKRAINE CAUCASE NORD COUBAN OURAL SIBERIE OCCIDENTALE BAS VOLGA AVXENTIEFF ALDANOFF DEMIDOFF KERENSKY KONOVALOFF MILIOUKOV RUBINSTEIN RODNEFF TITOFF VOLKOFF ZENZINOFF
Rolf Andword
Secretary of Mowinckel, Geneva, to Max Huber, President, ICRC

La Délégation de Norvège

Genève, le 9 octobre 1933

Monsieur le Professeur Dr. Max Huber,
Président du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge,
Genève.

Monsieur le Président,

Me référant à la lettre que M. Mowinckel vous a adressée, le 30 septembre dernier, relative à la question de la famine sévissant dans l’Ukraine Soviétique, j’ai l’honneur de vous faire parvenir sous ce pli les documents suivants :
1) Lettre du 4 octobre 1933 du Hilfskomitee für die Hungernden in der Ukraine, Berlin,

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Rolf Andword [signed]

E. Muret, letter to Gazette de Lausanne

A propos de la famine en Russie

Monsieur le Rédaacteur,

Il y a quelques semaines je vous écrivais à propos de l’action de secours proposée en faveur de la Russie affamée.

Ces jours, je lis dans le Bund (du 27 septembre) que l’Europäische Zentralstelle für christliche Hilfsaktion, à Genève se propose de développer cette action de secours autorisée, qui fait des envoie individuels. Dans ce communiqué se trouvent les phrases monumentales suivantes : « Malgré la bonne récolte il y a famine dans de vastes parties de la Russie, ainsi qu’en témoignent d’innombrables lettres. La riche récolte doit d’abord servir à entretien de l’armée et de la classe ouvrière dans les grandes villes, de sorte que justement
pour les campagnards il reste peu, et tout à fait peu pour les individus dont la nourriture n’est pas assurée par leur participation à la collectivité ». – C’est digne du voyageur que personne n’envie à la France !

Ces jours encore je lis dans la *Frankfurter Zeitung* du 26 septembre (2tes Morgenblatt) : « Notre correspondant des Balkans nous écrit : La Grèce a conclu avec l’organisation commerciale soviétique un achat de 20,000 tonnes de céréales provenant de la Crimée. Le premier envoi de 3000 tonnes (trois milles) a déjà été déchargé au Pirée. Les cercles commerçants russes espèrent pouvoir augmenter l’exportation de grain en Grèce jusqu’à 150 mille tonnes. En 1932 la Russie a encore exporté 1,500,000 tonnes de grain. »

Je crois inutile d’ajouter un commentaire quelconque.

E. MURET

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**No. 29: October 12, 1933.**

*Minutes, Plenary session of the ICRC, Werner presiding.*

**Séance du 12 octobre 1933**

**Présents** : M. G. Werner, président  
Mlle Odier  
Mme Chapponière-Chaix  
Dr Audeoud  
M. Boissier  
M. Burckhardt  
M. Favre  
M. de Haller  
M. Chenevière  

**Excusés** : M. Des Gouttes  
M. Max Huber  
M. B. Bouvier  
M. de Planta  
Mlle Ferrière  
Dr. Patry

Le PRÉSIDENT donna lecture du projet de la lettre préparé par lui au secrétaire avec le concours de M. Wehrlin.

Le président explique que la dernière phrase a été ajoutée pour apaiser les craintes de M. Wehrlin. M. Max Huber aurait désiré une phrase sur les voies et moyens d’une action de secours éventuelle.

M. de HALLER est venu prendre ce texte dans la matinée. La dernière phrase du second alinéa le choque. Il ne voudrait pas que cette phrase puisse être interprétée d’une façon fâcheuse pour M. Wehrlin. Il propose de supprimer la première phrase du dernier alinéa et commencer « Les rapports très courtois... » Il propose de supprimer également les premiers mots de la lettre « Vous n’ignorez pas que ».

M. CHENEVIERE n’insiste pas sur le maintien de la phrase « Nous avons certes remarqué... ». Il voulait en quelque sorte tendre la perche à l’Alliance pour sa réponse.
M. FAVRE s’associe aux vues de M. de Haller. Il se demande s’il ne faut pas rajouter le Turkestan dans les régions citées. Il désirerait savoir si l’on peut s’appuyer sur un texte de la Convention pour légitimer la demande.

M. WERNER pour ce dernier point répond négativement. Il n’y a que des principes et la tradition.

M. BOISSIER partage les vues de M. de Haller.

M. AUDEOUD comprend le point de vue de M. Chenevière, mais trouve suffisant comme fait nouveau l’intervention de la Société des Nations.

Mlle Chaponnière, Mlle Odier, M. Burckhardt s’associent aux vues de simplification de M. de Haller.

M. WEHRLIN craint que la phrase soit mal interprétée à Moscou.

M. WEHRLIN accepte la suppression de la première phrase du dernier alinéa.

L’expression des rapports très courtois fait l’objet d’une discussion. M. CHENEVIÈRE souligne l’équivoque de ce terme qui suppose une tension dans les rapports.

M. WEHRLIN demande que l’on atténue la forme de la lettre en soi fort désagréable.

Le Comité accepte les mots « excellents rapports ».

M. WEHRLIN demande que la lettre lui soit envoyée par courrier. Il la remettra lui-même. Il demande que le mot humanitaire soit maintenu. La lettre se terminera par les mots « notre devoir traditionnel et humanitaire ».

M. de HALLER demande si l’on ne remet pas à M. Wehrlin la réponse du CICR à M. Mowinckel.

M. WEHRLIN reconnaît que cette réponse constituerait un démenti aux informations parues dans la presse.

M. BOISSIER croit que la lettre au président du Conseil n’est pas pressée.

M. WEHRLIN considère qu’il lui suffit de pouvoir démentir les informations du Matin.

M. CHENEVIÈRE demande quel sera le résultat de cette lettre.

M. WEHRLIN croit qu’elle peut faire naître un conflit ou provoquer une réponse anodine.

Mlle ODIER demande si l’on pourrait intensifier les secours individuels dans ces régions.

M. WEHRLIN ne peut le faire que dans une mesure restreinte. Il demande s’il peut citer les démarches du CI en Italie et en Allemagne.

Le CI l’autorise seulement à parler de l’Italie.

La correspondance avec l’Alliance passera par M. Wehrlin.

La séance est levée à 14h 25.
No. 30: October 12, 1933

Max Huber, President, ICRC, Geneva, to Abel Enoukidze, President, Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Moscow.

Max Huber, Président
Comité International de la Croix-Rouge

12 octobre 1933

Monsieur Abel ENOUKIDZE
Président de l’Alliance des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et Croissant Rouge
De l’Union des Républiques Soviétistes Socialistes
MOSCOU
Ipatiewsky péréoulok, 6

Monsieur le Président


Nous conformant aux principes que nous avons toujours suivis dans nos relations avec les Croix-Rouges nationales, nous avons l’honneur, en portant à votre connaissance la démarche faite auprès de nous par M. le Président Mowinckel, de vous prier de bien vouloir nous faire connaître l’opinion de l’Alliance des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant Rouge de l’Union des Républiques Soviétistes Socialistes sur la situation des territoires visés plus haut, en nous indiquant si les craintes dont M. le Président Mowinckel nous fait part sont ou ne sont pas fondées. Nous serions heureux en particulier de connaître les mesures que les autorités compétentes ont déjà prises ou celles qu’elles comptent prendre le cas échéant pour assurer le ravitaillement des populations intéressées.

Les rapports excellents que nous entretenons avec l’Alliance des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et le Croissant Rouge de l’Union des Républiques Soviétistes Socialistes nous permettent de penser que vous ne verrez dans la pré-
sente demande que l’accomplissement de notre devoir traditionnel et humanitaire.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de notre haute considération.

(Max HUBER)
Président
BOOK REVIEW

MYKOLA RIABCHUK (Kyiv, Ukraine)

HISTORY THAT DIVIDES


David Marples has published a number of books and many articles on the twentieth-century Ukraine (as well as on Belarus) and is rightfully recognized as one of leading Canadian experts in the area. His new book’s stated goal is to examine “a question related to the concept of nation building, namely the construction of a national history.” (p. ix)

Indeed, as a postcommunist country, Ukraine inherited highly distorted, ideologically charged historical narrative focused primarily on the permanent “class struggle” and teleologically arranged towards the “historically inevitable” victory of communism. Yet, even stronger distortion had been determined by the country’s colonial past and its virtual non-existence on both political and mental maps of Europe. History of Ukraine had been just a regional part of a heavily mythologized “Great Russian” (and, eventually, all-Soviet) history. As a subject, it was progressively marginalized in schools and provincialized and disqualified in academia. Its central narrative had one more teleological plot: Ukraine and Ukrainians, since their very emergence in the late middle ages, had their primary if not single goal, their entire raison d'etre, in “reunification” with the “brotherly Russia”. This was the main perspective from which the nation’s development was observed, and the main criterion from which all the historic events and persons were evaluated.

Yet, not everything that was good, and glorious, and heroic for Russia was the same for Ukraine. And vice versa. This seemingly simple truth surfaced in the last years of Gorbachev’s glasnost’, and paved its way into the mainstream discourse in the independent Ukraine since 1991. Yet, in Russia, it was not an easy truth to accept and, more broadly, not a comfortable new reality to come to terms with. Either five, or ten, or fifteen years after the end of the Soviet Union, the majority of Russians still regret the break of the “great” (as they believe) country and still cannot accept Ukraine’s independence and recognize Ukrainians as a separate nation, with their right for a different language, culture, historical narratives and pantheon of heroes.

They love Ukrainians exactly like imperial Robinson Crusoe loved his Friday, and sincerely fail to grasp why those nice village bumpkins have gone, of
a sudden, crazy with nationalistic ideas, why they got rid of their masters and benefactors, and proclaimed their indigenous independence which, in a Freudian way, almost never is named in Russian mass-media by a proper Russian word “nezavisimost” but, instead, is misspelled derisively as a quasi-Ukrainian word “nezalezhnost”. Linguistic caricature is employed to reflect the politically caricatural character of the phenomenon it describes. Poor Friday could certainly never have come to that crazy idea himself; he should have been muddled away by some other – hostile and perfidious (American probably, if not Polish or “Jewish-Masonic”) – Robinson.

Even top Russian politicians can hardly refrain from this way of reasoning – as a recent interview of Vladimir Putin to the *Time* magazine graphically confirms. Here, with a typical Kremlin chutzpah, he reprimanded Americans for their interference in Ukrainian affairs and, without batting an eyelid, revealed to the whole English-speaking world that 17 million Ukrainian citizens are ethnic Russians, and “almost 100 percent” of Ukrainians consider Russian their native language. (The actual figures, according to the 2001 national census – if any *Time*’s reader would ever bother to take a look – are 7.8 million and about 30 percent respectively).

“He might as well have declared Ukrainian a dead language,” the *Kyiv Post* editor sarcastically remarked.

Stalin’s social engineering

David Marples’ book would have probably never been written – at least in the way it was – if the main problem of “creating national history in contemporary Ukraine” could have been effectively reduced just to cleaning it up from Soviet stereotypes and imperial wreckage, and taming the wrath of former imperial masters. Ukraine, unlike Poland, Estonia, or Lithuania, has internalized a substantial part of imperial legacy, of imperial history and identity – at the level of many people and of the whole regions. This makes creation of a national history a really challenging and painstaking task since the profound matter of country’s divided identity is involved, and lack of consensus on virtually every historical issue makes the very notion of *national* history rather problematic. This is especially true in regard of the highly divisive events of the twentieth century, and the author is largely (albeit not fully) right in limiting the scope of his study to the Stalinist (1928-1953) period of the Soviet – and Ukrainian – history.

This period [he argues] represents the most tragic era in the history of Ukraine, and one of the most profoundly influential in the formation of contemporary thinking about the modern nation and its relationship to the past. For it is in this period that Ukraine suffered its most dramatic and tragic experiences: the Famine of 1932-33, the Purges, the impact of the Nazi-Soviet Pact that saw its western territories incorporated into the USSR; the German invasion; and the bitter fighting as a result of national insurgency in the western regions that saw conflicts between several players: the retreating Germans, the advancing Red Army, the local Polish population, and the local Ukraini-
ans. How are these events portrayed in contemporary Ukraine? That question forms the backbone to this monograph because the *raison d'etre* of the modern state seems predicated on the way it views its past. [p. x]

The chosen chronological framework clearly signals that the book is rather problem- than topic-oriented. One cannot provide a detailed account of a national history-making in Ukraine without referring to fundamental Ukrainian-Russian controversies over the legacy of Kyivan Rus, the seventeenth-century Cossack rebellion and Ukraine’s alleged “reunification” with Russia, its eventual nineteenth-century attempts at emancipation from the Russian empire and, finally, the dramatic events of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1920. Yet, on the other hand (and Marples’ book largely proves it), none of those milestone events and developments is as controversial today and divisive for Ukrainian society as the issue of the Ukrainian Resurgent Army (UPA) that waged a hopeless national-liberation guerilla war against both the Soviets and Germans, and had been heavily demonized by the communist propaganda as bloodthirsty killers and Nazi collaborators.

However dramatic and harmful for the national psyche was the experience of the man-made famine of 1932-33 that took the lives of at least of three million Ukrainian peasants, its meaning is basically accepted today by a great majority of Ukrainians. Very few people doubt today that the famine was masterminded by Stalin and his associates, and implemented by the communist activists and Soviet authorities. There are enough documents and eyewitness evidence to prove that the Soviets attempted to thoroughly confiscate not only grain but any food in Ukrainian villages, and that peasants were prevented from escape not only by the newly introduced at the time passport/propiska system (as a sort of internal quasi-visas) but also by the police cordons at the stations and borders of famine-affected Ukraine and the Kuban region of Northern Caucasus (ethnically Ukrainian at the time).

As of today, the main controversy about famine revolves around interpretations of the event rather than its essence. It affects rather politicians (allegedly “pro-Russian” and “anti-Russian”) than society at large. The main debatable point here (comprehensively represented in the second chapter of Marples’ book) is whether famine can be defined — legally, not just metaphorically — as a genocide of Ukrainians masterminded by Moscow. Were Ukrainians slaughtered en masse as Ukrainians or “just as” peasants? The question may look tautological if one considers that, at the time, peasants in Ukraine were more than 90 percent ethnically Ukrainian, and ethnic Ukrainians were nearly 90 percent peasants.

The traditional Bolshevik disdain for peasants is broadly known; in the case of the Stalinist leadership it was translated not only into political mistrust but also into personal loathe and hatred. In a number of letters Stalin demanded to punish peasants for the alleged sabotage of collectivization, and the worse the punishment, he insisted, the better. And since the Ukrainian peasants had been especially resistant, Stalin connected their defiance with a sinister influence of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism.” “We may lose Ukraine!” wrote he to Ka-
ganovich, somewhat paranoiacly exaggerating the threat of domestic “nationalistic conspiracy” and international plot between the emigre Ukrainian “nationalists” and the Poles.

None of these fears, of course, was completely groundless. On the one hand, Ukraine was the largest (after Russia) Soviet republic, with a strong and ambitious, however Russified, local elite who had always felt some appetite for a greater autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow or St. Petersburg. This elite, by the end of the the 1920s, under the early Bolshevik policy of “indigenization,” obtained a broad network of quasi-national institutions and a substantial number of cadres that tended to be “communist in form, while national in content” – and not vice versa, as required.

And, on the other hand, the feeling of “Polish threat,” however ethemeral, was fuelled by the recent experience of Petliura-Pilsudski cooperation in 1919-20 and, more generally, by rather questionable legitimacy of Soviet/Russian possession of Ukrainian lands taken over from Poland.

Thus, the Ukrainian question had to be solved once forever – alongside with the peasant question. In both cases, yet, “solution” stood not for thorough extermination of either ethnic or social group but, rather, for their complete subjugation – even though, to this aim, a mass extermination was deliberately employed. Soviet policy targeted groups but not individuals; in these terms it was profoundly different from that of Nazis. Soviets had not been obsessed with racial, or ethnic, or even class purity; the peasants as a social group of independent owners and producers had to be fully eliminated, but the peasants as individuals could survive under condition they would accept a new social identity – of kolkhoz slaves. By the same token, Ukrainians as an ethnic group with a separate (different from Russian) self-awareness, with an independent high culture, and a prospect (at least potentially) for independent political development had to be fully extinguished. But as individuals most of them could survive under condition they would accept a new-old identity promoted by the empire – of “Little Russians,” of a regional brand of “all-Russian”/all-Soviet people – identity of a “Friday” who obediently accepts linguistic, cultural, and political superiority of the Great Russian “Robinson”.

It was certainly not a genocide, in a peculiar Soviet newspeak – just a purging of class enemies – “kulaks,” “saboteurs” and, of course, “bourgeois nationalists.” One should remember, however, that in this peculiar newspeak “kulak” was a label for any peasant who had some property and was disloyal (or just perceived as not loyal enough). But the same token, a label “bourgeois nationalist” stood for any Ukrainian with unequivocal Ukrainian identity, with some, however modest, national self-awareness and commitment to Ukrainian language and culture. It was exactly like with the terms “cosmopolitan” or, eventually, “Zionist” in the same newspeak. It was not just a label – it was a criminal accusation and a court sentence at once. In this view, the official extermination of “kulaks” was, in fact, extermination of peasants as a separate and specific social group. And, in the same way, the extermination of “bourgeois nationalists” in Ukraine was just a euphemism for extermination of
Ukrainians as a group with a separate and specific national consciousness. In both cases, single individuals could survive – at a price of abandoning their peculiar social and/or national identity. Physical destruction facilitated cultural and psychological destruction; in both cases it meant elimination of a group – either by physical extinction of its more active and self-conscious part, or forceful assimilation of the more passive and submissive (or merely luckier) rest.

Stalin, reportedly, complained to Khrushchev that there were too many Ukrainians to deport all of them – like Chechens or Crimean Tatars. In all these cases, he did not intend to annihilate all of them – as individuals. But he clearly intended to pacify and emasculate and destroy them as a viable national group. Therefore, the Famine of 1932–33, alongside with the prior, adjacent, and subsequent purges, should be clearly understood as a political and, in a sense, spiritual extinction of the Ukrainian nation, based on, but not limited to, a large-scale terror and physical extermination. Metaphorically, it can be described as a sort of lobotomy applied to the whole nation, something that happened to Nicholson’s hero at the end of the *One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest*. Whether “genocide” or not, it was certainly an attempt at a “final solution” of the Ukrainian question.

**Between the two leviathans**

Stalin’s project may have proved quite a success – in a sense that Ukraine, after his social-cum-genetic engeneering, would have become something like Belarus, or Transnistria, or Crimea – a vast reserve of *homo sovieticus*, with virtually no space for “bourgeois nationalists,” i.e., aborigens obsessed with their cultural and linguistic uniqueness and defying historical progress embodied in cultural and political Russification. Yet, he made a strategic mistake by incorporating Western Ukraine (as well as the Baltic states) into his monumental empire. In fact, he repeated a fatal mistake of his late eighteenth-century predecessors who included a huge part of partitioned Poland into the Russian tsardom. In both cases, the swallowed pieces proved to be undigestable; even worse, they infected the entire imperial organism and facilitated ultimately its collapse.

Neither Western Ukraine nor the Baltic states have ever accepted legitimacy of the Soviet takeover and, what is of a crucial importance, have ever internalized Soviet values – the “Soviet way of life.” The armed resistance against the Soviet rule in all these territories is a very important and, perhaps, the most dramatic part of the story. While in Western Ukraine, like in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, the anti-Soviet guerilla is broadly accepted as a heroic part of the national history, in all other (ex)Soviet lands it is largely perceived through the Soviet lenses – as a mere banditry of “bourgeois nationalists,” Nazi collaborators, and war criminals.

Indeed, the issue is the most divisive in Ukrainian society, and David Marples is probably right in addressing it first and foremost in his book, in five chapters of total eight (three other chapters are – introduction, conclusions,
and a chapter on Famine). The facts presented within the book would certainly not satisfy the Sovietophiles who established the “master narrative” on the topic long ago and still try to protect its major mythical postulates. But the facts also would hardly fit the “nationalists” who try to challenge the Soviet stereotypes and replace them with their own, uniformly heroic and rather unproblematic interpretation of the events.

What becomes clear from the debates on the topic in the post-Soviet Ukraine, rather impartially presented by David Marples, is that Ukrainian “nationalists” of the time were neither heroes nor villains or, more precisely, there were both heroes and villains in their ranks, as virtually in any army, but in sum, the phenomenon is too complex to be judged straightforwardly, in simplistic black-and-white categories. First of all, there were substantial differences among various “nationalistic” political groups and military formations in the both pre-war, and war, and after-the-war periods. The Soviets had typically piled up all of them as undifferentiated demonic “collaborators” — “Ukrainian-German nationalists,” as a propagandistic formula claimed in the late 40s-early 50s (eventually dropped probably because of its clear absurdity). Most of the so-called “collaborators” waged the war not only against the Soviets but also against the Nazis. Thousands of them were killed by the gestapo, and many more were incarcerated, including their heavily demonized leaders — Stepan Bandera and Yaroslav Stetsko, who spent all the war in Auschwitz and Sachsenhausen (Bandera was eventually assassinated in Munich by a Soviet agent). There are German documents that treat UPA as a real threat and instruct to kill not only UPA fighters but also any “nationalistic agitators.” In this regard, the Soviet and German attitude towards Ukrainian ‘nationalists’ was not much different.

Yet, besides the UPA that was established in 1942, there were some other “nationalistic” formations whose collaboration with Germans, however opportunistic and limited, is undeniable. First of all, there were two battalions, “Nachtigal” and “Roland,” that entered Ukraine with the Nazis in 1941, probably with a hope that the Germans would allow them to create a “friendly” state of a Hungarian-Romanian or, at least, Slovak-Croatian type. After the Germans rejected the idea and arrested in August 1941 all the leaders the self-proclaimed “independent Ukraine,” the battalions were dissolved, and their commanders ended up in the concentration camps while rank-and-file fighters joined eventually UPA.

Secondly, there was an auxiliary police that did not differ much from any police in occupied countries but, in 1943, at the UPA order, most of its members, with arms, joined UPA. It was, really, a dubious gain since, on the one hand, it provided the Soviets with an argument that the UPA consists of former policemen, collaborators, and war criminals, and, on the other hand, brought, indeed, into the UPA very different people, sometimes with murky pasts and questionable moral profiles.

And finally, there was the 14th Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS, Halychyna no.1, created in 1943 when the German defeat was rather obvious but
some nationalistic leaders still expected a miracle – this time probably in a form of a separate peace between Germany and Western Allies, and creation of buffer states in Eastern Europe where Ukraine with its own army may have had a chance. Again, after the crushing defeat in the eastern front in 1944, many Halychyna troops joined UPA, contributing eventually to the Soviet propagandistic image of UPA as Nazi hacks.

After the war, no accusations in war crimes against Rolland and Nachtigal were proved in Nuremberg, and no accusations of the sort were even raised against Halychyna which was recognized by the allies as a front-line military unit, not involved in any punitive actions. But all these nuances were of little importance in a propagandistic war where any differences among various nationalistic formations were blurred and a bestial image of generic “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” – “the worst enemy of Ukrainian people” – was firmly established and canonized in the official historical narrative.

This “master narrative,” albeit challenged, still is dominant in Ukraine – at least in most regions and in the majority of people’s minds. It is supported not only by old stereotypes and myths but also by actual propaganda emanating from local and, especially, Moscow sources. Surprisingly, all these aspects of propagandistic wars are absent in Marples’ book – a strange omission in a monograph that, as the author declares, “concentrates on discourse and narratives about events, rather than the ‘reality’ of what actually occurred” (p. xii), and intends to “provide representative perspectives from the different regions of Ukraine, as well as to demonstrate the viewpoints in mainstream newspapers” (p. xiv).

(Re)production of “normality”

In fact, neither Kyiv-based Literaturna Ukrayina nor Lviv-based Za vilnu Ukrayinu, extensively quoted by Marples, represent any sort of “mainstream”; on the contrary – both of them belong to a typical “niche” – nativist-literary in one case and radical-xenophobic in the other. In a sense, they are “representative” – but this representativeness should be certainly balanced by the opposite niche represented, for example, by the crypto-Stalinist newspaper Kommunist or extremely Ukrainophobic Donetskiy kriazh.

Of other newspapers monitored by the author, only Ukrayina moloda (100,000 copies daily) and Dzerkalo tyzhnia (50,000 copies weekly) and, probably, Den (with qualifications) can be placed within the mainstream. But what about the papers that claim half a million circulation daily like Kyiv-based Fakty and Segodnia, or Silski visti, or Lviv-based Ekspres? What about a bunch of Moscow-based periodicals that are freely distributed and widely read in Ukraine? And finally, what about TV, both local and central (Kyiv and Moscow), which influences public opinion much more than any newspaper, historical journal or textbook?

Of course, Ukraine is too large a country, and too diverse, in both regional terms and in terms of media plurality. Strong limitations are needed for any research, and Marples’ selection of sources is certainly neither random, nor
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incidental, nor irrelevant. It suits his main task – to show how the dominant discourse on very sensitive and controversial historic events was challenged in the late perestroika and eventually replaced by the alternative – national or, as you like it, nationalistic. But, by focusing his attention only on nationalistic texts (however broadly defined – from radical-xenophobic to civic and liberal) and by ignoring the other part of Ukrainian discursive reality – Rusophile and Sovietophile texts (also in versatile ideological representations), he fails to explain persuasively why Soviet/Russian discourses, however obsolete, mythical, and ahistorical, are still so persistent in this country and, on the other hand, why Ukrainian discourses, however freed from censorship and even promoted in textbooks and academia, still expose clear lack of internal freedom and external security, and still manifest seiged consciousness and inferiority complexes.

As an honest and careful observer of Ukrainian reality David Marples reflects all these problems in his analysis and concludes at the end that “independence in Ukraine has not brought a radical change of perspective” (p. 277). This conclusion is based on the results of opinion surveys and, certainly, on empirical observations but is hardly conceivable without due attention to the channels and instruments and techniques that not only promote the new historical information but also protect, and support, and regenerate the old one. Here, the victory in discursive wars come not necessarily to those who present better arguments in scholarly books or ideologically charged articles but, rather, to those who manage to represent their views as “normal,” “self-evident,” “generally accepted” and, at the same time, to misrepresent the views of opponents as dangerous deviation or, preferably, pitiful obsession. So far, the victory in discursive wars come not necessarily to those who present better arguments in scholarly books or ideologically charged articles but, rather, to those who manage to represent their views as “normal,” “self-evident,” “generally accepted” and, at the same time, to misrepresent the views of opponents as dangerous deviation or, preferably, pitiful obsession. So far, in Ukraine, the discursive wars are won not by the authors of textbooks or articles in the refereed journals or quality newspapers. Rather, they are won by producers and reproducers of popular culture – those who determine the notion of “normality” and “deviation” for the entire society, and who predetermine results of any public debate not so much by selecting and developing arguments but, rather, by a mere including the topic in, or excluding it from, the mainstream agenda. So far, the post-Soviet “normality” in Ukraine is determined by Soviet films and songs as allegedly “ours,” by Soviet street names and monuments to dubious “our” heroes, and by Soviet ambiguous holidays, habits, and linguistic cliches (like the “Great Patriotic War”) that are far from being ideologically neutral. But most importantly, this “normality” is strongly supported by unwillingness of its guardians to problematize whatsoever and to challenge the very notion of “common sense” as a social construct that secures a consensual (rather than coercive) dominance of the post-Soviet elite.

At some point David Marples comes very close to this problem – when he quotes a Canadian historian Roman Serbyn who questioned the need for the Government Commission for Examining OUN-UPA Activities created in 1997 by the then president Leonid Kuchma. Serbyn’s argument, as reported by Marples, is two-fold: (a) no special investigation is needed because the role
of the UPA is well-known, and (b) there is a double standard in operation since no commission has been established to study the activities of the Red Army and Soviet Partisans. (p. 261) David Marples dismisses this argument primarily because of its first part, which is really naive. But its second part is very strong and serious and, if taken carefully, could have been developed in a very clear and reasonable demand to examine activities of both UPA and the Soviets on the equal ground, by the same legal standards and moral criteria.

Only such an examination would reveal the complexity of the events and the real tragedy of the stateless nation that could not play any role of its own but just to choose between the two evils. Ukrainians who greeted Germans in the first days of the war (by the way, not only in the west of the country) could hardly expect that the new regime would be even worse than the old one. A hundred thousand of them happened to fight on the German side, half a million – in the UPA, and six million – in the Red Army. Nearly half of them perished. Most of them, undoubtedly, fought for their own country, for “free Ukraine,” however they imagined it. Most of them were driven by some idealistic, however naive, feelings that should be respected.

This is the starting point for any further discussions about specific events, and figures, and interpretations. And only in this way a national history can be written that embraces, as David Marples suggests, “the memory and perspectives of all Ukrainians, as well as all peoples who lives or lived in Ukraine during the tumultuous and tragic events of the twentieth century” (p. 312). But as long as a prevalent approach to the Soviet troops and the UPA remains flagrantly asymmetrical, and “common sense” apriori assigns the former with unproblematic goodness and the latter with absolute evil, no dialogue or reasonable discussion is possible. Besieged consciousness waives to recognize that “our boys,” sometimes, could have been “bad boys,” and some of our heroes were in fact villains – because any of such recognitions, under discursive war, is felt to undermine the entire cause, to grant “them” additional argument against “us,” to further prove our absolute “evilness” and elevate their absolute “goodness”.

This is why even liberal Ukrainians, as David Marples graphically exemplifies, are reluctant, in many instances, to condemn unequivocally the crypto-fascist ideology of “integral nationalism” that was dominant in OUN and influential in UPA; to denounce xenophobic and anti-Semitic stances of some OUN and UPA leaders, and – perhaps the most deplorable part of the story – to execrate ethnic cleansings of Poles in Volhynia carried out by some UPA leaders and troops.

Realistically, there are no signs that a discursive war on historical matters would end in Ukraine in a foreseeable future. Just too many factors are involved, including political power, identity, regionalism and, of course, Russian interests and influences. The “besieged consciousness” is unlikely to be replaced with more flexible and open mentality, even though the scope and quality of debates, as Marples observes, have been noticeably improved in the
last decade and, in some professional publications and intellectual periodicals, reached a pretty respectable level.

A good news from Ukraine, however, is that attempts to rehabilitate OUN and UPA as freedom-fighters, and to glorify their leaders as national heroes, are not accompanied by attempts to revive their ideology of “integral nationalism” and to promote any sorts of militancy and intolerance. The emphasis typically is put on rather ethical values than ideological. The UPA fighters, as it comes from Marples’ account, are praised primarily for their patriotism and commitment to the national-liberation cause, for their idealism and dedication, for spiritual strength and self-sacrifice. It is clearly a heroic myth to counter-balance the long-dominant myth of impecable Red Army. Any nation invents some historical myths of the sort, and one can only expect that all of them would be able to keep the irrational energy of historical myths under rational control.

_Ukrainian Center for Cultural Studies_
Gulag Studies

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