Poland and Ukraine in the 1930s and 1940s

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PREFACE

Representing the fruit of fifteen years of cooperation between Polish and Ukrainian scholars, this remarkable collection of documents, translated from Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian, covers the painful history of Ukrainian-Polish relations in the past century. Many of the documents have been newly discovered, and throw light on a particularly violent period of recent history for the first time.

Secrecy was the hallmark of Communist rule. The saying, “There’s no truth in ‘Pravda’ and there’s no news in ‘Izvestiya’” was quite appropriate for the Soviet Union. The archives in the Communist states were, and are, under the direct or indirect control of the secret police. Significantly, when the Soviets invaded Poland in 1939, the archives were one of the first institutions they occupied (see Chapter III). A regime noted for mass mobilisation in fact concealed its actual operations from the masses and the world. The Great Famine (Holodomor) of 1932–1933 in Soviet Ukraine (which killed millions of people), the national operations of the Great Terror (which targeted certain nationalities such as Poles, Latvians, and Koreans), and the Katyn Massacre are good examples of secrecy and cover-up. Those who have worked in the archives of former Communist countries (including the Soviet Union and Poland) know well how severely restricted access to them used to be. One often had to work without any guide whatsoever to the collections. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union a little more than twenty years ago changed the situation dramatically. Many formerly secret archives were thrown open, and the hunger for more information grew, precisely because so much had been kept secret by the Communist governments. The present volume reflects the hard work propelled by this hunger.

The result is both important and far-reaching. Many secrets have come out. For example, nothing had been known about the special terror operation of 1937–38 against the Poles. Archival documents drawn chiefly from Moscow and Kiev (and reproduced in the present volume) reveal the goals Moscow pursued with this mass terror and how it was carried out (Chapter II). Likewise, almost nothing was known about Operation “Sejm” an action implemented in 1944–1946 to liquidate Polish underground movements on the territory of former Poland which had now been incorporated into the Ukrainian and Belarusian Soviet Republics (Chapter V). Although the Polish-Ukrainian mutual massacres that took place towards the end of World War II in Western Ukraine/Eastern Poland were not unknown, it became possible to explore their full picture only after the formerly closed archives of the Communist states became accessible (Chapter IV). The same was true of the Great Famine of 1932–33 (Chapter I), the Sovietisation of former Polish territory following the September 1939 invasion by Soviet military forces (Chapter III), the coordinated exchange of ethnic Poles and Ukrainians between Poland and Ukraine in the period 1944–1946 (Chapter VI), and Operation “Vistula” a campaign for the forced resettlement of ethnic Ukrainians in Poland in 1947 (Chapter VII). The collection and publication of these documents, along with a
detailed introduction to each chapter, represents an extraordinary achievement of Polish-Ukrainian scholarly collaboration.

It may be unnecessary to interpret the rich collection of documents here, for the significance of such a document collection is to let readers form their own opinions. Specialists of the subjects covered in this volume will want to examine the original, more complete Polish-Ukrainian editions. Nevertheless, a few words are in order on the historical context within which some of the events covered here took place.

* * *

Political violence and terror, the most striking feature of events in this period, were far from gratuitous, but were fully intentional. Moscow, which was responsible for the Holodomor, used it to intimidate and disarm the Ukrainian national movements by deliberately branding them as Polish creations (i.e. “Piłsudski’s agents” in Ukraine)! Interestingly, Karl Radek (1885–1939), a Polish Marxist turned Soviet Bolshevik, often acted as Stalin’s mouthpiece. At the time of the Famine, Radek was working as Stalin’s personal diplomat responsible for Poland. Having secured Warsaw’s ratification in November 1932 of a Polish-Soviet neutrality pact, Stalin, through Radek, pressed Warsaw for closer relations in opposition to Berlin. In May 1933, when Polish diplomats asked Radek about the famine in Ukraine, he responded, “So what?” Radek went on to say that even if the Polish diplomats were right that a famine existed in Soviet Ukraine, and even if 2 million people had died in Ukraine, it just meant that the Soviet population would be 178 million instead of 180! At the same time, Radek did not hesitate to threaten Poland. In June 1933, raising the issue of “the Ukrainian problem,” he told a Polish journalist in Moscow that “any activity of yours in this territory [Soviet Ukraine] will be considered by us as a conscious or unconscious execution of German plans in the east.” Indeed, it was precisely at this time that Moscow began to fabricate the cases of the “Polish Military Organisation” (POW) and to repress ethnic Poles in Ukraine and elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Seeking better relations with Moscow, Warsaw chose not to allow the Ukrainians in Poland to raise the issue of the famine in Ukraine.

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1 See I. V. Stalin’s letter to L. M. Kaganovich (11 August 1932), in Сталин и Каганович. Переписка. 1931–1936 гг. (Moscow, 2001), 273–274.
2 Quoted in B. Miedziński, “Droga do Moskwy,” Kultura (Paris), no. 188 (1963), 82.
3 AAN, MSZ, file 6748a, p. 57 (emphasis added). See also J. J. Bruski (ed.), Holodomor 1932–1933: Wielki Głód na Ukrainie w dokumentach polskiej dyplomacji i wywiadu (Warsaw, 2008), 297.
4 See Г. Куромія, “Голод 1932–1933 років в Україні та євразійська політика,” Україна Модерна, no. 6 (17), 2010.
The “Polish operation” during the Great Terror stemmed in part from Moscow’s strategic failure to detach Warsaw from Berlin. According to Radek, he was once criticised by Stalin for attacking Piłsudski in the Soviet press: “You’re mistaken, don’t forget that Piłsudski – he is Poland.” If this account is true, its logical conclusion was that after Piłsudski’s death in 1935, Poland ceased to exist in Stalin’s eyes: Poland and the Poles were already doomed in 1935. In 1937–1938 Moscow therefore terrorised the ethnic Poles in the Soviet Union without restraint. This operation was followed in 1939 by the effective destruction of Poland by Stalin and Hitler. Shortly thereafter Stalin killed approximately 22,000 Polish prisoners of war in Katyn and elsewhere, and deported and exiled hundreds of thousands of Polish civilians to remote areas of the Soviet Union.

No one knows for sure whether Stalin considered the “Fourth Partition of Poland” to be permanent. Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, however, forced Stalin to revive Poland (at least in theory). Although Stalin could not revive the Poles he had killed, he was obliged to recognise the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, nullify the “Fourth Partition,” and offer “amnesty” and release to tens of thousands of Poles in order to form Polish military units (the so-called “Anders Army”) to help him fight the Nazis. In destroying Poland in 1939, Stalin had ostensibly championed the interests of Ukrainians and Belarusians. Yet they, like Poles, were in fact merely political tools to him. When in December 1941 Władysław Anders complained about pro-German Ukrainians in Lviv, Stalin responded: “They are your Ukrainians, not ours. We’ll work together to obliterate them!” In subsequent years, Moscow and Warsaw did indeed work together through resettlement, exile, and terror to obliterate the perceived danger posed by the ethnic Ukrainians. (It should be added, however, that Moscow and Kiev likewise worked together to remove the problem of ethnic Poles by the same methods.) Furthermore, the security forces of Moscow and Warsaw collaborated to eliminate the last remnants of Ukrainian nationalists through exceptionally elaborate schemes of provocation.

* * *

In light of all these events, it cannot be emphasised enough that the Poles and the Ukrainians were the victims of the “Great Powers” (Russia in particular). Instead of dwelling on victimhood, however, the present volume seeks to grapple with the thorny issues of Polish-Ukrainian relations on their own terms. After all,

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6 CAW, file I.303.4.3158, p. 235 (Radek’s account as related to a Polish diplomat).
8 See, for example, I. Hałagida, Prowokacja “Zenona”: Geneza, przebieg i skutki operacji MBP o kryptonimie “C-1” przeciwko banderowskiej frakcji OUN i wywiadowi brytyjskiemu (1950–1954) (Warsaw, 2005).
both Ukraine and Poland were participants – willing or not – in the violent events of the 1930s and 1940s discussed in this volume.

All the same, we still need to emphasise the central role Moscow played in all these events. In carrying out the resettlement of Poles and Ukrainians in 1944–1946, Moscow deliberately stayed in the shadows, and had Ukraine conclude an agreement with Poland. In fact, this was a political trick by Moscow. As the editors of the present volume note, there is still much that is unknown. For example, they state: “We have so far failed to locate any document which would provide an unambiguous and balanced summary of ‘Operation Sejm’.” Likewise, there are suspicions that it was Moscow which took the decision in 1947 to implement Operation “Vistula,” a forceful resettlement of ethnic Ukrainians in Poland. If Moscow opens those of its archives which are still closed, these questions will most likely be answered in full.

All nations manipulate history for political purposes. Historical memory itself often becomes the battleground of current politics. One good way to ensure a degree of “historical objectivity” in today’s contentious world is to allow free and unrestricted access to all archives. The present volume reflects such an effort by Poland and Ukraine. But whereas Poland has taken giant steps in this direction, Ukraine still has a long way to go. Many of the documents reproduced here from the Archives of the Ukrainian Security Service are not freely accessible to everyone. The guides to their vast archival holdings have not been made available to researchers. Until both Warsaw and Kiev allow free and unfettered access to all their archival holdings from the Stalinist era, a true and honest dialogue between Poland and Ukraine about the events discussed here is difficult to imagine.

Even if such dialogue becomes possible, Moscow’s shadow continues to loom overhead because, although Moscow played a central role in these events, it still guards its historical archives jealously. By releasing documents from its closed archives selectively, Moscow is seeking to manipulate history. It is odd to hear a Russian historian accusing Poland of alleged “pro-German” policy and anti-Soviet policy in the 1930s, when in the 1920s Moscow and Berlin worked together against Poland (the Rapallo accommodation). Although Moscow is prone to condemn Warsaw’s schemes in the 1930s to dismember the Soviet Union (these schemes included the Prometheus movement), it was the Soviet Union (in conspiracy with Nazi Germany) that in fact destroyed Poland in 1939. This sort of crude distortion of history is easily rebuffed. Other distortions are harder to deal with, however. At any rate, such political manipulation makes any constructive dialogue about history difficult. While Moscow would do a great service to the world by opening up its closed archives, the world nevertheless moves on – even without Moscow’s cooperation. The present volume represents an admirable advance by Poland and Ukraine in confronting their painful Stalinist past.

Hiroaki Kuromiya

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22
FROM THE EDITORIAL COMMITTEE

Talks on archival cooperation with the Branch State Archives of Security Service of Ukraine (DA SBU, present HDA SBU) were initiated from the Polish side by the Minister of the Internal Affairs of Third Polish Republic Andrzej Milczanowski in 1995. In November 1995, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Polish Republic with assistance of his adviser MSc Jędrzej Tucholski reached initial agreement with the head of SBU Gen. Volodymyr Radchenko on potential archival cooperation. An SBU delegation with Gen. Volodymyr Prystrajko at its head arrived to Warsaw in April 1996. Undertaken talks resulted in resolution to establish a joint working group consisting of employees of SBU and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MSW, later Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, MSWiA).

Ukrainian side committed itself to search documents concerning:

a) fate of Polish citizens; officers of MSW, Prison Guard (SW), military police, prosecutor’s officers, national judiciary and administration, as well as soldiers and civil employees of Section II of the Polish Main Staff;

b) deportation of Polish citizens from western districts of USSR in 1939–1941;

c) Polish underground organizations in 1939–1941.

While the Polish side assumed an obligation to search the following:

a) Ukrainian political parties and social organizations in Poland in 1920–1940;

b) Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Poland and combats between Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) and divisions of Polish Army and Internal Security Corps (KBW);

c) operations of intelligence and counter-intelligence services of Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA) and Ukrainian People’s Republic army;

d) relocation of Ukrainians in 1944–1947.

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The previous volumes of the publishing series “Poland and Ukraine in the 1930s – 1940s. Unpublished Documents from the Archives of the Secret Services” were a bi-lingual publication – in Polish and Ukrainian. This volume, which is a selection of the most interesting published series of documents, is supplemented with an English translation that will allow a much wider audience to become acquainted with this unique collection of documents.

The publication has been prepared on the Polish version of the volumes. With respect to Polish documents, has been edited into modern and consistent form,

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10 See: M. Majewski (ed.), 15 years of archival and historical cooperation. Poland and Ukraine in the 1930s–1940s (Warszawa 2011).
with punctuation and abbreviations changed according to modern rules. The apparent errors in Polish spelling, orthography and grammar have been corrected without additional comment and thus appear in the English translation. However, the style has been retained, leaving some stylistically awkward passages (major ones have been footnoted with: *As in the original*). Proper names have retained their original Polish spelling and any misspellings, which were verifiable, have been corrected and footnoted with information about the error. Unverifiable proper names have retained their original spelling, without any attempts at changing them into a more probable form, thus avoiding any unnecessary confusion. The Polish documents have also retained English transcription of Russian or Ukrainian words used by the document’s author (ex.: *trudoden* or *besprizorni*).

Slightly different rules have been applied to the translation of Russian or Ukrainian documents from the Polish language. Once again the main aim was to preserve, as much as possible, their original style, retaining the colloquial or official language, depending on the nature of the document. A number of Russian words remained not translated but have been given English transcription. They are words, which in the 1930s would be used by foreigners writing about the situation in the Bolshevik Russia (see ex.: documents produced by the staff of the foreign diplomatic missions in Soviet Ukraine), and which are already an element of particular language in the literature concerning the Great Famine (ex.: *khlebozagotovka* or *yedinolichniks*).

The graphic layout of the documents has largely been made consistent, retaining a degree of particularities characteristic to individual registers. All distinctions in type-written documents (uppercase, spacing, typewriting, underlining) have been eliminated, with appropriate information given in footnotes. The only exception relates to the documents produced by the GPU, and later the NKVD, where uppercase has been retained in writing surnames, as a typical characteristic of the registers of the two institutions (this concerns only typewritten documents, in handwriting this rule was usually disregarded). If a document has been written on a form or letterhead, appropriate information is supplied in the caption and footnotes.

Information regarding handwritten comments, underlining or corrections in parts of the text, has been given in footnotes (with the exception of several documents which are draft papers – not all handwritten corrections have been footnoted, due to their large number), while endorsements and other notes pertaining to the document and concerning its administrative circulation, have been described in the caption. The caption also includes additional information about the document, such as its original language.

In this volume, with regard to Polish documents, names of persons have retained their original Polish writing, with the exception of well-known historical figures, which names have been written in English.

Names of locations which are within Polish borders today, have been written in Polish (ex. Przemyśl), while the names of locations which today are within the borders of Ukraine (including those which prior to WWII belonged to Poland) have
been transcribed from Ukrainian into English (ex. Lviv). This applies to all geographic names. In those cases where in a Russian document a reference to a Polish name was made (with a footnote), names of those persons have been transcribed into English with the original spelling in Polish given in brackets in the footnote, ex. Miloshevsky (Zdzisław Miłoszewski).

Names of locations which are within Polish borders today, have been written in Polish (ex. Przemyśl), while the names of locations which today are within the borders of Ukraine (including those which prior to WWII belonged to Poland) have been transcribed from Ukrainian into English (ex. Lviv, Mykhaylivka). This applies to all geographic names.
CHAPTER I

Holodomor. The Great Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933
INTRODUCTION

The Great Famine of the years 1932–1933 is a unique event in the history of Ukraine, and even today discussing this tragedy brings about heated reactions. This publication, which is the seventh volume in the series entitled “Poland and Ukraine in the 1930s and 1940s. Unpublished Documents from the Archives of the Secret Services,” presents archival materials from the Polish and Ukrainian secret services on the situation in Ukraine during that dramatic period.

In the years of the Stalinist regime, the Ukrainian nation was subjected to cruel repression. Today it can be stated with certainty that among all the “fraternal republics” of the former USSR, Soviet Ukraine suffered the heaviest losses in human life. Questions continue to arise concerning the sources and the circumstances in that catastrophe, as scholars in various countries work to provide credible answers to those issues. A dispute over the number of the victims is an element of that process.

One claim is indisputable: the Ukrainian famine of the years 1932–1933 can neither be forgotten nor ignored. It was an important link in a chain of catastrophes which struck Europe in the twentieth century. It came to be reflected in the declarations adopted by the governments and parliaments of numerous states which recognise the famine of the 1930s as an act of genocide committed against the people of Ukraine. On 28 November 2006, such a resolution was adopted by the Verkhovna Rada (national parliament) of Ukraine, and on 16 March 2006, a similar document was adopted by the Senate of the Republic of Poland, followed on 6 December 2006 by the Lower House of the Polish Parliament.

Knowledge of the Holodomor is growing constantly as new documents are made public, disclosing the activities of the USSR’s top leaders in the years 1932–1933 and the working methods of the local apparatchiks, particularly those with roots in the Soviet party nomenklatura of the Ukrainian SSR. This knowledge fosters understanding of both the mechanisms behind the crime and the means through which the Stalinist regime intended to destroy Ukrainian nationhood, justifying it with the necessity of social modernisation while, in fact, aiming to completely subordinate and humiliate Ukraine. The documents made available are clear proof of the doctrinal and immediate motives driving the Communist establishment, while allowing for the reconstruction of the contemporary situation at both the macro- and the micro-level. It is worth emphasising that different regions of the USSR in the years 1932–1933 witnessed much different approaches by the authorities to fit the specific conditions of each region.

*      *

The amount of available Ukrainian literature on the subject is truly imposing. A list of the most fundamental syntheses and monographs would run for many
pages. In émigré circles – in Canada, the United States and Germany, Ukrainian researchers have pursued the subject of the Holodomor since the 1930s. In Ukraine, for understandable reasons, it would only come forth together with the issue of Stalinist repression as a subject for research at the very end of the 1980s. Pioneering work has been undertaken by Professors Stanislav Kulchytsky, Yuriy Shapoval, and others. An important contribution to the understanding of the rationale behind the Holodomor, how it was carried out and what its effects were in Ukraine in the first half of the 1930s, came with the work of a number of scholars: the Canadian Professor Roman Serbyn, the Italian Professor Andrea Graziosi, the American Professor Terry Martin, and the French scholars François Meslé and Jean Vallin. Recent years have also seen a growing interest in the Holodomor of 1932–1933 among German historians.

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1 See С. Кульчицький, “До оцінки становища в сільському господарстві УРСР в 1931–1933 рр.,” Український історичний журнал, no. 3, 1988; idem, 1933: Трагедія голоду (Kiev, 1989); idem, Ціна “великого перезимку” (Kiev, 1991); idem, Між двома війнами (Kiev, 1999); idem, Почему он нас уничтожал? Сталин и украинский Голодомор (Kiev, 2007); idem, Голодомор 1932–1933 pp. як геноцид: труднощі усвідомлення (Kiev, 2007); idem, Holodomor: Wielki głód na Ukrainie w latach 1932–1933 jako ludobójstwo – problem świadomości (Wrocław, 2008).


3 See Голод – геноцид 1933 року в Україні: історико-політичний аналіз соціально-демографічних та морально-психологічних наслідків. Міжнародна науково-теоретична конференція. Київ, 28 листопада 1998 (Kiev, 2000); Три голодомори в Україні в ХХ столітті: погляд із сьогодення. Матеріали міжнародної наукової конференції (Kiev, 2003); В. Марочко, ‘‘Торгсин’’: золота ціна життя українських селян у роки голоду (1932–1933),’’ Український історичний журнал, no. 3, 2003; В. Васильєв, Ціна голодного хліба політика керівництва СРСР і УРСР в 1932–1933 рр., in В. Васильєв, Ю. Шаповал (eds.), Командири великого голоду….


8 See the special edition of the periodical Osteuropa: “Vernichtung durch Hunger: Der Holodomor in der Ukraine und der UdSSR,” Osteuropa, no. 54 (December 2004).
It seems equally proper to note the work of the American scholar, James Mace, who came to Kiev at the beginning of the 1990s and continued his research there for several years. Mace would frequently touch on matters relating to the Holodomor, analysing its various aspects.9

An undeniably important contribution to disseminating knowledge of the problems of collectivisation and famine to the general public was made by Robert Conquest’s Harvest of Sorrow. Soviet Collectivization and the Terror Famine (New York, 1986).10 Seventeen years after the publication of Conquest’s monograph, a collection of utmost importance was released in Ukraine by a group of Ukrainian researchers under the title Голод 1932–1933 років в Україні: причини і наслідки (Kiev, 2003).

Pointing to primary sources, the most valuable collection is found in the second volume of Голод 1932–1933 років на Україні очима істориків, мовою документів (Kiev, 1990), which includes Communist Party documents from the Central State Archive of Public Organisations of Ukraine (TsDAHOU). Documents from that archive, along with those from the State Archive of the Poltava Oblast (DAPO) have been published in a collection of texts by Dmytro Solovey on the Holodomor.11 Another work of great significance for researchers was the Колективізація і голод на Україні, 1929–1933, Збірник документів і матеріалів (Kiev, 1993), which includes documents from the Central State Archive of the Supreme Organs of Government and Administration (TsDAVO). A number of documents from the TsDAVO were also published in the 1989–1990 issues of Український історичний журнал.

In Ukraine, recent years have seen the opening of a number of archives, including the Branch State Archives of the Security Service of the Ukraine (HDA SBU). In 2006, a collection of primary materials which had previously been denied to researchers were declassified. Thus, the employees of the Soviet security services unwittingly turned out to be that period’s chroniclers, with the documents prepared by them serving as witness to the situation in the Ukrainian countryside at that time, transmitting the orders issued by the authorities and their own efforts at implementation, reporting the growing social unrest, administering repression aimed at pacifying said unrest, and undertaking efforts to prevent the “leakage” of true information regarding the nature and scope of the famine. Some of those documents have been published in a collection of primary sources by the employees of the SBU.12

Among all the primary sources, two other publications are noteworthy. 33-ї: Голод. Народна книга-меморіал (Kiev, 1991), which comprises accounts of the witnesses of the events13, and Український Голокост 1932–1933, Свідчення тих, хто вижив (v. 1–2, Kiev, 2003–2004).
Documents regarding the famine that have not been published in Ukraine also should be mentioned. A particularly important publication is that of the documents of the British Foreign Office commemorating the 55th anniversary of the great tragedy: *The Foreign Office and the Famine. British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932–1933* (Kingston–New York, 1988). The same year saw the release of primary sources from the German Foreign Ministry, collected under the title *Der ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust. Stalin’s verschwiegener Völkenmord 1932/1933 an 7 Millionen ukrainischen Bauern im Spiegel geheimgehaltener Akten des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes* (Sonnenbühl, 1988). In the year following that anniversary, an Italian scholar, Professor Andrea Graziosi, published reports by Italian diplomats who served in Soviet Ukraine\(^{14}\) at that time.

Polish literature on the subject is much less voluminous than the Ukrainian, even though publications on such issues as collectivisation in the Ukrainian SSR were already available before WWII. Polish researchers also only had the opportunity to take up the subject after 1989. The issues of collectivization and the famine resulting in its aftermath have been explored by Jan Jacek Bruski, Robert Kuśnierz and Czesław Rajca.\(^{15}\) A short article on that very subject was also published by a renowned scholar of Polish-Ukrainian relations, Ryszard Torzecki, in the *Warszawskie Zeszyty Ukrainoznawcze*.\(^{16}\) As for the Polish minority in the Ukrainian SSR during the famine, two publications of primary sources are available: *Głód i represje wobec ludności polskiej na Ukrainie 1932–1947. Relacje* (Lublin, 2005), and *Polacy na Ukrainie* (part 1: 1917–1939, v. 1–5, Przemyśl, 1998–2005).

* * *

Following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October 1917, Vladimir Lenin and his party consequently strove to increase the territory of the “Soviet state.” One of the principal objects of that expansion was the newly established Ukrainian People’s Republic (UNR). In January 1918, the Bolshevik army made its first attempt at occupying Ukraine. Each entry onto the Ukrainian territories was followed by a wave of bloody terror, justified as a fight against the “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist counter-revolution.” As a result, the Bolsheviks managed to gain control over a significant part of Ukraine, establishing a nominally independent Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Towards the end of 1922, the partly re-established Russian empire had been given a federal form as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of which the Ukrainian SSR was an integral part.

\(^{14}\) A. Graziosi (ed.), “‘Lettres de Khar’kov’...”.


By 1921, in the territories occupied by the Red Army, including Ukraine, the peasantry found themselves in a very difficult situation. In accordance to the “Leninist principle of communism,” they were forced to hand all the crops they had managed to harvest over to the Bolshevik authorities. Economic ruin quickly set in. To make matters worse, in the spring of 1921 Russia and Ukraine were hit by drought which brought about famine. In response to this fact, Lenin decided to temporarily suspend the economic repressions imposed on the Ukrainian people. On 15 March 1921, the 10th Congress of the Communist Party decided to implement the New Economic Policy (NEP). Thanks to the changes the peasants were granted a degree of economic freedom, but nevertheless the taxes on their crops were even higher than in the previous year.\(^\text{17}\) Claiming for a long time that there was no famine in the Ukrainian SSR, Lenin only exacerbated the situation by continually increasing the quotas of grain to be sent to starving people in the Volga region, Moscow and Petrograd. As a result of the Holodomor, political and social life, as well as all forms of active resistance against the Bolshevik policies in Ukraine, were effectively paralysed.

In parallel with this, the Bolsheviks pursued a policy of “reaching to the roots” – which, in the Ukrainian SSR, initially took the form of Ukrainisation – a policy of national and cultural liberalisation that aimed to bring the mainly non-Ukrainian party and state apparatus closer to the people. This in fact improved the situation in the Ukrainian SSR, as well as in the entire USSR. Yet already by 1926, the fight against the “Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution” became one of the predominant goals of the local branch of the Bolshevik special service – the State Political Directorate (GPU) of the Ukrainian SSR.

The goal was pursued by collecting operational materials concerning the principal supporters of the “Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution” – the intelligentsia, the clergy and the faithful of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), and socially active villagers and military men, particularly those who, in the years 1917–1921, served in the Ukrainian Central Council, the army of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, the Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA), the UNR army, or who had participated in the revolutionary movement. This was followed by the next phase, a policy of acting on the “discrediting materials” – or in other words, turning to mass-scale political repression.

The process of “communising” the Ukrainian SSR through the destruction of the fundamentals of Ukrainian rural community life, or the collectivisation of individual farms, was met with active resistance from the wealthy and prospering farm owners (the so-called kulaks and srednyaks). This had an effect on the social engagement of the nation-oriented intelligentsia, which had always cultivated close ties with the people, advocating the peasants’ interests. These circles thus grew strongly critical of Bolshevism.

The most crucial problem was that of grain supplies. In the latter months of 1927, the Secretary General of the CC VKP(b), Joseph Stalin, forced the peasants

\(^\text{17}\) C. Rajca, Głód..., 18, 23–24.
to give their grain supplies to the state under the threat of stigmatising the
insubordinates as “enemies of Soviet authority.” They would be subject to a variety
of sanctions, starting with fines, and going as far as the complete confiscation of
property, “de-kulakisation” and deportation.

Crop failure, the brutality used in dealing with the peasants and the state-
controlled purchase of grain all led to a deterioration in the market for food
produce. In many of the administrative regions of the Ukrainian SSR, particularly
the south-western ones which had already experienced similar calamities in the
period 1921–1923, the year 1928 brought famine. Even this could hardly stop
Stalin, who continued to escalate the violence.

In the period spanning from 1929 to 1934, the organs of the GPU of the
Ukrainian SSR brought a number of group criminal cases against the Association
for the Liberation of Ukraine (ALU, 1929–1930), “the counter-revolutionary pest
organisation active in Ukrainian agriculture” (1930), “the officers counter-
revolutionary organisation” (“Vesna,” 1930–1931), the Ukrainian Nationalist
Centre (UNTs, 1930–1932), the Peasants’ Labour Party (TSR, 1931), the Ukrainian
Military Organisation (UVO, 1932–1933), the Polish Military Organisation (POW,
1932–1934) and many others.

As a result of these operations, thousands of people suffered from repression,
among them many representatives of the old Ukrainian pro-communist
intelligentsia, who had left a permanent mark on Ukraine’s political history during
the efforts to establish Ukrainian statehood in the years 1917–1920, and had played
an important social role in various areas of life under the Ukrainian SSR, in science,
education and culture, as well as in managing the various spheres of the economy,
including agriculture.

In parallel, a decisive blow was dealt to the Ukrainian peasants – the kulaks,
“kulak and Petliura-supporting elements” – thus breaking the political backbone
of a potentially recreated Ukrainian People’s Republic or any other democratic
form of Ukrainian statehood. The communist authorities held that kulaks also stood
in the way of the implementation of their new economic plans. The wealthiest
peasants were now officially targeted as enemies. However, it was not only they
who fell victim to Bolshevik repression. The Bolsheviks made it a point to find
the greatest possible number of kulaks defying the authorities and do away with
them, confiscating all their property if they put up resistance. Actually, any peasant,
irrespective of his or her wealth, could be included in the group hostile to the
system. Such actions were supposed to accelerate the process of the peasants
joining the kolkhozes, by giving plenty of examples of “de-kulakised” neighbours.

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18 Researchers estimate that up to three million people suffered from starvation at the time; see
C. Kulczycki, Між двома війнами...; idem, Голодомори в Україні 1921–1923, 1932–1933, 1946–1947:
Злочини проти народу (Kiev, 2000).
19 C. Rajca, Głód..., 45.
20 S. Kulczycki, Holodomor: Wielki głód..., 114.
At the beginning of 1930, in the “Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) newspaper,” Stalin formulated a new policy that called for the complete elimination of kulaks. A January 1930 resolution by the CC VKP(b) contained details on the implementation of that policy. The Bolshevik authorities divided peasants into three categories. The first one comprised “counter-revolutionary activists,” who were to be eliminated immediately – shot or deported to labour camps. Wealthy peasants in the second category were to be exiled to distant regions of the USSR. The third category encompassed farm owners who were forced to relocate beyond the borders of the kolkhozes. “De-kulakisation” was accompanied by a collectivisation campaign. From 18 February to 10 March 1932, 19,531 households were deported from 29 oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR.\(^21\)

The mass repression – perpetrated through manipulation of state-controlled grain purchases and confiscation of all produce owned by peasants, directed against the Ukrainian countryside (which was by default a security zone for “counter-revolutionary organisations”) – turned into total terror by hunger.

The peasants opposed these developments, but initially they believed that the repressions were the result of “unauthorised actions by local functionaries” and sent a total of over 100,000 complaints to Stalin and Kalinin. Some sold their farms and moved to cities, while others put up more vigorous opposition, including armed resistance.\(^22\) In a report describing the political situation in the Ukrainian SSR resulting from „the intention to eliminate the kulaks as a social class” in the period from 20 January to 12 February 1930, the Chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, Vsevolod Balytsky, wrote that in January some 37 demonstrations took place, with a total of 12,000 participants. On 9 February 1930, 11,865 persons were arrested, while the peasants perpetrated 40 military acts in response to the „de-kulakisation” policy. Throughout 1930, there were 13,754 peasant riots involving a total of 2,468,500 participants. Half of the riots took place in March.\(^23\)

Balytsky was even forced to preside over a group of “operational staff”, which had been established with the aim of combating the protests in the countryside, and personally directed their pacification in various regions of Soviet Ukraine. In Order No. 74 issued by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR (dated 31 March 1930), Balytsky stated that “on 19 March 1930, thanks to the organs of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR and with the active participation of the poor and peasant activists, the operation of deporting the kulaks from the Ukrainian regions subject to total collectivisation has been completed. In spite of a really tight schedule, lack of experience in conducting this type of mass operation, as well as numerous other difficulties, the action of deporting the kulaks from Ukraine has been conducted in a satisfactory manner. The work has been completed in a timely manner and the plan regarding the number of deportations from kulak farms has been exceeded [...]”.\(^24\)

\(^21\) Ibidem, 15–17, 114, 123.
\(^22\) Ibidem, 123.
\(^23\) Ibidem, 130.
\(^24\) HDA SBU, Spr. 2174, p. 31.
In accordance with Stalin’s “first command,” collectivisation and the *kolkhozes* imposed on the peasants the obligation to supply the state with grain in a strictly controlled manner. In 1930, 6.4 million tons of grain were collected under the quota system, and the Bolshevik authorities planned to collect 7.1 million tons from the peasants the following year. Members of *kolkhozes* received their rations only after the set quota had been met. The imposition of an unrealistic *khlebozagotovka* plan on the Ukrainian villagers led to a food deficit. Thus, it was quite obvious that Ukraine would be struck by famine once again.

Soviet Ukraine, together with the regions of the Northern Caucasus, supplied over half of the grain harvested in the USSR. In 1931, Stalin pointed out that in Ukraine “a number of fertile regions were on territories struck by destruction and hunger.” Regardless of that fact, the Kremlin still believed that the Ukrainian SSR held vast supplies of food produce, allegedly kept hidden from the state by the *kolkhozes* and individual farms. By 1931, the state-administered plans for grain purchases had already been restricted for many of the mountain regions of the Urals, the Volga region and in Kazakhstan, yet not for Soviet Ukraine or the Northern Caucasus. In 1931, Ukraine delivered less grain than in 1930, while over 150,000 persons died in the republic.

Disregarding the disturbing statistical data, in January 1932, Stalin demanded unconditionally that the plans for state-administered purchasing of grain be fulfilled. In a special decree of the CC VKP(b), the month of February 1932 was publicly hailed as the month of victorious completion of the *khlebozagotovka*. At the beginning of March, the Ukrainian villages witnessed large numbers of people starving, while in towns, parents abandoned their children, the most dramatic sign of the oncoming catastrophe. This, however, did not halt the policies pursued by the Communist authorities. The only measure taken was increased protection of “*kolkhoz* property.” The Party leaders realised that the starving peasants might pose a threat to the quotas by stealing the grain. To prevent this and to increase grain supplies, ever harsher means of repression against the peasants were instituted. On 7 August 1932, the decree “On safeguarding the property of state-run companies, *kolkhozes*, cooperatives and the strengthening of social (socialist) ownership” was adopted, under which perpetrators stealing even small quantities of grain were to be shot and their entire property was to be confiscated. Only under certain mitigating circumstances could this penalty be converted to a minimum ten-year prison term. “The law of five ears of grain,” so-called due to the draconian penalties, played a major role in the terror famine instituted by the Soviet authorities.

To motivate the *kolkhoz* managers and party activists to collect the quotas more effectively, harsher repressions were also inflicted on them, particularly in regions

27 Quoted in В. Васильєв, Ю. Шаповал (eds.), *Командири великого голоду...,* 23.
where grain was not supplied to the purchasing centres. The villages which did not meet their quotas would face various restrictions: e.g. supplies of food and other essential goods were discontinued, while any available merchandise was taken away from the stores. The authorities of Soviet Ukraine also turned to other forms of repression, for example, to “purging” the kolkhozes of “counter-revolutionary elements” which were allegedly responsible for disruptions in grain deliveries to the state-operated purchasing centres.

Stalin gave a clear manifestation of his dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in his letter dated 11 August 1932, addressed to Lazar Kaganovich. He expressed his doubt in the loyalty of the party organisation in the Ukrainian SSR, while demanding that Ukraine be made to turn over the grain that was – so he claimed – hidden, disregarding all and any potential victims. Pursuing drastic “purges” was intended to free society from “Ukrainian nationalists.”

Despite the mounting repression, the peasants were unable to transfer the set quotas to the state. However, Stalin still remained adamant in his determination to make sure the quotas were met, and sent Mendel Khatayevich and Ivan Arkulov to the Ukrainian SSR in order to “improve” the grain purchasing process. In spite of the additional pressure put on the peasants, they failed to meet the monthly plan for October, and only 20.1% of the projected quantity of grain was collected.

On 22 October 1932, the Politburo of the CC VKP(b) decided to send to the Ukrainian SSR an extraordinary commission headed by Vyacheslav Molotov, who was given special powers. Similar commissions were established for the Northern Caucasus, headed by Lazar Kaganovich, and for the Volga region, headed by Pavel Postyshev. It seems worth mentioning that in the view of Russian researchers, the work of the Postyshev commission was not characterised by the same degree of brutality as the work of the Molotov commission was. In turn, the pursuits of the Kaganovich commission struck at the Ukrainian inhabitants of Kuban the hardest.

As it proved impossible to collect the projected grain stocks, the Kremlin agreed to a certain reduction in the quotas, from 5.9 to 4.6 million tons. The new guidelines were announced on 30 October 1932, but the objectives they set forth were still far from realistic.

In December, the CC VKP(b) decided to establish a commission of the Politburo of the CC, which was to draft an act of law concerning the process of grain collection; on 14 December, the resolution “On the collection of grain in Ukraine, the Northern Caucasus and the Western Oblast” was adopted. The commission members for the Ukrainian SSR were Stanislav Kosior and Vasily Stroganov. In their subsequent resolutions, the CC VKP(b) and the Council of People’s Commissars USSR decided to send to Ukraine additional extraordinary representatives, Pavel Postyshev and Lazar Kaganovich, who were granted broad powers. The former was charged with a mission to eliminate what were

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30 Сталин и Каганович. Недавняя переписка. 1931–1936 (Moscow, 2001), 274.
32 C. Rajca, Głód..., 77.
33 S. Kulezycki, Holodomor: Wielki głód..., 243, 256.
euphemistically called “temporary economic difficulties.” Postyshev, who would in fact manage the Ukrainian SSR until 1937 (Kosior’s position as the formal leader of the CC KP(b)U was weakened), would blame the Ukrainians themselves, particularly Ukrainian nationalists and “supporters of Petliura,” for the famine. Postyshev, along with other party activists sent from Russia to “strengthen the cadres,” set themselves to exploiting the Ukrainian countryside while at the same time “purging” the party and the society. In those efforts they were joined by the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, headed by Vsevolod Balytsky. By the fall of 1932, a “mass attack on the class enemy” was advancing, together with an operation to “disclose counter-revolutionary centres, responsible for sabotage and dismantling the state-run grain purchases and other politico-economic endeavours.”

It was not long before a “counter-revolutionary organisation” whose members turned out to be agricultural specialists was uncovered in Ukraine. It was soon linked to other organisations in Moscow, Rostov and Minsk. Those arrested were charged with participating in an organisation spanning the territories of the entire Union, and which intended, according to the official statement, “to ruin the farming and instigate famine in Ukraine.” On 11 March 1933, the College of the OGPU of the USSR sentenced 35 alleged members of the organisation to death. It is worth noting that between November 1932 and January 1933, the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR eliminated 1208 “sabotage groups” in the kolkhozes.

Yet the stepped-up repression was unsuccessful, and the khlebozagotovka plan remained unfulfilled. Stalin blamed the “poor results” on the Party leaders of the main oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR: Odessa, Kharkiv, and Dnipropetrovsk. On 24 January 1933, the CC VKP(b) issued a decision to implement some personnel changes; Pavel Postyshev was appointed Deputy Secretary of the CC KP(b)U and First Secretary of the Oblast Party Committee in Kharkiv, Mendel Khatayevich was promoted to the position of the First Secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk party structures, and Yevgeny Weger was appointed to the same position in the Odessa oblast. Despite these changes, the grain quota was not met. By 1 February, the peasants had managed to supply only 3.6 million tons of grain. On 5 February 1933, the CC VKP(b) declared the end of state-administered grain purchasing in the Ukrainian SSR, but the Bolshevik authorities still attempted to collect the “missing” million tons from the rural population, and continued a policy of ruthlessly exploiting the Ukrainian people. The peasants were now deprived not only of grain, but also of the other food that they had.

The famine which had already struck Ukraine in 1931 and 1932 was dramatically aggravated in 1933. It affected whole families, whose members died one after another. People would eat anything they could find to save themselves. Those who

34 Ю. Шаповал, Україна 20–50-х років: сторінки ненаписаної історії (Київ, 1993); Розсекречена пам’ять: Голодомор 1932–1933...  
35 Ю. Шаповал, В. Золотарьов, В. Балицький, Особа, час, оточення (Київ, 2002), 193.  
36 “Итоги хлебозаготовок и задачи КП(б)У в борьбе за поднятие сельского хозяйства Украины. Доклад тов. Ст. Косиора на пленуме ЦК ВКП(б),” Известия, 15 February 1933.  
37 C. Rajca, Głód..., 77.
were lucky enough to live in wooded areas took to foraging; some ate moss growing on trees. In their search for food, people would even dig up dead animals.\[^{38}\]

The fact of the famine was eventually acknowledged by Party members and representatives of the GPU. For example, at the end of February 1933, a GPU branch in the Kiev oblast reported to the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR that there were 93,636 adults and 112,199 children starving in the oblast. As many as 47,392 persons suffered from hunger oedema, and 12,801 persons had died.\[^{39}\] Undoubtedly, the most terrible manner of obtaining food was by cannibalism. While some isolated cases of cannibalism were recorded in 1931, their incidence increased considerably in 1932. The terror of the famine led to situations where parents would sacrifice one child in the hope of saving others.\[^{40}\] However, it is hard to offer any estimates as to how many such cases occurred during the Great Famine in Soviet Ukraine. On 12 March 1933, the head of the Kiev oblast’s GPU reported 69 acts of cannibalism and 54 cases of corpse-eating between 9 January and 12 March 1933.\[^{41}\]

In other oblasts, e.g. Kharkiv, 9 acts of cannibalism were recorded by 1 March 1933, and the numbers grew as the months passed by. By 1 April 1933, the number of such cases had risen to 58, by 1 May 1933 to 132, and by 1 June 1933 to 221. In the Vinnytsia oblast, 71 cases of cannibalism were reported by 7 May 1933.\[^{42}\]

Many peasants left their villages to save themselves and their families. They went to towns and cities, where it was easier to find a job or to buy food, for example in the so-called Torgsin stores\[^{43}\] in exchange for gold and other precious items, which were traded at much below their real value.

The Stalinist regime grew uneasy about the fact that peasants were fleeing the famine-struck regions. In June 1932, in a letter addressed to Kaganovich, Stalin manifested his discontent with the fact that “tens of thousands of Ukrainian kolkhoz peasants continue to scatter around the entire European territory, thus disintegrating the kolkhozes from within with their complaints and whining.”\[^{44}\]

\[^{38}\]Ibidem, 91–92.

\[^{39}\]Ф. Рудич (ed. et al.) Голодомор 1932–1933 років на Україні: очима істориків, мовою документів (Kiev, 1990), 399.

\[^{40}\]C. Rajca, Głód..., 95.


\[^{42}\]Ibidem, pp. 511, 532.

\[^{43}\]Torgsin stores – the All-Union Association for Trade with Foreigners. On 29 June 1932, an All-Ukrainian Bureau of Torgsin was established. A network of shops had been operating earlier, serving not only foreigners but USSR nationals as well. Food and other products could be bought with hard currency. Over time, the main goal of the Torgsin was narrowed to taking gold and other valuables away from the people; it was with this aim that the network of shops was expanded. In October 1933,263 branches were operational, each possessing a number of small shops (kiosks), purchasing centres and branch offices. In 1931, the Torgsin network managed to transfer 6 million roubles in hard currency to the State Treasury, a further 50 million in 1932, and 107 million roubles in hard currency roubles in 1933. The peasants would bring in silver and gold crosses, wedding rings, earrings and other family valuables. In a single day, some centres would acquire as much as 800 kilograms of gold, all of which was classified as the lowest category of purity, although a higher category would be entered in the registers. Of the 107 million roubles in hard currency, 86 million came from internal revenues. See В. И. Марочко, “Торгсин”: золота ціна життя...; Е. Осокіна, “Торгсин – де л`ор pour l`industrialisation,” Cahiers du monde russe, no. 4, 2006.

\[^{44}\]Сталин и Каганович..., 179.
On 22 January 1933, Stalin and Molotov sent a directive to party and state organs in which they underlined that the migration process which accompanied the famine was being perpetrated by “the enemies of Soviet rule, esers and Polish agents with the aim of spreading enemy propaganda against kolkhozes and the entire Soviet rule among the peasants in the northern regions of the USSR.” Thus, the administrative organs, the organs of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR and the GPU in the Northern Caucasus were ordered to take the necessary steps to prevent mass migrations from the countryside to other regions. To ensure that those steps were effective, the transportation units of the OGPU USSR were issued appropriate orders. 45

On 23 January 1933, the oblast authorities were ordered to “crack down on mass peasant migrations.” 46 Furthermore, in the fall and winter of 1932–1933, with the help of internal army detachments and militia, the borders of the Ukrainian SSR were blocked, preventing all transport of food produce. The border blockade also made it impossible for individuals to bring in food products from the RSFSR and BSSR onto the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. The regime thus turned Ukraine into a starving ghetto. None of the other Soviet republics at the time were subjected to such sanctions.

The Bolshevik authorities claimed that famine was non-existent in Ukraine, even when in reality it was at its most severe. In the USSR, the official propaganda and the officially published statistical data were not only silent on the subject of the Ukrainian rural population’s situation in the early 1930s, but avoided the use of the very word “famine.” It was also ensured that no records of deaths from starvation were kept. Even though there is no written evidence for this, the concealment of the true causes of increased peasant mortality and instances of forging documentation were confirmed by some witnesses of the tragedy. The military surgeons working in the villages were forced to complete death certificates providing fictitious, often absurd, causes of death. When mortality drastically surged in 1933, death certificates ceased to be issued. 47 One thing is certain; the victims of the terror famine imposed by the Communist authorities numbered in the millions. 48

The famine of 1932–1933, which comprised of two tragic stages, was entirely man-made and was closely connected to the collectivization of agriculture. In the first half of 1932, the main driver of the famine was the grain collection policy imposed by the Bolshevik authorities, while on top of that, the peasants had all kinds of food confiscated in the latter half of that year and in 1933. 49

The Bolshevik leadership made sure that no news of the famine spread outside Ukraine. If any contact was made with foreigners, the real situation of the Ukrainian population was to be concealed at all costs. If some fragmentary

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45 Трагедия советской деревни. Коллективизация и раскулачивание. Документы и материалы в 5 томах. 1927–1939, vol. 3. (Конец 1930–1933) (Moscow, 2001), 634–635.
46 C. Rajca, Głód..., 87.
47 Ibidem, 103.
48 For more on the count of victims of the Great Famine, see S. Kulczycki, Holodomor: Wielki głód..., 330–373.
information on the Ukrainian famine reached other countries and offers of aid were made, such reports were denied, and assistance for the rural population was declined as unnecessary.\textsuperscript{50} Many foreigners were taken in by the shows of prosperity staged in Ukrainian villages by the Bolshevik authorities, while others intentionally withheld the truth. If the tragedy had been publicised, it would have strained relations with the USSR, which was at the time perceived as an important partner, not least in economic terms. However, the Bolshevik authorities did not entirely succeed in concealing the famine terror they brought about, as some individuals in the West spoke openly about what happened in Ukraine. For example, on 21 November 1933, Malcolm Muggeridge, a correspondent for the \textit{Manchester Guardian}, wrote: “Regarding the famine, an honest observer cannot claim that the villages which I visited suffer from famine today, yet equally it cannot be denied that the famine occurred, and not on an insignificant scale, mainly in April and May... We can readily assert that no other province suffered more than Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus.”\textsuperscript{51}

This chapter presents a selection of 30 documents reprinted from the volume \textit{Holodomor: The Great Famine in Ukraine 1932–1933} (Warsaw–Kiev, 2009). This material was obtained principally from the State Archives of the Security Service of Ukraine (HDA SBU), and also from the Central Archives of Modern Records (\textit{Archiwum Akt Nowych}, AAN) in Warsaw, the Central State Historical Archive of Ukraine (Центральний державний історичний архів України, TsDIAU) in Lviv, the State Archive of the Volhynia Oblast (Державний архів Волинської області, DAVO) in Lutsk, and the State Archive of the Ternopil Oblast (Державний архів Тернопільської області, DATO) in Ternopil. It is hoped that the documents provided will contribute to increasing knowledge of, and broaden the collection of available primary sources for further research on the famine of the 1930s in Ukraine and the USSR.

Among the most interesting materials is a document regarding a visit paid by the French statesman Édouard Herriot to the Ukrainian SSR (document no. 23). Alongside reports on the former Prime Minister’s visit to Odessa and the information on the operational security steps taken regarding the visit, there are also accounts of local community reactions to that event.

Some documents from the SBU archives, produced by the PP OGPU Crimea, reveal the scope of activity carried out by the security organs operating beyond the Ukrainian SSR, which were directly connected to the catastrophe. Of special interest are the GPU documents which present information and agent reports on the German minority in the Ukrainian SSR (including document no. 7). The

\textsuperscript{50} C. Rajca, \textit{Głód...}, 109, 112, 113.
\textsuperscript{51} Quoted in Ю. Шаповал, \textit{Невигадані історії} (Кiev, 2001), 84–85.
documents presenting the views and opinions of foreign diplomats who were witnesses to the developments in the Ukrainian SSR at the end of the 1920s and in the first half of the 1930s are also exceptional in their significance. As is known today, the Soviet security organs created an effective information network, even running agents among the staff of diplomatic representations. Their reports give an account of the statements as well as the views of the consular personnel regarding the deepening crisis, collectivisation and the resulting famine. Moreover, a portion of the documents from the German diplomatic missions were acquired by the GPU through operational methods. These primary sources give clear proof that the GPU had extensive knowledge of what, when and how information was being communicated by the embassies to their respective foreign ministries in regard to those nations that had established diplomatic relations with the USSR.

This chapter also presents documents which show the unfolding of the crisis in Ukraine, when the authorities began their uncompromising attack on the peasants. Stalin’s “great breakthrough” (rapid industrialisation and forced collectivisation) represented such a reckless change of policy that it was bound to arouse the dissatisfaction and opposition of all social classes. Stalin’s reforms resulted in opposition within the Bolshevik party, even among its leadership. It thus hardly comes as a surprise that the authorities met resistance from the peasants, a fact that did not escape the Western diplomats from diplomatic missions. According to one Italian diplomat, offering his opinion in July 1930, “before 1928 one could have thought that the government would be capable of escaping the crisis, yet now, with the last failed undertakings relating to collectivisation which have aroused strong opposition from the people, it is evident that the Soviet authorities will not cope with the tasks ahead” (document no. 3).

Observing those events as they unfolded, in their analytical reports on the authorities’ policy towards the peasants, the staff of the Italian Consulate were already making references to coming famine by the year 1928. In 1930, Turkish diplomats pointed out that the USSR was exporting food produce for hard currency instead of feeding its own nation, with the entire population being forced by the government to suffer from starvation (document no. 3).

As can be ascertained, the foreign diplomats were sufficiently well informed, which gave credibility to their assessment of the developments in agriculture in both the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR. This is quite clear from the cover letter produced by the OGPU of the USSR, sent in January 1930 to the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, which accompanies a copy of a report by the German Consul in Odessa. The report concerns the state-administered purchasing of grain. The collected documents and materials confirm most of the pessimistic estimates presented by the staff of the foreign diplomatic representations regarding the deteriorating socio-economic conditions and the growing hunger which resulted. Those sources, as well as the accounts of persons living under those conditions – among whom it is worth mentioning Ivan Slinko from Myrhorod, who sent Stalin

52 HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 22, p. 234.
a letter criticising the latter’s policy towards the countryside (document no. 1) – give a better understanding of the roots of the oncoming tragedy.

A number of diplomats pointed out that the particularly catastrophic situation in the Ukrainian SSR was much different from that in the southern oblasts of the RSFSR. Equally telling are the words of the Japanese consul in Odessa, who travelled through the USSR in June 1932. The diplomat remarked that “[...] the Ukrainian peasants, as compared to peasants in other republics, make a miserable impression both because of their torn clothes as well as the emaciated appearance and pleas for charity; even on main stations, peasants, their wives and children hold out their hands for alms, asking for bread” (document no. 6).

The tragedy of the Ukrainian nation was taking place behind the veil of an “exported lie” with which the authorities in the USSR aimed to convince the world that in the “land of the Soviets” there was simply no place for hunger. Still, by 14 January 1933, in response to the numerous enquiries coming from abroad, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Maxim Litvinov, issued a special statement saying that the rumours of a famine in the Soviet Union were not true.

This further motivated Ukrainian émigré circles in their efforts to reach the international community with a true assessment of the situation in the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, the émigré government representative of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Oleksandr Shulgin, addressed the Grain Commission established by the London Economic Conference, with the following words: “Today, when the Advisory Committee decides on the amount of grain to be exported by the USSR, we beg of you, in the name of universal human values, to prevent all forms of food export, and in particular grain from the territories of the USSR. That grain should lawfully be given to all those who have sown and harvested it, and who are nevertheless dying of starvation – the peasants of Ukraine and Kuban. Thus, we strongly protest against such exports which can be called criminal.” 53

Stalinist diplomats were skilful at countering strong protests against Soviet internal policies. The Soviet Union would host visits by such eminent persons as the former French Prime Minister, Édouard Herriot (he arrived by ship in Odessa on 26 August 1933, from where he was transferred to Kharkiv and Kiev), and the writers Romain Rolland, Henri Barbusse and Bernard Shaw. All of them would claim not to have see any famine in Ukraine. It is clear that the Soviet authorities intentionally manipulated reality, presenting the general well-being of the kolkhozes and inviting the foreign guests to visit bakeries working at full capacity. All this was to attest to the carefree life in the countryside. However, as the officers of the security services would themselves confirm, the people were fully aware of the scope of lies and manipulations perpetrated by the Stalinist propaganda. One worker from Odessa gave his account of the visit by the former Prime Minister of France: “Today, Herriot arrived in Odessa. Our authorities are scared and want to

pull the wool over the foreigners’ eyes, that – he says – we have socialism. I saw a militia officer run into the greengrocer’s and give a stupid command to immediately get rid of a line of people standing in front of the shop. It is clear that Herriot does not know what is happening here” (document no. 23).

In 1934, during the 17th Congress of VKP(b), Stalin declared that employment had risen in the USSR in 1933. Soon after that, even the secret documents were cleansed of all references to the famine problem. The guilty had been found, and the entire issue became taboo. The German Attaché for agriculture would comment on the subject with the following remark: “Victory has been gained by the government, the peasant brought to his knees” (document no. 29).

Yet the Great Famine, as recently discovered documents attest, was still a very real problem at that time. In April 1934, the Deputy Counsellor for Commerce in the Polish Embassy in Moscow, Jan Łagoda, travelled through the Ukrainian SSR, visiting Kiev, Korosten, Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, Koziatyn and Uman. He wrote, “I observed that in the regions I have visited, the village people are starving. Clearly hungry people are to be found in large numbers, at train stations there are many abandoned children who feed on what they can. [...] As a result of these observations, I can state that the hunger in the regions of right-bank Ukraine exists on a wide scale [...]. Due to that, there has been an epidemic of pernicious influenza which, as was the case in 1918 in the West, is extremely dangerous. A great many people have died from influenza. The events of last year’s famine have not disappeared from people’s memories, in the train cars they only talk of famine” (document no. 27).
DOCUMENTS
In response to my letter through a newspaper article.

To justify its clumsy mistakes, the CC of the Bolshevik bureaucracy is searching for a way out and wants to cover up its mistakes at all costs, [throwing] the collectives some shameful scraps, etc., and the government listlessly executes the will of the monarch STALIN. Can a unified collectivism be build on shameful scraps and repression against the peasants? What advantage and what benefits for the state will come with the Stalinist collectives if you exempt the collectives from almost all taxes, moving the main burden onto the average individual? It is a different matter with the mass-scale crediting of the collectives, and now, when the revenues from farms are falling, it is complete rubbish.

Our task is to organise a large collective farm in order to achieve the maximum benefits and product surplus for the state, not losses. The collectives built according to Stalinist principles can only bring in losses, and the Leninist collectives, built on technical bases, will gradually and voluntarily bring in significant profits for the state.

Did LENIN intend to build united collectivism on nags and oxen? No, he did not. He strove for and taught that collectivism needs to be built using tractors and electricity, gradually and wisely, as the cultural level of the peasants rises, reaching the level of, let us say, the German peasant, voluntarily, at the initiative of the peasantry itself, under our management. Only then will collectivism acquire a real and solid character.

This winter, who was guilty of forced collectivisation if not the impostor STALIN, while the guilt was placed on us, the rank and file party activists? This was mean and vile on the part of the CC goofs who thoughtlessly follow the will of the monarch STALIN.

Can unified collectivism be built in four years in a country where five different systems of national economy exist, a country which is still inhibited by savage nationalities whom it will take decades to bring into the light of education? No, this cannot be done.

Can we turn a blind eye to the mass arrests of peasants, even the poorest or those just getting by, even the Red partisans?

Never before, under any government, were the prisons as full as they are now. The prison built in Lubny was to serve some 120 prisoners, yet now it has 1350 persons; Romny, designed for 180, houses 2000 persons. What do you think, comrade KALININ? Is it good? Think and respond. LENIN said: “Strength of
the authority – trust of the masses;” and now there is no trust whatsoever. Because of this mistaken policy pursued by the party, I resign and join the ranks of the People’s Revolutionary [Party], with which we will build socialism in our country and win against the dictatorship of the bureaucracy.

Till we meet again, with a socialist greeting, 
true to the socialist idea

SLINKO, Ivan G.

Ukrainian SSR, town of Myrhorod

Long live free work on a free land. 
Death to those who take away the freedom of the working people.

20 April [19]30

In conformity: (—)

*18 August [19]30*

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*HDA SBU, F. 6, Spr. 68068-FP, T. 1, pp. 203–203v.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.*
3rd gr[oup] KR Department

3rd gr[oup] KR Department

T[op] secret 10 May [19]30

Ger[man] Con[sulate]

SOMMER\(^1\) expressed his surprise to see me in his consulate: almost all of his acquaintances are afraid to pay visits, since those who visit consulates are being arrested (not long ago two business partners of the pharmacist were arrested).

I told him that I was forced to pay a visit by the hopeless circumstances in which DETERING-SCHMIDT found herself, having been seriously abused by the Fin[ancial] Department, which has registered all her belongings as a guarantee for her former husband’s debts. It turned out that SOMMER had already written to the Department of Foreig[ners] regarding this case, yet the manner of response had outraged him and he does not intend to pursue the matter any more.

As concerns the German colonists in Ukraine, he considers their situation to be catastrophic since many of the farms had been ruined by the forced collectivisation; many of the colonists (kulaks and middle-size farmers) had been deported, their families left with no home or bread and no way to help them either. The colonists’ desire to leave for Germany is great, but he is helpless and can do nothing for them.

SOMMER learned from the Polish Consul that on Poland’s northern border there had been cases of mass crossings by the peasants, but now the border guard has been greatly strengthened and the “gap has been eliminated.”

SOMMER was very interested in the food crisis, which is most probably continuously getting worse, and, as can be assumed, will be of catastrophic scale since the villages have been left with nothing (individual farms have been robbed of everything and the kolkhozes can not be expected to deliver any time soon as they lack organisation [of labour]); he is also interested in the mechanism of purges by the Sov[iet] apparatus.

[...]

In conformity:

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\(^1\) Rudolf Sommer, German Consul in Kiev between 1928 and 1933, later Consul General in Leningrad.
26 July 1930, Odessa. Extract of a report by the Chief of the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR for the Chief of the counter-intelligence Unit of GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, regarding statements by foreigners on the situation in Odessa

On the reactions of foreigners to the events in Odessa

The unrest which took place in recent days in the bazaars in Odessa, and then a partial strike in the hessian factory which was a result of difficulties with supplies, have caused numerous rumours among the foreigners’ colonies.

Among the leadership of the Japanese Consulate, statements have been made that, as can be seen, for the Soviet government it is not enough to use physical force in executing and implementing the task of socialist construction because “the government is unable to organise supplies that would give the working class everything it needs. Cooperatives, as much as the socialisation of production, although constituting the necessary leverage for the socialist order, are presently unable to meet the most basic needs of the people. There is a lack of sufficient number of stores, salesmen and proper management. One of the main mistakes is the almost complete dissolution of private commerce and private initiative, while a private entrepreneur would pose no competition for cooperatives in the Soviet state. He would play a subordinate role, complementing the latter in supplying the people.

Today, when cooperatives are unable to completely meet the needs of the people, the role played by the private sector would be particularly beneficial if it was not the object of most comprehensive persecution and repression.”

The new Consul, TANAKO, having arrived and seeing the queues for bread and food products in Odessa, was utterly surprised by the situation, and when a note from a newspaper was read to him that the harvests and vegetable crops in Ukraine were good, TANAKO stated: “The people will probably not benefit from those good harvests, since with private initiative lacking and those ill attitudes...
present among the working class, a large part of those harvests will not be collected and valuable food products will be wasted.”

The Italian Consul General, TOMASI, is ever more interested in the events which took place in the town, collecting information on the unrest in the bazaars and the strike in the hessian factory, and commenting on them with a claim of the weakening authority of Soviet rule.

According to him, before [19]28, one could think that the government will be capable of escaping a crisis, yet now, with the last failed undertakings relating to collectivisation which have aroused strong opposition from the people, it is evident that Soviet authorities cannot cope with the tasks ahead.

The Bolsheviks are losing the remaining trust of the working class, and the masses are only now realising the degree of ruin to which all were driven; wherever one goes, one hears that there is nothing and the people are literally starving.

The efficiency of labour in the kolhozes is nothing compared to the efficiency of individual farms, and all the individual farmers are often threatened and have absolutely no motivation to develop their farms, which in turn leads to the food crisis that we can now observe.

The Bolshevik party is full of disgusting egoists who are anxious about their own positions and thus do not honestly inform their superiors about the situation in these regions, preferring to paint an optimistic picture.

An Italian by the name of ROGERO, in his own circles, talks about the trains which constantly bring in masses of peasants from the neighbouring villages to Odessa. They have been arrested for having set fire to their grain and for the fact that some of them are not willing to walk out into the fields to harvest the crops. ROGERO is delighted with the new fighting methods which the peasants turn to in response to collectivisation – sending their wives to all meetings and assemblies for them to take active participation there [while] they attend no such events.

In another conversation, he made similar statements to those made by other employees of the Italian Consulate – that if it was not for the Soviet government, which exports all food products abroad, there would be plenty of everything.

An Italian by the name of VERDI, referring to a conversation about the supply problems, states that the workers do not attend meetings because it is only promises that are made there and nothing is given, which he sees to be a sign of the weakening of Soviet authority as well as the loss of influence and trust on the part of the working class.

In the Turkish Consulate, there are daily conversations between the Consul and the Vice-Consul regarding the increase in prices in the Odessa bazaars and lack of products in the CRK shops and pishchetriesty. With regard to this, the Turkish officials in the consulate voice numerous unfavourable opinions about “Bolshevik rule”. They continually claim that the Bolsheviks exporting the food products which are lacking in the USSR, such as sugar or fats, can be explained by an enormous crisis which the government is trying to conceal with the aim of acquiring hard currency, which is necessary to conduct Communist propaganda in countries such as China, India, and others. At the same time, the government forces
its own working class and the entire population to starve, disregarding the fact that this is the worst possible propaganda for socialism.

No lesser are [the feelings of] absurdity and anger arising from the supply problems in the Greek colony. And so, in a conversation, a Greek woman by the name of PRIMIKIRIO said that she was recently in a house which was also visited by a Russian worker. All present went into endless conversations about the problems with supplies, which are observed in the entire [Soviet] Union, and particularly in Odessa, as well as about the lack of perspectives for improvement. The worker who was present there declared that there was a solution, known to all workers – killing STALIN, who is driving the country to annihilation.

The Greeks coming to the canteen run by the Greek PAPAIOANNIS also had conversations about current affairs – the lack of food on the market and the unrest in the bazaars.

One of the Greeks, referring to the words of his wife who had been present during the unrest in the bazaar, said that one of the women, once the militia arrived at the bazaar, ran up to an officer and screamed at him: “During the time of Nicholas [II] we were shot at for our demands, and now you will also shoot at us workers.” The officer responded to that: “You only start the revolution and we will join your ranks and help you with everything.” This promise from the militia was spread over the town, raising the spirits of the gathering crowds.

Commenting on the story told by the worker, the Greeks talk of the impermanence of Soviet rule and discuss the option of leaving the USSR.

We will report on the attitudes in other colonies.

Chief Odessa Okr[ug] Division GPU
(—) YEMELYANOV³

Chief KRO
(—) SHOSTAK–SOKOLOV⁴

HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 418, T. 1, Cz. 3, pp. 629–633.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

In the top left corner of the document, a rectangular stamp with inscription in Ukrainian and Russian stating: Ukrainian SSR. State Political Directorate. Odessa Okrug Division with the Okr[ug] Ex[ecutive] Com[mittee]. Directorate of the 26th Uzhrynych military division of the GPU. No. 373445. town of Odessa. 26 Jun[e] 1930; next to the stamp a handwritten note: Note concerning Italians, Turks and Greeks was made. (—).

³ Aleksandr Yemelyanov, from 1930 Chief of the Odessa Okrug Division of the GPU, from 14 September 1931 to 23 May 1933 Chief of the Directorate for GPU Border Security and Military Units, from 23 May 1933 to 10 July 1934 Deputy Chief of this Directorate.

⁴ Petro Shostak-Sokolov (1896–1937), from May 1927 Chief of KRO of Odessa Okrug Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, from September 1930 assistant to the Chief of the Information Department of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in Kharkiv, from April 1931 Chief of the 3rd Department in the Secret Political Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR in Kharkiv, from December 1931 Deputy Chief of the Donetsk Operational Sector of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR.
30 April 1932, Sobolivka. Letter from an inhabitant of Sobolivka to family in Poland, describing the hard living conditions in the Ukrainian countryside

Translation from Russian
Sobolivka, 30 April [19]32

As the first duty of this letter, I inform you, my dear brother Ignacy, that I have received the letter which you wrote to me on 21 April [19]32, and which I received on 29 April [19]32, and for which I wholeheartedly thank you. You ask how I am. I will tell you – not well, even though I work permanently, that is, all year round. It is very hard to get by since everything costs so much and I receive only 80 roubles a month in my salary. A pood of rye flour costs 100 rubles, yet it is nowhere to be found here. Potatoes also cost a lot – 20 rubles a pood. A pound of fatback costs 10 rubles; in general one can not buy many things with such pay for work. Dear brother, I have been without a slice of bread for a month now and I am on the verge of dying of hunger. I have received my food ration of 10 pounds for the month, but there is nowhere to buy anything. While Easter Sunday is tomorrow, I have no bread, not to mention meat – since there is nothing at all, it is a beggar’s life. Such a life I had not experienced until this year.

Concerning my departure, I can say about the question of me leaving – since I have no funds for it, and I only think of how to survive – there is no point in thinking of the journey. Perhaps I will soon die of starvation, since there is nothing to be bought. You think that I wrote out of my goodness in the previous letter but the necessity forces one to do anything. Yet, there is nothing to write about.

Dear brother Ignacy, you ask about our brother Józef; I will tell you that it has already been a year since I received a letter from him and I do not know of his whereabouts at present. Since my friend was in Kiev in June last year, he told me that he visited him, and my other friend was there in August and told me that he was no longer at the home in which he had lived before. Presently, I do not know where he might be. I pass my regards to Wania, Ksenia, and all our relatives and friends. I wish you health and happiness. Farewell for now, I remain with warm love for all of you. Signature illegible.

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1 The so-called Russian pound, a measure of weight equivalent to 409.5 grams.
Translated in Stolin, 12 April [19]32 (—) S. Walczuk
S. Walczuk, senior constable of inv[estigating] s[ervice]

19 May [19]32. In conformity (—) signature
Chief of the Chancellery
Stolin District Office

Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
On 1 June, in the course of a conversation, V. S. MERKLINGER stated that he has recently visited his brother in Kleinliebenthal. At present, the place is truly stricken by a famine, most of the peasants, they say, have no more grain. Although there is a possibility for good crops, it seems that the peasants are not interested and do not want to work. From his words, they think as follows: why should they work and put in the effort if all will be taken away from them? and if anyone gets something, they will deport him as a kulak. As regards the recent government decrees on the trade of agricultural products, it – as he says – does not matter any more, since the people have nothing to trade; and moreover, the decree might well be changed again in the autumn. MERKLINGER believes that the peasants are right, and if they turn to sabotage, it is completely understandable to him. Naturally everyone – he says – anxiously awaits political changes, yet no one has a clear idea how and where they might come from.

In conformity:

HDA SBU, Odessa, Spr. 633, T. 8, p. 461.
Copy, typescript on a form.
Document in Russian.
On 21 June, the courses with the Consul resumed. Above all, I learned about his state of health, and about the journey. [...] Consul’s travelling route was as follows: Odessa – Sevastopol – Alushta – Simferopol (by car) – Yalta (by car) – Novorossiysk – Batumi – Tiflis – Baku – Mineralnye Vody – Rostov – Kharkiv – Donbas (Stalino) – Kharkiv – Dnipropetrovsk – “Dnieprostroy” – Kiev – Odessa. He was profoundly moved by the fact that [...] 2) the Ukrainian peasants, as compared to peasants in other republics, make a miserable impression both because of their torn clothes and the emaciated appearance and pleas for charity; even on main stations, peasants, their wives and children hold out their hands for alms, asking for bread; 3) the construction of new factories and huge plants, as well as the construction of houses for the workers, particularly in the Donbas, is carried out at a fast pace, and thousands of workers take part in it. It is very expensive everywhere – in Tiflis a modest three-course meal (soup with two dumplings, fried mutton and a compote) costs 10 roubles. [...] On his way back from Kiev to Odessa, a man travelling with him in the same compartment told him about the tragic famine in Ukraine, and particularly in the Kiev gub[ernia], where many cases of suicide, caused by starvation, were noted among the peasants. Those stories, combined with the rain, which did not stop through the entire journey to Odessa, made a grave impression on the Consul. [...]
No. 7
11 July 1932, Odessa. Extract of a report by a secret informer of the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, regarding the situation and attitudes in the village of Kleinliebenthal

On 5 July, in the course of conversation, V. MERKLINGER stated that he has recently visited Kleinliebenthal and that this place, and the countryside in general, is a witness to things which one can hardly imagine. Here in the city, he says, no one has any idea about the hunger which is there. Everyone says that the peasants do not want to work, but it is not like that – they simply are physically not able to work because they are so drawn from hunger. Besides, they see no perspectives for a better future ahead. This, he says, is what the communists have brought Russia down to. He himself, in a way, is also completely unwilling to work because there is no point in making the effort. It is getting worse with each year. “Not counting the brief moment between 1925–[19]27, our situation is constantly getting worse. There is no hope for the future; there is no point in hoping for an intervention, since everyone abroad is busy with their own things, and the hope of an internal revolt is just as faint because our society is too inactive.” There is no hope of improving [the situation] after the harvests because not all the crops will be collected, and moreover they are being destroyed by caterpillars, etc. There are rumours, he says, that as of 15 July, they will stop distributing bread altogether, leaving it all to free trade at the price of 1 rouble 20 kop[ecks] per pound. And those who have no money, let them rot. Anyway, if you now get a salary of 200 roubles, it is much less than the old 20 roubles. He complained that the ‘German community’ has now altogether come apart – he rarely sees any friends, they hold no meetings, everyone is so busy and depressed that they have no mind for it.

In conformity:

HDA SBU, Odessa, Spr. 633, T. II, p. 172.
Copy, typescript on a form.
Document in Russian.

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"^a Oddessa Oblast Division GPU^a
Special ^aUnit^a
^a'T[op] secret^a
11 July 1932

^a-^a Printed form."
Protocol of interrogation

Written on 18 October 1932 in the secretariat of the State Police Station in Pidvolochysk by the senior constable Balawender Ignacy with Maria Błażejewska, 45 years of age, widowed by the late Mikołaj, daughter of Michał and Bogumiła Nieboga, born in Doroﬁyivka, Skalat district, of Roman Catholic creed, last residence in Volochkivtsy (Soviet Russia), regarding illegal crossing of the border from Soviet Russia into Poland, who has testified as follows:

Some 27 years back, I married a Russian citizen, Błażejewski Mikołaj, from Volochkivtsy in the Proskurov uyezd, where I resided at the time. My husband Mikołaj owned a six-morgen farm and a house in Volochkivtsy. In 1919 my husband died, leaving me the farm, on which I lived together with my children. Until 1931, life on the farm was satisfactory even though I had to manage it alone with only my minor children as help. From 1931, life in Soviet Russia, as well as the relations there, turned into unbearable torture because the Soviet authorities began taking almost all the grain and the living stock away from us, leaving me only a very small amount [...] which absolutely did not suffice even for the most modest standard of living.

In 1932, relations in Soviet Russia have further deteriorated because in the spring they did not allow for sowing the grain or planting the potatoes, but instead ordered the planting of sugar beets for the sugar factory. Generally in the spring of that year, we lacked potatoes for planting, as well as spring crops for sowing the fields. When following the crops, I harvested what had grown, that is, some rye and wheat, the Bolshevik authorities took all that grain away, leaving me nothing; thus I and my family were left threatened with death by starvation. Moreover, the Bolshevik authorities not only requisitioned the live and dead stock, but also burdened me with a tax of 240 roubles, which I was after all in no way capable of paying, and beside this I was to pay yet another tax in the amount of 336 roubles.

Because the Bolsheviks took all grain and property from me, life became simply impossible, as we were threatened with death by starvation. Therefore I decided, together with my daughter Jadwiga, 18 years of age, and sons Bronisław, 20 years of age, and Jan, 16 years of age, to cross over to Poland at any price, and on 15 October 1932, at around 10 a.m., I set out towards the Polish border with the aforementioned children, where pretending to be washing the clothes in the Zbruch River at the border area of Doroﬁyivka, I entered Poland.

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\(\text{a}^a\) Handwritten.
\(\text{b}\) Illegible fragment, crossed out in typewriting.
\(\text{c}\) Word corrected by hand.
At present, I am filing a request to the Polish authorities for permission to settle with my children in Poland, and in the case of such permission being granted, I will settle down with my children in Dorofyivka, Skalat district, where I have relatives such as Charczuk Mateusz in Dorofyivka. This ends the protocol.

The protocol has been read.

(—) Balawender a-senior const[able]^a

(—) Maria Błażejewska

_DATO, F. 176, Op. 1, Spr. 9, pp. 3–3v._

_Original, typescript._

_Document in Polish._
No. 9
20 October 1932, Svatovo. Letter by party activist Nechayev to the Svatovsky Raion party committee, containing a critique of the Communist party

Copy of a copy

To the Svatovo Ra[ion] Part[y] Com[mittee]

From party member since 1925 no. 0705272
NECHAYEV I. P.

Declaration

I have been mobilised, no. 2340, to the countryside by the Stalinsky GPK and party Obkom to your raion to work as the head of the ONO. Not only to head the Department of Public Education, but also to assist the part[y] organisation, as a party member, in carrying out the plan during the autumn sowing campaign, grain purchase action, etc. I am to fight to sustain the general party line on the reconstruction of the countryside, strengthen the kolkhozes as one of the socialist forms of economy, fight for success during the autumn sowing, and live to see [the anniversary of] the October Revolution with achievements in agriculture.

It is good when you share the general party line on all issues, you feel you are right, it makes it easier to lead the work. I remember how from the first day in the Komsomol, in 1921, I yearned and went to every work with a feeling that the party line was right and that I was right. Remembering my father when he struggled to fight for the strengthening of Soviet rule, holding himself as the just one. Five little children could not stop him from the work which he carried out because he believed in what he was building.

Such was the man which the Makhno1 gang hacked to death on 29 April [19]21 at the militia station in the village of Karpivka in the Stalino okrug, where he was sent by the party and the trade union during the distribution of the food rations.

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1 Nestor Makhno (1888/9–1934), Ukrainian revolutionary ataman, one of the leaders of the anarchist movement. In 1910 he was sentenced to death by the Odessa Okrug Military Court, but the death penalty was soon commuted to life sentence in a labour camp. In March of 1917 he returned to Yekaterinoslav, where he started a widespread political and military movement, taking charge of the local workers’ and peasants’ delegates. At the start of 1917, he formed the Free Peasant Battalions. In 1918, he organised a small revolutionary detachment fighting against the rule of hetman Skoropadsky. In the same year, his detachments joined the Bolsheviks, taking part in battles against Denikin, Petliura’s armies and the Entente. In June of 1919 he openly came out in opposition to the Soviet authorities. In the same year, he turned his detachments into the Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine. In September-October 1920, during an attack by Wrangel’s armies, he once again stood with the Bolsheviks; although with Wrangel’s defeat, the Soviet command began eliminating the Makhnovist detachments. On 28 August 1921, Makhno, together with 77 members of his detachments, crossed over into Romania and came to live in Bucharest for some time; later he went to Warsaw, where he was arrested in 1923. During a court trial, he was accused of holding talks with Soviet diplomats on instigating an uprising in the eastern województwo of Poland and
Thus I struggled too, from [19]21 until [19]29. a-From 1929 I started hesitating and having doubts about the rightness of the general party line, primarily as regards agriculture. Those doubts have not decreased, b- and what assured me 100% of that was the 3rd decisive. c- When all the newspapers shouted about meeting the khlebozagotovka plans, and when the people were already starving, literally swelling from hunger (regions of Kiev, Poltava and Mariupol), the newspapers continued their praise for meeting the khlebozagotovka plan.

At that point you will not only have doubts but you will state openly that the general party line is in fact wrong and its implementation led to poverty in the countryside, to forced proletarisation in agriculture, which is confirmed by our stations and the appearance in the cities of entire masses of besprizorni.

Apart from this, what else confirmed my doubts? The establishment of closed shops and canteens for those holding the most responsibility among the employees. During my work with the editorial board of the Partaktivist magazine – the city of Kharkiv, organ of the CC KP(b)U of Ukraine ([19]32) – I dined at the CC KP(b)U canteen and [even] when there was not enough bread, [and the people] were swelling up from hunger; the CC VKP(b) canteen was serving meat and a variety of dishes at lower prices. The people were living, unable to even imagine the hunger which the public was suffering from. They broke the ties with the masses because they themselves lived in prosperity. And our officials of the oblast apparatus can really fall low. They also grew numb in the apparatus, not seeing that now the people are hungry.

The worker is living in poverty from one day to the next, the kolkhozniks themselves – that temporary, grain producing class – are chewing on dark bread, made with a whole variety of substitutes. And the lower-level officials – the poor, who have also fought for Soviet rule, we also give them 300 grams each (and this only recently), we gave them each 200 grams of bread per day, and this only when the grain problem was resolved (see the decision of the 17th part[y] conference).

And our ultra-revolutionaries, living in affluence, do not see how difficult it is for the workers, the kolkhozniks, to live with the high prices which we have. Withholding the payment of salaries, the new financial system, no products, and apart from that, we force those half-starved and exhausted to compete between themselves – this has further reassured me in my convictions and hence the conclusion – a- that the general party line is wrong and requires surgical treatment, a sharp cut. This means to demand the removal of the heads of the CC VKP(b), with STALIN as the first one. Why with STALIN? Because he is the leader, and was incapable of working together with such revolutionaries from the old guard as ZINOVIEV,2 KAMENEV,3 SMILGA, RAKOVSKY,4 Karl RADEK,5

Incorporating them into the Ukrainian SSR. He was released for lack of evidence, and at first came to live with his family in Toruń, then in Gdańsk, under constant police surveillance. In 1925 he left for Paris and settled down in Vincennes, keeping in touch with the international anarchist movement. He died in Paris.

b- As in the original.

2 Grigory Zinoviev (Ovsei-Gershon Radomyslsky) (1883–1936), Communist activist; from December 1917 chairman of the Petrograd Council; from 1921 member of the Politburo of the CC VKP(b); in 1926
LASHEVICH, UGLANOV, TOMSKY, RYKOV, BUKHARIN and others. He was the one left out of seven, he alone took onto himself the management of a vast country, and hence the mistakes.

expelled from the Politburo of CC VKP(b); in 1927 expelled from the CC, and during the 15th congress of VKP(b); in December 1927 expelled from the party, detained; in 1928 offered self-criticism, was allowed back into the party and was appointed rector of the university in Kazan; in 1931 member of the College of the People’s Commissariat for Education of the RSFSR; in October 1932 again expelled from the party and exiled to Kostanay; in 1933 for the second time he was allowed back into the party; on 16 December 1934 arrested and in January 1935 sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment during an open trial of the so-called “Moscow centre”; in 1936, while in prison, charged in the trial of the so-called anti-Soviet “Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre”; on 24 August 1936 sentenced to death; shot.

3 Lev Kamenev (Rosenfeld) (1883–1936), Communist activist, Trotsky’s son-in-law; participated in the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk as part of the Soviet delegation; from September 1918 member of the VTsIK; from October 1918 to May 1926 Chairman of the Moscow Council; from March 1919 member of the CC VKP(b); from September 1922 to February 1924 Deputy Chairman of the SNK RSFSR; from July 1923 Deputy Chairman of the SNK USSR; in years 1925–1927 one of the leaders of the so-called new opposition; in January 1926 nominated to the post of People’s Commissar for External and Internal Trade of the USSR; from August 1926 representative of the USSR in Rome. Arrested on 16 December 1934 and in January 1935 sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. On 25 July, covered by the trial of the so-called Kremlin Command Library; on 25 July 1935 sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment; on 24 August 1936, in the trial of the so-called anti-Soviet “Trotskyite-Zinovievite centre,” sentenced to death; shot, rehabilitated in 1988.

4 Khristian Rakovsky (1878–1941), party activist, one of the founders of the social-democratic parties of Bulgaria and Romania, a distinguished activist of the international socialist movement. In January 1918 nominated to the post of the Chairman of the Supreme College for Russo-Romanian relations; in January 1919 head of the Ukrainian Soviet government; from March a member of the CC of the Russian RKP(b); in 1936 arrested in the trial of the so-called anti-Soviet “rightist-Trotskyite” bloc. Held in the Orlovsk prison, shot.

5 Karl Radek (Sobelsohn) (1885–1939), party activist, journalist; in 1902 joined the PPS, in 1904 the SDKPiL; after the February Revolution of 1917, member of the foreign representation of the RSDRP in Stockholm, one of the principal liaisons between the party leadership and the German General Staff, and the organiser of Lenin’s journey through Germany into Russia in a sealed train; in 1917 member of the Soviet delegation in Brest-Litovsk; between 1919–1924 member of the CC of the Russian RKP(b); from 1920 the secretary and in 1922–1924 member of the Comintern Executive Committee; in 1927 expelled from the party as part of a Trotskyite opposition group; in January 1928 sentenced to three years in detention for anti-Soviet activity, released in May 1929; in January 1930 returned to VKP(b). Arrested on 16 September 1936 in the trial of the so-called anti-Soviet right-Trotskyite bloc. Sentenced on 30 January 1937 to 10 years’ imprisonment, murdered while serving the sentence.

6 Mikhail Lashevich (1884–1928), party and military activist, in 1917 member of the Petrograd committee of the RSDRP and the Military-Revolutionary Committee; in 1918 member of the Petrograd Bureau of the CC of the Russian RKP(b); from August to November 1918 member of the Revolutionary War Council; from December 1918 to November 1919 Commander of the 3rd Army; between 1919–1920 with the Revolutionary War Councils of the Principal Fronts of the Red Army; from August to November 1920 Commander of the 15th Army; between 1922–1925 Chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee, at the same time member of the Revolutionary War Council of the West-Siberian MD and Commander of Siberian MD; from 1925 Deputy People’s Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary War Council of the USSR; between 1926–1928 Deputy Chairman of the Chinese Eastern Railway Council; in 1927 expelled from the CC and the party; reinstated in 1928 following his self-criticism.

7 Nikolai Uglanov (1886–1937), Communist activist, in 1917 chairman of the Petrograd Okrug Commission on the Fight with Desertion, later in 1918–1920 military commissar; from February 1921 Secretary of the Committee of the Russian CP(b) for the Petrograd gubernia; from February 1922 Secretary of the Nizhny Novgorod gubernia Committee of VKP(b); in 1924–1928 First Secretary of the Moscow Committee of the VKP(b); from August 1924 Secretary of the CC; in 1928 a leader of the so-called “right-wing” deviation; from November 1928 People’s Commissar for Labour of the USSR; in April 1929 expelled
And I refuse to work as the head of the ONO, not because I will not be able to cope, oh, no. I have finished the four-grade elementary school, the four-grade VN, thus my general level is not that low after all, nor is my political consciousness – I have finished the Sov[iet] part[y] school, courses at the Donetsk Gub[ernia] Party Com[mittee] in 1925, the 1st course at the com[munist] university. I have eight years of practical experience and the old Komsomol fire has not died out yet. All of this together would enhance a prompt command of the technique, and this means that I would cope with the work. *But I will not cope and I cannot cope because I should fight for the khlebozagotovka, yet I do not agree with it, as there is no faith in the cause which [I am] to pursue. Not only do [I] have no faith, but also consider many of the undertakings and decisions of the CC of the VKP(b) as wrong – and that is why I can not cope, that is generally work in the countryside, as I do not share the general party line with regard to agriculture, and in particular with regard to the plans of khlebozagotovka because [they] are unrealistic and inappropriate in so difficult a year for the entire Sov[iet] Union.*

Because the year [19]31 was a hunger year (despite the fact that in the years [19]21–[19]27 we purchased 711 mil[lion] poods of grain and it was enough for all, and in [19]31 we purchased 1 bil[lion] 400 mil[lion] poods and it was not enough, hence the norms have been established). There was hunger, the spring plan in 1932 was not fullfilled and the kolkhozniks are eating bread that is not pure, but dark with a variety of substitutes.

The kolkhozniks do not want to work in the kolkhozes – how are they to take an interest in the material condition of their kolkhoz when they receive nothing but

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8 Mikhail Tomsky (Yefremov) (1880–1936), Communist activist; from 1919 member of the CC of the Russian RKP(b); at the end of 1920 came out in opposition to rapid industrialisation and collectivisation, which was taken for “right-wing deviation.” During the April Plenum of the CC (1929), he was an object of fierce criticism; worked, among other posts, as the chairman of the All-Union Association of Chemical Industry. Committed suicide.

9 Aleksey Rykov (1881–1938), Communist activist, from October 1917 People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the RSFSR; from 1921 Deputy Chairman of the SNK of the RSFSR; from April 1922 member of the Politburo of the CC VKP(b); from February 1924 to May 1930 Chairman of the SNK of the USSR; in 1928–1929 came out in opposition to rapid industrialisation and collectivisation, which was taken in the VKP(b) as “right-wing deviation.” During the April Plenum of the CC (1929) he was an object of criticism, and in December 1930 expelled from the Politburo; from January 1931 to September 1936 People’s Commissar for Post and Telegraph of the USSR; in February 1937 expelled from the party and on 27 February 1937 arrested in the trial of the so-called anti-Soviet “right-Trotskyite” bloc; on 13 March 1938 sentenced to death penalty; rehabilitated in 1988.

10 Nikolai Bukharin (1888–1939), Communist activist, Lenin’s closest collaborator, the principal theoretician of the party, in years 1918–1929 Editor in Chief of Pravda, from 1924 member of the Politburo of the CC; in 1928 he stood out in opposition to the increased collectivisation, proposing a path of evolution. In November 1928, the Politburo of the CC and the Plenum of the CC termed the views held by Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky as “right-wing deviation”; removed from office; from 1932 member of the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the USSR. From 1934 Editor in Chief of Izvestiya; in February 1937 expelled from the party and arrested as part of the trial of the so-called “right-Trotskyite” bloc. Sentenced to death on 13 March 1938, shot; rehabilitated in 1988.
If there is not enough grain now, what will the situation in the countryside be in the spring of 1933?

If the plan is realistic, what explanation is there for the tensions arising from the khlebozagotovka in [19]32, the resistance of the kolkhozes to deliver grain? If the kolkhoznik started to have a better life, as far as material conditions are concerned as compared to the life under the individual farms, what explanation is there for the fact that so many kolkhozniks have been collecting grain heads for themselves for the winter? Would a prosperous life force anyone to collect grain heads, to steal grain from the fields? I see the explanation in the fact that the kolkhozniks are the same people who want to eat pure bread and not corn and barley; they simply want to live decently and not in the way they lived in slavery under feudalism. They are interested in improving the material situation in their kolkhoz, but the khlebozagotovka does not give the kolkhozniks the necessary motivation to seek interest in the material strengthening of the kolkhoz. Moreover, the peasants are escaping from the countryside (a true flight of the Jews from Egypt) to mines and factories, but why? Leading an affluent and happy life, they would not flee. They would not roam with their children around the stations, in dirt, with no pants or shoes, resettling from one place to another. Thus, there is some “deterrent” that discourages them.

If they ask me: “Does that mean that in your opinion, [the construction of] factories should be stopped because there will be no workforce?,” [I will answer that] in my opinion, it should all be organised so that the life of a worker is 300% better compared to the peasant, then he will go to the factory and thus the problem of the workforce will be resolved.

Instead of improving [on what was in] [19]31, we again go [with]: “Let the thunder of victory resound.” During the 3rd All-Ukrainian Conference, KOSIOR spoke of the mistakes of [19]31. His conclusion – the raions are again to blame and again they have found a scapegoat among the subordinates. When irregularities were taking place in the years [19]29–[19]30, along with peasant unrest, the blame was placed on the raion employees, and in [19]31 [they] are again to blame. And where was the CC, why did it only draw conclusions and not pursue preventive actions in the long-term? I am convinced that the entire blame is with the CC KP(b) of the Ukrainian CP(b).

If there are errors made with regard to the countryside, the raion organisations are dissolved and the raion activists are expelled. Why shouldn’t the CC KP(b) of the Ukrainian CP(b) be expelled and a new one chosen? Why shouldn’t Secretary General KOSIOR be changed?

What else do I disagree with? Frankly, it concerns the matter of the country’s industrialisation. Am I against the fast pace? Oh, no, I am for fast pace. Yet not so fast as to make the kolkhozes, the working class and food products into the source

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11 Stanislav Kosior (1888–1939), from 1928 Secretary General; from 1934 First Secretary of the CC KP(b) of the Ukrainian CP(b). Repressed for membership of the Polish Military Organisation (POW). On 26 May 1939, Kosior was executed by firing squad.
for country’s industrialisation. Other sources, not those, should be found. If there are no sources – that means that the pace should be decreased, building only the defence of the country, and the rest according to available means. Now they have increased the pace and the coal production is decreasing. The reason for the decrease in coal production is not technical defects; the material situation of the workers is the most important, i.e. supplies for them. The laws of biology state that the primary source of human energy is fat. And energy is the strength which assures effectiveness of labour. And what does the worker eat? Cucumbers, tomatoes, etc. – vitamins give no energy, yet we demand that the worker fulfils the planned quota.

I was the representative of the Obkom party for coal matters in Kadiyivka, Golubovka mine no. 22. What are the attitudes among the workers? I describe them as such: a) If there is bread, meat, and a decent life, you will achieve full success. a

I have visited all the barracks and it is better not to call on them. They will write down all the decreases, there is mass fear. The workers understand everything, but to tell them about ideals when they have empty stomachs is a hopeless cause.

It is not consciousness that defines the existence, after all, but the existence that defines human consciousness. Having arrived here in the countryside (Svatovsky raion), I have also taken interest in the life of teachers and what did I find? They have not received salaries for two to three months; instead of bread, we give them barley; the quality of education is falling and we demand more of them without creating [proper] conditions. They leave work and migrate. We scream: “Seize the deserter!” And [we should] ask, can a man live for two months without salary, receive no food, work and still compete with others? They are not people, they are heroes – true heroes – those very teachers, those miners running on tomatoes and producing coal. Are those individual cases or not? Such cases can be found everywhere. Thus, these are not errors of the raions but errors of the CC, errors in the general party line. Those are the fundamental reasons that have led me to disagree with the general party line on the following matters:

1. Agriculture

a) We have achievements, undeniably, in the grain exports for example; however, all the kolkhozes have been organised not on a voluntary basis, but through force, a)although not directly, rather indirectly through economic pressure.a

b) a)If they were organised voluntarily, we could tell the kolkhozniks: “Those who want [to stay] in the kolkhoz – let them stay, we will help them, and those who do not – let them leave,” guaranteeing them that economica) pressure will not ensue. I am convinced that there would be 25% out of 100% of our kolkhozes left. The attitudes among the kolkhozniks and conversations with them confirm my assumptions.

And us? Do we fulfil the directives set by LENIN on carefully pursuing the organisational work in issues concerning peasantry?

LENIN spoke of the middle-sized farmers: “We should primarily concentrate on the truth, which states that on this matter, forceful methods will in fact achieve
nothing. We have a completely different economic task here. There is no top which could be cut, leaving the entire base. Pursuing forceful means here means ruining the entire cause. We need to work through long-term education here... there is nothing more foolish than even the mere thought of force with regard to the economic relations of the middle-sized peasantry,”

When in [19]21 the peasants were dissatisfied with the state of relations, during the 10th congress of our party (see volume XVIII, part 1, p. 138) LENIN declared: “We should not attempt to hide anything. We should say openly that the peasantry is dissatisfied with the state of relations which have taken root with us, that it does not want this form of interdependence and it will not function that way any longer. That remains indisputable. Its will has been clearly expressed. This is the will of the great masses of the working people. We should respect that and we are sober enough as politicians to speak frankly: we should reconsider it.”

Is the peasantry satisfied with the present state? In [19]21 the discontent of the peasants found its expression in the Kronstadt rebellion, and now? A number of uprisings and unrest also confirm that the party line, as far as agriculture is concerned, is wrong. With regard to class elimination, LENIN also spoke of long-term efforts and not of setting deadlines (see decisions of the 17th conference).

LENIN, Vol. 17, p. 118: “Eliminate the classes – that means not only to drive away the landowners and capitalists – that we have accomplished quite easily, but it also means to eliminate small producers, and they can not be driven away, they can not be crushed, we have to make peace with them. They can be and have to be reconstructed and re-educated; this [can be achieved] only with very slow, long, careful organisational work.”

And in Vol. XVIII, part 2, p. 55, LENIN underlined: “In the mass of people, we are only a drop in the sea and we can lead only when we express properly what the people already realise. Without that, the communist party will not lead the proletariat, the proletariat will not lead the masses and the entire machinery will fall apart.”

And there is the question, are we moving in that direction? It is the very peasants who do not want to go to kolkhozes willingly, and we have forgotten the directions set by ENGELS when we economically force the peasants to join the kolkhozes.

ENGELS (see brochure on the peasant question): “We definitely stand in support of the small peasants. We will do all that is possible to make their lives more bearable, to facilitate their joining the Comrades, if they should so decide. Yet, if they should still be unable to make that decision, we will make the effort to give them as much time as possible for considering it on their own patch [of land].”

What I propose:

1) Continue organising the kolkhozes, yet exclusively on the principle of voluntarism (taking into account LENIN’s directives) – “no force, direct or indirect, nor economic pressure.”

2) Propose to the kolkhozniks that they remain in the kolkhozes of their own will, and if they do not want to – dissolve the kolkhozes. The matter will be resolved
all the faster in the direction of improving the agri[cultural] econ[omy] and supplies for the workers.

3) a In order to offer stimuli for the remaining kolkhozniks to take interest in the mater[ial] situation, reduce khlebozagotovka by 75%.

4) Strengthen the sovkhozes with the aim of centralis[ing] the supply and let the remaining burden of khlebozagotovka be taken over by the sovkhozes.

[2.] Supplies for workers
a) It is high time to lower the prices on industrial and food products by 75%, and thus to increase the real salary, not concentrating on a nominal increase.

b) It is high time to carry out a change in setting food norms. Set the bread rations at the same level for all working people and specialists, that is: 1 kg per day for a working person, 600 grams per day for dependants. Products and bread to be withdrawn from exports, lowering them to such a level as to satisfy the working people in our Sov[jet] Union.

c) It is high time to eliminate closed shops and canteens, turning them into places open for all working people of the Soviet Union.

d) Give more opportunity for efforts to be undertaken in the cooperatives by improving the supply of all shareholders, without discrimination based on class divisions.

e) Lower the contribution to 50%, thus increasing the [real] salary, leaving the differences in contribution to the tax.

[3.] On the issue of trad[e] unions
a) Abolish the decree of the 3rd plenum of the AUCLU, and allow labour unions to concentrate solely on the defence of their members, that is not getting members of the lab[our] union involved in the management of the economy but dealing with protective efforts.

b) AUCLU has not carried out its decree to reduce percentage deductions from salaries, and has even increased them by 3/4% [!]. They need to be decreased to 50% – this will also result in a salary increase.

c) Loans should be given only on a voluntary basis, applying no pressure, neither moral nor any other.

[4.] On the matter of leadership
a) Change all of the leadership. Call an extraordinary party congress with the aim of electing a new CC and new Politburo and changing the Stalinist narkoms.

There are fundamental matters which should be dealt with; to carry out a purge and the revision of the present general party line. Those are my thoughts. And with such an attitude, I can not work in the countryside; if I am to work, I will not carry out the general party line on the agri[cultural] matters [or] khlebozag[otovka].

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12 Russian: zakrtytie razpredilelitieli – shops with a wide selection of products exclusively for the upper party and state functionaries, inaccessible for the general public.
If you say that it is only I who has such an attitude, go among the masses, listen. The masses do not stand in support of the CC of the VKP(b) and STALIN, but in support of BUKHARIN, TOMSKY, RYKOV, ZINOVIEV, UGLANOV and KAMENEV. Try holding a “secret” vote in the party and you will find out with whom the party masses stand – not the part[y] officials.

And the final issue which I oppose – the decision of 9 October [19]32 (CC VKP(b)) on the expulsion of ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV, UGLANOV from the party. I categorically protest against casting away those people who have built the party, the best students of LENIN; against driving away the people who are disobedient and think differently, and leaving obedient fools.

I do not trust the press on the claim that ZINOVIEV is a counter-revolutionary. These people have fought for the party all their life, for the revolution, and have been in exile – they cannot be counter-revolutionaries, it is only the fear of letting them into the CC, and thus [an attempt at] strengthening its own influence, having no support from the masses.

It is necessary not to push away, but to attract the better part of the party and jointly repair the general party line under the call: “Fewer steps, stronger steps.”

I strongly believe that ZINOVIEV will be back in the party and that he will become its leader.

20 October [19]32

With a Com[munist] greeting!

member of the party since 1925 no. 0705273

NECHAYEV

In conformity: SPO Representative
Svatovo R[aion] Div[ision] GPU
NIKOLAYEV

For conformity of the copy with the copy: Representative 1st Dep[artment] SPO
Don[etsk] Ob[last] Division GPU
(—) STOLNIKOV

I have read. Conforms to the original
(—) Nechayev

Certified copy of a copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
No. 10
21 October 1932, Odessa. Report by a secret informer of the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, regarding the reactions of the people towards arrests and the signs of famine

On 17 October of this year, during a conversation, V. MERKLINGER and his wife strongly complained that the life is getting harder by the day and allegedly the people in the countryside are now starving. And it is most outrageous, he says, that the party apparatchiks are doing well, receiving such allowances that, for example, the head of the Sov[jet] part[y] school has indecently gained weight while others have to starve. M[ERKLINGER] stated that a number of party apparatchiks have informed him that this year many people will die of starvation. One has even given a “check number” of 16 million, yet this – he says – is not important, but that the plan is fulfilled. M[ERKLINGER] is outraged by this devilish experiment and claims that this will lead to no good. He told me that in the Catholic colonies, a great many people have been arrested, particularly from among the clergy. They allegedly look for gold, but where can “a village priest” have gold from? He is extremely outraged by the fact that his relative, GEYZER, a form[er] mill owner, has been arrested. He had worked, he says, with his daughter on the construction of the GPU sanatorium; they had been awarded a bonus at the end. A few days later, he was arrested, with demands for gold and currency made of him. He says that the celebrations organised for the end of the construction cost 25,000 roubles, while at the same time masses of people are starving.

In conformity: (—)
No. 11
16 November 1932, Moscow. Circular distributed by the OGPU regarding
the intensified fight against illegal trading of grain, flour and bread

In accordance with telegram no. 428 sent for information to PP OGPU of C[entral] Asia, BSSR, West[ern] Oblast, DVK, Crimea, Gorky [Krai], Northern Krai, TSFSR, Yakutia, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and LMD, I order:

First: all representatives, with the exception of PP OGPU MO, DVK, TASSR, North[ern] Krai and TSFSR, to cease all trading of grain and flour immediately, and to cease the trading of baked bread in large quantities (over one pood). With this aim and without further ado, designate the most experienced officers of PP OGPU to carry out this task aimed at interrupting the illegal trade in seeds, flour, bread. Present the names of the designated officers to me as soon as possible, via telegraph.

Second: [...] flour, seeds and bread transported to the bazaars for sale are subject to confiscation.

Third: traders and speculators trading seeds, flour and bread are to be reported immediately through agent-based operational activities and, without further delays in agent-based observation of those persons, to be arrested immediately and the cases transferred to the PP troika.

Fourth: the confiscation of seeds, flour and bread in the markets is to be carried out under the supervision of the PP apparatus by militia and Zagotzierna [employees].

Fifth: the officers of the militia and employees of Zagotzierna designated for this task are to be thoroughly instructed and all acts of abuse and rudeness on the part of the militia and Zagotzierna agents are to be prevented under any circumstances during the requisition of seeds, flour and bread from the peasants. Explain that the requisition is being carried out in accordance with a governmental decree, forbidding the trading of seeds, flour and bread until the plan for grain purchases is completely fulfilled.

Sixth: ensure that the entire countryside population is informed, both in the villages and the bazaars, that the law forbids the trading of seeds, flour and bread until the khlebozagotovka plan set for the oblast is fulfilled.

Seventh: every 10 days, present special reports by couriers on the implementation of the operation, including the description of the situation on the bread deliveries, the quantity of confiscated [products], the number of those covered by repression, speculators and traders, the number of investigations opened and sentences handed down in such cases.

Underlined by hand.
Eighth: the operation is to be carried out until the *khlebozagotovka* plan *a*is fulfilled by your *oblast.* *a*

Ninth: to report the steps you have undertaken, via telegraph, *a*within two days* a* of receiving the circular.

Dep[uty] Chair[man] of OGPU ad interim
YAGODA¹

Sent by Representative
PAVLOV

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¹ Gienrikh Yagoda (1891–1938), from 31 July 1931 Deputy Chairman of the OGPU with SNK USSR, from 10 July 1934 People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR; from 26 September 1936 People’s Commissar for Communication of the USSR; from 1935 General Commissar of State Security. Arrested on 28 March 1937, charged with participation in a conspiracy within the NKVD, sentenced to death in a trial against the “right-Trotskyite’ bloc,” shot on 15 March 1938; never rehabilitated.
On 6 December, the Consul\(^1\) enquired about the food [supply] situation as far as the people in Odessa are concerned. I answered that the bread rations have been decreased, but the decreases [in rations] did not concern heavy-industry workers and students. “And the consular crops,” he added, “have been put at the same level as the heavy industry workers,” and laughed. Then he asked: “Have you not heard about cases of death from starvation?” – “No, I have not heard such things and I believe it to be doubtful that such things have taken place: there are food shortages, but no famine,” I answered. “If at the beginning of December the bread rations are decreased with completely satisfactory crops, then most probably in February or March there will be cases of death from starvation,” the Consul said. “And I think I opposed – precisely that the Soviet authorities made prior calculations as to how much bread should be distributed so as not to be faced with the lack of grain later.” Thus the conversation was concluded. With the farewells, the Consul asked me to inform him about changes in prices in the bazaar. I promised to pass on the information based on what my wife says, as she buys most of our food in the bazaar.

On 13 December, the Consul asked me about the prices in the bazaar. I gave him some of the prices which I knew from my wife: 5 pounds of bread – 12 or 13 roubles, chicken – 25–30 roubles, soup powder [!] – 3 roubles for a glass, butter – 16 or 18 roubles for a pound, sunflower oil – 12 roubles for a pound (there was no point concealing those numbers, since his maid also goes to the bazaar). He kept nodding his head, as if in amazement. “Tell me,” he said, “how can a worker who receives on average 200–250 roubles per month make a living, supporting a family?” I explained that in a majority of workers’ families, all who are capable do work. “And if there are small children?” the Consul asked. “If they go to school or to the kindergarten, they get some food there,” I answered. “But still,” the Consul noted, ”this is [a life] of semi-starvation.” – “Yes, there are food shortages, but there is no famine.” – “And abroad, they do not know what to do with grain, with the overproduction there.” I told the Consul: “We had pretty good crops and if they were all collected, we too would have a surplus. That is why the

\(^1\) Reference to the Japanese Consul in Odessa, Bunitaro Tanaka.
party is mobilising all its strengths in the countryside, to carry out the *khlebozagotovka* [plan] before it is too late.” – “But it is already too late, it is already December.” – “Luckily the weather is alright; we hope to harvest plenty before 15 January.” – “Oh, I see that you are an optimist.”

Thus the conversation was concluded.

In conformity:

*HDA SBU, Odessa, Spr. 66, T. 5, pp. 2579–2579v.*

*Copy, typescript on a form.*

*Document in Russian.*
No. 13

12 December 1932, Warsaw. Letter from the head of the Office of Ethnic Issues in the Ministry of the Interior to the Ternopil voivode, regarding aid to refugees from the USSR

*Ministry of the Interior* to *Wojewoda in Ternopil*

The winter season and the continually increasing hunger in Soviet Russia are undeniably causing an increased flow of refugees into Poland. The Ministry has in the past defined the general guidelines for dealing with the refugees. Those guidelines remain in force.

At present, with the aim of relieving the local administration authorities as regards the aid to refugees, the Ministry has initiated the establishment of a special committee for assistance to refugees, which is to comprise: a representative of the Red Cross, a representative of the Department of Social Welfare, a representative of the Episcopate and the representative of the League of Nations¹ for refugees, Mr. Gallati. With that, the Ministry kindly requests that in each individual case, the voivode inform the Ministry about refugees crossing the border, while making recommendations on the scope of assistance required.²

M. K. (—) H. Suchenek-Suchekci²

Head of the Department

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Original, typescript on a printed letterhead.
Document in Polish.
At the top of the document, a letter: B; in the bottom left corner a rectangular receipt stamp with the text: *województwo* Office in Ternopil, Received on ... 19... encl. ... [no.]; ... and a handwritten date: 15 XII ...32 as well as a number: N.B. 33; on the right, next to the signature, illegible initials and a note: ko.

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¹ League of Nations – established in 1919 (with the Versailles Treaty), an international organisation of independent states with headquarters in Geneva. The organisation’s purpose was to eliminate international disputes, as well as to support cooperation in the world and promote peace; regular sessions were held from 1920 to 1941; formally dissolved in 1946.

² Henryk Jan Suchenek-Suchekci (born 1887), Administration Captain of the Reserve; until 1926 with Section II of the General Staff; in 1926–1937 Head of the Office of Ethnic Issues in the Political Department of the Ministry of the Interior; from 1928 Chairman of the Executive Council of the Sybirak Association; author of *Państwo a cerkiew prawosławna w Polsce i w państwach ościennych* (Warsaw, 1930).
No. 14
13 December 1932, Odessa. Report by a secret informer of the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, regarding the critical assessment of the situation in the countryside

MEWES¹ said that the life of a cow is equal to the life of five people because recently five people have been shot for stealing a cow. GAN added that peasants are left with no grain whatsoever, all having been taken away; the peasants have now started pulling out stocks made by field mice and gophers. One can sometimes find as much as a pood of grain, but even that is sought after by the authorities, calling it “plundering.”

In conformity:

HDA SBU, Odessa, Spr. 380-T, p. 244.
Copy, typescript on a form.
Document in Russian.

¹ Karsten Mewes, representative of the German steamship association “Deutsche Levante Linie.”
Your Excellency,¹

The Foreign Bureau of the Ukr[ainian] Radical Democratic Party has the honour of addressing you, as the supreme Arch-Shepherd of the Ukr[ainian] Greek Cathol[ic] Church, with the following request.

The people of Greater Ukraine, that is, three-quarters of the entire Ukr[ainian] nation, are in deadly danger. Times are approaching which bring terror much greater than anything that Ukraine has experienced before, whether under the rule of the Tatars and the revenge taken by Jarema Wiśniowiecki, or after the Poltava pogrom, or during the last war for independence and the famine of 1921.

Famine is once again approaching, unbelievable and unprecedented in scale and intensity. At the beginning of the summer, Ukraine’s population was already starving, as it had no stocks from the previous periods and all the remaining food had been taken out of the country. This year’s crops, with decreased sowing and the utter disintegration of the farms, cannot satisfy even the most basic needs of the people, and even more so as during the time after the crops, the grain and other stocks were mercilessly taken away. Starvation and uprisings have already started in the cities (Kiev, Odessa, Donbas), cases of death from starvation have been noted in the countryside. Even strangers who have come to Ukraine are terrified of what will happen there in the coming months.

The Soviet authorities and their obedient press are intentionally silent on the state of affairs, and thus the foreign public, having no sources of information of its own, is equally silent in regard to this new tragedy of the Ukr[ainian] nation. At this moment, we turn to you, most Reverend Vladyka, with a request for your supreme Arch-Shepherd’s voice in defence of the Ukr[ainian] people.

Your voice, most Reverend Vladyka, will be listened to by all, both the high representatives of the Church, the world press and the international charity institutions, which thus will be able, in time, to send impartial enquiry commissions

¹ Word corrected by hand.

¹ Andrey Sheptytsky (1865–1944), actually Roman Maria Aleksander Count Sheptytsky; brother of general of the Polish Army Stanislaw Sheptytsky, grandson of Aleksander Fredro; Greek Catholic priest, monk; from 1888 with the Basilian monks; from February 1899 Bishop of Stanyslaviv, from 1900 Metropolitan Archbishop of Galicia and Lviv; at the same time deputy speaker of the Galician National Diet and in 1903–1914 member of the Austrian Chamber of Lords; following the Russian occupation of Lviv, in 1915–1917 imprisoned in Kiev; advocate of an independent Ukrainian statehood; after 1919 supporter of a wide autonomy for the Ukrainians within the Polish statehood; in 1939 advocated the establishment of a Ukrainian state in Carpathian Ruthenia.
to Ukraine, to see for themselves what is happening there, and through the actions taken, to save the lives of some thousands of people.

Thanks to your voice, Most Dear Arch-Shepherd, the indifference of the entire Christian world will vanish in face of the great suffering that the Ukrainian people are undergoing presently, and which will grow worse in the coming months.

We are at your mercy and ask for your high pastoral blessing.

Prof[essor] Kost’ Matsiyevich
Chairman of the For[eign] Bureau

M. Slavinsky
Dep[uty] Chairman

Secretary of the Fore[ign] Bureau
W. Diakonenko, Associate Professor

Prague, 14 December 1932

Certifying that this is a true copy of the original:
Secretariat of the Metropolitan Kyr Andrey
Lviv, 17 January 1933
(—) b-secretary\(^b\)

\(^b\) Filled in by hand.

2 Kost’ Matsiyevich (1873–1942), professor, economist, agronomist, social activist; after 1917 one of the initiators of the agricultural reform plan in Ukraine; in 1919 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UNR; in years 1919–1923 Head of the diplomatic mission of the UNR in Romania, later in exile in Czechoslovakia; in the late 1920s in exile in Romania; participant in the All-Ukrainian Assembly in Prague in 1929; in 1929–1932, a member of the Auditing Committee with the Main Council in Exile; from 1930 Head of the economic seminar at the Ukrainian Academic Institute in Warsaw; published texts in Tryzub, among other periodicals.
4 January 1933, Odessa. Letter from the German Consul in Odessa to the MFA and the German Embassy in Moscow, regarding the worsening situation in the Odessa oblast

German Consulate
Odessa, 4 January 1933

Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Berlin
German Embassy – Moscow

Content: Insufficient grain supplies.
State organs turning to forceful means.
Worsening of economic problems.

The Odessa oblast has fallen furthest behind in the khlebozagotovka. The imposition of a special tax on individual farms merely increases the number of problems. Chernomorskaya Kommuna from 29 February reports that at the special request from the People’s Commissar for Justice and the Attorney-General of the Republic, special groups of prosecutors have been designated with the aim of [supervising the] fulfilment of the khlebozagotovka and monitoring the institutions responsible for the grain purchases. On 14 December, the Odessa party committee expelled nine party members as deserters from the grain purchase front.

The head of the Odessa and Mykolaiv grain trust, BALYUKEVICH, for not fulfilling the khlebozagotovka plan, was expelled from the party and the AUCEC, and sent for trial.

On 23 December, three alleged kulaks, members of the artel, were sentenced to death by shooting, for having broken the state grain purchasing campaign, two members of the artel were sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment. On 28 December, Chernomorskaya Kommuna published a directive under Art. 127 of the criminal code on the unconditional ban on purchasing and selling of agri[cultural] products and items of basic necessity for speculative purposes. Chernomorskaya Kommuna published the names of 50 party members who, upon the decision of the Od[essa] Obl[ast] Control Committee Presidium, had been expelled from the party and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment for having acted against the interests of the party of the proletarian state on the “fight for grain’ front.” On the same day, the Odessa oblast’s ispolkom took the decision to expel 500 farmers and their families, confiscating their property.
On 3 January, Chernomorskaya Kommuna reported that five members of the farming artel of the Odessa oblast were sentenced to death by shooting for concealing and breaking the khlebozagotovka.

Translated from German: translator KEGLER

In conformity: Oper[ational] Representative of Special Division UGB (—) SHNAYDER

Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

\[\text{\footnotesize 1 Paul Rot, from 1928 German Consul in Odessa.}\]
Some general comments

[...] Often, when the Red Army soldiers are ordered to shoot to the rebelling peasants, the Red Army soldiers refuse to execute the order.

I visited the “Dnieprostroy.” [...] Some 30,000 workers fled due to hunger. Those who still remain at the “Dnieprostroy” have nothing to eat.

[...] Many plants have already been closed down, 20–25% of the officials, clerks and workers have been dismissed from the operating plants. One-third of those angry and hungry workers live off of theft and robbery. Workers, when caught, openly admit to having committed a crime in order not to starve to death.

[...] The reductions in officials, clerks and workers by 20–25% have been undertaken in all [branches] of industry, factories, plants and generally all enterprises and works. Stagnation has begun, with hunger and unpaid salaries. Unemployment is counted in the hundreds of thousands.

In the cities of Zenkov, Poltava, Kobeliaky, and many other cities and villages, there were hunger rebellions this past autumn. Masses of people were shouting: “Work, bread!” The result – terror, mass arrests and exile.

In many places, the people attack their “leaders”, “activists” and others. They kidnap them and hang or kill them. Sometimes, some are set on fire.

Jails, militia, the GPU – all are filled to capacity with those arrested. All places of exile are filled with those sent to do forced labour.

All forced collectives, regardless of the conditions, are falling apart. “Soviet farms” (sovkhozes) bring nothing but losses: disintegrating while their property is stolen away.

In the winter of [19]31–[19]32, I was passing through the territories west of the Dnieper River. In Zhytomyr, I was shown 12 children’s skulls lying with the trash: “they eat human flesh: they eat Bolshevism.” Children’s heads (skulls) were also found with the trash in Kharkiv.

In Poltava, a man pretending to be a garbage collector found his way to barracks standing in the GPU courtyard and in one of them saw several bare, frozen human corpses. [This] man swears that it is true.

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2-3 As in the original.
Hunger, terror, disorganisation and loss in all spheres of life. Unemployment and hunger – [those are] the basic characteristics describing it all.

10 January 1933
Representative of General Wrangel
Vas[ily] Af[anasyevich] Af[anasyev]

CAW, Oddz. II SG, I.303.4.2094, T. W-37, n.pag.
Original, manuscript.
Document in Russian.
For a summary of the document in Polish, dated 18 January 1933, see CAW, Oddz. II SG, I.303.4.2094, T. W-37, n.pag.
No. 18

6 February 1933, Odessa. Letter from the German Consul in Odessa to the MFA in Berlin and the German Embassy in Moscow, regarding the confiscation of grain from the peasants by the “shock” brigades

German Consulate
Odessa, 6 February 1933

Translation from German

To Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Berlin
To German Embassy – Moscow

With reference to the information
Dated 4 January – this year – N 6

Despite applying all measures of coercion with the aim of meeting the khlebosdacha, in Odessa the plan was not fulfilled.

On 31 December of last year, [information] has been published stating that the plan was 72.2% fulfilled. Thereafter, no more data was published. Party members are constantly held responsible for insufficient cooperation in implementing the khlebosdacha. The Secretary of the Party Committee for the Odessa oblast was expelled from his post. Selsoviet are to prepare new guidelines, brigades are searching through the households, sowing material is being confiscated. For allegedly withholding the sowing material, innocent people are forced to face trial. Kolkhozniks are to return the seeds earned by them under the pretext of “miscalculated, mistaken portioning during distribution.” At best, they are allowed to keep the corn.

Endless searches, day and night, have led the men to flee from the villages, staying in hiding and leaving their families without a provider. But also as regards the remaining members of families, all possible measures are carried out, such as “keeping in the freezing weather,” in order to force them to hand over the grain.

In this situation, it is hard to imagine that the planned preparations for the spring sowing can be carried out. Those from among the kolkhozniks and yedinolichniks who have not delivered the sowing material are being fined so that with the money from the fines, sowing material can be purchased in other raions. Whenever a poor farmer complains about the overburdening tax, he is fined [just] as a kulak is.

Displacement and deportations continue.

Increased inflow of information to the German State Committee for Debt Obligations about the sale of bonds gives proof to the claim that the peasants are handing over everything in their possession, so as to prolong their existence through food bought in the Torgsin.
The peasants visiting the consulate – German colonists and citizens of other countries – describe the difficult state of affairs in the countryside.

Translated from German: translator KIGLER\textsuperscript{a}

In conformity: Oper[ational] Representative of Special Division UGB (——) SHNAYDER

\textit{HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 161, T. 7, pp. 23–24.}

Certified copy, typescript.

Document in Russian.

\textsuperscript{a} As in the original. Earlier: KEGLER.
Concerns: Crop yields and the state of food supply

The reports on the crop yields in the Odessa oblast bear witness to the relatively large local disparities. There are villages which have fulfilled the khlebosdacha and have enough grain to last the winter, but there are also cases where, in spite of the conclusion of the harvests, the obligation of grain deliveries to the state remains unfulfilled. It can be safely estimated that the crops have not even reached the level of 50% of those from the previous year, and since the obligatory deliveries are severely enforced, the majority of the population in the countryside will either have insufficient or no grain at all for the winter.

Since the majority of reports on the state of late crops such as corn and potatoes seem unfavourable, it should be considered that the oncoming winter will not only bring hunger but also another increase in the mortality rate caused by the famine.

In some of the northern raions of the Odessa oblast, which already suffered greatly during the winter famine of 1932/[19]33, the people are already starving. Despite this, preparations are being carried out to export the grain from this year’s harvests. As for now, the grain is brought in relatively slowly, undoubtedly because of the wide-spread technical difficulties in transportation; however, the first small shipments have already been loaded on the ships.

Grain shortages are already visible since there is a lack of flour and groats on the market.

Translated from German: translator KIGLER

In conformity: Operational Representative OO UGB
(—) SHNAYDER
Food supply situation in Soviet Ukraine

The last weeks of May and the beginning of June have been marked by the uniquely tragic signs of an all-present famine. Of all the cities on the right bank of the Ukraine, only in Kiev has the sale of the so-called *kommercheski*\(^1\) bread been organised, at the price of 1 rb. per pound. A single person could purchase no more than four pounds of bread, which has been now reduced to three. The selling points are scattered quite densely around the city, and yet the queues of those buying at every such point often reach a kilometre in length. People stand in queues for 10 hours or more. In some parts of the city, usually in the suburbs, the queues never end, as people stand 24 hours a day. In order to get the bread in the morning, one must get in line at 10 in the evening of the previous day. In the morning, nearly every such queue numbers some 2000 persons. The bread deliveries are extremely irregular and there are often cases where a given point receives no bread for two to three days.

As a result, there is often unrest taking the form of open revolts, suppressed with all severity by the militia, where it often happens that the mounted militia units charge [into] the crowd with whips, dispersing the crowd. Moreover, from time to time, the authorities send militia units with trucks, which are then loaded with thousands of people forcibly taken to work at the surrounding beet plantations or to dig earth. All that repression has no effect, since on the free market the price of bread reaches 6 roubles for a pound in Kiev (up to 15 in Odessa), and the rationed bread is issued in minute quantities. The difference between the market prices and the *kommercheski* prices results in enormous speculation activities. The authorities are entirely powerless in the face of the mass migration of peasants from the neighbouring villages who come to get bread.

The mortality rate has increased enormously over this period of time. The cases of death from starvation, on the streets and in the courtyards, are presently counted not in tens, but in hundreds every day. During each night, trucks and horse wagons pass to collect the dead from the streets and markets, gardens, courtyards. In the morning one day, four trucks were seen to have carried away the dead and those dying of hunger from the main train station in Kiev. Information was given that

\(^{a-\rightarrow}\) *Filled in by hand.*

\(^1\) Commercial.
such is the case each day. What testifies to the number of such deaths is the fact that the management of individual houses often has to wait three or four days after informing the municipal authorities to take the corpses of the besprizorni, or peasants, who have come in search of food remains or shelter and died of starvation in the courtyard or the staircase. During two nights, 3–4 and 4–5 June, some 2000 bodies were buried in 40 holes at the Catholic cemetery of Baykova Gora. Only the final stage of the burial was seen, as the those graves are located near the Polish military cemetery. Thus two enormous vats filled with lime were placed there, and each layer of corpses was covered with lime and a shallow layer of soil. It requires explanation that only some of the corpses are buried at the cemeteries, and in a way whereby there is a certain system: for two nights they are transported to one cemetery, the next two [nights] to another one, etc. (Kiev has five open cemeteries). However, the majority are buried in the fields near the city, in the gardens, etc. It is unfortunately impossible to determine the exact number of corpses collected each night. It is known from an entirely reliable source that the number averages some 700 corpses each night.

The situation in other cities of right-bank Ukraine is far worse than in Kiev, even in such large ones as Odessa, Vinnytsia, Kamianets, etc., and in the countryside. There is not even such a “luxury” as the sale of kommercheski bread. The informers from Odessa and other cities pass on stories which are literally terrifying. An entirely reliable informer from Berdychiv told the story that a hunt for children takes place at the peripheries of the city. At the fall of night, no mother will let her children out in the streets. Nevertheless, there are cases of stealing children from their homes. Remains of dead horses are dug up, and there are also cases of families eating the dead, having waited for days for a coffin and a permission to bury the dead.

The hunger is most severe in the countryside. In a number of raions, such as Tsvetkovsky, Zvenihorodsky, Umansky, Butsky, Tarashchansky, and partially Berdychivsky, cannibalism has became a sort of addiction. The mortality rate there has reached such levels that one finds villages completely deserted, or villages – where out of the population of 2[000]–3000, merely 300–400 persons remain.

The supply situation of the kolkhozes population is by no means better than that of the “single individuals”. The latter have one advantage over the former, namely that not being prikleplenii to the kolkhoz, so they have the relative option of leaving, moving with the aim of finding somewhat better conditions. The kolkhozniks are deprived of that possibility; they are forced to show up for daily work, receiving only some cabbage soup without any fat, barley groats, potatoes and no bread. Only for those working with the beet crops, 22 pounds of bread have been assigned for the entire work force on a single h[ectare]. However, [this] is only a theoretical quota, a myth such as the sugar and the beet crops. A bonus for those working with the beets, in the form of bread and sugar, has been the cause of excessively frequent mismanagement and speculation by the various distributing organisations.

2 Assigned.
Due to the extremely low number of livestock, both in the kolkhozes and on the individual farms, a decree was made on hand ploughing in the fields. The quota was set – 250 m\(\text{etres}\) squar\(\text{ed}\) for every person. However, that proved to be entirely unachievable because of the physical exhaustion of the peasants. Extremely frequent are cases in which in the morning, 80 persons go out into the fields and only 70 come back in the evening. The rest die of hunger and exhaustion, and are buried in the fields. On the roads, in the grain and in the woods there are tens of uncollected corpses. The villages, even those close to the city, are full of boarded-up, abandoned houses. Dogs and cats are nowhere to be seen – all of them eaten. The woods are full of half-wild people, living on mushrooms, moss and roots. On the roads, one often comes across peasant families leaving the countryside on horse wagons, in no particular direction. The Red Cross units organised at present have undertaken to feed the children. This is, however, an enterprise with meagre results, as there is a shortage of food products.

The above information, however improbable it seems, comes from all regions and is identical in detail.

The heavy rains which have come over nearly all the past month, as well as the lack of an appropriate vehicle, made it impossible to check the facts on the spot. Yet the information regarding the situation in Kiev is entirely true.

During my journeys, I have seen a quite satisfactory state of winter crop and the late spring crop. Nearly all of the late grain and beet crops are much worse. The beets planted early have in many cases been replanted. The first weeding of the beets has been completed. Presently, there is the so-called “pause.” The oblast\(^b\) and raion authorities have concentrated all efforts and energy on the beet crops. It should be concluded that the starving population is going en masse to work with the beets, since it receives at least minimum rations and some bread and sugar from time to time.

\(\text{CAW, Oddz. II SG, I.303.4.5424, pp. 63–67.}\)
\(\text{Original, typescript.}\)
\(\text{Document in Polish.}\)

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\(^b\) \text{Was: regions.}\)
6 June 1933, Kiev. Excerpt from a report by a secret informer of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, regarding a statement made by the writer Borys Antonenko-Davydovich

6 June [19]33

B. ANTONENKO-DAVYDOVICH

on the ROSENBERG plan

Since HITLER’s ascent to power, ANTONENKO and DENISENKO have been following events carefully and with anxiousness. In order to keep up to date with the current situation in Germany, they have turned to foreign newspapers (probably received by PIDMOKHYLNY in Kharkiv and DENISENKO in VUAN), as well as to various speeches, presentations and “ROSENBERG plans.” Ukraine under the protectorate of PIDMOKHYLNY, PLUZHNYK has given wings to their hopes and revived their spirits. A number of statements on the subject can be summarised as follows:

ANTONENKO-DAVYDOVICH: One obviously cannot dream of a sovereign Ukraine. Only naive patriots may still make references to that. Ukraine is too weak to exist independently and in sovereignty. Nonsense. It can only remain unconditionally under someone’s protectorate. Anyone who is of sound mind and not blind will understand that the role of protector, in this case, can be played by any civilised state, as long as it is not Moscow. Greedy, primitive Moscow has

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1 Borys Antonenko-Davydovich (1899–1984), Ukrainian writer, author of over 20 books, short stories, novels, romance stories and literary critiques. Following a heavy campaign of criticism directed against his books and the charge of nationalism brought against the author, he left for Almaty, where he worked as an editor in a state-run publishing house. Arrested on 2 January 1935 and charged with membership in the UVO, sentenced to 10 years in ITL, having served the sentence he was sent to exile for life in the Krasnoyarsk krai; rehabilitated in 1956, returned to Kiev the following year.

2 Alfred Rosenberg (born 1893), German from Estonia, politician, author of racial theories, from 1918 in Germany; in 1919 one of the founders of the German Workers’ Party (DAP), later in the NSDAP; from 1921 editor of the Volksischer Beobachter; following the Munich Putsch, temporary head of the NSDAP; from 1930 member of the Reichstag, in parallel from 1933 head of the foreign department of the NSDAP; from July 1941 Reichminister for the occupied eastern territories; captured in 1945 by the Allies; sentenced to death on 1 September 1946 by the IMT in Nuremberg, executed on 16 September 1946.

3 Valerian Pidmokhylny (1901–1937), Ukrainian writer, arrested on 8 December 1934 in the building of the Writers’ Work Committee near Kharkiv. Charged with “membership of a terrorist organisation.” The investigation was carried out in Kharkiv and then in Kiev. Upon the verdict of the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR on 27–28 March 1935, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He served the sentence in the Solovki prison camp. Based on the decision of the special troika of the UNKVD of the Leningrad oblast, dated 9 September 1937, he was shot on 3 November 1937; rehabilitated in 1956.

4 Yevhen Pluzhnyk (1898–1936), Ukrainian writer, arrested on 4 December 1934, charged with membership of a counter-revolutionary organisation, ties to a nationalist writers’ group, and carrying out counter-revolutionary activities. Upon the verdict of the Military College of the Supreme Court of the USSR on 27–28 March 1935, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He was sent to the Solovki prison camp, where he died on 2 November 1936; rehabilitated in 1956.
suppressed Ukraine for centuries and presently, under the Bolsheviks, the meanness towards the Ukrainians has not decreased, but on the contrary, deepened tenfold. We are the formal slaves of the Russkies and Jews of Moscow. The peasants are dying of starvation by the thousands, praying to God for the corvée laws, for the attack of the Turks, Batu Khan... They know that never before, since the beginning of history, has Ukraine ever been as oppressed and poor as it is now under Sov[iet] rule. There is no point waiting any longer. The entire world screams about the unprecedented cruelty to the Ukrainian people. Hundreds of photographs and articles presenting our situation are to be found in the foreign newspapers. Special lists are published there of those who have died, starving, killed by the bandits, etc. And only despotic Moscow, entangling Ukraine with its net of spy organisations, disseminating there ... the GPU army, stationing its mighty military units in every point of any significance – is silent. It is silent, and with the pleasure of a sadist it reaches its hands into the blood-drenched guts of the Ukrainian peasant. Moscow, the Georgian, the uncrowned ruler, and with him hundreds of thousands of flatterers-clerks and all of Russia – waiting like rats, like locusts [for] our Ukrainian grain, taken away to the [last] seed by criminal methods. And we are left with the corpses of the hunger and convulsion-twisted peasantry. Where is justice? Who else can have his eyes blinded with trivial stories of a Soviet socialist future? Is socialism to be founded on the extermination of a hard-working, able, once-renowned nation?

I am shocked [at the fact that] the Germans, Japanese, English and Americans can all wait like that. Each day of delay costs us thousands of hard-working lives. What are they expecting?

On our own, with our hands and legs tied, we are unable to rise and revolt. We are defenceless, powerless with poverty; we can only grab with our teeth at the legs of our oppressors and bite till we lose our strength, like dying dogs. We are running, and Moscow is trampling us, growling and dancing with prysudy.

Any civilised country will be outraged at our fate [and will come as a] protector – [will be] good. Let someone come, anyone, stop this enormous horror. The best solution for us is to turn towards the fascism of Germany, towards HITLER, towards ROSENBERG, towards OSTRANINA. Joining Ukrainian natural resources and Ukrainian skills with the German culture and also with German capital – this is the best we can hope and strive for. The Sich riflemen are organising themselves anew, colonels KONOVALETS⁵ and KAPUSTIETS (whom I even knew personally at one point) are forming the renowned polks and kurins.. perhaps I will not live to see the moment, maybe they will shoot me before that in the dungeons of the GPU, but I am deeply convinced that soon, very soon, Ukraine will breathe freely, having freed itself of the Muscovite yoke.

[...]

⁵ Yevhen Konovalets (1891–1938), Ukrainian military and political activist, Colonel of the UNR army; from 1922 in exile; initiated the creation of the UVO (1921) and OUN (1929), the first chairman of the Provid. Murdered in Rotterdam by the employees of the USSR NKVD.
As a result of numerous conversations I was able to establish that ANT[ONENKO] is deeply involved in matters related to German plans in Soviet Ukraine. He treats the ROSENBERG plan as, in fact, the most favourable and only way of “freeing Ukraine from Muscovite oppression.”

During the conversations, ANTONENKO-DAVYDOVICH declared as follows: “It makes no difference to Moscow, it is not capable of holding Ukraine in any case. Sooner or later, she will be occupied. Last year, and in the previous years, our commanders, bloody cretins, were convinced that the moment of occupation had come, and that is why they started squeezing everything out of here. As a result of such sickness – leaving grain and cattle to the enemy (or at least not to the kulak [social] groups), there is this terrible condition of the peasantry which we have today. It is perfectly clear that the government has, if not looking at the thousands of deaths from hunger, cannibalism, mass banditry, etc. Millions of people living in Ukraine have been cheated, spat at, robbed and stripped of their dignity. It would be laughable to speak and think that any of them can come to believe in any socialism. People want anything – German ......., tsarist whips, an attack by Batu Khan, and finally they become convinced that no rule, even the most barbaric... no rule would allow for the people who work for it to die of starvation. It is unthinkable, terrible. In Kiev alone, they bring people dying of starvation and exhaustion daily to the Anatomical Theatre... This is socialism. This is the Leninist program. This is what is being done for the victory of the dying proletariat; or possibly, all those dying were kulaks, and there is no need to pity them. No, everyone knows that it is mainly the poor, not the wealthy. Workers, cooperative members, they are those who, at some point, have willingly followed the Bolshevik stack [!]. And now, to cheat like that ... starve like that ... insolently, with no shame in face of the entire world – to cheat tens of millions of peasants. This is clearly some thoughtless, sadistic carnival on corpses... In the name of the bright future of socialism – to cut the branch on which one is sitting, chopping the roots.”

In conformity:

HDA SBU, F. 65, Spr. S-4468, T. 1, pp. 2–5.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

As in the original. Probably a fragment missing.
German Consulate General

Translation from German

No. 138

City Kharkiv, 16 June 1933

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Berlin

Supplement to report no. 96
dated 26 April and 19 May of this year
In 3 copies

Famine in Ukraine
Since the above mentioned reports were sent, informing about the worsening of the situation of the countryside population of Ukraine, the accounts and information I receive almost daily have been deteriorating; the information about the famine which has struck Ukraine has now been fully confirmed.

Although back in April there might still have been some doubt that the situation would prove to be that bad, and that the reports on the famine did not reflect the actual state of affairs – now it has been determined that the famine has struck the whole of Ukraine, and that regions where there is still grain are an exception.

Judging by the reliable information at my disposal, 80% of the population of Ukrainian villages have died of starvation.

For example, a German settler from Solntsnevo (Starokaransky raion near Mariupol)\(^a\) has informed me that:

“In our village, people have not been dying of starvation yet because we are all still yedinolichniks. In the Yekaterino-Khoprovsky kolkhoz, located one kilometre from Solntsnevo, 130 out of 160 families have died. In the village of Stepanivka, three kilometres from Solntsnevo, where 80 families lived, 220 persons have died since Christmas.”

A reliable source from one of the colonies to the north of Berdyansk\(^a\) also reports that around 80% of the village’s Russian population has died of starvation.

In a small town in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, 1500 of 4000 persons have died since Christmas.

In other oblasts\(^b\), the mortality rate has been at the level of 40%.

\(^a\) Underlined by hand.
\(^b\) Was: regions.
Finally, it can be stated with certainty that there have been numerous cases of cannibalism in Ukraine.

Places where no cases of death from starvation have been noted are an exception. Even the peasants who are in a relatively good situation have no grain as of the beginning of this year.

In principle, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes can no longer supply the kolkhozniks and the sovkhoz employees with bread, and even the payment for the trudoden at 200 grams of flour for each trudoden has been suspended.

Obviously, it is impossible to give precise numbers, or at least estimates, of the scope of mortality in the countryside resulting from the famine. The estimates vary, yet if one was to assume with all reservations that the number of victims of the famine, as of the beginning of the year, in the villages and cities, amounts to 20% of the overall population – that number would not be an overestimate.

One would have to add to it the significant loss of national potential resulting from the decreased birth rate and the physical, as well as psychological, exhaustion.

In any case, the Bolsheviks’ agricultural policy under the first five-year plan has brought forth, up to now, horrifying accounts in Ukraine.

It is somewhat comforting that the situation in German colonies is still much more favourable than with the Ukrainians, although deep poverty is also felt here. However, German citizens, if they are [also] Soviet citizens, have in large part joined the kolkhozes, although they have until now shown great skill in resisting, which can be contributed to their energy and capabilities.

Overall, the mortality rate in German colonies has not gone beyond 10%; however it still constitutes a most horrifying number, testifying to the hardship that has befallen our compatriots.

The situation of the Germans – German citizens, as compared to the Soviet citizens – is much better, at least through the fact that, in the worst case, they are able to emigrate to Germany, even if that means losing all their belongings.

With regard to that, emigration of German citizens from Ukraine, in the recent months, has greatly increased.

In the month of May alone, through my services, 230 persons have been sent home. Since their departure has in many cases been delayed, due to difficulties described in the previous reports, the consulate-general needs significant funds to offer support to those people. The reasons given in my report, dated 26th of the previous month, among others, entirely concern this oblast.

I have recently learned of various cases in which the Soviet authorities attempt to stop German citizens from leaving for Germany, pointing to the alleged famine in Germany.

For example, in the Solntsnevo colony in the Starokaransky raion, a member of the selsoviet and the chairman of the local party cell attempted to divert a German citizen, TESHKE, from leaving through long dealings; seeing that [his] efforts were futile, he declared: “Tonight we will settle our accounts.” Half an hour later, TESHKE’s house started to burn, and the aforementioned member of the
selsoviet forbade the inhabitants to help TESHKE extinguish the fire, laughing at TESHKE at the site of the fire.

In the Lukono colony, a prosecutor from Volnovakha (Donbas) gave guidelines to the selsoviet not to issue German citizens with any documents certifying that they have [paid] their due taxes, documents necessary to obtain the visa for departure.

All this is done with the aim of preventing the Germans from being able to say anything bad about life here once they are in their fatherland.

In this context, it is of interest to recall a statement delivered in Moscow to one of the foreign correspondents that “departures to Ukraine are presently undesirable.”

In light of all this information, it must unfortunately be stated how little is known in Germany about the real situation of German colonists here – not only among the German society, but clearly also in the official circles interested in undertaking efforts to organise help for their starving compatriots.

The German press devotes very little space to the poverty of our fellow countrymen in the Soviet Union.

In press reports, generally known here, at the Passau meeting of the FDA (“Verein Ausland-Deutsche,” – Association of Foreign Germans [transl.]),¹ there is no mention of the particularly difficult situation of our fellow countrymen in the Soviet Union.

Regrettably, the German assistance effort is far from what is needed to save the German settlements here.

Recently, it was once again confirmed that the German Mennonites have been receiving aid from their co-religionists in the USA and Canada on a much broader scale than German Lutherans, who are to be considered first in [the distribution] of aid.

Regardless of the difficulties conditioned by the general situation and the particular “sensitivity” of the Soviet government, preventing the intensification of the propaganda effort in Germany and the aid campaign in the USSR, more should be done on the part of the Germans to aid our fellow men here.

It should be undertaken to collect much larger sums than has been the case thus far, with the help of the German Red Cross, church organisations and other, and as far as possible, together with official means also.

It would mean saving our fellow countrymen from hunger, as they are turning to most desperate ways to save themselves from poverty. In the course of such struggles for survival in the colonies, the moral level of the Germans is deteriorating equally. In some settlements, nearly one-tenth of the native Germans have taken part in oppressing and persecuting their own fellow countrymen in order to acquire a good reputation with the authority [representatives] and reap the benefits; this takes the form of mutual slanders, such as “class enemy”, kulaks, etc.

Many do it because they have lost hope of any change and of help from abroad. Apart from material help, the German masses in Russia urgently need moral support.

In general it needs to be emphasised that faced with the local system of moral pressure and oppression, it is difficult to prevent the Bolshevisation of Soviet Germans, but a great majority of Soviet Germans continue to expect that the entire civilised world, and first of all the German nation, will spare no effort to save their lives and show all support in this difficult struggle.

We continually receive requests to pay particular attention to their desperate situation, and it is impossible to understand why the entire world, and even the fatherland, does so little to save them.

Through all possible means, we should sustain the Germans living in the Soviet Union, in their faith in the German [state] and its vital role; this will be of most crucial importance for the saving of their political strength.

As far as the form of those support efforts is concerned, firstly material help needs to be organised.

With the German countryside population in Ukraine amounting to 300,000, that is more or less 40,000 families on average – since not everyone can at this point be covered with the assistance, we should deliver financial aid to 20,000 families, in the amount of 20 marks per month for each family, which will come to 400,000 German marks each month.

Considering the great poverty of the people and the benefits from attracting them towards Germanism, this sum is not very high.

Since establishing offices and [finding] reliable people to organise the assistance seems impossible under local conditions, collecting addresses, distribution and control of the received money and food through the *Torgsin* will be burdensome.

First of all, we should organise it in such a way as to have the settlers come and ask for help themselves. The peasants, German citizens, can undertake to inform those in need of the aid opportunities available.

Perhaps, in the following year of good crops, it will be possible to request grain and meat surplus from the *Druzag*.

Transcribed from German: translator SHTIVELBAND

In conformity: *Oper[ational] Representative of Spec[ial] Division*  
(*—*) SHNAYDER

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2 Karl Hermann Walther, from 1928 German Consul General in Kharkiv.
No. 23
28 August 1933, Odessa. Excerpt of a special communication from the Odessa Oblast Division of the GPU to the Special Unit of the Ukrainian MD of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, regarding the visit by former French Prime Minister Édouard Herriot to Odessa


*ag*ive to Ch[ief] of Spec[ial] Un[it]
Com. Lunev*

No. 746906
24 August*

Spec[ial] communiqué on the visit of for[mer] French Prime Minister Édouard HERRIOT† to Odessa

At 9 a.m. on 26 August, on the steamer “Chicherin,” Édouard HERRIOT arrived, accompanied by CERLAINE and JOULIEN, as well as Deputy Marcel REY.

They were met in the port by the dipl[omatic] representative GAYLUNSKY, Dep[uty] Head of the Western Department of the NKID GELFAND, Chair[man] of the Oblispolkom PAKHOMOV, chair[man] of the municip[al], council CHEBUKIN, chief and captain of the port, press correspondents from Moscow, Kharkiv and Odessa, cinematic operators and photographers.

In response to the welcome address by the representative of the NKID GELFAND and the Chairman of the Oblispolkom PAKHOMOV, HERRIOT stated: “I am very happy to be back in the USSR and I hope that my visit to the USSR will be of benefit for our countries and the world.”

As HERRIOT was disembarking from the steamer, the greeting crowds (admitted based on permits issued by the Oper[ational] Div[ision]), gave HERRIOT an ovation. To those greeting him, HERRIOT spoke through the microphone: “I believe in the great future of your nation and I hope that my visit will benefit peace. I want to see how the country has flourished since 1922 when I was here for the first time.” In the port, HERRIOT shook hands with some of the [people] from the welcoming crowd.

*†* Filled in by hand.
† Édouard Herriot (1872–1957), French politician, writer, active in the radical socialist party; from 1905 to 1942 and 1945–1947 mayor of Lyon; in 1916–1917 Minister for Public Works and Transportation, at the same time Minister for Supply; from 1926 to 1928 Minister of Education; in 1924–1925, in July 1926 and from June to December 1932 Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs; in 1925–1926 and 1936–1940 under house arrest; later in June 1944 transferred by Vichy authorities to the Germans, held in Mareville; in 1947–1954 Chairman of the National Assembly (lower house) of the French Parliament.
HERRIOT, together with the persons accompanying him, left by car for the London Hotel and were accommodated in the rooms prepared for them.

The French Ambassador to the USSR, ALPHAND, did not take part in the welcome [ceremony] at the port because the train car in which ALPHAND was travelling to Odessa had been detached from the train at the Vapniarka station after the axis socket caught fire, and only after several hours was the car brought to Odessa with a special steam engine.

At 9 a.m. on a Moscow train, the representative of the French Embassy, Deputy MARGEN, arrived, meeting HERRIOT at the port.

MARGEN did not meet the NKID b representative at the station and was taken to the London Hotel by the “Intourist” representative who was at the train station.

It is worth noting that following his arrival at the hotel at 9 a.m., HERRIOT was left for two hours without the NKID representative and interpreter. He left often and sat on the balcony; the NKID representatives went to meet Ambassador ALPHAND at the train station.

At 11:30, Ambassador ALPHAND arrived at the hotel accompanied by French journalist LUCIEN and an NKID representative.

The breakfast, at which only the NKID representative GELFAND was present, lasted for some time.

When on the balcony, and later in the restaurant at breakfast, HERRIOT readily posed for our cinematic operators and photographers.

After breakfast, everyone, accompanied by citizens PAKHOMOV, GAYLUNSKY, GELFAND and CHEBUKIN, left by car for the “Krasny Luch” kolkhoz of the Odessa Municipal raion, where they spent about four hours.

On the way, having stopped in the fields where the kolkhozniks from the “Krasny Luch” artel were working, HERRIOT and the persons accompanying him observed a thresher at work. HERRIOT, with the help of the interpreter, talked with the thresher foreman, taking interest in the organisation of the work crew, the number of kolkhozniks in a work crew, the amount of hectares of fields in the kolkhoz, etc. HERRIOT also spoke with the chief of the polit[ical] department of the CAM, and took an interest in the work of the polit[ical] department.

After some time, all left for the village of Biliaivka, where the “Krasny Luch” kolkhoz was located and where the meeting was held. HERRIOT talked for a long time with the kolkhozniks, looked into the kolkhoz granaries filled with grain, took interest in how much grain is given for a trudoden (in this kolkhoz 15 kilo[grams], in addition to the vegetables and fruits), of which HERRIOT was informed.

At the kolkhoz courtyard, a wonderful breakfast was served. HERRIOT had a kolkhoz woman sit next to him; all the time, being in the fields and in the kolkhoz courtyard, HERRIOT had photographs taken of him with the kolkhozniks and the kolkhoznikis’ children. HERRIOT and ALPHAND had direct contact with the kolkhozniks and the children.

b Was: GKID.
Before sitting down to breakfast, HERRIOT washed his hands and dried them with a *kolkhoz* towel of which he was very fond, so eight new towels were given to him as a present.

Everything that HERRIOT saw in the *kolkhoz* made a positive impression on him.

At 5 p.m., everyone left the *kolkhoz* for the city and went to the baking plant, where HERRIOT talked with the [representatives of the] administration, taking interest in how much bread a worker receives and how much grain is harvested in the [Soviet] Union, writing this all down in a notebook. [Thereafter] HERRIOT wrote down his positive opinion about the baking plant in the factory [visitors’] book.

After the visit to the baking plant, [the guest] was driven around the city on a pre-designated route and shown some of the streets.

At 7:30 in the evening, at the NKID headquarters a dinner was served by the Oblispolkom. During the dinner, Chair[man] of Oblispolkom PAKHOMOV gave a brief welcome address in honour of HERRIOT. In response to it, HERRIOT underlined that for the [past] 11 years, as well as at present, he has been fighting for peace and friendly relations between France and the USSR. Having raised his glass of wine, HERRIOT wished success in building the USSR and making it flourish.

After dinner, HERRIOT, together with persons accompanying him and our representatives, left for the train station and at 9:40 in the evening departed for Kiev.

Prior to the departure, the NKID delivered 18 Ukrainian *rubashki* to his car as a gift because HERRIOT was very fond of them.

HERRIOT’s visit to Odessa was met by lively reactions among the population. During the visit by HERRIOT, the anti-Soviet element carried out a wide-scale dissemination of provocative rumours that HERRIOT came with the aim “of sucking grain and gold out of the USSR.”

A worker at the railway technical school, SOKOLOVSKY, commenting on the visit by HERRIOT, stated: “He came to look at how many people are left after the hunger and to prepare the agreement for the export of grain, so that those who were left alive would die.”

A worker at the January [Uprising] Plant, DIATLOV Dmitry, 50 years of age, stated in the presence of other workers: “My son in law works on the *Gruziya*. The ship was renovated in accordance with the most advanced technologies, the entire crew changed, special new uniforms sewn and they are preparing for the meeting with the French minister. Surely they are preparing new plans for how to subjugate the nation and take away the new crops.”
A barge worker with the Sov[iet] Commer[cial] Fleet, LEDOK F., in a conversation with his acquaintances, stated: “The previous time, the foreigners who came here laughed at the people and threw foreign money in the streets, which the people jumped on greedily. Yesterday, distinguished representatives from abroad came again to see how much grain is here and how much can be sucked out [of us], and how much the nation is suffering and if it is near its end. [But] they will not torment the nation for much longer.”

A home worker, GOYKHMAN, on the matter of HERRIOT’s visit, stated in a conversation with his acquaintances: “HERRIOT came to take our gold. This means that the GPU will once again fill the Dopr to get the gold.”

With regard to HERRIOT’s visit, we took note of conversations wherein it was claimed that HERRIOT “is blinded and shown only the achievements, while the hunger and the poverty are hidden [from him].”

A lithographer from the Kalinin plant, ANDREYEV G., on the matter of HERRIOT’s visit, stated: “Today, HERRIOT arrived in Odessa. Our authorities are scared and want to pull the wool over foreigners’ eyes that – he says – we have socialism. I saw a militia officer run into the greengrocer’s and give a stupid command to immediately get rid of the line of people standing in front of the shop. It is clear that HERRIOT does not know what is happening here.”

KLIMENKO, living at 44 Lazarev St., declared: “Again they have come from abroad to learn what is happening here. But what can they see except the baking plant? It was specially built to show off our technology and no one sees our poverty anyhow.”

We have noted individual cases of provocative rumours disseminated by the anti-Soviet element with regard to HERRIOT’s visit, about the alleged coming fall of Sov[iet] rule and the pogroms which were to take place on the Jews.

BEZUGLY Yefim, working with the tram network, a Stundist 2 living in house no. 67 at Lazarev St., stated: “It is not without meaning that the foreigners started visiting us. It is high time to throw the heavy yoke off our backs. The hunger is less severe now and everyone can start thinking about politics. The time will come when even we will show what we can do.”

A worker VEDENEV, commenting on the reasons for HERRIOT’s visit, stated: “In the near future, a whip will fall on the Jewish backs. We have suffered under their oppression long enough. We will bring them into line and remind them of everything.”

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2 Stundism – a Baptist sect established in Russia in the middle of the 19th century.
GA VRIUK M., living at 7 Zaytsev St., stated: “[It is] not long before they will feed us with clay, such as this bread. Today foreigners came and they take interest in how we are fed. Soon the foreigners will feed us themselves because the fall of our rulers is near.”

Ch[ief] ad interim* of the Od[essa] Ob[last] Division of GPU

Kaminsky*3

Chief of the Oper[ational] Div[ision]

BORETSKY

*In conformity: Repres[entative] of the Oper[ational] Div[ision]*6 (—)

HDA SBU, Odessa, Spr. 71, T. 8, pp. 111–116.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

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3 Yakov Kaminsky (born 1891), from 1921 with the VCheKa, in the CheKa of the Mykolaiv gubernia; from 6 January 1921 to 18 January 1923 in the Mykolaiv gubernia Division of the GPU; from 1923 Chief of the Secret Department in the Secret Operational Unit of the Odessa gubernia Division of the GPU; from 1924 assistant to the Head of the Secret Department in the Secret Operational Unit of the Kiev gubernia Division of the GPU, assistant to Chief of the Kamianets border detachment of the operational unit; from 15 September 1926 to 1930 Chief of the Tulchin, Proskurov and Korosten Okrug Divisions of the GPU; from 1930 assistant to Chief of the Odessa Okrug Division of Odessa Operational Sector of the GPU; from 27 February 1933 Chief of the Special Unit and assistant to Chief of the Odessa Oblast Division, Odessa Operational Sector of the GPU; from 11 July 1934 Chief of the Odessa Oblast UNKVD; from 28 August 1934 Deputy Chief of the Kharkiv Oblast UNKVD; from 17 March 1937 Deputy Chief of the RKM Directorate of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR; from 17 July 1937 Chief of the RKM Directorate NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. Arrested on 9 March 1938, sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment on 23 November 1939, released from camp on 24 March 1947. Arrested for the second time on 26 January 1949, sentenced to obligatory deportation to Kazakhstan on 27 April 1949; rehabilitated.
No. 24
4 September 1933, Berlin. Call by the Ukrainian Ministry in Germany to participate in the mourning ceremony devoted to the victims of the famine in Ukraine

Berlin, 4 September 1933

Invitation

The Ukrainian and Georgian nations, Germans from the Black Sea and other non-Russian communities inhabiting the southern parts of the Soviet Union, have been condemned by the Communist decision-makers in Moscow to death by starvation.

As claimed by [Le] Matin, the Soviet government has been systematically organising (provoking) the famine so as to destroy the free movement of the nations oppressed by this government. In Ukraine alone, in this “granary of Europe,” millions of people have died, and the same fate awaits further millions. Entire villages have vanished, black flags flying on the roofs, a symbol that the inhabitants have died of starvation.

The border between Russia and Ukraine has been closed so that the starving cannot pass into Russian territories yet untouched by the famine. In the face of this terrible situation, the entire Ukrainian Catholic Episcopate in Galicia has been protesting against the destruction of the Ukrainian nation, calling, in a moving address, on the entire civilised world to come to help and march in protest.

Following that call, His Eminence Cardinal Innitzer 1 ThD. has spoken out in Vienna, calling for the establishment of a world-wide organisation for social aid that would be supranational and multi-faith in its character, aiming to rescue the millions of people threatened with death by starvation.

The utterly impoverished Ukrainian émigré circles in Germany are able to provide only limited financial help to the victims of the famine. Thus, they can only pray to the Almighty Creator. He could yet take pity on his nation and save those who are still alive from complete destruction.

The Ukrainian Ministry in Germany, with its headquarters in Berlin, calls on its faithful to [observe] the day of mourning, which will conclude with a mourning mass for the victims of famine and terror, taking place on 11 September (Monday).

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1 Theodor Innitzer (1875–1955), doctor of theology; from 1921 in the Prefecture of the Pontifical Household; in 1923 apostolic visitor to the Barnabite Order in Austria; in 1928–1929 Rector of the University in Vienna; in 1929–1930 Minister for Social Affairs of Austria; from 1932 Archbishop of Vienna, from 1923 Cardinal; initiated the action of informing the European countries about the famine in Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus (including the cases of cannibalism); from 1938 apostolic administrator of Burgenland.
at 6 (18 h.) in the afternoon in [Saint] Mary’s chapel, Falzburgerstrasse 18 February. The Ministry hereby takes the liberty of kindly inviting those of good birth to attend the mourning mass.

Peter Werhun,2 ThD., priest

TSDIAL, F. 358, Op. 3, Spr. 135, 3b, pp. 1–1v.
Copy, typescript.
Document in German.

2 Petro Werhun (1890–1957), Greek Catholic priest; from 1909 with the Austro-Hungarian army (89th Infantry Regiment); from 1918 in the UHA; after release from Polish prison, joined the RCS, and entered the UVO there; studied in Prague, Vienna and Berlin; in 1926 ordained priest, responsible for the Ukrainian Catholics in Berlin and Germany; from 1937 in the Prefecture of the Pontifical Household, from 23 November 1940 to June 1945 apostolic visitor to the Greek Catholics in the Third Reich; in May 1945 stayed in Berlin. Arrested on 11 June 1945 by the Soviet security organs, transported to Kiev; on 29 May–3 June 1946 tried by the VT of MVD of the Ukrainian MD, sentenced to 7 years in ITL, imprisoned in camps in Tayshet, Vorkuta, Inta, Irkutsk; died in a camp hospital in Krasnoyarsk; beatified in 2001.
No. 25
Before 29 October 1933, [no place given]. Announcement by the Committee for Aid to Ukraine, declaring 29 October as a day of Ukrainian national mourning

To
Ukrainian Citizens
of the district

The day of 29 October of this year is the day of national mourning. On that day, Ukrainian citizens will manifest their spiritual pain caused by the death from starvation of six million of [their] brothers in the Dnieper Region, and will protest against the affairs which were the cause of this situation.

On 29 October of this year, Ukrainian citizens will attend the commemorative service and will attend a Panakhyda for the Souls of the Victims of the Famine in Greater Ukraine. To express the compassion to our unfortunate *brothers, Ukrainian citizens have declared the day of 29 October of this year as a day of general fasting, and the money which would be spent on food on that day will voluntarily be given for those starving in the Dnieper Region.

On that day, Ukrainian citizens in villages and towns will meet in their communities and listen to addresses on the affairs in Greater Ukraine, and with relevant resolutions will protest against inhuman regime in Greater Ukraine.

We particularly request [...] the priests and intelligentsia to urgently proceed with the matter.

Ukrainian Civic District Committee for Aid to Ukraine:

Stetsiu Hryhory, PhD. v.r.
Father Kostiuk Vasyl v.r.
Father Haydukevich Ostap v.r.
Father Yaremak Vasyl v.r.
Deputy Yavorsky Oleksa v.r.
Farion Hryhory, PhD. v.r.
Kalba Jaroslav v.r.
Mostovy Oleksa v.r.
Hol Vasyl v.r.

Copy, typescript.
Document in Ukrainian.

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*a-a Text marked with a vertical line on the left margin.
*b-b Underlined by hand.
*c-c Filled in by hand under a Crossed out text: With the aim of carrying out those decrees, a committee should be immediately established in every part of our district which will make sure that the day of national mourning is properly observed.
No. 26
11 December 1933, Kharkiv. Extract from an annual report by the German Consul General in Kharkiv for the German Embassy in Moscow, regarding the general situation in the Ukrainian SSR

German Consulate General

Leitung der deutschen diplomatischen Vertretung in der Ukraine

L.dz. 312
Kharkiv, 11 December [19]33
3 copies

To the German Embassy in Moscow

Annual report
(General situation in Ukraine)

Agriculture

This year, Ukraine found itself amidst great famine, or – from the Soviet point of view – under the victory of the Communisation of agriculture. This famine has reached a particularly critical [point] with regard to the peasant population, and due to the significance of Ukrainian agriculture – equally for [the entire] Republic and the Soviet Union. It was about settling the issue of whether collectivisation, pursued since 1929, would finally bring about an improvement in the situation, ensuring, in the end, food supplies for the [entire] population, or whether the socialisation of agriculture, regardless of its fundamental importance and certain practical consequences, would break down due to the negative attitudes among the peasants. If the Soviet authorities, as they always do, answer the question affirmatively, it should be underlined that it has come with an extremely great sacrifice.

For people abroad it is often incomprehensible how a famine on such a scale was possible in Ukraine, with its fertile fields and no visible crop failures. It is the system that is responsible for that, carrying out the collectivisation too soon, too fast and with insufficient means, which has led to enormous chaos in agriculture.

At the same time, in parallel with other factors, they lost sight of what STALIN was talking about: “The people decide on the matter”; the matter of decisive importance – will the 22 million Ukrainian peasants join in and, instead of the rooted, individualist views, show the necessary understanding and will to work for the new Communist form of economy?

Years of collectivization have brought unsatisfactory results, and have given grounds for the assumption that socialisation should have been carried out gradually, so as not to pose a threat to food supplies for the entire population, and of the loss of that great value. For example, when the new [generation of] people educated in line with Marxist teaching came about, or when the visible material benefits and a sufficient amount of agricultural machines proved the advantages of the new, grand undertakings.
Each year, the same line was followed. The crops were not sufficient to meet both the needs of the state and the peasants. The state was to ensure food supplies for industrial workers, whose numbers were growing fast with the five-year plans, to the cities’ remaining inhabitants, and in the face of the tensions in the Far East, to the military, and moreover, to secure the grain for exports to provide hard currencies.

Against meagre opposition, each year the state took, in a most cruel way, more grain from the peasant than he was able to provide. Thus, the farmers did not have enough grain to provide for bread, fodder and sowing material; the sowing area was insufficiently used and sown. The countryside population attempted to save the meagre remains of the crops from requisition by the government organs, and was not interested in sowing more than was necessary and harvesting according to the plan. As a result, once again there were insufficient crops. The planned area of sowing was decreased, as was the amount of industrial plants, leading to growing poverty in both the individual farms as well as the kolkhozes; the latter did not develop as expected, although they did profit from certain benefits of priority. The organisation and contacts were insufficient, and the kolkhoz members could not adapt so promptly to the work model of “one for all.”

When the catastrophic situation became clear at the beginning of this year, and when a “downturn in Ukrainian agriculture” was visible, the most pressing, fundamental task for the government seemed to be making all possible efforts to feed the people left with no means in the countryside, first by releasing grain stocks. Should these prove insufficient, supplement them with purchases from abroad, regardless of the inescapable loss of hard currency, the possible depletion of military stock, and all other consequences; halting the collectivisation was itself effectively impossible, and in reality would be difficult to implement. Thus, the government gave up on the idea, and under the leadership of the party, taking full responsibility, preferred to continue down the same path.

The urgency of the situation was fully understood. The party and the government, whose main goal was the fulfilment of the five-year plan in heavy industry, took great efforts to lead agriculture out of the catastrophe; managerial level party members toured the country to see for themselves, in person, the overall state of affairs with the aim of taking appropriate steps.

According to the reasoning presented at the moment by the party, the most important issue in this struggle was the eradication of the kulak, White Army and nationalist elements which have penetrated the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, machine and tractor stations, the Academy of Agriculture, and the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, and which – allegedly – attempted, in collusion with foreign imperialists and capitalists, to bring down the socialist changes in agriculture in Ukraine. Such anxieties, even if in fact present, prove in any case how serious the anxieties were with regard to the current agricultural policy, collectivisation and its consequences in the entire country among the broad masses of society. Not only among the peasants, but also among the educated citizens, officials and in the party itself. Recent years have already shown that the people in the countryside, having no
organisations of their own, are too weak to actively oppose and are, in fact, oppressed and exhausted due to the repression and the deportations of the kulaks.

Through intensive work in the kolkhozes, attempts were made to first guarantee sowing and harvests, as well as to induce individual farms to work – if need be – with forced famine. In order to carry out all the tasks and worker’s inspection, over the past 10 months the party sent out 1340 of its members to take on managerial positions in the countryside. 640 current secretaries and raion chairmen were recalled from their positions, and a further 12,500 party members ordered to take posts in villages. The machine and tractor stations have worked with particular efficiency; with the farming machines at their disposal, not only do they facilitate, from the technical point of view, the cultivation of the fields and harvesting, but – through their polit[ical] offices – they carry out convincing propaganda in the spirit of party decrees. Applying force, they educate the peasants in the new form of economy and, as the supervising organ for the kolkhozes, they monitor the work and personal relations. 643 such polit[ical] offices and 203 polit[ical] offices with the sovkhozes have been filled with 3000 party functionaries.

Industrial workers are being sent to the countryside to repair farming machines. As for the work in the fields and harvesting, over many weeks inhabitants of the cities of all professions have been mobilised to help the peasantry, which has been weakened and suffered from the famine.

In accordance with the party decree, Ukraine received 555,000 tons of sowing seeds from the existing stocks of the [Soviet] Union, delivered to the kolkhozes and not the individual farms, and which are to be returned with an additional 10% in kind; on top of that, 15,000 new tractors, 2400 combine harvesters and 3000 trucks were also delivered.

The famine struck on top of the pressures which were exerted by the part[y] apparatus on the countryside population and the obligatory deliveries taking place in parallel to the harvests. The peasants came to understand that there was no hope of the government giving them support; thus it was achieved that, with their last strength, they went out into the fields, and worked and weeded them as much as was possible. If the peasants took some of the grain from the fields for themselves, they risked and suffered most severe punishment for stealing state property. No significant aid action was carried out in the countryside; without distinction and without mercy it was stated – those who work [...]a (18.5) in 1931, for the kolkhozes 11.86 (11.48), for the sovkhozes 2.13 (1.87) and for individual farms 3.14 (5.35). In total, 19.5 million hectares have been sown this year in the kolkhozes (spring and winter crops), as compared to 17 million in 1931.

For the first time, the khlebosdacha plan was entirely fulfilled by Ukraine before the deadline at the beginning of November. So far, there has been no data yet on the overall results and crops. Even if it shows average crops, Ukraine will join those oblasts, which have yielded best results. There are three reasons given for this: the aforementioned dynamic efforts undertaken by the party, which has

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a As in the original. A missing fragment.
given consideration to STALIN’s words: “The reasons behind difficulties with the khlebozagotovka are not to be found with the peasants, but among us because we have the power.” The next reason was that the peasants, due to this most cruel repression and hunger, have ceased to resist and have applied all their strength, summed up by POSTYSHEV in the following way: the Bolshevik leadership and the honest work of the kolkhozniks have won. Finally, the crops have been outstanding due to favourable weather everywhere this year; winter crops, compared to the previous years, did not suffer, with mild snowfall and quite low temperatures; the spring brought abundant rainfall, and the summer sufficient heat. The crops would have been even better if the severe khlebozagotovky had left the peasants with more sow[ing] seeds and if a larger area of fields had been sown and carefully worked. There was not a large enough workforce or draft power to harvest all the crops in time. The machine and tractor stations made their threshers available only for the grain delivered for the state. Thus, wanting to thresh the grain for their own needs, the peasants were left with traditional methods. The party deems it possible that “much of the crops were wasted.” It is difficult to state what percentage of crops were left in the fields and wasted; in some parts – it is claimed – it reached 25%.

The average productivity this year, according to the governmental data, has reached 12 hundred[weights] per hectare (1902: 9.1; 1910: 9.3; 1930: 10.5; 1932: 7 hundred[weights]), thus with the area sown amounting to 17.5 million hectares, the crop yield would reach 21 million tons (last year 11.2), which, compared to the crop amounts forecast for the entire [Soviet] Union at the level of 65 million tons, was surely overestimated, as was the data quoted by POSTYSHEV that the overall crops are nearly twice as high as last year. The best yields in Ukraine, and in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast, reached the level of 11 hundred[weights] per hectare; the sovkhozes, with nearly 3 million hectares of grain, have delivered 6 hundred[weights] [per hectare], as compared to 2.7 hundred[weights] [per hectare] last year.

Before more precise data is made available, it should be estimated that the average productivity reached a mere 7–8 hundred[weights] per hectare; the khlebozagotovka reached some 6 million tons, compared to 4 million tons last year, and the total crop yield reached 12–13 million tons.

[Peasants] have been particularly encouraged to work the fields by the fact that this year the khlebosdacha was not raised with a coefficient method, as well as the lawlessness of the organs [responsible for] khlebozagotovka, but that it was required to deliver a given amount (depending on the oblast, 3–4 hundred[weights] per hectare, and yedinolichniks 10–15% more) from the area sown in accordance with the plan’s obligations. The government has often underlined in [its] declarations that once those obligations are fulfilled in kind, and others as well,

1 Pavel Postyshev (1887–1939), from 1930 secretary of the CC of the VKP(b), in January 1933 sent by Stalin to the Ukrainian SSR, with unrestricted rights to act, nominated to the post of Secretary of the CC of the KP(b)U and in parallel, First Secretary of the Kharkiv and later Kiev Oblast Committees of the KP(b)U. Shot as an “enemy of the nation.”
the surplus will be distributed for personal use and free trade. How this will turn out with the end of *khlebozagotovka* is still impossible to state clearly because free trade has been banned, as speculation, until [state] seed stocks and other reserves are filled.

Free trade has only been allowed in a number of *oblasts* (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Vinnytsia, Chernihiv and in the Republic of Moldavia). However, in some places, *kolkhoz* members have already received large quantities of seed to be traded freely. For each *trudoden*, treated as a unit [of measurement], in the whole of Ukraine they will pay 4–6 kilo[grams] on average, from 3 to 4 times more than in the previous year; in the Kharkiv *oblast* 4.7 kilo[grams] – 3 times more than last year, in the *kolkhozes* [located] in other *oblasts*, initially the amount of 12–14 kilo[grams] was calculated, thus 8–10 times more than in the previous year.

In all regions it is being emphasised that as a result of this year’s efforts, there is a growing “prosperity” among the *kolkhoz* members, and the press published photographs of individual families and the sums earned by them in the *kolkhoz*.

Since the main efforts this year have been concentrated on the grain harvests, other crops have not yielded such good results. By 1 October, 75% of the planned hay has been collected, less than in the previous year, but this year’s plan [will be] fulfilled only by 100%. Of the field area designated for potato planting, 300,000 hectares still remained unplanted in mid-November; the plan of deliveries was fulfilled only up to 50%. The entire area planned for sunflowers was not planted and the plan surely remains unfulfilled. Soybeans have been planted on a mere half of the planned area, [that is on] 400,000 hectares. The area of sugar beets has decreased to 855,000 hectares. By the beginning of December – it is claimed – 98.1% of sugar beets have been harvested; however only 80% have been taken from the fields.

To sustain what has been achieved with such great effort and to ensure next year’s crops, the party has already been issuing detailed guidelines. Large *kolkhozes*, comprising up to 900 farms and 3,000 hectares, have been divided into smaller *kolkhozes* and the costs of management, making up to 30% of the *kolkhozniks’* income, are decreasing. The machine and tractor stations, serving up to 80,000 hectares, are to limit their scope to 25,000–30,000 hectares and 20–25 *kolkhozes*.

Presently, there are 4650 such stations in Ukraine, with 48,500 tractors, 4,200 combine harvesters, 30,000 threshers and 8000 trucks. A mere 60% of the tractors are used, as they need to be regularly and thoroughly repaired, the technical service personnel should be increased, and beyond that, [more] attention should be paid to the quality of the workers. Particular attention should be focused on fodder and caring for the horses, and the fight with weeded fields should be pursued more vigorously. The law defines work discipline as the decisive [factor], and therefore all means should be used to increase it; they say that in a *kolkhoz* with 750 members, each day 100 people would miss work.

The costs at which greater grain yields have been achieved are terrible. However highly one values “the victory over shortages in agriculture,” aiming to
provide food for the entire nation this year and to implement the system, if one looks from the perspective of humanity, they (that is, the costs — translator’s comment) can in no way justify what was achieved. The famine in Ukraine has cost the peasantry millions of lives. If one assumes that seven million (according to a friendly official source) is a number that is not overestimated, this means that one-fourth of the peasant population has been annihilated, a terrible number even compared to the losses in world war.

Those who remain alive, partly starved, were too weak to carry out the necessary hard work. There is a conviction among the countryside population that although the Soviet government did not initiate the hunger on purpose, it nevertheless used it as means to carry out its own plans to break the resistance towards the system and the aversion towards collective work. Officially, the famine has been eliminated everywhere. Even the most threatened regions did not receive any aid, and aid from abroad was deemed unnecessary. If anyone opposed, they suffered. The party bears responsibility. The internal political struggle, present during the grain campaign, shows how serious the situation was — when the better circles of the desperate masses looked for a way out of the poverty, out of the ever worsening standard of living and out of the errors of the system, this [very fact] was considered to be the principal reason [behind the difficulties].

The outcome of this struggle between the party and the people has once again shown the superiority of the party organisation, having the entire power of the state at its disposal. The millions of dead were not too high a price to finally introduce the Communist system. Even if the crops were 20% higher than last year, from now on that can hardly guarantee well-being, or even less a prosperous life for the people, particularly since the requirements of the state [as far] as the incomes from the crops [are concerned] are no lower.

Thus, even if one is not to expect any resistance on the part of the defeated peasants, if they have humbly adapted to the system and the kolkhozes are growing stronger due to the improved working methods and sufficient supply of machinery, there are still other threats, for example bad crops, which can change the entire situation. Already the forecasts regarding the yield of winter crops are unfavourable, due to light snowfall and low temperatures. At present, it can only be stated that the Ukrainian harvests are better than last year and the crops are average.

The supplies to the peasants have improved, at least insomuch that the kolkhozniks and yedinolichniks, with whatever area of fields at their disposal, directly participate in the income from the crops; there is some visible dynamism in the supply of agricultural products to the cities, even at high prices. Whether the crops suffice to continue providing food to the people, and how long will they last, depends on the amount of surplus, on how it will be used and also on whether it will be shared, by providing workforce among those masses of people who have a very small purchasing power, left on the verge of existence, as a result of fields and grain taken away, reducing the industrial output or other undertakings.

[...]
The internal political situation

The situation in Ukraine at the beginning of this year, the unsatisfactory results of last year’s grain-harvesting campaign, and the negative attitudes among the impoverished population have caused apprehension in the central organs in Moscow, placing responsibility for this crisis with “the insufficient Bolshevik vigilance” of the Ukrainian party organisation; therefore, with the aim of strengthening the party apparatus and sustaining the general Moscow line in Ukraine, POSTYSHEV was sent from Moscow to Kharkiv as secretary of the Ukrainian party committee.

At the same level as the secretary general of the Ukrainian party, KOSIOR, who has fallen onto the sidelines, and in cooperation with the always reliable commander of the GPU, BALYTSKY, whose achievements in disclosing anti-state manipulations were recently noted in the press, POSTYSHEV is beginning to act vigorously to bring order with a heavy hand in the cities and in the countryside, in the spirit of the party. Over this past year, he has become a central figure in the political, economic and cultural field, and has acquired such influence that, undeniably, he is the most powerful man, a trusted person for STALIN – a STALIN of Ukraine.

With his educating speeches, he comes to the fore everywhere. His opinion is considered on every issue [as] having the decisive influence: the initiative and decision-making are in his hands as regards party matters, guidelines for agriculture and industry, as well as the issues of changing the cities and making them more beautiful. Thanks to that, as well as the fact that, in various cases, he has contributed to the improvement of the standard of living in a dictatorial way, he has quickly become well-known. It is quite telling that rumours on the anniversary of the October Revolution claimed that the capital town of Kharkiv was to be renamed to “Postyshev.”

Objectively speaking, one has to admit that the presently celebrated “victory of socialisation in agriculture” is to a large extent seen as the achievement of POSTYSHEV and of his unfailing energy, so he can be satisfied with the achievements in agriculture this year. To that, he has not failed to point out to the significant help received from the Moscow party leadership in combating difficulties.

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2 Vsevolod Balytsky (1892–1937), from 1919 with the VCheKa; from November to December 1919 Chairman of the CheKa for the Volhynia gubernia, from December 1919 to 1920 Chairman of the CheKa in the Kiev gubernia; later VCheKa representative for right-bank Ukraine; from 1920 to 6 April 1921 Deputy Chairman of the Central Directorate of Extraordinary Commissions; from 6 April 1921 to March 1922 Deputy Chairman of the VCheKa; from July 1922 to 31 August 1923 Deputy Chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR; from 1 September 1923 to July 1931 Chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, and OGPU representative in the Ukrainian SSR; from 18 September 1923 to 10 August 1934 member of the OGPU Collegium; from March 1924 to November 1930 People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR; from 31 July 1931 to 10 July 1934 Deputy Chairman of the OGPU; from November 1932 to 20 February 1933 OGPU representative in Ukraine; from 21 February 1933 to 10 July 1934 OGPU representative in the Ukrainian SSR and Chairman of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR; from 15 July 1934 to 11 May 1937 People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR; from 11 May to 19 June 1937 Chief of the UNKVD in the Far Eastern krai. Arrested on 7 July 1937, sentenced to death in an extraordinary procedure on 27 November 1937 and shot on the same day in Moscow; never rehabilitated.
The next task of particular importance this year was that of combating Ukrainian nationalistic aspirations towards independence. During the times of the former People’s Commissar for Education, SKRYPNYK, the Ukrainian language was ever more wide-spread, especially as the official language in schools, in the press and arts; all the while it was held that Ukraine, as a republic in the union, has the constitutional right to sustain the growth of its native language and culture. The party leadership in Moscow and Kharkiv believed that there are justified fears that Ukrainisation will not stop at culture, but will foster the drive towards an even greater self-government or, further, to the separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union.

Having hunted down well-honoured Communist party [activist] SKRYPNYK, voluntarily parted with his own life in a most unceremonious way, the process of Ukrainisation was overturned on the grounds that with the popularisation of the Ukrainian language, Russian, as the language of a national minority in Ukraine, was supposedly being indecently marginalised. Thus, the Russian language is once again being propagated, and during the revolutionary ceremonies this year, the representatives of the Municipal Council and the All-Ukrainian Central Committee delivered their speeches in Russian.

All the clearer are the suggestions offered by the party and the government, especially the deliberations presented by KOSIOR and POSTYSHEV during the November congress of the Ukrainian party, that Ukrainisation with regard to language issues is supposedly an outpost of a wider drive towards separatism.

If SKRYPNYK, in the immediate aftermath of his death, was presented as a victim of the intrigues pursued by his counter-revolutionary, nationalistic circles, he is now described as the leader of the national movement, pointing to the fact that back in 1923 he allegedly spoke out against the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. SKRYPNYK and his supporters are accused particularly of pursuing a Galician–West-Ukrainian line, with the call for “as far from Moscow as possible”; the same aim was called for by a Ukrainian writer, KHVYLOVY. The majority of the nationalists came to Ukraine from Prague and Galicia; they included party members such as, for example, the first local deputy representative

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3 Mykola Skrypnyk (1872–1933), one of the organisers and leaders of the KP(b)U, from 1918 member of the CC, and from 1925 of the Politburo of the CC KP(b)U; one of the principal supporters of the policy of Ukrainisation and opposing Russian national chauvinism; in 1922–1927 People’s Commissar of Justice, and from 1925 Prosecutor General of the Ukrainian SSR, in 1927–1933 People’s Commissar for Education of the Ukrainian SSR; from February 1933 Deputy Chairman of the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR and Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the Ukrainian SSR; in June 1933 charged with “nationalist deviation”; committed suicide on 7 July.

4 Mykola Khvylovy, (born Nikolai Fitilov, 1893–1933), Ukrainian writer and literary critic, member of the KP(b)U, co-founder and leader of the literary group VAPLITE (Free Academy of Proletarian Literature); in 1928 founded the periodical Literatura i Mystietstvo; one of the main representatives of twentieth-century Ukrainian romanticism, author of the widely criticised novel Valdshepy (1927). Khvylovy advocated freeing Ukrainian literature from Russian cultural supremacy and struggling against local provincialism; committed suicide on 13 May 1933 in Kharkiv in protest against Stalinist terror in Ukraine.
of Narkomindel. The next aim of the nationalists, as they say, was the separation of Ukraine from the Soviet Union with help from Germany and Poland. There was allegedly an entire list of members of government for an independent Ukraine. This program was organised under the aegis of the so-called Ukrainian National Centre, headed by the form[er] chairman of the [Ukrainian] Central Council, Professor HRUSHEVSKY, as well as the counter-revolutionary, nationalistic organisation uncovered at the beginning of this year, managed from abroad by KONOVALOV and headed by MAKSIMOVICH, the former official with the Narkomindel, the former ambassador in Warsaw and Ukrainian People’s Com[missar] for Edu[cation] SHUMSKY, together with BELENKY, the Chief [of the editorial board] of the Ukrainian Soviet Encyclopedia.

Professor LOZINSKY was sent down for 10 years [in ITL] after he admitted to having been a member of an organisation which, together with Russian socialist revolutionaries, Georgian Mensheviks and Belarussian nationalists, aimed to overthrow the Soviet government. A member of this organisation, KOCORIZ, has

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3 Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934), renowned Ukrainian historian, archeologist, literature expert, sociologist, writer, supporter of Ukrainian science, social and political activist. In 1917, elected to chair the Ukrainian Central Council; became senior member of the VUAN (1923) and Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1929). As of December 1930, his theories came under strong attacks from the party centre at the VUAN. From March 1931 in Moscow. Arrested on 23 March 1931 by the GPU organs, charged with leading the Ukrainian National Centre. Following his release, he was not allowed to return to Ukraine. In October 1934 left for health treatment to Kislovodsk, where he died on 15 November 1934.

6 Aleksandr Shumsky (1890–1946), SR activist, later communist, in 1917 member of the Ukrainian Central Council; from the end of 1917, following a split with the SR group, active with the Bolsheviks in Kharkiv; co-founder of the Ukrainian Communist Party, from 1920 member of the VKP(b) and KP(b)U; in 1920 member of the Military Council with the 12th Army; from 1919 to 1927 People’s Commissar for Education of the Ukrainian SSR; accused of disseminating anti-Russian attitudes. In 1926, with a widespread campaign directed against him, admitted to “errors” during the June plenum of the KP(b)U, dismissed from the post of the People’s Commissar for Education and sent to Moscow, where he held a low post in the labour unions. Arrested on 13 May 1933 by officers of the Soviet security organs; upon the decision of the College of the OGPU of 5 September 1933, sentenced to 10 years in ITL, sent to Solovki; in 10 December 1935, with the decision of the Special College with the NKVD of the USSR, the sentence was changed to exile in Krasnoyarsk; released in 13 May 1943, remained in treatment in Krasnoyarsk and Yeniseysk, in July 1946 attempted to commit suicide; on 18 September 1946 murdered by the officers of the MGB of the USSR on the road from Saratov to Kiev.

7 Mykhailo Lozinsky (1880–1937), Ukrainian political and state activist, writer, lawyer by profession; member of the UNDO, in 1918–1919 member of the Ukrainian National Council of the ZUNR/UNR; from February 1919, headed the state secretariat for foreign affairs; in March 1919 headed the UNR delegation to Polish-Ukrainian talks, also a member of the Ukrainian delegation to the Paris peace conference. Later in exile, professor of international law at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague. Having returned to the Ukrainian SSR, headed the Faculty of Law at the Kharkiv Institute. Arrested on 22 March 1933; upon the decision of the court troika of the College of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR, sentenced on 23 September 1933 to 10 years in ITL; served the sentence in the Solovki camp. Upon the decision of the special troika of the UNKVD of the Leningrad Oblast, sentenced to death on 9 October 1937, shot at some point between 27 October and 4 November 1937 near Medvezhyegorsk; rehabilitated in 1959.

8 Mykhailo Kozoriz (1882–1937), scholar with the VUAN. Arrested on 14 February 1933 for membership of an illegal organisation, sentenced, on 1 October 1933, by the court troika of the College of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR to five years’ imprisonment. Served the sentence in the Solovki camp. Upon the decision of the special troika of the UNKVD of the Leningrad Oblast on 9 October 1937, sentenced to death, shot at some point between 27 October and 4 November 1937 near Medvezhyegorsk; rehabilitated in 1959.
allegedly testified that Germany, together with France and Poland, are participating in a campaign against the Soviet Union, and will in return receive from Poland the territories taken from the Germans and the corridor; Poland, for its part, once Soviet Ukraine is taken over, will receive a part of Lithuania and right-bank Ukraine as its sphere of influence with access to the Black Sea; Ukraine on the left bank of the Dnieper River will come under the influence of Germany, which will then be able to exploit the riches of the Donbas. The arrested Galicians are charged with membership of a secret branch of the UVO (Ukrainian Military Organisation), which has already recruited military staff and terrorist groups. The arrested Professor VASYLKYVSKY, under pressure from the GPU, confessed to having received 20,000 roubles from this organisation for acquiring dynamite, for which he was sentenced to 5 years [in ITL].

The head of the Ukrainian State Publishing House, OZERSKY, who while presiding over the Ukrainian General Directorate of Science had contacts with the German Scientific Society, was dismissed from the Collegium of the People’s Commissariat of Education and recently arrested for his alleged ties to the UVO.

Moreover, an organisation of Ukrainian left-wing, social revolutionaries has supposedly also been uncovered, with influence over the [editorial board of the] Chervony Shlakh weekly, the [People’s] Commissariat for Agriculture and other state institutions, as well as state-run Ukrainisation courses. A recently arrested party activist from Chernihiv has testified that he joined the party on the orders of the Polish Military Organisation with the aim of pursuing a propaganda campaign among the Polish population in Ukraine.

Professor YAVORSKY, a former Austrian soldier, professor of the Kharkiv Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and an alleged agent of Polish intelligence, was

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9 Ukrainian Military Organisation (UVO) – founded in 1920, mainly by the officers of the Sich Riflemen and the UHA (Ukrainian Galician Army); its aim was to fight for the Ukrainian nationality. The Chief Command of the UVO was headed by Yevhen Konovalets; the UVO organised a number of terrorist attacks in Poland, including an attempt on the life of Józef Piłsudski.

10 Yuriy Ozersky (1896–1937), chairman of the Ukrainian State Publishing House, lecturer at the Institute of National Education; upon the decision of the court troika of the College of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR sentenced on 26 February 1934 to 10 years of imprisonment. Served the sentence in the Solovki camp. Upon the decision of the special troika of the UNKVD of the Leningrad oblast on 9 October 1937, sentenced to death, and shot at some point between 27 October and 4 November 1937 near Medvezhyegorsk; rehabilitated in 1962.

11 Matvey Yavorsky (1884–1937), Ukrainian historian with a PhD in history. In August 1920, returned to Ukraine, lectured at the Institute of National Education and the Central Party School in Kharkiv, from December 1922 worked at the Ukrainian Institute of Marxism; in 1924 promoted to deputy head, and in 1926–1929 interim head of the Directorate of Scientific Institutions in Ukraine with the People’s Commissariat of Education of the Ukrainian SSR; from 1928 came under attack for “nationalist deviations”; the fight against Yavorsky’s legacy became one path to eradicating Ukrainian national historiography in the Ukrainian SSR. In June 1929 elected as a senior member of the VUAN. Arrested in Leningrad in 1931, sentenced by the Court College of the OGPU on 7 February 1932 to six years in ITL. Served the sentence in the Solovki camp, where, upon the decision of the special troika of the UNKVD of the Leningrad oblast, on 9 October 1937 was sentenced to death, shot at some point between 27 October and 4 November 1937 near Medvezhyegorsk; rehabilitated in 1964.
preparing the separation of Ukraine with the help of German and Polish fascist regimes, and was shot on the border with Finland during an attempted escape.

It is also claimed that the former Soviet Ambassador to Prague, KALUZHNYY, serving with the *Narkomindel* since 1921, was also shot, and that the two former secretaries to SKRYPNYK – ERSTENIUK and BADAN, considered to be the principal conspirators – to the contrary, are still alive.

The long-time director of the local Ukrainian theatre, KURBAS, had to resign due to nationalist tendencies; nevertheless, the theatre had to carry out its plan for staging plays. A few weeks back, a newly opened Russian drama theatre in Kharkiv, having no artistic achievements thus far, was praised in a special decree by the People’s Commissariat of Education and was given the task to become the model theatre for the whole of Ukraine.

All posts in the People’s Commissariat for Education were filled with Moscow’s trusted supporters, pursuing a severe policy of de-Ukrainisation and Russification. According to data from POSTYSHEV, in the course of this year, over 2000 people, under the scope of *Narkompros* alone over 300 scientists and writers, 1000 employees of cooperatives and organs of the state grain purchase, and over 200 state officials have been dismissed from their posts in eight central state institutions, accused of being nationalist White Army elements. Repression clearly continues. There are rumours that in recent days, the f[ormer] *Narkom* for Justice PORAYKO and the former Deputy [People’s] Commissar for Education,

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12 Mykola Ersteniuk (1892–1937), during WWI with the Austro-Hungarian Army, later in the UHA; assistant to the Secretary of the People’s Commissar for Education. Sentenced on 23 September 1933 by the court *troika* of the GPU College of the Ukrainian SSR to 10 years of imprisonment; served the sentence in the Solovki camp, where he was sentenced to death by the special *troika* of the UNKVD of the Leningrad *oblast* on 14 October 1937; shot sometime between 27 October and 4 November 1937 near Medvezhyegorsk; rehabilitated in 1989.

13 Oleksandr Badan-Yavorenko (1894–1937), history professor; sentenced on 23 September 1933 by the court *troika* of the GPU College of the Ukrainian SSR to 10 years of imprisonment; served the sentence in the Solovki camp, where he was sentenced to death by the special *troika* of the UNKVD of the Leningrad *oblast* on 9 October 1937, shot sometime between 27 October and 4 November 1937 near Medvezhyegorsk; rehabilitated in 1959.

14 Les (Oleksandr) Kurbas (1887–1937), Ukrainian, active in the theatre establishment, and also as a theatrical director. In 1911 studied at the Vienna School of Drama, later managed the Hutsul theatre “Verkhovyna”; in 1912–1914 was an actor with the “Ruska Besida” Society. From 1916 in Kiev, worked in the “Young Theatre” and the Kiev Drama Theatre; later left for Kharkiv, where he worked at the “Berezil” Theatre. From 1931 on, was attacked and accused of nationalist activities; in September 1933 refused to deliver self-criticism or condemn the line pursued by Khvylovy and Skrypnyk; On 5 October 1933 dismissed from the position of artistic director of the “Berezil” theatre. Arrested on 26 December 1933 in Moscow and sentenced by the court *troika* of the College of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR to five years in prison. Served in the sentence in the Solovki camp, where, upon the decision of the special *troika* of the UNKVD of the Leningrad *oblast* on 9 October 1937, he was sentenced to death, and shot at some point between 27 October and 4 November 1937 near Medvezhyegorsk; rehabilitated in 1957.

15 Vasyl Porayko (1888–1937), party and state activist, in 1920 member of the Galician organisational committee of the KP(b)U, the Kiev *Gubernia* Committee of the KP(b)U; in 1927–1930 Chief Prosecutor, People’s Commissar for Justice of the Ukrainian SSR; Deputy Chairman of the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR. Arrested on 13 August 1937, sentenced during an away session on 24 October 1937 by the College of the Supreme Court of the USSR to death, shot on 25 October 1937 in Kiev; rehabilitated in 1957.
later the [People’s] Commissar for Justice, PRIKHODKO, were arrested, the latter having served as chairman of the court which was responsible for the case against the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine.

The government probably preferred to avoid a widely expected show trial of Ukrainian nationalists, rendering the movement harmless by GPU administrative methods; it expected that a trial would disseminate knowledge of the existence of a widely active anti-Soviet national organisation three years after the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was eradicated, making an unfavourable impression with the public in the country and abroad. In relation to Germany’s alleged interventionist plans, it will thereby not contribute further to [instigating] further doubts as to the permanence of Soviet rule in Ukraine. Even without that, there are voices of surprise at the supposedly wide-spread discussion in the press of the independence movement, causing the rebirth of long-dead hopes of great freedom, especially in the countryside.

It is completely understandable that the purge within the party, which will probably be ended by mid-December, will be used to guarantee the present line. All the more so since it is believed that the Ukrainian party, which has grown from 231,360 members in 1929 to 550,433 at the beginning of this year, comprises many unneeded elements, particularly due to the mass recruitments carried out for political reasons. Up to now, out of 120,000 members, 27,500 have been expelled.

The Kharkiv party leadership, in a lengthy resolution on the 22nd of last month, presented its stance on the issue of Ukrainian national policy and declared, among others: the direction of the communist policy towards nationalities is laid down in the words of STALIN, that the revolution was not carried out under the banner of [mutual] national hostility, but under the call for workers and peasants to come together under the nationality of the Soviet Union, not in the name of nationalism but internationalism. The Bolshevik Ukrainisation should be directed against Great-Russian chauvinism, as well as Ukrainian nationalism. Great-Russian chauvinism has long been the main threat; this in no way stands counter to the fact that at the present time, in some of the republics of the Soviet Union, the main threat is posed by local Ukrainian nationalism joining in with imperialist intervention. The former and the latter are supported by every counter-revolution, as well as by the Trotskyites, united in their pursuit of separating Ukraine from the Soviet Union.

Everyone who tries to weaken the bonds between Ukraine and the Soviet Union, even to the smallest degree, “throws the Ukrainian nation to the Polish and German landlords and capitalists.” This most recent discovery, as can be seen, once again shifts the course significantly, by underlining the negative attitudes towards “Great-Russian chauvinism” and by ordering the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as far as possible, to be published in Ukrainian.

Thus the attitude of the Soviet Union towards Ukraine does not show unconditional consistency and trust, and the way in which the Soviet central organs treat the Ukrainian nation is not much different from that of the tsarist regime. The Union’s constitution and the Soviet principles promise a certain independence which this second largest republic of the Union, with a territory not much smaller
than that of Germany and a population nearly equal to that of Prussia [!], has used to only a small scale, and only in the area of culture. The decree on the country’s natural riches was quickly rejected; in what has so far been the most important industrial region of the Soviet Union, Donbas, the management of industry, as a matter of state importance, fell into the hands of Moscow from the very beginning, by which even more permanent ties are established through the construction of the new railways, direct telegraph connections, etc.; [through] drawing the Ukrainian peasants into [the system of] collectivisation, disregarding the particularities of the ownership relations in the country. A large part of the most important narkomats have gradually been changed into directorates of representatives of the union commissariats. The most important administrative posts are filled by Moscow or with her consent, so that Moscow holds all decision-making positions.

It is understandable that there are aspirations for independence directed against this subordination which grows with every year; thus their existence can not be neglected. However, apart from numerous, general statements made by the party leadership, there are no points of reference (as long as detailed materials are not released to the public) which would substantiate the claim of counter-revolutionary, separatist trends with far-reaching influence that could be treated seriously.

Ukrainian political leaders, such as SKRYPNYK and other persons from the top of the Ukrainian government, did not always approve of Moscow’s directives; they had particular objections to the agricultural policy and in their opinions, the unique conditions in the country demand a wider freedom of action. Nevertheless, they were all convinced and trustworthy Communists, and there is no way to [even] consider that they might have consciously pursued the idea of [Ukraine’s] separation from the Soviet Union.

Many of the people being persecuted at present in the area of spiritual life, among them Ukrainians – exiles from Polish Galicia, who for many years have already been playing a role in the cultural life of the country as ardent supporters of the party, – have sacrificed themselves, as far as can be seen so far, in good faith and dedication to the cause of supporting the native Ukrainian language and reinstating long forgotten cultural values into public consciousness.

Those circles have rejected the accusation of state treason through separatist aspirations, believing that their work in the area of culture is being persecuted by the party as “non-Bolshevik Ukrainisation,” and that the attack on them is [in fact] directed against the Ukrainian intelligentsia. If, according to the party definition, Ukrainian culture should be national in form and socialist in content, now, after it has been allowed to develop the national form for many years with no objections, clearly more importance is given to the content.

All these observations, made on the spot, allow one to see clearly the limited extent of expressions of national consciousness among the people, not to mention any serious movement towards [Ukraine’s] separation founded on nationalist reasoning; in turn, a strongly rooted, anti-Soviet and anti-Communist attitude is visible, especially among the peasants and the well-educated citizens, particularly over the past year, in relation to the famine in the country and revolt in Germany.
The enormous poverty in the aftermath of the first five-year plan, pursued [at the price of] such great sacrifice and [loss of] hope, certainly fostered deep dissatisfaction and disappointment among the entire population, while the new Germany, while in fact strongly distancing itself from the Marxist system, not only attracted envious looks, but also incited strong desires and wishes for the collapse of the system, as well as provoked hopes for a coup here as well.

Although separatist drives can exist anywhere, they result from the all-present dissatisfaction and disgust with the Soviet regime, and in consequence, they should be seen as a means to an end, and in the least, as resulting from a desire to unite with the remaining parts of the Ukrainian nation. The central party organs were surely well informed as to the dissatisfaction in Ukraine springing from the poverty this year, and in order to sustain the entire construction of the Soviet state, sought those responsible outside the system [itself]. Jewry particularly should have turned against the national and separatist movement, aiming to sustain itself, since it has a stronger representation in Ukraine, constituting 5.4% of the population (as compared to 80% of Ukrainians, 9.2% of Russians, 1.6% of Poles and 1.4% of Germans) than in other republics of the Union. They are hated and one finds them everywhere, holding influential posts. The unyielding fight against the separatist aspirations was a mere diversion, one not so much directed against the nationalist and the states which allegedly backed them, but against a perhaps anticipated strike at the system. Similarly, the kulaks, who in the past years have disappeared, were to be held accountable in order to hide the errors committed by the Soviet regime during collectivisation. The matter was presented in such a way that the Soviet Union was under threat from outside, and according to the needs, the Ukrainian national spirit was incited by recalling the earlier Polish rule and the period of German occupation, as well as by arguing that the country could be turned into a “colony” of other countries, only to later reject it [the feeling of national community], so that it would not become a threat to strengthening Soviet rule.

Under such circumstances, when the national question has come to the fore in the course of this year, clearly under the pressure [of the situation] with regard to higher politics rather than with any internal and real conviction, no clear line is to be expected, as is evident with the aforementioned decision by the Kharkiv party congress, nor any clear definition of national rights, or any further, practical implementation of Ukrainisation.

Moreover, if the decree assumes that steps are necessary to protect the Bolsheviks’ work among the German and Polish population in Ukraine against fascist elements, equally here the concern for the national minorities comes down to creating an internationalist, proletarian worldview in place of individual, national cultural life.

The national issue is of secondary importance for the party. The party now has only one goal – strengthening its rule – and to that aim, it [attempts to] give legal form to its role as the link between the various republics and nationalities. To that end, the party has taken a great step forward this year in Ukraine thanks to the efforts of POSTYSHEV and to a very costly, albeit only temporary, success in
overcoming the crisis in agriculture, and thanks to the shift and use [for its purposes] of the national question. However, Ukraine should note that it is turning ever more into an administrative unit of a uniform Soviet statehood, and after centuries of partitions between Russia and Poland, the Soviet regime is sparing no efforts to destroy the potential hopes for a sovereign national existence. Next year, it will fully share in the old and new worries for the [Soviet] Union, such as strengthening Soviet rule, fulfilling the plan, assuring food supplies for the people and raising the standard of living.

[...]

Translated from German: translator
SCHTIWELBAND

In conformity: Representative of Spec[ial] Division
(—) RYBAKOV

Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
No. 27
11 April 1934, Moscow. Extract of a report from an official trip to Soviet Ukraine by the Counsellor for Commerce with the Polish Embassy in Moscow

a Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Moscow

Report by Mr. Jan Łagoda\(^1\) from his official trip to Ukraine, which took place in the period between the 1st to 10th of this month

Destination and purpose of the trip
As the destination of the trip, the regions that run along the railway from Kiev to Korosten have been chosen, and then further on to Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, Koziatyn, Uman; that is, those administrative regions which, according to numerous data and reports, suffered from the famine in the winter of 1933/[19]34, and in which the terrible famine of the previous year has brought significant losses of population and livestock. In essence, the aim is to verify on the spot the situation as regards supplies to the people, the state of supply stocks before the harvests, the condition as far as livestock is concerned, the scale of the work in the fields, the state of the sowing and the perspectives for the crops in 1934.

General impression
Aiming for direct contact with the people travelling on trains, I made the journey from Kiev to Uman, via Korosten, Berdychiv, Koziatyn, on a third-class car, which was overcrowded to the utmost degree. I consider this mode of transport, although extremely burdensome, to be necessary, since there is no other way of getting in direct contact with the common people of the countryside. Travelling on comfort cars and sleeping cars does not yield the desired results, regarding making observations, since it is almost exclusively state and party dignitaries, as well as OGPU members, who travel on those cars. As an additional comment, it should be noted that on Ukrainian trains, among the passengers travelling in “soft” and sleeping cars, a large percentage of them are representatives of national minorities.

One may also point out that in those cars one does not typically hear the Ukrainian language; in the third-class cars, the so-called ‘hard’ ones, the Ukrainian language is heard only from time to time.

[...]

\(^1\) Jan Łagoda (born 1886), contract employee with the MFA; from 16 January 1933 to 1937 Deputy Counselor for Commerce with the Polish Representation in Moscow.
Supplies

The supplies for the population of the cities in Korosten, Zhytomyr, Koziatyn and Uman are very insufficient, the free market is poorly supplied, potatoes are sold in small amounts by the piece, as are of beetroots and carrots. I have seen potatoes no larger than a walnut in the market. There is no bread available in free trade, as the state-run commercial stores are the only source of bread supplies. The supplies in the market in Uman are particularly poor. When I was there, in a large market square there were at least 2000 persons walking around for no real reason, as I did not see them buy or sell anything. There are almost no products in the market. Some tree branches were being sold, some coal wood, a few sacks of barley, a small sack of wheat flour, a few bottles of oil. The prices are very high: for example, potatoes are sold for 25 rb. for a pood, barley for 45 rb.; there is almost no fodder. The cost of feeding a cow in Zhytomyr comes to 20–25 rb. per day, the milk is sold at 3 rb. per litre, hence only a really good cow would justify the cost of feeding it. The supplies of fodder to the market have decreased abruptly with the beginning of the field work. The state-run stores have all recently been changed into univermags, with the shelves all empty. Formally, the authorities' decree on raising the state commerce to a higher level has been fulfilled. Instead of impoverished stores, there are equally impoverished univermags. In essence nothing has changed.

The supplies to the countryside are much worse. The people say that there is almost no bread in the rural areas at all, the salaries in the farming collectives were low, not more than 3kg of grain per day. In a normal state of health, one can work 200 days in the collective and receive 600 kg of grain. This is much more than is needed to feed a working person, yet if one considers the need to support a family, supplying it with even the worst of clothes, shoes, the purchase of wood, kerosene and all the other most basic products, it becomes clear that the countryside population is forced to starve. Those regions with a sugar plant are in the most difficult situation, since the people are forced to plant beets in order to supply the sugar factory, while the prices for delivered beets are very low, and they take a long time to settle accounts. As a result, the people view the sugar plant as a true plague which deprives them of the best plots and forces them to work for a loss.

I observed that in the regions I have visited, the villagers are starving. Clearly hungry people are to be found in large numbers; at train stations there are many abandoned children who feed on whatever they can. Not only the eyes of starving children, but also those of the adults are set on those who are having a meal. I counted 23 abandoned children, aged between 5 and 12, at the Uman [train] station.

To buy bread over the past year, the people have gotten rid all their assets. Presently, the commercial, state-run stores in Kiev, Zhytomyr, and from 1 April in Uman, are the only source of bread. In the cities mentioned above, against Moscow’s practice, a single person can purchase more than 1 kg of bread and, in Uman, for example, even an entire loaf. The lines waiting in front of the stores are enormous. There is even an entire group of traders who deal solely with buying and reselling bread. On the trains, [there are] many people carrying sacks with
bread. In those cities which have commercial stores, it is difficult to get on a third-class car due to the huge mass of people with sacks.

At the present time, with the sale of bread that began in Uman, the crowds have decreased. Before now, the bread had to be bought in Kiev, and a year ago, people would even travel to Leningrad, where in the workers’ districts, they would buy bread rations. The people would also travel to the Northern Caucasus, and even to Baku, to get corn flour. In most cases, trading of bread is carried out by specialised traders who spend the time on trains, at the stations and in the markets. Those new Soviet merchants have a portly physique and are acquainted with the conditions in far-away markets, prices, transporting conditions, ways of paying bribes to the authorities, mainly the railway authorities for a proper treatment on the car, assistance with loading the grain, a place on the bench to sleep, and other privileges which are very important on a long journey. There are instances in which a single peasant brings up to 10 poods of corn flour. Such a journey usually lasts two weeks. The trade is extremely profitable. Usually, the traders make the following calculation: half of the flour is left to feed their own family, and the other half is sold at a profit of 100% with regard to the travelling costs and the value of the entire load of flour. So far, the commercial operations mentioned above have been bringing such profits.

Conclusions

As a result of those observations, I can state that the hunger in the regions in right-bank Ukraine exists on a wide scale. Its intensity increases before the harvests, but it is much less severe than last year, when the authorities could not keep up with burying the dead bodies; the physical state of the people is very weak. Due to that, there has been an epidemic of pernicious influenza which, as was the case in 1918 in the West, is extremely dangerous. A great many people have been dying from influenza. The events of last year’s famine have not disappeared from people’s memories – in the train cars they only talk of the famine. The women are more resistant than men, hence the shortage of men is seen everywhere. One of the traders present on the car bragged about how during the famine, he could bury up to 50 corpses a day. They also talk about cases of cannibalism which took place last year. They are also happening this year. A month ago in some village, a mother killed her two sons and ate them. With a court verdict, she was sentenced to death by poison injection. In the opinion of the Ukrainian population, during last year’s famine at least half of the people died. At present, the population has recovered to some extent due to the emigrants from central Russia. Presently, Belarusians from the Mazyr Region are resettling in Ukraine, populating the free lands. The state authorities support this migration, offering moral and material assistance to the emigrants and allowing them to sign

\[\text{\textsuperscript{b}}\text{\textsuperscript{-b}}\text{ As in the original.}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{c}}\text{\textsuperscript{-c}}\text{ Filled in by hand above an illegible, Crossed out word.}\]
up with the collectives. In the regions I visited, this year the fields will be sown, although with some delay. It is too early to talk about the results of this year’s sowing campaign, but the forecasts so far are positive.

clerk Jan Łagoda

AAN, MSZ, 9513, pp. 200–201, 207–211.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
...Russia has presently decided to strike its final blow: to destroy the Ukrainian nation with hunger.

During the famine of 1922, foreign aid committees would often be surprised that the Bolshevik authorities would rarely, if at all, mention the Ukrainian regions struck by the famine... The same is happening this year, only on a much wider scale. It is estimated that in 1933, 6,000,000 Ukrainians died of starvation, and if no one comes to the rescue, 6,000,000 more may die during the winter. This might be so because, despite the unusually good crops this year, a small area has been sown due to shortages of seeds.

The hunger is so terrible that cannibalism has been widespread. Parents eat their children and bury only the bones of the dead. For example, in the village of Zalyvan, out of 3500 inhabitants, 200 persons have already died. In Zachansk, out of 1500 persons, 700 have died. In Samhorodek, out of 3000, 800 persons have died. Those villages are located in the Kalynivsky and Koziatynsky raions.

Ukrainian [parliamentary] deputies from Galicia attempted to raise this issue during the last session of the League of Nations. The League undertook to consider the case, [but] in the process, during a separate meeting, transferred it to the International Red Cross, with which the matter ended.

The Soviet government is utterly passive on the issue of undertaking any steps to bring aid. To the contrary, it cynically denies the facts, thus preventing possible aid from the international humanitarian circles.

[...]  

[Yevhen Lakhovich¹]

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¹ Yevhen Lakhovich (Dmytro Dolovchuk?), (1900–1976); engineer, OUN member; in the 1930s the PUN’s representative in Great Britain; from 1936, temporary representative of the PUN in the USA, Konovalets’ emissary to the ODVU.
No. 29
20 August 1934, Moscow. Communiqué from the Agriculture Attaché of the German Embassy in Moscow, regarding the situation of food provisions in the Soviet Union

Translation from German

Food supply situation in the Soviet Union

As was already stated in the previous report, the mortality rate that was observed in 1932 due to hunger has decreased this year, although the food supplies are extremely poor.

In many oblasts, a large part of the population was again starving this year. In many villages there has been no grain since spring. Again surrogate bread could be found. The situation with food supplies in the central Russian oblasts, Moscow and the central Chernozem oblasts is particularly bad, worse than in the previous year.

Hunger has also struck the great oblasts of Ukraine and in the Volga [River] regions. In the German villages of the Volga [River] regions, the food supply situation is also extremely severe. However, cases of death from starvation were very rare.

The Germans of the Volga regions do not expect any significant improvement after the next harvests; there are, however, no anxieties about mass deaths from starvation occurring again.

In the autonomous oblasts of the the Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia, the situation regarding food supplies has in recent years been far better than in the oblasts of southern Russia. Nevertheless, the wave of hunger reached the Northern Caucasus in 1933 and took its toll on the population. In Vladikavkaz, many people who were resettled there have died. Yet overall, in those oblasts, the number of deaths from starvation was far smaller than in other places in the Nor[thern] Caucasus because the entire struggle concerned grain, while here it is corn that is primarily planted.

In the Cherkess Republic, entire grain crops have been take away, and only corn was left for the people.

This year, the situation of food supplies in the autonomous republics is more or less normal. In the southern parts of the Stalingrad oblast, there are still grain stocks from the previous year in many of the kolkhozes, allowing them to survive until the next year.

Generally, there are still places in the Soviet Union where the people have entered into the spring season with the same limited food stocks as in the hungry
year of 1933. The difference comes down to the fact that, first of all, the stocks collected by the remaining part of the population were far greater, and second, the state itself had greater stocks at its disposal.

The starving population found significant relief with the introduction of commercial bread sales. Long queues lined up in front of the stores selling bread. The prices of commercial bread were the same everywhere: dark bread – 1.50 [roubles], regular – 2 r[oubles] and white 3 roub[les]. In the southern and south-eastern oblasts, commercial bread was sold only in large cities. The sale of commercial bread in small towns was either not introduced or quickly stopped due to shortages in stocks. In those oblasts where, due to bad crops, the market trade was weak, for example in the Transvolga Region, the people living in the countryside would undertake long journeys to buy bread. The Germans from Markstadt in the regions of the Volga River were forced to travel all the way to Saratov to get bread. In those oblasts which had good crops last year, for example in the southern part of the Stalingrad oblast, the market sale complemented the commercial trade. Many of the kolkhozes and yedinolichniks sold their grain surpluses in small bazaars. Compared to the previous year, the prices were relatively low, for exam[ple] in Kotelnikovo (south of Stalingrad), rye flour was sold at 15–20 roub[les] for a pood, and recently it started to be sold at 35–40 roub[les]. In the autonomous oblasts of the Nor[thern] Caucasus, which always had lower prices, particularly for corn, flour was relatively inexpensive – corn flour 10–15 roub[les], wheat 50 r[oubles] for a pood. The average prices of flour this year have been as follows: rye flour 35–40 roub[les] and wheat 60–70 roub[les] for a pood, while last year a pood of wheat flour would cost more than 100 roubles, and in some places even up to 250 roub[les].

In one of the government’s decisions, taken with the desire to justify the increase in bread prices, it was stated that all prices will be higher on the free market. In reality, in many local markets in the oblasts [which] we have already visited, there has been no increase in prices. At the beginning of July, due to the commencement of the harvests, free trade of grain and flour in the markets was forbidden.

If the famine in the Soviet Union has not taken such a catastrophic form this year as in 1933, it is not only due to the development of the commercial and market trade in bread and grain, but also for a different reason, one presented in [my] answer dated 28 April 1934. At this time last year, the victims of hunger were counted by the millions; this year they are counted by the thousands. This year, during my three trips through the oblasts of the European [part of] Russia, I was not able to see a single case of swelling from starvation, and not a single dead body of a person who died from hunger; while last year, in some places one could find more people swollen [from starvation] than healthy.

The present year has proven that particular conditions are necessary in this country to take it from a [state of] usual hunger [before the harvests] to mass deaths.
Even in the case of bad crops, to reach that state, a particularly severe directive would be required from the Soviet institutions which have the capabilities to prevent such atrocities with relatively small means. If it should not be assumed that the government incited the famine intentionally, in any case, it can be claimed that consciously or by disregarding the consequences, it did not undertake all the steps that it could have done to prevent the mass deaths.

The belligerent attitude that the government showed in 1933 has disappeared this year. A victory has been gained by the government, the peasant brought to his knees. And already this year, an example can be given that in all the oblasts in need, the government is offering assistance, giving corn, millet, peas, etc. to the kolkhozes. Thus, on top of the support that the people have received with commercial sales, they have also direct (although not individual) assistance from the government. The deaths from starvation occurring in 1933, which are questioned only by the official organs, have been impressed into the consciousness of the people as a one-time incident.

The crops in 1934 are not so bad as to expect the catastrophe of 1933 to be repeated, yet the geographic distribution of the crops is not favourable. Over almost the whole of Ukraine and in some regions of Russia, the crops are so bad that after the khlebosdacha, the people will not have enough grain to sustain them at the bare minimum. The permanent system of a strict quota per hectare does not allow for balancing [the shortages] at the moment of khlebosdacha. Thus, the oblasts that have had bad crops are entirely at the mercy of the government.

In the previous year, the Soviet government increased the state grain stocks. It should be expected that in the coming year, it will have great stocks at its disposal. This means that the sale of commercial bread will reach even greater quantities throughout the next year, and that, as was the case this year, the individual kolkhozes in need [of assistance] will receive grain credits. Those starving cannot [however] count on individual assistance. This year, there are so many oblasts with bad crops that next year, one should also expect – especially in Ukraine – hunger, but on a normal scale. Not only the yedinolichniks, but also the kolkhozniks in those oblasts who do not have a cow or have to support a family will suffer many hardships. Those German settlers in Ukraine and the Volga Region who have suffered from bad crops and have no stocks from the previous year will also share the fate of those starving. But even if in individual oblasts of the Soviet Union there will be hunger next year, and maybe even deaths from starvation which, in Ukraine, might be on a larger scale than in 1934, after the experiences of this year, one need not expect that a catastrophe of such magnitude as in [19]33 should happen again in [19]35.
Moscow, 20 August [19]34  
Signed SCHILLER

*Translated from German: translator* KIGLER

In conformity:
Chief of the 3rd Department of Special Division UNKVD
Lieutenant of State Security
(—) SHNAYDER¹

Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

¹ Abram Shnayer (1899–1942), from 1922 with the GPU, serving in Zinovievsk, Mykolaiv, Tiraspol, Mohyliv Podilskyi, Melitopol; from 5 April 1931 representative of the 4th Department of the UGB NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, from 1 December 1935 Chief of the 4th Department of the UGB NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Chief of the 4th Department of the Secret Political Division of UNKVD in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast; from 8 July 1938 to 13 June 1942 was the Chief of the 8th Department 4th Division of UGB NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, Chief of the 1st Department 3 Division, and Deputy Chief of the 3rd Division of UNKVD for the Kharkiv oblast respectively.
Soviet propaganda in cinemas

Over the past months, the diplomatic representatives of the Soviet Union have carried out a screening of Soviet film[s] which quite openly transmit Bolshevik propaganda in a number of [regional] capitals, whereas the reality in the Soviet Union differs drastically from the depicted propaganda. For example, the Soviet Embassies in London, Bucharest, and even Berlin sent out invitations for receptions, during which, among others, the following films were shown:

1. “New Gulliver”
2. “Friends”
3. “Good crops”
4. “Air maneuvers near Kiev”
5. “Happy youth.”

The Soviet representations intend for those films, with subtitles in local languages, to be distributed, and thus to pursue intensive Bolshevik propaganda.

[...]

With the aim of allowing manifestations against this propaganda, we hereby present a brief overview of five of the aforementioned film[s], as well as materials [useful] for countering the presented propaganda.

[...]

III. “Good crops”

Thousands of copies of this film have been sent abroad. It is screened in every place where the truth about the famine of the years 1932/[19]33 and the later period was the achievement of [the policy of] openness. It was especially produced with the intention of countering the educational work of the anti-Comintern and other institutions. The film shows a place in the lower Dnieper Region (that is, precisely the region where the famine was particularly severe). There is a large kolkhoz, enormous herds of pigs and horned cattle, joyous peasants at work and nutritious meals. Enormous harvesters gather crops from the fields very quickly. Grain elevators seem as if they were mountains or skyscrapers. Next, the great “Dnieproges” dam is shown, and finally a “spa for peasants;” earlier [there was] „a palace of a certain landlord.”

a- -a Stamped.
The propaganda present in this film needs to be countered with the fact that in the kolkhoz which was shown, individual cases have cleverly been selected, that most of the collectives are far behind the old individual farms as far as profitability is concerned, that the forced collectivisation has been carried out by driving millions of inhabitants of the rural areas out from their own homes and deporting them to labour camps, and, most of all, by the fact of the disastrous famine of the years 1932/[19]33 and the period that followed. Those disasters, which show not only the inability of the Soviet government to resolve the problem of supplies to the people, but also the uniquely evil intention of eradicating certain groups of people (“organised famine”), are historical facts, whose details are revealed today by credible witnesses. The numbers [given by the] Archbishop of Canterbury (“6 million rather than 3 million victims of 1932/[19]33”) and the data [provided by] Dr. AMMENDE, in his work on the famine in Russia (“Must Russia starve?”, Vienna, 1935) are indisputable. Moreover, it is essential to emphasise that considering the state of the Soviet food supply sector, a return of hunger is to be expected.

As for the “Dnieproges” and the “spa for peasants,” it should be noted that near the dam on the Dnieper River, the workers live in terrible pit-houses (Izvestiya from 23 August [19]35), that the spa is a “Potemkin decoration,” and that it is not likely that in the entire Soviet Union, there is another one like it.

[...]

Translated from German: translator KIGLER

In conformity:
Ch[ief] of 1st Dept. of 3rd Division UGB
Lieutenant of State Security
(—) SHNAYDER

HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 161, T. 14, pp. 40–45.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

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b *Was:* AMMENDES.

Wassily Ammende (1892–1936), PhD., an Estonian German, co-founder of the Association of German Minorities Abroad; co-founder and, between 1925–1936, the Secretary General of the European Congress of National Minorities; author of *Human Life in Russia, Muss Russland hungern? Menschen und Völkerschicksale in der Sowjetunion*; defender of rights of national minorities in the League of Nations. He believed that states should treat minorities with due respect, in accordance with international law, while the minorities should be loyal and respect the state and not be a source of irredentism. He publicised the issue of the famine in the USSR in the 1920s and 1930s; believed that Moscow exploited the national minorities in the neighbouring countries to destabilise the situation in those countries; died in China.
CHAPTER II

The Great Terror: The “Polish operation” 1937–1938
INTRODUCTION

In the second half of the 1930s, the Great Terror was raging in the Soviet Union, claiming countless human lives in the process. The wave of repression initiated and directed by Joseph Stalin hit not only the so-called “counter-revolutionaries” or “anti-Soviet elements,” but also members of the Communist party, the security apparatus and, finally, the national minorities who lived in the land of the Soviets. Stalin has lashed out with particular anger against the Poles residing on the territories of Belorussia, Ukraine, and in numerous cities in Russia as well as Siberia. As a result of this wave of persecution, more than a hundred thousand people of Polish nationality lost their lives.

The victims of this atrocity were recently commemorated by the Polish parliament in the Resolution dated 14 July 2009, which stated inter alia that “The Sejm of the Republic of Poland hereby wishes to honour the memory of 150,000 Poles murdered by the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) in the years 1937–1939 in the course of the so-called ‘Polish operation’ during the times of the Great Terror.” In the same Resolution, the deputies also expressed their gratitude towards the activists of the Russian association “Memorial,” who managed to unearth many important documents hidden away in the Russian archives, including the instructions of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Yezhov, to commence an operation directed against the Polish Military Organisation (POW); as well as towards the researchers from Russia and Ukraine “who uphold the memory of the genocide perpetuated against our innocent fellow countrymen.”

The term “genocide” as used by the members of the Polish parliament still remains open for debate. A slightly different term (“mini genocide”) was used by the British historian Simon Sebag-Montefiore. Another British researcher, Prof. Michael Ellman from the University of Amsterdam, believes that, much like the Great Famine, the “Polish operation,” together with the terror directed against the Eastern Orthodox Church and other Churches, does carry some of the hallmarks of genocide, in accordance with the 1948 UN convention. With respect to the “Polish operation,” however, he points to at least three factors which make it impossible to apply the term “genocide” in its full extent. First and foremost, he cites the fact that command no. 00485 issued by Yezhov was not directed against all Poles, but only against the so-called “members of the Polish Military Organisation (POW)” as well as other specific groups of this nationality.

In practice, however, the manner in which the said command was executed was a different matter altogether. Since no actual members of the POW could be

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2 S. Sebag-Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (New York, 2005), 204.
found, the NKVD’s functionaries interpreted the said command in accordance with the ethnic origin of Soviet citizens. Secondly, according to Ellman, only 22% of all Poles in the Soviet Union were subjected to persecution (148,000 were arrested, of whom 140,000 were sentenced as of 1 July 1938). This, however, is not a sufficient argument against treating the “Polish operation” as genocide, since Article II of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide dated 9 December 1948 states that genocide may be directed not just against an entire ethnic group, but also a part thereof. In the latter of those cases, an interpretation of those events which points towards genocide would therefore be justified. The third factor, according to Ellman, is that one-third of all those sentenced were not in fact Poles.³

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There is a wealth of literature covering the subject of the Great Terror.⁴ One needs to bear in mind that even in the 1930s, Western democracies had no knowledge of the scale of the purges which took place in the USSR, or the existence of the Gulag. Following the end of World War II, even as statements made by former Gulag prisoners and those who fled the USSR began to circulate, these issues were still not brought to light. The reason for that was that it would be difficult to admit to the public that in order to defeat the Third Reich, the Western democracies had allied themselves with a country whose system of government was equally ruthless; to admit that the price for the freedom of the West was their de facto consent to the occupation of Central Europe by the Soviets and the implementation of a totalitarian regime there would have felt even less comfortable. The situation changed together with the escalation of the Cold War, while the discussion on the scale of Stalinist atrocities itself began following Khrushchev’s “secret speech” during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, which mentioned the purges and confirmed the existence of a well-established network of prison camps in the USSR.⁵

The breakthrough moment in this discussion is considered to be the publication of *The Great Terror*⁶ by Robert Conquest. It was this publication, along with *The Gulag Archipelago, 1918–1956*⁷ by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, published in the West in 1974, which have provided evidence that the terror itself, as well as its structure

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⁵ V. Rogovin, 1937, *Stalin’s Year of Terror* (Oak Park, 1998), XI–XIII.
and the scale of the accompanying genocide, were no coincidence in the Stalinist era of the USSR’s history. The issue of Stalinism has assumed particular importance in the works of Adam Ulam,8 Robert Tucker,9 Roy Medvedev10 and Isaac Deutscher.11

Nevertheless, even up until the 1980s, some western historians refused to accept the scale of the atrocities wrought, stating that the issue of Soviet terror was exaggerated by politicians and historians. Researchers such as Arch Getty, Gabor Rittenshporn and Robert Thurston have denied the generally accepted proposition that the persecution which has taken place was inspired by the Soviet authorities. They believed that Stalin himself became a hostage to the reign of terror, which spun out of control of the central government.12

In 1989, a periodical called “Izvestiya CK KPSS” began to appear in the USSR, containing previously unavailable documents. These documents have confirmed the assumption that it was Stalin and the highest Party authorities of the Soviet Union who personally guided the campaign of repression. The main centre of power in which plans for the extermination of specific ethnic groups were drawn up was the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Central Committee (CK VKP(b)). Another publication which was of great importance in the process of demonstrating the inspirational role of Stalin and the Politburo was Реабилитация (edited by Aleksandr Yakovlev).13 This work, as well as many others14 based on declassified documents from Soviet archives, has confirmed that the initiators of the 1937–1938 Terror devised the techniques for the upcoming operations themselves, taking the decisions on the categories of all those who were to fall victim to the purge. Research conducted by Dmitry Volkogonov,15 Aleksandr Yakovlev,16 Oleg Khlevniuk,17 Anne Applebaum,18 Vladimir Khaustov and Leonard

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10 See P. Такер, Сталин у власти 1928–1941. История и личность (New York, 1974); idem, О Сталине и сталинизме (Moscow, 1990).
14 See e.g. Лубянка. Сталин и Главное управление госбезопасности НКВД 1937–1938, Архив Сталина. Документы высших органов партийной и государственной власти. 1937–1938, А. Н. Яковлев (ed.) (Moscow, 2004).
15 Д. Волкогонов, Триумф и трагедия. Политический портрет И. В. Сталина, vol. 1–2 (Moscow, 1989).
16 See A. Яковлев, Горькая чаша. Большевизм и Реформация России (Yaroslavl, 1994); idem, По мощам и елей (Moscow, 1995); idem, Сумерки (Moscow, 2003).
17 See О. Хлевнюк, 1937-й: Сталин, НКВД и советское общество (Moscow, 1992); idem, Политбюро. Механизмы политической власти в 1930-е годы (Moscow, 1996); idem, Большой террор 1937–1938 гг. как проблема научной историографии, in Историческая наука и образование на рубеже веков (Moscow, 2004); idem, Сталин и утверждение сталинской диктатуры (Moscow, 2010).
Samuelson, Nicolas Werth, and Hiroaki Kuromiya has provided ample evidence to back up these propositions.

In Ukraine, the first monograph dedicated to the issue of mass repression in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, based on hitherto unpublished documents, was published in 1990. Among the researchers dealing with these issues should be mentioned Viktor Danylenko, Georgy Kasyanov, Stanislav Kulchytsky and Yuriy Shapoval. The topic of the Great Terror was also considered by Viktor Chentsov, Dmytro Arkhireysky, Oleg Bazhan, Leonid Mitsinkevich, Valery Vasylyev and others.

A work of paramount importance, containing a comprehensive analysis of the issue, is the monograph Політичний терор і тероризм в Україні. XIX–XX ст. Історичні нариси, edited by Valery Smoliy. In this publication, the researchers have gone to great lengths to prepare an analysis of the phenomena of terror and terrorism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with special emphasis placed on the events which took place between 1937 and 1938 in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. The issue of mass terror in both the USSR and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic features prominently in the works of Serhiy Bilokin.

Although they do not deal directly with the period of the ‘Yezhovshchina’, Політичні репресії в радянській Україні в 20-ті роки, a monograph by Viktor Chentsov, and За повідомленнями радянських спецслужб, by Roman Podkur are works which make it possible to understand the causes and the subsequent

19 В. Хаустов, Л. Самуэльсон, Сталин, НКВД и репрессии 1936–1938 (Moscow, 2009).
22 See Ю. Шаповал, У ті трагічні роки. Сталінізм на Україні (Кiev, 1990).
23 See В. Даниленко, Г. Касьянов, С. Кульчицький, Сталинізм на Україні: 20–30-ті роки (Кiev, 1990); С. Кульчицький, Україна між двома війнами (1921–1939 рр.) (Кiev, 1999); Ю. Шаповал, Україна 20–50-х років: сторінки ненаписаної історії (Кiev, 1993); idem, Людина і система. Штрихи до портрета тоталітарної доби в Україні (Кiev, 1994); idem, Сталинський терор у світлі нововиявлених архівних документів Служби безпеки України, в Українське архівознавство: історія, сучасний стан та перспективи (Кiev, 1997), part 2, 49–56; idem, Україна як об’єкт політичного терору, 20–і – початок 50-х років, в Тоталітарна держава і політичні репресії в Україні у 20–80-ті роки (Кiev, 1998); idem, Більшовицька політична поліція в Україні: етапи становлення та дії щодо української інтелігенції (20–30-ті), в Черкащина в новітній історії української нації та держави. Збірник наукових праць (Кiev, 1999), 91–125; idem, Україна ХХ століття: особи та події в контексті важкої історії (Кiev, 2001); idem, Неспівідомі історії (Кiev, 2004); idem, „Україна в добу великого терору: етапи, особливості, наслідки,” в архівів ВУЧК-ГПУ-НКВД-КГБ, no. 1, 2007, 76–100.
26 See В. Чепов, Політичні репресії в радянській Україні в 20-ті роки (Тернопіль, 2000).
27 See P. Podkur, За повідомленнями радянських спецслужб (Кiev, 2000).
escalation of the campaign of mass repression, as well as its connections to the political strategy of the communist regime.

Other authors who deal in their publications with the key issues relating to the causes and consequences of Stalinism in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic are Myroslav Popovich,29 Ivan Dziuba,30 Hryhory Kostiuk,31 Oleg Bazhan,32 Valery Vasylyev,33 Valentyn Ivanenko and A. Holub,34 Dmytro Tabachnyk and Vitaly Roztalny,35 Semyon Tsviliuk36 and Mykola Shytiuk.37

In order to understand the mechanisms behind the Great Terror, it is critically important that one becomes acquainted with those publications which analyse the role of the individuals who were charged with putting Stalin’s policies into practice. The above primarily applies to the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR in 1936–1938, Nikolai Yezhov. On the pages of their works, Nikita Petrov and Mark Jansen,38 Aleksey Polansky,39 Borys Briukhanov and Yevgeny Shoshkov,40 and Aleksey Pavlukov41 have attempted to prove that Yezhov was no more than an obedient tool in the hands of Stalin and implemented his orders without a second thought. Yet the facts are that the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs was also known for showing his own initiative, which was very much in line with the Stalinist strategy of terror. On the other hand, the publications by Yuriy Shapoval and Vadim Zolotarov concentrate on the functions performed by the long-term head of the GPU/NKVD, Vsevolod Balitsky,42 as well as the People’s

29 See М. Попович, Червоне століття (Kiev, 2007).
30 See І. Дзюба, Пасха. 30 років зі Сталіним. 50 років без Сталіна (Kiev, 2003).
31 See Г. Костюк, Сталінізм в Україні. Генеза і наслідки. Дослідження і спостереження сучасника (Kiev, 1996).
34 See В. Іваненко, А. Голуб, Феномен сталінізму і Україна: (карально-репресивний аспект), in Границы: Наук.-теорет. і громад.-полит. альб. (Нпипропетровск, 1999), 43–49.
36 С. Цвілюк, Трагедія нескореної нації: Політичний і національний терор в Україні в період сталінського тоталітаризму (Odessa, 2005).
38 See M. Jansen, N. Petrov, Stalin’s Loyal Executioner: People’s Commissar Nikolai Ezhov, 1895–1940 (Stanford, 2002); Н. Поворов, М. Янсен, Сталинский питомец – Николай Ежов (Москов, 2008).
40 See Б. Брюханов, Е. Шошкин, Оправданию не подлежит. Ежов и ежовщина (Sankt-Petersburg, 1998).
41 See A. Павлюков, Ежов. Биография (Москов, 2007).
Commissars for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the period 1937–8, Israel Leplevsky and Aleksandr Uspensky, within the Stalinist system of repression.

Another work deserving mention is Репресивна діяльність органів державної безпеки СРСР в Україні (кінець 1920-х – 1950-ті рр.). Історико-статистичне дослідження by Volodymyr Nikolsky. The work in question is based on statistical reports from the GPU-NKVD-NKGB-MGB-KGB, kept in the Special State Archive of the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) in Kiev. Nikolsky has taken on the task of evaluating the credibility of the statistical data relating to the persecutions contained in the archives. The author of the work has approved their value as a source of information, while at the same time exposing the mechanisms of falsification and deception applied by the security services.

In recent years publications have surfaced which deal with the purges amongst the officers of the Red Army, the fate of Soviet as well as Ukrainian intelligentsia, the persecution of Komsomol operatives, the prisoners of the Solovky camp, the persecution of historians, writers, the faithful and clergy.
of the Eastern Orthodox Church, and even with the locations of mass graves where the victims of the Great Terror were buried. The German historians Rolf Binner and Mark Junge have succeeded in revealing the manner in which Yezhov’s Order No. 00447 actually came into being. The most recent work by both those writers (together with Gennady Bordyugov) contains an analysis of the way the aforementioned directive was implemented in various parts of the USSR (including the Ukrainian SSR), the primary targets of the operation, the relationships between Moscow and the local centres, the role played by the judicial authorities, the participation of party structures, and the credibility of the investigations carried out. Volodymyr Nikolsky, Oleg Rafalsky, Volodymyr Yevtukh and Bogdan Chyrko have placed particular emphasis on the nationality-related aspects of political repression. Many historical works have told the stories of individual ethnic groups residing within the USSR: Germans, Czechs, Greeks, Latvians and finally Poles.
The Great Terror is also often analysed from a regional perspective. A book by Mykola Shytiuk contains a study of the mass persecutions which took place between 1920 and 1950 in southern Ukraine. Zoya Lykholobova and Volodymyr Nikolsky have investigated the events which took place during the Great Terror in the Donbas, Oleg Bazhan and Alexander Loshytsky have considered the Odessa region and the Kiev region, Volodymyr Zhezicky in Podolia, Hryhory Kovtun, Volodymyr Vimonialovich and Yuriy Danylyuk in the Poltava region.

Another work deserving mention is the multi-volume series entitled Реабілітовані історією, edited by Petro Tronko. A total of more than fifty volumes prepared by district editor committees have already been published. In 2006, a volume dealing with the political persecution in the Zhytomyr region was published. Another historian, Henryk Stroński, devoted his efforts to the investigation of the history of the Marchlewski Polish National Raion. According to this researcher, the aforementioned area was the first to experience terror on a mass scale. The issues related to the persecution of Poles in the Zhytomyr area were also investigated by Maya Lutay.


65 See М. Шитюк, Масові репресії проти населення Півдня України в 20–50-ті роки ХХ століття (Київ, 2001). See also idem, “Масові репресії на території Миколаївщини (30-ті рр. ХХ ст.),” Український історичний журнал, no. 1, 1998, 94–98.

66 See З. Лихолобова, Сталінський тоталітарний режим та політичні репресії кінця 30-х років в Україні (Донецьк, 1996); eadem, Тоталітарний режим та політичні репресії в Україні у другій половині 1930-х років (переважно на матеріалах Донецького регіону) (Донецьк, 2006).


70 See В. Жезицький, Великий терор на Поділлі у другій половині 30-х рр., іn VIII Всеукраїнська наукова конференція ‘Історичне краєзнавство і культура’: Наукові доповіді та повідомлення (Kharkiv, 1997), part 2, 183–186.


74 See М. Лугай, Воїнський центр Польської організації військової – існує чи реальний? , іn Знанки питання в історії України: українська історія у європейському контексті. Збірник матеріалів II Міжнародної конференції (Vinnytsia, 2005), 131–134.
In Polish historiography, the issue of the persecution of Poles, both in the USSR and in Ukraine, constitutes a broad and significant area of study. One cannot forget that the western parts of Soviet Ukraine had been inhabited by Poles for hundreds of years, with substantial areas of Ukraine originally forming an integral component of the Polish state, from which they had become separated in course of the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. At the beginning of that century, tsarist Russia embarked on a course of decisively imperialist policies with respect to Poland, aimed at the conquest and dissolution of its independent neighbour.

These political directions have been consistently upheld by the USSR, which – up until 22 June 1941 – spared no expense to erase the “bastard of Versailles” from the map of Europe. The actions taken to this end were not merely confined to the realm of politics, but also encompassed practical activities aimed at the final solution of the issue of the Polish nationality. These final solutions could take one of two distinct forms: the creation of a „homo Sovieticus” who would become an element of the Soviet communal organism – or extermination. Both of these variants have been put into practice, with the latter – genocide – becoming a painful legacy which has managed to prevent the full normalisation of relations between the two countries until this day. The actions which took place in Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s – comprising the persecution and forced migration of Polish nationals to Kazakhstan, followed by the ethnic cleansing brought about by the “Polish operation,” confirm that the Bolshevik regime of the USSR resorted to genocidal methods in the course of its quest to extend the borders of the empire.

There is an extensive amount of literature covering the persecution of the Poles in the USSR. The body of work in question comprises memoirs and journals, documents, works of fiction, historical and analytical works. During the People’s Republic of Poland, this issue was considered taboo, while such works as did appear during that period were imbued with the prevailing ideology. Most Polish-language works dealing with the true fate of Polish nationals in the USSR at that time were only published in Western Europe and in America around Ukrainian themes would only appear in a fragmentary manner, since they constituted just one of many aspects of persecution which the Poles were forced to endure. It was only after 1990 that research based on source materials that had hitherto been unavailable could begin in earnest.

A thorough analysis of Soviet Ukrainian society and the causes of repression in the 1930s was presented by Robert Potocki, and Henryk Stronński and Janusz

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76 See R. Potocki, Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930–1939 (Lublin, 2003), 294–357. Issues of nationality were examined even before World War II. The most important work deserving mention in that regard is a book by Mikolaj Kowalewski entitled Polityka narodowościowa na Ukrainie sowieckiej (Warsaw, 1938).
Kupczak has also devoted publications to the issue of the repression of Poles in the Ukraine. The practices of harassment directed against citizens, including those related to their religious life, were described by Roman Dzwonkowski. Paweł Piotr Wieczorkiewicz has made an in-depth analysis of the purges in the Red Army, including the persecution of the Poles who had served there, with particular emphasis on the events which have taken place in Ukraine. The issue of forced migration of Poles to Kazakhstan was considered by Stanisław Ciesielski, Grzegorz Hryciuk, Aleksander Srebrakowski and Antoni Kuczyński. Another particularly important issue is the actions taken by the Communist regime in the USSR against the Catholic Church, which were aimed at its absolute obliteration. A large number of both its clergy and its followers were Polish. Thus, the campaign of repression against the Catholic Church would entail the persecution of the Polish minority. This phenomenon is well documented in works by Roman Dzwonkowski, Mykola Ivanov, Stanisław Nagy, Julian Zdzisław Winnicki, Janusz Wróbel.

84 See M. Iwanow, Z. J. Winnicki, Katolicy na terenie bytego ZSRR: kontrowersje wokół liczebności – szacunki bieżące i potencjalne, in Odrodzenie Kościoła katolickiego... (Lublin, 1993), 177–183.
Henryk Stroński\textsuperscript{88} and in the memoirs of Father Teofil Skalski.\textsuperscript{89} In a short article, Julia Gorbaniuk\textsuperscript{90} has even attempted to come up with a psychological analysis of the resistance of Ukrainian citizens against the actions of the Communist regime. Andrzej Paczkowski,\textsuperscript{91} Mieczysław Łoziński\textsuperscript{92} and Henryk Stroński\textsuperscript{93} (referred to above) have produced works dealing with the “POW case” and the “Polish operation” in the period between 1933 and 1938. This issue was also examined by Nikolai Ivanov\textsuperscript{94} and Nikita Petrov.\textsuperscript{95} We must point out that apart from Petrov’s article, almost the entire issue (issue 11) of the \textit{Karta} periodical from 1993 was devoted to the Great Terror and the repression of Poles. At this stage, we should also mention the work of Krzysztof Jaworski devoted to the persecution of Bruno Jasiński.\textsuperscript{96} In recent years, the issue of the “Polish operation” has also been examined by the Polish press.\textsuperscript{97}

As far as source publications are concerned, one collection of documents relating to the issue in question is of fundamental importance: the fifth volume of the series published by the South-Eastern Research Institute in Przemyśl (Południowo-Wschodni Instytut Naukowy w Przemyślu). \textit{Polacy na Ukrainie. Zbiór dokumentów}, edited by Stanisław Stępień and Oleksandr Rublov, containing documents and memoirs of Ukrainian Poles from the period between 1937 and 1938.\textsuperscript{98}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{89} T. Skalski, \textit{Terror i cierpień. Kościół na Ukrainie 1900–1932. Wspomnienia} (Lublin, 1995).
  \item \textsuperscript{91} See A. Paczkowski, \textit{Polacy pod obcą i własną przemocą}, in \textit{Zbior dokumentów}, collective work (Warsaw, 1999), 341–366.
  \item \textsuperscript{92} See M. Łoziński, \textit{Operacja polska. Stalinowska zbrodnia na Polakach w latach 1937–1938} (Klodawa, 2008).
  \item \textsuperscript{95} See N. Petrov, “Polska operacja NKWD,” \textit{Karta}, no. 11, 1993, 24–45.
  \item \textsuperscript{96} K. Jaworski, \textit{Bruno Jasiński w sowieckim więzieniu – aresztowanie, wyrok i śmierć} (Kielce, 1995).
\end{itemize}
The body of work referred to above clearly shows that the interest in the Great Terror of 1937–1938 in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as well as in those events of that period which related specifically to the Poles, is far from waning. On the contrary: by taking advantage of source materials, historians are striving to find the final answers as to what exactly happened during the “Polish operation,” and what the behind-the-scenes events leading up to it actually were, thereby exposing the atrocities of the Communist regime.

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Formally, the “Polish operation” of the NKVD began on 11 August 1937, when Nikolai Yezhov signed Operational Order No. 00485 and the “secret dossier on the activities of the Polish intelligence in the USSR involving fascist insurgency, espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism.” According to these documents, an operation was to be staged between 20 August and 20 November aimed at the complete obliteration of all local structures of the Polish Military Organisation (POW) and “first and foremost, its subversive, spying, insurgent agents in the industry, transport as well as the sovkhozes and kolkhozes.”

Categories of individuals earmarked for arrest were also specified:

- a) all POW activists exposed in the course of the investigation who have not yet been captured, in accordance with the attached list;
- b) all prisoners of war originating from the Polish Armed Forces who remain on USSR territory;
- c) all fugitives from Poland, regardless of the time of their entry into the USSR;
- d) all political refugees from Poland as well as [persons who have arrived in the course of] exchange [of political prisoners];
- e) former members of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and other anti-Soviet Polish political parties;
- f) the most active members of the local anti-Soviet nationalist element from the Polish [national] raions (regions).

The most characteristic feature of this order was the way in which the Polish nationals arrested were identified. They were not individuals suspected of some sort of criminal activity, but all were Poles who had remained on USSR territory, including fugitives, refugees, members of political parties and “nationalists.” Anyone could potentially fall into the latter category. Even NKVD operatives themselves understood the absurdity inherent in the order they received: ‘When the head officer of the Third UGB NKVD Department in the Moscow province

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99 This document was first published in the Karta magazine (see Karta, no. 11, 1993, 27–29). In the West, this document first saw the light of day in 1997 (see Le Livre Noir du Communisme. Crimes, terreur et repression (Paris, 1997). In the Ukraine, these documents were both first published in 1997 (see Ю. Шаповал, В. Пристайко, В. Золотарьов, ЧК-ГПУ-НКВД в Україні: особи, факти..., 347–377).
100 Quoted in ibidem, 348.
101 Quoted in ibidem.
read the order on the arrest of Polish political refugees, former prisoners of war, fugitives and members of the Communist Party of Poland (KPP), he caused the astonishment of his subordinates. The Chekists were told, however, that the ordinance was consulted with Stalin and the Politburo and that “the Poles must be hit as hard as it gets.”

The individuals arrested were divided into two groups. The first comprised all those who served in the NKVD apparatus or the Red Army, who worked in military facilities or other factories whose manufacturing activities were linked to wartime needs, in railway, water and air transport industry, in the energy sector powering all industrial facilities, and in the gas and oil processing industries. The second group encompassed all other prisoners, originally employed in manufacturing facilities of no defence significance, in the sovkhozes and kolkhozes (state and collective farms) and in administration.

In the course of the organisational preparations preceding the “Polish operation,” two special teams of operatives were created, with the aim of achieving “the complete exposure of all individuals who organise or direct subversive groups, in order for the network of subversion to be unmasked in its entirety.”

In the course of investigation, those placed under arrest were divided into two categories, depending on the gravity of their alleged misconduct: the first category (“individuals engaged in espionage, subversion, sabotage and insurgency”) faced execution by shooting, while the second category (comprising those who were less active) were sent to prison or labour camps for periods between 5 and 10 years. The allocation to a given category, on the basis of an analysis of materials obtained through investigation and the activities of agents, was the task of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the given Soviet republic, as well as of the head officers of the NKVD directorates at the oblast or national level, along with the local prosecutors. The sentence was carried out immediately after the decision was taken.

As a consequence of the order, no further releases of any inmates from prisons and labour camps were made if the individuals in question had been convicted of being Polish spies. All materials relating to such persons were to be transferred immediately to the Special Council of the USSR NKVD, so that the prisoners in question could be accused and convicted once again.

An important development with respect to the categories of individuals earmarked for arrest took place on 2 October 1937, when by way of extraordinary regulation Yezhov extended the scope of Order No. 00845 to the family members of those arrested in connection with the same order. The regulation in question was the regulation “on repression against the wives of traitors, members of rightist and Trotskyist organisations, sentenced by the military court and military tribunals” dated 15 August 1937. Under the said regulation, the wives of those convicted by

102 See N. Petrov, “Polska operacja NKWD...”, 30.
103 See Ю. Шаповал, В. Пристайко, В. Золоторьов, ЧК-ГПУ-НКВД в Україні: особи, факти..., 349.
the judicial authorities specified in the order, regardless of whether they had any connection whatsoever with the “counter-revolutionary” activities of their husbands, were to be detained; the same applied to children above 15 years of age, provided that they were considered to constitute “a danger to society” and that they “possessed an inclination towards anti-Soviet conduct.” The wives of convicted individuals were placed in Gulag camps for a period of 5 to 8 years, while children above 15 years of age, depending on their behaviour, were transferred to Gulag camps, juvenile penal colonies or high-security orphanages. Children aged 1 to 15, who as a result of arrests had no parents to ensure their care, were placed in nurseries or orphanages. As a consequence of the implementation of Order 00486, the Gulag camps, juvenile colonies and orphanages were unable to accommodate the arrested wives and children placed in detention.

A separate issue worthy of attention concerns the official pronouncements which were intended to justify the persecution of the Poles. The preface to the “secret dossier on the activities of the Polish intelligence in the USSR involving fascist insurgency, espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism” contained an explanation concerning the nature of the anti-Soviet activities allegedly perpetuated by the POW. It presented a historical background painted in such a way as to convey the only truth the authorities would allow. The centre of the re-established organisation was to be based in Moscow. The document also mentioned the links and the subsequent integration of the Polish counter-revolutionary forces with those of the Trotskyists; the direct contacts which the organisation allegedly maintained with Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the leader of a “fascist-militaristic conspiracy”; the deep penetration of the ranks of the Communist Party of Poland (KPP), the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU) as well as the Polish section of the Communist International by the agents of the organisation; and finally the “unhindered anti-Soviet activities” perpetuated within the security apparatus of the USSR by Polish spies – Stanisław Messing, Roman Pilar, Filip Miedwied, Mieczysław Łoganowski, Jerzy Makowski, Jan Kulikowski-Olski, Józef Unszlicht, Ignacy Sosnowski, Barański and others, who have allegedly “taken over the

105 Ignacy Sosnowski (real last name – Dobrzański) was a legendary figure in the USSR OGPU. In 1919 – 1920, as a second lieutenant of the High Command of the Polish Army (NDWP), he was the main operative of the Polish intelligence (nom de guerre “Świerszcz”) in Bolshevik Russia. In June 1920 he was arrested in an intelligence “safe house” by an operational group headed by F. Karin. In the Lubyanka, he was interrogated by A. Artuzov, R. Pilar and V. Mienzhynsky as well as member of the Central Committee of the KPP, J. Marchlewski. They managed to persuade the Polish intelligence officer to switch sides, and he disclosed to them the identities of virtually all of his co-operatives. Soon afterwards Dobrzański, now known as the “chekist” Sosnowski, left for the South-Eastern Front, where he was charged with the liquidation of the Polish resistance; he even managed to foil an assassination attempt against Mikhail Tukhachevsky, the commander of the front. He also became known for his address to the Poles, in which he explained how “the truth” was “revealed to him.” For all those exploits, in 1921 Sosnowski was awarded the Order of the Red Banner; he joined the ranks of the Bolshevik party and – acting on an order from Feliks Dzierżyński – the VCheKa. In 1921 he destroyed “counter-revolutionary resistance groups” in Kiev, Zhytomyr, Cherkasy and Kharkiv. He took part in an investigation concerning Professor S. Tagantsev and the “Western Oblast Committee” in Homel. Ha managed to coax O. Staunic-Opperput,
The entire body of intelligence and counter-intelligence work of the VChKa-OGPU-NKVD which was directed against the Poles.\footnote{106}

The authors of the document presented a falsified version of the history of the POW and the activities thereof, and at the very end of the said document, also levelled criticism against the Ukrainian NKVD: “Despite the remarkable wealth of opportunities between 1933 and 1935 which could lead to the activities of the POW being exposed (the arrest of Skarbek’s and Stasiak-Koniecki’s group), the Ukrainian NKVD apparatus has failed to develop their investigation at that point to the extent necessary to fully expose the activities of the POW in the Ukraine...”\footnote{107}

By framing the issue in such a manner, the authors attempted to prove that the POW conspiracy had infected the government, party and security structures in a manner which constituted a threat to national security.

In order to make the “Polish operation” possible, Order No. 00485 introduced a substantial novelty into the OGPU-NKVD practice insofar as the administration of punishment was concerned. After the investigation was complete, an information document was prepared for every person accused, along with a summary of investigative and intelligence materials. The information-gathering process took 10 days, after which all information was collated into a single manifest (in the form of an album), which was then to be processed by an NKVD head officer or by a head officer of the given NKVD agency, acting together with a prosecutor. This procedure of case processing came to be referred to in NKVD documentation as album proceedings, since the mechanically printed manifests were made on horizontally positioned sheets which were later bound at their narrower edge, so that, from the outside, they had the form of an album. A commission made up of one prosecutor and one NKVD operative became known as the dvoika, (i.e. an organ composed of two persons). It was those commissions which were vested with the power of sentencing in both the first (death by firing squad) and the second (5 to 10 years’ imprisonment) category of offences.

The next stage of the procedure involved forwarding the relevant manifest to Moscow, where it was finally processed and approved by the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor-General (Nikolai Yezhov and Andrey Vyshynsky). Following approval, the manifest was sent back to the relevant region in order for the sentence to be carried out. In practical terms, the sentence would be discussed locally, in course of the processing of the case of the given accused,
and proposed by the relevant NKVD operative, along with the head officer of the given department or division. The directorate and prosecution service head officers who signed the manifests would do so automatically, in most cases independently of each other, without any analysis, discussion or perusal of investigation case files. In the second half of 1938, due to the excessive number of cases which were at that time being forwarded to Moscow for processing, the system underwent a reform, in the course of which specialised organs called “troikas” (i.e. organs composed of three persons) were established. The decisions adopted by the troikas were final, and did not require Politburo approval. 108

All things considered, cases concerning a total of 143,810 persons were processed in the USSR in connection with the “Polish operation.” Of those, a total of 139,835 (97%) faced convictions, with 111,091 (79%) being sentenced to death by firing squad 109. According to the records as of 1 November 1937, a total of 19,030 Polish citizens were arrested in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. 7,069 (37%) of those arrested faced trial, with 4,854 (69%) later facing execution. In the period 1937–8, as many as 50,000 citizens of Polish nationality were persecuted in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, all this under the façade of waging war against the alleged counter-revolutionary activities. 110

The “Polish operation” may be subjected to analysis in the context of the prevailing policy of terror, the associated spying mania, and the impression that enemies were lurking in the shadows wherever one turned. Yet it also carries the hallmarks of a typical ethnic cleansing. Similar operations were perpetuated on other nationalities. At this point, one needs to add that Order No. 00485 formed a template for subsequent orders of its kind levelled against other ethnic groups. 111

On 20 July 1937, a day before a session of the Politburo of CC VKP(b) was to be held, Joseph Stalin personally decreed that actions be taken against citizens of German origin: “Suggest to c[omrade] Yezhov that he command the NKVD apparatus to arrest all Germans employed in military facilities (artillery plants, factories manufacturing munitions, rifled gun barrels, bullets and suchlike) and to expel some of those arrested from the country. A copy of the order is to be sent to the Central Committee. Provide the Central Committee with (daily) updates on the progress of the operation and the number of arrests.” 112 And so the “German

108 Even in the summer of 1938, the Moscow archives already contained albums which related to more than 100,000 individuals. At that point it became clear that the central apparatus would no longer be able to subject those documents to any type of scrutiny, even if the said scrutiny were to be strictly formal in nature. On 15 September 1938, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) adopted a decision which was intended to modify the „album proceedings“ for the administration of punishment, replacing it with the so-called “special troikas,” established in every region for the purposes of sentencing with regard to “national quotas,” which meant that these troikas would have jurisdiction with respect to all case albums which had not been processed up to that point. All operations of the “troikas” were terminated on 15 November 1938.

109 See Н. Петров, А. Рогинский, “Польская операция” НКВД..., 33; М. Ellman, Stalin and Soviet Famine..., 686.

110 See Реабілітовані історію. У двадцяти семи томах..., 38.


112 Quoted in В. Нікольський, Репресивна діяльність..., 103.
"operation" began, confirmed by way of Order No. 00439, issued by Nikolai Yezhov on 25 July 1937. A total of 31,753 cases were reviewed, with 24,858 (78%) people being sentenced to death.\textsuperscript{113}

Following August 1937, other "national operations" were carried out. Subsequent waves of repression would engulf Estonians, Finns, Romanians, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Latvians, Greeks, Iranians, Chinese, and "Harbinians" (a name applied to former officials of the Eastern Chinese Railway as well as repatriates from Manchukuo – not an ethnic group in its own right). Both Soviet and foreign citizens would be affected by the purge. Stalin and Yezhov themselves were convinced of the existence of an extensive network of espionage, subversion and insurgency, consisting of agents incited to act by foreign nations who intended to cause damage to the Soviet Union; Soviet leaders thus chose to use this concept to justify the persecution of individual ethnic groups. The specifications contained in the respective orders were in no way dissimilar, encompassing political refugees and fugitives, much as the "Polish" command did. In total, 227,986 persons were affected by the aforementioned "national operations," with 172,830 (76%) facing the firing squad.\textsuperscript{114}

In order to get a full glimpse of the campaign of repression, one must not forget the so-called "kulak operation," aimed at affluent farmers, which commenced in parallel to the "national operations" with Order No. 00447, issued by Nikolai Yezhov on 30 July 1937, and approved by the CC VKP(b) Politburo the very next day; this operation provided a massive boost to the Great Terror in the Soviet Union. As a result of this operation, which lasted from August 1937 to 17 July 1938, a total of 770,000 persons were convicted, with more than 370,000 (48%) sentenced to death, and in excess of 380,000 (49%) imprisoned. Among those accused was a large number of citizens of Polish origin, whose individual farms were considered to be kulak farms.\textsuperscript{115}

\* \* \*

The historical source section below contains a total of 23 documents originating from the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). The first of these documents is the order which started it all – Order No. 00485 by Nikolai Yezhov dated 11 August 1937, on the commencement of the "Polish operation," which has already been published on multiple occasions. The copy of Order No. 00485 published in this book was addressed to the head officer of the Department for the Protection of Railways and Transportation (DTO) of the NKVD Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) responsible for the Southern-Kharkiv Railway. The next

\textsuperscript{113} See О. Мозохин, Право на репрессии: внесудебные полномочия органов государственной безопасности (1918–1953) (Zhukovsky–Moscow 2006), 186.

\textsuperscript{114} See \textit{ibidem}, 185.

\textsuperscript{115} See М. Юнге, Р. Биннер, \textit{Как террор стал...}, 9.
document, a telephonogram dated 11 August sent from the head officer of the Third Department of the NKVD Agency of State Security (UGB) of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) to the GUGB NKVD of the USSR, presents the results of an investigation carried out against the alleged POW activists accused of collaborating with the Polish police or military intelligence. Another document worthy of attention is the Guidelines dated 1 October 1937 from the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Israel Leplevsky, concerning so-called operational activities. In this document, Leplevsky indicates the mistakes made in the course of operation in Poltava and orders that work be intensified in the newly established provinces of the Ukrainian SSR. The document also refers to the activities of the NKVD within the framework of the so-called kulak operation. In another document, this one from 1 November 1937 and sent by Leplevsky to Yezhov, the Ukrainian narkom summing up the results of the operation emphasises the “burning need to make further arrests,” and therefore requests that the deadline for completion of the operation stated in Order no. 00485 be extended to 15 December 1937. It is also worth mentioning the order from Lavrentiy Beria relating to the implementation of the ordinance of the Council of People’s Commissars (Soviet Narodnykh Komissarov – SNK) of the USSR and the CC VKP(b) dated 17 November 1938. This particular order repealed Order No. 00485 dated 11 August 1938 (among others), which had initiated the “Polish operation.” Other orders relating to ethnic groups were also repealed; however some of them remained in force following alterations made to the contents of certain subsections thereof. Beria also ordered that the investigators must have the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure at their disposal. The People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR put an end to some of the methods of adjudication and castigated the “perverted practices” of the NKVD apparatus.

The documents referred to above demonstrate the anti-Polish actions taken in the period between 1937 and 1939 under the authority of the People’s Commissars for Internal Affairs of Ukraine – actions which in fact took the form of ethnic cleansing. The source documentation confirms that at that time, no aspect in the life of society existed in which the Soviet security apparatus would not seek to establish the existence of “Polish spies” or “agents”, and where actual enemies were nowhere to be found, then such enemies would be fabricated.116

116 In May 1938, the former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Ukraine (CC KP(b)U), Stanislav Kosior, was arrested in Moscow. Both he and his brother Kazimierz Kosior were accused of collaborating with the intelligence services of foreign nations which perpetuated subversion and espionage, as well as of commanding the structures of the POW.
No. 1
11 August 1937, Moscow. Operational Order No. 00485 from the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs Nikolai Yezhov, concerning the “Polish operation”

Delivered personally

*To: Head officer of the Department for the Protection of Railways and Transportation (DTO) of the NKVD Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB) Southern-Kharkiv Railway Comrade Leopold*1

Top secret
Copy No. 71

Operational Order
of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

11 August 1937 Moscow

No. 00485

The secret dossier on the activities of Polish intelligence in the USSR involving fascist insurgency, espionage, sabotage, subversion, defeatism and terrorism,2 distributed in conjunction with the present order, as well as the investigation materials gathered with respect to the case of the Polish Military Organisation (POW), present us with a picture of the activities of Polish intelligence on Soviet territory which involve espionage and subversion – activities which have been carried out for a number of years and with relative impunity.

These materials demonstrate that the destructive activities of Polish intelligence were – and still are – conducted so blatantly that the fact that it has continued with impunity may only be explained through inadequate operation of the GUGB apparatus and through the negligent conduct of the Chekists.

1 Danil Samoylovich Leopold, real name Roytman (1901 – 19 April 1939), from 1921 member of the VCheKa; until 1925 he worked in Mohyliv-Podilskyi, Nova Ushytsa, Kamianets-Podilskyi; from September 1925 onwards he was a plenipotentiary of the Secret Operational Department of the GPU Chernihiv Oblast Department; from January 1926 senior plenipotentiary of the Special Section of the Ukrainian GPU; from 15 August 1931 head officer of the Foreign Department (Inostranniy Otdel – INO) of the Ukrainian GPU; from 29 October 1932 head officer of the Special Section of the GPU Vinnitsia Oblast Department; from 23 March 1934 head officer of the Special Section of the GPU Donetsk Oblast Department; from 28 January 1936 assistant head officer of the Donetsk Oblast UNKVD; from August 1938 head officer of the Sixth UNKVD Department for the Kharkiv Oblast; from August 1937 head officer of the NKVD GUGB DTO for the Southern Railway in Kharkiv. Arrested on 1 July 1938, executed on 19 April 1939.

Even now, the activities aimed at eliminating the local Polish diversionist and espionage groups and the POW organisation are yet to commence in full. Both the pace and the scope of the investigation are insufficient in the extreme. The main groups [collaborating with] Polish intelligence have not even been entered into our operational records (records were established with respect to only about 9000 fugitives from Poland, where the total amount of those fugitives is about 15,000). In Western Siberia, where about 5000 Polish fugitives have settled, not more than 1000 of them have had their files established. The same applies to the records concerning political refugees from Poland. As far as intelligence work is concerned, there is almost none to speak of. Furthermore, the existing agents – in most cases working for both sides – were set up by Polish intelligence.

The lack of decisiveness in the process of eliminating Polish intelligence operatives is particularly dangerous at the present time, following the liquidation of the POW Centre in Moscow and the apprehension of many of its resourceful operatives. Polish intelligence, already aware of the inevitability of its defeat in the future, is attempting to create a network of subversion within our national economy (and in particular, within those facilities which are important from the point of view of defence); in individual cases, such a network is already up and running.

For the above reasons, the primary objective of the GUGB apparatus as of today is the obliteration of the anti-Soviet activities of Polish intelligence and the absolute elimination of the extensive – and hitherto untouched – subversive, insurgent structures of the POW, as well as the basic human resources of Polish intelligence in the USSR.

Therefore I command:

1. To commence, on 20 August 1937, a large-scale operation aimed at the complete elimination of local POW structures and, first and foremost, their subversive, insurgent and espionage-minded operatives who have infiltrated our industry, transport system and our sovkhozes and kolkhozes.

   The entire operation is to be completed within three months, i.e. by November 1937.

2. The following categories of individuals are to be arrested:
   a) all POW activists exposed in the course of the investigation who have not yet been captured, in accordance with the attached list;
   b) all prisoners of war originating from the Polish Armed Forces who remain on USSR territory;
   c) all fugitives from Poland, regardless of the time of their entry into the USSR;
   d) all political refugees from Poland as well as [persons who have arrived in the course of] exchange [of political prisoners];

b Underlined by hand.
3 Not for publication.
e) former members of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS)\(^4\) and other anti-Soviet Polish political parties;

f) the most active members of the local anti-Soviet nationalist element from the Polish [national] raions [regions].\(^b\)

3. The arrests are to be conducted in two stages:

a) the first to be arrested shall be the aforementioned categories of persons serving in the NKVD apparatus or the Red Army, working in military facilities or military divisions of all other manufacturing facilities, in the rail, water and air transport industry, in the energy sector powering all industrial facilities, as well as in gas and oil processing industries;

b) the second group to be arrested shall comprise all other individuals from the aforementioned categories, employed in manufacturing facilities of no defence importance, in the sovkhozes and kolkhozes and in administration.

4. Investigation shall commence in parallel with the arrests. The main emphasis in the course of investigation is to be placed on the complete exposure of all individuals who organise or direct subversive groups, in order for the network of subversion to be unmasked in its entirety.

All spies, saboteurs and diversionists are to be arrested immediately.

A special group of operatives to be assigned to investigation work.

5. All the individuals put under arrest, in the course of exposing their guilt as the investigation unravels, shall be divided into two categories:

a) the first category shall comprise [persons] earmarked for execution by firing squad. This category shall include all spies, diversionists, saboteurs and insurgents working for Polish intelligence;

b) the second category shall comprise the less active [individuals] who shall be sentenced to incarceration for a period of 5 to 10 years in prisons or labour camps.

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\(^4\) The Polish Socialist Party (PPS) – founded in Paris (1892), espoused Polish independence as a prerequisite for establishing democracy and the future socialist transformation of society. It split over differences in outlook between the group centred around Piłsudski, who sought to separate the Kingdom of Poland from Russia through an armed uprising, and who formed the Combat Organisation of the Polish Socialist Party (OB PPS) to organise armed actions against the Russian occupier; and those activists who voiced the slogans of internationalism and purely economic struggle. The result was the Polish Socialist Party-Left (PPS-Lewica), which merged with the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL) in 1918 to form the Communist Party of Poland (KPP); and the Polish Socialist Party-Revolutionary Faction (PPS-Frakcja Rewolucyjna). After the outbreak of the World War I, Piłsudski and his supporters, whose only goal was to win the independence of Poland, left the Party. However, the Polish Socialist Party still supported their actions. PPS members, who created the bulk of the actions for national independence, worked with certain paramilitary organisations, especially the Polish Military Organisation (POW). In 1919, a unified Polish Socialist Party was established following the merger of all the factions and organisations from the three partitions. The Polish Socialist Party went underground after the September Campaign.
6. Every 10 days, manifests of those [individuals] who were allocated to the first or second category shall be prepared, containing a short summary of investigative and intelligence materials which specify the degree of guilt of the individual arrested; [the manifests] are to be forwarded to the USSR NKVD for final approval.

A prisoner shall be allocated to the first or second category on the basis of intelligence and investigative materials by the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the given Soviet republic, the UNKVD head officer for the given oblast or krai, along with the competent prosecutor for the given republic, oblast or krai.

The manifests are to be sent to the USSR NKVD in order to obtain the signature of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the given Soviet republic, the UNKVD head officer and the prosecutor for the given republic, oblast or krai.

Following approval of the manifests by the NKVD and the Prosecutor of the [Soviet] Union, the sentences shall be carried out immediately, i.e. those allocated to the first category shall be executed, while those in the second category shall be transferred to prisons and camps in accordance with the ordinance of the USSR NKVD.

7. Releases of all prison and work camp inmates convicted of espionage for the benefit of Poland, whose terms of imprisonment are about to expire, shall be suspended. Materials concerning all such inmates shall be forwarded to the Special Board of the USSR NKVD.

8. Skill and consideration must be exercised in the course of operations relating to the elimination of the POW and all other Polish intelligence groups, so that these operations may also lead to the recruitment of new agents from amongst the Poles themselves.

When selecting potential agents, particular care must be exercised with regard to the safety measures aimed at preventing Polish double agents from infiltrating the NKVD.

The lists of agents for recruitment, along with an exhaustive description thereof, is to be forwarded to Comrade FRINOVSKY, head officer of the NKVD GUGB, for approval.5

5 Mikhail Piotrovich Frinovsky (1898–1940), army commander 1st Rank, member of the VCheKa from 1919; from 1920 onwards member of the Operational Department of the South-Western Front of the Red Ukrainian Galician Army (UHA); from 1921 head officer of the Operational Department of the Secret Operational Unit, VCheKa Special Section; from 1922 secretary of the empowered agency of the Ukrainian GPU in the Right-bank Ukraine; from 1923 secretary of the empowered agency of the OGPU in South-Eastern Russia and then OGPU in the Northern Caucasus krai; from 1928 assistant head officer of the Special Section of the Moscow OGPU, Eastern Department (VO); from 1930 head of the Azerbaijan GPU; from April 1933 head of the Chief Directorate of Frontier Guards and Interior Troops (GUPVO) of the USSR NKVD; from 16 October 1936 simultaneously Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR and head of the USSR NKVD GUPVO; from 15 April 1937 First Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR and head of the USSR NKVD GUGB; from 8 September 1938 People’s Commissar for the USSR war fleet. Arrested on 6 April 1939, sentenced to death on 4 February 1940 by the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court, executed on 8 March 1940; never rehabilitated.
9. Reports on the progress of the operation to be sent by telegraph every 5 days, i.e. on the 1st, 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th and 30th day of each month.

The People’s Commissar for the Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar for State Security
YEZHOV

Certified true copy:
Operational secretary of the USSR NKVD GUGB
kombrig (—) ULMER

HDA SBU, F. 9, Spr. 23, pp. 20–24.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

6 Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov (1895–1940), general commissar for state security; until 1936 holding various offices in the Central Committee of the VKP(b); from 26 September 1936 to 7 December 1938 holding the office of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR; from 8 April 1938 also the People’s Commissar for Maritime Transportation of the USSR; on 9 April 1939 deposed from the office of the People’s Commissar of Maritime Transportation of the USSR. Arrested on 10 April 1939, sentenced to death on 2 February 1940 by the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court, executed on 6 February 1940 in Moscow; never rehabilitated.

7 Voldemar Avgustovich Ulmer (1896–1945), from 1923 in the USSR NKVD OGPU; from 12 February 1923 to 4 April 1924 assistant commander of the 2nd convoy regiment of the GPU; from 4 April 1924 to 3 November 1924 head officer of the border control forces academy in Odessa; from 1930 holder of various prominent positions in the GPU Border Guard Forces; from 15 September 1930 to 5 March 1931 assistant head officer of the Second Department of the OGPU Special Section; from 5 March 1931 to 5 September 1931 assistant head officer of the Second Division of the OGPU Special Section; from 5 September 1931 to 25 January 1934 assistant head officer of the Third Division of the OGPU Special Section; from 25 January 1934 to 14 February 1934 assistant head officer of the Chief Directorate of Fire Guards (GUPO) Operational Department and OGPU military forces; from 14 February 1934 to 10 July 1934 acting head officer of the Chief Directorate of Fire Guards (GUPO) Operational Department and OGPU military forces; from 10 July 1934 to 26 November 1934 head officer of the Chief Directorate of Frontier Guards and Interior Troops (GUPVO) of the NKVD; from 26 November 1934 to 16 April 1937 head officer of the First Department of the NKVD GUPVO; from 16 April 1937 to 8 September 1938 operational secretary of the USSR NKVD GUB (Main Directorate of State Security); from 8 September 1938 to 2 October 1938 head of secretariat and deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR; from 2 October 1938 to 1 February 1939 acting head of the Chief Directorate for Border and Internal Troops (GUPVV) of the USSR NKVD. Arrested on 20 April 1939, sentenced on 16 February 1940 by the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court to 15 years’ imprisonment; he died on 28 March 1945 in the place of his incarceration; rehabilitated in 1955.
Telephonogram

Moscow NKVD
For BELSKY¹

In connection with the “Polish operation” in Ukraine, 3283 persons in total have been arrested as of August 15. The above sum comprises individuals of the following nationalities: Poles – 2180, Ukrainians – 615, Galicians – 256, Jews – 156, others (Russians, Belarusians etc.) – 76.

Among all the individuals arrested, 505 have pleaded guilty with respect to the following offences: activities comprising subversion and espionage – 257 [persons], membership of the POW – 158 [persons], nationalist counter-revolutionary activities – 90 [persons].


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¹ Leon Nikolaievich Belsky, real name Abram Mikhailovich Levin (1889–1941), from 1919 member of the CheKa; between 1921 and 1930 an empowered agent of the VCheKa-GPU-OGPU in the Far East, Turkmenistan and Central Asia; from 17 February 1930 to 8 August 1931 an empowered agent of the OGPU for the Moscow oblast; from 5 August 1931 to 23 July 1933 head officer of the Chief National Food Committee of the People’s Commissariat for Supplies of the USSR; from 25 July 1933 to 4 January 1934 empowered agent of the OGPU in the Lower Volga krai; from 4 January 1934 to 7 August 1937 head officer of the Chief Directorate of the USSR OGPU-NKVD Workers’ and Farmers’ Militia (RKM); from 3 November 1936 to 8 April 1938 Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR; from 8 April 1938 to 1 April 1939 First Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR; until 30 June 1939 head officer for the construction of the Kartaly–Akmolinsk railroad. Arrested on 30 April 1939, sentenced to death on 5 July 1941 by the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court, executed on 16 October 1941; never rehabilitated.

² Despite the fact that the name of the capital of the Donetsk oblast was changed to “Stalino” in 1924, the oblast itself was still referred to until 1938 as the “Donetsk oblast,” and was later renamed “Stalino oblast.”
We continue to make further arrests.

no. 2342/sn^3

Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
Senior Major of State Security

STEPANOV

^a^ August 1937
Kiev

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 30 (1951), Spr. 70, p. 176.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

^a^ Filled in by hand.

^3^ Mikhail Arkhipovich Stepanov (1900 – 1940), from 1920 member of the CheKa; from 14 January 1936 Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic; from 1 January 1937 Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic; from 20 July 1937 Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Arrested on 31 January 1938, sentenced to 12 years in prison on 9 June 1940, he died on 17 October 1940 in a camp in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
No. 3
16 August 1937, Kiev. Guidelines from the Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mikhail Stepanov, for the head officers of oblast directorates of the NKVD, with respect to the operation commenced pursuant to Order No. 00485

Delivered personally

Series ‘K’

To: Head Officer of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD Oblast Directorate ....................
Comrade ........................
City ........................

I hereby forward to you the secret letter from the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, General Commissar for State Security, Comrade YEZHOV dated 11 August 1937, concerning the activities of Polish intelligence in the USSR involving fascist insurgency, espionage, sabotage, subversion, defeatism and terrorism, as well as the operational Order No. 00485 concerning the actions taken for the purposes of disrupting the anti-Soviet activities of Polish intelligence, as well as the subversive and insurgent activities of the regular POW members;

In connection with the above, I hereby command:

1. To commence large-scale operations in your respective oblasts starting on 20 August, beginning with the ranks of the Red Army, the military manufacturing facilities, the divisions of other manufacturing facilities of defence importance, the rail, water and air transportation sectors, the energy supply stations of all industrial facilities, and the natural gas and oil refineries.

2. To prepare, simultaneously, and – in the second instance – to commence the arrests of all other persons specified in section 2 of the operational order, employed in all manufacturing facilities of no defence importance, in sovkhozes and kolkhozes, in administration, etc.

3. To proceed with an immediate review of all records remaining in the possession of the NKVD which relate to the Poles, all personal dossiers, object files, intelligence inquests, intelligence denunciations and archived cases, and to apply the same for the purposes of the operation.

In the course of the operation, materials supplied by special factory units and assistant employment directors, by the police departments responsible for visas and passports etc., as well as records concerning persons who have visited Polish consulates and individuals linked to the “Currency” case should be taken advantage
of. All materials are to be studied with utmost diligence, and the most suspect of the individuals referred to in the said materials are to be included in the operation.

4. Particular attention is to be paid to large cities, industrial centres of Ukraine as well as the border zone, where a large number of Polish intelligence operatives, diversionists, fugitives, organisation members, double agents, Razvedupr\(^1\) operatives, former smugglers and POW members have taken shelter; the same emphasis is to be placed on Polish refugees and displaced individuals from the border area who have settled in the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

5. All double agents dealing with Polish nationals and suspected of having links with the subversive and espionage-minded element are to be arrested, including all agents related to the INO and the Razvedupr.

6. All Poles and all people related to them are to be arrested on suspicion of being members of anti-Soviet rightist, Trotskyist and nationalist organisations or of being linked to a militaristic conspiracy; these individuals are later to be subjected to detailed interrogation in accordance with the order of the narkom, aimed at exposing the espionage-minded, subversive, insurgent and nationalistic activities of the Poles.

7. In the course of implementation of the present directive, the head officers of oblast directorates of the NKVD as well as head officers of special units\(^2\) shall exercise particular care with regard to fugitives and refugees originating from Polish territory, persons with links to foreign countries, Galicians, as well as persons holding leading or command positions in military staff, construction operations, recreation and sports services, auxiliary enterprises etc., in particular where such persons have obtained their positions in the course of free recruitment.

Air force, armoured force and engineering units, as well as military warehouse facilities, need to be checked with particular attention.

Sanctions with respect to the arrest of individuals holding leading or command positions are to be obtained in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

8. Particular care must be exercised with respect to all individuals who surround those commanders and head officers in whose families spies, political refugees, Polish fugitives and persons accused of having links with the Polish intelligence services have been identified.

All oblast directorate head officers shall immediately establish special investigation groups to deal with persons of Polish nationality, derived from the personnel of the Third Departments and composed of the operatives which possess the best qualifications for the task.

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\(^{a}\) *Sentence struck through.*

\(^{1}\) Razvedupr – Razvedytvateľne Upravlene – Intelligence Department, referring to military intelligence.

\(^{2}\) This probably refers to military counter-intelligence. The same applies to all subsequent references.
The Third Department of the NKVD Directorate of State Security (UGB) of the Ukrainian SSR is to be notified of the composition of investigative groups.

9. In order for all materials related to the Poles to be collected in a single location, the head officers of the oblast directorates shall establish procedures which ensure that all copies of interrogation protocols which relate to the activities of the Polish nationalist, espionage-minded and subversive elements be forwarded to the Third Department of the Directorate of State Security (UGB), regardless of which department was responsible for the arrest of the given individuals, and which will further ensure that accurate records of all persons appearing (in the said protocols) are kept.

10. In accordance with the order of the narkom, all oblast directorate members are to personally instruct the head officers of the regional, municipal and local divisions, as well as the head officers of special divisions of the respective corps, divisions and brigades.

If necessary, I hereby consent to convening an operational meeting of the head officers of the special authorities with regard to this matter.

11. This directive shall be communicated to the head officers of the Departments for the Protection of Railways and Transportation (DTO) having jurisdiction over the relevant roadways; specific actions must also be taken to support them in connection with disrupting the operations of Polish intelligence in the rail transport sector.

12. The head officer of the Directorate of Frontier Guards and Interior Troops (UPVO) shall reinforce border controlsm and intensify operational and intelligence work in the border area.

The risk that, as a result of the commencement of our operation, persons subject to arrest may attempt to escape across our borders must be taken into account. The UPVO head officer and the head officer of the Third Department of the UGB is to provide the border control force commanders with special guidelines on implementing the operation against Polish nationals in the border area, in accordance with the materials amassed by the respective departments, and following consultation with the applicable oblast directorates of the USSR NKVD.

13. The guidelines specified by the narkom, Comrade YEZHOV concerning the recruitment of new and highly qualified agents for the purposes of investigating the affairs of Polish nationals are to be implemented without delay. The current operation may be used as an opportunity by those of our agents who have proven to be dependable and highly promising to infiltrate the Polish political authorities and intelligence services.

Lists [of individuals] earmarked for recruitment are to be presented to the Third Department of the NKVD UGB of the Ukrainian SSR.

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b Was: 10. Subsequent numbering has also been corrected.
14. Notifications on the progress of our operation to be provided by telephone on every 1st, 5th, 10th, 15th, 20th, 25th and 30th [day of each month].

Procedure for the provision of manifests [of individuals allocated to] the first and second category (see section 6 of the operational order) shall be specified by means of special guidelines.

15. Head officers of oblast directorate may only disclose the contents of the secret letter to those individuals who were mentioned therein (p. 43).

Appendix/appendices:
1. Secret letter no. 59098
2. Operational Order No. 00485
3. Schedule of agents sought for

Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs
Senior Major of State Security
(→) STEPANOV

“16” August 1937
no. 2351/sn
Kiev

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 30 (1951), Spr. 147, pp 88–92.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
First page contains the following handwritten note: F[or] dir[ectives].

3 Not for publication.
4 See chapter II, document no. 1.
27 August 1937, Kiev. Report from the head officer of the UNKVD for the Kiev oblast, Nikolai Sharov, to the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Israel Leplevsky, concerning the progress of the operation against Polish nationals

Kiev Oblast Directorate of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD

Report concerning the progress of the operation against Polish nationals as of 25 August 1937

In accordance with the directive of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, the General Commissar for State Security, Comrade YEZHOV, the Kiev Oblast Directorate of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD has, following applicable operational preparations, launched a campaign against the espionage-minded, subversive, insurgent Polish resistance forces in the city of Kiev as well as elsewhere in the Kiev oblast.

Until today, as a result of the operations performed against Polish nationals, a total of 1521 persons have been arrested, including:

a) Polish nationals: ...................... 953
b) Ukrainian nationals: ................. 433
c) Galicians: ............................. 37
d) Jews: ................................. 25
e) other: ................................. 73

Among the numbers specified above, the arrests made in Kiev have yielded a total of 112 persons brought into custody.

Furthermore, on 26 August, an additional operation was carried out at night, resulting in the arrest of 110 persons.

Our operations were directed primarily against border regions; as a result, the number of arrests made (among the general numbers specified above) were as follows:

Korosten okrug: ......................... 356 persons
Zhytomyr okrug: ......................... 320 persons
Novohrad-Volynskyi okrug: .......... 275 persons
Total: .................................. 951 persons
Number of arrests made in specific branches of the national economy:

- Persons employed in industrial facilities: 143
  - including defence industry: 22
- Persons employed in the railway transport sector: 77
- Persons employed in sugar industry: 102
  - including sovkhozes producing sugar beet: 21
- Persons employed in agriculture: 518
  - including lespromkhoz [State forest management units]: 47
  - including kolkhozes: 367
  - including sovkhozes: 14
- Persons with no permanent occupation: 133
- Soviet administrative institution employees: 120
- Khalupniks [cottage farmers/cottage industry]: 40
- School teachers and VUZ [higher education institution] educational staff: 68
- Medical personnel: 18

In accordance with the operational order of the narkom of the USSR, operational and investigative groups aimed at investigating the affairs of Polish nationals have been established in Korosten, Zhytomyr, Novohrad-Volynskyi, Uman, Cherkasy, and Bila Tserkva, as well as in the [Kiev] Oblast Directorate.

As a result of the investigation, as of this moment among all those arrested a total of 319 individuals have pleaded guilty, including:
- espionage and subversion: 188
- POW membership: 91
- Polish counter-revolutionary nationalist activities: 40

Principal emphasis in the course of the investigation was placed on the detection of espionage and diversionist residenturas as well as counter-revolutionary, insurgent diversionist groups.

As a result of the investigation carried out, on the basis of the depositions taken, even now the following organisations are being exposed and eliminated within the territory of our oblast:

- Polish espionage and diversionist residenturas: 44
- Polish consulate intelligence residenturas: 4
- Polish intelligence operatives (operating in an individual capacity): 25
- Polish consulate informants (operating in an individual capacity): 8
- POW structures: 9
- counter-revolutionary insurgent organisations: 3
- counter-revolutionary diversionist insurgent groups: 21
- counter-revolutionary Polish nationalist groups: 10

*The above division does not encompass all persons arrested; compare the numbers specified with the total number of all arrests made.*
The following issues have been considered to be the most significant and worthy of attention:

Polish intelligence operatives originating abroad

The “Strelok” case – a Polish intelligence operative, POLEKH Konstantin Andrejevich, born 1904 and resident in Poland – has been dealt with. The agent arrived on the [Soviet] Union territory at night, on 7 July this year, with orders from the Sarny subordinate intelligence office (*podekspozytura*) together intelligence in the Korosten garrison and fortified region.

Upon his arrest, the following items were confiscated from POLEKH: two revolvers; two explosive charges; a compass; various Soviet documents carrying the name of MIELNIK Mikhail, a resident of the Horodnytsia raion, Kiev oblast; as well as 1200 roubles (in Soviet banknotes).

POLEKH has confessed that prior to his infiltration of the Soviet Union he underwent intelligence training in Poland, and was subsequently sent to the USSR for the purpose of gathering intelligence.

The “Khodok no. 2” case – A Polish intelligence operative originating from the intelligence office in Sarny, KONONCHUK Mikhail Anastayevich, has been eliminated. The agent arrived on Soviet territory in order to gather intelligence in the Novohrad-Volynskyi garrison and fortified region.

Following his arrest, KONONCHUK was relieved of his revolver, 15 bullets and forged documents, including a passport bearing the name of Ivan MISHCHUK.

KONONCHUK has confessed that in 1936 he underwent intelligence training in Poland and has subsequently infiltrated Soviet territory on multiple occasions for intelligence purposes.

The “Khutorianin” case – KHAINSKY Karp Andreyevich, a Polish intelligence operative – has been dealt with. The agent was sent to Soviet territory by the intelligence office in Sarny in order to gather intelligence in the Novohrad-Volynskyi garrison and fortified region.

In the course of his arrest KHAINSKY resorted to armed resistance and attempted to escape; he was wounded and subsequently apprehended.

KHAINSKY has confessed that he arrived on orders of the Polish intelligence services for the purpose of espionage and recruitment of a number of individuals in Novohrad-Volynskyi.

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1 Konstantin Andreyevich Polekh was sentenced to death by decision of the *dvoika* of the USSR NKVD (protocol No. 27 dated 17 September 1937), and executed on 23 September 1937 in Kiev.

2 This in fact refers to the 7th intelligence unit of the Polish Border Protection Corps (*Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza*, KOP) in Sarny, part of the Lviv intelligence office (*ekspozytura*).

3 Mikhail Anastayevich Kononchuk was sentenced to death by decision of the *dvoika* of the USSR NKVD (protocol No. 5, dated 31 August 1937). The date and location of his execution remain unknown.

4 Karp Andreyevich Khainsky was sentenced to death by decision of the *dvoika* of the USSR NKVD (protocol No. 5, dated 31 August 1937). The date and location of his execution remain unknown.
Following his arrest, KHAINSKY was relieved of his revolver and bullets as well as 1000 roubles in Soviet banknotes, which he received from the Polish intelligence services.

Espionage and diversionist intelligence *residenturas*

The “Krimchanye” case – on the basis of the statements given by the following arrested individuals: ZAPLATINSKY Pavel Vasilyevich,⁵ arrested in Kiev, a Galician, expelled from the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine in 1933, former operative of the Markhlevsk raion; and PAVLISHYN Panteleyemon Grigoryevich,⁶ arrested in Zhytomyr, a Galician, teacher in a Polish school in the Radomyshl raion, an important espionage and diversionist outpost, operating in the former Markhlevsk and Radomyshl raions – has been exposed. The intelligence outpost in question has been established by the POW command in Volhynia.

The “Opytny” case – on the basis of statements given by MISKOV Dmitry Yosifovich,⁷ assistant head officer of the local communication department in Ovruch, arrested by the Korosten Okrug Department of the NKVD, an espionage outpost of the Polish intelligence services – has been exposed. The outpost was established in the years 1920–1922 in Novohrad-Volynskyi by IDESIS Grigory Petrovich,⁸ a refugee from Rivne, whose most recent position had been that of the assistant Division Head Officer of the ISO [Investigation and Information Department] of the Directorate of Frontier Guards and Interior Troops (UPVO) of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD. IDESIS has been arrested and an investigation against him is currently underway in Kiev.

The “Topograf” case: This case involved the exposure of an espionage outpost operating in the town of Ovruch, established by KOSHUBSKY Mikhail Andreyevich,⁹ an Eastern Orthodox Church clergyman and an agent of Polish intelligence.

The individuals arrested – KUSHEVICH Aleksandra, the clergyman’s wife, of no fixed occupation; DANILEVICH Borys, teacher; and BIELETSKAYA Tamara, who worked as a ticket seller in the Ovruch train station prior to her arrest – have admitted to being engaged in espionage activities, in the course of which

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5 Pavel Zaplatinsky was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 94 dated 10 September 1937) and executed on 14 September 1937 in Kiev.
6 Panteleyemon Pavlishyn, imprisoned in Zhytomyr, was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 53 dated 28 September 1937) and executed on 5 October 1937 in Kiev.
7 Dmitry Yosifovich Miskov was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 94 dated 10 September 1937) and executed on 15 September 1937 in Kiev.
8 Grigory Petrovich Idiesis was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 94 dated 10 September 1937) and executed on 14 September 1937 in Kiev.
9 The person in question is probably Mikhail Viktorovich Kashubsky (born 1904), a priest of the orthodox cathedral in Ovruch. Arrested in 1937, sentenced to death on 25 September 1937, executed on 28 September 1937 in Zhytomyr.
they were connected to the Polish intelligence operative, Mikhail KOSHUBSKY, who is currently being held in prison.

From the statements given by BIELETSKAYA, we have learned that she used her contacts among the Red Army command of the Ovruch garrison without their knowledge, in order to attain better results in the course of her work as a spy.

The “Lektor” case – on the basis of the statements given by LAKH Ilia Mykhailovich, a Polish fugitive who, prior to his arrest in the town of Cherkasy, worked as a German teacher, and was an important espionage and diversionist outpost in the town of Kansk, Krasnoyarsk krai, has been exposed.

LAKH confessed to being a member of Polish intelligence.

The “Tabachnik” case – RATKIEWICZ Józef, son of Iwan, a Polish spy who, before his arrest in the town of Cherkasy, worked as a locksmith in a tobacco factory, has confessed to being an operative of Polish intelligence, which in 1932 ordered him to cross the Soviet border along with 8 other Polish agents.

As a consequence of the statements given by RATKIEWICZ, we were able to expose an espionage network in the cities of Pervouralsk and Zlatoust.

POW [Polish Military Organisation] structures

The “Polonisatory” case – in the city of Kiev as well as in other raions of the Kiev oblast, we have managed to eliminate a POW group which has infiltrated the party and government apparatus.

The individuals arrested in connection to the above case: ROZUMOWICZ, a Polish national, first secretary of the Kaniv RPK of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine (KP(b)U), and WOJNOWSKI (a Polish national), secretary of the Kaniv RPK of the KP(b)U, have confessed to being members of the POW, as well as to actively engaging in nationalist, counter-revolutionary activities and to perpetuating agricultural sabotage.

Both ROZUMOWICZ and WOJNOWSKI concealed their nationality until the time of their arrest.

In the case referred to above, a total of 8 Polish nationals were arrested, all of them holding top positions in the government and party apparatus.

A similar group consisting of 7 persons was broken up in the city of Kiev and other raions of the Kiev oblast; this group also comprised responsible party officials, including SEKANOVICH, the head of the Pereyeslav RPK and former member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR –.

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10 Ilia Mikhailovich Lakh was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol No. 43 dated 23 September 1937) and executed on 28 September 1937 in Kiev.

11 Józef Ratkiewicz was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 43 dated 23 September 1937) and executed on 28 September 1937 in Kiev.
The “Organist” case – a Polish espionage and diversionist network of the POW was exposed and eliminated in the Uman, Monastyrshchyna, Plyskiv and Pohrebsche raions. The members of this network were mostly Polish nationals, former long-term employees of sugar refineries.

The aforementioned POW network operating in the sugar industry was also linked, through PLA VINSKY, one of its members and chief engineer of the sugar refinery in Tsibulev, with the head of a counter-revolutionary, rightist conspiracy in the sugar industry SINIAKOV, who prior to his arrest held the position of the director of the Kiev sugar manufacturing trust.

In the course of the present case, we have also managed to expose a Ukrainian counter-revolutionary insurgent group composed of former Petliura loyalists, political mobsters and kulaks, designed to perform diversionist acts in the period of mobilisation.

In connection with the present case a total of 30 persons have been arrested.

The “Druzhba” case – this case resulted in the discovery and dismantling of a counter-revolutionary, nationalist POW network in Bila Tserkva, established some time ago by the Catholic priests PIETKIEWICZ and ŻMIGRODZKI.

In the course of the investigation it came to light that the organisation was engaged in active preparations of insurgent diversionist units which were to be used at the time of mobilisation.

By utilising its links to the Polish consulate in Kiev, the organisation was able to engage in espionage activities.

Statements given by the members of this network – SIERIEDNIKI, SŁOMCZINSKI, POLINKIEWICZ and others – confirm that the organisation intended to provide young Polish nationals with education in the spirit of nationalism, and had illegally sent Polish youths to Poland. Between 1926 and 1930, over 40 persons crossed the Soviet border in this manner.

In connection with the case, a total of 22 persons were arrested.

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b In the original: PIEDKIEWICZ.
c In the original: ŻMIGRODZKI.

12 Adolf Pietkiewicz (1871–1933), alumnus of the Zhytomyr seminary. He held the office of administrator in the following parishes: from 1902 to 1904 Kuniv, from 1905 to 1910 Ushomyr, from 1914 to 1920 Ostropol, from 1923 to 1925 Krasilov; he was also a temporary administrator in Kulchiny. He also worked in Bila Tserkva. Arrested on 7 February 1930, held in prison facilities in Bila Tserkva, Kharkiv and Kiev. Sentenced on 10 May 1930 by the GPU Council to 3 years imprisonment. He was placed in a prison in Yaroslavl, and in August 1932 was transferred to Arkhangelsk, where he died.

13 Józef Żmigrodzki (born 1880), alumnus of the Zhytomyr seminary; from 1903 he was the vicar of the St. Alexander parish in Kiev; from 1910 administrator of the St. Nikolai parish in Kiev. Arrested on 14 January 1930, held in prison facilities in Kiev and Yaroslavl. Sentenced on 10 May 1930 by the Ukrainian SSR GPU Council to 7 years imprisonment. Transferred to a lazarette in the Solovetsky Islands, he died in May (?) 1935.
Espionage and diversionist organisations

The “Lesniki” case – In connection with this case we have begun to break up an espionage and diversionist organisation in the Korosten okrug. The organisation in question was established by Polish intelligence services in the years 1924–1925.

In connection to the present case, the following arrests were made: KUZHMIN Aleksandr Ilyich, the Centrospirt representative in Olevsk; SHVIED Ulyan, a former member of the KP(b)U, a forester of the Olevsk lespromkhoz; GULIMOV Fiodor Yakovlevich, assistant plenipotentiary for government supplies of the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) in the Olevsk raion, and others.\(^\text{14}\)

The organisation is made up mostly of Polish refugees.

Individual members of the organisation: KUZHMIN, SAVCHUK\(^\text{15}\) and others have turned out to be operatives of the intelligence department of the Kiev VO, and have taken advantage of their employment in that department to bring further benefits to the Polish intelligence services.

In connection with the case, a total of 17 persons were arrested.

The “Ostatki” case – As a result of the statements given by CESARUK Ignacy son of Markian, a Polish refugee, former member of the KP(b)U and member of the POW arrested in Novohrad-Volynskyi, an important Polish espionage and diversionist organisation was exposed in the Novohrad-Volynskyi okrug. The organisation in question was established by the Volhynia POW Centre, i.e. by OŁDAKOWSKI\(^\text{16}\) and others.

Espionage and diversionist activities of the Polish consulate in Kiev

In the city of Kiev, the following clients of the Polish consulate have been arrested: OSTROVSKY Semyon Yevgenevich,\(^\text{17}\) a nobleman, working as a

\(^{14}\) Aleksandr Ilyich Kuzhmin, Ulyan Shvied and Fiodor Jakovlevich Gulimov, held in the Zhytomyr prison, sentenced to death by decision of the USSR NKVD dvoika (protocol no. 46 dated 25 September 1937) and executed on 28 September 1937 in Kiev.

\(^{15}\) Sergei Grigorevich Savchuk, held in prison in Zhytomyr, was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 46 dated 25 September 1937) and executed on 28 September 1937 in Kiev.

\(^{16}\) Eugeniusz Ołdakowski (1897 or 1899–1937), a Communist activist; from 1925 head of the organisational committee for the establishment of the Marchlewski Polish National Raion; from 1934 political editor of the State Publishing House for National Minorities in Kharkiv; responsible secretary of the Committee for Fuels of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR. Arrested on 18 April 1935 by the Ukrainian SSR NKVD UGB, sentenced to death on 15–17 February 1936 by the VT (Military Tribunal) for the Kiev VO; by resolution of the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court dated 7 April 1936, the punishment was reduced to 10 years’ imprisonment; however, by decision of the UNKVD troika of the Chief Directorate for Construction in the Far North dated 12 September 1937, he was executed while in prison on 29 October 1937; rehabilitated in 1991.

\(^{17}\) Semyon Yevgenevich Ostrovsky (born 1900), arrested on 15 August 1937 by the Kiev Oblast UNKVD, sentenced to death by decision of the USSR NKVD troika (protocol no. 5 dated 31 August 1937). Location and date of execution remain unknown; rehabilitated in 1989.
technician at the “Elektroprom”; MILEWSKA Maria Gotfridowna, a Polish national, working as a messenger at the Oblpotriebsoyuz; GRINBERG Michael, son of Isaac, born in Poland, former member of the Communist Youth Union of Ukraine (LKSMU), trained as a radio technician; DZHEVITSKY Sigizmund Mykhailovich and others.

The statements given by the above individuals have exposed a substantial amount of espionage and diversionist activity of the Polish consulate in Kiev.

MILEWSKA has confessed to acting as a connection for the Polish consulate and to maintaining contacts with a network of 9 persons in the city of Kiev, including MATSUREVICH, the wife of a Kiev State University professor, YAZHEMSKY, technician at the South-Western Railroad Directorate, and others.

OSTROVSKY has admitted that he provided the Polish consulate with intelligence materials, and at the very same consulate he was allocated specific tasks which formed the basis for his diversionist activities in two factories located in the city of Kiev.

GRINBERG confessed that, by order of the consulate, he travelled to Kamianets-Podilskyi at the end of 1936 in order to gather intelligence on the garrison located there. Furthermore, the consulate also ordered him to gather information on aircraft manufacturing facilities located both in Ukraine and in other Soviet republics.

From the statements made by GRINBERG we have learned that the Polish consulate, in exchange for the active performance of his duties as a spy, promised to grant him substantial aid at a later stage, enabling him to legally enter Polish territory.

PINIŃSKI Władysław, son of Artur, a medical doctor arrested in Cherkasy, born in Poland to a family of rich landowners, has confessed that he established contact with the Polish consulate in Kiev in 1929 in connection with espionage activities.

On the basis of the statements provided by PINIŃSKI, an espionage network of informants working for the Polish consulate has been exposed in Cherkasy.

In the course of this operation, cases relating to a total of 93 persons were concluded and reviewed during the sessions held by the special troika, including 43 [persons allocated to] the first category and 50 [persons allocated to] the second [category].

As of today, we have concluded cases relating to 183 persons; special manifests with respect to these cases have been submitted to the USSR NKVD for approval.

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18 Maria Gotfridovna Milewska was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 27 dated 17 September 1937) and executed on 23 September 1937 in Kiev.
19 Sigizmund Mikhailovich Dzhevitsky was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 5 dated 31 August 1937). The date and location of his execution remain unknown.
20 Władysław Piniński (1871–1937), son of Artur Piniński, clan Jastrzębiec, and Joanna Ledóchowska. Sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 163 dated 22 October 1937) and executed on 1 November 1937 in Kiev.
Initial data concerning the operation aimed at disrupting the activities of the Polish counter-revolutionary espionage resistance has already allowed for certain operational conclusions to be drawn with respect to the main lines and directions of activity of Polish intelligence in the Kiev oblast.

Polish intelligence services have, in the course of their activities, applied the following methods:

1. Intelligence operatives were transferred directly from Poland to the border okrugs and to the city of Kiev, in order to engage in active intelligence operations in fortified regions and military garrisons.

   These intelligence operatives were used both for direct intelligence [operations] as well as for establishing contacts with existing espionage outposts and networks, and for establishing new ones.

   As a rule, agents who infiltrate the USSR from abroad are armed with revolvers and grenades in order to facilitate armed incursions in the event of coming into contact with border control forces.

   Polish intelligence equips its operatives with a variety of Soviet documents, including passports.

2. Intelligence operations are performed by means of espionage outposts (residenturas) and networks established at different times by Polish intelligence operatives.

   It is worth noting that some of the intelligence outposts exposed through our operations have been established by persons recruited from the ranks of Polish army officers and legionnaires, who, while the Polish forces were being withdrawn from Ukraine, remained behind deliberately in order to carry on their illegal activities in this area.

   The aforementioned outposts, in parallel to their espionage activities, were designed to perpetuate subversion in the period of mobilisation. For this purpose, they have spawned various diversionist and insurgent organisations and groups.

   [3.] Current seditionist activities.

   The intelligence outposts have maintained contact with foreign centres by means of special messengers who carried information across the border.

   Some of them, however, have changed their [strategy] and established direct contact with the Polish general consulate in Kiev.

   The network of intelligence outposts spanned border okrugs and raions, sugar refineries and alcohol distillation plants, forestry and transportation sectors.

   For the Polish intelligence services, the facilities referred to above have formed a particularly valuable foundation upon which counter-revolutionary formations could be built, since it was there that a large number of old workers – Polish nationals with counter-revolutionary mindsets, closely linked to the former great landowners who have [now] emigrated to Poland – have been “preserved”.

   It must be mentioned that espionage outposts were mostly composed of Polish fugitives – political refugees who have arrived from Poland at various times, Razvedupr operatives as well as former smugglers.
4. Usage of the widespread underground POW network and other counter-revolutionary formations, whose common cause for action is the desire to separate Ukraine from the USSR, and to recreate “Greater Poland” in its pre-1772 borders.

The actions taken by the intelligence networks were aimed at creating insurgent groups, at infiltrating the state and party apparatus, and at using all legal means available for the purposes of nationalist and counter-revolutionary activities.

[5.] Usage of organisation operatives for espionage and subversion.

On the basis of the cases now established (“Pulemiot”, “Organist”, “Legionery”), we were able to learn that the anti-Soviet organisations engaging in insurgent and subversive activities are mostly composed of: former members of political mobster groups, former Petliura loyalists, Galicians, kulaks, and in some cases criminals.

We have also determined that Polish counter-revolutionary formations have allied themselves with Ukrainian nationalist organisations.

6. Organising and conducting espionage and diversionist activities through the Polish general consulate.

The consulate’s intelligence activities encompass the following areas:

a) military espionage, gathering intelligence on the defence industry and on enterprises which provide supplies for the military;

b) establishing subversive networks of agents for the mobilisation period;

c) perpetuating seditious activities and sabotage in industry and agriculture, using a widespread network of agents;

d) investigating the political and economic status of citizens on various social strata in both urban and rural areas.

It has been determined in the course of investigating the respective cases that the consulate has resorted to mass recruitment of its clients, especially those of Polish origin.

A peculiar feature of this process is that in order to facilitate the recruitment of individuals whose desire is to depart for Poland, the consulate invents a variety of artificial barriers related to the given person’s departure and uses that fact in the process of recruitment.

In order to maintain links with its agents, the consulate uses elderly women with patriotic convictions as connections, taking advantage of the fact that their appearance gives no cause for suspicion.

In the course of these activities, the consulate makes use of the clergy to facilitate espionage and nationalist activities.

From the analysis of all the cases, we have concluded that the counter-revolutionary and espionage formations being broken up are mostly linked to the 5th intelligence office (ekspozytura) in Lviv, to intelligence units in Sarny and Rokitno, to the intelligence services based in the border regions, as well as to the Polish general consulate in Kiev.

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*Was: 3.

*Was: 4.
Although in the course of our future operations we shall concentrate on the final elimination of the counter-revolutionary, espionage-minded and insurgent underground, our direct operational task remains to investigate the operations of the 2nd Department of the Polish General Staff in the Kiev region.

Head officer of the Kiev Oblast UNKVD
Senior Major of State Security
(—) SHAROV

no. 624040
“27” August 1937
City of Kiev

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 30 (1951), Spr. 67, pp. 27–45.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

21 Nikolai Davidovich Sharov-Shavier (1897–1939), from 1919 member of the CheKa; from 1920 CheKa representative for the Odessa gubernia; from May 1920 head officer of the Secret Operations Department (SOCh) and deputy head of CheKa for the Mykolaiv gubernia; from 10 October 1921 head officer of the Secret Operations Department and deputy head of CheKa for the Volhynia gubernia; from 8 February 1922 head officer of the Secret Operations Department and deputy head of GPU for the Yekaterinoslav gubernia; from 13 October 1923 head officer of the Prison Facility Division (TO) of the Economic Department (EKU) of the RSFSR GPU; from 18 December 1923 head officer of the First Special Department of the Counter-Intelligence Department (KRO) of the OGPU Empowered Agency (PP) in the Leningrad VO, and from 6 March 1924 assistant head officer of the OGPU PP KRO in the Leningrad VO; from 21 July 1926 acting head officer of the Special Section and deputy head officer of the OGPU PP KRO; from 23 January 1930 head officer of the Counter-Intelligence Department (KRO) and the Border Protection Directorate of the OGPU PP in the Leningrad VO; from 20 April 1932 deputy empowered representative of the OGPU in the Belarusian VO; from 31 July 1934 deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic; from 31 May 1935 head officer of the UNKVD in the Kiev oblast; from 29 December 1937 recalled to the USSR NKVD; from 10 January 1938 head officer of the UNKVD in the Stalingrad oblast. Arrested on 27 September 1938, sentenced to death on 22 February 1939 by the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court and executed on the same day; never rehabilitated.
No. 5

21 September 1937, Kiev. Message from the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Israel Leplevsky, to the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Yezhov, concerning the progress of the “Polish operation”

Top secret

To: People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR
Commissar-General for State Security
Comrade YEZHOV N. I.

In connection with the “Polish operation” in the Ukrainian territory, 8869 persons have been arrested as of today.

Our activities aimed at exposing and dismantling the Polish intelligence network are taking place mostly in the border oblasts (Kiev oblast – 2303 persons arrested, Vinnytsia oblast – 2145 persons arrested) as well as in the most prominent industrial centres of Ukraine (Kharkiv [oblast] – 1194 persons arrested, Dnipropetrovsk [oblast] – 805 persons arrested, Donetsk [oblast] – 786 persons arrested).

The following entities have been eliminated:
1. 125 espionage outposts (residenturas),
2. 38 Polish nationalist organisations (POW),
3. 69 diversionist and insurgent organisations.

Our operationally prepared offensive is directed against the following groups which form the basis of enemy activities: political refugees, [persons who have arrived in the course of] exchange [of political prisoners], fugitives, persons who maintain contact with the consulate, church and clergy-related circles, former legionnaires, prisoners of war and deserters from the Polish Armed Forces, former members of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), members of Polish nationalist organisations, long-term employees of great Polish landowners, Galicians and Razvedupr operatives.

In accordance with the information gathered in the course of investigation, the enemy activities were concentrated around the following areas:
1. Infiltration of the party and government apparatus by prominent agents for the purposes of espionage and sedition;
2. Establishment of subversive groups in the industry and in those raions located near the border where railway nodes, strategic facilities and fortified regions are situated;
3. Establishment of intelligence outposts in places where important military forces remain stationed, as well as in important administrative centres;
4. Establishment of mass nationalist movements in areas populated by Poles (using former POW operatives) for the purposes of spreading disorganisation and
perpetuating sabotage at the present time, as well as for the purposes of perpetuating subversive and insurgent activities at the time of war;

5. Establishment of links with Ukrainian nationalist circles using the connections of the consulate as well as Galician intelligence operatives;

6. Establishment of religious nationalist groups through the Catholic clergy and church activists, mostly in Polish villages.

The enemy modes of operation and methods of infiltration of our ranks by hostile agents comprise the following activities:

1. The most significant intelligence groups have been established by Polish nationals at the time of the civil war, when Piłsudski loyalists were being introduced into the Party and then gradually ushered up its ranks (such as the former secretary of the Vinnytsia obkom of the KP(b)U BEGAILO, the former NKID representative PIOTROVSKY, the former operative of the Special Department of the 12th Army KERSHKOVSKY, the former head of the Polish Bureau of the CC KP(b)U, LAZOVERT, the former GPU operative, head of the Special Chamber of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Court RUDOMINO, and others).

As the Polish Armed Forces retreated from Ukrainian territory, many intelligence outposts were established, comprising army officers/legionnaires, operatives of Polish law enforcement agencies, local POW commanders and the local nationalist element (SKORNIEWSKI, officer of the Polish Armed Forces; KNAP, Polish intelligence operative; KOCHEVSKY, counter-intelligence operative; ŻDACEWSKI, legionnaire, and others).

3. In recent years, Piłsudski loyalists – who have been responsible for a significant portion of organisational work behind nationalist espionage and diversionist groups – have infiltrated the Soviet Union disguised as political refugees, allegedly arriving in the course of exchange of political prisoners. These

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1 Adolf Piotrowski (1887–1937), Communist activist; from 1904 member of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party–All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (RSDRP–VKP(b)); in 1925–1934 an operative of the diplomatic corps; from 1934 representative of the NKVD in the Ukraine. Arrested on 24 July 1937 by the NKVD UGB of the Ukrainian SSR. Sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 17 dated 13 September 1937) and executed on 17 September 1937 in Kiev; rehabilitated in 1957.

2 Samuel Lazover (1885–1937), a communist; from 1904 member of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL); from 1917 representative of the Commissariat for Polish Affairs in the Moscow okrug; from 1919 member of the Executive Bureau of the Communist Workers Party of Poland (KPRP) Groups in Russia and secretary of the Polish Bureau for Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (RKP(b)); between 1923–1930 secretary of the Polish Bureau of the KP(b)U; from 1926 member of the Polish Bureau of the Central Committee of the VKP(b); in 1931 state arbitrator for the Ukrainian SSR government. Arrested on 11 March 1937 by the NKVD UGB of the Ukrainian SSR. Sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 34 dated 22 September 1937) and executed on 25 September 1937 in Kiev; rehabilitated in 1956.

3 Ignacy Żdacewski (1901–1937), arrested on 22 May 1937 by the Horlivka Municipal Department of the UNKVD for the Donetsk oblast, sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 14 dated 19 September 1937) and executed on 23 September 1937 in the city of Stalino; rehabilitated in 1962.
included SCHMIDT-DOBERSKY, the former sector chief of Giprokoks; SŁOWACKI, the former director of the alcohol manufacturing trust in Kiev; SKAKOVSKY, a dangerous diversionist; WAGNER, the former director of a synthetic rubber factory in Kharkiv; ŻYWINISKI, former secretary of the Dibrova District Committee of the Communist Party of Poland (KPP), and others.

4. Police provocateurs, who have already proven their worth in the course of their traitorous exploits in Poland, were smuggled into the Soviet Union, disguised as fugitives attempting to evade persecution, in order to engage in large-scale organisational work as well as diversionist and intelligence activities. These included LIPENKO-KURTIAK, member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU)’s Central Committee Secretariat; YAVORSKY, secretary of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League of Western Ukraine (KZMZO); ZARVA, member of the KPZU Central Committee Secretariat; GOCANIUK-MARCHENKO, and others.

5. The Poles have often installed their most trustworthy agents in the network of the Razvedupr, our foreign intelligence apparatus, and have encouraged our own agents to switch sides; subsequently, they have managed to position those agents in the most critical locations (YAKOVCHUK, a dangerous diversionist; the Razvedupr operatives group; KINITIUK, ZALOMSKY and others).

6. By turning the agents of the Razvedupr and the NKVD to their side and by obtaining our official personnel data from these agents, the enemy, using the aforementioned agents, has attempted – and in some cases succeeded – in recruiting the non-secret operatives of the Intelligence Directorate (RU) and the NKVD (head officer of the Intelligence Department of the Kiev Military District MAKARIEVICH; the department head officer of the Intelligence Department of the Kiev Military District PUSHKARIEV; the head officer of the border agency of the Intelligence Department in Kamianets-Podilskyi SAVCHENKO; the deputy head officer of the 3rd Department of the NKVD Oblast Directorate in Donetsk and former operative of the Foreign Department (INO) ORLOVSKY, and others).

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4 Seweryn Słowacki-Świętochowski (1897–1937), arrested on 29 September 1936 by the NKVD UGB of the Ukrainian SSR. Sentenced to death by decision of the Military Tribunal (VT) of the Kiev VO, commuted to 10 years’ imprisonment. Judgement of the Military Tribunal approved on 23 November 1937 by resolution of the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court. After new materials surfaced, a new investigation was launched on 7 September 1937 and Słowacki-Świętochowski was transferred from the location of his imprisonment to participate in the trial. Sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 60 dated 1 September 1937) and executed on 4 September 1937 in Kiev.

5 Matwiej Jaworski vel Dubnicki (born 1897) former member of BP and secretary of the KC KPZU, before the arrest he was the party's office manager RPK Makhnovist region (Vinnytsia circuit). Arrested on 27 I 1935 by UNKVD Vinnytsia circuit, was sentenced in October 1935 by the Kiev WO WT for 10 years in prison. He died on 13 I 1939. Rehabilitated in 1958.

6 Ivan Vasilievich Zarva (1903–1937), arrested on 17 July 1937 by the Kiev Oblast Directorate of the NKVD. Sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 17 dated 13 September 1937) and executed on 17 September 1937; rehabilitated in 1961.

7 Vasily Mikhailovich Orlovsky-Goroshchyk (1898–1937), from 1921 member of the CheKa; between 1927 and 1929 representative of the INO and KRO of the Kiev Okrug Department of the GPU; in 1929–1931 senior representative and then assistant head officer of the Special Section of the GPU.
7. Prominent Polish agents who at some point had been convicted and who had served their time resumed their communications with Polish intelligence services abroad and with Polish diplomatic missions in the USSR, continuing their intelligence and diversionist operations (LIPIŃSKI, a Polish army officer who returned from labour camp in 1935; SVIONTEK, a POW operative, and others).

8. In the period between 1930 and 1932, the Poles managed to implant a significant number of their agents in our industry; these agents disguised themselves as foreign specialists and established a number of diversionist cells in the Donbas (groups directed by PAGUTA and WOLSKI, both of them engineers, as well as other groups).

9. The Poles have taken extensive advantage of the kulaks and other anti-Soviet elements who fled to Poland at an earlier stage, using them and their contacts in the process of establishing espionage and diversionist groups in the border areas, subsequently moving the said groups into our industry and transport (the LANGE group, the IGNATIUK group, the ANTONIUK group and others). There are up to 20,000 refugees from the border areas now residing in the industrialised raions of the Ukraine, including those who were resettled in the manner provided for in 1935.

10. Polish missions in Kiev and Kharkiv have regularly spawned espionage and diversionist cells and organised nationalist resistance groups, which were instructed to prepare a series of bombings and arsons in the event of war (the case of Father KWAŚNIEWSKI, the GORIETSKY case; the GUYSKY brothers case, the ŻDANIECKI case, the case of Rev. SKWIRECKI and others).

Over the last three months, a total of 29 Polish agents who have infiltrated our territory from abroad have been captured; 14 of those agents arrived armed with revolvers and grenades.

Operational Sector in Kiev; in 1936–1937 head officer of the Special Section of the UNKVD for the Donetsk oblast. Arrested on 28 August 1937 by the USSR NKVD and sentenced to death under a special procedure by decision of the USSR NKVD Commission, Prosecutor of the USSR and President of the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court dated 8 October 1937. Executed on 11 October 1937; rehabilitated in 1989.

Yosif Potapovich Antoniuk, Dionisiy Jakovlevich Mosieychuk and Foma Savovich Mosieychuk were sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 5 dated 31 August 1937). The date and location of their executions remain unknown.

Zygmunt Kwaśniewski (1877–1937), alumnus of the Zhytomyr seminary, worked in churches in Proskurov, Kiev and Bratslav until 1920; from 1920 in the Proskurov parish. Arrested in 1920, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1927, 1930 on suspicion of espionage for the benefit of Poland. On 27 August 1930, he was sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment (sentence deferred) and loss of civil rights for 3 years. Between 1930–1936 he worked as a church minister in Rostov-on-Don and then in the church of St. Alexander and St. Nikolai in Kiev. Arrested on 3 June 1937, sentenced to death by decision of the Special Board (OSO) of the USSR NKVD (protocol number and date of execution remain unknown); rehabilitated in 1989.

Wincenty Skwirecki (born 1888), from 1914 administrator of the Alexandrovsk chapel, in 1928 he worked in the Konstantinovka parish in the Crimea; in the first half of the 1930s in the Dnipropetrovsk parish. Arrested on 28 June 1937. Sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD dated 9 November 1937 (protocol number and date of execution remain unknown); rehabilitated in 1989.
1. Intelligence outposts

According to the information from 19 September, in the Ukraine a total of 125 espionage groups and outposts have been eliminated, including:

Kiev and Kiev oblast: ................................................................. 42
Vinnytsia oblast: ................................................................. 21
Donetsk oblast: ................................................................. 17
Dnipropetrovsk oblast: .......................................................... 16
Kharkiv oblast: ........................................................................ 15
Odessa oblast: ................................................................. 9
Chernihiv oblast: ................................................................. 3

In right-bank Ukraine, the most active intelligence outposts were established by Polish nationals in large administrative centres, near important railway junctions (Korosten, Shepetivka, Koziatyn, Zhmerynka, Hrechany), as well as in those territories where large garrisons and fortified regions are located (Kiev, Zhytomyr, Berdychiv, Vinnytsia, Proskurov, Novohrad-Volynskyi, Shepetivka, Kamianets-Podilskyi).

1. In Kiev and in the NKID apparatus, an espionage group has been exposed. The NKID representative in Ukraine, PIOTROVSKY, a former member of the Communist Party of Poland (KPP), who had arrived in the USSR by way of personnel exchange, was recruited by the Poles in 1921 through his wife’s brother – the head officer of the Political Referat (office) of the 2nd Department of the Polish General Staff, BIRNBAUM. While working in the NKID structures, PIOTROVSKY engaged in intense espionage activities for the benefit of Poland, and has systematically provided the Poles with critically important information with respect to the international politics of the [Soviet] Union. In Kiev, he maintained contact with KARSZO-SIEDLEWSKI, the Polish consul.

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a The number obtained by summing up the numbers from individual oblasts is 123. This difference may be due to the fact that the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) was omitted, or due to erroneous data.

b In the original: SIEDLECKI. The same spelling was also used elsewhere in the document.

11 This refers to an exchange of political prisoners.

12 Jan Karszo-Siedlewski (1891–1955), nom de guerre “Mikado,” diplomat, brother of Polish senator Tadeusz Karszo-Siedlewski; in 1919–1920 with the MFA, later to 1922 with the Polish Consulate General in Opole; until December 1922 in the Political and Economic Dept. of MFA; from the end of 1922 to end of 1923 first secretary of the Polish representation in Belgrade, later in the Political and Economic Dept. of MFA; from the end of 1924 to 1930, adviser with the Polish representation in Prague, later again in the MFA; in years 1931–1932 adviser with the Polish representation in Moscow, from 1 May 1932 to 12 April 1934 head of the Polish Consulate General in Kharkiv; from April to the end of July 1934 adviser with the Polish Embassy in Moscow; from 1 August 1934 head of the Polish Consulate General in Kiev; at the same time from July 1932 to November 1937 head of the “Karsz” intelligence unit of Sect. II of the Main Staff in Kiev; from the end of September 1937 again with the MFA; in 1938–1942 Polish representative in Tehran, also accredited in Afghanistan and Iraq; from 1942 to 1943 head of the Polish Consulate General in Beirut (Polish representative in Lebanon and Syria), later until 1945 Deputy General Secretary of the MFA, at the same time from January 1944 head of the Western Dept. of MFA; after 1945 emigrated to the USA.
KARZOS-SIEDLEWSKI used PIOTROVSKY to maintain contact with the former head of the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK) of the Ukrainian SSR, LUBCHENKO, and to direct Ukrainian nationalist organisations in such a manner as to ensure that they act in accordance with Polish interests. Apart from PIOTROVSKY, other Polish agents operating within the NKID included YUSHKEVICH and BREDENKO.

YUSHKEVICH, a deputy representative of the NKID, was recruited by the Poles in 1919 during the occupation of Belorussia. BREDENKO, the secretary of the NKID representative, was recruited by the Polish intelligence services in 1932 during his stay in Turkey, in connection with his work in the NKID.

2. The Polish consulate in Kiev has created a far-reaching network of intelligence cells.

An espionage outpost of the Polish consulate was exposed in Kiev, comprising the following persons: Maria SENDZIKOVSKAYA, engineer’s wife; SENDZIKOVSKY Karl, former operative of the Special Department of the Kiev VO; KLIMENKO Georgy, lawyer; SAGUTSKAYA, employee of the theatre in the Kiev VO, and others.

SENDZIKOVSKAYA is a dedicated activist of the POW command in Kiev and a well-qualified intelligence operative. KLIMENKO was recruited by the Polish intelligence in 1921 when he was working in the Special Department of the Kiev VO. The SENDZIKOVSKAYA/KLIMENKO outpost, until recently under direct control of the Polish consulate in Kiev, pursued a series of very intense operations, aimed at the Kiev garrison and industrial facilities.

3. Intelligence activities of the Polish nationals originating from political prisoner exchange were exposed in connection with the case of the former Zakordot operatives (the Zakordot was a Red Army Intelligence Department organisation operating in Poland between 1921 and 1924). The individuals in question included ŁYSIAK-MIELNIK, GINZBURG, BERGER and others. All these individuals in the period between 1923 and 1924 had been serving time in Polish prisons, where they were recruited for intelligence work. In 1925 they were transferred to the USSR “by way of prisoner exchange.”

With respect to this case, it needs to be stated that the Poles controlled the primary Zakordot network and have managed to infiltrate the USSR on a mass scale, sending in their agents by way of prisoner exchange programmes.

4. In Kiev and a number of other cities in right-bank Ukraine we have detected a number of intelligence networks established by Poles who were former Galicians – soldiers of the [Ukrainian] Galician Army. Of particular importance is a group of officers who began their careers in the Austrian-Hungarian army and who then

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13 Mikhail Vinkientievich Yushkevich was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 34 dated 22 September 1937). The date and location of his execution remain unknown.

14 Maria Vikentievna Sendzikovskaya, a Kiev resident and St. Nikolai church parishioner. Arrested on 8 August 1937, she was sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the Ukrainian SSR UNKVD for the Kiev oblast (protocol no. 34 dated 22 September 1937).
migrated to the Galician Army – NAZARUK, RISHKA and others. By expanding their contacts amongst Ukrainian nationalists, they have managed to extend their activities to cover many significant locations, including, first and foremost, military garrisons in the Vinnytsia and Kiev oblasts (Vinnytsia, Kiev, Zhmerynka, Uman, Kamianets-Podilskyi).

A substantial number of Galicians (several hundred), who originated from the vestiges of the [Ukrainian] Galician Army which had occupied Ukraine, or who later arrived from Bohemia, have also managed to infiltrate our militia forces, with entire groups of Galicians installing themselves within militia ranks.

5. Apart from the Galicians, Polish intelligence has also taken extensive advantage of the local nationalists. In 1930, the commanders of a Ukrainian insurgent network – IGNATENKO, NAZARENKO and BELORUS – made their way to Poland. It was there that they were recruited by the Poles and were later systematically transferred to the [Soviet] Union for the purposes of diversionist and espionage activities. Through these individuals, the Poles have succeeded in establishing combat groups and diversionist cells in a number of raions of the Zhytomyr okrug.

They also put together an intelligence network operating in the Kiev, Zhytomyr and Novohrad-Volynskyi garrisons as well as other garrisons.

These groups were prepared to commit mass acts of sabotage and guerrilla warfare in the vicinity of the front if war broke out. In the course of dismantling this organisation, we confiscated one fully operational heavy machine gun, 1000 bullets for the said machine gun, as well as 11 other firearms.

6. On the basis of a number of cases, we have learned that Polish intelligence operatives have infiltrated the NKVD apparatus on various levels.

a) In the Southern Enterprises of the Gosgeosyomka, the NKVD has detected an important intelligence network established by VERESHCHINSKY, a Polish intelligence operative and head officer of the Gosgeosyomka planning department. The network in question comprised the following individuals: GLUBOKOVSKY – deputy head of the Southern Enterprises; MATVEYEV – head of camera manufacturing operations; LEUSOV – head of photographic services; SHKARABA – head of the drafting division, and others. Thanks to this network of agents, the Poles managed to obtain a number of strictly confidential materials with defence significance (diagrams illustrating works carried out in the Vinnytsia, Odessa and Koziatyn sectors and others, aerodrome plans, and data concerning many strategic railroad nodes). In the course of our investigation, we have learned that a group of ex-specialists managed to infiltrate the Southern Enterprises of the Gosgeosyomka. These hostile operatives, apart from espionage, have also perpetrated substantial numbers of sabotage activities.

b) Another group of Polish agents detected was that of former NKVD UGB operatives, whom the Poles managed to persuade to switch sides when they were operating on Polish territory. In connection to this case, the following arrests were made: ORLOVSKY, a former deputy head officer of the 3rd Department of the NKVD Oblast Directorate in Donetsk, in 1928–1929 linked to the INO in an
official capacity; LUGOVOY Ilia,\(^{15}\) a former operative of the NKVD Oblast Directorate in Kiev, who visited Poland for the purposes of carrying out tasks assigned to him by the INO (it was in Poland that the Poles managed to turn this agent to their side); OGON-DOGANOVSKY, an INO operative who was recruited by Polish and Romanian intelligence services; AUZEN – a former special forces operative whose most recent position was that of head officer of the Criminal Department of the Workers’ and Farmers’ Militia of the Ukrainian SSR. We have determined that by recruiting our foreign intelligence operatives, the Poles have been able to obtain information concerning our officials responsible for the management of our agents, and subsequently to recruit those agents through the said officials.

c) A group of Polish agents employed in the border protection corps has been exposed. KULESHA – head officer of the operational department of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD UPVO; RYKOV – deputy head officer of the 20th border control unit; YEVTODEV – a former operative of the Yampil border control unit.

All of the aforementioned agents were recruited by the Poles in the course of sessions of the commission for international conflicts. We have learned that the Poles took considerable advantage of the meetings they held with our operatives. In the course of those meetings the Poles serve them alcohol; as a result, our border control operatives, being in a state of intoxication, are more likely to give away their weaknesses, which in turn facilitates their recruitment.

d) In Podolia, a large number of Polish intelligence operatives has been detected amongst former staff of the criminal services. DOMOSIUK-KUCHEVSKY, a counter-intelligence operative whom the Poles ordered to stay in the Ukraine in 1920, has managed to “squeeze” into the criminal service, where he was able at various times to recruit a total of 9 Criminal Division operatives. DOMOSIUK maintained regular contacts with Polish nationals across the border and, acting on their orders, he established diversionist cells near Proskurov, as well as near the Hrechany railway junction.

\(^{15}\) Ilia Polikarpovich Lugovoy (Vlasienko) (1898 or 1896–1937). According to his personal files, he served in the Red Guard in 1917–1918 and subsequently, until the end of 1919, in a Ukrainian People’s Army (UNR) resistance force and in the UNR itself; in 1921 arrested by the CheKa of the Mykolaiv gubernia; from 1925 a secret agent of the Ukrainian SSR GPU, nom de guerre “Klin”; on numerous occasions he has crossed the Romanian border; in the autumn of 1926 he was arrested by the Siguranca (Romanian secret police); after his release he returned to the USSR. In 1928 he was ordered to infiltrate Polish territory using a false surname (Protsenko) by the INO of the Kiev Okrug Department of the GPU; he was recruited by the Polish intelligence under the nom de guerre “Dnepr,” upon his return to the USSR he contacted the GPU and, equipped with disinformation materials, he returned to Poland; after he handed in the said materials, he returned to the USSR but received no further tasks from the Polish intelligence, which prompted the GPU to put the game to an end. From November 1931, he was unofficial assistant to the representative of the Kiev Okrug Department of the GPU; he subsequently worked in the “Arsenal” factory in Kiev, and from January 1933 to 1935 he once again served as assistant to the representative of the Kiev Okrug Department of the GPU. Arrested on 20 August 1937, sentenced to death by decision of the dvoika of the Ukrainian USSR NKVD (protocol no. 34 dated 22 September 1937). Executed on 25 September 1937 in Kiev; rehabilitated in 1958.
7. A substantial Polish intelligence cell was detected amongst the Razvedupr operatives and subsequently broken up. The Poles recruited those operatives through the agents of our intelligence department who had been persuaded to work for Polish intelligence.

The head officer of the border intelligence unit in Kamianets-Podilskyi was recruited by his own agent, whom he had sent abroad on multiple occasions.

YAKOVCHUK, an agent of the Razvedupr, was planted there by the Poles in 1924, resulting in the entire Razvedupr diversionist network being revealed to the Poles. At the same time, acting on orders given to him by the Poles, YAKOVCHUK engaged in intelligence operations on our soil, drawing in a number of other Razvedupr operatives, and establishing a network in Kiev and many other locations. YAKOVCHUK also plotted bomb attacks against strategically important bridges on the Dnieper River.

As far as the industrial centres of the Ukraine are concerned, the Poles have planted the most active portion of their espionage and diversionist personnel in the following enterprises: in the metallurgical works in Stalino, Makiivka and Mariupol, in a nitrogen fertiliser manufacturing plant in Horlivka, in Factory no. 25 in Kostantynivka (a facility of importance for the defence industry), in the Dneprovski aluminium factory, and in aircraft manufacturing facility no. 29 in Zaporizhia; other facilities include the Piotrovo factory, the Molotov factory, the Karl Liebknecht factory, the Artiom factory, the Voroshilov military plant, the Dzerzhinsky factory in Dniprodzerzhynsk; the KHTZ and KHETZ in Kharkiv, and a number of other enterprises.

1. SKAKOWSKI, a Polish legionnaire and police provocateur who arrived in the [Soviet] Union in 1931 as a political refugee, has established diversionist groups in Magnitogorsk, in manufacturing facilities in Zaporizhia (factories which are of defensive importance) as well as near railroad nodes in the Vinnytsia oblast.

2. LIPIŃSKI, a Polish Armed Forces officer, one of the prominent agents of the 2nd Department of the Polish General Staff, arrived from Poland in 1923 and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. Following his release, LIPIŃSKI resumed his cooperation with the Polish consulate in Kharkiv and established a diversionist group operating within a number of enterprises in the Donbas, Kiev and Vinnytsia.

3. In 1932 an important Polish intelligence operative, PAGUTA, arrived in the [Soviet] Union, disguised as an engineer and foreign specialist. He successfully set up a diversionist network in manufacturing facility no. 25 – a plant which is of defence significance.
4. SAMILO, a Polish agent of some repute, infiltrated the [Soviet] Union posing as a fugitive. Thanks to his direct contacts with foreign centres as well as the Polish consulate in Kharkiv, SAMILO was able to establish intelligence and diversionist groups made up of Polish fugitives; these groups operated in the Karl Liebknecht and Artiom factories – facilities of defensive importance. SAMILO provided the Poles with strictly confidential information concerning the manufacturing activities of departments of defensive importance.

5. ŻDACEWSKI, a Legionnaire of the Polish Armed Forces, was one of those left behind in Ukraine after the departure of the Poles. While maintaining contact with the Polish consulate in Kharkiv, in 1923 he plotted attacks on a number of mining facilities. To that end, he managed to recruit gas concentration measurement technicians in those mining facilities. ŻDACEWSKI has also drawn up plans for the destruction of trains on the Horlivka–Panteleymonovka line.

2. Polish nationalist organisations (POW)

In the Vinnytsia oblast, we have managed to expose a large-scale network of interconnected POW cells, spanning across Vinnytsia, Zhmerynka, Proskurov, Shepetivka, Polonne, Berdychiv and Bratslav.

The POW command structure in Podolia consisted of the following individuals: BEGAILO, the former second secretary of the Vinnytsia obkom of the KP(b)U; LEVITSKY, the former head of the Polish Bureau of the Proskurov okruzhkom [okrug committee] of the KP(b)U; ROMANSKY, an instructor at the Vinnytsia obkom of the KP(b)U. The POW network in question established links with the local nationalist organisations – namely the Ukrainian nationalists as well as the Trotskyists. In addition to the selection, training and integration of nationalist groups, the base cells of the POW were also establishing combat units which were to be mobilised at the time of war. A number of prominent POW members – ZHUKOVSKY, an engineer from Vinnytsia; VIElfZHYNSKY, a sovkhoz director in Zhmerynka; SHOSTAK, head of the Polish school in Hrechany – established diversionist groups operating in the transport sector, in industrial facilities as well as in strategic fortifications.

A powerful POW network has been detected and dismantled in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast. The leaders of this organisation were: ŻYWIŃSKI, a POW emissary who arrived from Poland in 1931 as a political refugee, MATYEVSKY, who has managed to work his way into the party while acting on direct orders
of the intelligence services, and VILCHINSKY, who was recruited by DĄBAL in 1927.

The POW activities in the Dnipropetrovsk oblast were mostly directed at major industrial facilities in Dnipropetrovsk and Dniprodzerzhynsk, especially those of defensive importance.

Apart from communications maintained through the Polish consulate in Kharkiv, the network maintained contact with Poland through DEMINSKY, one of its agents, who traversed the Polish border on several occasions.

The organisation established diversionist groups in the Dzierżyński and Piotrowski factories, as well as the GRES and the steam locomotive maintenance facility.

Father SKWIRECKI was a Polish agent who headed the Dnipropetrovsk group, which he had put together at an earlier stage. He received orders from the Polish consulate in Kharkiv, as well as from ROMANSKI, an intelligence operative who arrived from Poland on a regular basis; he also maintained contacts with foreign circles related to the Catholic clergy and the Church.

SKWIRECKI was responsible for preparing youth groups to be spirited across the border to Poland, where they would later undergo special training in diversionist activities and espionage. Following the orders received from the consulate, SKWIRECKI and others established espionage cells in the defence industry and the railway transportation sector.

In the Donetsk oblast, we have managed to expose a POW network which was most recently under the leadership of NEVEU, a bishop currently resident in Moscow, as well as the leadership of the Polish consulate in Kharkiv. The individual cells of this network were mostly spread across the Stalino and Makiivka raions. One of the former POW members – SVIONTIEK – has established a diversionist group in the nitrogen fertiliser manufacturing plant in Horlivka. SVIONTIEK ordered the members of his group to perform bomb attacks against critical facilities within the manufacturing plant, resulting in the entire factory becoming disabled.

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17 Tomasz Dąbal (1890–1938), noms de guerre “Niezłomny”, “Tomasz”, “Włodzimierz Tęgoborski” – a Communist writer and political activist operating in both Poland and the USSR; from 1911 member of the Polish Peoples’ Party (PSL); in 1917 in the Polish Legions. Co-founder of the Republic of Tarnobrzeg (1918) and the Radical Farmers’ Party (1919); in 1919–1921 deputy of the Legislative Sejm; from 1920 member of the Communist Workers Party of Poland (KPRP). Arrested by the Polish police in 1921 and sentenced to 6 years’ imprisonment; in 1923 he was transferred to the USSR in the course of an exchange of political prisoners and subsequently became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belorussia (KP(b)B). Co-founder of the Red Peasant International (Krestintern); between 1923 and 1928 he became its deputy secretary general. Subsequently he operated as an educational activist in the Marchlewski Polish National Raion. Arrested on 26 December 1936, sentenced and executed on 21 August 1937 (works of popular history also specify 4 December 1938 as the date of his execution); rehabilitated in 1955.

18 Pie-Eugène Neveu (1877–1946), in 1905 consecrated priest in the French Assumptionist Order; from 1906 in St. Petersburg, from 1907 to 1926, priest in the Makiivka parish in the Donets Basin; in 1926 appointed as bishop and apostolic administrator in Moscow; in 1936 he temporarily moved to France, but was never granted a return visa to the USSR. He died in Paris.
In 1932, BACZYŃSKI, 19 a prominent POW member since 1915 and an agent planted in the Communist Party of Poland (KPP), arrived in the Donbas from Poland, disguised as a political refugee. He was ordered to transfer to the Donbas by a convicted POW emissary, ŻARSKI 20 for the purposes of establishing POW cells within the industry.

A substantial branch of the POW was exposed and broken up in the city of Kiev and the Kiev oblast. A former head of the Polish Bureau of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U and POW commander, LAZOVERT, established nationalist, espionage and diversionist groups in Kiev and a number of other cities. POW networks in the Kiev area were especially active in Uman, Zhytomyr, Korosten and in the former Marchlewski Polish National Raion.

The nationalist, espionage and diversionist units which the organisation consisted of were established by Polish consulates, POW operatives who maintained direct contact with countryside dwellers, and church activists.

The consulates recruit their informants *en masse* from amongst the numerous clients of the consulate and then gradually draw them into their nationalist agenda. The most efficient informants of the consulate are then transferred to the *kolkhozes* and the Machine and Tractor Stations (MTS) in order to perpetuate sabotage and build up combat formations intended to support the Polish Armed Forces in their advance during wartime.

1. Father KWAŚNIEWSKI, a head Polish intelligence operative with connections to the Polish consulate, has established organisational links with numerous religious and nationalist groups in the Kiev and Vinnytsia oblasts. In accordance with his orders, these organisations established illegal churches, pursued intensive patriotic activities and created combat groups for the purposes of providing support to the Polish Armed Forces during wartime.

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19 Władysław Baczyński (1893–1937), Communist activist, in 1908–1910 a member of the PPS; from 1916 in the SDKPiL, and then in the Communist Worker’s Party of Poland (KPRP). Arrested in 1922. After his release went to France, where he joined the French Communist Party; expelled from France in 1926. From 1926, secretary of the District Committee of the KPP in Sosnowiec; elected to the Polish Sejm in 1928; in 1929, sentenced to 5 years’ hard labour; in 1932, left for the USSR after an exchange of political prisoners. Arrested on 11 August 1937 by the Directorate of the NKVD in Donetsk region; upon the decision of a *dvoika* of the USSR NKVD (protocol no. 565 of 29 December 1937), was sentenced to death (date and place of execution unknown); rehabilitated in 1955.

20 Tadeusz Żarski (born 1896), teacher, activist of the Revolutionary Faction of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), he subsequently became a member of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the Communist Party of Upper Silesia; in 1919 leader of the Polish Peoples’ Party-Opposition (PPS-Opozycja) which merged with the KPRP; subsequently he became a member of the KPP; between 1928 and 1930 a deputy of the Polish Sejm. Arrested by the Polish police, in 1930 sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment. In 1932 he left for the USSR under the political prisoner exchange programme. Arrested by the Soviet security apparatus in 1934 and sentenced to death; executed on 9 April 1934 in Moscow.
2. Father SAMOSENKO\textsuperscript{21} established a nationalist network in Berdychiv and a number of surrounding raions. This network spawned a number of illegal churches, efficiently brainwashed Polish nationals and engaged in the establishment of combat groups.

3. In the Korosten raion, we have exposed an organisation established by LISOVSKY, a kulak, recruited by the consulate in 1933. This organisation comprised nationalist groups which initially concentrated on acts of sabotage in rural areas, but would later have been reconfigured to pursue diversionist activities.

On the basis of the investigative materials obtained, even at this stage the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. The current operational system employed at the border control points by the Red Army Intelligence Directorate facilitates infiltration by enemy agents. The number of border control points (for almost every single border control unit) does not meet the actual needs arising during the operations of the Intelligence Department of the Kiev Military District. The absence of well-qualified, dependable intelligence operatives sometimes leads to the recruitment of random individuals who are obviously incapable of gaining any knowledge of intelligence and counter-intelligence work in the course of a 6-month training period.

Agents of the border intelligence units are allowed across the frontier by the border control corps on the basis of passes which only contain the code-names of the agents in question. Neither the local border control department nor the Border Control Directorate and the NKVD possess a comprehensive set of information on these intelligence operatives. Furthermore, documents forwarded to and from Poland are not being checked by our authorities.

[1.] I therefore consider it necessary to take the following steps:

a) reduce the number of intelligence units at the Polish-Ukrainian border, so that 2 units instead of the current 4 remain;

b) establish a procedure whereby the Intelligence Department of the Kiev VO will only receive their passes from the Border Control Directorate, and which shall provide that in every case a check must be run on the given intelligence operative, and that the use of the said operative must be approved by the Directorate for State Security;

c) documents forwarded to Poland as well as documents originating from abroad must be checked by an operative of the border control forces (at least with the rank of section commandant) who shall perform the actual transfer of the said documents across the border.

\textsuperscript{21} Aleksander Samosenko (1893–1956), graduate of the Zhytomyr seminar, priest in the Ushomyr and Makhnovka parishes; from 1923 to 1925 administrator of the Samhorodek, Vahnovka and Zoziv parishes in the Berdychiv deaconship; in the 1930s a church minister in Berdychiv. Arrested in 1935 and sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment. He was detained in prison facilities in Vinnitsia, Kiev and the Solovetsky Islands; from 1952 in Zhytomyr, where he died.
2. I consider it necessary to modify the rules pertaining to situations where our border control operatives come into contact with Polish nationals on the Soviet border. The modifications in question shall be effected in order to promote the following trends:

a) Instead of representatives which are empowered to come into contact with Polish nationals, two commissions consisting of a permanent team of operatives must be established for each border control unit on the [given] section of the Polish-Ukrainian border, the composition of the said team is to be approved by the Main Directorate for Border Control and Internal Security;

b) the number of sessions must be reduced to a minimum, and efforts must be made to ensure that more of these sessions take place on our side of the border.

3. The border areas remain inhabited by a large number of families who have, in the past, been subjected to repression for counter-revolutionary crimes. Their presence provides a fertile ground for hostile activities. I consider it a necessity to raise the issue of having these individuals resettled to the North.

4. Most Ukrainian sugar refineries are located in right-bank Ukraine. The degree to which enemy agents [have managed to infiltrate] the permanent crews manning the said refineries, especially regarding the specialist and administrative/technical personnel, proves that the Poles have managed to gain a solid foothold in the Ukrainian sugar industry.

In addition to the operationally prepared campaign against these groups, we must also consider an organised transfer of long-term workers and other suspect individuals to the Kursk and Voronezh oblasts (as well as other regions), utilising the resources of the Narkompishcheprom [People’s Commissariat of the Food Industry]. These workers would be replaced by persons brought in from the interior of the country.
5. A large number of refugees from the border areas (including those who were resettled as a result of cleansing the border) have settled in the industrialised oblasts of the Ukraine. These groups provide the enemy with a reservoir of recruits for the purposes of subversion in industry. I consider it a necessity to raise the issue of having these groups resettled to the North.

6. Practice shows that when we turn to our prison camps for information on those previously convicted with respect to “Polish issues,” most of those arrested turn out not to have given sufficient testimony and to have withheld information on their primary activities and on intelligence operatives.

Furthermore, as a result of the short prison terms, important Polish intelligence operatives were able to complete their sentences and swiftly depart from labour camps in order to resume their hostile activities.

On the basis of some cases (NAZARUK, SVIONTEK and others), we may observe that counter-revolutionary activities take place even in the labour camps themselves.

I consider it necessary to perform a review of the cases of all those who had previously been sentenced in connection with “Polish issues,” as well as with the Ukrainian Military Organisation.

I request guidance with respect to the above issues.

People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar for State Security – 2nd Rank
(—) LEPLEVSKY

“e- 21 – e” September 1937
no. 2897/sn

The city of Kiev

Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

22 Israel Moiseevich Leplevsky (1894–1938), 2nd Rank commissar for state security; from 1918 member of the CheKa; from 23 May 1922 head officer of the GPU Department in the Yekaterinoslav gubernia; from 16 February 1923 head officer of the GPU Department in the Podolia gubernia; from 5 May 1925 in the reserve force of the Ukrainian SSR GPU; from 27 October 1925 head officer of the Odessa Okrug Department of the GPU; from 1 August 1929 deputy head officer, and from 9 December 1929 head officer of the Secret Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian SSR GPU; from 15 August 1931 deputy head officer, and from 17 November 1931 head officer of the Special Section (OO) of the OGPU; from 20 February 1933 deputy head of the Ukrainian SSR GPU; from 5 January 1934 empowered representative of the OGPU for the Saratov krai; from 26 November 1936 head officer of the Special Section (OO) of the USSR NKVD; from 14 June 1937 People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR; from 25 January 1938 head officer of the USSR NKVD Prison Department (TO). Arrested on 26 April 1938, sentenced to death, executed on 28 July 1938 in Moscow.
No. 6
29 September 1937, Kiev. Report from the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Israel Leplevsky, to the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Yezhov, concerning the Ukrainian repression plan and the request for an increase in the limits placed on the number of arrests

To: People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR
Commissar-General for State Security
Comrade YEZHOV N. I.

Report

In accordance with your Order No. 00447 concerning our operations against the kulaks as well as criminals and other counter-revolutionary elements; the limit on the number of arrests to be made on the territory of Ukraine was set at 8000 (for the first category) and 20,800 (for the second category).

At my request, you have subsequently increased the said limit by another 4,200 individuals with respect to the first category.

Ever since the operation has begun on September 27 this year, the troikas operating in the individual oblasts of the Ukraine have sentenced a total of 23,158 persons, including 9458 in the first category and 13,700 in the second category.

Therefore, within the limits specified, in the coming days the troikas will have reviewed the cases of the remaining 9842 persons: 2742 in the first category and 7100 in the second category.

As of 28 September, there are 13,764 persons arrested in the Ukraine in connection with the kulak operation whose cases have not yet been reviewed by the troikas. Furthermore, the Ukrainian SSR NKVD oblast directorates hold materials which could form the basis of repression with respect to a further 15,000 people.

In connection with the establishment of 4 new oblasts in the Ukraine (the Poltava oblast, the Mykolaiv oblast, the Zhytomyr oblast and the Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast), and with the resulting greater proximity between the oblast authorities and the respective raions, the operations against the kulaks and other counter-revolutionary elements will be intensified. I therefore request the approval of an additional limit of arrests for the Ukraine: 4500 persons (for the first category) and 15,200 (for the second category).

Appendix: arrest limit data.

People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar for State Security – 2nd Rank
LEPLEVSKY
Appendix:
Data concerning the limits for convictions, divided between individual *oblasts* of the Ukrainian SSR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[Oblast]</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Limit</th>
<th>Number of persons convicted following the commencement of the operation, up to 27 September 1937</th>
<th>Number of persons remaining (until limit is reached)</th>
<th>Number of the requested increase of the limit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>2900</td>
<td>2062</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>3191</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1731</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>3483</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vinnytsia</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>1414</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1806</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1732</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>2686</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1441</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donetsk</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1368</td>
<td>1632</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>1300</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavian Autonomous</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>First category</td>
<td>Second category</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>12200</td>
<td>20800</td>
<td>2742</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9458</td>
<td>13700</td>
<td>7100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamianets-Podilskyi</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine – total:</td>
<td>12200</td>
<td>20800</td>
<td>2742</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9458</td>
<td>13700</td>
<td>7100</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4500</td>
<td></td>
<td>4500</td>
<td></td>
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*HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 30 (1951), Spr. 81, pp. 246–248.*

*Copy, typescript.*

*Document in Russian.*
No. 7
1 October 1937, [Kiev]. Telegram from the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Israel Leplevsky, to the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Yezhov, concerning the progress of the “Polish operation”

1 October 1937

Telegram no. 80235

Moscow NKVD

For Comrade YEZHOV

I hereby wish to provide information on the progress of the operations against the Polish counter-revolutionary espionage elements pursued in accordance with your Order No. 00485.

From the commencement of the operation until 20 September, a total of 8869 persons have been arrested, with a further 2965 being arrested between 21 September and 30 September. As of 1 October, a total of 11,834 persons have been arrested since the operation has begun.

The numbers of arrests made in the respective oblasts are as follows: Kiev – 2923 [persons], Vinnytsia – 2279 [persons], Donetsk – 1770 [persons], Kharkiv – 1288 [persons], Dnipropetrovsk – 1202 [persons], Odessa – 1100 [persons], Chernihiv – 228 [persons], arrests made by border control forces – 669 [persons], arrests made by central apparatus – 207 [persons], the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic – 168 [persons].

Cases concerning a total of 2446 persons have been presented for approval to the Soviet Union NKVD. Among those, cases concerning 1650 persons have been reviewed. Cases concerning 796 persons are yet to be reviewed.

Among all cases reviewed, 1394 have been approved for the First Category, while 205 persons have been sentenced to serve terms in Corrective Labour Camps (ITL) as well as to undergo forced migration.

Furthermore, in accordance with the guidelines received from Comrade BELSKY, the UNKVD *troika* for the Kiev *oblast* has reviewed a case from the Kiev *Oblast* Directorate concerning 99 persons, with all of those convicted being allocated to the first category.

As of 1 October, a total of 9340 persons remain under investigation.\(^a\)

\begin{flushright}
no. 80235
LEPLEVSKY
\end{flushright}

People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar for State Security – 2nd Rank
LEPLEVSKY\(^b\)

In conformity:

\begin{flushleft}
_HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 30 (1951), Spr. 81, pp. 250, 251._
Non-certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
\end{flushleft}

\(^a\) On the basis of calculations, made one has to assume that the document contains some erroneous data.

\(^b\) Next to this line, on the left margin, the following date has been written by hand: 1 October [19]37.
Guidelines of the Narkom, Comrade LEPLEVSKY
laid down in the course of a meeting dedicated to the organisation of new oblast
directorates of the NKVD dated 1 October 1937

[...]
Operational activities

1. Head officers of oblast directorates shall, by devoting less time to economic
matters, divert their resources to operational work, increasing its volume within
the next couple of days so that within 1 – 1.5 months a significant breakthrough is
achieved on all fronts of our operations.

2. Our operations within the newly formed oblasts are to be directed primarily
against the Poles and Germans; in the Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast the third national
group to be included on this list is Romanians. In the Zhytomyr oblast, further
operations are necessary even though the Kiev Oblast Directorate has already
performed specific actions with respect to the Poles.

The operation against Polish nationals in Poltava has failed to yield satisfactory
results, with substantial intelligence cells still in place and a number of raions
where no arrests at all have been made.

The newly formed oblasts shall forward progress reports to Moscow every five
days.

3. In Poltava there is a need to expose the identity of individuals who make up
the local anti-Soviet Ukrainian network as well as of their contacts in the
surrounding raions. In Mykolaiv, intelligence cells established by the Polish and
German intelligence still exist, especially in industrial facilities having defence
significance.

4. Head officers of the newly established oblast directorates shall reach an
agreement with the party obkom secretaries with respect to the request to the
Central Committee for the allocation of additional limits for arrests to be made in
connection with the kulak operation in these oblasts.

The number of all individuals arrested in the kulak operation who are currently
under investigation must be determined and provided to me in the form of a report.

I have submitted a request to the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of
the USSR, the General Commissar for State Security, Comrade YEZHOV for an
increase of limits with respect to the kulak operation in the newly established
oblasts by 500 persons in the first category and 1000 to 1500 persons in second
category.
Successful completion of this operation will result in a radical cleansing of the raions.

5. Head officers of oblast directorates must immediately depart for their new work locations, acquainting themselves with applicable materials on their allocated oblasts in the appropriate UGB Narkomat departments beforehand.

6. After arrival, a one-day meeting of head officers of city and raion divisions as well as head officers of special departments must be held, in order for the said head officers to be presented with specific issues related to operational work, and in order for them to be able to immediately commence directing the operations of their respective departments on all fronts.

[...]

Head Officer of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD Secretariat
Captain of State Security
INSAROV

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

1 Emanuel Alexandrovich Insarov-Polak (1902–1938), personal secretary of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs Israel Leplevsky; from June 1937 head officer of the Secretariat of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD; from 1938 deputy head officer of the NKVD DTO (Department for the Protection of Railways and Transportation) for the Lenino railway. Arrested 25 April 1938, executed on 29 August 1938. Subsequently rehabilitated.
No. 9
5 October 1937, Kiev. Telephonogram from the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Israel Leplevsky, to the head officer of the Third Department of the USSR NKVD GUGB, Alexandr Minayev, concerning the progress of operations against the so-called anti-Soviet resistance

Telephonogram no. *6374-*
Moscow USSR NKVD
For Comrade MINAYEV

1. From the day of commencement of the “Polish operation,” up to 3 October, the following numbers of individuals were arrested in the Ukraine: ........................................................... 12,738 persons
2. Including arrests made between 20 September and 3 October: 3,869 persons
3. Number of persons who admitted to engaging in espionage, diversionist and insurgent activities: ......................... 3,600 persons
4. As of 5 October, manifests concerning the following number of persons were reviewed and approved: ......................... 2,116 persons
   including: First category: ........................................................... 1,870 persons
   Second category: ................................................................. 246 persons

* * *
Filled in by hand.

1 Aleksandr Matveyevich Minayev-Tsykanovsky (1888–1939), from 1919 member of the CheKa; from 1920 deputy head of the CheKa in the Kherson uyezd (administrative subdivision used in the RSFSR for some time after the 1917 Revolution); from 1921 deputy head officer of the CheKa in the Yelisavetgrad uyezd, and then the Feodosiya uyezd; from November 1921 to May 1922 head officer of the Secret Operations Department of the CheKa/GPU in the Mykolaiv gubernia; from May 1922 to February 1923 deputy head officer of the GPU Department for the Yekaterinoslav gubernia; from November to August 1923 deputy head officer of the GPU Department for the Vinnytsia gubernia and head officer of the Secret Operations Department; from August 1923 to October 1924, deputy head of the GPU Department for the Volhynia gubernia; head officer of the Secret Operations Department; from October 1924 to 25 September 1926, head officer of the OGPU Economics Department (EKO) Empowered Agency (PP) in the the North Caucasus krai; from 25 September 1927 to 5 December 1928, head officer of the Second Division of the EKO OGPU; from 5 December 1928 to September 1930, head officer of the Perm Okrug GPU Department; from September 1930 to 27 September 1931, head officer of the EKO PP OGPU for the Moscow oblast; from 27 September 1931 to 15 May 1932, assistant head officer of the Economics Directorate (EKU) of the OGPU; from 16 May 1933 to 25 January 1934, deputy empowered representative of the OGPU for the Ural oblast; from 25 January 1934 to 10 July 1934, empowered representative of the OGPU for the Chelyabinsk oblast; from 15 July 1934 head officer of the UNKVD for the Chelyabinsk oblast; from 15 July 1936 head officer of the UNKVD for the Stalingrad oblast; from 7 April 1937 deputy head of the Third Department of the USSR NKVD GUGB; from 11 July 1937 acting head officer of the Third Department of the USSR NKVD GUGB; from 28 March 1938 to 10 July 1938, head officer of the Eighth Department in the First Directorate of the USSR NKVD; from 29 June 1938 to 5 November 1938, Deputy People’s Commissar for Heavy Industry of the USSR. Arrested on 6 November 1938, sentenced to death by the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court and executed on the same day; never rehabilitated.
5. Manifests concerning the following number of persons have been submitted for review and are awaiting approval:.................... 626 persons
6. Between 5 – 7 October manifests concerning the following number of persons are to be submitted:..................................... 694 persons

LEPLEVSKY
no. *3119/sn*^a^ 

People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar for State Security – 2nd Rank
LEPLEVSKY

“a-5*^a^” August 1937
The city of Kiev

_HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 30 (1951), Spr. 29, p. 136._
_Copy, typescript._
_Document in Russian._
No. 10

8 October 1937, Kiev. Telegram from the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Israel Leplevsky, to the head officers of the NKVD oblast directorates, concerning the execution of Order No. 00486 of the USSR NKVD

To all Head Officers of the USSR NKVD Oblast Directorates

Order No. 00486 of the Narkom, Comrade YEZHov, concerning the arrest of the wives of all individuals sentenced under the first and second categories and the formal conclusion of cases pertaining thereto by the Special Council of the NKVD, is being carried out by all oblast directorates in a remarkably apathetic manner.

Despite the fact that the operation is due to complete on 25 October and is also intended to pertain to wives of individuals facing repression under the “Polish operation,” as of this day in Odessa, Vinnytsia and Chernihiv a mere 15–20 wives have been arrested for each city; in Kharkiv and the Donbas a total of 40 cases were submitted for review, while in Kiev and Dnipropetrovsk no cases at all have been submitted.

In connection with the above, I hereby command:

1. Immediately conclude all investigations pertaining to the already arrested wives of rightist and Trotskyist spies which are still underway in Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk, Stalino and Kharkiv, and to forward these investigations for review by special councils through the Eighth Department of the UGB of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD.

2. All oblast directorates – especially in Odessa, Vinnytsia and Chernihiv – shall have 3 days to make arrests of the wives of the convicted rightist and Trotskyist spies pursued under the “Polish operation,” concluding investigations without delay.

3. Further actions to be taken must strictly abide with Order No. 00486 of the narkom and with the contents of telegram no. 928, dated 3 October 1937.

4. Information on the progress made and on the number of cases submitted to the Special Council to be provided every 3 days.

LEPLEVSKY

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 30 (1951), Spr. 147, pp. 164–166.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
First page contains the following handwritten note: For directives. 8 0240. 8 October 1937 r.
Document certified by the head officer of the Secretariat of the Ukrainian SSR NKVD, Emmanuel Insarov.
No. 11

11 October 1937, Kiev. Letter from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Israel Leplevsky, to the managing authority of the USSR NKVD, regarding the co-financing of repressive actions carried out against Poles and Germans

T[op] secret

To Deputy People’s Commissar for USSR Internal Affairs
Senior Major of State Security
Comrade RYZHOV¹
The City of Moscow

Financial Department
no. 3197/sn
11 October [19]37

I present the cost estimate of the expenditures related to the maintenance of operational groups, supplies for arrested persons, sending them to labour camps and Gulag colonies, and expenses for the dismissal of the families [persons] of repressed persons, to the total amount of 6,255,175 roubles.

The presented cost estimate has been calculated based on the quantities subject to retention in the 4th quarter of 1937 of contingents [persons] in the number specified in Order No. 00447 at more or less 15,000 persons, along the line of 3rd Division of UGB (Poles and Germans) at 10,000 persons, and also at 30,000 captured and imprisoned after detention carried out before 1 October this year.

Taking into account the total lack of funds for the expenditures presented above, I hereby ask for the immediate release of credits to be ordered.

Appendix: cost estimate².

p.p. People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
2nd Rank Commissar of State Security
LEPLEVSKY

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

¹ Mikhail Ivanovich Ryzhov (1889–1939), from 1 July 1937 to 16 August 1937, Chief of the Administrative and Economic Directorate of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR; from 16 August 1937 to 31 December 1937, Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR; from December 1937 to 25 December 1937, People’s Commissariat for Forestry of USSR. Arrested on 25 December 1938 without prosecutor’s sanctions; died on 14 January 1939 during interrogation due to the “illegal investigation methods” employed against him.

² Not to be published.
No. 12

1 November 1937, Kiev. Letter from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Israel Leplevsky, to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Yezhov, regarding postponing the date for the termination of the “Polish operation” to 15 December 1937

Top secret
To Comrade Yezhov

As of 1 November 1937, 19,030 persons have been arrested in Ukraine as part of the “Polish operation.”

Of this number, cases regarding 7069 persons have been completed. 4885 persons have been classified in the first category; 509 persons in the second category have been sentenced; cases regarding 1675 persons are being considered by the USSR NKVD.

As of 1 November in Ukraine 11,961 persons remain in detention.

In the course of the investigation, the following was determined:

The existence for many years of secret outposts in major administrative facilities; flourishing sabotage organisations in enterprises significant for defence in Kiev, Kharkiv, Donbas and Dnipropetrovsk raions; extensively developed Polish Military Organisations (POW) in the raions of Podolia, Kiev, Dnipropetrovsk and in Donbas; hundreds of consulate’s agents conducting sabotage and espionage activities; vast espionage network in the sugar, spirit and forestry industries; espionage and sabotage organisations in all border zone raions, including our reinforced raions and border garrisons; an extensive Polish espionage network composed of Galicians and Petliura supporters returning from Polish concentration camps; a vast amount of work carried out by Polish clerical environments and insurrectionary units in the Polish countryside.

With relation to these issues, there is an urgent need to implement further detention-related activities.

In the last few days alone, in the new oblasts (Zhytomyr, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Mykolaiv, Poltava) 2000 persons have been arrested, in Kiev oblast up to 600 persons, in Vinnysia oblast 450 persons, in Dnipropetrovsk oblast 400 persons.

It is therefore completely obvious right now that we will not be able to complete the operation by 20 November.
I am asking that the deadline for the operation and execution of the tasks to be postponed to 15 December 1937 so that the “Polish operation” in Ukraine could be successfully completed.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
2nd Rank Commissar of State Security
LEPLEVSKY

“а-1-а” November 1937
а-нр 3444/сн-а
The City of Kiev

Communications to:
1. Comrade Yezhov

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

\*\* Fill in by hand.\*\*
No. 13

30 November 1937, [Emilchyn]. Letter from prisoner Gustaw Dalmer to the Chief of CIK of the Ukrainian SSR, Grigory Piotrovsky

Kiev

To the Chief of Ukrainian SSR CIK
Comrade PIOTROVSKY G. I.

From prisoner of
Emilchyn District Division of
NKVD of Zhytomyr Oblast
DALMER Gustaw Eduardovich

Statement

On 24 November 1937 I was arrested by the Emilchyn Division of the NKVD. I had ascribed to me contacts with a certain NEJMAN, a former sexton, who crossed the Polish border in 1931. In order to prove this I was confronted with an arrestee named OKS who in my presence testified about the contacts with NEJMAN. OKS was forced to give false evidence by being beaten. After this confrontation the investigator who conducted the inquiry in my case (I do not know his name) started to interrogate me. After the interrogation, during which I was beaten with a rifle barrel and bottles, not to mention hit with fists and kicks, I found myself in such a situation that I had to give series of false evidence, not corresponding to reality. I thus “confessed” that I was a spy and saboteur, had contacted NEJMAN, prepared an arson attack on a kolkhoz, gathered information about public feelings, forwarded blueprints of military facilities, etc.

I am asking to be released because I believe I am innocent and my false testimonies were forced out of me by beating at the Emilchyn NKVD. Many other people, not only me, are being treated in the same way. One person had the word “spy” written on his forehead, he was spat at in the face, beaten to give false evidence. Other prisoner had a fascist-devil drawn on his stomach, and then they started beating him. Others are just beaten with anything and anywhere.

Yesterday a woman tried to kill herself. Several days ago 3 women miscarried because they were beaten so badly. Dozens of beaten people are lying in a special corridor or cells. They are not offered even the slightest medical care. Monstrosities go on endlessly. Please help me and other people.

30 November [19]37

DALMER G.

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 31 (1951), Spr. 37, pp. 179–180.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
No. 14
11 December 1937, Kiev. Report by the Chief of UNKVD of Kiev oblast, Nikolai Sharov to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Israel Leplevsky, along with a statistical account of the cases brought against Poles in Kiev oblast

Directorate of Kiev Oblast NKVD
[...]

Top secret

To People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
2nd Rank Commissar of State Security
Comrade LEPLEVSKY

Report
on the results of the Pole-related operation in Kiev oblast
as at 10 December 1937

In reference to an operation order from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, General Commissar of State Security Comrade YEZHOV of 11 August 1937 no. 00485, the Kiev Oblast Directorate of NKVD attacked the Polish espionage-sabotage counter-revolutionary nationalist underground movement.

As a result of the operation carried out against Poles, 6174 persons were arrested as of 10 December 1937. Of this number, 716 arrested persons were transferred to the organising Zhytomyr oblast.

In this way, directly in Kiev Oblast Directorate of NKVD, cases regarding 5468 persons were conducted.

From the number of arrested persons:

a) convicted by USSR NKVD based on enclosed accounts ........ 4175 persons
b) in Moscow there are unresolved cases regarding ................ 814 persons
c) sentenced based on the decision of special NKVD troika .... 479 persons

In total: ...................................................................................... 5468 persons

In the course of the investigations, 3798 of the overall number of arrested persons confessed to the accusations.

Including:

a) to espionage- and sabotage-related activities ......................... 1545
b) to participation in Polish Military Organisations ..................... 1308
c) to participation in Polish nationalist counter-revolutionary organisations ............................................................................ 945

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a The first page of the document, including a heading identical to the following, has been omitted.
Focusing in the investigation in particular on uncovering Polish, espionage and sabotage and insurrectionary formations, in the course of the operation we have uncovered and eliminated:

1. spying and subversive outposts of Polish intelligence service......................................................... 96 including 581 persons
2. outposts of Polish consulates........................................ 17 – “ – 111 persons
3. agents of Polish intelligence service
   (acting on their own, not entering the structure of outposts) ............................................................. 722 persons
   Including:
   a) moved from Poland at various times ................................................. 328
   b) recruited by the Soviet side ............................................................. 380
   c) eliminated during illegal passage from Poland in 1937 ....................... 5
   d) agents of the 2nd Division of Polish Main\(^b\) Staff................................. 9

   Spies in total: ............................................................................. 1625 persons
5. Polish Military Organisations........................................ 47 with 1017 persons
6. sabotage-insurrectionary organisations,
   founded by Polish secret services ................................. 25 – “ – 404 [persons]
7. sabotage-insurrectionary organisations,
   founded by Polish consulate ..................................................... 5 – “ –
8. sabotage-insurrectionary groups ......................................... 54 – “ – 251 [groups]

During the operation associated with Poles, the operationally prepared attack was intended to apply repressions towards major [population] groups, as provided for in the Order No. 00485. As a result, the following persons were detained:

1. fugitives from Poland ................................................................. 843
2. political emigrants from Poland.................................................. 118
3. deserters from the Polish Army .................................................. 69
4. former prisoners of war and Polish legionnaires ......................... 373
5. former members of Polish political parties........................................ 77
6. former members Razwiedupr and INO agents ............................... 59
7. re-emigrants and repatriates from Poland........................................ 175
8. former smugglers .......................................................................... 192
9. visitors to the Polish consulate .................................................... 397
10. members of Polish Military Organisations ...................................... 1410
11. military men from UHA (Ukrainian Galician Army,
    who settled in Ukraine).................................................................. 271

\(^b\) *Was* Gen[eral].
12. for foreign contacts ................................................................. 494
13. Polish nationalist counter-revolutionary activists .................. 990
In total: ...................................................................................... 5468

The Polish espionage-sabotage counter-revolutionary nationalist activists were arrested and detained in the following areas of the economy:

In industry .................................................................................... 725
  including in defence [industry] – 93
In sugar industry .......................................................................... 537
  including in kolkhozes producing beets – 87
In agriculture ............................................................................... 2115
In transport and communication ................................................. 307
  Including:
    railway transport – 128
    river [transport] – 28
    road [transport] – 36
    Post and communication – 125
    In the army ........................................................................... 69
      Including:
        command-political structure – 58
        privates – 11

Taking into account composition in terms of nationality, the arrested persons may be divided as follows:

a) Poles ...................................................................................... 2535
b) Galicians ............................................................................... 468
c) Ukrainians, emigrants from Poland ..................................... 589
d) Jews, emigrants from Poland .............................................. 126
d) other emigrants from Poland ............................................. 196
In total: .................................................................................... 3914 = 71.6%
f) Jews ................................................................................... 35 = 0.6 %
g) other nationalities .............................................................. 167 = 3%
h) Ukrainians .......................................................................... 1351 = 24.8%

Note: Of 1351 Ukrainians who were arrested as part of the “Polish operation,” [there are] 437 spies, 852 members of anti-Soviet organisations (POW and others). This number includes:
former Petliura supporters 194
former political offenders 106
former members of the White Movement 52
In line with the order of the People’s Commissar of the USSR, General Commissar of State Security Comrade YEZHOV, we shall continue the operation regarding Poles. The investigation shall be intensified in order to ensure its completion according to the agreed deadline.

Chief of Kiev Oblast of UNKVD
Senior Major of State Security
(--) SHAROV

Chief of 3 Division of UGB UNKVD
State Security Captain
(--) ROGOL

no. 657674
“11” December 1937
The City of Kiev

Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

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1 Mark Pavlovich Rogol (1905–1941), from 23 January 1937 Deputy Chief of UNKVD of MASSR; from 8 August 1937 Chief of 3rd Division of Kiev oblast of UNKVD. Arrested 5 April 1938, during the investigation he became mentally ill; he was held in compulsory treatment, and executed by firing squad by the Germans on 18 October 1941; rehabilitated.
No. 15
15 December 1937, [Kiev]. Letter from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Israel Leplevsky, to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Yezhov, regarding the awards to the most active members of the Ukrainian SSR’s NKVD

To People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security
Comrade YEZHOV N. I.

In reference to the executed operation consisting in elimination of rightist-Trotskyite spies, Bukharin spies, saboteurs, bourgeois nationalists, Polish-German and Romanian espionage outposts and nationalist organisations in Ukraine, I believe it is necessary for you to grant awards in the form of the USSR orders and distinctions of Pochotny Chekist to the most outstanding and distinguished operational employees of the Central and Oblast Directorates of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR.

Units of NKVD have in a very short time detected and eliminated the enemies – rats, traitors and spies in the very body of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, and there were quite a lot of them there, and at the same time they dealt a final blow to all kinds of counter-revolution and espionage activity in Ukraine.

During the operation many employees demonstrated exceptional firmness, perseverance, intransigence and ruthlessness towards the enemies of the Soviet state and party.

In this period the Military Collegium sentenced rightists, Trotskyites and nationalists for participation in military conspiracies – those classified under the first category: 2376 persons, and under the second category: 358 persons;

In cases regarding Poles, 17,393 persons classified under the first category, and 2412 persons under the second category, were sentenced.

In cases regarding Germans, 3911 persons classified under the first category, and 2451 persons under the second category, were sentenced.

In cases regarding Romanians, 1694 persons classified under the first category, and 637 persons under the second category, were sentenced.

In cases regarding Harbinians, 269 persons classified under the first category, and 50 persons under the second category, were sentenced.

In cases regarding treason and participation in conspiracy among NKVD employees - 102 persons classified under the first category were sentenced.

In the kulak operation, 26,429 persons classified under the first category and 49,511 persons under the second category were sentenced; this includes a large amount of anti-Soviet nationalist, insurrectionary, subversive and sabotage organisations as well as Polish and German nationalist counter-revolutionaries.

In this period military tribunals, [courts], Special Collegia and a Special Collegium [subject to the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR] sentenced rightists,
Trotskyites, nationalists, spies and under other accusations – 672 persons classified under the first category, 5800 persons classified under the second category.

Additionally, 70 open trials were conducted regarding subversive activities in agriculture, animal husbandry and the network of points Zagotzierna, during which 235 classified under the first category and 153 persons under the second [category] were sentenced.

I enclose the list of officials\(^1\) where I entered the most truly distinguished persons, presented for high rewards and the *Pochotny Chekist* distinction, and I am asking you to grant them these honours.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
2nd Rank Commissar of State Security
LEPLEVSKY

“\(\mathrm{a-15}\)" December 1937
no. \(\mathrm{a-38231/sn}\)

\(^{1}\) Not to be published.
No. 16
10 January 1938, [Kiev]. Information from the 8th Division of the UGB of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, regarding the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR’s operational-investigative work for the period from 1 June 1937 to 10 January 1938

Top secret

Figures
regarding operational-investigative work
of the units of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR

1. From 1 June 1937 to 10 January 1938, a total number of 180,350 persons were arrested, including:
   by central [bodies]: 2058,
   by field units: 178,292.
Number of arrested persons as divided into groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>In total:</th>
<th>Including by central bodies:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trotskyites and rightists</td>
<td>6805 persons</td>
<td>382 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of military-fascist conspiracies</td>
<td>1266 persons</td>
<td>176 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian nationalists</td>
<td>15,669 persons</td>
<td>348 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish counter-revolution and conspiracy</td>
<td>43,201 persons</td>
<td>551 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German counter-revolution and conspiracy</td>
<td>15,026 persons</td>
<td>137 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanian counter-revolution and conspiracy</td>
<td>5915 persons</td>
<td>67 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese counter-revolution and conspiracy</td>
<td>881 persons</td>
<td>42 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek counter-revolution</td>
<td>3929 persons</td>
<td>4 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian counter-revolution</td>
<td>1558 persons</td>
<td>29 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian counter-revolution and conspiracy</td>
<td>407 persons</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox church-sectarian counter-revolution</td>
<td>7295 persons</td>
<td>37 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulak operation</td>
<td>68,301 persons</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wives of traitors to homeland</td>
<td>7181 persons</td>
<td>72 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionists</td>
<td>167 persons</td>
<td>3 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of other anti-Soviet parties</td>
<td>379 persons</td>
<td>22 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other crimes and offences</td>
<td>2370 persons</td>
<td>188 persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. From 1 June 1937 to 10 January 1938, the total number of sentenced persons is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>In total:</th>
<th>[Including by central bodies:]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>131,711 persons</td>
<td>1614 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under first category</td>
<td>68,600 persons</td>
<td>1299 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under second category</td>
<td>62,960 persons</td>
<td>310 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Expelled] outside USSR</td>
<td>151 persons</td>
<td>5 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Sentenced by Military Collegium</td>
<td>3473 persons</td>
<td>652 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under first category</td>
<td>3005 persons</td>
<td>611 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under second category</td>
<td>468 persons</td>
<td>41 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian nationalists, Trotskyites and rightists</td>
<td>2660 persons</td>
<td>472 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under first category</td>
<td>2214 persons</td>
<td>434 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under second category</td>
<td>446 persons</td>
<td>38 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of military-fascist conspiracy</td>
<td>813 persons</td>
<td>180 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under first category</td>
<td>791 persons</td>
<td>177 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under second category</td>
<td>22 persons</td>
<td>3 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Sentenced by military tribunals, special collegia [subject to Court] and Special Collegium [subject to NKVD]</td>
<td>6328 persons</td>
<td>235 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under first category</td>
<td>518 persons</td>
<td>47 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under second category</td>
<td>5810 persons</td>
<td>188 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including: Ukrainian nationalists, Trotskyites and rightists</td>
<td>2799 persons</td>
<td>77 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under first category</td>
<td>265 persons</td>
<td>6 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Classified] under second category</td>
<td>2534 persons</td>
<td>71 persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
c) Sentenced by the USSR NKVD based on abstracts of records:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In total:</th>
<th>First category</th>
<th>Second category</th>
<th>Expelled from USSR:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>27392</td>
<td>23119</td>
<td>4273</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>7077</td>
<td>6294</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>3901</td>
<td>2609</td>
<td>1292</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbinians</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total:</td>
<td>38788</td>
<td>32362</td>
<td>6275</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additionally sentenced by *troikas*:

Poles – 2002 persons
Germans – 4019 [persons]

From the overall number of sentenced persons based on excerpts from records, in the cases of the central unit the following persons were sentenced:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In total:</th>
<th>First category</th>
<th>Second category</th>
<th>[Expelled] from USSR:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbinians</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total:</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>530</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cases that have not been considered by the USSR NKVD:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In total:</th>
<th>By central [body]:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regarding Poles</td>
<td>8824 persons</td>
<td>98 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ –” Germans</td>
<td>4553 persons</td>
<td>20 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ –” Latvians</td>
<td>977 persons</td>
<td>10 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ –” Greeks</td>
<td>780 persons</td>
<td>3 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ –” Romanians</td>
<td>682 persons</td>
<td>9 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ –” Harbinians</td>
<td>184 persons</td>
<td>1 person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total:</td>
<td>16,000 persons</td>
<td>141 persons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Results of kulak operation:
Assumed limit ................................................................. 77,950 persons
[Classified] under first category ................................. 30,150 persons
[Classified] under second category ............................. 47,800 persons
   Additional limit from Donetsk oblast, approved by Comrade BIELSKY
[Classified] under first category ................................. 2565 persons
   Total persons sentenced according to assumed limits: .... 83,122 persons
   Including:
[Classified] under first category ................................. 32,715 persons
[Classified] under second category ............................. 50,407 persons
   Division of persons sentenced by troikas:
Kulaks ................................................................. 40,381 persons
Criminals ............................................................... 13,026 persons
Others ................................................................. 29,715 persons
   [In total:] .............................................................. a-83,122-a
Repressed, detained under the kulak operation:
In cities ................................................................. 27,714 persons
In the countryside .................................................... 55,408 persons
   Including:
From kolkhozes ....................................................... 25,716 persons
From sovkhozes ...................................................... 2978 persons
From industrial enterprises ....................................... 7709 persons
From transport ......................................................... 4762 persons
From Soviet apparatus ............................................... 5593 persons
From construction .................................................... 1358 persons
Persons without specific occupation and others .......... 35,006 persons

Ethnic composition of persons sentenced by oblast troikas is as follows:

Ukrainians .............................................................. 66,598 persons
Russians ............................................................... 6882 persons
Jews .......................................................... 662 persons
Poles ............................................................... 2002 persons
Germans ............................................................ 4019 persons
Greeks ............................................................. 304 persons
Bulgarians .......................................................... 381 persons
Others .............................................................. 2274 persons

-- a - a  Filled in by hand.
3. In total 72 open trials were conducted:

Persons sentenced as a result thereof: ................................. 399 persons
[Classified] under first category ........................................ 238 persons
[Classified] under second category ................................. 161 persons

Including:

a) For subversive activities in agriculture .............................. 17 trials
Sentenced: [Classified] under first category ......................... 52 persons
[Classified] under second category ............................... 33 persons

b) For subversive activities in animal husbandry .................. 27 trials
Sentenced: [Classified] under first category ......................... 110 persons
[Classified] under second category ............................... 55 persons

c) For subversive activities in the network Zagotzierna
   and Zagotovek Committee ............................................. 27 trials
Sentenced: [Classified] under first category ......................... 70 persons
[Classified] under second category ............................... 72 persons

a) For subversive activities in coal industry ..................... 1 trial
Sentenced: [Classified] under first category ......................... 6 persons
[Classified] under second category ............................... 1 person

4. Wives of traitors to homeland sentenced: 994 persons *33 persons*

5. Number of persons remaining under investigation as at 10 January 1938:
14,967 persons *447*

Including:

Trotskyites and rightists ..................................................... 1932 persons
Members of military-fascist conspiracy ............................ 301 persons
Ukrainian nationalists ......................................................... 829 persons
Polish counter-revolution and conspiracy .......................... 3529 persons
Greek counter-revolution and conspiracy ............................ 2687 persons
German counter-revolution and conspiracy ....................... 633 persons
Latvian counter-revolution and conspiracy ........................ 589 persons
Romanian counter-revolution and conspiracy .................... 234 persons
Japanese counter-revolution and conspiracy ...................... 77 persons
Orthodox church-sectarian counter-revolution .................. 278 persons
Wives of traitors to homeland ............................................ 970 persons
Zionists ............................................................................. 288 persons
Other crimes and offences ................................................. 2620 persons

a*By central [body]*

212
Chief of 8th Division of the UGB of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR
State Security Lieutenant
(–) MUNVIEZ¹

“*10*-” January 1938

HDA SBU, F. 42, Spr. 33, pp. 44–48.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

¹ Lazar Grigorievich Munviez (1895–1938), from 1928 in GPU; from 1933 to 22 March 1934, Chief of Registration-Statistical Department of Kharkiv Oblast Division of GPU; from 22 March 1934, Chief of the 2nd Division and assistant to the Chief of Registration-Statistical Department of UGB of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SRS; from 1 November 1937, Chief of the Registration-Statistical Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SRS; from 8 September 1938, Chief of the Courier Department of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. Arrested on 29 May 1938, sentenced on 25 September 1938 by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR to death, executed by firing squad on 25 September 1938 in Kiev; rehabilitated in 1957.
2 February 1938, Kiev. Telegram from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Alexander Uspensky, to the Chiefs of the Oblast Directorates of the NKVD, forwarding directive no. 233 from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Yezhov, regarding the continuation of repressive actions against specific ethnic minorities groups

I hereby forward the telegram from People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Comrade YEZHOV, no. 233 of 2 February this year.

Reports on the course of the operation, in line with item 5 of the telegram, should be sent to me.

USPENSKY

1. In reference to the inquiries [from] the field I will clarify: the operation aiming at breaking up espionage-sabotage groups of Poles, Harbinians, Latvians, Greeks, Iranians - both citizens [of foreign states] as well as Soviets - is to be continued until 15 April this year, according to my Orders no. 00485, 00593, 49990, 50215 of 1937, and no. 202 of 1938.

2. At the same time, a similar operation should be commenced in order to break up espionage-sabotage groups of Finns, Estonians, Romanians, Chinese, Bulgarians, Macedonians - both citizens of foreign states as well as Soviets. Also all Germans suspected of espionage-sabotage and other anti-Soviet activities who have Soviet citizenship are to be arrested, according to the categories listed in my Order No. 00485. The operation regarding these categories is to be completed by 15 April this year.

3. Until 15 April the out-of-court manner for considering cases regarding the persons arrested under all these operations, as specified in my Order No. 00485, is to be maintained regardless of these persons’ citizenship.

4. During these operations, special emphasis should be placed on detecting and capturing fugitives, regardless of the countries they came from and time when they arrived in the USSR, as well as political emigrants and all persons who have contacts with foreign missions, diplomatic missions, consulates, licensed associations and foreign institutions.
5. Information about the progress of the operation should be forwarded in communiques produced every five days, presenting the number of arrested persons and the most crucial investigation-related materials.

No. 233

YEZHOV

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 31 (1951), Spr. 59, pp. 46–47.

Copy, typescript.

Document in Russian.
No. 18
25 February 1938, Kiev. Statistical list from the 8th Division of the UGB of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR to the Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Alexander Radzivilovsky, regarding the number of persons sentenced by the USSR NKVD since the commencement of the “Polish operation”

Top secret

To Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Senior Major of State Security
Comrade RADZIVILOVSKY

Information

1. a- Sentenced since the commencement of the operation the USSR NKVD, based on excerpts from the records presented by the units of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, 64,180 persons, including:

Underlined by hand.

1 Aleksandr Pavlovich (Izrail Moisiejewicz) Radzivilovsky (1904–1940), from November 1920 a secret collaborator with the Special Branch (military counterintelligence) of the CheKa for the Black and Azov Seas, and from 1921 Secretary of the Militia division of Crimea; secretary to the representative of the Chief Militia Command of the RSFSR NKVD in the Crimea; from 1922, representative of the CheKa of the Crimean region and the GPU’s Crimean Branch Circuit; from 18 December 1922, assistant to the representative of the Special Branch of the GPU in the Crimea; from January 1923, representative of the Crimea GPU’s Secret Division. In the Secret Operational Unit (SOCh) of the Crimea GPU: from 14 July 1924, interim head, then head of the 1st Division; from 3 December 1924, assistant to the head of the 1st Division; from 4 June 1925, head of the 1st Division of the Secret Department of the Crimea GPU; from 6 October 1925, representative of Divisions 2 & 3 of the Secret Department of the USSR OGPU; from 29 April 1926, representative of the OGPU’s Plenipotentiary Representation (PR) in the Western District; from 17 December 1926, head of the GPU’s Secret Unit in Bryansk province; from 8 October 1927, head of the KRO OO of the GPU’s Homel Regional Division; from 8 October 1928, representative of Division of the Secret Department of the OGPU PR for Siberia; from 30 October 1929, assistant to the Head of Divisions of the Secret Department of the USSR OGPU; from 1 March 1931, special task officer for the Secret Political Department (SPO) of the USSR OGPU; from 27 September 1931, head of the Secret Political Department (SPO) of the OGPU PP for Moscow district; from 14 January 1933, assistant to PR and head of the OGPU SPO for Moscow district; from 10 July 1934, head of the SPO of the NKVD Committee for National Security for Moscow district, and assistant to the head of the NKVD Committee for Moscow district; from 20 March 1935, deputy head of the UNKVD for Moscow region; from 20 July 1937, head of the UNKVD for Ivanovo region; from February 1938, Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs for the USSR; from 28 March 1938, head of Division 3 of the 3rd Committee of the USSR NKVD. Arrested on 13 September 1938, sentenced to death on 24 January 1940 and shot; not rehabilitated.

a- a Underlined by hand.
2. "Cases that have not been considered by the USSR NKVD (without DTO):"*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Under &quot;Polish operation&quot;</th>
<th>In total:</th>
<th>Classified under first category</th>
<th>Classified under second category</th>
<th>To exile from USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41127</td>
<td>33882</td>
<td>7245</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– &quot; – German – &quot; –</td>
<td>12185</td>
<td>10436</td>
<td>1508</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– &quot; – Romanian – &quot; –</td>
<td>4899</td>
<td>3118</td>
<td>1780</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– &quot; – Greek – &quot; –</td>
<td>3946</td>
<td>3552</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– &quot; – Latvian – &quot; –</td>
<td>1420</td>
<td>1258</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– &quot; – Harbinian – &quot; –</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total:</td>
<td>64180</td>
<td>52694</td>
<td>11242</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including by DTO:</td>
<td>2847</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td>1232</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In total: 64180

Under "Polish operation" .......................................................... for 735 persons
– " – German – " – ........................................................... for 372 persons
– " – Polish – " – ............................................................... for 94 [persons]
– " – Latvian – " – ............................................................ for 45 [persons]
– " – Romanian – " – ......................................................... for 25 [persons]
In total................................................................. a for 1271 persons a

25 February 1938

Chief of 8th Division of the UGB of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR
State Security Lieutenant
(–) MUNVIEZ

Distribution list:
1. To the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
2. To the Deputy People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
3. For the records of 8th Division of the UGB of the NKVD

*HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 31 (1951), Spr. 105, p. 198.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
No. 19
27 February 1938, Kiev. Telephonogram from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Alexander Uspensky, to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Yezhov, regarding the results of the “Polish operation”

*a* No. 1408

Telephonogram
Moscow NKVD

To Comrade YEZHOV
Comrade FRINOVSKY
Comrade MINAYEV

Since 15 January, according to the data of 26 February, 4259 persons have been arrested as part of the “Polish operation” in Ukraine.

In the main industrial *oblasts* in Ukraine, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk, a series of espionage-sabotage outposts of the Polish secret services have been detected.

*a*1. In Gorlovka (Donbas) a fugitive from Poland, MIRONCZUK, an officer of the Polish Army, who set up sabotage organisation in Gorlovka and other industrial *raions* of Donbas, mainly in construction enterprises, was arrested. 12 persons recruited by MIRONCZUK were arrested.

*a*2. In Voroshilovgrad, in plant no. 10, a sabotage group was liquidated which was led by KAZI, a special resettler from the border zone, an agent of the Polish secret services.

Under orders from the Polish secret services, KAZI established an insurrectionary organisation among special resettlers from the border zone, located in Donbas in the Rovienietsky *raion*.

*a*3. In the Donsoda chemical plants, a sabotage group composed of 10 persons was detected, established by the Polish agent engineer GASZYCKI.

*a*4. In Kharkiv the following persons were arrested: construction engineer OKSZEWSKI, an officer of the Polish Army, sent to the USSR by the Polish secret services in 1919.

OKSZEWSKI deceitfully gained access to the Red Army. In recent years he established contact with the Polish consulates in Kharkiv and Moscow.

OKSZEWSKI listed 6 Poles recruited by him, former officers.

*a*5. A clerk at the shoe factory POLIONIS, a fugitive from Poland, an employee of the Vilnius defence, testified that he had been placed there by the Polish secret services in 1924, and listed 15 persons he recruited at different points in time.

*a*6. A clerk at the shoe factory SPINAYSKY, a resident of the Polish consulate

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*a* Filled in by hand.

*b* As in the original.
in Kharkiv, has testified about the sabotage-espionage organisation he set up; he said that in 1937, by order of the consulate, he had prepared an arson attack at the bakery facilities in Kharkiv.

*7.* In Lozovsky and other raions of Kharkiv oblast, espionage-sabotage groups and insurrectionary formations were detected among special resettlers from the border zone. A group led by an agent of the Polish secret services, a labourer at the state-owned mill JANDULSKI, prepared the destruction of trains.

CHMIELEVSKY, an instructor in a division of the Budian plant for porcelain and faience, testified when arrested that when he lived in the cross-border Polish National Marchlewski Raion in 1919, he was recruited by the secret services during the Polish occupation, and at their orders he set up an insurrectionary organisation. Then he established contact with the priest KOBEĆ, whereas after resettlement from border zone, in the Barvenkovsky and Merefiantsky raions of Kharkiv oblast, he established a relationship with an espionage-sabotage organisation, set up by the priest KOBEĆ among the special resettlers.

In the Pavlohrad raion, Dnipropetrovsk oblast, among the special resettlers from the former Polish National Marchlewski Raion, Novohrad-Volynskyi and other raions of right-bank Ukraine, an espionage-sabotage organisation was detected which was managed by RUZHYTSKY Yakov, an agent of the Polish secret services, exiled in 1935 from the border zone, and prepared active riots and disturbances during the outbreak of war.

*8.* In Dniprodzerzhynsk a combat terrorist group of Polish Military Organisation has been liquidated, which was led by an agent of the Polish secret services, RAGULIN Mikhail, a former instructor at the “Zaporozstal” conglomerate.

The group was composed of counter-revolutionary staff, gathering White Army officers and kulaks.

Members of the group were preparing for terrorist activities. 30 persons were arrested.

*9.* At the K. Liebknecht plants in Dnipropetrovsk, an espionage-sabotage group was detected, which was established in 1935 by an employee of the Polish secret services, VISHNEVSKY Georgy Aleksandrovich, a mechanic at the Liebknecht plants, and a member of the Trotskyite-Sapronov group at the National Economy Institute in Kharkiv. The group set up by VISHNEVSKY at the Liebknecht plants conducted intelligence activities and prepared sabotage actions at the beginning of the war.

*10.* PETROVSKY Mikhail, a fugitive from Poland arrested in Dnipropetrovsk, a former manager of Department of Culture and Propaganda of KP(b)U (Communist Party of Ukrainian Bolsheviks) for the Piereshchepino Raion

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* Crossed out by hand.

As in the original. The Julian Marchlewski Polish National Raion was officially founded in 1925.

1 Probably refers to Reverend Antoni Kobeć (born 1881), minister to areas of the Zhytomyr diocese, or to his brother Reverend Wojciech Kobeć (1873–1937), from 1914 administrator of the parish in Mohyliv-Podilskyi, and then in the parish of Felstin. Both were arrested in 1929 and exiled to the Solovetsky Islands.
Committee, expelled from the party in 1937, testified that he was recruited to the USSR in 1923 to carry out tasks of an espionage-sabotage nature.

By order of the secret services, he established a sabotage group in the power plant in Dnipropetrovsk. This group was composed of fugitives from Poland: DORTS, SHCHERBINSKY and others.

\textit{a}11.\textit{a} In Vavarov raion, Mykolaiv oblast, in the John Reed agricultural commune, organised in 1927 by Galicians who came to the USSR from America between 1921–1923, an outpost of Polish secret services directed by the Polish consulate in Moscow was detected.

The arrested persons, ZACHARKOV Dmitry, manager of kolkhoz, and TRUFEN Nikolai, manager of a farm in the Kirov sovkhoz, were former members of the Communist Party of America,\textsuperscript{2} who then slipped into the All-Union Communist Party. They testified that they had been recruited by the Polish consulate in Moscow in 1925, and by order of the consulate they set up an espionage outpost to penetrate the plants in the armaments facilities in Mykolaiv. At the same time, they worked intensively to destroy numbers of cattle in the nearby kolkozes and sovkhozes, and break off the agricultural campaigns.

\textit{a}12.\textit{a} In Kiev a fugitive from Poland was arrested, ZAINCHKOVSKY Franc, of no permanent occupation; he was moved by the secret services to the USSR in 1923 “under the cover” of a deserter from Polish border security\textsuperscript{6}. In line with the order issued by the lieutenant of the Polish secret services, DOMBROWSKI, ZAINCHKOVSKY set up an espionage-sabotage group in Stalino and Lisianka raion, Kiev oblast.

In 1927 ZAINCHKOVSKY established contact with the Polish consulate in Kiev.

We shall develop the investigation with the aim of detecting units that supervise and control intelligence services [for] Poland in Ukraine.

\textbf{USPENSKY}

no. ..........  
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR  
3rd Rank Commissar of State Security  
\textit{(–) USPENSKY}

“27” February 1938  
The City of Kiev no. 314/sn

\textit{HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 31 (1951), Spr. 12, pp. 39–44.}  
\textit{Original, typescript.}  
\textit{Document in Russian.}

On the first page, at left margin, stuck telegraphic tape: Sent to Moscow 27 February [19]38 time 10:35 p.m.

\textsuperscript{6} As in the original. Refers to Border Police.

\textsuperscript{2} The Communist Party of the United States was established on 31 August 1919 by John Reed.
No. 20
30 April 1938, Kiev. Report from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Alexander Uspensky, to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Nikolai Yezhov, regarding the liquidation of Polish Military Organisations on the territory of the USSR, along with an accompanying letter from Alexander Uspensky, addressed to Chiefs of Oblast Directorates of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR and the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Moldavian ASSR

Top secret

To all Chiefs of Oblast Directorates of the NKVD and People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the MA SSR

I forward for information purposes the report no. 1038/sn of 30 April 1938 to the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, General Commissar of State Security, Comrade YEZHOV N. I., regarding the liquidation of the Polish Military Organisation on Ukrainian territory.

It is necessary to expand the agency’s work and operational-investigative activities aiming at the detection and elimination of formations associated with the Polish Military Organisation.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
3rd Rank Commissar of State Security
USPENSKY

“a:4—a” May 1938
no. “1064/sn”

__________________________________________________

Top secret

Report
on liquidation of Polish Military Organisation
on the territory of Ukraine

According to the testimonies of numerous arrested members of the Polish Military Organisation in Ukraine, including its leaders KWIA TEK,1 a former

1 Kazimierz Kwiatek, born Jan Witkowski (1888–1938), Polish; from 1917 a member of the VKP(b); from 1918 to 1920, deputy commander of the 44th Rifle Division’s 1st regiment; from 1922 to

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Deputy Commander of the Army of Kharkiv Military District; KOSIOR Kazimierz, a former People’s Commissar for Forestry of the Ukrainian SSR; GNIEZDINSKY, a history professor, director of the Zoology Institute in Kamianets-Podilskyi; ZAGRIETSKY, a doctor in Odessa, and other persons, it was determined that until recently in Ukraine an organised, strictly confidential underground movement functioned related to the Polish Military Organisation, which was led by a Ukraine-wide facility called General Headquarters.

As we have determined, the Polish Military Organisation already functioned illegally in Ukraine before the revolution (between 1914–1917). It was managed by General Headquarters, composed of well-known Piłsudski loyalists: MATUSZEWSKI (presently a general in the Polish Army), HOŁÓWKO (managed the Eastern Department of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, killed) and SKARBEK – [all] linked directly with PIŁSUDSKI.

1923, deputy commander of the 44th Rifle Division; from 1923 to 1924, commander of the 99th Rifle Division; from 1926 to 1928, commander of the 44th Rifle Division; from 1928 to 1930, commander of the 7th Rifle Division; from 1930 to 1935, commander of the 46th Rifle Division; from 1935 to 1936, commander of the 17th Rifle Corps. Between 1936–1937, deputy commander of the Kharkiv Military District. Arrested on 17 December 1937, sentenced to death on 25 August 1938 by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court; shot the same day; rehabilitated 8 September 1956.

Kazimierz Kosior (1897–1938), brother of the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, Stanislav Kosior; in 1916–1919 a member of Polish Socialist Party, then in the All-Union Communist Party; Deputy People’s Commissar for Forestry of the Ukrainian SSR. Arrested on 17 April 1938, under the verdict of Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of 20 August 1938 sentenced to death, executed by firing squad; rehabilitated on 14 April 1956.

Ignacy Matuszewski (1891–1946), Polish politician, diplomat, lieutenant. In 1917 he took part in the formation of a Polish corps in Russia, served in the I Polish Corps; from April 1918 a member of the Polish Military Organisation; in July 1920 appointed head of the II Department of Supreme Command of the Polish Army; between 1924–1926, military attaché in Rome; between 1926–1928 director of the Administration Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs; between 1928–1929 a Member of Parliament of the Republic of Poland in Budapest; between 1929–1931 Minister of the Treasury. Feature writer for Gazeta Polska, editor-in-chief of “Polityka Narodów”; émigré since 1939; in 1941 he came to the USA. Co-organiser of the Józef Piłsudski Institute in New York and the National Committee of Americans of Polish Descent.

Tadeusz Hołówko (1889–1931), Polish politician, feature writer; in November 1918 Vice-Minister of Propaganda in the government of Ignacy Daszyński; co-organiser of the Polish Military Organisation; since 1930 a Member of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland representing the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government. Murdered by members of OUN in Truskavets.

Bolesław Skarbek-Szacki (1888–1934), between 1907–1917 member of Polish Socialist Party; since 1917 in Polish Military Organisation in Ukraine; from 1919 co-founder and member of Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, then member of the Polish Office of Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine; from 1922 plenipotentiary for support to Communist Party of Poland in Ukraine; member of party and state authorities in Kharkiv, Kiev and Chernihiv. Arrested by officers of the GPU of the Ukrainian SSR on 15 August 1933 on a charge of being a member of Polish Military Organisation, executed by firing squad on 3 June 1934; rehabilitated in 1958.

Józef Klemens Piłsudski (1867–1935), pro-independence activist, statesman, Marshal of Poland; between 1914–1916 commander of the I Brigade of Polish Legions by Austro-Hungarian Army; between 1918–1922 Head of State; since 11 November 1918 commander-in-chief; in May 1926 he organised and performed a coup d’état; between 1926–1928 and in 1930 Prime Minister; between 1926–1935 General Inspector of Armed Forces.

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After the October Revolution, up until 1920 it functioned almost legally in Ukraine. Under the order issued by Piłsudski, Ukraine was divided into 3 districts of the Polish Military Organisation: the Right-Bank Ukrainian Command (KUP) in Kiev, the Left-Bank Ukrainian Command (KUL) in Kharkiv and the Black Sea Ukrainian Command (KUCz) – covering the Black Sea shores of Ukraine, Crimea and the Caucasus – in Odessa.

In the field numerous city commands were established. In these commands the following divisions were set up:
1) administrative (Administration Department),
2) secret services (Secret Services Department),
3) press and propaganda,
4) communication (Union Department).

These commands had their staffs and chancelleries; they provided the members of Polish Military Organisations with ID cards, issued orders, instructions, etc.

Currently we can find in the archives a whole range of documents and instructions from the Polish Military Organisation, regarding sabotage and intelligence activities.

The following are quotations from documents of the Right-Bank Ukrainian Command which characterise the work of the Polish Military Organisation at the time:

“Order No. 77-A of 7 October 1919 regarding situation of employees in service for KU.
1. KU is a state institution, subject directly to the General Command of P. (Poland) and has the rights of a designated military unit for administration and tactics.
2. All persons drawn via the agency of KU into intelligence service in practice perform true military service in P. (Poland) and remain in service to the 2nd Division of General Staff.” (Translation from Polish).

In this period, the Polish Military Organisation primarily conducted extensive espionage and insurrectionary work.

“Instruction no. 1 for information organisations of the Polish Military Organisation.
1. The objective of an information organisation is to:
a) determine the state of military depots and units,
b) determine the state of military transport,
b) determine the state of technical transport,
d) examine the mutual relations and feelings of local population and its impact on the army.
2. To this end, the organisation:
(translation from Polish)

Was: Main. As in entire document. The name ‘Main Staff’ was used by the Polish Army from 1928.
a) systematically executes intelligence services through direct observation,
b) establishes relations with persons holding responsible functions,
c) tries to obtain documented military data,
d) explains events of a military nature, the attitude of military circles and 
population towards them, etc.”

Another instruction says:
“1) Secret services [dealing with] the insurrectionary movement should
determine the source of [this] movement, its strength, and to what extent it is 
supported by the local community, and finally its combat power.

2) Ideological leaders of the political insurrectionary movement and their 
specification, specification of commanders [divisions], party and political groups, 
having an impact on the insurrectionary movement, the public feelings of the local 
population supportive or hostile to this movement” (translation from Polish).

Since the Soviet-Polish war, the Polish Military Organisation has been 
redeveloped, is concealed in the deeply secret underground, and is beginning to 
execute the directive issued by PIŁSUDSKI regarding the preparation for Polish 
annexation of the territory of Ukraine and Belorussia within the borders of “Greater 
Poland” of 1772. According to this directive and based on the military-sabotage 
plans drawn up by Polish General Staff, the Polish Military Organisation has 
commenced its activities.

Hiding in the underground, the management of Polish Military Organisation 
issued the following order to b-the Right-Bank Ukrainian Command b [KUP]:
“...If Poland fails to attach Ukraine in any way thereto, then permanent military 
forces should be kept in the East. Therefore the conclusion is, bearing in mind the 
difficulties related to the general development of the young state, that the people 
appointed to work in the Polish Military Organisation are absolutely indispensable 
to us.

It is necessary to skilfully and cautiously manage the forces, otherwise at the 
moment of active combat they may turn out to be insufficient...”

“...The existence of the KUP is associated with the vital interests of the state. 
These are the reserves from which the composition of the KUP will be 
supplemented.

With KUP’s work we are clearing the way for future victories. Therefore we 
must show even greater willpower and fortitude than our Comrades on the front...”

Soon after this, in relation to the conditions of underground work, one Ukraine-
wide centre of the Polish Military Organisation was established, named b-General 
Headquarters b, that has functioned until recently. The b-General Headquarters b was 
composed of: BIENIEWSKI, a colonel d-in the Polish service d, who fled to Poland;
SKARBEK, a former manager of the Political Office of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine; (sentenced in 1933); POLITUR,

\[d- As in the original.\]
a former editor of the Polish paper “Sierp,”, KONIECKIć7, a former deputy manager of the Kulturprop of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine; LAZOVERT, the former manager of the Political Office in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, then state arbiter of the Ukrainian SSR; BEGAILO, the former Secretary of the Vinnysia Oblast Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (all sentenced in 1937); KWIATEK, the former deputy commander of the troops of Kharkiv Military District (arrested) and KOSIOR Kazimir, the former People’s Commissar for the Forestry Industry of the Ukrainian SSR (arrested).

The scale of the operation aimed at breaking up the Polish Military Organisation underground movement has led in March and April this year to the detection of numerous formations of the Polish Military Organisation, especially in right-bank Ukraine. Oblast units of the Polish Military Organisation, the so-called district commands, were liquidated in Kiev, Odessa, Zhytomyr, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Vinnysia and Kharkiv, raion commands of the Polish Military Organisation and hit squads (combat units) that conducted subversive, espionage and insurrectionary activities and also performed pro-Polish nationalist propaganda.

In this period, 49 raion commands of the Polish Military Organisation and 450 hit squads in total were liquidated, and 8692 members of these units were arrested.

As was determined in the investigation regarding the cases of arrested members of the Polish Military Organisation, the structure of the Polish Military Organisation underground movement in recent times was as follows:

- The General Headquarters, district and raion commands were led by the Chief of the Polish Military Organisation.
- General Headquarters was composed of the following units:
  - Sector “A” – military-intelligence, led by KWIATEK;
  - Sector “B” – agitation and propaganda, led by POLITUR, KONIECKI and LAZOVERT respectively;
  - Sector “N” – sabotage-insurrectionary, led by BEGAILO and KOSIOR respectively.

The Office of Technology and Communication – maintaining contact with Poland and Polish consulates in USSR; led by MICHAJLOW-ŁAPIŃSKI, a well-known Piłsudski loyalist who arrived from Poland, and LAZOVERT (both sentenced).

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7 Józef Koniecki, vel Leon Rozin (1900–1938), before his arrest, an instructor in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine for science. Arrested on 1 September 1935 by the UGB of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, sentenced on 19–23 June 1936 by Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District to 10 years’ imprisonment, upon the decision of the UNKVD troika for Novosibirsk oblast of 2 November 1938; executed by firing squad (date of execution unknown); rehabilitated in 1956.

8 Michał Łapiński-Michajłow (1910–1934), member of Polish Socialist Party-the Left and Communist Party of Western Ukraine (KPZU); lecturer at Polish Proletariat Culture Institute in Kiev. Arrested in 1933, sentenced to death on 3 March 1934.
The Coordination Office – establishing contacts with other anti-Soviet organizations, led by a number of commanders of Polish Military Organisation – SKARBEK, after his arrest LAZOVERT and others.

In some of the oblast units there were the same units as in the General Headquarters.

Results of the operation we conducted show that the hit squads, which were the bottom points of resistance of the Polish Military organisation, were set up by Poles at the most strategically important rail and car roads, within the Red Army and many other branches of Ukraine’s national economy, especially in the forest, sugar and glass-porcelain industries.

The Poles’ points of resistance, as eliminated by us, were, according to the plans of the General Staff, situated mainly along the following lines:

2) Olevsk – Korosten – Kiev;
3) Shepetivka – Berdychiv – Koziatyn;
4) Kamianets-Podilskyi – Zakupnoye – Yarmolintse – Hrechany;
5) Zhmerynka – Odessa.

Over many years, the management of the Polish Military Organisation introduced its commanding staff into the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, utilising its capabilities in the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine and Oblast Committees, where a number of important sections were managed by the members of the Polish Military Organisation, they moved these staff to managerial positions in the raions, the Red Army, transport, industry, etc. From these members of the Polish Military Organisation who infiltrated the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, they formed oblast and raion commands of the Polish Military Organisation.

Due to this, the members of the Polish Military Organisation seized the party and state apparatus in a number of raions. Hence, during the operation within the Zhytomyr and Kamianets-Podilskyi oblasts from 17 to 25 April this year, the arrested members of the Polish Military Organisation included 5 secretaries of raion party committees, 2 heads of raiospolkoms, large number of instructors of raion party committees and 79 managers of raion Soviet offices.

In Horodok and Volochysk raions as well as others in the Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast, the raion party committees were almost entirely composed of members of the Polish Military Organisation, and in reality they reflected the composition of the raion commands of the Polish Military Organisation.

During the investigation, it was determined that the oblast and raion commands were mostly led by members of the Polish Military Organisation who had infiltrated responsible [positions] of party and state works, professors, engineers, and doctors. In the structure of oblast and raion commands, we discovered and arrested a number of officers of the Polish secret services, who were left behind by the Poles during the evacuation from right-bank Ukraine, arrived illegally in recent years, and were serving as emissaries of the Polish General Staff.
The basic contingent of hit squads was composed of former legionnaires of the Polish Army, kulaks, church activists, some Poles with a pro-clerical attitude living in the countryside and other Polish nationalist element. The Catholic clergy also drew the hostile elements from among Ukrainian Catholics into the hit squads.

We have many testimonies proving that the Polish Military Organisation in Ukraine conducted extensive espionage, sabotage, insurrectionary and propaganda work.

Sector “A”

Espionage-sabotage hit squads were established in the staffs of Kiev and Kharkiv Military Districts in the 15th, 25th, 44th, 46th, 51st, 62nd, 97th, 99th and 100th Rifle Divisions; the 2nd, 3rd, 24th and 28th Cavalry Divisions; the 1st Cavalry Corps; the 2nd brigade of the Polish Military Organisation; the 16th and 56th air brigades, and a number of mobilisation divisions and military stations.

The members of the hit squads provided Polish secret services with espionage materials regarding the state of military readiness, technology, armament, supply and military construction in the districts, and also the organisation of mobilisation of the troops of the South-Western Front.

Members of the Polish Military organisation in the army conducted extensive subversive activities in the area of mobilisation, aiming at complicating our plans and calculations related to mobilisation and preventing the timely mobilisation of units of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in the first and second phases.

Sector “A” prepared treason at the front during the future war between USSR and Poland, via the agency of Polish Military Organisation members, belonging to the command staff of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army.

Sector “B”

Extensive Polonisation activities were conducted in the Western part of right-bank Ukraine through an established broad network of Polish institutes, Polish technical education facilities, Polish schools, Polish clubs, Polish theatres and other Polish nationalist organisations acting under the banner of “cultural and educational institutions”.

Through these institutions, intensive nationalist agitation activities and propaganda were conducted among the Polish population and Catholic Ukrainians who were being moulded in the spirit of Polish patriotism.

Sector “B” widely utilised the network of Catholic churches and chapels existing until 1933; there were almost 200 of these in right-bank Ukraine, and also the numerous rosary groups and tertiary clubs established by Catholic priests, through which anti-Soviet propaganda was conducted and the Polish population was being moulded in a clerical spirit.

In the rosary and tertiary groups, Polish youth prepared for combat actions and were then introduced to the hit squads. As was established in the course of investigation, some of the members of the rosary and tertiary groups were illegally
transferred to Poland, where after training in the special schools of the 2nd Division of the General Staff, they returned in the same way to right-bank Ukraine to organise sabotage-insurrectionary and espionage activities.

Through the members of the Polish Military Organisation who seized the ethnic minorities organisations, Sector “B” opposed the closing of churches for a long time, despite the persistent demands of kolkhoz members.

By means of fraud and false numbers regarding the Polish population, through the espionage network of the Sector in party and state bodies, Sector “B” brought about the establishment of the Marchlewski Polish National raion and an entire range of Polish national village councils in Volhynia and Podolia, which were widely utilised as a base for the organisational work of the Polish Military Organisation

Sector “C”

I have already reported in the telephonogram of 14 April about the significant sabotage organisation [acting] in the military communication network of Kiev Military District, which we have eliminated, and which was preparing the destruction of the strategic rail hubs of Korosten – Koziatyn – Zhmerynka, Hrechany, Shepetivka, and also the bridges on the rivers Dnieper, Yuzhny Bug, Sluch and Teterev.

Parallel to sector “C”, a large network of sabotage groups on the railroad was established, encompassing all the strategic hubs on the right-bank area.

On the South-Western Railroad and Odessa [Railroad] in March-April, we eliminated dozens of sabotage hit squads of the Polish Military Organisation, whose members were located at the major points on these railroads, and had prepared serious subversive actions for the period of mobilisation and war.

At the present moment, members of these hit squads have been destroying steam locomotives, crashing carriages, organising [train] crashes, etc.

Arrested at the station of Odessa Railroad Slobodka, POLTORAK, a member of the sabotage hit squad of the Polish Military Organisation, admitted that between 1937 and 1938 he had damaged 3 steam locomotives.

Similar subversive acts were performed by members of the Polish Military Organisation in the locomotive sheds at Zhmerynka station, Shepetivka station, Korosten station, and all other locomotive sheds.

On the South-Western Railroad between 1937 and 1938, sabotage groups of Polish Military Organisation members prepared crashes of passenger and freight trains at the Khristinovka, Hrebenka, Ovruch, Post Volhynsk stations and others; they committed arson in the mechanical and locomotive departments of the Kiev Facilities for Renovation of Carriages and Locomotives.

Sabotage groups of the Polish Military Organisation were eliminated in the district artillery depots of Kiev Military District no. 63 in Nizhyn and no. 64 in Kiev, which were to be blown up during war.

Numerous sabotage groups were eliminated which were established by Sector “C” in the network of the People’s Commissariat for Forestry, mostly in Olevsk, Horodnytsia, Slavutsk, Starokonstantinov, Slovetsan, Antoniny, Latychov, Zhytomyr, Ovruch and other lespromkhozes in the Kamianets-Podilskyi and Zhytomyr oblasts.
[Members of these groups] conducted the following subversive activities:

a) cleared hidden airports for the Polish air force, established in distant backwoods;
b) conducted special clearing of the forests, revealing railroads and car roads;
c) according to the Main Staff’s guidelines, they cleared forest paths from West to East, constituting convenient facilities for gathering and marching Polish troops;
d) they failed to thin out dense forest complexes in the zone of reinforced raions, leaving fire positions with limited visibility.

Sector “C” placed great emphasis on establishing sabotage groups in the defence industry, in order to disrupt production during wartime at a number of significant plants and enterprises working for state defence, as well as the massive power plants providing these facilities with power. Such sabotage groups were detected and eliminated in Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Donbas, Odessa and other places in Ukraine.

Large numbers of sabotage groups established by Sector “C” were detected and eliminated in the sugar and glass-porcelain industry in Zhytomyr, Kamianets-Podilskyi and Vinnitsia oblasts.

We have also liquidated numerous insurrectionary hit squads established by Sector “C” which were to participate in armed riots and reform themselves into partisan units, acting at the rear of the Red Army.

All these sabotage and insurrectionary hit squads of the Main Staff were to commence large-scale destructive armed actions and insurrectionary activities; based on directives from Poland, they were to disorganise the work of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army of the South-West Front at the moment of mobilisation, complicate the situation at the rear, and hence enable Polish troops to annex right-bank Ukraine with a sudden attack.

Office of Technology

This regulated work in the field of communication with Polish consulates in Kiev and Kharkiv, through which a large amount of materials collected by members of the Polish Military Organisation was forwarded to the Main Staff. Through the Polish consulates, the General Headquarters of the Polish Military Organisation received instructions and money for activities.

At the same time the Office of Technology established a number of decentralised communication lines with Poland, which were managed by the cross-border raion commands of the Polish Military Organisation. Many such communication lines were liquidated in the Kamianets-Podilskyi, Satanov, Horodok, Volochysk and Slavutsk raions in Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast and in the Zhytomyr, Vinnitsia and Odessa oblasts.

In the course of the investigation it was determined that the priests who fled to Poland (ŚWIDERSKI, SZYMAŃSKI and others), who dealt with the work of

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9 Perhaps Jan Świderski (1888–1959), priest, graduated from the seminary in Zhytomyr; from 1912 to 1918 assistant curate in Zhmerynka; between 1918–1920 a religious instruction teacher in Proskurov;
the Polish Military Organisation in Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast, settled in the border zone in Poland, and from there they [have been acting as agents] maintaining contact between the Polish Military Organisation underground movement in Ukraine and the Polish Main Staff.

Coordination Office

The Coordination Office established contacts with a rightist-Trotskyite unit in Ukraine, the military-fascist conspiracy and an anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist organisation.

As was determined in the course of the investigation, communication with the rightist-Trotskyite unit was maintained by SKARBEK, and then LAZOVERT and KOSIOR Kazimir through members of this unit; POPOV, the former secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine; [and] SZELECHIES, the former deputy head of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, and others.

A substantial part of the Polish Military Organisation members and at the same time commanders in Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army belonged to the military-fascist conspiracy, including such well-known members of the Polish Military Organisation as KWIAITEK, KAPCEWICZ, the former commander of the 58th Rifle Division; RACZYŃSKI, a former commander of the 2nd brigade of the Polish Military Organisation; KULIKOWSKI, a former head of the military

from 1921 to 1929 parish priest in Bar. In 1926 appointed apostolic administrator of Kamianets diocese. Arrested 18 October 1930; upon the sentence of the troika by the Collegium of the OGPU of the Ukrainian SSR of 27 June 1930, sentenced to the death penalty, commuted to 10 years’ imprisonment. In February 1932 he came to Poland under an exchange of political prisoners; he worked in Lutsk diocese; from 1939 in Warsaw; from 1944 in Wrocław diocese.

10 Walerian Szymański (born 1848), priest, from 1920 administrator of the Armenian church in Kamianets-Podilskyi, sentenced to the death penalty on 2 October 1922 by a revolutionary tribunal in Kamianets-Podilskyi, commuted to imprisonment; his later fate is unknown.

11 Nikolai Nikolaievich Popov (1891–1938), Ukrainian party activist, party historian. Lecturer at Artiom Communist University in Kharkiv and on Marxism courses of the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks); from 1922 to 1927 manager of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine; from 1928 to 1929 manager of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda in Moscow Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks); within 1929–1933 member of Editing Collegium of Pravda; from 1933 to 1937 the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Arrested on 17 June 1937, executed by firing squad on 6 February 1938; rehabilitated on 22 March 1956.

12 Iliia Savielevich Szelechies (1891–1938), from 1908 member of Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks); from 1921 responsible secretary of the committee of Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of Mykolaiv gubernia; from 1924 responsible secretary of the committee of Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine of Karpaty gubernia; from 1926 in the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks); from 1929 to 1933 Chief of the West Oblast Executive Committee; from 1934 First Deputy Chief of the Council of People’s Commissars of Ukrainian SSR; from 23 May 1936 member of Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. Arrested and executed by firing squad in 1938.

13 Grigory Antonovich Kaptsevich (1895–1938), brigade commander (kombrig), Belarusian; from 1929 a member of the VKP(b); commander of the 58th Rifle Division. Arrested on 13 August 1937, sentenced to death on 17 October 1938 by the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court; rehabilitated 18 January 1958.
In the course of the investigation, it was determined that the Polish Military Organisation in Ukraine was particularly strongly linked to Ukrainian nationalists, and in recent times, the basic links of these organisations joined and acted together at the level of sections.

Some members of the Polish Military Organisation from management belonged, as representatives of the Polish Military Organisation, to the managerial anti-Soviet links of the Ukrainian nationalist underground movement. For instance KWIAŁEK [belonged to the structure of] the anti-Soviet military staff of a Ukrainian nationalist unit; BEGAILO [belonged to the structure of] an oblast insurrectionary committee; KAPCEWICZ, commander of division, [belonged to the structure of] the Kiev oblast insurrectionary committee; PROKOPCZUK, commander of the 51st Division, [belonged to the structure of] the Odessa oblast insurrectionary committee, etc.

The Polish Military Organisation and anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist organisation, under an agreement between the anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist unit and the Polish Government, prepared a joint armed insurrection in order to overthrow the Soviet authorities in Ukraine.

The arrestee KWIAŁEK and the Chief of Polish Military Organisation in Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast GNIEZDINSKY testify that, apart from the grand plans of the Polish Government, assuming the expansion of Poland’s territory to the borders of 1772, which Poles intended to execute during a war with the USSR, there was a plan for a local war, developed by the Polish Main Staff.

According to this plan, under the directive of the Polish General Staff, the Polish Military Organisation conducted intense propaganda activities among the Polish and Ukrainian Catholic population in Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast, [propagating that] Kamianets-Podilskyi [and] Proskurov, along with the surrounding areas, are historically Polish cities and are drawn to Poland, consistent with all economic interests and spiritual values.

As everybody knows, Poland’s borderline from USSR from the place where the Zbruch falls into the Dniester, and running up the River Zbruch at a section of over 200 km, is the line of the former border between Austro-Hungary and Russia, whereas the whole remaining part of the USSR border remains unchanged. The Poles have tried very hard to convince everyone, both in Poland as well as through their espionage network in Ukraine, primarily in Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast, that this part of the border should also be changed to lead to the annexation of the territory of Podolia, and the incorporation thereof into Poland. In relation thereto, some members of the Polish Military Organisation were preparing an armed insurrection in Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast. To this end numerous insurrectionary

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14 Nikolai Andreyevich Prokopchuk (1896–1938), brigade commander (kombrig), Belorussia; from 1929 member of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks); commander of 51st Rifle Division. Arrested on 2 February 1938, sentenced to death on 25 September 1938 by Military Collegium of the Supreme Court; rehabilitated on 27 December 1957.
hit squadsb (units) were set up there. Within the last two months alone, 215 insurrectionary hit squads\(^b\) were eliminated on the territory of Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast.

According to the plans of the Polish General Staff, at the moment of the outbreak of insurrection in Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast, the Poles were, at the request of the insurgents, to lead their troops onto these areas, and through an “armed plebiscite” incorporate the territory of Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast into Poland.

KWIAEKT and other members of the Polish Military Organisation who were commanders in the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army testify that in line with the plan of the Polish General Staff, one of the commanders of Polish Military Organisation in USSR, DĄBAL, brought up the issue of forming Polish national corps of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in 1925, and of locating it in the border zone of Podolia and Volhynia, building it up from the local Polish and Ukrainian-Catholic populations. Also then DĄBAL proposed to move the Unszlicht [military school of Polish communards] from Moscow to Kamianets-Podilskyi. The Poles hoped that these military groups would play a significant role in the realisation of [their plans regarding] a small local war.

In relation to the failure of this undertaking, at a later time [the task] of executing this plan was delegated to insurrectionary formations of the Polish Military Organisation, which KWIAEKT was to group in Borderland Divisions before the riots.

In line with KWIAEKT’s directive, a member of the anti-Soviet Ukrainian nationalist organisation, DEMICHEV,\(^{15}\) a former commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps, on the pretext of forming a kolkhoz cavalry, was to build up a large insurrectionary strike force whose task would be to participate in this riot and conduct actions against the cavalry of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army located in the Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast.

Within the last two months, 64 insurrectionary units which were supposed to join the corps of kolkhoz cavalry have been liquidated.

According to the testimonies of the detainees KWIAEKT and GNIEZDINSKY, by means of this “local riot” the Polish Main Staff intended to move the Soviet-Polish border beyond the Kamianets-Podilskyi–Proskurov–Shepetivka line up to the line of our reinforced raions, and transform the Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast into a stronghold for the concentration [of forces] and an attack on Kiev, and also to accomplish the great plan of incorporating right-bank Ukraine [into Poland].

Based on the testimonies of KWIAEKT and BUTYRSKY,\(^{16}\) the former commander of Kiev Military District, it has now been very precisely determined

\(^{15}\) Mikhail Afanasieich Demichev (1885–1937), division commander (komdiv), from 1920 member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks); from 1923 to 1931 commander of the 1st Division of Red Cossacks Cavalry; from 1933 to 1937 commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps. Arrested on 9 August 1937; sentenced to death under the verdict of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR of 19 November 1937; rehabilitated on 20 October 1956.

\(^{16}\) Vasily Pietrovich Butyrsky (1896–1938), division commander (komdiv), from 1930 member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), from 1930 to 1935 deputy chief of the Operational Division
that while constructing the lines of reinforced raions in Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast, moved 100 and more kilometres from the border, subversive activities were being performed, in line with the Poles’ arrangement with YAKIR and other leaders of the military-fascist conspiracy, resulting from the plans discussed above of the Polish Main Staff regarding the seizure of Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast.

The Poles started to prepare execution of the plan to incorporate the Kamianets territory primarily after Hitler had come to power in Germany. Together with the Germans and Japanese, the Poles joined [the group of states fighting] local wars of occupation, beginning with the annexation of Manchuria by Japan, then of Abyssinia by Italy, preparations to annex Austria, etc.

Since that time Poland, simultaneously with preparations to annex Lithuania, has exerted strong pressure on the management of the Polish Military Organisation in Ukraine to accelerate insurrection there. The Poles expected that the USSR, unwilling to get involved in a global conflict, would be forced to go along with the occupation of Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast by the Poles.

The operation is being continued.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
3rd Rank Commissar of State Security
USPENSKY

30 April 1938
no. 1038/sn
The City of Kiev

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Order of People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR of 1938

no. 00606

Subject: Regarding establishment of special troikas for investigating the cases of persons arrested under the orders of the USSR NKVD no. 00485 and others.

No. 00606. 17 September 1938, the City of Moscow.

1. To ensure the speedier consideration of investigative cases [filed] for persons arrested under USSR NKVD Orders no. 00485, no. 00439 and no. 00539 of 1937, and no. 302 and no. 326 of 1938, [I order] that the directorates of NKVD of the krai and oblasts establish special troikas and impose on them [the responsibility] of considering the cases referred to above.

2. These special troikas shall be set up in [the following] composition: First Secretary of Oblast Committee, State Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) or Central Committee of the National Communist Party, the head of the relevant NKVD directorate, and the prosecutors of oblast, krai, republic.

   In the Ukrainian and Kazakh SSRs and in the Far Eastern krai, special troikas shall be established in oblasts.

3. The special troikas shall consider the cases related to persons arrested only up to 1 August 1938, and have two months to complete their work.

4. Cases regarding all persons belonging to national and counter-revolutionary groups arrested after 1 August 1938, shall be forwarded for consideration by the relevant court bodies according to their competencies (war tribunals, line and oblast courts, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court), and also by special collegia of the USSR NKVD.

5. The special troikas shall not consider cases concerning persons who are citizens of foreign states. Such cases shall be forwarded to the 3rd Division of the

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1st Directorate of the USSR NKVD for consideration at the Centre, and forwarded [on] according to the court’s competencies.

6. The special troikas shall consider the cases of UNKVD (NKVD) and also the Road and Transport Division of the NKVD and the third divisions of labour camps of NKVD, situated in the location of the relevant UNKVD (NKVD).

7. The special troikas shall issue verdicts in compliance with the NKVD Order No. 00485 of 25 August 1937, in the first and second category, and also return the cases for supplementation [of the investigation] and take decisions on releasing accused persons from custody if there are not enough materials to sentence the arrested persons.

8. Decisions by the special troikas [adjudicating] in the first category shall be executed immediately.

9. The special troikas will maintain reports of their sessions where they enter decisions issued by them in relation to each person sentenced. In the investigations directed against nationalities (Polish, German, Latvian, etc.), separate reports shall be maintained. The reports shall be signed by all the members of each troika in 2 copies. One copy of the report shall be submitted to the 1st Special Division of the USSR NKVD.

10. Excerpts from the report shall be attached to investigative cases separately in reference to each person sentenced. After executing the verdicts, both in the first as well as in the second category, the cases shall be immediately forwarded to the 1st Special Division of the USSR NKVD.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security
YEZHOV

In conformity:
Senior Inspector of Codification Department
AChU USSR NKVD

HDA SBU, F. 9, Spr. 672, pp. 161–163.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
On the document assignment: for Comrade Poyasov and inscription: I have read it. 22 September 1938. (–).
No. 22
21 September 1938, Moscow. Circular from the Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria, with additional instructions to Order No. 00606

T[op] secret

Circular by
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR of 1938

no. 189. Contents: explanation of the manner in which Order No. 00606 [of] 1938 of the USSR NKVD [should be executed]

no. 189. 21 September 1938, the City of Moscow

To all People’s Commissars for Internal Affairs of Soviet and autonomous republics, the Heads of Krai and Oblast NKVD Directorates, the Heads of Oblast Directorates of NKVD of Ukrainian and Kazakh SSR and DVK

To supplement the order by the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR no. 00606, of 17 September 1938, the following is explained:

1. Special *troikas* in the field are to consider the cases of persons arrested in the manner determined by orders of the USSR NKVD no. 00485, 00439 and 00593 [of] 1937 and no. 202 and 326 [of] 1938, and also in the manner determined by the directives sent to the field to supplement or extend these orders: no. 49990 of 30 November [19]37 (the Latvian operation), no. 50215 of 11 December [19]37 (the Greek operation), etc. In other words this refers to all persons of Polish, German, Latvian, Estonian, Finnish, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Greek, Romanian, Iranian, Afghan and Chinese nationality, as well as Harbinians and members of the White Guard organisations (ROVS, BRP, RFP^1), arrested before 1 August 1938, whose espionage, sabotage, terrorist and other anti-Soviet activities have been exposed.

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^1 The Russian Fascist Party (RFP), established on 26 May 1931 in Harbin by White Russian emigrants; in 1934 it joined the Russian Fascist Organisation. The party was led by Konstantin Rodzeyevsky; in the territory of Manchukuo it had c. 12,000 members. Activists of the party conducted anti-Communist propaganda activities, and propagated nationalist and anti-Semitic slogans, following the example of Italian fascism; from 1932 they collaborated with Japanese in the military field. The Party’s press organs were the papers “Our Road” and “Nation.” The party terminated its activities in August 1945 after the Red Army entered Manchukuo.
2. In addition to the cases which the special *troikas* are not entitled to consider, [i.e.] cases regarding citizens of other states, the special *troikas* will not issue verdicts: a) in cases regarding engineers, professors, doctors, and other highly qualified specialists; b) in cases regarding employees of units and troops of the NKVD, and c) in cases regarding former army and navy soldiers who were promoted to special [and] military ranks. The cases of these persons should be forwarded as relevant to military tribunals, line and oblast courts, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR and the Special Collegium of the NKVD.

Note: Cases regarding soldiers of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Fleet who had not been granted special [or] military ranks their arrest, are to be considered by the special *troikas* in a normal manner.

3. In addition to the verdicts [for persons classified under the] first and second categories, and also [in addition to] decisions to return the cases for repeated investigation and to release the accused persons from prison with [a simultaneous] withdrawal from [investigation of] the case, the special *troikas* may issue a verdict of putting a person in corrective labour camp for 5 years, exile to a designated place in the USSR, put under open supervision in the accused person’s place of residence, and release from prison, including the period of initial detention in the total duration of the penalty.

4. Reports with the special *troikas’* decisions should contain on the left side of the sheet basic personal details (last name, first name and patronymic, year and place of birth, nationality, citizenship, membership in the party, last occupation before arrest) and a brief summary of the prosecution material; on the right side of the sheet the verdict or decision to release from custody, suspend the case, return the case for repeated investigation, forward to the relevant court institution, etc.

5. It is necessary to attach the following documents to investigative cases, forwarded after execution of the verdict issued by the special *troikas* to central [units]: to cases of persons sentenced under the first category - information about verdict execution and one copy of the registration card according to template no. 1; to cases of persons sentenced under the second category - two copies of the registration card.

6. Directorates (of NKVD) shall present 1st Special Division of the NKVD with the figures regarding the work of the special *troikas* in compliance with the enclosed template. Information should be listed separately: for the period to

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2 Special ranks and military ranks were introduced accordingly for the commanding staff of the Main Directorate of State Security of the USSR NKVD, upon resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars of USSR no. 20/2256 of 7 October 1935; for military men serving in the internal and border troops of the USSR NKVD under the directive of the Council of People’s Commissars no. 2250 of 7 October 1935. New ranks were announced on 10 October 1935 upon the order of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs no. 319. Moreover, to supplement resolution no. 20/2256 of 7 October 1935, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars passed resolution no. 2542 of 26 November 1935, regarding the introduction of the rank General Commissar of State Security.
30 September inclusive, for the period from 1 to 31 October, and for the remaining
time. After the work of the special *troikas* is completed, a general summary should
be developed in line with this template.

7. Along with the order of People’s Commissar no. 00606 and this circular, the
secretaries of the *Oblast* Committees, State Committees of All-Union Communist
Party (Bolsheviks) and the Central Committee of national Communist parties, as
well as prosecutors who are members of the special *troikas*, should be notified of
the contents thereof.

Appendix: template [for development of] information.²

Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
1st Rank Commissar of State Security
BERIA ⁴

In conformity: Senior Inspector of Codification Department
AO AChU USSR NKVD (—)

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² Not to be published.
⁴ Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria (1899–1953), from 1921 in VCheKa-OGPU; initially in managerial
positions in Azerbaijan, then the Georgian CheKa-GPU; from 2 December 1926 to 3 December 1931 Chief
of GPU of Georgian SSR; from April 1927 to December 1930 People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of
Georgian SSR; from 17 April to 3 December 1931, Chief of OO GPU of Red Flag Caucasian Army and
PP GPU of USSR in ZFSRS; head of Caucasian GPU; from 31 October 1931 to 31 August 1938, on
managerial positions in Georgia; from 22 August to 25 November 1938, First Deputy People’s Commissar
of Internal Affairs of the USSR; from 8 September 1938 Chief of the 1st Directorate of USSR NKVD;
from 29 October to 17 December 1938, chief of GUGB of NKVD of the USSR; from 25 November 1938
to 29 December 1945, People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and Deputy Head of Council
of People’s Commissars of USSR; from 30 June 1941 to 4 September 1945, member of the State Defence
Committee of the USSR; from 16 May 1944 to 4 September 1945, Deputy Head of the State Defence
Committee of the USSR; from 19 March 1946 to 15 March 1953, Deputy Head of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR; from 5 March 1953 Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Arrested on 29 June 1953,
sentenced to death on 23 December 1953 by the Supreme Court of the USSR, executed by firing squad on
that day; not rehabilitated.
No. 23
26 November 1938, Moscow. Order from the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria, regarding the mode of implementing the decision issued by the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938

T[op] secret

Order of
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR of 1938

Contents: no. 00762 regarding the manner of implementation of the Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938.

No. 00762 26 November 1938, the City of Moscow.

The Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938, “Regarding arrests, prosecutor’s supervision and investigation management,” reveals serious irregularities and distortions in the works of NKVD units and the prosecutor’s office, and highlights the methods with which we can improve the activities of our Soviet intelligence services in relation to the final defeat of the enemies of the people and clearing our state of the espionage-sabotage network of foreign secret services, of all the rats and traitors to the homeland.

Correct implementation of this resolution, which requires from all the employees of central and local [units] of the NKVD united, energetic, determined efforts, will lead to a significant improvement in the quality of intelligence-informative and investigative work, and to a substantial improvement and the elimination of errors and irregularities that have occurred in the work of the NKVD.

To secure permanent implementation of the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938, I charge all units of the NKVD to follow the directives listed below while executing this resolution:

1. Preparation of any mass arrests and displacement should be immediately abandoned; understanding mass operations as group arrests or displacements without a diverse attitude towards each arrested or displaced person, and the initial comprehensive consideration of all aggravating materials held by this person.

2. Arrests should be carried out with absolute respect for individual order, preparing for each arrested person a special warrant that should [contain] detailed and specific substantiation of the need to apply the sanction of arrest. Any cases of omission of the practice of preparation of the so-called *spravka or memorandum* for arrest should first be agreed upon with the prosecutor.
3. Heads of *Raion* and Municipal Divisions of NKVD must report, initially to the Chiefs of the relevant UNKVD or NKVD of Unions or autonomous republics, the intention of applying arrest, [submitting a] justified decision and receiving the warrant for arrest.

4. Carrying out arrests in the *raions* without the initial agreement of [this] sanction with higher NKVD bodies shall only be allowed in exceptional cases when there is a danger that the person being arrest may be hiding or may cover up the tracks of their crime, or in a case when the perpetrator was captured on the spot while committing the crime. The head of the *Raion* or Municipal Division of NKVD shall immediately notify his superior authority of each such arrest.

Note: 1) The *Raion* Divisions of the NKVD which are located in towns distant from the *oblast*, country or republican centres (list enclosed in appendix¹), are entitled to carry out an arrest after agreeing upon it with the *raion* prosecutor, without prior [issuance of a] warrant [for arrest], but with the obligation to immediately notify superior NKVD bodies of such an arrest.

2) Police units of the *Raion* Committee may carry out arrests on their own, based on the decision of the Head of the *Raion* or Municipal Police Division of the *Raion* Committee and under the warrant of the *raion* prosecutors.

5. Detention of persons by the units of NKVD and the Police of the *Raion* Committee is to be carried out strictly under Art.s 100, 103 and 104 of the penal code of the RSFSR, or under the relevant articles of the penal codes of other union republics with implications: the arrest must become binding and valid, or the detained person must be released after 48 hours.

6. The following orders, circulars and regulations of the USSR NKVD are invalid as of now:
   No. 00439 of 25 July 1937 – operational order;
   No. 00447 of 30 July 1937;
   No. 00485 of 11 August 1937;
   No. 00593 of 20 September 1937;
   No. 49990 of 30 November 1937;
   No. 50215 of 11 December 1937;
   No. S-74 of 13 January 1938;
   No. 202 of 29 January 1938;
   No. 326 of 16 February 1938;
   No. 00606 of 17 September 1938;
   No. 189 of 21 September 1938,
   and in line with Items 1 and 2 of the Resolution of Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938, the following orders, circulars and regulations of the USSR NKVD should be changed:
   No. 00486 of 15 August 1937;
   No. 00693 of 23 October 1937;

¹ Not to be published.
No. 234 of February 1938;
No. S-835 of 31 March 1938;
No. 63 of 31 March 1938;
No. 860 of 23 April 1938;
No. 00319 of 21 May 1938.

7. While taking a decision on forwarding [further] closed investigations, the following [guidelines] should be observed:

a) all cases, according to the practice, should be forwarded by the prosecutor for consideration by the court in line with the acts [specifying] court responsibility;

b) the Special Collegium of the USSR NKVD should receive cases with a petition from the prosecutor in situations when there are circumstances in the case that constitute an impediment to forwarding the case to the court (the danger of exposing a valuable agent; the inability to use evidence in a court trial; proving the defendant’s guilt in [a case] when their innocence is obvious, etc.). The number of cases forwarded to the Special Collegium should be subject to thorough selection and maximally limited.

8. It should be ordered that the cases forwarded to the Special Collegium of the USSR NKVD should be prepared entirely in line with penal codes, especially with paragraph 206 of the UPK RSFSR, and in compliance with relevant articles of the UPK of other union republics, regarding presenting the persons investigated with all the materials collected during the investigation, after the investigation is terminated.

Note: materials related to espionage network and investigative cases should not be equated [with the cases], but protected separately in a separate case, and should not be presented to the person investigated.

9. It should be ordered that the cases forwarded to the Special Collegium should be presented at the Special Collegium personally by the People’s Commissars of Internal Affairs of the union and autonomous republics, and by heads of State and Oblast UNKVD or their deputies.

Heads of relevant divisions and directorates of the USSR NKVD should be obligated to participate in the consideration of cases during the Special Collegium of the USSR NKVD.

10. A secretariat of the Special Collegium, whose task will consist of initial review and preparation for session of the cases forwarded to the Special Collegium, should be set up.

Regulations of the Secretariat of the Special Collegium by the USSR NKVD, its structure and jobs (enclosed), should be approved.

11. Investigative cases against citizens of foreign states are to be considered on-site by the relevant NKVD units which, in line with applicable law, will forward them to the court via the prosecutor, in compliance with applicable orders from the NKVD regarding arrests and the manner of examining the cases of citizens of foreign states.

The cases of citizens of foreign states should only be submitted for consideration to the Special Collegium of the USSR NKVD in exceptional cases.
Note: item 5 of the Order of the USSR NKVD no. 00606 [of] 1938, regarding the submission of all cases of foreign citizens to the 3rd Division of the GUGB of the USSR NKVD, is annulled by item 6 of this order.

12. In relation to Soviet citizens who visit foreign consulates and embassies, they should be detained and their identity should be established. Detention should not exceed 48 hours during which time, with compromising materials, it is necessary to carry out formal actions [legalising] the arrest of the detained person strictly following the relevant provisions of the KPK, or to release such a person if the required grounds for arrest are not found.

13. All investigative cases that are presently pending in the NKVD units should be prepared and then forwarded to courts to the Special Collegium of the USSR NKVD, strictly following the relevant provisions of the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938, and of this order.

All People’s Commissars of Internal Affairs of the union and autonomous republics, as well as the heads of Oblast and State UNKVDs, should immediately prepare a specific plan and schedule for forwarding for consideration [all] the investigative cases presently being conducted, and commence the implementation of such a plan and schedule.

To ensure these works are completed on time, special groups of qualified operational employees should be appointed in the divisions as necessary.

Information about the initiatives undertaken should be reported to the USSR NKVD, and every ten days the USSR NKVD should be notified about the extent to which this item of the order has been accomplished.

14. Those investigative cases that have already been considered by the Special Collegium or troikas by the NKVD, UNKVD and militia in which the verdict has not yet been carried out are also subject to consideration as described in item 13 of this notice. Cases regarding these persons are returned to the relevant [units of] NKVD, UNKVD and divisions of the USSR NKVD to ensure the supplementation of the investigation and further transfer, in line with the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938.

15. The practice of extending the sentences [for persons] in exile or labour camps should be repealed. Persons who have served the adjudicated time of penalty should be released. If in relation to those persons who have served the adjudicated penalty, new compromising materials were received when these persons were serving their time in a labour camp, then the cases against them should be resumed, strictly following the provisions of the resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938.

16. The entire team of operational employees at NKVD Headquarters and in the field should be provided with copies of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Deputy Chief of the First Special Division of the USSR NKVD, Comrade
PETROV, should within ten days consult the central legal publishing house and
also the publishing companies in national republics regarding the assignment (or
repeated edition) of the required number of copies of the Penal Code and the Code
of Criminal Procedure.

17. The People’s Commissars of Internal Affairs of the Union and autonomous
republics and the Oblast and State Chiefs of the UNKVD, upon receipt of this
order, are required to personally hold special meetings of the NKVD operations
employees, to be attended by the heads of the Raion and Municipal Divisions of
the NKVD, to read out the Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of
the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party
(Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938, Orders no. 00701 and no. 00702 of 23 October
1938 and this order, and to provide the necessary explanations and guidance.

Similar meetings should be conducted in the raion and municipal bodies of
the NKVD personally by the heads of these divisions.

18. Orders regarding the activation of espionage and informative networks will
be issued additionally.

The organs of the NKVD, by consistently implementing the provisions of the
Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Central
Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November
1938\(^a\), led by the Party and the Government, should quickly and firmly work to
eliminate all mistakes and irregularities in their work, and thoroughly enhance the
organisation of the further battle for the complete destruction of all enemies to the
people, for removing foreign intelligence spies and saboteurs from our homeland,
thus ensuring the further achievements and successes of socialist construction.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
BERIA

Top secret

Regulations of
Secretariat for special sessions by People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the
USSR

The Secretariat of Special Collegium by the People’s Commissar of Internal
Affairs of the USSR is obliged to prepare investigative cases for consideration
during the Special Collegium, organise the sessions, and produce reports from the
sessions.

According [to its obligations], the Secretariat of the Special Collegium:
1. verifies whether a given investigative case has been properly prepared in
line with the Resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and

\(^a\) Was: 1936.
the Central Committee of All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of 17 November 1938;

2. adjusts the number of cases admitted for consideration during the Special Collegium, and verifies whether these cases are eligible for consideration by Special Collegium;

3. reviews the materials of the case, verifies whether the indictment complies with the content of the materials, prepares a short report [confirming the grounds] for trial before the Special Collegium and the correct preparation of documentation, and submits the case for consideration to the prosecutor;

4. prepares the sessions of the Special Collegium, arranges the agenda of meetings, notifies the relevant NKVD and UNKVD bodies about the sessions of the Special Collegium, and registers decisions on forwarding cases for consideration by the Special Collegium in the 1st Special Division of the NKVD;

5. draws up a report of the sessions of the Special Collegium and transfers excerpts from reports and cases [already] considered to the 1st Special Division of the USSR NKVD for implementation;

6. controls the implementation of the decisions issued by the Special Collegium.

According to the imposed tasks, the secretariat for special session by the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR is composed of 2 divisions:

the 1st Division is obliged to:

verify the investigative cases filed for consideration by the Special Collegium, review the case materials and prepare petitions to the cases (items: 1, 2, 3 hereof).

The 2nd Division is obliged to:

organise meetings of the Special Collegium, draw up reports of the sessions and forward excerpts from cases to the 1st Special Division, and control the implementation [of decisions] (items 4–6 hereof).

Note: operational employees of the secretariat who prepare petitions to cases participate in the consideration of these cases by the Special Collegium.

Appendix: jobs at the secretariat of the Special Collegium².

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² Not to be published.

HDA SBU, F. 9, Spr. 8, pp. 152–154, 155v.–156.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
CHAPTER III

The Polish Underground 1939–1941
INTRODUCTION

On 1 September 1939, Germany attacked Poland, and on 17 September the territory of Poland was invaded by Red Army units. In accordance with the secret protocols to the agreement between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) of 23 August 1939, the so-called Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Demarcation of 28 September 1939, a border cordon was delineated beyond which Nazi troops were not to proceed eastwards, and Soviet forces were not to advance westwards.

By invading the territory of Poland, the Stalin administration violated a number of basic international documents: the Covenant of the League of Nations of 26 June 1919, the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed in Paris on 27 August 1928, as well as the London Convention for the Definition of Aggression of 3 July 1933. Moreover, all the provisions of interstate agreements between Poland and USSR were infringed: the Peace of Riga signed on 18 March 1921, the Non-aggression Pact of 25 July 1932, which on 5 May 1934 was extended to 31 December 1945, as well as the joint communiqué of the governments of Poland and the USSR announced in Moscow on 26 November 1938, which confirmed that the 1932 Non-aggression Pact would constitute the basis for peaceful relations between the two countries.

As a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, areas with Ukrainian and Belarusian majorities were incorporated into the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSRs.1 From the very outset, these events were evaluated and commented by official Soviet propaganda in the USSR as the process of strengthening the Union’s western border and uniting the territories, and was referred to as the “golden September” and the “liberating march of the Red Army.” These events had a decisive impact on the distribution of powers and orientations of various strata and circles in Polish society both during the war and in the post-war period.

In the former Soviet Union, and of course also in the Ukrainian SSR, it was not possible to comprehensively and objectively assess the impact of this “golden September” of 1939 on the nationalities residing in Western Ukraine, or to ascertain what it meant for many Ukrainians and Poles. It can only be said that the “golden September” did result in territories being united. As early as autumn 1939, transformations were initiated aimed at harmonising the political system in the

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1 In September 1939, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army took control of 8 Polish provinces. The Ukrainian Front captured the following provinces: Volhynia, Lviv, Stanislawiv and Ternopil. The Belarusian Front captured the provinces of Bialystok, Vilnius, Novohrad and Polesia. According to the 1931 national census, this area was inhabited by 13,021,300 Polish citizens, who declared their mother tongues as follows: Polish: 5,597,600 (43%); Ukrainian and Russian: 4,301,100 (33%); Belarusian and “local” (in Polesia): 1,693,800 (13%), other languages: 1,428,800 (11%). The situation in the four provinces invaded by the Ukrainian Front was as follows: this area was inhabited by 8,292,600 citizens, who declared their mother tongues as follows: Polish: 3,271,900 (39.5%); Ukrainian and Russian: 4,241,100 (51.1%), other languages: 777,000 (9.4%). See Mały Rocznik Statystyczny 1939 (Warsaw, 1939), 22.
newly-established western *oblasts* of the Ukrainian SSR with the political and socio-economic Soviet system of governance.

Only now can the document of 15 September 1939 be disclosed which contains the secret directive of Lavrentiy Beria. This document precisely defined the tasks of the Cheka and operational NKVD groups which entered the annexed territories in the wake of Red Army units.¹ In accordance with this document, these groups were under instructions to create interim directorates composed of the head officers of the operational groups, among others.

These operational groups were assigned the task of immediately capturing all liaison facilities, state buildings and private buildings where valuables were believed to be stored, banks, printing houses and paper warehouses, and especially archives. At the same time, it was ordered to immediately arrest all police officers, gendarmes, intelligence and counter-intelligence officers, officials, representatives of the ruling, political and economic elites, and to develop investigative and secret service activity.

The instruction lists particular parties whose active members were to be eliminated first. These were the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the National Party (SN), the Labour Party (SP), the National Radical Camp (ONR), the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO), the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), the Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (USR) and Russian White Guard organisations. It should be emphasised that this list was soon expanded, and the names of the arrested were included in the aforementioned register of 3435 surnames.

One of the sixteen points of the above directive reads as follows: “Parallel to conducted operations, developing investigative activity among prisoners in order to detect underground counter-revolutionary organisations, groups and persons aiming at pursuing subversion, terror, insurgent activity and counter-revolutionary sabotage. Immediately arrest persons whose participation in politically disturbing events or public counter-revolutionary incidents has been confirmed by way of investigation.”

This inhuman directive portended future tragic events, among which one should first mention the executions in Katyn, Kharkiv and Tver, the execution of prisoners in western *oblasts* of the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSRs. The ministry headed by Lavrentiy Beria, which had already accrued vast experience in counteracting “enemies of the people,” commenced the process of disposing – in the literal sense – of persons who were classed as “hostile” or “socially dangerous” elements in secret NKVD orders and instructions. This especially concerns the events of 5 March 1940, when Beria sent a report to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). In the report, Beria requested permission to execute “fierce enemies of Soviet rule,” who in his opinion “were only waiting to be released, so that they could actively join the battle against Soviet

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rule.” This group of “enemies” included Polish officers, police officers, gendarmes, prison guards and intelligence officers, as well as landed aristocracy and settlers interned in the three huge prisoner-of-war camps and imprisoned in the jails of Western Ukraine and Belorussia – 21,857 persons in total. Permission was granted. Preparations for the mass deportation of the population of western Belarusian and Ukrainian oblasts to remote areas of the Soviet Union began in December 1939. Polish military settlers and foresters with families were the first to be deported in February 1940. The second wave of deportations in April 1940 involved families of the repressed, whereas the third and fourth deportations of June 1940 and May-June 1941 mainly concerned biezhentsy [refugees]. These deportations affected around 320,000 persons in total.

The transport and settlement conditions led to immense losses, especially among children, the disabled and the elderly. The deported were seriously ill-treated, abused and tormented. They suffered from hunger and cold, as well as cruel and barbaric treatment.

Moreover, a multitude of ethnic Polish citizens, irrespective of their nationality, were placed in Soviet forced labour camps, prisons and prisoner-of-war camps. According to Soviet NKVD documents from 1 August 1941, up to 28,236 persons sentenced to long-term hard labour were still living in forced labour camps; 18,358 detainees were held in prison cells, and apart from that there were 26,197 prisoners of war – soldiers and police officers – in the camps.

The total number of deaths during transportation, in prisons and camps, as well as the number of those executed on the basis of various verdicts, has yet to be calculated. It should be emphasised that in June 1941, after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, thousands of prisoners and prisoners of war were executed by firing squads in prisons or during the evacuation. In order to present reliable data regarding executions carried out at that time, it is necessary to conduct detailed research.

The situation in the western Ukrainian oblasts was more difficult because the local party and state organisations were headed by authorised representatives from the central and eastern oblasts, and (of course) from Russia. Not only did they rarely have any command of the local languages, customs or traditions, but they also did not want to become acquainted with them, and did not even pretend to acknowledge that the local population had long been functioning in different social and political, cultural and living conditions. This situation provoked fratricidal battles during which Ukrainians were forced to oppose Ukrainians.

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5 J. Tucholski, Katyn – liczby i motywy..., 46–63.
In Western Ukraine, a ban was imposed on all Polish and Ukrainian political parties, as well as scientific, social, youth, cultural, commercial and industrial organisations and associations. The new administration commenced its campaign against the clergy and believers. All Catholic printing houses and magazines were shut down, and arrests of clergy of various faiths began.

Especially meritorious associations – such as the *Prosvita* society and the "*Macierz Szkolna* association" [a Polish educational society], and even the Taras Shevchenko Scientific Association – were banned. The state took over private collections, and a number of state museums were closed down. It is worth presenting a fragment of the report regarding the inspection of museum exhibits addressed to the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, M. Burmistenko, drafted by a special committee: “In the Lviv History Museum – close the last floor dedicated to the imperialist war, soldiers aged 18-19-20, as it is chauvinist and anti-Soviet [...] Ukrainian Army Museum – close the entire museum, as it is nationalistic [...]. In the Museum of Applied Art, it is necessary for the state to take over [...] items of military value (rifles), and hand them over to the state bank for storage.”

Autocracy, lawlessness, the wilfulness of the repressive bodies and judiciary, as well as the party and governmental bodies – all this gave rise to the discontent of the country’s citizens. They protested openly or clandestinely against the new authorities. Even those who had long harboured the hope that the new administration would assume the role of protector and defend them against full Polonisation turned against Soviet rule. At the time, people quite justly protested against Sovietisation and Russification.

This is confirmed by numerous documents and testimonies provided by the direct participants of these events. To give an example, Ivan Makovetsky, resident of Vysotsk village in the Yaroslav district of the Lviv *oblast*, wrote in his memoirs that his locality had for a long time belonged to the Russian Province of pre-partition Poland. Thanks to the efforts of the Russian Orthodox clergy, the Ukrainian revival was overcome, and faith in an indivisible Russia was upheld. However, as Makovetsky recalls, “ [...] when in autumn 1939 the Bolsheviks entered Vysotsk, the entire population of the village was cured of its pro-Russian approach. Our people had never before encountered such despicable behaviour. During the deportation of 12 families from Vysotsk to somewhere in Bessarabia, even that thick-headed fervent devotee of Russia, Father Stańczak, faltered in his faith in the Union.”

Such examples – and a wide range of them could be given – help us understand why many Ukrainians acknowledged the OUN as the defender of their interests, and later on placed their trust in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) which was active in those areas. This was especially apparent in the period from 1944 to 1947,

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7 *Biłe*, no. 6, 1993, 117.
during the brutal resettlements which took place parallel to the ill-famed anti-Ukrainian Operation “Vistula.”

* * *

The loss of independence, the division of the country between two occupiers and the imposition of Soviet citizenship triggered violent protests by Polish society. Poles gave vent to their objection by establishing underground organisations of military nature.

As early as 16 September 1939 in Kolomyia, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły entrusted Major Edmund Galinat with the task of launching and commanding the “behind the lines” diversion network of the Second General Staff Department, as well as using it as a basis for creating insurgent units to fight German forces. As the military and political situation changed with the Red Army’s invasion of Poland, the Marshal modified the order and commanded that a secret organisation resembling the former Polish Military Organisation (POW) be established. This order was delivered by Major Galinat to Warsaw, which was still in the midst of battle.

At the same time, on 17 September 1939 in Stanyslaviv, General Waclaw Stachiewicz, Chief of the Polish Army’s General Staff, ordered Major Jan Mazurkiewicz to establish the Secret Military Organisation. The order was immediately carried out.

On 17 September 1939 in Grodno, General Józef Olszyna-Wilczyński, Commander of Corps District Command No. 3, also ordered the establishment of a conspiracy network in the Białystok Province. On 21 September 1939, while the fight against the Germans was still underway, Commander of the Lublin Army, General Tadeusz Piskor, ordered his subordinate officers to prepare to shift to underground combat.

On 22 September 1939, the day of Lviv’s capitulation, General Marian Januszajtis established the Polish Organisation for Fighting for Freedom (POWW). A few days later, on 26 September 1939 in Warsaw, which was still defending itself, General Michal Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz began establishing the Service for Poland’s Victory (SZP) organisation, and on the very same night of 26/27 September – with support in the form of the aforementioned order issued by Marshal Rydz-Śmigly delivered by Major Galinat – made it the basal conspiracy organisation supported by the Commander-in-Chief; this organisation de facto constituted the Polish underground army.

The Commander of the Border Protection Corps, General Wilhelm Orlik-Rückeman, after engaging in the battle of Wytyczno with the Red Army on

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8 At a meeting of 3 August 1990, the Senate of the restored Republic of Poland adopted an act clearly condemning the operation. This was also reflected in a joint statement by the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine issued on 21 May 1997.
1 October 1939, ordered the head of counter-intelligence of the Border Protection Corps, Major Bolesław Studziński, to establish the conspiracy organisation Defenders of Poland.

This period ended on 13 November 1939 in Paris. Its end was marked by the issuance of an order by the new Commander-in-Chief, General Władysław Sikorski. The General ordered the establishment of the Union of Armed Struggle (Związek Walki Zbrojnej, ZWZ)\(^9\), a secret military organisation constituting an integral part of the Polish Armed Forces which united all the previously undertaken military initiatives. This order was delivered to Polish territory one month later.

It should be stressed that at the same time, starting from the last days of the September Campaign, secret groups connected with political parties and social, vocational, youth-related organisations, social groups, and even family groups, had been spontaneously created. These organisations were concerned with collecting and securing weapons and military equipment, providing the wounded with aid, and supporting those who lost everything due to military operations; they also helped soldiers who were striving to escape imprisonment. These sometimes very small groups made heroic efforts to replace devastated state structures.

As with the chaos triggered by the summary dismantling of the Polish state, the establishment of these diverse initiatives was an expression of widespread opposition to the occupiers. These pro-independence efforts were additionally fuelled by the effects of introducing the border cordon which divided the country.

* * *

The Lviv conspiracy, which is generally the main topic of this chapter, was initiated by the establishment of the aforementioned POWW organisation. Almost at the same time, the Scouting Independence and Military Organisation was established. The organisation was then transformed into the Grey Ranks [Szare Szeregi].

In December 1939, the emissaries of the Central Command of the Service for Poland’s Victory from Warsaw and the Central Command of the Union of Armed Struggle from Paris reached Lviv. This duality, combined with the ambitions of local leaders of the military conspiracy, resulted in the formation of two separate

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\(^9\) Union of Armed Struggle (Związek Walki Zbrojnej, ZWZ) – an underground military organisation established on 13 November 1939 by General Sikorski. The task of the ZWZ was to uphold patriotic attitudes in society, organising active resistance to the terror instilled by the occupiers, and prepare a general armed insurgency. The ZWZ was active on both territories occupied by the Germans and areas subject to Soviet rule. The country was divided into six districts: No. 1 Warsaw, No. 2 Białystok, No. 3 Lviv, No. 4 Cracow, No. 5 Poznan and No. 6 Toruń. As this system did not prove effective, individual commanders were appointed to each of the occupied zones: Colonel Rowecki for the German zone, and General Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz for the Soviet zone. The headquarters of the ZWZ were located in Paris until 1940, when they were moved to Warsaw. General Sosnkowski was Commander of the ZWZ, and from 30 June 1940 this function was performed by General Rowecki. On 14 February 1942, by order of General Sikorski, the ZWZ’s name was changed to the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK).
organisations – ZWZ-1 and SZP, which was transformed into ZWZ-2 in January 1940. On the one hand, this situation led to organisational chaos, but on the other hand, it inhibited the effective activity of NKVD bodies.

The Lviv ZWZ centre expanded its structures and embraced the territories of the former Ternopil, Stanyslaviv, Volhynia and (of course) Lviv provinces, and established its districts there. A wide range of other underground organisations functioned parallel to the ZWZ in those areas, such as the Borderlands Death Battalions, the Army of Great Poland, the Revolutionary Association for Independence and Freedom, several organisations called the Polish Military Organisation, and a number of other groups.

In spring 1940, the NKVD struck at the Polish conspiracy organisations, especially the ZWZ. The ZWZ-1 Area Command was eliminated, together with a large part of the Lviv and field structures of both ZWZ-1 and ZWZ-2. Moreover, the NKVD managed to enlist two agents from among the arrested, who had undergone cruel interrogations, and placed them in the ZWZ-2 Staff and the recreated ZWZ-1 Command. Both agents continued to operate until Soviet authorities withdrew from the area, i.e. June 1941, and paid the ultimate price for their treacherous activity by verdict of the ZWZ Central Command in December 1941.

Despite these blows from the Soviet security bodies, the ZWZ conducted a number of subversive operations aimed mainly at railway transport, and executed informers, representatives of Soviet authorities and NKVD officials.

In the second half of 1940, the NKVD intensified its repressive activity aimed at the actively functioning OUN, especially in the Ternopil Province and Volhynia. This was reflected by the special reports sent to Moscow by NKVD officials operating in the Ukrainian SSR. To quote a fragment of one of these reports: “From 1 January to 15 June 1941, 38 political and 25 criminal bands with a total of 273 active members were eradicated in the western oblasts. Moreover, 212 persons providing bandits with aid and shelter were arrested. Apart from that, 747 special intelligence officers (nielegalś) were exposed and detained, and in April and May alone, 1865 active members of the Ukrainian counter-revolutionary nationalist organisation (OUN) were arrested and resettled. During the operation, 82 bandit OUN members, nielegalś and criminals were killed and 35 were wounded. Large amounts of weapons were confiscated from members of the eradicated bandit groups, as well as OUN members and nielegalś [...] Usually, these groups were connected with counter-revolutionary formations (OUN and others).”

Even this very brief presentation of the problems of those times shows the difficult situation in Western Ukraine, whose territories formerly constituted part of Poland. This complex historical and political amalgam cannot be considered in individual fragments. All-embracing research is necessary here.

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10 Органы государственной безопасности СССР в великой отечественной войне, vol. 1, part 2 (Moscow, 1995), 234.
DOCUMENTS
No. 1
[20] December 1939, Kiev. Report by Ivan Serov to Lavrentiy Beria, on the detection and eradication of the Polish underground organisation in Kolomyia

Top secret

To People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union
1st Rank of State Security
Comrade BERIA L. P.

In the town of Kolomyia in the Stanyslaviv oblast, we have detected and eliminated a counter-revolutionary insurgent organisation composed of Polish nationalist youth whose aim was to fight for the restoration of the Polish state.

 Eleven persons were arrested in connection with this case – the commanders and most active members of the organisation:

KALITA Mieczysław,¹ son of Tomasz – born in 1919 in the town of Kolomyia, commander of the counter-revolutionary organisation.

LAUTERBACH Tadeusz,² son of Wiktor – born in 1921 in the town of Kolomyia, secondary school student, former head of “Boy-Scouts” organisation,³ deputy commander of the counter-revolutionary organisation.

LAUTERBACH Eugeniusz,⁴ son of Ryszard – born in 1918 in the town of Bachtia [!], residing in the town of Kolomyia, active member of the counter-revolutionary organisation.

SZESTAK Roman,⁵ son of Aleksy – born in 1920 in the town of Khotyn (Bessarabia), active member of the organisation.

KOSOWSKI Marian,⁶ son of Kazimierz – born in 1919, returned in September 1939 from the [former] Polish Army, active member of the organisation, and others.

The following items were found at the organisation members’ homes:

1) counter-revolutionary leaflets calling Poles to unite and fight for the restoration of the Polish state;

2) a practical plan of the organisation’s activities;

3) written commitments and vows of the organisation’s members;

¹ Mieczysław Kalita, nom de guerre “Granit,” arrested by the NKVD on 21 October 1939, sentenced to execution by firing squad, died in prison.

² Tadeusz Lauterbach, nom de guerre “Szelma,” arrested by the NKVD on 21 October 1939, sentenced to execution by firing squad, executed on 6 September 1940.

³ This is undoubtedly a reference to the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHP).

⁴ Eugeniusz Lauterbach, nom de guerre “Klepa,” arrested by the NKVD on 21 October 1939, sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment in a corrective labour camp (ITL).

⁵ Roman Szestak, arrested by the NKVD on 21 October 1939, sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment in a corrective labour camp (ITL).

⁶ Marian Kosowski, corporal, arrested by the NKVD on 21 October 1939, sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment in a corrective labour camp (ITL).
4) reports of the organisation members regarding activities completed.

The counter-revolutionary organisation, according to its plan, was divided into three units: combat, intelligence and female (informative).

Each unit of the organisation was headed by an active member of the organisation who delegated tasks to subordinate organisation members.

The activity of organisation members was aimed at: collecting statistical data on the Red Army and the movement of its particular units, performing acts of terror against the most active members of the Soviet Union and the Party, as well as pro-Soviet citizens, issuing and disseminating counter-revolutionary leaflets, enlisting new members, obtaining weapons, establishing and maintaining contact with counter-revolutionary organisations in rural areas and conducting military training.

During initial interrogations, it was established that the LAUTERBACHs, Eugeniusz and Tadeusz were ordered by the organisation command to prepare terrorist [attacks] and subversive operations against the most active Soviet workers. In regard to this order, they were specially sent to the town of Lviv in order to purchase strong poisons. Organisation command also intended to use these poisons for dealing with organisation members who committed treason.

The LAUTERBACHs E. and T. were also supposed to contact a similar counter-revolutionary organisation during their stay in the town of Lviv. Funds necessary to cover the costs connected with the journey to Lviv were collected from organisation members.

A member of the Kolomyia organisation – ŻYBURA – following the order of the organisation’s command, left for the town of Horodenka with the special task of establishing an identical counter-revolutionary organisation composed of Polish nationalist youth. In Horodenka, ŻYBURA established contact with many young people with counter-revolutionary approaches, but the organisation was not established due to ŻYBURA’s arrest.

As has been established during the investigation, in order to hinder the elections of deputies to the People’s Assembly of Western Ukraine, on the night of 22 October the organisation member SZESTAK prepared the operation of blowing up the building of one of the election constituencies in the town of Kolomyia by undertaking activities aimed at obtaining bombs.

During the investigation, the organisation members confessed that they kept persons actively participating in the activities of the Interim Authority under systematic observation. They designated persons who were to be assassinated from among the most active members of the Soviet apparatus.

The organisation decided to attach a previously prepared note to the bodies of killed Soviet activists. The note was to read as follows: “Tell Saint Peter that you are not the first, and not the last.”

Particular organisation members who performed systematic observation of the movements and deployment of Red Army units informed the organisation’s command about their findings in special reports.

7 Zbigniew Żybura (born 1919), nom de guerre “Jaszczur,” arrested by the NKVD on 21 October 1939, sentenced to execution by firing squad.
The organisation held several illegal meetings, during which issues connected with counter-revolutionary activity were discussed.

During these meetings, newly enlisted persons pledged unconditional subordination to the organisation’s command.

Although the testimonies of organisation members lead to the conclusion that KALITA Mieczysław was the commander of the organisation, and although KALITA himself confirms this, we believe, on the basis of the investigation materials at hand, that another person with experience in conspiracy counter-revolutionary activity was in command.

From among the 11 persons arrested in connection with this case, 7 confirmed their membership in the organisation, and are submitting testimonies regarding the organisation’s counter-revolutionary activity.

The aim of the investigation is to reveal all the organisation members, their anti-Soviet activity, weapon reserves and contacts established by the organisation with [other] functioning counter-revolutionary centres.

I will provide regular reports on the progress of the investigation. 8

Appendices: materials confiscated during search – 10 pages. 9

People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security

No. a-4843/SN-a
[20] December 1939
Kiev

No. 1 – addressee
No. 2 – to Secretariat archive
No. 3 – to Third Department files

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Illegible stamp in the left top corner, below a hand-written note: Reply received from Fifth Main Directorate of State Security of NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, no. 25/267 of 8 January [19]40.

8 The persons mentioned in notes 1, 2 and 4 to 7 were judged by the Military Tribunal of the 12th Army of the Kiev Special Military District on 16–19 April 1940. Discussed in greater detail in Polskie podziemie 1939–1941..., 283–417 (case of 18 members of the Polish youth conspiracy organisation in Kolomiya); compare also with Polskie podziemie na terenach Zachodniej Ukrainy i Zachodniej Białorusi w latach 1939–1941 (Warsaw–Moscow, 2001), 193–195.

9 The appendices were never found in the archive.

Deliver immediately

Top secret

Telegram

Moscow NKVD USSR
Comrade BERIA

During the investigation it was ascertained that the course of events of the Polish nationalists’ attack in Chortkiv was as follows: the assault was conducted on 21 January at about midnight in three locations by three groups composed of 6 to 9 persons.¹

The first group attacked a guard of the 17th engineer battalion of the Red Army. After butchering him quietly with a knife, organisation members took his rifle and entered the kitchen of the battalion, where they also butchered the Red Army cook.

The political commissar, who was in the kitchen, offered resistance and fired his gun. During the fight, the bandits lightly wounded him six times with a knife and fled.

The second group attacked the guard of the Red Army field post station, butchered him with a knife, took his rifle and took shelter.

The third group attacked the municipal hospital, where 10 patients who illegally crossed the border were placed and which was guarded by a border guard watch composed of 4 persons: two kept watch, and two were asleep.

The hospital orderly KIESTURA, who served in the former Polish Army as hospital orderly, actively participated in the attack and hid after the assault. The bandits captured 4 rifles and fled. The hospital orderly and the Red Army soldier were lightly wounded by gun and hunting rifle shots.

The bandits succeeded in killing 3 [soldiers], wounding 3 and capturing 6 rifles, one of which was found in the snow on the street, and another was found in the hallway of the house of a tenement owner, who was arrested.

The events described above occurred solely due to exceptional negligence in keeping watch and the guards’ complete weakness.

As a result of the activities undertaken, as of today 98 persons have been arrested, 27 of whom confessed they participated in the incident. Approximately half of them are young people aged 17–25.

¹ The first published document regarding the uprising in Chortkiv is the concise report No. 322/B sent by Beria to Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov on 23 January 1940. See Polskie podziemie na terenach Zachodniej Ukrainy i Zachodniej Białorusi w latach 1939–1941..., 257.
On the basis of the testimonies filed by the arrested, it was established that there were three organisation leaders: MALAWSKI – a dental technician residing in Chortkiv, meetings of organisation’s command were held at his apartment; KOWALSKI – a former Polish Army officer, who was in the town of Chortkiv one month earlier, and one more visitor, a former Polish Army officer, whose surname was not established. All three are in hiding – and are wanted.

According to the testimonies of two detainees, the organisation is headed by the former Polish Army general TOKARZEWSKI, residing in Lviv. Orders have been issued to establish his place of residence and arrest him.

At the meeting point in the cemetery, about 80 organisation members gathered, the majority of whom were unarmed and scattered at the sound of the first gunshots.

The basic aim of the group was to capture weapons by way of disarming the garrison, and then force their way through to Romania, arms in hand. Recruits were assured that the attack was also being prepared in many neighbouring districts, and that Polish legions were waiting at the Romanian border to support the attempt at overthrowing Soviet rule.

Four Bickford fuses, one Finnish knife and 25 bullets were confiscated from the arrested.

Some organisation members had skulls and crossbones sewn onto their berets. Two such berets were found. The woman who sewed these emblems onto the berets, a Ms WASILEWSKA, was arrested and admitted her crime.

The following persons were arrested: a former head officer of Romanian border guard SKOWRONEK Stanisław, unemployed, the direct leader of the assault on the Red Army battalion barracks; and CZOSIK Ludwik, a barber from Chortkiv, a former Polish soldier, who shelled a Red Army patrol on the street and was arrested gun in hand. Both detainees confirmed they knew each other.

2 Heweliusz Malawski, the popular Gizek, reserve corporal, leader of the group attacking the hospital, managed to avoid being arrested.

3 Michał Tadeusz Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz (1893–1964), noms de guerre “Michał,” “Stolarski,” “Doktor”; brigadier general. During the 1939 September Campaign, commander of the Operational Group of the Pomeranian Army, later deputy commander of the “Warsaw” Artillery Group. Initiator and Chief Commander of the Service for Poland’s Victory, appointed commander of ZWZ Area No. 3 – Lviv, then ZWZ commander during the Soviet occupation. Arrested when crossing the border cordon on the night of 6/7 March 1940. Unrecognised, he was sent to a camp near Arkhangelsk, in January 1941 exposed and transferred to Moscow; after release from prison, he assumed the function of leader of the 6th Armoured Division of the Polish Army in the Soviet Union, and deputy leader of the Polish Armed Forces in the East.

4 Aleksandra Wasilewska (born 1920), arrested by NKVD on 22 January 1940, sentenced by the Oblast Court in Ternopil on 10 January 1941 to 8 years’ imprisonment, released on 22 September 1941, then active in the Polish Army in the Soviet Union.

5 Stanisław Skowronek (1904–1940), master corporal of the Polish Army, from 1926 in the Border Protection Corps, before 1939 commander of the Skafat Border Protection Corps observation tower; leader of the group which attacked the barracks in Chortkiv, captured by Soviet soldiers on 22 January 1940, judged by the Military Tribunal of the Odessa Military District at the assize in Kirovohrad on 21 October 1940, sentenced to death, executed on 26 December 1940.

6 Ludwik Czosik (1912–1941), member of “Sokół”; member of the group which was to attack the railway station, arrested by NKVD on the night of 21/22 January 1940, judged by the Oblast Court in Ternopil on 20–23 September 1940, sentenced to death. Executed after 30 January 1941.
CZOSIK, together with 2 members of the rifle association – MUDRY\(^7\) and CEBRO – were subject to secret service investigation [code name] “Powstańcy” conducted by the district NKVD department, which was commenced on 16 January. The first reports on the detainees came in at the end of November 1939. Both were arrested.

The secret service activity of the district NKVD division was organised in an unsatisfactory manner; the informer network is too small, contact with most informers was lost.

Steps have been taken to strengthen the city’s defence system by military border guard departments. The necessary instructions for the border guard have been issued. In agreement with the district NKVD divisions, the order was given to arrest the active members of Polish counter-revolutionary nationalist organisations under surveillance, and boost the secret service operational activity. The UNKVD of western Ukrainian oblasts was briefed.

The brigade of operational workers which was summoned arrived in Ternopil. We are conducting a diligent investigation, and at the same time we are developing secret service and operational activity. We are enlisting people in nearby villages. Emphasis is laid on arresting all the participants of the incident, especially the leaders, as well as finding the weapons captured by the group.

MERKULOV\(^8\)  
SEROV

Deputy narkom for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic  
Captain of State Security  
(−) GORLINSKY\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Jan Mudry (born 1910 or 1911), ZS member, arrested by the NKVD on 24 January 1940.

\(^8\) Vsevolod Merkulov (1895–1953), Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security; in 1939–1941, First Deputy of the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union, then People’s Commissar until 1946, then Minister of the MGB of the Soviet Union. Executed by firing squad with Beria in December 1953.

25 January 1940
no. 04/SN

Kiev
vo.

Sent 26 January [19]40 r. at 2:05

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 33, Spr. 58, pp. 72–76.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

a- Filled in by hand.
b- Inserted teleprinter message.
February 1940, [no place given]. Special report by Ivan Serov to Lavrentiy Beria, on the results of the investigation regarding the armed incident in Chortkiv

Top secret

To People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union
Commissar 1st Rank of State Security
Comrade BERIA L. P.

On 21 January 1940 at 11.30 p.m. in the town of Chortkiv in Ternopil oblast, attacks on the guards of the barracks of the engineer battalion, the field post guard and the municipal hospital guards watching the detained fugitives were organised.

The assailants, having assessed the situation and noting that the soldiers were negligent about their duties in these sections, disarmed 6 persons in total, 3 of whom were butchered with knives, and 3 were wounded. One of the Red Army soldiers was shot.

In accordance with your guidelines, during Comrade MERKULOV’s and my stay in Chortkiv, 128 persons were arrested on the basis of secret service and investigative materials. The arrested are mainly young people of Polish nationality, the majority had been members of rifle associations.

During initial interrogations, 91 persons confessed that they had participated in the attack and submitted testimonies. Others are mentioned in the testimonies, which expose their active participation in the assault.

The attack was led by: a citizen of the town of Chortkiv, a dental technician and first reserve lieutenant MALAWSKI and the non-commissioned officers KOWALSKI and WOŁSZYNSKI.

Their main objective was to organise a group of former officers and escape abroad, as well as to obtain weapons by capturing them from Red Army guards in order to offer resistance at the border.

They decided to involve many young people in the operation, so that it would be easier for them to hide after the assault. In December and January, they enlisted a few former riflemen, children of settlers and non-commissioned officers of the Border Protection Corps unit previously deployed in Chortkiv. However, the vast majority of participants were enlisted in a church on the day preceding the attack and on the day of the assault.

During recruitment, the leaders declared that they were following instructions from abroad, that their attack would receive support from Polish legionnaires.

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1 There are 24 death sentences and 55 sentences to long-term imprisonment in forced labour camps in the recovered files of the arrested Chortkiv insurgents. Moreover, one of the prisoners died in the prison in Odessa.
concentrated along the border with Romania, and that the operation in Chortkiv would take place simultaneously with similar operations in Lviv, Stanyslaviv and other cities.

Participants were recruited in the street, at church and in other places, and the leadership met in the apartment belonging to WASILEWSKA, where debates were held.

The following young people participated in these meetings: KAMIŃSKI Henryk, BANKOWSKI Tadeusz, WASILEWSKI Kazimierz, TOPOLSKI Zygmunt, HANKIEWICZ Tadeusz, NOWICKI Tadeusz (all were arrested), KOLUSZEK Jerzyk and KUNIK (who managed to hide).

During the last meeting, the participants drafted a plan of the assault, and determined the password and time of the attack.

Before the assault, the attackers divided themselves into three groups composed of 20–40 persons each, met at the cemetery and left the meeting point in groups of 3–4 persons, heading for the targets of the planned attack.

Due to the lack of vigilance and courage of the Red Army soldiers, the attackers managed to butcher 3 Red Army soldiers, disarm and wound 3 Red Army soldiers and capture 6 rifles.

In each group there were 3–4 non-commissioned officers, who played an active role in the attack. The remaining participants were passive, and did not participate directly. After the first gun shots, the participants of the attack dispersed.

After arresting the participants, 3 black berets with the skull and crossbones symbol were found during the search. These emblems were sewn on by Aleksandra WASILEWSKA (arrested), who was apparently told the berets were theatre costumes.

The search for MALAWSKI and two officers is ongoing. We have determined all the addresses where MALAWSKI stayed. 4 rifles were taken from the arrested.

We have undertaken the following operational activities:

1. In order to prevent similar cases, as well as to ensure activation and implement practical solutions in such situations, we have ordered the immediate audit of all investigation results and secret police reports in those districts of Ternopil oblast which have been most exposed to anti-Soviet attitudes.

2. In accordance with your guidelines, experienced operational employees from NKVD oblast directorates have been sent to all districts with the task of providing practical assistance in developing operational activity.

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2 Kazimierz Wasilewski (born 1921), Aleksandra Wasilewska’s brother, arrested by NKVD on 22 January 1940, judged by the Oblast Court in Ternopil on 25–28 September, sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment in a corrective labour camp.

3 Zygmunt Topolski (born 1914), locksmith, arrested by NKVD on 27 January 1940, judged by the Oblast Court in Ternopil on 17–18 September 1940, sentenced to death.

4 Tadeusz Hankiewicz (born 1922), arrested by NKVD on 22 January 1940, judged by the Oblast Court in Ternopil, sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in a corrective labour camp.

5 Bolesław Kunik (born 1921), arrested by NKVD on 25 January 1940, judged by the Oblast Court in Ternopil on 25–28 September, sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in camps.
3. Moreover, the head officers of the NKVD district directorates of western Ukrainian oblasts have received directives on the need to undertake vigorous activity aimed at exposing and arresting the leaders and active members of counter-revolutionary organisations.

Appendices:
1. Guidelines for head officers of district departments of the Ternopil oblast;
2. Guidelines for oblast UNKVD;
3. Interrogation protocols.

Narkom for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security
SEROV

[...] February 1940
No. b-501/SN-b

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Appendices not for publication.
Rectangular illegible stamp with signature in the left top corner.

\[b-b\] Filled in by hand.
No. 4
16 March 1940, [Kiev]. Special report by People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Ivan Serov, on the seizure of two ZWZ couriers, Józef and Stanisław Żymierski, by the Militarised Border Guard

Top secret
Personal delivery only

To Deputy Head Officer of the Second Special NKVD Department of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant of State Security
Comrade SURYGIN

In January 1940, two Polish officers – the ŻYMIERSKI brothers1 – were seized in the area controlled by the Chortkiv border unit when illegally crossing the Romanian-Soviet border. Upon arrest, they claimed their surnames were NIEGALSKI and ŁOZOWSKI.

During the investigation, the ŻYMIERSKI brothers confessed that they entered Soviet territory in order to perform the tasks2 assigned to them by the command centre of the Polish illegal terrorist and subversive organisation Union of Armed Struggle (Zvienzok Valky Zbroynoy) a-ZWZ-a.

The organisation was headed by the Prime Minister of the “Polish government” in Paris, General SIKORSKI,3 nom de guerre “Strażnica” and General SOSNOWSKI,4 nom de guerre “Godziemba.”

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1 Józef Bronisław Żymierski (born 6 November 1902 in Cracow), armour captain of the 1st Armoured Battalion, nom de guerre “Piotr”; and Stanisław Adam Żymierski (born 23 March 1905), 2nd flight lieutenant of the 1st Aviation Regiment, nom de guerre “Paweł”.

2 In December 1939, both officers were sent from Paris to the occupied homeland with courier mail: “Paweł” was sent to Warsaw with Instrukcja dla Obywatela Rakonia (The Instruction for Citizen Rakoń) of 4 December 1939, while “Piotr” was sent to Lviv. It follows from this report that they were on the courier mission together.

3 Władysław Sikorski (1881–1943), politician, independence activist, lieutenant general. From 1921 Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Military Affairs. Without portfolio during the 1939 September Campaign; from 28 September 1939 commander of the Polish Armed Forces in France, at the same time Prime Minister of the government of the Republic of Poland and Minister of Military Affairs, from November 1939 Commander-in-Chief and Chief Inspector of the Armed Forces. From 1940 lieutenant general. In July 1941, Sikorski signed an agreement on the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the formation of the Polish Army in the Soviet Union. Sikorski died in a plane crash in Gibraltar. He was buried at the Polish War Cemetery in Newark near London.

4 Actually Kazimierz Sosnkowski (1885–1969), lieutenant general, independence activist, co-organiser of the Polish Armed Forces. During the Polish-Soviet War, he served among other positions as a member of the Council of National Defence, and in 1921–1924 as minister of military affairs. Polish Delegate on disarmament to the League of Nations. During the 1939 September Campaign, he served as commander
Among other instructions, NIEGALSKI and ŁOZOWSKI were to inform commanders of local ZWZ organisations in Lviv and Warsaw that a short-wave radio station would be installed in Paris at the beginning of December 1939. The radio station will maintain contact with:

1. Lviv – mornings from 8 to 10 on the 22 m waveband. Evenings from 10 to 12 on the 65 m waveband.  
Call sign for Paris – “G-0-4.”  
Call sign for Lviv – “K-4-3.”  
2. Warsaw – on even days: mornings from 8 to 10 on the 22 m waveband. Evenings from 10 to 12 on the 45 m waveband.  
On odd days: mornings from 8 to 10 on the 65 m waveband.  
Evenings from 10 to 12 on the 85 m waveband.  
Call sign for Paris – “1-A-F” or “1-A-Z.”  
Call sign for Warsaw – “T-K-1.”  

Apart from this, the existing ZWZ radio station base in Bucharest will maintain radio contact with Lviv on 7 or 7.5 metres, on Wednesdays from 8:30 a.m. to 9.30 a.m. and on Sundays from 9.30 p.m. to 10.30 p.m.
The data obtained by us lead to the conclusion that there should be a short-wave radio station in Lviv. It was also intended to establish transmission stations in Białystok and Vilnius.


The cipher is based on page 117 of the book, which should correspond to the date 29 November 1939. Every day, the cipher is based on the next page of the book. All the characters of the first fourteen verses are used for enciphering. A group of three numerals corresponds to each letter. If applicable, the necessary number of zeroes is added at the beginning.

I recommend that monitoring of these radio stations and the aforementioned wavebands be organised immediately, and that the existing illegal transmission stations be detected in this manner.

Reports on the measures adopted and the results of the monitoring are to be delivered to me every two days.

Peopie’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security
SEROV

16 March 1940

*no. 956/SN*
Question: During previous questionings, you provided numerous contradictory testimonies regarding your counter-revolutionary activity. Do you intend to submit a truthful testimony concerning your anti-Soviet activity?

Answer: Yes, during the investigation I intend to submit a truthful testimony concerning my counter-revolutionary activity.

Question: Speak.

Answer: I escaped from the town of Lviv with my sons Janusz and Jerzy in my own car on 12 September 1939. On 18 September, I crossed the border with Romania, and on 1 October 1939 I was already in Bucharest.

In Romania, there were many civilian refugees and former military men who had fled from the town of Lviv. I learned from them that my house and workshop survived – apart from that, my wife was still in the town of Lviv, so after a few days I decided to arrange my return to Lviv. Therefore, I turned to the Soviet embassy in the city of Bucharest and requested the issuance of the documents necessary for me to return home legally. At the embassy, I was told that they could not help me in any way and that it would be necessary to wait for some time. A few days later, I resubmitted my request at the Soviet embassy, but I did not receive a positive reply.

At the time, a committee of relief for war refugees was already operating in Bucharest. It was headed by the Polish Armed Forces’ Colonel KOWALEWSKI, one of the distinguished activists of the Camp of National Unity in Warsaw, who served as military attaché at the Polish embassy in Bucharest a few years earlier. KORSAK, the Deputy Finance Minister of the Polish government, was the colonel’s deputy.

Around the first days of November 1939, I turned to the head of the committee for war refugees for assistance in returning home to the town of Lviv. The colonel directed me to his secretary, I do not remember his name, who asked me to come back in about a week, as he would be able to give me an answer then.

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1 Jan Aleksander Kolbuszewski (1888–1940), engineer, served in the 6th car regiment (captain) in 1921–1926. From September 1939 in Romania, came to Lviv from Bucharest in December 1939; arrested by NKVD on 15 March 1940, tried by the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court on 27 November 1940, and sentenced to death, executed on 25 December 1940.

2 Jan Kowalewski (1892–1965), colonel, from February to October 1937 performed the function of Commander-in Chief of Staff of the Camp of National Unity, and then headed the Association for the Import of Strategic Raw Materials (TISSA company).

3 This might be a reference to Władysław Korsak (1890–1949) who served as Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs in 1930–1939.
After a few days, I went to see the secretary of the committee for war refugees. When I asked how he saw the issue of my return to Lviv, he replied that he was working on getting me to the border, but that not everything was ready yet. He asked me to come back in a few days in the evening.

In the evening of 15 November, I went to the committee for war refugees, which had its office at 38 Roma Street. I found the secretary and accepted his invitation to dinner. During dinner, the secretary told me that he was sending another person with me to the town of Lviv. This person was to engage in secret illegal activity, and I was to provide him with technical support, as I was a specialist mechanic. The secretary asked me to consider this issue and come back to communicate my decision.

I looked into the issue and, as I wanted to return home, I agreed to fulfil the task assigned to me. When I told the secretary of the committee for war refugees about my decision, he asked me to meet him in two or three days, and said that he would introduce me to the person with whom I would illegally enter the USSR.

On 18 or 19 November, when I came to the secretary of the committee for war refugees, he introduced me to a person who said his name was Captain KOMARSKI. That was the end of the conversation at the committee, and KOMARSKI and I went to a restaurant. During dinner, I repeatedly asked KOMARSKI what sort of technical assistance I was supposed to provide. KOMARSKI refused to give a precise answer for a long time. Finally, he told me that he would need help with obtaining a radio in Lviv. Afterwards we parted.

In the evening of 21 or 22 November 1939, I went with KOMARSKI to the secretary of the committee for war refugees. During this meeting, our conversation took on a specific character. The secretary told me that Captain KOMARSKI was an employee of the Second Department of the Polish General Staff, that he was a reliable employee and was well-versed in secret service work, that he had previously worked for the Second Department in Germany, and that he would now go with me to Western Ukraine to complete the task of organising intelligence activity in Lviv. I was told that I shouldn’t take interest in the details of KOMARSKI’s activity, but that as a citizen of Lviv I should help him find an apartment and undertake activity aimed at obtaining a radio transmitter.

KOMARSKI was provided with a document from which it followed that he was an official in the department of the Ministry of Railways of the former Polish government.

In my presence, KOMARSKI asked the secretary of the fugitive committee whether the cipher he needed for working with the radio was ready. The answer was that the cipher had not been prepared yet. When leaving, KOMARSKI also

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4 Probably Mieczysław Komarski (born 1896), *noms de guerre* “Mak,” “Maks,” retired liaison captain, (probably served in Section II of the Polish General Staff); during the September 1939 Campaign served at the telegraphic headquarters of the Communication Ministry of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief. In December 1939 travelled from Lviv to Bucharest; in 1940 reached Warsaw through Rawa-Ruska; from June 1942 head of Division No. 5 of ZWZ-AK Lublin Area Command, arrested before 11 November 1944 by Soviet security bodies.
inquired about when he would be put in contact with an employee of a foreign intelligence service, but he did not mention which foreign intelligence service he had in mind. The secretary instructed him to come the next day at around three o’clock, [and said] that they would go together to meet the right person.

At this point, we parted.

On 23 November 1939, I went to meet the secretary of the committee. I met KOMARSKI there. The secretary instructed us to go to a certain place to obtain information and listen to a lecture on using a cipher. I asked the secretary how this could be useful for me, as KOMARSKI was the one who would take care of intelligence-related issues. It was explained to me that in order to ensure [the correct] performance of the task, it was necessary for me to learn the cipher, as it was not impossible that KOMARSKI would forget some detail of the cipher, and one had to know the cipher by heart. In such a case, I would be capable of helping KOMARSKI.

Question: Describe in detail where, at what street, in what house and according to whose instructions you were taught to encipher radiotelegrams?

Answer: We drove to a nearby place by car, then we left the car and walked down a few streets, then entered house number 28, then we went up to the second floor, where a young man opened the door and invited us in.

What the name of the street is, I do not know, because I was there only once, but I will try to additionally sketch it to give an idea of the place where that house was located.

I should also add that in Bucharest, the name of the street is visible only at the beginning and end of the district, and this also made it impossible for me to remember the name of the street.

The person who received us spoke Polish quite well, but had a strong English accent. Later, KOMARSKI told me that our instructor was a captain of the Intelligence Service.5

The lecture lasted more than two hours.

We had to cipher and decipher two conventional telegrams. After we completed the task, and the English intelligence officer ascertained that KOMARSKI and I had learned the cipher well, we said goodbye, left the apartment and went to town, and arranged to meet at the committee for war refugees on 24 March 1940 [!].

Question: Discuss the cipher you were to use together with KOMARSKI.

Answer: I remember the cipher and I will describe it separately; the cipher is very simple.

Question: Go on, how was your transport to Western Ukraine organised, and what tasks were assigned to you by English intelligence?

Answer: I did not receive any other tasks from the English intelligence officer, nor from the secretary of the committee for war refugees. During the next meeting with KOMARSKI and the secretary of the committee, we were told that on

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5 Probably Captain Stephen Ernest Carlton.

* * *

Filled in by hand.
27 November we were to leave for the border. And so it was. On 27 November, KOMARSKI and I, accompanied by the aforementioned secretary, travelled by train to Chernivtsi and were housed there by KOMARSKI’s relatives.

Question: What is the surname of this relative of KOMARSKI?

Answer: I do not remember his surname. He was a Romanian working as controller at the railway construction site. His wife is a relative of KOMARSKI’s wife, a Pole working as cashier at the railway station in *Černivtsi*. Her name is Nuška, she is a stout woman, about 42 years old, and I think they do not have children.

Nuška’s own sister works as a teacher on the Soviet side in the village of *Sniatyn*, I was told that by KOMARSKI.

We spent the night there, and afterwards the secretary put us in contact with an unknown citizen, who travelled by train with us in the direction of Orisheni station. At the next station, we got off the train car and walked to the village, where we were given a guide – a woman – who led us in the direction of the border, and in the evening of 30 November we crossed the border.

About 10 p.m. of the same day we were detained by Soviet border guards near... We were detained until 1 p.m. of the next day, i.e. 1 December, then we were released and we walked to ..., where we bought train tickets, and afterwards we travelled to the town of Lviv.

After arriving in the town of Lviv, KOMARSKI spent the night at my house, and on the next day I found him an apartment at my acquaintance KLECAN Irena⁶, where I accommodated KOMARSKI. KLECAN lives at 37⁶ Lychakivska Street.

Question: How, in practice, did you and KOMARSKI [complete] the political tasks assigned to you by English intelligence?

Answer: I should also add the following piece of information: on the way KOMARSKI told me that in Lviv he was supposed to contact General SPIECHOWICZ,⁷ whom he did not meet in the end, because the general had already left for Hungary before we arrived.

Now about the activities I carried out with KOMARSKI.

In the second half of December 1939, a friend of my elder son – Doctor CZARNIK⁸ – came to my house. We had a long conversation on the current

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⁶ In the original: KLECMAN. The same applies to all subsequent references.

⁷ Mieczysław Ludwik Boruta-Spiechowicz (1894–1985), brigadier general. Commander of the “Bielsko” (“Boruta”) Operational Group of the “Cracow” Army during the September 1939 campaign. After escaping from German captivity, became commander of the POWW in Lviv. Arrested by the NKVD on 14 September 1939 on the way to Hungary, released on 2 July 1941. Commander of the 5th Armoured Division of the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union, then commander of the Polish First Corps in Scotland; stayed in Poland after the war.

⁸ Leszek Czarnik (born 1905), scoutmaster with the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHP), Doctor of Medical Sciences. In 1939–1940, he was one of the five top leaders of the Scouting Independence and Military Organisation, and then served in the Grey Ranks Command of the Eastern Area. Arrested in Lviv in February or March 1940. Extracts from Czarnik’s interrogation protocols have been included in
political situation in the territories of the former Polish state. It was then that CZARNIK told me that a number of counter-revolutionary secret organisations were operating in Lviv, that they did not have one command centre, and that this was affecting the activity of these organisations. He also told me, among others, about the organisation headed by Colonel ŻEBROWSKI, that he himself, i.e. CZARNIK, was the head of one organisation, and that his organisation was composed mainly of Polish young people, and he also told me that there was also the organisation headed by General BORUTA ..., who had escaped abroad, and his deputy was Major DOBROWOLSKI, whom he did not know well yet.

CZARNIK asked why I wasn’t participating in counter-revolutionary organisations, and I answered that I was interested in politics, but was not taking part in any secret activity.

Then I asked CZARNIK whether he knew anyone from whom I could buy a radio transmitter. CZARNIK promptly replied that he had a friend who had a transmitter and that he would send that person to my house. At this point, we parted.

After a few days, a young man came to my house in the evening. He was about 25–27 years old. He said CZARNIK had sent him and that he had come to offer me a military radio transmitter which he had managed to hide.

There was no mention about paying for the radio transmitter. This person simply wanted to give it to me.

When I asked where the transmitter was and where the man got it from, the young man answered that he served in the radio-telegraphic units of the Polish Army during the German-Polish War and that during a retreat he had hidden one transmitter in the church on Kurkowa Street in the catacombs, where the sarcophagi were kept. The catacombs were divided by a stone wall; the young man had made a hole in it, hidden the transmitter, and covered the wall with stones and soil.

After hearing the man out, I gave him KOMARSKI’s address. After that the man left. I never saw him again.

Question: How did you use the transmitter?
Answer: During a meeting with KOMARSKI in January 1940, I asked KOMARSKI whether he was using the transmitter which he was to obtain from

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9 Władysław Kazimierz Żebrowski (1883–1940), noms de guerre “Żuk,” “Jasieńczyk,” “Dębiński,” retired colonel of artillery. Initially commander of the organisational group of the POWW in Lviv city; from the end of 1939 served as ZWZ-1 acting commander of Area No. 3 Lviv. In order to avoid arrest, he left Lviv in April 1940 with the intention to reach Paris; Żebrowski died on 25 April 1940 in Horodenka raion during an attempt to cross the border.

10 Zygmunt Dobrowolski (1899–1975), noms de guerre “Feliks,” “Zygmun,” major of artillery. During the September 1939 Campaign, he served as commander of the 11th Heavy Artillery Battalion. Before the capitulation of Lviv, Dobrowolski managed to enter the city; first he joined the POWW, then from March to April 1940 served as ZWZ-2 commander of Area No. 3 Lviv. Arrested on 20 October 1940, released on 15 August 1941; then served in the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union, taking part in the Battle of Monte Cassino.
the young man sent by me. KOMARSKI said that the man was undoubtedly reasonable, serious, but he had already got a transmitter from Doctor or Professor ERNEST, I do not remember exactly, so he was using that one.

The interrogation was discontinued.
The interrogation lasted 5 hours 30 minutes.
The testimony was correctly drafted in accordance with my words, in Russian, which I understand, which I hereby confirm with my signature.

The arrested was interrogated by:
Deputy Head Officer of the First Department of the Second Division of NKVD Directorate of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant of State Security FALKOWSKY

[...] April 1940.

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

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11 A reference to either Professor Doctor Marcin Ernst, head of Astronomy Department at the Jan Kochanowski University, or engineer Kazimierz Ernest, lecturer at the department of botany at the Lviv Polytechnic.

12 Falkowsky, investigator of the UNKVD Investigation Unit for Lviv oblast until March 1940, deputy head officer of the First Department, Third Division of the Directorate of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR from mid-March 1940.
No. 6
17–20 March 1940, [Lviv]. Interrogation protocol of the accused Edward Gola

Interrogation protocol of the accused Edward Gola, son of Józef

17–20 March 1940

Question: Summarise your biography.

Answer: I was born in 1908 in Lipa village in the Dobromil district of the Lviv gubernia; my father served in the Austrian army, and afterwards in the Polish army as a sergeant major of cavalry and a warrant officer. Currently, he lives in the town of Mostyska, in the same district in the Lviv oblast, he pursues agricultural activity, and that is where my mother, Julia Legowówna, also lives. From 1918 to 1923 I was a middle-school student, and from 1924 to 1926 I attended the Lviv Cadet Corps, after the completion of which I commenced three-month courses for infantry in Warsaw, and then I was admitted to the navy in the port of Gdynia. I was expelled from the navy in 1928 because of an argument I started in the Dutch port of Nekso, and I was admitted to the Warsaw Engineer School for Officers.

After 6 months, I was assigned to the sapper regiment deployed in Przemyśl and demoted from the rank of corporal officer cadet for insulting an officer. I served in this regiment until August 1929 until I was demobilised. After the demobilisation, I lived in the town of Mostyska until 1930. From 1930 to 1932, I worked as clerk in the Tax Services Office in the town of Drohobych; from 1932 to 1936 I lived in the town of Mostyska and was engaged in literary activity, I published my texts in a number of newspapers: Ilustrowany Kurier Codzien ny, Polska Zbrojna, Morze, Arena, Wiadomości Literackie. In 1936, I moved to Warsaw to a friend from the Cadet Corps, a first lieutenant engineer of the Military Engineer School, Siemko Edward. I did not work anywhere in Warsaw, I only performed individual drawing assignments for Siemko. In 1938, I met a friend from the Cadet Corps, Nagórski Jan, in Warsaw. Thanks to his contacts, I got the post of instructor at the Association for the Development the Eastern Lands, and after three months I was transferred by this association to Ternopil, where I lived at 7 Puncherta Street in Blumenfeld’s apartment.

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1 Edward Gola, aka Andrzej Azurewicz (1908–1941), nom de guerre “Andrzej,” reserve private. In September 1939 served in the 41st route company, in 1939–1940 in ZWZ-2, in March 1940 arrested by the NKVD and recruited for collaboration; from August 1940 to June 1941 the head of intelligence in ZWZ-2. Sentenced to death by the Star Chamber of the ZWZ NHQs, executed on 4 December 1941 in Warsaw.

2 Locality unverified.

3 The Association for the Development of Eastern Lands was established in 1933 upon the initiative of the Association for the Reconstruction of the Republic of Poland. It pursued activity for the economic and cultural development of the eastern Borderlands with the aim of uniting them with Poland. The Association operated until the outbreak of World War II.
In September 1939, I was called up for military service in the army and assigned to the 41st sapper battalion. In October 1939, near the village of Stavchany, 15 kilometres from Lviv, I was taken captive by the German forces, and the next day I escaped to Komornica village and entered Lviv as the Red Army was advancing into Poland. I got married in 1932 in the town of Drohobych to Janina Kratelówna, a resident of Drohobych, whom I later divorced. She is currently living in Drohobych at 41/43 Błonna Street. I have not had contact with my father since October 1939. I have a brother, Wincenty Gola, son of Józef, who lives with my father in Mostyska, and I have three sisters: Helena, Stanisława and Maria; they live in Mostyska. Helena is married to Orłowski Roman, a clerk in the commune office.

Question: Give me the addresses at which you stayed in Lviv after September 1939.

Answer: I lived at 85 Zadwórzańska Street, at my aunt’s, Łaskawska Maria; at 22 Zadwórzańska Street, in the apartment of Śliwińska Cecylia; at 24 Zadwórzańska Street, at Śliwińska’s house after she moved.

Question: What names did you use in Lviv?

Answer: First I used my real name, Gola. Then I used the names Pesz Kazimierz, Azurewicz Andrzej, Czapliński Fabian, Rawicz and Czaban.

Question: Did you have documents with those surnames?

Answer: I only had documents issued for the names Pesz, Czapliński and Czaban.

Question: Who provided you with falsified documents?

Answer: I fabricated the documents with the names Czapliński and Czaban myself, and I got the documents with the name Pesz from Pesz Kazimierz, a refugee from Poznań. He had two identity cards: one from the Teacher’s Association and one from the Ministry of Education, and he gave me one. Pesz returned to his family home in October. I bought the stamp and seal necessary to prepare the documents from *Kaczorowski*, I do not know his exact address, he lives aont Jelinki Street.

I met him through the Hungarian consul in Lviv, Doctor Blum, who directed me to Kaczorowski, so that I could help him cross the border and enter Hungary. Before the war, Kaczorowski lived in Białystok, served as a non-commissioned police officer and tried to escape to Romania or Hungary.

Question: Why did you use other people’s names?

Answer: Because I was involved in criminal activity and had contact with anti-Soviet organisation members.

Question: When and in what circumstances did you meet Blum?

Answer: After the defeat of the Polish army I came to Lviv, I had no means to support myself, so I wanted to cross the border with Hungary illegall. In order to do this, I went to the Hungarian consulate at 17 Akademicka Street, where I was received by Blum. I declared that I was an officer of the Polish army and would like to go to Hungary, I asked him to provide me with a pass enabling

*a- Underlined by hand.*
me to cross the border. Blum fulfilled my request, and after three days, I departed from Lviv with a group of Poles: Nowosielski Władysław⁴, my colleague from the Cadet Corps; Bülow, a count from Poznań; a doctor – I do not know his name; and a professor - I do not know his name. We left Lviv.

We reached Delatyn station, and then we walked up into the mountains; we kept on walking for two days, and on the third day we were arrested by foresters and handed over to the militia. We were released in the town of Nadvirna, Stanyslaviv oblast, after five days of arrest in an NKVD prison. Bülow and I returned to Lviv. Two to three days after our return to Lviv, Bülow left for Germany. A few days later, I went to Blum, told him I had been in Hungary in the town of Kereshmet and returned because there was an illegal Polish organisation in Lviv, and I was its courier, and asked him to issue passes for me and for the persons I would indicate when necessary. Blum believed me and promised to provide me with assistance.

Question: What kind of assistance did Blum provide you with?
Answer: Blum directed me to a number of persons, so that I could get practical help in crossing the border.

Question: Where were you arrested?
Answer: In the apartment of Doctor Bruchnalski⁵ at 5 Zyblikiewicza Street.

Question: How many times did you visit Bruchnalski?
Answer: I went there for the first time.

Question: Who sent you to Bruchnalski?
Answer: The head of the anti-Soviet organisation, the Polish army major Dobrowolski, residing at 37 Lychakivska Street – in the apartment of Klecan Irena.

Question: Do you know Bruchnalski?
Answer: No, I do not. I have never seen him.

Question: You have testified that you were involved in criminal activity in Lviv and were associated with anti-Soviet organisations. Describe your criminal activity and the anti-Soviet organisations you know.
Answer: After returning to Lviv after the failed attempt to cross the border, I began to disseminate false information among my friends that I was first lieutenant of the Polish Army, that I had established contact with General Sos[n]kowski⁶, who was in Paris at the time and who had allegedly assigned me special tasks connected with illegal activity. My friends included: Śliwiński Tadeusz,⁶ student of the Lviv Polytechnic, residing at 4 Staszica Street; Kulik Tadeusz (I do not know the address); Szumowski Bartek,⁷ residing at 69 Tarnowskiego Street.

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⁴ Władysław Nowosielski was actually a graduate of Cadet Corps No. 1 in Lviv (8th promotion, 1926). This is probably a reference to Władysław Nowosielski (born 1906), first lieutenant of cavalry, 6th Uhlan regiment.

⁵ Gustaw Bruchnalski (1894–1941), retired captain, doctor of medical sciences (dentist). Served in the reserve staff of the 6th District Hospital in Lviv before 1939, after the capitulation of Lviv, became involved in underground activity as Sokolowski’s partner; arrested on 1 March 1940 by the NKVD, after harsh interrogation was tried by the Lviv Oblast Court on 29 December 1940, sentenced to death.

⁶ Tadeusz Śliwiński (born 1914), active in Lviv underground organisations since December 1939; by order of the Special Council of the USSR NKVD sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment in corrective labour camps (ITL). After the amnesty, on 12 August 1941 he was transferred to Buzuluk.
At the beginning of December 1939, Śliwiński Tadeusz informed me that a delegate of the Polish government from Paris arrived in Lviv (he did not mention his name), and that the delegate wanted to meet me. I agreed. On the same day, at 2–3 p.m. we met in Lintner’s restaurant. The stranger introduced himself as Strowski Tadeusz. ⁸

During our chat, Strowski asked me who I was and what I did. I replied that my name was “Azurewicz,” I was first lieutenant of the Border Protection Corps, and that he should know all the remaining details about me if he had really come from Paris. My answer was so imprecise that Strowski did not ask any more questions. Strowski said he was a reserve major of the Polish Army, that he resided in Paris, and that he had come to Lviv with coded instructions from the Polish government for General “Anders,” General “Spiechowicz” or General “Januszajtis,” that he had been in Przemyśl and met with Anders, who refused to take the instructions and illegal work, justifying his decision by his poor health, and “Spiechowicz” and “Januszajtis” had been arrested.

As a result, “Strowski” asked me to find a few colonels or heads of Polish organisations in Lviv, so that he could deliver the instructions and 5 million zlotys

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⁷ By decision of the senior investigator of the Transport and Railway Department of NKVD in Lviv of 17 September 1940, investigation materials on the conspiratorial activity of Bartosz Szumowski (and others) were extracted from the files and delivered to the appropriate UNKVD departments of the Lviv oblast.

⁸ Tadeusz Strowski (born 1892), *noms de guerre* “Turzyma,” “Tadeusz”; emissary of the Chief Commander of ZWZ “Godziemba,” arrived in Lviv from Paris on 19 December 1939. Strowski is a very interesting personage due to his ambiguous character. The criminal investigative records stored in Moscow would surely explain a great deal. It appears from the materials available that he was arrested on the border in January 1940 during his return to Paris, in May 1940 he was in Moscow, and in 1941 he was tried by a military tribunal.

⁹ Władysław Anders (born 1892), lieutenant-general, politician and statesman. He commenced military service in the Russian army; until autumn 1917 he served as staff officer of the cavalry, then in the First Polish Corps in the East. Organiser and commander of the 15th Uhlan regiment; in 1921–1923 attended military school in France. Until 1937 commander of the 2nd Independent Cavalry Brigade in Brody. From 12 September 1939, commander of the Nowogród Cavalry Brigade, then commander of Cavalry Operational Group; wounded in the skirmish of Turka on 29 September 1939 and taken prisoner; from 1 October 1939 in hospital in Lviv, then in Przemyśl. Held prisoner in Lviv and Moscow. From 4 August 1941 commander of the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union and successful commander of the 2nd Polish Corps in the Italian campaign, the battle of Monte Cassino. From 26 February 1945 Commander-in-Chief and General Inspector of the Polish Armed Forces. Settled in London after the war. Died on 12 May 1970; buried in a Polish military cemetery in Monte Cassino, Italy.

to them. Strowski gave me his address to contact him later on – 43 Listopada Street, 2nd floor, entrance on the left.

I informed Śliwiński T., Szumowski B. and Kulik T. about the meeting with Strowski, the character of our conversation and his instructions, and asked them for assistance.

After some time Kulik introduced me to a young doctor, Skrobaczewski, I do not know his first name or address, he was a non-commissioned reserve officer. The meeting with Skrobaczewski took place on the street. During the conversation with Skrobaczewski, I informed him that I had direct contact with a person who had been sent by the Polish government from Paris with special tasks connected with anti-Soviet activity, and that if he had nothing against it, I could introduce him. Skrobaczewski agreed willingly.

I sent Skrobaczewski to Strowski, I characterised him as a reasonable and trustworthy man. Strowski expressed the wish to meet him.

Strowski and Skrobaczewski met on the street in my presence. Then I walked away and left them to talk in private. Skrobaczewski later informed me that he had established contact with Colonel Żebrowski, and asked if he should introduce Żebrowski to Strowski and whether I wanted to be present during their first meeting. I instructed Skrobaczewski to introduce Żebrowski to Strowski, but not in my presence, as he knew me from the Cadet Corps. I know from Skrobaczewski and Strowski that Colonel Żebrowski was ordered to command all Polish organisations in Western Ukraine. Paszkowski was Żebrowski’s deputy, I have never seen him and I do not know his address. The Polish organisations in western Belorussia were headed by Colonel Jarosz, and those in Cracow by Colonel Zygmuntowicz. At the time, Jarosz and Zygmuntowicz lived at Żebrowski’s apartment, I do not know the address.

In January 1940, Skrobaczewski informed me that he was taking orders to Hungary to Strowski. That was my last meeting with Skrobaczewski. When I was fulfilling my task, Kulik informed me that there was an illegal anti-Soviet organisation in Lviv established by General Spiechowicz, and that it was headed by Major Dobrowolski [and] that he could contact me with this organisation through a Ms Dzierżanowska.

Kulik introduced me to Dzierżanowska on the street. Right after that, Kulik walked away from us. Dzierżanowska informed me that she knew a lot about me from Kulik and proposed we went to “Mrs Włada” Piechowska, residing at 18 Bogusławskiego Street.

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11 This might be a reference to Tadeusz Skrowaczewski, born on 13 October 1910, artillery non-commissioned officer of the reserve.

12 Other information about the officers mentioned by Gola was not found in the available materials. It cannot be ruled out that these are noms de guerre.

13 Krystyna Dzierżanowska, sister of Andrzej Stocker.

14 Władysława Piechowska (1900–1987), noms de guerre “Włada,” “Regina,” head of Female Military Training (PWK). During the September 1939 Campaign she participated in the defence of Lviv, then served in POWW and ZWZ-2, arrested on the night of 16/17 September 1939 by NKVD, judged by
After introducing me to a-Piechowska-a, Dzierżanowska said that I was the person who had had contact with a delegate of the Polish government from Paris. Dzierżanowska left the room, and left me alone with Piechowska. The latter said that she worked as the secretary of General Spiechowicz and that the general was being held prisoner at the time. I informed Piechowska that I had had contact with the delegate of the Polish government from Paris, who had delivered instructions addressed to Spiechowicz. Piechowska replied that she could give me the name of Spiechowicz’s deputy, but only if I gave my name and explained who the delegate from Paris was. I refused to give my name and the name of the delegate from Paris, and as a result our conversation came to an end. After I left Piechowska’s apartment, a-Dzierżanowska-a caught up with me on the street and asked me not to get upset over a-Piechowska-a, and she promised to introduce me to a man who would introduce me to the head of the organisation. When we reached Supińskiego Street, a-Dzierżanowska-a asked me to wait for her. She went away somewhere and returned half an hour later with a stranger, who turned out to be a-Stocker Andrzej[15], who introduced me to a-Dobrowolski-a on the corner of Stryjska on the next day.

After meeting Dobrowolski, I proposed to him and Stocker that we should go to meet a-Strowski-a at 43 Listopada Street. Strowski was home and I introduced them. Stowski instructed me to wait in the other room while they talked, to assure they were not overheard. The conversation between Strowski and Dobrowolski and Stocker lasted about 2 hours. I know from a-Dobrowolski-a that Strowski instructed him to unite his organisation with a-Żebrowski-a’s organisation, which Dobrowolski refused to do, as he doubted whether Strowski was a delegate from Paris, and not a representative of an organisation supporting Rydz-Śmigly in Romania.16

On the evening of the same day, I was at Strowski’s house. Strowski said Dobrowolski was a careerist and an unwise man, who did not want to b-shift-b the place of his organisation under Żebrowski’s command.

Strowski gave me his new address – 9 Supińskiego Street, ground floor, first door to the right, and 1000 zloty to exchange for Soviet currency. He instructed me to go to Żebrowski, take my vow and assume command of intelligence in Żebrowski’s organisation. I did not go to Żebrowski, so as to avoid a slip, because Żebrowski knew I was not an officer and he could expose my actual role, that of a troublemaker. On the next day, I visited Strowski to inform him that I could not fulfil his instructions, because I knew Żebrowski as a careerist and a person with

the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court, sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment in corrective labour camps (ITL); released in August 1941, then commander of the Polish Armed Forces in the Soviet Union and chief inspector of the Women’s Auxiliary Service.

b- a Crossed out by hand.

[15] Andrzej Stocker (born 1916), active member of the Lviv underground, by verdict of the Special Council of the USSR NKVD sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment in corrective labour camps (ITL). After the amnesty, on 12 August 1941 he was transferred to Buzuluk.

[16] The suggestion that Strowski was not an emissary from Paris, but merely a courier of the supporters of Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigly, who was interned in Romania, is unjustified. See Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945, vol. I, 160, 234, 249.
dirt on his hands, I returned 300 roubles to him and left. Dobrowolski told me later that Strowski had been arrested together with his wife during an attempt to cross the border with Romania, and was in prison in Kolomyia or Chortkiv.

The second meeting with Dobrowolski and Stocker took place in a restaurant on the corner of Stryjska Street. Dobrowolski expressed interest in who I was and what I did. I said that my name was Azurewicz Andrzej, I was a first lieutenant of the Polish army, and that I had established contact with General Sosnkowski, who was in Paris at the time, and that I had received special tasks. Dobrowolski believed me and informed me that he was also an officer with the rank of major and the head of the Polish organisation established by Spiechowicz, which was composed of 5000 persons, had weapons, a short-wave radio transmitter and 250,000 zloty. Dobrowolski gave me his new address – the “municipal official’s houses” at Stryjska Street, I do not know the number of the house, but I can point out the house personally. He asked me to visit him or appoint one of my men to maintain contact with him. I appointed Szumowski Bartek to maintain contact with Dobrowolski. I informed Szumowski Bartek about the details regarding Dobrowolski as head of the organisation. In December 1939, Dobrowolski invited me to Klecan Irena’s apartment. Klecan Irena had a visitor from Romania – a certain Maks, a relative of Klecan and a good friend of Dobrowolski.

During the conversation, Maks expressed interest in the relocation of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine and asked me to obtain information about this issue. After drafting some invented data on the stationing of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine, I went to Klecan’s apartment. I met Dobrowolski, Maks and a stranger named Szczerbicki at Klecan’s apartment.

I delivered the information on the Red Army units to Maks, who in my presence immediately handed them over to Szczerbicki.

According to Maks, the information I provided was intended for Grabowski, an employee of the Polish consulate in Chernivtsi. Before leaving for Romania, I met Maks and Szczerbicki in a canteen in Lviv.

KLECAN Irena later said that Szczerbicki had worked at the Romanian border in the town of Kuty as a driver at some Soviet institution. Apart from that, I know that Maks was supposed to receive money from Grabowski and promised to distribute it to me and Dobrowolski, but apparently he had not received it, and left for Warsaw in the first days of January.

I know from Dobrowolski that he had established contact with Sokołowski (I do not know him), who assumed general command over the organisations,

17 This is a reference to Eugeniusz Strzelbicki, nom de guerre “Szczerbicki.”
18 Jan Maksymilian Sokołowski (1895–1986), noms de guerre “Trzaska,” “Jan,” a reserve lieutenant-colonel. During the September 1939 Campaign, he served as Chief of Staff of the 35th Infantry Division of the Reserve; from the end of 1939, commander of the SZP in the Lviv province, then from March 1940 acting commander of Area No. 3 and commander of the ZWZ-2 Lviv Region, then head of the conspiratorial organisation Wierni Polsce (Loyal to Poland); from 1942 member of the National Defence Committee.
whereas he – Dobrowolski – was his deputy and at the same time the head of
organisations operating in the provinces; “Bolek” (I do not know the surname)
heads the organisation for Lviv; “Aleksander” (I do not know the surname) heads
the organisations for the suburbs of Lviv, and “Karol” is the head of intelligence.
Apart from that, I also know that Sokołowski was contacted by Doctor
Bruchnalski, and by “Karol” through Piechowska. 19 The other day, Dobrowolski
told me that two people from Warsaw sent by General Tokarzewski were coming
to see him (through Piechowska). One of them was Niewiarowski, the former
Governor of Lviv, a major of the Polish Army. His real name is Kloc. 20 Together
with Sokołowski and Żebrowski, they discussed uniting their organisations and
placing them under Tokarzewski’s command.

In mid-January 1940, Dobrowolski instructed me to present the deployment
of Soviet troops in Western Ukraine. By my order, the deployment was drafted by
a man I enlisted named Herman – nom de guerre “Piotruś,” 21 a captain-geographer
(I do not know his surname or address) – [and concerned] solely Red Army units
and institutions in Lviv. I was to hand this plan over to “Bolek” through
Bruchnalski, whose address I received from Dobrowolski.

Question: Where is the deployment you prepared for “Bolek”? 
Answer: It is at the apartment of Jezuit Józef, at 34 Wschodnia Street.
Jezuit lives at the apartment of a carpenter – I do not know his surname – and
helps him with his work.

Question: Who introduced you to Jezuit Józef? 
Answer: Kulik introduced me to Jezuit Józef at the end of January 1940; I have
seen Jezuit no more than three times.

Question: Who introduced you to Herman – “Piotruś”? 
Answer: ZBYSZYŃSKI Leonard introduced me to Herman “Piotruś” in
December 1939, and Kaczorowski introduced me to Zbyszyński. Kaczorowski
lived with Herman “Piotruś.”

Question: Where is Zbyszyński? 
Answer: Zbyszyński escaped to Germany in January 1940.

Question: Apart from the people you have already mentioned, do you know
any other organisation members? 
Answer: I know from Szumowski that he had made contact with organisation
member LACH, 22 who lives at the same address as Szumowski. Kulik maintained
contact with the student “Desław,” “Jurek” – address: 20 Halicka [Street].

19 For the composition of the staff of Lieutenant-Colonel Sokołowski’s organisation.
20 Alfons Aleksander Kloc (Klotz) (1898–1976), noms de guerre “Niewiarowski,” “Zosia,” a reserve
infantry major. During the September 1939 Campaign, he served in the staff of the “Poznań” Army.
Emissary of General Command to Lviv; assumed the function of Chief of Staff of the Lviv Command of
SZP, then of Chief of Staff of Area No. 3 Lviv ZWZ-2.
21 Probably Herman Marcinowski (born 1904).
22 Tadeusz Lach (born 1916 in Cracow), an active member of the Lviv underground; by verdict of the
Special Council of the USSR NKVD of 22 February 1941 sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment in
corrective labour camps. After the amnesty, he was transferred to Buzuluk on 12 August 1941.
I maintained contact with KUCZKOWSKI Edward, officer cadet, residing at 21/7 Zadwórańska Street.

I intended to send Kuczkowski to Hungary in order to check whether Dobrowolski actually had contact with Drzewiecki, an employee of the Polish consulate in Budapest. I discussed this issue with Kuczkowski, who took my order. Kuczkowski’s delegation did not take place, as Dobrowolski did not give me any tasks within the scope of liaison with Hungary; and then I was arrested.

Question: Did Dobrowolski list the cities where organisations are operating?
Answer: Yes, he did. Dobrowolski said that he had organisations in Stanyslaviv, Kremenets, in Ternopil, in Kolomyia, in Stryi, in Sambir, in Przemyśl, in Drohobych, in Boryslav, in Horodok, in Rava-Ruska, in Sokal, Rivne, Lutsk, Zhovkva. Apart from that, I know from Szumowski Bartek that the Stanyslaviv organisation was composed of 1000 members and the Kremenets organisation included 200 persons. Szumowski was in those cities in January 1940 and established the organisation through Wyszyński.

Szumowski, with my consent, placed the organisations in Stanyslaviv and Kremenets under Dobrowolski’s command.

Question: Do you know the heads of those organisations?
Answer: I know from Dobrowolski that the head of the Stanyslaviv organisation is Colonel “Hucuł” and Captain “Somar” – these are their noms de guerre.

Question: What funds did the organisation have at its disposal?
Answer: I do not know anything about the funds the organisation had at its disposal. In February 1940, I received 30,000 zloty to exchange for Soviet money. I did not return the money to Dobrowolski. I gave 900 roubles to Kulik, 1,500 roubles to Szumowski, 500 roubles to “Herman”, and I spent the rest on alcohol.

Question: What do you know about Spiechowicz?
Answer: I know from Dobrowolski and Piechowska that he was arrested when crossing the Hungarian border under the surname Morawski.

I also know from Dobrowolski that Strowski and his wife were arrested when crossing the border.

Question: Do you know where the organisation’s weapons are stored?
Answer: No, I do not know where the weapons are kept. I know from Dobrowolski that he has three officers whose special duties involve obtaining weapons. Dobrowolski did not tell me the names of these officers.

Question: The man you mentioned – Kulik – is this his real name or his nom de guerre?
Answer: I know him as Kulik.

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23 Władysław Smereczyński (1895–1958), nom de guerre “Hucul,” lieutenant-colonel of infantry; during the September 1939 Campaign, commander of the Reserve Centre 5th Infantry Division; in 1940–1941 commander of the ZWZ-1 Stanyslaviv region, in 1941–1942 commander of the ZWZ-AK Lviv Region. Arrested by the Germans, held at the camp in Majdanek, then in concentration camps in the Reich.

24 Probably Captain Sommer, probably the organiser and chief of Staff of the ZWZ-1 Stanyslaviv Region.
Question: Did you read the instruction delivered by Strowski?
Answer: I acquainted myself with part of the instruction, Strowski gave it to me to decipher it. I didn't decipher it myself, I passed it on to Officer Patolski.

I remember that there were two noms de guerre of the generals in the instruction: the nom de guerre of Spiechowicz was “Kopa”; Anders – “Waligóra,” Januszajtis – “Krasicki,” Sikorski – “Eugniesz,” Sosnkowski – “Godziemba.” It was recommended that all correspondence with Sikorski and others be drafted only in the form of ciphers. Special recognition signs for the couriers were explained.

Question: Did Patolski know what was going on in the organisation?
Answer: No, he did not. He only knew there was some activity underway, but he did not have any precise information. Patolski and his wife left for Cracow in December 1939.

Question: Did Kaczorowski and Kuczkowski belong to the organisation?
Answer: No, they did not.

My answers were recorded faithfully in the protocol and read out to me, which I hereby confirm with my signature.

(–) Gola

The arrested was interrogated by:
Operational Officer of the First Division of the NKVD Main Prison Administration.
Senior Lieutenant of State Security
(–) Bekman

HDA SBU, Lviv,Spr. P-7259, p. .....  
Original, typescript.  
Document in Russian.
Interrogation protocol of
the accused SUŁKOWSKA Janina, daughter of Jan¹
of 27 March 1940

The interrogation was commenced at 6.30 p.m.

SUŁKOWSKA Janina, daughter of Jan, born in 1914 in the town of Dnipropetrovsk, Pole, citizen of the USSR, without permanent employment before arrest.

Question: The investigation was informed that you were an active member of an anti-Soviet group, and that you were instructed by this group to pursue anti-Soviet activity. Will you submit a truthful testimony concerning your crimes?
Answer: Yes. I will tell the truth about my crimes.
I plead guilty. I was an active member of an anti-Soviet group and was instructed by this group to pursue criminal activity.

Question: When, by whom and in what circumstances were you enlisted into the anti-Soviet group?
Answer: Actually nobody enlisted me for the anti-Soviet group, because it was I – SUŁKOWSKA Janina – who, together with RUMEL Zygmunt,² decided, after a conversation about the defeat of the Polish state, to organise a group of people capable of undertaking activity leading to the restoration of the Polish state. In order to achieve this goal, RUMEL and I decided firstly to get involved in the activity of the anti-Soviet group associating the members of the Volhynia Rural Youth Association³ we knew.

Question: Does this mean that you were also a member of the organisation Volhynia Rural Youth Association?
Answer: Yes. I have been a member of this organisation since 1936.

Question: Whom did you persuade to pursue activity within the anti-Soviet group you established?

¹ Janina Sułkowska (1914–1997), arrested by NKVD on 24 March 1940, held prisoner in Dubno, sentenced to imprisonment in a corrective labour camp, escaped from the USSR with Anders’ Army; died in Canada after the war.
² Zygmunt Rumel (1915–1943), noms de guerre “Krzysztof Poręba,” “Mały,” 2nd lieutenant, dispatched to Warsaw by the Volhynia Government Delegation (September 1941); member of the Peasants’ Battalions (BCh); from January 1943 commander, 8th District of the Peasants’ Battalions Volhynia and the Peasants’ Guard (Straż Chłopska); murdered by Ukrainians in Kustycze 10 July 1943.
³ The Volhynia Rural Youth Association – a peasants’ youth organisation, initially (from June 1928) an autonomous group belonging to the Rural Youth Association of the Republic of Poland (ZMW RP-Wici), later separated from the RYA and began operating independently.

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Answer: The first person I enlisted was TRAUTMAN Teresa, daughter of Tadeusz, residing in Dubno at 4 Zabramie Street.

Question: In what circumstances did you enlist TRAUTMAN T. to the anti-Soviet group?

Answer: I have known TRAUTMAN T. since 1936. I met her at the house of her brother-in-law – KOWAL Leon, who was my colleague at work. And since KOWAL L. was the secretary of the Volhynia Rural Youth Association, every year I met Teresa TRAUTMAN during the summer holidays. I knew perfectly well that Teresa is a Polish patriot, so I was certain that she would agree to participate in the activity of our anti-Soviet group.

When I came to the town of Dubno at the end of November or at the beginning of December 1939 to visit TRAUTMAN T., at first we talked about quite general issues. Later, I told her that RUMEL Z. and I were considering the establishment of an anti-Soviet group and undertaking activity, I also asked her whether she would like to join our group. TRAUTMAN T. agreed to participate in the activity of our group, I instructed her to recall the names of her friends who would be capable of and would like to become part of an anti-Soviet group.

RUMEL Zygmunt also discussed this issue with Teresa TRAUTMAN. More or less at the same time, ZALESKI Pius – who escaped to Sarny after the Germans captured Warsaw – came to Dubno from the Sarny raion.

Question: Whom was ZALESKI visiting in Dubno?

Answer: ZALESKI came to visit RUMEL, who lived in TRAUTMAN’s apartment, a bit earlier than I did. As a result, a group of people willing to engage in the fight for Poland’s restoration gathered at TRAUTMAN’s apartment.

Question: Is it possible that ZALESKI found out earlier that RUMEL and you were organising an anti-Soviet group?

Answer: I do not know that; what I do know is that via correspondence RUMEL and ZALESKI renewed an old acquaintance and exchanged addresses. It might be that ZALESKI Pius came to Dubno with exactly that aim; I also know that RUMEL talked to ZALESKI about the anti-Soviet group we were establishing, and that ZALESKI gave RUMEL a positive answer.

At that time, at TRAUTMAN’s apartment, we – RUMEL Zygmunt, ZALESKI Pius, Teresa TRAUTMAN and I – SUŁKOWSKA Janina – had a coordination meeting, during which we discussed issues connected with our group’s further activity and establishing contact with JÓZEWSKI, who was in Łódź during the war, and after the German invasion evacuated to Volhynia. We did not know his precise address, but we assumed that as a representative of the authorities, he could

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\[ a \]Filled in by hand.
\[ b \]Underlined by hand.

4 Teresa Trautman, arrested by NKVD after 24 March 1940, sentenced to death, executed in Dubno in 1941.

5 Henryk Józewski (1892–1981), political activist; in 1928–1938 was intermittently Governor of Volhynia Province; from 1929 to 1930 Minister of the Interior, in 1939–1945 an underground group member, held prisoner in Poland between 1953 and 1956.
have gone with the government to Romania or Hungary. Therefore, we decided to send RUMEL and ZALESKI to Warsaw, so that they could determine where JÓZEWSKI was. They were to try and establish JÓZEWSKI’s address with the help of his friends. RUMEL and ZALEWSKI agreed to go to Warsaw illegally, and determined the time and place of their meeting in the town of Rivne at the house of HERMASZEWSKI Antoni, residing at 83/7 Promin Street, or at the house of his brother ZALESKI Paweł, residing at 3 Worcel Street.

Question: When did ZALESKI and RUMEL intend to illegally travel to Warsaw?
Answer: I do not remember exactly on which day they left for Warsaw, but it was in January 1940.

Question: Did RUMEL and ZALESKI determine JÓZEWSKI’s address? and what did you need his address for?
Answer: RUMEL and ZALESKI did not succeed in determining JÓZEWSKI’s address, because on their way to Warsaw their legs got frost-bitten and they were forced to go back and stay in Lutsk at the house of KOWAL, an acquaintance and secretary of the Volhynia Rural Youth Association, until their frost-bitten legs healed. RUMEL stayed in KOWAL’s house for about ten days, and ZALESKI stayed for over a month. We needed JÓZEWSKI because he could give us instructions and directions for our anti-Soviet group.

I would also like to add that after the coordination meeting held at TRAUTMAN’s apartment, RUMEL Zygmunt asked me to meet his brother Bronisław RUMEL after the return to Kremenets, and tell him to come to Dubno, because he wanted to discuss the issue of travelling to Warsaw and family issues.

I complied with Zygmunt’s request, but Bronisław was late and did not meet Zygmunt in Dubno, so he went to the house of his father, who lived in Nowogród province. The father told Bronisław that Polish money was no longer valid, and that is why they needed to be taken to Warsaw to his eldest brother, Stanisław RUMEL, which Bronisław did.

At the beginning of February 1940, I received a letter from my aunt who planned to move from Rivne to Białystok to her mother, because her sister and her husband – MADALIŃSKI, a former military settler – had been resettled. My aunt asked me to come and help organise the journey. On the very same day, I set out to Rivne to my aunt WOŁKOWA, residing at 24 Młynkowa Szosa Street.

During my stay in Rivne, I visited HERMASZEWSKI Antoni, residing at 7/b. 3 Promin, whom I told that RUMEL Zygmunt did not manage to walk to Warsaw and had turned back. HERMASZEWSKI then told me to write a letter to Zygmunt and ask him to come to HERMASZEWSKI, because he had some

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6 Antoni Hermaszewski (born 1898), served in the Volhynia Staff of Colonel Majewski from February or March 1940; arrested by NKVD on 13 March 1941, released on 20 February 1942.
7 Bronisław Rumel, brother of Zygmunt and Stanisław, arrested by NKVD on 23 March 1940, sentenced to death on 15 January 1941, executed in Dubno.

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information for him. So, I wrote a letter to TRAUTMAN Jadwiga (Teresa’s sister), in which I said that HERMASZEWSKI would like to meet “Mały,” as we called Zygmunt.

RUMEL Zygmunt came from Dubno to see me in Rivne, and went to meet HERMASZEWSKI, who, as he told me later, told him that SZMIGIEL had arrived illegally from Warsaw, as they had been sent by the central command of the Warsaw organisation, whose main objective was to restore the Polish state. SZMIGIEL and POTAPOW were sent to Volhynia to organise groups of people belonging to the Warsaw insurgent organisation within the districts. SZMIGIEL was responsible for establishing insurgent groups in Volhynia, and POTAPOW was his “assistant.”

Question: Did you personally establish anti-Soviet contact with SZMIGIEL and POTAPOW?

Answer: In accordance with RUMEL’s instructions, I went to HERMASZEWSKI’s apartment and talked to SZMIGIEL in HERMASZEWSKI’s presence there. SZMIGIEL repeated what he had told RUMEL Zygmunt, and entrusted me with the task of organising district organisation units in Lutsk, Dubno and Kremenets.

Apart from that, he also told me that a certain MARZECKI Piotr residing at Street might be the head of the district insurgent organisation. He did not name any other names.

Question: Did you perform the task assigned to you by SZMIGIEL?

Answer: I completed part of the task, mainly: after some two to three days I travelled from Lutsk to KOWAL Leon, whom I told that a man from Warsaw had arrived and would lead the organisations which were being established in Volhynia. I also told him about the goals of the organisation and the task that man had assigned to me. Next, when I was certain that KOWAL would not refuse to join the Lutsk organisation, I instructed him to seek out people willing to join a “unit” of this organisation. I instructed him to find not more than 5–6 people, who could then select their acquaintances and stand by until the right moment came, whereupon these five people were not to tell the others about the organisation. I also told KOWAL that MARZECKI Piotr would be the head of the organisation.

Question: Did KOWAL agree to become a member of the insurgent organisation in Lutsk?

Answer: Yes, KOWAL agreed to join the organisation and undertake activity.

Question: Did you also enlist MARZECKI to the organisation?

Answer: No. MARZECKI was already the head of the organisation.

As in the original.

Jadwiga Trautman (born 1920), sister of Teresa Trautman and wife of Leon Kowal, arrested by NKVD on 23 March 1940, sentenced to 6 years of imprisonment in corrective labour camps.

Tadeusz Majewski (born 1894), noms de guerre “Szmigiel,” “Grzbiet,” colonel; from May 1939 commander of the Pomeranian National Defence Brigade, organised SZP structures in Bydgoszcz and Toruń, from the beginning of 1940 commander of the ZWZ-2 Region Volhynia. Arrested by the NKVD on 30 May 1940, sentenced to death on 13 November 1940. Detained in the Lubyanka to 5 February 1941.

Jerzy (Jarosław) Potapow, actually Jerzy Bronikowski, lieutenant-colonel. Arrived in Rivne together with Colonel Majewski on 8 February 1940, arrested in March 1940 by the NKVD, released after two days, held under observation, then arrested, held captive in Dubno, missing.
Answer: Yes. On the next day, I went to MARZECKI’s house and told him that SZMIGIEL had sent me. I said that SZMIGIEL had told me he (MARZECKI) would head the illegal organisation in Lutsk. MARZECKI agreed and said that he knew what the organisation’s objectives were; that is why I believe MARZECKI had already discussed this issue with someone else. I also told MARZECKI that there was already one man who could help him – KOWAL, whom I promised to come with next time.

Question: Did you contact KOWAL with MARZECKI?

Answer: Yes, on the next day I went to MARZECKI’s house together with KOWAL and introduced KOWAL to MARZECKI. They decided that if any of them found [a suitable] person, they will contact each other and take a joint decision.

This is where my activities aimed at establishing an insurgent organisation in Lutsk ended.

The interrogation was discontinued at 2.15 a.m.
The interrogation was resumed on 28 March 1940 at 12 o’clock.

Question: What activities aimed at establishing an anti-Soviet insurgent organisation did you undertake in Dubno?

Answer: I travelled from Lutsk to Dubno to organise an insurgent group there. Since I knew hardly anyone in Dubno, I wanted to assign this task to Teresa TRAUTMAN, whom I had briefly informed about the tasks of our group in Lutsk. When I arrived in Dubno, Teresa was not there, which is why I did not find out what steps Teresa took to organise the insurgent group.

At that time, Bronisław RUMEL was staying at TRAUTMAN’s house. I told RUMEL that a man had arrived from Warsaw and that he would lead the entire organisation in Volhynia. (I did not give his – SZMIGIEL’s – name to RUMEL Bronislaw).

Question: Did you tell RUMEL about the organisation’s tasks?

Answer: I told RUMEL Bronislaw that this man had ordered the establishment of district units composed of persons capable of engaging [in the fight] for the restoration of Poland at any given moment – Polish patriots, who could keep the activity of our illegal organisation secret.

I also told Bronisław that Zygmunt had gone to Warsaw, where he was to receive instructions regarding the illegal organisation’s further activity. It was then that I also told Bronisław to look for the right people together with Jadwiga TRAUTMAN, but instructed them not to talk about the organisation with them, only to act in agreement with Teresa, i.e. provide her with information about persons they believed were suitable for the organisation, as Teresa was to talk to them about joining the organisation, i.e. to enlist them.

Question: Did RUMEL Bronisław agree to join your anti-Soviet group and undertake activity?
Answer: Yes. Besides, I never doubted it, because Bronislaw had already known that we, the aforementioned active members of the anti-Soviet group (Zygmunt, Teresa, Pius and I) were involved in some illegal activity. He just was not fully informed about all our undertakings. That is why I spoke boldly and openly with Bronislaw about the organisation.

Question: Earlier you testified that while you were enlisting Bronislaw to the anti-Soviet group, you told him that his brother Zygmunt RUMEL had gone to Warsaw to get instructions for the organisation. This means that you knew Zygmunt had gone to Warsaw. Tell us, how did you know that?

Answer: I found out that Zygmunt RUMEL had gone to Warsaw from RUMEL himself when he met SZMIGIEL at HERMASZEWSKI’s house for the first time. It was then that RUMEL told me that SZMIGIEL was sending him to Warsaw in order to establish contact with the organisation operating in Warsaw, and that to this end SZMIGIEL had given RUMEL a secret sign, i.e. a password, but he (RUMEL) did not say exactly what the password was.

Question: Who was RUMEL supposed to meet in Warsaw?

Answer: I do not know that, because RUMEL did not tell me, and I did not ask him. Besides, our group adhered to the principle that one should not know too much, i.e. should not take an interest in what the other group members are doing.

By the way, I would also like to add that before my departure from Rivne to Lutsk I met ZALESKI Pius, whom I came across at his brother Pawel’s house, where I went to simply find out how he was doing, because Pius asked me to visit his brother and find out how he was.

When I met ZALESKI Pius, I told him that a man had come from Warsaw and is now staying at HERMASZEWSKI’s apartment. The man had come to establish and lead an illegal organisation in Volhynia, I asked him to visit HERMASZEWSKI, who would give him all the details and instructions regarding further steps.

Question: Did ZALESKI Pius visit HERMASZEWSKI?

Answer: I cannot give a more precise answer, but I assume that ZALESKI Pius met HERMASZEWSKI, because I departed from Rivne to Lutsk, and he remained in Rivne.

Question: When did you meet ZALESKI Pius in Rivne?

Answer: About 9–12 March 1940.

Question: Did you tell ZALESKI why you were going to the town of Lutsk?

Answer: Yes. I told ZALESKI I was going to Lutsk to complete a task assigned to me by SZMIGIEL, i.e. to organise a district unit of the illegal organisation in Lutsk.

Question: You keep saying you were establishing an organisation, but you do not speak of the organisation’s methods.

Answer: I have already confessed that the goal of our anti-Soviet organisation was to restore the former Polish state. We did not know ourselves how we would achieve that, we were waiting for guidelines from Warsaw.

And, as I have already testified, RUMEL Zygmunt had gone to Warsaw to bring back such instructions.
Question: What did TRAUTMAN Teresa do in order to establish an insurgent group in Dubno?
Answer: I do not know, because Teresa did not inform me about that, and I could not ask her, because on the night of 22 March I departed from Dubno, while Teresa had not returned from Lutsk yet.

Question: Where did you go after you left Dubno?
Answer: I went straight to my house in Kremenets from Dubno. At home I found POTAPOW, who came from Warsaw together with SZMIGIEL and to whom RUMEL Zygmunt had introduced me in Rivne.

Question: Describe the circumstances in which you met POTAPOW.
Answer: As I have already testified, I was at my aunt’s – WOŁKOWA Irena – in Rivne. In the evening, I don’t remember the exact date, RUMEL Zygmunt and POTAPOW came to WOŁKOWA’s apartment, where I was staying, as POTAPOW had nowhere to spend the night.

At the beginning, POTAPOW didn’t tell me anything about himself, and I kept information to myself as well. But when RUMEL Zygmunt told POTAPOW that I was a trustworthy person, that I was already an active member of the group and that I would join the organisation, POTAPOW told me he had come from Warsaw with SZMIGIEL, and that they would undertake activity aimed at establishing an organisation in Volhynia.

In Kremenets, POTAPOW told me that SZMIGIEL had ordered him to travel to Brest-Litovsk. POTAPOW did not tell me what task he was to complete there. In Brest-Litovsk, POTAPOW met certain people, whose names he did not mention, who were arrested with him. After two days, he was released and bought a ticket to the town of Rivne, whereby POTAPOW was photographed in Brest-Litovsk. POTAPOW, as he told me, did not stop in Rivne, but as soon as he got off the train, he bought a ticket and went to Kremenets to my apartment, to the address I had given him in Rivne.

Question: Did you undertake any activity aimed at establishing an insurgent group in Kremenets?
Answer: No. I arrived in Kremenets on 22 March, on that very night my father SUŁKOWSKI Jan, son of Wojcław [!] was arrested, and two days later, i.e. on 24 March, I too was arrested.

Question: Do you know why your father was arrested?
Answer: No, I do not.

Question: Where was POTAPOW during your arrest?
Answer: POTAPOW was in my apartment during my arrest. When the persons arresting me asked me for the key to the suitcase, I walked over to my handbag, which was on the bed and next to which POTAPOW was sitting. As I took the keys out of my handbag, I said quietly to POTAPOW: “Go to Dubno, 4 Zabramie Street, to TRAUTMAN and tell them I sent you – SUŁKOWSKA Janina – and tell them that one of them has to go to Rivne and warn HERMASZEWSKI that there have been arrests in Brest.”

Question: Is there anything you can add to your testimony?
Answer: I would like to add to my testimony that during the war I met a refugee named DOLSKA, who had escaped from Warsaw. She told me that her daughter, who was married to a high official ... foreign of the former Polish state, departed to Romania with her husband, and she – DOLSKA – remained in Kremenets, where she rented a room at Dubienskiej Rogatki Street (I do not know the number of the house).

At the end of January or the beginning of February 1940, DOLSKA came to our house and when we were alone in the room, she said she had leaflets and asked whether I had seen them. I answered I hadn’t seen any leaflets. She showed them to me then and gave them to me to read. The contents of the leaflet called upon the people remaining in Poland not to lose hope, as Poland would be restored with the help of France and England. It was also mentioned in the leaflet that Poland will be governed by the whole nation, not by a group of people as it had been earlier.

At the end of the leaflet was written: “The Government of Poland, the town of Angers, December 1939.”

I asked DOLSKA if she had any other leaflets. She said she did, and gladly showed them to me, as she didn’t have any other friends and couldn’t show them to anyone, and she was afraid of keeping them at her house. I received twenty leaflets from DOLSKA.

Question: Did you ask DOLSKA where she got the leaflets from?
Answer: Yes, I asked DOLSKA, but she didn’t give me the name of the person from whom she obtained the leaflets, she just said that a man had given them to her. I also asked where the leaflets came from, but DOLSKA didn’t tell me anything.

Question: What did you do with the leaflets you received from DOLSKA?
Answer: Some of the leaflets, i.e. 10 of them, I gave to TRAUTMAN Teresa; Jadwiga TRAUTMAN also knew about the leaflets. What they, i.e. Teresa and Jadwiga, did with the leaflets, I do not know.

Question: Why did you give the leaflets to TRAUTMAN Teresa?
Answer: So that she could give them to her friends.

Question: To whom did you give the remaining leaflets, i.e. the other 10 leaflets?
Answer: I gave the remaining 10 leaflets to KOWAL Leon to the same end.

The interrogation was closed at 7 p.m.

The protocol was drafted faithfully on the basis of my words, with the assistance of a translator, and was read out to me.

I confirm the compliance and truthfulness of the protocol with my signature.
Interrogated in the presence of a translator of the NKVD Directorate for the Rivne oblast in Dubno – Ms TROFIMCHUK
Investigator of the Investigation Unit of the USSR NKVD Main Directorate of State Security
Lieutenant of State Security
(--) TITOV

Translator of the NKVD Directorate for the Rivne oblast in Dubno
TROFIMCHUK

In conformity (--)\(^{f}\)

\(^{f}\) Handwritten.
In order to complete the official note regarding the exposure of the Polish nationalist insurgent organisation Union of Armed Struggle in the western oblasts, we report the following:

The Lviv and Drohobych UNKVD have arrested the leaders of the Union of Armed Struggle regional centre which was detected in Lviv.

1. In total, the Drohobych UNKVD arrested 287 persons, members of the Union of Armed Struggle. The most important prisoners are:

I. MARCINIAK Piotr, son of Franciszek,\(^1\) nom de guerre “Emil,” a major of the former Polish army. Member of the Lviv regional centre, whose task was to organise field insurgent centres in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR.

During his activity, “Emil” enlisted and appointed oblast directors of the ZWZ organisation in Stanyslaviv, Drohobych, Rivne and Lutsk, and assigned the following tasks to the organisational committees:

a) to detect independent insurgent formations existing in the oblasts, and unite them under the joint command of oblast insurgent ZWZ committees;

b) to activate the process of enlisting members to the organisation, in order to create new insurgent groups, mainly among non-commissioned officers and junior officers of the former Polish army and unenrolled university students;

c) to facilitate communication and command over insurgent formations in districts;

d) to intensify the process of obtaining various types of weapons, and provide weapons to organisation members.

“Emil” presented them with the following structural principles: basic links – groups of five join to form platoons (wzвод), which then form companies (рота). It was also emphasised that citizens of Polish nationality are to be admitted to the

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\(^1\) Piotr Marciniak (born 1897), nom de guerre “Emil,” infantry major. Commissioned to the German army in 1916; took part in the Greater Poland Uprising as commander of a scouting reserve. Member of the Polish Armed Forces from 1919; during the September 1939 Campaign, served as commander of 1st Battalion 81st Infantry Regiment. In ZWZ-1, head of Organisational and Operational Department for Provinces in Area No. 3 Lviv Command.
organisation, and that citizens of all other nationalities who were dissatisfied with Soviet rule were to be used only after the outbreak of the armed insurgency.

II. WIDAWSKI Józef, son of Andrzej,\(^2\) *noms de guerre* “Wid” and “Józek,” second lieutenant of the former Polish army, was “Emil’s” assistant for the Rivne and Boryslav committee.

WIDAWSKI will be sent to Rivne, where he has organised an insurgency centre, for the purpose of conducting further investigations.

III. CZECHOWSKI Erwin,\(^3\) son of Stanisław, *nom de guerre* “Jezierski,” doctor, head of the Boryslav committee.

IV. PIEROWSKI Antoni, son of Jan,\(^4\) *nom de guerre* “Wid,” afterwards “Bierieg,” professional captain of the former Polish Army, head of one of the Lviv committees.

V. WUNDERLICH Zbigniew, son of Władysław,\(^5\) *nom de guerre* “Winnicki,” former Deputy Governor of the town of Zborów, headed the Ternopil oblast insurgency committee. WUNDERLICH was also transferred to the Ternopil oblast so that we could continue working with him.

VI. STEC Tadeusz, son of Jan,\(^6\) professional captain of the former Polish Armed Forces of the Polish army, *nom de guerre* “Skierli,” was responsible for military issues in the Boryslav committee.

VII. KURPIEL Józef, son of Jan,\(^7\) *nom de guerre* “Wilk,” first lieutenant of the former Polish army, headed the organisation in Drohobych.

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1 *Was:* “Wilt.”

2 Józef Widawski (born 1914), reserve officer cadet, teacher. In ZWZ-1, acted as “Emil’s” messenger to Rivne and Boryslav. Arrested and detained in Drohobych on 31 March 1940. The case was directed to the Special Council of the USSR NKVD on 22 June 1941, but was not investigated due to military incidents. Probably executed by firing squad in the Drohobych prison on June 1941.

3 Erwin Czechowski (born 1897), *nom de guerre* “Jezierski,” reserve officer, doctor, an active member of the Rifle Association in Boryslav, commander of the Drohobych Sub-Region in ZWZ-1. The files of the case confirm that he was arrested on 19 February 1940, then held prisoner in Drohobych and Kiev. Tried in a group of 26 soldiers involved in the underground movement on 2–4 July 1941 by the Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District (KOV); sentenced to death. Executed by firing squad in Kiev on 7 July 1941.

4 Actually Antoni Berowski.

5 Zbigniew Ryszard Wunderlich (1907–1940), *nom de guerre* “Waliciki,” district Vice Governor in Borschiv and Sambor; in 1939 acted as Deputy Governor in Zboriv. In ZWZ-1, commander of the Ternopil Region. Arrested in Drohobych on 27 March 1940. Initially detained in Drohobych, and from 5 April 1940 held prisoner in Ternopil. Tried by the Military Chamber of the Kiev Military District (KOV) during the assize in Ternopil in a group of 20 members of the Ternopil conspiracy on 15–17 October 1940. Sentenced to death. The Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court on 22 November 1940 and the Presidium of the Supreme Chamber of the USSR on 21 December 1940 upheld the sentence. Executed on 27 December 1940 in Ternopil.


7 Józef Kurpiel (1911–1941), correct *nom de guerre* “Wilk,” second lieutenant of the reserve infantry, 53rd Infantry Regiment, law student at the Jan Kochanowski University in Lviv. In ZWZ-1, co-organiser
VIII. MICHALSKI Władysław, son of Władysław,\(^8\) performed the role of military emissary between Drohobych and base no. 2 in Budapest.

Apart from the aforementioned, a number of persons from the directorates of raions in Drohobych oblast were arrested. At the time, the Drohobych UNKVD confiscated: 2 machine guns, 2900 bullets, 94 grenades and 4 radio transmitters.

During the eradication of the Dobromil insurgent organisation, the following items were confiscated: the plan of the insurgency, the deployment of the insurgents, the insurgency’s targets, and passwords and ciphers for ensuring secure communication between organisation members.

A bandit group [composed of] 5 persons, headed by the non-commissioned officer of the former Polish army ZIELAK G. J., established by the ZWZ Lviv centre, was arrested in the Mościce region of the Drohobych oblast.

The following items were confiscated: 92 grenades, 3 revolvers, approx. 2000 bullets, 2 radio receivers and transmitters.

2. The Lviv UNKVD uncovered a regional centre of the Union for Armed Struggle, which is expanding its influence and leadership onto all organisation oblasts.

It has been established that the Lviv Regional Centre is headed by the director of the Lviv Cadet Corps, Colonel ŻEBROWSKI, who uses the *noms de guerre* “Żuk” and “Stary Kowal.”

The Lviv Regional Centre, apart from MARCINIAK who was arrested by the Drohobych UNKVD, was composed of:

I. DZIEWOŃSKI\(^9\) – a former colonel of the Polish Armed Forces, deputy military division commander.

II. WICE-ŻERCZEWSKI,\(^10\) a former owner of a stud farm, active as head of the organisation’s Staff.

III. ŚWIERZBIŃSKI\(^11\) – head of the commissariat.

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\(^8\) Actually Szczepan Michalski (1905–1941), ZHP Hufiec Commander in Drohobych, head of the youth underground movement in Drohobych. Joined the ZWZ-1 Drohobych Sub-Region together with his organisation. Arrested on 14 February 1940 on the border during his return from Budapest, held captive in Drohobych and Kiev. Tried in a group of 18 soldiers involved in the Drohobych and Boryslav underground movement on 12–16 May 1941 by the Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District (KOV), sentenced to death. Executed by firing squad on 22 June 1941 in Kiev.

\(^9\) Actually Karol Jan Dziekanowski (born 1884), *noms de guerre* (among others) “Olgierd Dziewoński,” “Czarin,” “Karol,” “Korwin,” “Nadolski”; retired infantry lieutenant-colonel. In 1903–1906 served in the tsarist army. Member (in 1906–1911) of the Union of Active Struggle (ZWC), then instructor of the Rifle Association, then a legionnaire. In ZWZ-1, the Second Deputy Commander of Area No. 3 Lviv.

\(^10\) Actually Stanisław Żarczewski (born 1893), *noms de guerre* “Neron,” “Stanisław,” retired first lieutenant of the cavalry, stud farm owner, horse trainer and horse-riding teacher. In ZWZ-1, chief of staff of Area No. 3 Lviv. Arrested on 3 March 1940, tried by the Lviv Oblast Court. Sentenced to death by firing squad on 22 March 1941. No documents regarding the execution survived.

\(^11\) Antoni Świerzbiński (born 1900), *noms de guerre* “Lis,” “Antoni,” second lieutenant of the reserve infantry, 60th Infantry Regiment. Member of POW in Bila Tserkva; from 1919 a volunteer in the Polish
IV. SZULMIŃSKI\textsuperscript{12} headed the special office for falsifying documents and commanded transports heading abroad.

V. BOGDANOWICZ,\textsuperscript{13} priest, financed the organisation, had personal contact with ŻEBROWSKI, was responsible for the cipher which enabled contact to be established with bases abroad.

VI. Arrested on the basis of STROWSKI’s testimony, “Hanka” DASZKIEWICZ,\textsuperscript{14} former tobacco shop owner, was the owner of an underground apartment where General Staff meetings were held; she was responsible for the material aid department.

VII. CHRZĄSTOWSKI,\textsuperscript{15} agronomist, deputy military division commander. Also arrested on the basis of STROWSKI’s testimony.

The following items were confiscated from the arrested organisation members: 15 combat grenades, 7 rifles and 1000 bullets.

Thanks to the operation performed on 13 April in the town of Lviv, a large amount of golden and silver items were confiscated in one of the churches, where they were hidden in one of the walls. These items had previously been stored in a pawn shop in Poznań, and in September 1939 they were transported to Lviv and handed over to the directors of this bank for the organisation [whose aim was to] restore the Polish state.\textsuperscript{16}

Work aimed at exposing the remaining key members of the organisation is being continued.

3. The UNKVD in Stanyslaviv completed two investigations, “Paryżanie” and “Siemierka” at the beginning of February. As a result of this operational and investigative activity, the counter-revolutionary insurgent organisation Union of Armed Struggle was also detected in the Stanyslaviv oblast.

\textsuperscript{12} In the criminal and investigative records which have been revealed, only copies of the interrogation protocols of Mieczysław Szulmiński, son of Aleksander, survived. On the basis of these documents, however, it is possible to assume that he was responsible for legalising the documents, A. Świerzbiński, who supervised those issues, did not mention the surname of his partner within this scope; he only gave the \textit{noms de guerre} “Rawicz” and “Lubicz.”

\textsuperscript{13} Adam Bogdanowicz (born 1898), \textit{nom de guerre} “Pies”; priest, canon of the Armenian-Catholic chapter in Lviv. Apart from his religious functions in the Lviv diocese, he headed the religious library in Warsaw and was editor of the paper \textit{Gregoriana}. In ZWZ-1, he was a member of the supervisory and financial committee of the Commissariat Department of Area Command No. 3 Lviv.

\textsuperscript{14} Bronisława Daszkiewicz (born 1880), arrested on 29 March 1940. Sentenced by the Special Council of the NKVD on 17 May 1941 to 5 years of imprisonment in corrective labour camps; held prisoner in the Kolyma region (Severo-Vostochny camps). Released from the camp on 17 September 1941 by right of amnesty, forced to migrate to Chelyabinsk.

\textsuperscript{15} Zygmunt Hieronim Chrząstowski, of the Płomieńczyk heraldry (born 1890), landed aristocrat, agrarian and engineer; first lieutenant of the reserve cavalry. In ZWZ-1, he served in the supervisory and financial committee of the Commissariat Department of Area Command No. 3 Lviv, and was at the same time deputy commander for the Region Lviv-East.

\textsuperscript{16} The case of the “Poznań treasure” was thoroughly looked into during the investigation of the Area Command for Area No. 3 Lviv ZWZ-1.
On the basis of the testimonies submitted by those arrested, it has been established that the organisation is performing the same activities as in other western oblasts. In total, 150 persons have been arrested in the Stanyslaviv oblast, and there are plans to arrest approx. 600 persons.

The leaders of the counter-revolutionary organisation are:

I. MARCINOWSKI Paweł, son of Jan, first lieutenant of the reserve of the former Polish army, born in Manchuria, headed the insurgent organisation in the Stanyslaviv oblast.

II. LISZYNSKI Roman, son of Adam, former first lieutenant of the Polish Armed Forces, is one of the heads of the oblast centre.

III. DUKIET Zbigniew, son of Władysław, son of a former judge, head of the Kolomyia organisation.

Apart from the aforementioned, the following persons were arrested: MARCINOWSKI Tadeusz, WIELICHOWSKI Aleksy, JAKUBOWSKI Tadeusz, PIOTROWSKI Wiesław, CZECHOWSKI Adam – former officer’s of the Polish army who headed district insurgent organisations.

During the interrogation, it was established that the basic directives for the Stanyslaviv oblast were received from the town of Lviv.

In order to complete the insurgent organisation’s general tasks, it was intended to establish contact with Polish groups in Romania.


19 Zbigniew Dukiet (born 1905), nom de guerre “Bujan,” accountant employed at a bank in Kolomyia. Commander of ZWZ-2 Kolomyia region. Arrested on 2 April 1940 in Kolomyia. Tried in a group of 32 soldiers involved in the underground movement on 20–23 October 1940 by the Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District (KOV) in Stanyslaviv. Sentenced to death. No documents regarding Dukiet’s execution survive, although reports confirming the execution of his 11 comrades in arms performed on 22 June 1941 were found.

20 Actually Teodor Marcinowski (1898–1940), clerk employed by the board of directors of the Polish State Railways (PKP) in Poznań and Stanyslaviv. Close associate of Jan Wyszyński, member of the Staff of ZWZ-2 Stanyslaviv Region. Arrested on 1 March 1940. Tried in a group of 24 ZWZ soldiers in Stanyslaviv. Sentenced to death. Executed by firing squad in Stanyslaviv on 25 December 1940.


The regional counter-revolutionary organisations strictly adhered to the principles of underground activity, passwords, ciphers and codenames in their practical activity.

According to the testimonies of those arrested, the Stanyslaviv organisation is composed of about 500 members, and the Kolomyia organisation has 1600 members. Apart from that, approx. 500 persons are active in other regions.

It follows from the testimony of MARUSZCZAK, who was a messenger between Stanyslaviv and Lviv, and who transported weapons and grenades from Lviv four times, that there is a sanitary school in the town of Stanyslaviv headed by one of the Stanyslaviv doctors. The tasks of this school included purchasing and storing medicines, bandages, gauze, and cotton which the organisation would need during an insurgency.

Apart from that, the organisation was to expose and list NKVD employees and locals helping Soviet rule, in order to impose mass terror on those persons upon the outbreak of the insurgency.

Moreover, the organisation was to set up transfer points for persons who were to be transported abroad, so as to evacuate organisation members suspected by NKVD. At the same time, the organisation was instructed to undertake sabotage and subversive activities, should the organisation of an insurgency prove impossible.

The investigation is being continued with the following aims:

a) exposing all the organisation’s members both in cities and other oblast regions,

b) revealing all operating contacts between the Union for Armed Struggle and Ukrainian insurgent groups, as well as detecting all locations where weapons are buried,

c) revealing the channels used by the counter-revolutionary leadership to receive orders from abroad.

The following items were found at organisation members’ homes: revolvers – 4, rifle – 1, grenade – 2, various bullets – 110, radio transmitters – 2, nationalist and counter-revolutionary literature – 69 items.

4. The UNKVD in Rivne uncovered the Union for Armed Struggle organisation in the cities of Rivne, Dubno and Kostopol. In total, 88 persons were arrested. The counter-revolutionary organisation in the Rivne oblast was established by the Lviv oblast centre representative WIDAWSKI, who enlisted the following persons as commanders:


25 One of those accused tried during the trial of the 24 ZWZ-2 Stanyslaviv underground movement members was Doctor Zofia Gołębiewska (born 1904). One might assume that she was the head of the sanitary service of the ZWZ-2 Stanyslaviv Region Command. Sentenced to death. The Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court commuted this sentence to 10 years of imprisonment in corrective labour camps. Sent to the Karlag (Karaganda Corrective Labour Camp). Released on 15 October 1941 by right of amnesty.
I. ZARĘBSKI M. A.,\(^{26}\) a former officer cadet of the Polish army and commander of the Strzelcy organisation, commander of the counter-revolutionary organisation.

II. WIERZBOWSKI,\(^{27}\) a former fire brigade head officer, deputy commander of the counter-revolutionary organisation.

After enlistment, ZAR BSKI and WIERZBOWSKI were instructed to contact JAŻWIŃSKI\(^{28}\) in Rivne. JAŻWIŃSKI remained in Rivne as WIDAWSKI’s replacement to supervise work [carried out by] the Lviv centre.

ZARĘBSKI contacted JAŻWIŃSKI, and gave him the addresses of a number of persons residing in Lutsk, Kremenets, Sarny and other cities, to help him enlist new members and facilitate organisational work. The tasks of the counter-revolutionary organisation were identical to those in other oblasts.

Apart from that, the organisation was instructed to introduce its representatives into Soviet bodies.

After the arrest of one of the counter-revolutionary organisation members, one of the members – JANICKI\(^{29}\) – attempted to persuade our agent “MOŁOT” to immediately free the arrested by blowing up the NKVD Directorate for the Rivne district in Janowa Dolina, and then to release the prisoners.

The Rivne UNKVD is stepping up work aimed at exposing regional insurgent organisations and arresting their members.

5. WUNDERLICH Zbigniew, son of Władysław, arrested by the Drohobych UNKVD, was transferred to the Ternopil UNKVD. During the interrogation in Drohobych, he submitted a testimony on the insurgent counter-revolutionary organisation he had established in Ternopil.

During the interrogation, it was determined that WUNDERLICH had been appointed commander of the oblast insurgent committee in Ternopil.

His deputy was WEIDEL Rudolf, son of Józef,\(^{30}\) a former student of the Lviv University, unemployed.

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\(^{26}\) Marian Zarębski (born 1910), *noms de guerre* “Sęk,” “Marysia,” reserve second lieutenant, Rifle Association activist, teacher in Janowa Dolina. ZWZ-1 Commander in Janowa Dolina. Arrested on 23 March 1940. Held prisoner in Rivne and Dubno, tried in a group of 9 underground movement soldiers by the *Oblast* Court in Rivne on 11–12 July 1940, sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in corrective labour camps. Released under amnesty on 28 August 1941.

\(^{27}\) Bogdan Wierzbowski (born 1911), *nom de guerre* “Bosak,” fire brigade commander in the quarry in Janowa Dolina. ZWZ-1 Deputy Commander in Janowa Dolina. Arrested on 23 March 1940, held prisoner in Rivne and Dubno, tried in a group of 9 underground movement soldiers by the *Oblast* Court in Rivne on 11–12 July 1940, sentenced to 10 years of imprisonment in corrective labour camps. Released under amnesty on 28 August 1941.

\(^{28}\) Kazimierz Jaźwiński (1891–1941), *nom de guerre* “Blaks,” POW activist, reserve first lieutenant of infantry, owner of the “Nowy Świat” cinema in Rivne. In ZWZ-1, commander of the Rivne *Oblast*. Tried in a group of 14 soldiers involved in the underground movement on 22–23 November 1940 by the *Oblast* Court in Rivne. Sentenced to death. Executed by firing squad on 10 June 1941 in the prison in Rivne.

\(^{29}\) This might be a reference to Stefan Janicki, ZWZ-1 member in Janowa Dolina, arrested in spring 1940. Mentioned in criminal and investigative records of the Zarębski case and 8 other cases.

\(^{30}\) Rudolf Weidel, (1910–1940), ZHP deputy *hufiec* commander in Ternopil, established the TOH “Młody Las” organisation. In ZWZ-1, deputy commander of the Ternopil Region. Arrested on 26 March
GRYŻLAK Antoni31 – priest of the Polish church; headed the agitation department, and was responsible for the oblast committee’s finances.

MAZIEJ Kazimierz,32 former gymnasium student, unemployed, served as a courier-messenger between the head of the organisation and the head officer of the weapons department.

SAMBOR Tadeusz Ilkowicz,33 unemployed, courier-messenger between the Lviv command and the Stanyslaviv insurgent organisation.

WARCHAŁOWSKI,34 student of the Pedagogical Institute, head of the university insurgent group.

We are searching for the last two persons on the list in order to arrest them. The organisation’s command intended to develop organisational activity in all raions of the Ternopil oblast.

On the basis of the testimonies filed by the heads of the insurgent oblast committees, WUNDERLICH and WEIDEL, it was possible to determine the details of approx. 450 members in Ternopil and approx. 700 members in the raions with oblast insurgent centres.

In total, 66 persons belonging to the oblast command and regional heads of the insurgent organisation were arrested.

As a result of secret service and operational activity and this investigation, it was determined that the organisation has available to it large amounts of weapons buried in various places. This also follows from the register maintained.

The following items were confiscated during the search carried out by the Ternopil UNKVD: 3 rifles, 1875 rifle bullets, 13 grenades, explosives and poisons.

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1940 in Ternopil, tried on 15–17 October 1940 by the Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District (KOV), sentenced to death. The Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court on 22 November 1940 and the Presidium of the Supreme Chamber of the USSR on 21 December 1940 upheld the sentence. Executed on 27 December 1940 in Ternopil.

31 Antoni Gryzlak (1909–1945), priest, teacher of religion in the Pedagogical Secondary School in Ternopil. One of the organisers of the Insurgent Youth Organisation (POM) in Ternopil (according to the report, this was the TOH “Młody Las” organisation). Staff member of ZWZ-1 Command of the Ternopil Region. Later sentenced to forced labour in Germany. Arrested by the Gestapo, detained in the Gross-Rosen camp, where he died on 4 March 1945.

32 Kazimierz Maziej (1919–1940), nom de guerre “Nemo,” staff member of ZWZ-1 Command of the Ternopil Region; quartermaster, responsible for weapons storehouses and served as messenger of the youth organisation (POM). Arrested on 26 March 1940 in Ternopil, tried on 15–17 October 1940 by the Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District (KOV) in a group of 20 members of the Ternopil underground organisation, sentenced to death. The Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court on 22 November 1940 and the Presidium of the Supreme Chamber of the USSR on 21 December 1940 upheld the sentence. Executed on 27 December 1940 in Ternopil.

33 Tadeusz Sambor (1920–1940), clerk at the Patients’ Fund in Ternopil. In ZWZ-1 Command of Ternopil Region, messenger to Command of Area No. 3 Lviv. Arrested on 6 April 1940 in Ternopil; tried on 15–17 October 1940 by the Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District (KOV) in a group of 20 members of the Ternopil underground organisation, sentenced to death. The Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court on 22 November 1940 and the Presidium of the Supreme Chamber of the USSR upheld the sentence on 21 December 1940. Executed on 27 December 1940 in Ternopil.

34 Władysław Warchałowski, (born 1919), teachers’ seminar student. Staff member of the ZWZ-1 Ternopil Region Command and head of the Insurgent Youth Organisation (POM) in Ternopil. Escaped to Lviv due to the high risk of arrest.
The arrested indicated the locations where the weapons were buried. The weapons shall be confiscated after data verification.

6. The Volhynia UNKVD uncovered the Union for Armed Struggle organisation and arrested the organisation’s commander WRÓBLEWSKI, whose previous employment was as Deputy People’s Commissar for Education (narobraz) of the Rozhyschche raion. The arrested testified that he had been enlisted by “Emil” (arrested by the Drohobych UNKVD), who entrusted him with the task of enlisting new members and pursuing counter-revolutionary activity in the Volhynia oblast.

ŁUSZCZYŃSKI, employed as driver at one of the offices and courier between Brest-Litovsk and Lutsk, was also arrested.

A detailed note on ŁUSZCZYŃSKI’s testimony was sent to the BSSR NKVD to Comrade TSANA. In total, 53 persons – members of the insurgent Union for Armed Struggle organisation – have been arrested and are submitting testimonies.

During the arrests we captured ciphers, counter-revolutionary leaflets and the insurgency plan.

As of 18 April 1940, approx. 900 persons belonging to the command of the Union for Armed Struggle were arrested. These data include the figures for western oblasts. The following items were captured: 2 machine guns, 21 rifles, 4 revolvers, 124 grenades, approx. 5000 bullets, 6 radio receivers and transmitters, much counter-revolutionary literature, ciphers, etc.

Work on further eradication of the Union for Armed Struggle is being continued.

Narkom for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security
SEROV

18 April 1940
No. 1301/SN

35 This might be a reference to Zygmunt Wróblewski, who was held at death row in Lutsk at the turn of 1941. See R. Szawlowski, Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1939, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1995), 228.

No. 9
19 April 1940, [Kiev]. Special report by the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Ivan Serov, on the biological warfare planned by the Polish underground movement

Top secret

To: People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR
Commissar 1st Rank of State Security
Comrade BERIA L. P.
Moscow

During the numerous operations aimed at eliminating Polish insurgent organisations in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, it was determined that the counter-revolutionary underground was planning to employ terror and subversion, and has commenced preparing subversive bacteriological operations targeted at Red Army units and civilians.

Doctor CZARNIK Leszek, who was arrested in Lviv in relation to the “CENTRAL” case, and is one of the heads of the Polish counter-revolutionary organisation, prepared bio-subversive operations targeted at Red Army units and consulted the Lviv doctors PARATYŃSKI and JANKOWSKI on issues connected with their performance.

Arrested in connection with the same case, JAGLARZ Jerzy confirmed that bio-subversive attacks had been planned, and confessed that courier JANOWSKI was sent to Romania in order to obtain bio-preparations of paratyphoid bacteria of the “...” group from the Polish embassy in Bucharest.

One of the members of the Polish counter-revolutionary organisation eliminated by the Drohobych UNKVD, KAZIMIRSKIJ, was ordered by the organisation’s command to establish a laboratory in the town of Stryi in order to obtain bacteria and target mass amounts of them at civilians.

WALCZAK Zbigniew, an arrested member of the counter-revolutionary Union for Armed Struggle organisation, was instructed to prepare and carry out subversive operations in the area of transport, and to poison the horses of Red Army units.

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1 Jerzy Jaglarz (1909–1941), nom de guerre “Sztorm,” Doctor of the Science of Law, priest; member of underground movement since October 1939. Arrested in February 1940, tried by the Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District (KOV) on 22–23 November 1940, sentenced to death. Executed on 16 January 1941. Jaglarz submitted a testimony regarding the preparation of subversive bacteriological operations during the interrogation of 22 March 1940, and mentioned Dr Zbigniew Duma and Dr Leszek Czarnik as persons involved in the operation.

2 Jaglarz, when providing information about the courier Janowski, mentions his name, Jerzy. No files containing further information were found. This might be a reference to Stanislaw Janowski, son of Ludwik, born in 1920 in Lviv; a student, arrested in Lviv on 4 May 1940, tried by the Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District (KOV), sentenced to death. Executed by firing squad in Kiev on 27 June 1941.
In February 1941, the commander of the 6th division of the Red Army received a leaflet containing the following message: “If you do not cease to torment our nation, murder and resettle its citizens, then we will immediately commence bacteriological warfare with you. We will infect all of you with the most terrible diseases, so nothing will be left of your country but one big cemetery. Our nation would rather die here in its own land than be in exile and starve in your country of beggars. It is obvious that you are cowards, as you are afraid even of a defenceless nation. Remember that organisations in your whole country are only waiting for the command to poison you all like rats and eliminate your horrible regime once and for all. Air Defence Forces.”

There is a scientific and research institute in Lviv which is developing serums against epidemiological diseases. The institute is headed by WEIGL.3

WEIGL is an outstanding globally acclaimed scientist, member of a number of scientific academies, inventor of the vaccine against epidemic typhus. WEIGL is the only scientist who knows the secret serum production process.

Currently, WEIGL is still researching epidemic diseases.

After Italy conquered Abyssinia, MUSSOLINI personally invited WEIGL to Abyssinia to stop the typhus epidemic from spreading among Italian soldiers.

In 1938, WEIGL was approached by representatives of the Chinese embassy to the former Polish state with a request to counteract epidemic typhus in China.

The Soviet Union purchased the serum against typhus at WEIGL’s clinic.

WEIGL is a reserved scientist who feels best within the walls of study, and has vast scientific knowledge. The committee concerned with issues connected with the higher school to which WEIGL’s institute is subordinate, still has not appointed a director.

There are 500 employees at the institute, and there is no appointed Soviet employee among them.

The institute is located in the University building; it is crammed into seven small unheated rooms in a semi-basement. The conditions are not sufficient to conduct large-scale scientific research.

The poisons and bacteria cultures are stored in a disorderly manner in the Miedsansbyta storehouses.

The raions of Lviv oblast are threatened with an epidemic due to outbreaks of typhus among the civilian population, as well as highly contagious intestinal infections and wide-spread venereal diseases.

The laboratories of Professor WEIGL could be used by counter-revolutionary elements striving to conduct bio-subversive operations.

3 Rudolf Weigl (1883–1957), internationally acclaimed bacteriologist, in 1920–1939 professor of the John Casimir University in Lviv; after the war, professor at universities in Cracow and Poznań, member of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (PAU) and many other organisations; also of international institutions and scientific organisations, honorary life-long member of the New York Academy of Sciences, papal chamberlain, chevalier of numerous orders awarded for his contribution to bacteriological research. Weigl identified the germs of typhus and developed the first effective vaccine against this disease.
At the moment, the institute of Professor WEIGL is of high scientific value; there are no appropriate conditions for scientific research in Lviv.

In connection with the above, we believe it is justified to move WEIGL’s institute further into the Soviet Union.

We have informed the UNKVD of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR about the aforementioned issues, and we have drawn its attention to the necessity of detecting and eliminating the counter-revolutionary underground which is preparing bio-subversive operations, as well as of counteracting possible bio-subversive assaults.

People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security
SEROV

\(^a\)No. 1313/SN\(^a\)
19 April 1940, Kiev
4 copies
1 – Comrade BERIA
2 – to be archived in the files maintained by the People’s Commissar Secretariat
3 – to be archived in the files maintained by the Secretariat of the Third Department
4 – to be attached to executive files

*HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 33, Spr. 58.*
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Rectangular stamp confirming receipt with illegible check signature in the left top corner.

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\(^a\) Handwritten.
No. 10
2 June 1940, Kiev. Ivan Serov’s telegram to Pyotr Fedotov on the arrest of Tadeusz Majewski

Top secret

Telegram

Moscow NKVD USSR 2nd Division of GUGB
To Com. FEDOTOV

In the spying-investigative cases „Powstańcy” and „Gimnazjaliści” which have been exposed by the Volhynia UNKVD, it was established that one of the active members of the Polish counter-revolutionary insurgent organisation is the conspirator MAJEWSKI, a former Polish Army colonel.

According to the testimony provided by the arrested in this case KAZMIERCZAK, MAJEWSKI, as one of the leaders of counter-revolutionary organisations in Volhynia in many cities (in Rivne, Kovel, Lutsk and Zdolbuniv), had at his disposal conspirational premises in which he remained in hiding. For example, in the town of Rivne, one of MAJEWSKI’s conspirational premises was the apartment of a female teacher DYNAKOWSKA, residing at 310 Stalina Street.

Due to the actions undertaken on 31 May this year, MAJEWSKI was arrested at the address indicated above in the town of Rivne.

During the arrest of MAJEWSKI, the following were confiscated: an order and circular on the mode and methods of executing counter-revolutionary insurgent activity on the territory of former Poland and the list of conspirational premises, including those located in the town of Lwów.

In documents confiscated from MAJEWSKI, the organisation is defined as the ZWZ (Union of Armed Struggle). These are dated: order – 7 February 1940, circular – 18 February 1940.

a- Handwritten.
b- Was: DANIKOWSKA.

1 Pyotr Vasileevich Fedotov (1900–1963), in 1939–1946 was Head of the 2nd Division of the GUGB NKVD USSR, 2nd Directorate of the NKVD-NKGB-MGB USSR, then vice-minister of internal security of the USSR and Head of the 1st Main Directorate of the MGB USSR respectively.

2 Actually Marceli Kazimierczak or Kaźmierczak, nom de guerre “Marceli,” Deputy Commander of the District ZWZ-2 Volodymyr-Volynskyi, arrested by the NKVD, and sentenced to death on 6 November 1940 by the Oblast Court in Lutsk.

3 Janina Dynakowska, teacher, arrested by the NKVD probably in late May 1940, sentenced to death and shot before April 1941 in Lutsk.

4 Formerly 3 Maja Street.
Together with MAJEWSKI were arrested the following: the liaison officer to the organisation, KASPRZYCKI,\(^5\) nom de guerre “BURDA,” and the owner of the apartment, DANIKOWSKA.

During the preliminary interrogation, MAJEWSKI (nom de guerre “SZMIGIEL”\(^c\)) testified that he is a colonel in active service, in wartime he commanded the brigade of the former Polish Army, and that by order of the general commander of the city of Warsaw \([!]\), General TOKARZEWSKI, he was appointed province commander of Volhynia and was entrusted with carrying out organisational activities aimed at creating an insurgent underground capable of armed combat against Soviet authorities.

We shall inform you about the results of further interrogation accordingly.

(–) SEROV

_Narkom_ Internal Affairs of USSR
3rd Rank Commissar of State Security
SEROV

No. \(^d\)[…]73/SN\(^d\)
2 June 1940
Kiev

\(^e\)Sent on 2/6-[19]40, at 21 and 35 minutes\(^e\)

\(^c\)Was: Chwigieli.
\(^d\)–\(^d\) Filled in by hand.
\(^e\)–\(^e\) Inserted teleprinter message.

\(^5\) Dionizy Kasprzycki, aka Ryszard Burda, 2nd lieutenant. On 31 January in 1940 he went with Colonel Majewski and 2nd Lieutenant Potapov from Warsaw to Volhynia. From February 1940 was deputy commandant of ZWZ-2 in Lutsk. Arrested by the NKVD on 1 June 1940; tried by the Circuit Court in Lutsk on 2 December 1940, and sentenced to death.
No. 11
22 June 1940, [Kiev]. Special report by the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Ivan Serov, concerning the NKVD’s search for Gen. Michal Karaszewicz-Tokarzewski

Top secret

To: People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Belarusian SSR
3rd Rank Commissar of State Security
Com. TSANAVA
Minsk

As a result of the investigation into the case of the Polish counter-revolutionary insurgent organisation *a-ZWZ*-a, detected and liquidated in the western district of the Ukrainian SSR, it was established that one of the main organisers of this underground movement was the former Polish Army General TOKARZEWSKI-KARASZEWICZ Michał Tadeusz, son of Bolesław.

Based on the same data, it was assumed that after the Polish Army had been defeated, TOKARZEWSKI-KARASZEWICZ emigrated abroad, from where he headed the insurgent activity in the western regions of the USSR. In addition, TOKARZEWSKI often crossed the border illegally and entered our territory, [going] to Lviv and other cities, from where he gave practical guidance on the development of counter-revolutionary activities.

Allegedly, during one of his recent trips in March this year, TOKARZEWSKI was apprehended when trying to illegally cross the border from Germany to the USSR under a false name, together with his comrade SIEWIERSKA Bronisława. ¹ SIEWIERSKA is an active member of the Polish uprising counter-revolutionary organisation, associated with the Warsaw centre.

We do not exclude the possibility of TOKARZEWSKI crossing and being apprehended at the border of the Belarusian SSR, together with SIEWIERSKA, since the couriers sent from behind the cordon by TOKARZEWSKI had their transfer point in the area of Wielipole, 90 km from Białystok and Brześć, as is clear from the investigation materials.

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¹ As is known from numerous reports, on his way to Lviv, Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz was accompanied by three female messengers: Ewelina Karasiówna (*nom de guerre* “Wela”), Antonina Płońska (*nom de guerre* “Pela”) and Maria Trojanowska (*nom de guerre* “Mela”). While the information on choosing the route via Białystok is explicit evidence of the NKVD’s deep infiltration of the ZWZ, it was just a coincidence that General Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz took the route via Przemyśl. There is no trace of any “Bronisława Siewierska” as a person accompanying the general.
While sending as an attachment a photo of TOKARZEWSKI-KARASZE-WICZ Michał Tadeusz, son of Bolesław, we kindly request you to order a search for this man in the prisons subordinated to your oblast.²

At the same time, we provide some data on TOKARZEWSKI: born in Drohobych, 53–55 years old, tall, fair-haired, greying, grey eyes.

Please continue to inform us about the results of the search.

People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR
3rd Rank Commissar of State Security
SEROV

22 June 1940
Kiev
SIROBOKOV

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 33, Spr. 58.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
In the top left corner a rectangular receipt stamp with illegible initial.

No. 12
11 July 1940, Ternopil. Record from the interrogation of Rudolf Weidel in the case of Stanisław Węgrzynowski

Record from the interrogation of defendant WEIDEL Rudolf, son of Józef of 11 July 1940, town of Ternopil

WEIDEL Rudolf son of Józef, born in 1910 in the village of Czernichów Mazowiecki in Ternopil district, a Pole, single, not a party member. Education: 6 grades in gymnasium, former Polish Army sergeant. Lived in the town of Ternopil at 17 Punczerta Street.

Started – at 10.00.
Finished – at 16.30.

Question: As a deputy head of the district insurgent centre of the Polish anti-Soviet organisation a-ZWZ-a operating in the town of Ternopil, during the preliminary interrogation you gave evidence on financial matters and the sources of funding for the organisation. Have you told the interrogators everything about the amounts you have received?

Answer: By confirming the fact that I, WEIDEL, was the deputy head of the district insurgent centre of the Polish anti-Soviet organisation a-ZWZ-a operating in the town of Ternopil, I have told the interrogators everything about the money I received for the organisation’s needs.

Question: Repeat once more: what amounts did you receive, and from whom?

Answer: During the entire period of the organisation’s operations, we received from the Lviv centre the amount of 3000 roubles, out of which 1500 roubles were brought by SAMBOR from Lviv in late January this year. Another 1500 roubles were brought by a Lviv courier at the end of February. I do not know the name of the courier. I do know he was called “JUHAS”¹ – of course that was his nom de guerre.

Question: In addition to the above-mentioned sums, what kind of extra money had you been receiving, and from whom?

Answer: As I testified during the previous interrogations, in total we received 3000 roubles. I also confirm these statements now.

¹ Jakub Juhas (Walenta), in the period of March–April 1940, he was the ZWZ courier between Lviv –Stanyslaviv – Ternopil, most probably a lieutenant.

a- -a Filled in by hand.
Question: WEIDEL, what circumstances are forcing you to deceive the interrogation? After all, we know very well that in addition to the 3000 roubles you mentioned, you got some other amounts personally, too. Tell us about them.

Answer: Yes, it’s true, I got some other money.

Question: In Soviet banknotes or in the foreign currency?

Answer: The money about which I will now speak I got in Soviet banknotes. I was not receiving any foreign currency.

Question: Tell us, when, from whom and how much money you got.

Answer: It was in early January 1940, the money, in the amount of 800 roubles, I got from WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław.

Question: What about this WĘGRZYNOWSKI? tell us about him in detail.

Answer: WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław is a young man aged 17–18; he is the son of Lieutenant WĘGRZYNOWSKI living in the town of Ternopil. I have known the WĘGRZYNOWSKI family for a long time, and in addition to that, I know Stanisław from Scouting. Until December, the WĘGRZYNOWSKI family used to live in the town of Ternopil, and then they moved to Lviv.

In Lviv, as I was later told by WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław, he went to middle-school, in which he became associated with a student counter-revolutionary organisation. Given that he was threatened with arrest in connection with the slip-up of the organisation, WĘGRZYNOWSKI was forced to flee abroad to Hungary. He escaped together with four other members of the organisation, whose names Stanisław did not disclose.

Question: After WĘGRZYNOWSKI left for Lviv, did you maintain any contacts with them?

Answer: Yes, I did. At the beginning of January this year, in an apartment at 17 Punczerta St., Stanisław’s younger brother, Jerzy WĘGRZYNOWSKI, visited me and said his brother Stanisław had recently returned from Hungary with his father and that WĘGRZYNOWSKI invited me over to visit him in Lviv, because he had brought a very important task and money for me from Hungary.

The next day, along with Jerzy WĘGRZYNOWSKI, I departed to Lviv.

Question: What do you know about the tasks Jerzy WĘGRZYNOWSKI was to execute during his stay in the town of Ternopil?

Answer: When Jerzy WĘGRZYNOWSKI was in Ternopil, he asked me for skis, and to show him the way to the village of Zaboyki; then he went to visit Captain DRZEWIECKI’s wife who was living there.

I became interested in the purpose of this travel. Jerzy WĘGRZYNOWSKI told me that via Stanisław, who had returned from Hungary, her husband Captain DRZEWIECKI sent her a letter, a few dollars, Hungarian money, and a medallion, which was to be a confirmation that all these things are actually from DRZEWIECKI.

Stanisław Węgrzynowski (born in 1899), lieutenant, in 1927–1935 bandmaster in the 34th infantry regiment, the 2nd Podhale Rifles Infantry Regiment and the 54th infantry regiment respectively.
Also, Jerzy WĘGRZYNOWSKI asked where ŁONGARD lived, a former mayor of the town of Kozłów. I replied that most probably he still lived in the same place, in the town of Kozłów.

Jerzy did not ask me anything more, nor say anything more to me.

Question: Continue your testimony on your departure to Lviv.

Answer: As I said, the next day I went to Lviv. I went to the apartment of the WĘGRZYNOWSKI family, living at 10 Akademicka Street. There, Stanisław gave me 800 roubles in the presence of his father.

Question: Who was the money from?

Answer: WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław (the son) told me that the money was being transferred to me personally from the defensive, i.e. the 2nd Unit of the Polish General Staff, located at present in Hungary in Budapest.

WĘGRZYNOWSKI did not specify by name the persons from whom he had been given the money.

Question: With whom did you maintain contact in relation to the work in the defensive?

Answer: I did not maintain any relations with the defensive.

Question: If so, how can you explain the defensive’s generosity towards you? You have to remember, WEIDEL, that the defensive has never given any money to anyone for free; now tell us in detail what you have done for the 2nd Unit of the Polish General Staff.

Answer: Now I would like to confess the whole truth about the course of events.

Question: Tell us.

Answer: WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław described in detail the tasks I, WEIDEL, was assigned, which he received from the defensive, when he was in the city of Budapest.

He told me that the 2nd Unit of the Polish General Staff is interested in everything that is happening presently in the territory of former Western Ukraine.

The 2nd Unit attaches particular importance to gathering information about the number of troops, their technique, deployment and fieldworks being carried out. To this end, he instructed, on behalf of the defensive, to make me, WEIDEL, a proposal and ask for permission to work in intelligence.

If I should agreed, he was to give me money to the amount of 1000 Polish zloty, to take a receipt and give me encrypted contact data for a person to whom I would be linked in my intelligence operations.

Question: Did you agree to work in intelligence?

Answer: Yes, I agreed to work in intelligence for the 2nd Unit of the Polish General Staff. I accepted money from WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław. I gave him a receipt confirming that, whereon I wrote that I, WEIDEL Rudolf, had received 1000 Polish zlotys (800 roubles – the money had already been exchanged for Soviet banknotes) for “community work.”
In the receipt, the statement “for community work” was written intentionally, in order to conceal the actual purpose of this work, for which I received money.

Question: What code name were you given by the intelligence?
Answer: I did not have a code name. It is possible that later on, the defensive would have given one to me.

Question: Provide us with the place of contact and the mechanism of the cipher with which you made contact while disclosing spy information.
Answer: WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław told me, in the presence of his father, that I should send the ciphered messages to this address: Engineer CHUWIEN, in the town of Vorokhta in the Stanyslaviv district, the villa “Marta.”

Encryption of the information was based on using both hidden and explicit text. For this purpose, you take a regular sheet of white paper, soak it in water and place on a hard surface, which is not rough. You write the message with a thin object that does not leave any coloured trace. Then, you leave the paper to dry, and once it has dried, on the other side of the paper you write the content of a regular letter. When you splash such a paper with ink, the hidden message written with water becomes visible.

Question: Did you contact Engineer CHUWIEN?
Answer: Yes, I did.

Question: How many dispatches did you send him? What was their content, and what kind of instructions did you receive from him?
Answer: I sent only one dispatch to Engineer CHUWIEN, in which I described the condition of the Ternopil garrison and asked him to provide me with detailed information on the subjects he was interested in. I have disclosed the content of the intelligence information during the previous interrogation.

I received no answer from CHUWIEN.

Question: Why did you send just one dispatch to CHUWIEN?
Answer: Because in the Ternopil garrison nothing happened that might be of interest to CHUWIEN.

Question: Whom did you use to collect the information on the Ternopil garrison?
Answer: I executed these tasks via the heads of groups of the Polish insurgent organisation *ZWZ*-a.

Question: Provide the names of these heads of groups and describe them in short.
Answer: Confidential information was provided by the following persons:
1. RUNIEWICZ³ – head of the general civic insurgent group consisting of 75 persons, member of *ZWZ*-a.
2. WARCHAŁOWSKI – head of the insurgent group consisting of students, in total 75 persons, member of *ZWZ*-a.

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³ Jan (Janusz) Runiewicz, scout, a participant in the September 1939 Campaign; in October 1939 organised a scout conspiracy in Ternopil, published a newspaper “Jestem Polakiem”; after the war settled in Poland.
3. MAZIEJ – head of the insurgent group consisting of the members of Stronnictwo Narodowe [the National Party], in total 40 to 50 persons, member of a-ZWZ-a; at the same time he was the head of the insurgent base ammunition depot.

4. SAMBOR – head of the general civic insurgent group consisting of 10 persons, member of a-ZWZ-a. At the same time, he was the courier of the Ternopil centre maintaining contact with Lviv.

5. WUNDERLICH – head of the insurgent centre of the a-ZWZ-a organisation in Ternopil.

WUNDERLICH was collecting this information from other members of the a-ZWZ-a, who were unknown to me.

Question: Did the persons you have mentioned know on whose orders, and to what purpose, you were gathering confidential information?

Answer: No, they did not; and they thought it was needed by our organisation.

Question: Did WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław disclose to you the information on the tasks given by the defensive to him?

Answer: WĘGRZYNOWSKI told me that the defensive ordered him to contact a number of persons, to whom he would offer intelligence work on behalf of the 2nd Unit of the Polish General Staff on the territory of former Western Ukraine, create a network for the defensive’s spy ring here, and assure the location and means of contact for everyone. In this case, I was assigned this contact via Engineer CHUWIEN in Vorokhta.

Whom WĘGRZYNOWSKI recruited for intelligence work, and whether there were other contact points, I do not know.

Upon having completed this task, WĘGRZYNOWSKI was to return to Budapest and report on the results of the activities carried out.

Question: Did WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław arrive from Hungary alone or with somebody else?

Answer: WĘGRZYNOWSKI arrived from Hungary together with Lieutenant STARAK.

STARAK Julian,4 around 30 years old; in the former Polish Army he served in the 54th infantry regiment in Ternopil. In 1931–1932 was a school company commander, in which I was serving.

I talked with Lieutenant STARAK at the WĘGRZYNOWSKIs’ apartment. He told me about the life of the Polish officers in Hungary, and showed me a wound [he had received] in the side while crossing the USSR’s border with Hungary.

Question: What was Lieutenant STARAK’s mission in the USSR?

Answer: I do not know that. WĘGRZYNOWSKI told that STARAK was well-versed in organising the defensive intelligence network here, and he had come to establish it. What STARAK’s task was in particular, I do not know.

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4 Julian Starak (born 1908); lieutenant of infantry, in September 1939, the pioneers’ platoon commander of the 54th Infantry Regiment.
Question: Who did you see at WĘGRZYNOWSKI’s apartment?
Answer: The next day after my departure, in the evening, a lieutenant of the former Polish Army, ZBOROMIRSKI, together with his wife, came to WĘGRZYNOWSKI’s apartment.

ZBOROMIRSKI (I don’t know his name or his father’s name), around 32 years old, served in the military police in the town of Ternopil. During the German-Polish war, he went to the front and has not returned to Ternopil ever since then.

Question: What did you talk about with ZBOROMIRSKI?
Answer: ZBOROMIRSKI was interested in life in Ternopil; he was especially interested in the number of troops and arrests made. I told him everything I knew about it; I did the same while talking to Engineer CHUWIEN in Vorokhta.

Question: What did ZBOROMIRSKI talk about with WĘGRZYNOWSKI and Lieutenant STARAK?
Answer: They did not talk in my presence at all.

Question: Apart from the persons mentioned, who visited WĘGRZYNOWSKI’s apartment, who else used to come there?
Answer: On the third day of my stay at WĘGRZYNOWSKI’s apartment, a man came who introduced himself as WUJKO.

This WUJKO was described by the WĘGRZYNOWSKI family as a well-mannered and decent man, and they referred to him with visible respect. I saw WUJKO just once.

Question: Who is WUJKO? Describe him.
Answer: As I said, I saw him only once. I know nothing about him. WUJKO looks as if he was 40–45 years old, with blond hair combed back, above average height, strong build, a stout but not a fat man. Swarthy complexion, rosy. He is calm, quiet, well-mannered.

Question: Who else used to visit WĘGRZYNOWSKI’s apartment apart from WUJKO?
Answer: Once, during the day, before dinner, a colonel’s wife named KONDRACKA came in. Her husband KONDRACKI had been taken captive by Germans. KONDRACKA had dinner, but no conversations worth mentioning took place.

I visited WĘGRZYNOWSKI’s apartment for the second time in February, and then I met Major DURKO there.

DURKO Paweł, around 45 years old, brown hair, in the former Polish Army he was the battalion commander of the 54th infantry regiment in the town of Ternopil.

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5 Eugeniusz Zboromirski (probably born 1903), military police lieutenant, in September 1939 the head of the military police of the 12th Infantry Division.
6 Borys Kondracki (1895–before 1945), lieutenant-colonel; in September 1939, commander of the 6 artillery regiment. He died in a camp in Murnau.
7 Actually Karol.
During the apprehension of officers in December 1939, he escaped from Ternopil and remained underground. In Ternopil, this DURKO had an insurgent group comprised of officers and NCOs. I have already disclosed all this information in the previous interrogations.

After arriving from Lviv to Ternopil, at DURKO’s command I visited his wife, living at that time at 5 Matejki Street (ground floor).

I told DURKO’s wife that he was sound and healthy [and] was going to escape abroad, via Germany to Hungary.

DURKO asked me to help his wife, should such a need arise.

DURKO’s wife thanked me, but she did not ask for help. I do not know where she is now.

Question: Whom did you visit together with WĘGRZYNOWSKI, during your stay in Lviv?

Answer: During a conversation with WĘGRZYNOWSKI about our former work in scouting, he said that our former scouting inspector-controller of the Lviv district used to live in Lviv – Edwin BERNAT\(^{b8}\) – and he asked me to visit BERNAT with him.

Question: Did you visit BERNAT?

Answer: Yes, I visited him the next day after my arrival to Lviv.

Question: Where does Edwin BERNAT live?

Answer: His address is Lviv, 18 Głęboka Street.

Question: What issues did you raise while at BERNAT’s?

Answer: We talked mostly about the former work in scouting; in addition, BERNAT also asked about the situation in Ternopil, who had been arrested, what people were doing; [he was also asking a] number of other questions of no significance to this case.

Question: Who is BERNAT?

Answer: BERNAT Edwin, around 33 years old, graduated from the Lviv University.

During Polish rule there, he also worked there as an assistant to the professor at the Technology University. Short, dark-haired, hair combed to the side, wears glasses, an extremely intelligent man. Then, when I was at his place, he remained unemployed. I do not have any information about his relatives.

Question: Apart from that visit at BERNAT’s, did you ever visit him again?

Answer: Yes, I used to visit him in March this year.

Question: Did WĘGRZYNOWSKI Stanisław tell you anything about BERNAT’s affiliation to the intelligence under the 2nd Unit of the Polish General Staff?

Answer: WĘGRZYNOWSKI did not tell me about that; however, Edwin BERNAT himself, when I visited him in March this year, told me he knew about

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\(^{b}\) Was: Bernard. The same for the entire document.

\(^{8}\) Edwin Bernat (also referred to as Erwin, Edward), scoutmaster, a member of POWW, then in the Eastern Department HQs of the Grey Ranks; after the war probably settled in Great Britain.
my contacts with the defensive, and that I used coded messages while sending information.

In addition, BERNAT informed me that he had received the very same code from WĘGRZYNOWSKI, but he did not tell me whom he contacted.

Question: So, Edwin BERNAT also works for the intelligence?
Answer: Yes, and [I know that] since BERNAT himself informed me about it.
Question: What were BERNAT’s intelligence tasks?
Answer: I do not know anything about that.

You are not telling everything you know about the activity of the 2nd Unit of the Polish General Staff and its espionage ring located on the territory of former Western Ukraine. We will interrogate you in this respect later on.

The interrogation was interrupted.

The Protocol was written down accurately according to my oral testimony. I had it read personally in a comprehensible language, which I confirm with my signature.

WEIDEL

Interrogated by:
Deputy Head of the 3 Unit of UGB UNKVD LO
Junior Lieutenant of the State Security
BASAY

Operational officer of the 4th Department of the 3 Unit
Sergeant of the State Security
BIELY

In conformity: (–) Biely

HDA SBU, Ternopil, F. 27702, pp. 39–52.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Under the text, a round seal with the USSR emblem and partially legible inscription in rim: People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs... NKVD oblast Ternopil.
No. 13
16 July 1940, Kishinev. Report by Ivan Serov to Lavrentiy Beria, on the disclosure and partial liquidation of the ZWZ branch in Volhynia

T[op] secret
To the People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR
1st Rank State Security Commissar
Com. BERIA L. P.
City [of ] Moscow

The Volhynia UNKVD have exposed a branch of the Polish counter-revolutionary insurgent organisation (*ZWZ*) managed from the town of Lviv.

The organisation was headed by a former lieutenant-colonel of the Polish Army, CZAPLIŃSKI.

Members of this organisation set out to prepare an armed uprising that would lead to the overthrow of Soviet power and the rebirth of the former Polish state.

In order to accomplish these tasks, the organisation conducted large-scale recruiting activities among the Poles and former Polish Army officers.

Based on the investigation’s documents from this case, it was found that the Lutsk counter-revolutionary insurgent organisation had, in addition to Lviv, organisational links with counter-revolutionary formations active in the town of Volodymyr-Volynskyi.

Based on this information, 14 members of the counter-revolutionary organisation mentioned in interrogation materials were detained in the town of Volodymyr-Volynskyi, and these people were arrested.

During the action, we seized: 21 grenades, two revolvers, five swords, 7 machine guns, counter-revolutionary nationalist leaflets and two radio transmitters.

In the course of the investigation, it was established that the following well-developed counter-revolutionary formations were active in the town of Volodymyr-Volynskyi: “Skauci,” POW, SZP (Polish Victory Serviceb), forming the bloc of three counter-revolutionary organisations subordinated to one joint command under the ZWZ [...].

These organisations’ counter-revolutionary activities have been headed by former Colonel MAJEWSKI Tadeusz (arrested) who arrived from Warsaw by order of the former Polish Army General TOKARZEWSKI.

Before crossing the border with the USSR, MAJEWSKI had been in hiding in Warsaw.

In January this year, MAJEWSKI met the general commander “… TOKARZEWSKI in Warsaw.

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a – *Filled in by hand.*

b *Was:* Polish Salvation Service.
During the conversation with TOKARZEWSKI on the counter-revolutionary activities conducted in the western districts of the USSR, MAJEWSKI was, allegedly at TOKARZEWSKI’s request, appointed commanding officer “...” in Volhynia.

Before departing to the USSR, MAJEWSKI held a training conversation with a former colonel of the Polish Army ROWECKI,¹ a member of the insurgent committee in Warsaw.

ROWECKI familiarised MAJEWSKI in detail with the instructions set by the staff of the “...” organisation and approved by TOKARZEWSKI.

The instructions consisted of the scheme/procedures and rules for establishing the organisation, namely:

- Province HQs,
- *Powiat* HQs,
- Outpost HQs.

The number of organisation members in a given outpost was not limited; on the other hand, the required number of a squad was not to exceed 20 persons.

A Commander was to head the squad. As a rule, the commanders of individual squads were not supposed to know each other.

During the detention of MAJEWSKI, the following were seized: Operating Order No. 1, a circular, the main principles for keeping a conspiracy, and other documents, which he received from couriers from Warsaw.

In order to be able to execute in practice the tasks set up for the organisation, the following units were established at the province and *powiat* HQs:

1. Organisational and record keeping, whose task was to organise the recruitment of new people, keep their records and maintain communication with different sections and sub-units;
2. Political or propaganda purposes;
3. Operational (combat), whose task was to form the insurgent units, conducting military training and collecting firearms;
4. Administrative and economic, whose task was to seek support both financially and in kind.

ROWECKI ordered MAJEWSKI to organise “councils” in the provinces and *powiats* which were to be headed by the commanders of the 2nd U[nit], acting at the same time as the deputy province and/or district HQs commanders.

The activities of the “councils” were to lead to the reunification, under the banner of the “liberation of Poland,” of all the political parties operating in former Poland. The “councils” would consist of members of the organisations, regardless of the positions held.

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¹ Stefan Rowecki (1895–1944), *noms de guerre* “Rakoń,” “Grot,” “Grabica”; major general in the Polish Army; CO, Warsaw Armoured Motorised Brigade during the September Campaign (1939); from October 1939 CS and Deputy C-in-C., Service for Poland’s Victory (SZP); CO, Union for Armed Struggle (ZWZ) during German occupation; C-in-C., ZWZI, and C-in-C., Home Army (AK). Arrested by Gestapo (1943); murdered in Sachsenhausen concentration camp.
However, successful applicants had to have a good grasp of matters of politics and enjoy authority, so as to be able to unite Polish parties and political groupings of different currents around a common goal – the overthrow of Soviet power and the rebirth of the former Polish state.

In addition to becoming acquainted with the general principles of counter-revolutionary insurgent activity and the organisational projects in Volhynia, MAJEWSKI was provided in Warsaw with a number of addresses in Rivne, Lutsk, Volodymyr-Volynskyi, Bialystok, Lviv, and other locations.

Some time later, at these addresses, using previously defined code words, MAJEWSKI managed to establish some contacts in relation to counter-revolutionary activity with SIERAKOWSKI and KAZIMIERCZAK in Volodymyr-Volynskyi, MARZECKI in Lutsk and in other locations.

In relation to the counter-revolutionary activity, MAJEWSKI established contacts in Lviv, according to the address and code word received in Warsaw, via SIEMIENTKOWSKA Maria, resident of 24 Wulecka Street.

SIEMIENTKOWSKA, once MAJEWSKI gave him the code word “BRZOZA 5-10-20,” put him in contact via the liaison-messenger CZETIEWINSKI Józef (nom de guerre “ROMAN”) with the commander of the counter-revolutionary insurgent organisation in LVIV, NIEWIAROWSKI Adolf (nom de guerre “ADOLF”).

NIEWIAROWSKI, in turn, put MAJEWSKI in contact with the commander of the organisation “...” in Lviv, the former lieutenant colonel of the Polish Army SOKOŁOWSKI, whose deputy was NIEWIAROWSKI himself.

During a conversation with SOKOŁOWSKI, MAJEWSKI declared that he would contact Warsaw and get some guidelines from there concerning the coordination of the counter-revolutionary operations and subordinating the Volhynia organisation “...” to the provincial organisation in the town of Lviv.

Then in Lviv, MAJEWSKI also received a number of addresses and code words to establish contacts with counter-revolutionary formations operating in Dubno, Kremenets, Zdolbuniv, Rivne, Lutsk, Kovel, Kostopol, Liuboml and Volodymyr.

The directorate of the liquidated counter-revolutionary insurgent underground maintained constant contact with foreign countries and organisations “...” in the western districts of the USSR via special couriers and radio transmitters.

The command “...” in Lviv also contacted the district organisations “...” in the western districts of the USSR and BSSR via messengers/couriers.

Additionally, in order to maintain written contacts with the outpost in Lviv, a special code was developed.

A special instruction specified three types of premises for secret contacts:

Type I – secret premises for messengers. Upon his arrival, the messenger gives his code word and can stay in the premises for the duration of his stay in the city at which he has arrived.

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² Zbigniew Sierakowski; arrested by NKVD, sentenced to death in November 1940.
Type II – premises where the messenger arrives to meet the organisation’s commander.

Type III – the place of permanent residence of the organisation’s commander. No meetings were held there, nor any messengers allowed.

Mail correspondence could only be kept with secret premises of type I. Letters sent there should be of a family-related nature and [should be written] using a carefully ciphered text.

Moreover, in line with the developed instruction, each commander of the district organisation “...” should possess an illegal radio transmitter to keep in contact.

In practice, the organisation’s operations were aimed at:

1. Recruiting new members for the organisation and preparing them for a military uprising.
2. Organising a network of radio transmitters and receivers to keep contact between both located abroad and those domestically based “...”.
   For this purpose, the employees of post offices and radio centres who were members of a given organisation were used.
3. Organising a courier network in order to maintain contacts with Warsaw, district and powiat branches “...” and establishing transfer points.
5. Organising secret premises where messengers coming from abroad and hiding members of the conspiracy would be received.
7. Organising contacts, code words and codes.

The arrested commander of the organisation “...” in Volhynia, MAJEWSKI, testified that in early March this year, he received from a messenger a coded order of the Lviv HQs “...”.

In this order, MAJEWSKI was obliged to organise a protest against the deportation of Polish citizens into USSR.

A number of acts of sabotage were proposed, including blowing up the bridge over the Slucz River. In addition, MAJEWSKI was to damage the telegraph and telephone line between Zdolbuniv and Lviv.

MAJEWSKI, acting in line with instructions he received in Warsaw, conducted a series of operations on the territory of Vohlynia district and part of Rivne district, aimed at reunifying the dispersed “Skauci,” POW and SZP counter-revolutionary insurgent formations.

MAJEWSKI established the powiat outposts “...” in the towns of Rivne, Lutsk, Zdolbuniv, Sarny, Volodymyr-Volynskyi, as well as in other former powiat towns.

The people recruited by MAJEWSKI were also recruiting new members for the organisation.

In total, the Volhynia UNKVD arrested 42 active organisation members as part of this case.
We are conducting an intensive investigation, aimed at revealing the counter-revolutionary leaders of the underground, their contacts in the USSR and abroad, their secret meeting & transfer places, and the points where weapons and explosives are hidden.

*Narkom* of the Internal Affairs of the USSR
3rd Rank State Security Commissar
SEROV

“a-16-a” July 1940
No......
Town of Kishinev
NK

*Copy, typescript.*
*Document in Russian.*
Complementary interrogation protocol of defendant SOKOŁOWSKI-KIŁAWIEC Marian, son of Jan, born in 1908, a Pole, captain of the former Polish Army, born in the city of Cracow.

28 August 1940
Interrogation started at 15:30

Question: Your testimony of 24 August 1940 concerning you and the activities of a counter-revolutionary underground insurgent organisation in the town of Stanyslaviv do not correspond to reality. The interrogators have information that you are one of the leaders of the counter-revolutionary organisation; the interrogators order you to give honest testimony.

Answer: It is true; during the interrogation of 24 August I did not tell the truth, trying to hide my crimes and get a lower sentence. Secondly, by voluntarily joining an anti-Soviet organisation in order to conduct an active struggle against the Bolsheviks, I took an oath that I would not give away the entire organisation, or my companions, which was to be remembered by each of the commanders and members of the anti-Soviet organisation, but seeing the futility of denying it, I decided to tell the truth to the interrogators.

Once I was recruited to the anti-Soviet organisation which I discussed in my previous testimonies, I was seconded to an executive post in the town of Stanyslaviv. I was to report there at the disposal of the Stanyslaviv district organisation commander who worked there under the nom de guerre “Hucul”; he was also the chief of staff of the organisation.

Question: Name the persons forming the staff of the counter-revolutionary underground insurgent organisation of the Stanyslaviv district.

Answer: I know that the staff of the anti-Soviet organisation in the Stanyslaviv district composed of:

1. a SMERECKI a; his first name is unknown to me. A Pole, around 50 years old, a lieutenant-colonel of the former Polish Army, of middle height, average body build, grey hair, limping on his left leg, he is a refugee from Cracow. In Stanyslaviv, he resided at Józefitów street [1], house No. 1. In the organisation, he

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a Underlined by hand.
b As in the original.

1 Marian Gabriel Sokolowski, aka Piotr Kilawiec, Kazimierz Bożek (Bożak) (1908–1941), noms de guerre “Sommer,” “Kiławiec”. Infantry captain, in September 1939 operating officer of the 24th Infantry Division, in the ZWZ as of February 1940. Detained on 22 August 1940 by the NKVD frontier troops while trying to cross the border in the area of Horyniec; tried on 28 February 1941 by Lviv Oblast Court, sentenced to death.
worked under the pseudonym „Hucuł” and, I think, had some other name; what exactly I do not know. a-“Hucuł”-a was the commander of the organisation in Stanyslawiv district; where he is now, I do not know.

2. a-MARŻEWSKI-a; his first name is unknown to me. A Pole, 50–52 years old, a major of the former Polish Army, a refugee from Warsaw; in Stanyslawiv he resided at the street second on the right from the beginning of Wojciechowskiego street, house 5, small house with a garden, I cannot now recall the name of that street.

In the organisation, MARŻEWSKI worked under the pseudonym of a-“Jastrzębiec”-a, a deputy to „Hucuł”; and at the same time he was heading an anti-Soviet organisation in the very town of Stanyslawiv.

I met a-MARŻEWSKI “Jastrzębiec” for the last time around 15th June this year in town of Lviv, he was to flee abroad then, to Germany. Where he is know I do not know either-a.

3. “KRZYWDA”; his name and last name are unknown to me, 40–45 years old, a civil engineer by profession, of medium height, stout, blond hair, has no military rank, apparently did not serve in the Polish Army, comes from Stanyslawiv, lived at Gołuchowskiego street, I do not know the house number.

In the organisation, “KRZYWDA” was in charge of organisational issues; he still should be staying in the town of Stanyslawiv.

4. WOŁŻYŃSKI2; his name is unknown to me, around 27 years old, lieutenant... no, second lieutenant of the former Polish Army, a refugee from Warsaw, mid tall, brown hair, he worked in the organisation under the nom de guerre “Janek” and directed the intelligence unit. I do not know where he lived; as I heard, he has been arrested.

5. a-Myself – SOKOŁOWSKI Marian son of Jan, In the organisation, I worked under the noms de guerre “SOMMER” and “KIŁAWIEC,” I was the chief of staff and headed the branches of our organisation in the Stanyslawiv oblast-a.

Question: In which cities and regions of the Stanyslaviv oblast did your counter-revolutionary organisation have its branches? Identify their commanders and number.

Answer: a-As I testified before, the anti-Soviet organisation was operating in the town of Stanyslaviv, number of members: 500. It was headed by the deputy to “HUCUŁ,” MARŻEWSKI “Jastrzębiec.” I did not head that organisation, and in practice I did not give any commands related to its activities; I only received the information that should be transferred to the Lviv Staff of the anti-Soviet organisation from the commander of this organisation. In addition to this anti-Soviet organisation, I know of the existence of its branches:

1. The biggest organisation existed in the town of Kolomyia, the number of [its members] reached 300 persons-a, once I learned from a messenger that its number had grown significantly and now reached 500 persons.

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2 Actually Jan Wyszyński (underground pseudonyms Roman Leszczyński, Jan Król; noms de guerre “Jan,” “Janek”); according to personal testimony, a reserve second lieutenant in the 71st Infantry Regiment; arrested by the NKVD on 31 March 1940, sentenced to death, executed on 25 December 1940.
The Kolomyia organisation was headed by a citizen of that city, a man called DUKIET, I do not know his name, I met him just a few times; around 30 years old, strong build, operated under the *nom de guerre* “OSTRY.”

2. In the town of Nadvirna the organisation consisted of between 60 and 100 persons. At first, this organisation was headed by a NCO known as “GRUBY,” but he did not want to work in the organisation and relinquished command himself. After “GRUBY,” the organisation was commanded by LOGIN; I can’t say whether this was his last name or *nom de guerre*, since I have not met him.

3. In the town of Kalush and in Dolyna, the organisation consisted of around 30 persons, the commander of this organisation was a reserve second lieutenant of the former Polish Army, whose name, first name or *nom de guerre* I do not know and whom I never met.

4. The organisation in the town of Tlumach was broken up prior to my arrival, and I did not undertake any measures to reconstruct it.

In addition to these organisations which I mentioned above, there were small groups in the cities of Sniatyn, Kosiv and Horodenka in Stanyslaviv oblast; these groups were relatively small, from 5 to 10 persons, we failed to form the organisations in these towns because they had small Polish populations. There were no other organisations and groups in Stanyslaviv oblast. I say this with full responsibility.

Question: What number of rifles did your organisation possess, and where are they hidden?

Answer: In February this year, when I came to Stanyslaviv under the command of “Hucul,” I was told that the organisation there has around 3000 rifles and even a few dismantled cannons, but when I checked whether these weapons did in fact exist, it turned out that these were just boasts; in fact, the organisation in Stanyslaviv, before I fled from there, had 2 or 3 machine guns, around 20 rifles, the same amount of revolvers and around 40 pieces of combat grenades, most of them without detonators, at its disposal. These weapons were hidden in various places – attics and cemeteries. I cannot identify a specific person who would be able to find or indicate the place of storage, because the weapons were in different hands.

According to the information that I received by couriers, the organisation in Nadvirna had four machine guns, and the Kolomyia organisation had around 25 guns; I had no information about the weapons in other organisations. In this case, before escaping from Stanyslaviv, I received a message stating that Ukrainian nationalists had stolen the firearms belonging to the province organisation which is why I think it was impossible to increase the number of weapons.

Question: Identify the goals and tasks of your counter-revolutionary organisation.

Answer: The anti-Soviet organisation operating under the name of “the Union of Armed Struggle” set itself the goal of preparing Polish patriots for an armed struggle against Soviet authorities, including acquiring and hiding weapons until a defined time, carrying out acts of sabotage, eliminating Soviet influences on
Polish youth, gathering information of a confidential nature, the armed overthrow of the Soviet authorities and the rebirth of the former Polish government, in which England and France were supposed to help.

Question: What exactly did your command over insurgent organisations in the provinces consist in?

Answer: Command over the organisations in the provinces consisted in the following: via messengers, I issued commands to the commanders of the insurgent organisation concerning the recruitment of insurgents, the acquisition and storage of rifles and other types of weapons, gathering confidential information about the deployment of Red Army troops; and I required the submission of reports on the implementation of these tasks, also via messengers. I periodically reported on the activities conducted in preparation for the uprising to the Staff of the ZWZ organisation based in the town of Lviv.

In addition, I entrusted the insurgent organisations’ commanders in the provinces with tasks of an intelligence character, tracking sentiments and attitudes among the population and conducting demoralising, anti-Soviet agitation, referring to foreign radio broadcasts, disseminating fabrications against Soviet authorities.

Question: What kind of information did you gather concerning the deployment of Red Army troops?

Answer: I gathered information on the deployment of Red Army troops in the towns of Stanyslaviv, Nadvirna, Kolomyia, Halych, Horodenka, Kosiv and on the border, with data on the type of troops, number, and individual lines of fortification; I prepared reports and informed the staff of our organisation in the town of Lviv.

Question: Did your Stanyslaviv organisation maintain contact with abroad?

Answer: No, we did not maintain contacts with abroad.

Question: And the messengers from Lviv to abroad and back were sent by your agency?

Answer: No, they did not arrive to us. The Lviv staff instructed our staff to prepare the crossings and the people who would help the messengers across the borders, but we failed to perform this task.

Question: Tell us, what specific tasks concerning the practical activities did you receive from the Lviv staff of the organisation?

Answer: The Lviv staff of the anti-Soviet organisation, bearing the name of the Union of Armed Struggle, sent their couriers to us in Stanyslaviv from time to time, through whom we actually received a reminder to reinforce the organisation’s activities. First of all, the Lviv staff required us to increase the size of our organisation, acquire weapons, gather information about the deployment of Red Army troops, distribute anti-Soviet agitation among the people, and gather information about the political and moral attitudes amongst the people. In addition, in April this year, the Lviv organisation staff sent us an order in which it requested us to prepare and carry out acts of subversion and sabotage both in the cities and in areas such as Stanyslaviv oblast; we received no other commands.

Question: How many acts of sabotage did you manage to execute under this order, and how did you carry them out?
Answer: The order which we received to conduct acts of sabotage was discussed in the Stanyslaviv staff of the organisation, and we came to the conclusion that it should not be carried out for now, because in our opinion we would not increase damage to the Soviet state – on the contrary, our organisation might suffer, there would be arrests. Therefore I personally ordered the provincial organisation commanders to designate only objects such as unprotected railway bridges, factories and the like, and to conduct acts of sabotage against these sites [only] during the uprising; and as regards conducting acts of sabotage, I did not give any commands.

I remember one case of a train derailment in the Stanyslaviv oblast; I was extremely indignant, supposing that it was the work of members of our organisation; however, when I examined the incident, it turned out not to be the case, because with full responsibility I declare that we did not conduct any acts of sabotage.

Question: How did you maintain contact with the Lviv organisation staff?

Answer: We maintained contact with the Lviv staff of the organisation solely by messengers who came to us every 5–10 days, and brought the orders and commands with them; and I sent the collected information to the staff via them. For contact with us, code words were set, which were often changed. The code words I can remember as for now are: “to Felix,” “to the blonde,” “to Somer her shoes [!],” I do not remember any others.

In most cases, those messengers would arrive with messages from the Lviv staff member “EMIL,” to whom I was also sending the reports on the activities carried out by the entire organisation. A messenger “JUHAS” would arrive quite often.

In mid-April this year, directly from the commander of the anti-Soviet organisation ZWZ, ŻEBROWSKI (nom de guerre “ŻUK”), an officer – a messenger would arrive, whose name or nom de guerre I do not know. He had a quite long conversation with “HUCUŁ,” I do not know what they were talking about, and “Hucuł” did not mention that; I knew that “HUCUŁ” would remain silent about the topic of their discussion.

In March this year, when the voyencomat issued the order concerning the registration of Polish citizens for conscription, messengers from the province would start arriving, believing that they would be enlisted for the Red Army and asking for guidance in this matter. We did not give them specific guidance, because we did not know what exactly to do; that is why “HUCUŁ” sent me to Lviv to report on this situation to the organisation commander ŻEBROWSKI, whom I was supposed to find at the secret premises located at Tarnowskiego street, house no. 27. A woman named DASZKIEWICZ was the owner of the apartment. I did not meet ŻEBROWSKI that time, but I met another organisation member named NAPOLSKI or NABOLSKI, who told me about ŻEBROWSKI’s absence and provided me with a second address at the contact point at Kochanowskiego street, house no. 14, first floor, should the need to contact the organisation’s command arise. The owner of this apartment was REGINSZTREJF.

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During this stay, I did not succeed in finding any of the commanders of the organisation in Lviv, so I returned to Stanyslaviv without any results, and we did not provide the provincial organisations with any instructions concerning the registration.

Question: Tell us about the reason and date of your escape form Stanyslaviv.

Answer: I fled from the town of Stanyslaviv, fearing arrest, on 25 April 1940, after the detention of a staff member of our organisation named WOŁSZYŃSKI, nom de guerre “Janek” and the head of intelligence, his aide “PIETRIN,” and other members of our organisation; there were no other reasons. Upon having fled from Stanyslaviv, I lived all the time in Lviv.

Question: Where did you live and what did you do in the town of Lviv?

Answer: In the town of Lviv, I used to reside at the following addresses: Sahaidachny street, house no. 8, ground floor, at BOCZKOWSKA Zofia’s; she was a refugee who departed to Germany on furlough. After she left, I lived on Leona Sapiehy street, house no. 49, ground floor, at GUTNER’s, working as an artist in the Polish theatre. Recently, I lived at Lisa Kuli street, house no. 14 apt. 10, at GAWDASKOWA Milada’s, she was working as a nurse at a hospital at Kurkowa 33; and during the displacement of the refugees, I hid in cemeteries and outside the city in the hills. I did not work anywhere, I had no regular occupation.

Question: Did you, while living in the town of Lviv since April this year, contact the counter revolutionary organisation?

Answer: No, since April I have not had any contacts with the organisation in the town of Lviv.

Question: It is too naïve to expect that you – an officer and nationalist – declare that you have not contacted a counter-revolutionary organisation.

Answer: As soon as I arrived from Stanyslaviv to Lviv, I tried to establish contact with the organisation staff members; to this end, I went to the contact point located on Kochanowskiego street, house no. 14. The owner of this apartment, a man named REGINSZTREJF, did not even let me in; he just waved at me to go away, and after that I was afraid of visiting him again.

After this failure, I told the landlady named BOCZKOWA about me, and I asked her to introduce me to somebody who could help me contact the anti-Soviet organisation in Lviv. BOCZKOWA introduced me to an officer of the former Polish Army, whose name and address I do not know.

He helped me contact the deputy to ŻEBROWSKI, nom de guerre “REY.” The meeting with “REY” took place in Bogdanovka, I do not know the name or the number of the street since it was at night. I told him in detail about the situation of the Stanyslaviv organisation and asked for guidance for further action. “REY”

\(^{a}\) Was: “JANYK.”

\(^{b}\) Com. ab. cit: Boczkowska.

\(^{c}\) Emil Macieliński (1892–1941), noms de guerre “Rey,” “Kornel”; major, then lieutenant-colonel, commander of Lviv-West District ZWZ-1; from April 1940 acting commander of Area No. 3 ZWZ-1; arrested at least twice by the NKVD, recruited to collaboration; sentenced to death by the Star Chamber of the ZWZ NHQs on 26 September 1941; executed on 17 December 1941 in Warsaw.
replied that he had not met ŻEBROWSKI and could not tell where he is. “REY” also offered me then to settle in the town of Lviv and head the Stanyslaviv organisation from here, to which I did not give a definitive answer. “REY” promised to send a man to my apartment and contact me, but no-one came to me, nor I could contact “REY” again, although I tried to meet him once again.

After I failed to contact “REY” for the second time, I set myself the goal of fleeing to Germany, to where in May, I sent my wife and child, while I was temporarily staying in Lviv. In around mid-May, I met a friend of mine by chance on the street, an officer – a Lieutenant of the former Polish Army named BUDZIŃSKI, whom I told of my intention to flee to Germany, and I asked for help in this matter.

BUDZIŃSKI promised to help me, and to this end, at the Jura square, he introduced me to a major of the former Polish Army DOBROWOLSKI, whom I also told about myself and about my dead-end situation. Most probably, however, DOBROWOLSKI did not trust me and he did not give me any specific answer. I did not meet him again. While living in Lviv, I used to visit Orzeszkowa street quite often, since it was the address of the Soviet-German commission on the displacement of the refugees, via which I planned to leave to Germany, but I failed, I was unable to leave. I do not remember the exact day in May, but with the help of an officer I know named MAKULSKI, I met a woman – Mrs. Włada, around 35–38 years old, medium height, and during the conversation, – when we tackled the issue of organisation, she told me that ŻEBROWSKI’s organisation had been broken up. I never mentioned that organisation again when talking to her.

Probably in the first days of July, on the same Orzeszkowa Street, via Mrs. Włada, I met a member of the anti-Soviet organisation, nom de guerre “Andrzej,” with whom I had a conversation about going abroad. He told me that he had contacts abroad, and had supposedly brought contraband from there. “Andrzej” invited me to live at his home and promised to help in my escape to Germany, but because I did not trust him, I never met him again, or any other members of the organisation.

Question: Where does Mrs. Włada live?
Answer: That I do not know.

Question: So, you resided in Lviv from April to August, and you did not contact the counter-revolutionary organisation?
Answer: That is correct, I did not maintain any contacts, my search remained futile.

Question: This is an outright lie, you will be heard in this case separately. The interrogation was adjourned on 29 August 1940, at 05.40.

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4 Referring to Wladysława Piechowska.
The protocol was written down accurately according to my oral testimony, I had it read and translated into Polish.

SOKOLOVSKY

Interrogated by:
Head of the 2nd Department of the 3rd Unit of UGB UNKVD LO
Junior Lieutenant of State Security
BOGDANOV

Translator:
Translator of the 3rd Unit of the UGB
MARCISZEWSKI

In conformity (–)

HDA SBU, Lviv, F. P-28361, pp. 35–47.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Excerpt

From the interrogation protocol of defendant PIECHOWSKA Władysława, daughter of Tadeusz
dated 30 October 1940

Question: How can you account for the fact that DOBROWOLSKI did not develop any active operations and just assumed an attitude of waiting?
Answer: I should say that before the arrival of a courier from Paris, who brought the name of the organisation, a courier from Warsaw used to come, Colonel SOSABOWSKI, a 42 years old, dark-haired, slim, medium height, with parted hair, a moustache and beard. Previously he was a lecturer in a higher military school.
Upon his arrival, he informed me and DOBROWOLSKI that in the near future a second messenger was to come from Warsaw, who would bring further instructions and guidance concerning conducting illegal activities in the city.
In anticipation of the courier I was dealing only with refugees, and DOBROWOLSKI was grouping officers around him.

Question: Whom did SOSABOWSKI arrive to find?
Answer: Generally speaking, SOSABOWSKI travelled to Paris. He was sent there by General TOKARZEWSKI, and at his order he dropped in for a couple of days to Lviv, to get a good grasp of the situation of the Lviv organisation’s illegal operations. I do know that he was looking for BORUTA-SPIECHOWICZ.

Question: And how did you meet SOSABOWSKI?
Answer: He visited me at my place at 17 Lelewela street.

Question: How did he know your address?
Answer: Most probably he got it from TOKARZEWSKI.

Question: Well, did TOKARZEWSKI know your address?
Answer: I do not think so.

Question: So how can you account for the fact that the Warsaw organisation knew the address of WASYLEWSKA Halina?
Answer: It can be explained by the fact that after retirement, Halina remained in contact with military circles in Warsaw and was the author of several guides on

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1 Stanisław Sosabowski (1892–1967), noms de guerre “Węglarz,” “Emil Helm”; brigadier-general. In September 1939 the commander of the 21st Infantry Regiment; at the end of 1939, SZP courier to Lviv and to France, organiser of the 1st Independent Parachute Brigade in the UK and its commander until December 1944; a participant in the Battle of Arnhem.
2 Halina (Halszka) Wasilewska (1899–1961), sister of Wanda Wasilewska, before 1939 in the PWK; in September 1939 she fought in defence of Lviv; in the ZWZ-2 she ran contact premises, from 1941 in the ZWZ-AK NHQs. Arrested by the Germans in 1943, imprisoned in Ravensbruck concentration camp.
civil defence training, and for women, and on physical culture, and therefore WASILEWSKA Halina’s address could also have been known to TOKARZEWSKI.

Question: Again, it is not clear if TOKARZEWSKI knew that you were in touch with WASILEWSKA Halina?
Answer: I do not think he knew that.

Question: What was SOSABOWSKI talking with you about?
Answer: SOSABOWSKI told me that in Warsaw an illegal organisation had been founded, headed by General TOKARZEWSKI, that they formed combat units, which in the initial period were actively fighting against Germany, leading a guerrilla struggle; but the ruthless repression by the Germans (they shot every tenth person from among the civilian population) forced the organisation to change the methods of struggle, and to conceal their activity deeply.

According to SOSABOWSKI, TOKARZEWSKI planned to manage the entirety of the illegal activities of both the Warsaw and Lviv organisations and, in fact, throughout the territory of former Poland. For this purpose, he sent Sosabowski to Paris as a courier, with a report on the situation of the organisation in Warsaw, and asked him to visit Lviv on his way, in order to learn more on the situation in Lviv.

Sosabowski later explained that the Lviv organisation, until the arrival of a new person from Warsaw, should refrain from any active operations, and only deal with those aimed at ensuring proper help for refugees.

In conclusion, SOSABOWSKI said that TOKARZEWSKI was preparing in the conspiracy and, as soon as he received instructions from Paris, he would take a more active part in the illegal organisation, until the moment he received the order to start the uprising.

During a second conversation with DOBROWOLSKI, SOSABOWSKI said in my presence that in the immediate future a man should go to Lviv who could take over management of the entire organisation, and he would have the correct guidance and instructions to conduct illegal activities.

In mid-December SOSABOWSKI went to Paris.

Shortly afterwards, as I mentioned earlier, a courier who had brought instructions arrived from Paris and gave them to Colonel ŻEBROWSKI.

And DOBROWOLSKI’s group, in accordance with the agreement with SOSABOWSKI, was waiting for a courier from Warsaw.

Question: When did DOBROWOLSKI’s group start to develop its activity?
Answer: Active illegal operations nu DOBROWOLSKI’s group started after the arrival of Major NIEWIAROWSKI.

Question: When was that?
Answer: Around 10 January 1940.

Question: Did NIEWIAROWSKI arrive from Warsaw as the courier?
Answer: No, NIEWIAROWSKI arrived from TOKARZEWSKI as a person with power of attorney to take over the leadership of the illegal Lviv organisation. Major NIEWIAROWSKI, around 40 years old, brown hair, blue eyes; he served somewhere in Pomerania (in the north of former Poland), and more recently in the
reserve forces. Upon his arrival he also provided the name of the organisation, ZWZ; and he was in possession of a detailed plan for developing the illegal activity.

Because from that time, there were two groups bearing the same name in Lviv, NIEWIAROWSKI was striving to unite them under one common management. The first thing NIEWIAROWSKI did was to meet ŻEBROWSKI; and, as I have learned later on, he did not reach an agreement with him, because ŻEBROWSKI, as an officer holding a rank higher than NIEWIAROWSKI, did not want to submit himself, and wanted to take command of the organisation himself.

NIEWIAROWSKI, in turn, did not accept the working methods of ŻEBROWSKI, and there was a significant discrepancy between the two of them in this regard.

Not being able to find a common language with ŻEBROWSKI, after consultation with DOBROWOLSKI, NIEWIAROWSKI decided to hand over the management of an illegal group, which had hitherto been headed by DOBROWOLSKI, to Colonel SOKOŁOWSKI, whom I did not know then. In this way, in the ZWZ organisation, two separate groups started to operate: one led by ŻEBROWSKI, the second under the command of SOKOŁOWSKI. Colonel SOKOŁOWSKI, 45 years old, dark blond, slim, of medium height, shaves his face, combs his hair with parting.

Question: What were the mutual relations between ŻEBROWSKI’s group and SOKOŁOWSKI’s group?

Answer: SOKOŁOWSKI depreciated ŻEBROWSKI as a commander, and did not want to be subordinate to him. His working methods were troubling, because the number of people recruited into ŻEBROWSKI’s organisation reached a colossal scale, and ŻEBROWSKI himself, as rumour had it, was trying to initiate an uprising without adequate preparation or orders from the government.

At the beginning of the conversation ŻEBROWSKI tried to win me over. He called me a wise woman who enjoys considerable authority in the organisation, and who had an influence on the management of the organisation. As for himself, he said that he was the most famous man in Lviv, remains on good terms with SIKORSKI, was the highest in rank in the organisation, and he says all that so that I should influence NIEWIAROWSKI, SOKOŁOWSKI and DOBROWOLSKI, to make them subordinate to him as the higher in rank.

He told me that we are not authorised to use the name “the ZWZ organisation,” and from now on, he would forbid any kind of activity; otherwise he would punish us and exterminate us. After hearing all this, I asked ŻEBROWSKI for permission to tell him something; and having been granted this permission, I said that I am not an officer and I cannot give any commands to officers, especially not to NIEWIAROWSKI, SOKOŁOWSKI and DOBROWOLSKI, because they operated in accordance with the orders of General TOKARZEWSKI, and they had received power of attorney and instructions from him.
In conformity:
Operational Officer of the 3rd Department of the 2nd Unit of GUGB NKVD
Lieutenant of State Security
(–) LALIASHVILI

HDA SBU, Lviv, F. 861185, pp. 41–46.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Protocol of interrogation of defendant
Klimkowski Jerzy, son of Mieczysław
dated 24 December 1940

Klimkowski J. M., born in 1909 in Kiev, a Pole, a former Polish subject, a qualified Lieutenant of the former Polish Army, at the time of arrest without regular occupation or place of residence.

(Interrogation started at 22:20)

Question: You are presented with six photographs of people bearing numbers. Which of these people do you recognise?

Answer: Of the six photos presented to me, I recognise a familiar face on photo number 4.

Question: Who is it?

Answer: I do not know the name of the man, but I know him as a member of the Polish anti-Soviet illegal organisation whom I met in Lviv.

Question: Tell us about the circumstances of your meeting with this man, and how you know about his membership in a Polish illegal anti-Soviet organisation.

Answer: Back then, when I was in Romania, I heard from the vice-consul of the so-called “Polish government” in Bucharest, named Kański, and a co-worker of consul Rostworowski, that in Lviv there were Polish illegal

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1 Jerzy Klimkowski (1909–1991), lieutenant, a participant in the September 1939 campaign, General Boruta’s liaison courier from Lviv to Paris. In late summer 1940 he arrived in Lviv. Arrested on 6 September 1940 by NKVD, released in August 1941; then Adjutant to General Anders and commander of the 12th regiment. In September 1943, he was arrested for the so-called conspiracy of young officers and put in prison, after 1946 in Poland.

2 Władysław Kański (born 1906?), activist of SN, vice-consul; in 1929–1939 employee of the Attorney General of Poland; from April 1940 to January 1941 head of the government office (outpost R) in Bucharest, then in Jerusalem; after 1945 in Great Britain.

3 Stanisław Rostworowski (1888–1944), noms de guerre “Prawdzic,” “Rączy,” “Odra”; brigadier-general. In the September 1939 campaign, was chief of staff of the Warszawa Praga section; from autumn of 1939, commander of the Base No. 2; from 1941 to 1942 commander of the Base No. 1, then the KG AK inspector; from 1944 the Cracow District AK Commander; arrested and murdered by the Germans.

4 Roman Tatarski (1912–1995), noms de guerre “Luda”; reserve second lieutenant. In September 1939 commander of the mounted reconnaissance platoon in the 2nd Legion’s Infantry Regiment; from October 1939 in POWW, then ZOWO; to April 1940 the ZWZ-1 communications officer for abroad, then went to Romania and Yugoslavia as the ZWZ Belgrade Conference participant. At the end of 1941, was PSZ technical team leader for communications between Moscow and Warsaw, then in Department “A” at the 6th Branch of the Chief’s General Staff.
anti-Soviet organisations, headed by the former Polish officers Dobrowolski and Macieliński, known by the *noms de guerre* “Rey” and “Kornel.”

When I illegally came to Lviv on 2 September 1940, I made attempts to contact Dobrowolski and Macieliński. In the apartment, where I stayed (Lviv, Kalecza street, 24), a girl used to live whose name I do not know. This girl, when she learned that I wanted to get in contact with “Rey,” promised to arrange a meeting with an aide of “Rey,” a man named “Leszek,” whom she apparently knew.

The next day this girl told me she had met “Leszek,” who promised to come on 4 September 1940 to my apartment on Kalecza street, 24.

On 4th September, I actually met two young men who introduced themselves to me as people from Macieliński “Rey.” One of those two was the man whom I recognised [on the picture] under no. 4.

Question: What did you talk about with them?

Answer: At the beginning of our conversation, they asked me some questions, probably just to see if indeed I was Klimkowski, and then asked me to talk about the situation in the West. At the end of the conversation I expressed my opinion that we should not count on help from France and Great Britain in restoring an independent Poland, and that the Poles should look for ways to revive Poland by themselves; and in this case I would like to speak personally with Macieliński. They promised to arrange a meeting with Macieliński and this ended our conversation. I never met this man again.

Question: Did they inform you about the activities of the organisation in Lviv and about their functions in the organisation?

Answer: No.

Question: Did you meet Macieliński?

Answer: No, I didn’t, since shortly after I was arrested.

The interrogation was adjourned at 24:00, 25 December this year.

I have read the protocol, and the answers were written down accurately according to my oral testimony:

(–) Klimkowski

Interrogated by:
Investigating officer of the 2nd Unit of the GUGB NKVD
Lieutenant of State Security
(–) Vorobyov

*HDA SBU, Lviv, P-35205, pp. 40–45.*
*Original, manuscript.*
*Document in Russian. Each sheet of the interrogation protocol is signed by J. Klimkowski.*
As regards the questions I have been asked:

1) I think that in November 1939, one of our intelligence agents, Maria KORNIŁOWICZ, was contacted by an old man saying that he knew her from the period of the war of 1919–1920, and he knew that she had worked in Polish intelligence. He asked her what she was doing, and whether she might agree to work against the USSR. In response, she informed him that she was a teacher in a high school and did not intend to engage in any other job. Then, he said that he was working in General BAŁACHOWICZ’s group, and his task was to prepare the ground in Belorussia in the event of a Russo-German war, which is why he was offering her this work.

Upon her definitive statement that apart from her professional work she would not deal with anything else, he said that he would ask her again in some time, then he walked away. I therefore ordered that BAŁACHOWICZ’s people be found. We found some of them on a property of the POTOCKI family in Jabłonna and we sent a lieutenant there, I do not remember his name – a reserve officer who was a relative of Gen. BAŁACHOWICZ.

The lieutenant found them there, and because we were interested in whether they have any connection with the USSR or Germany, after establishing closer contact he asked for help in transferring him to the Soviet side. His request was met, and he was smuggled to the other side somewhere between Białystok and Malkinia; he stayed there for two weeks in his village near Kovel, after which he returned, also with their help.

However, later on, it became clear that this officer was an alcoholic, so we could not longer use his services. I ordered that he be left in peace, with the

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1 The document (written in Russian) is a supplemented version of Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz’s testimony of 6 February 1941 written personally, which after translation from Polish was supplemented with additional information during the course of the interrogation.

2 Maria Kornilowicz was active in the POW in Cracow in 1918.

3 Stanisław Bulak-Bałachowicz (1883–1940), major-general of the Russian army. Until 1920 in the White Army, then Commander of the Belarusian troops in the Polish Army; participated in the civil war in Spain. In September 1939, the commander of a volunteer unit in the defence of Warsaw, then a commander of the Confederate Army. Murdered by the Gestapo while trying to arrest him.

4 Maurycy Potocki (1894–1949), landowner, owner of Jabłonna; after the war in exile.
provision to introduce another officer with his help. What we learned in late January about BAŁACHOWICZ was as follows: on the estates on POTOCKI’s property, there were around 150 of his men; apparently, around 100 of his people were in the vicinity of Warsaw. We failed to establish whether he had men in other locations.

His men are for the most part Russians or Belarusians, many of them elderly, with a hostile attitude towards Poland; they were counting on a Russian-German war, and at this moment they would seek to prepare a Belarusian uprising against the USSR.

In the personal dimension – the mutual condemnations, the struggle for influence on B[ALACHOWICZ] himself – they split into three groups, the differences between which we could not identify. Whether Polish prisoners of war were active there – that was not established then.

As rumour had it, B[ALACHOWICZ] was supposed to have decided to cooperate with the Germans. How far he was engaged in this direction – that has not been established, but the fact was that they were able to cross the border, which seems to have been organised with the help of the Germans. It was also found that some of them in Jablonna possessed firearms.

In addition to this officer’s personal observations, these pieces of information were based on two or three conversations with some two colonels from BAŁACHOWICZ’s group, I do not remember their names.

We failed to penetrate the aforementioned BAŁACHOWICZ’s group, except for Jablonna. This became our next task. Our counter-intelligence had been intensively supporting the officer seconded to run this case. Since the end of January, I have had nothing to do with this case.

2) The group of officers I recruited to cooperation, even before the surrender of Warsaw, was recommended by the head of intelligence to General RÖMMEL, Lieutenant-Colonel STARZYŃSKI – a Border Guard inspector, whose Christian name I cannot recall.

I did not require him to participate in the general briefings which I organised before the capitulation of Warsaw, but personally I informed him during the meeting that, depending on the situation, I was going to start organisational work. I did not explain any details. When he said that not only could he put himself at my disposal, but also a group of Border Guard officers, I accepted the offer and gave him 15,000 Polish zloty to organise such a group, its outfitting and concealment, as well as two addresses at which he could contact me until 15 October.

Neither he nor anyone else had contacted me at those addresses by 1 November.

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5 Mieczysław Starzyński (1891–1941), lieutenant-colonel, in 1929–1934, military attaché in Belgrade, then retired; in 1935 Pomeranian Vice-Governor. In September 1939, the head of the 2nd Unit of the Warsaw Defence Headquarters, afterwards in hiding. Arrested by the Germans and murdered in Sachsenhausen.

6 Presumably Major Aleksander Kuźmiński, murdered by the Gestapo in Warsaw.
After 1 December, I ordered the liaisons residing at those addresses to move to another place, in order to protect us from being disclosed.

We decided that the inspector had been deported by the Germans. At the end of November or early December, at a café on the corner of Aleje Jerozolimskie and Nowy Świat, one of our officers witnessed the following event: when the German police checked the papers of people present, it was exactly the same inspector, in the company of four or five men who seemed to be military men, who showed an ID card in a red cover; the police did not check any other men sitting at the same table any further.

Some time later, we managed to locate the apartment of that inspector and during the observation we found that every day, once or even twice a day, a group of 6–10 people used to visit him. These were primarily the Border Guard officers and two non-commissioned officers, who behaved quite freely. From the watchman and the neighbours, we learned that sometimes in the evenings and at night they sang and caroused, there were noises of drinking, etc.

In late December, this inspector went to Lublin. Our observations proved that during this stay he did not go anywhere. It seemed he was spending Christmas there. We have not reported any contacts with or from him. After around 10 days he came back, and in around mid-January, he moved to Cracow. There we also organised his observation, but I do not know the results of that.

We did not have any evidence that the inspector and his men were working in German intelligence; in any case, it was clear that they enjoyed full freedom of movement, that they formed a certain group, and that they had money. However, this could also be due to their business with Germans. We knew of cases, when the Germans were looking for partners to this end, who would issue ID cards allowing for free movement. Most surely this case was clarified later on.

3) At the end of October, we received some reports stating that the wife of Lieutenant Colonel SIKORA had had some relations with Germans.

A member of our group, a man named JASZCZOŁT, the former Secretary of the President of the city of Warsaw, Mr STARZYŃSKI, was ordered to clarify this matter. He learned from her that, together with several officers’ wives, she had been offered a job in a film production company in Gdańsk by Germans. She accounted for this fact by her contacts with various German institutions.

Since according to our assumptions we could have expected something even worse, JASZCZOŁT was ordered to find employment in that film production

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7 Presumably Oskar Sikora (born 1887), retired lieutenant-colonel; in 1928 in the 3rd District Communications Headquarters. Retired lieutenant-colonel Dr Jan Sikora-Sikorski (born 1875) from Kielce will not be considered in this case.

8 Jerzy Jaszczołt (1903–1944), nom de guerre “Sulima,” reserve second lieutenant, actor. In September 1939, Secretary to Stefan Starzyński; in the period from establishing SZP, Starzyński’s liaison with General Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz, later in the SZP/ZWZ-AK. Killed in the Warsaw Uprising.

9 Stefan Starzyński (1893–1944), economic and political activist. From 1929 to 1932 (with intervals), Deputy Minister of the Treasury; in 1930–1933 Member of Parliament of the Republic of Poland, then a senator; from 1934 to 1939 mayor of Warsaw. In September 1939, the Civil Commissioner for Warsaw Defence Headquarters; in October 1939 arrested by the Germans and murdered in a concentration camp.

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company in Gdańsk, to fully and thoroughly explain the matter. In January, he
began to work there. With what results, I do not know.

4) Earlier in prison, I was asking my fellow inmates:
   a) if somebody leaves the camp before me, to inform Halina WASILEWSKA in
Lviv and Halina KRZYŻANOWSKA\(^\text{10}\) in Warsaw about me.

   I did not know the former, although I was in a very good relationship with her
mother. Because I was concerned about [such an arrangement] during the necessary
stay in Lviv, as no-one knew of my presence, I agreed with Ewelina
KARASIÓWNA,\(^\text{11}\) who was travelling with me as my sister, that she would visit
WASILEWSKA H., and that with her help she would find an apartment for me.

   To this end (as I think) she took the address at 49 Zadwórzańska Street from
her mother H. WASILEWSKA. Since Ewelina KARASIÓWNA had been released
from prison in Przemyśl, I believed she would manage to reach Lviv and inform
H. WASILEWSKA about everything.

   Because I did not know any other address in Lviv, and I wanted to inform my
comrades about my fate, to get some money and necessary things, when I was
already in the camp I wrote her a letter from Mostowice in late October, a postcard
in November, and in December, when I was in Wielis, a postcard as well.

   Since I was not sure if she was still living there, in the Mostowice camp I asked
GOLDFRUCHT\(^\text{12}\) a pharmacist from Lviv, to ask in a letter to his family to check
the address of H. WASILEWSKA and to ask his family, if she was found, to pass
her information about me, requesting at the same time to repeat everything to my
sister and writing a letter to Halina KRZYŻANOWSKA in Warsaw, at the address
of 12 Mokotowska Street.

   I received no answer to all these efforts and letters.

   b) From Mostowice, I also wrote twice to Halina KRZYŻANOWSKA, sending
her a letter and postcard. She has been my companion and friend for over 15 years.
I lived with her several times at 37 Plocka Street, when in recent years I worked
in Warsaw; she also knew the name under which I left. From Wielis, I wrote to
her a third time.

   c) From the camp in Wielis I wrote to Zdzisław TRZECIAK\(^\text{13}\) in Mostowice.
I had met him in Mostowice; he was a reserve lieutenant in the 1st light horse
regiment. I wanted to give him my address so he knew where to send mail if
anything came to me. The second time I wrote him from the camp near Shangal.
They took this postcard away from me in Wielis.

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\(^{10}\) Halina Krzyżanowska (?–1952), *nom de guerre* “Suzuki,” treasurer of SZP (financial unit). After
the war in Poland.

\(^{11}\) Ewelina Karasiówna (1894–1965), *nom de guerre* “Wela,” head of the premises unit at the DG SZP,
liaison to ZWZ; she accompanied General Tokarzewski-Karaszewicz on his way to Lviv. After the war was
imprisoned from 1951 to 1956.

\(^{12}\) Presumably Salo (Salomon) Goldfrucht of the town of Zniesienie near Lviv.

\(^{13}\) Zdzisław Trzeciak (born 1901); acc. to ROR of 1934, reserve second lieutenant. Participant in the
September 1939 campaign; in 1940 sent to *gulag* in Kargopol, after the war in exile. Nomination to the
rank of lieutenant in the Polish Army in the USSR.
d) I also wrote once or twice to the pharmacist named GOLDFRUCHT, whom I have already mentioned, both in order to learn about the search for H. WASILEWSKA's address, and also in the case of a medicinal handbook. I asked him to purchase the handbook via his relatives. Also, GISA\(^{14}\) asked this handbook to be sent.

e) I wrote twice, from Mostowice and later on from Shangal (the last [postcard] was taken away from me), to Irena ZAJĄCZKOWSKA in Radziwiłłów.

In Dnipropetrovsk I did time for 2–3 months with her husband Wacław\(^{15}\) – a major, a reserve physician, director of the hospital in Radziwiłłów. They arrested him because before the war he used to work in various social organisations. I wanted to tell her where her husband was, and ask her to send him some money.

5) The photos found at my place are: 1) 2 photos of my daughter Irena\(^{16}\); 2) there was also one more photo of my wife,\(^{17}\) but I did not see it in the documentation I was confronted with; 3) 2 photos of Doctor ARUNDALE and his wife, a Hindu woman.\(^{18}\) He is the president of the Theosophical Association; before the war he lived in India, in Madras.

I met him in [19]25 or [19]26, when he travelled in Poland giving lectures.

In 1927, I visited him in London, where with his help I became acquainted with Tibetan and Indian medicine. From that time on, I made friends with him and we exchanged correspondence. I paid him a visit twice more later in London; he in turn was once in Poland and three times in the Netherlands, where he came from India giving lectures. 4) One photograph of a Hindu man – his name is on the business card that was attached to my case file. I met him in while on holiday in Hendaye, France (I think it was in 1931 or in 1932). He lives permanently in Paris, is an expert in Sanskrit and he also helped me in studying philosophy, Hindu and Tibetan medicine. I was at his place in Paris once (at Hendaye) and I wrote to him once or twice. He sent me the supplement (amendments) to the *Bhagavad Gita*.

He has not replied to my last letter (I think from 1934). Later on, I did not write to him any more either, and I lost contact with him. 5) One photograph of the Wawel Castle in Cracow. 6) One photo of Mrs. Gilda TINZ,\(^{19}\) whom I met in 1929 in Yugoslavia during the holidays, and I became friends with her. In 1929 she was in Poland for a few days, and in 1931 or in 1932, returning from France, I met her in Prague. Earlier in 1930 I visited her in Vienna for 2 – 3 days.

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\(^{14}\) In handwritten testimony by General Tokarzewski-Karaszewic of 6 February 1941 – Gries.

\(^{15}\) Wacław Zajączkowski (born 1898), medical doctor; in 1929–1939 ran a physician’s practice in Radziwiłłów.

\(^{16}\) Irena Tokarzewska-Karaszewicz (born 1919), married Petrusewicz; from 1939 in exile in France, since 1940 in Canada.

\(^{17}\) Antonina Tokarzewska-Karaszewicz (born 1892), maiden name Kądzioła; after 1939 in France and Canada.

\(^{18}\) Dr George S. Arundale’s wife (he was a theosophist in the “*Droit Humain*” British Federation) was Rukmini Devi, a dancer and choreographer.

\(^{19}\) Gilda Tinz, a theosophist, maybe a relative of retired Major-General Eugeniusz Tinz (1877– after 1938).
Since 1935, when – as she wrote me – she got married, we used to write to each other very rarely, maybe once or twice, and I think since 1937 we have ceased to exchange letters at all. Since then, nothing about her is known to me. 7) 2 photos of Halina KRZYŻANOWSKA and Wanda DZIEWOŃSKA²⁰ from Warsaw.

These are my friends; we have known each other for 15 years. We worked together in the “Servants’ Association”²¹ and in the Polish Theosophical Association²² for a couple of years at the beginning, when I worked there. I used to keep all these photos in my wallet, while I took the latter two deliberately, in case I might need to send someone to Poland, [to give them to a messenger] in order to find them more easily – I mean here Halina KRZYŻANOWSKA in Warsaw and Wanda DZIEWOŃSKA, who have lived in Budapest since the outbreak of the war.

As regards the case of Colonel MAJEWSKI, whose name I did not remember, I recalled upon being asked whether there was any brigade commander of such a name in Pomerania.

Upon the arrival of the courier from Paris (GIEYSZTOR), when I was waiting for him at 16 Al. Jerozolimskie, Colonel ROWECKI took me Colonel MAJEWSKI, whom I had known beforehand, from the 1st Brigade of Polish Legions, and later on as the regiment commander in Przemyśl, and suggested sending him to Volhynia, from where we had not received any messages. I talked to him very briefly then. This trip was convenient for him (because he had relatives or acquaintances there), so I said that ROWECKI had recruited him to the organisation, and within 2 – 3 had weeks made him acquainted with our work. I do not remember what I told him about the task he was assigned, since all of us were concerned by the lack of any messages from the government, but it seems to me that I said nothing specific.

Later on, after maybe a week and a half, Colonel ROWECKI asked me to send MAJEWSKI to Lutsk as soon as possible.

As I had already decided that I would go to France if the government did not allow me to stay in Warsaw, I did not want to meddle in the affairs of the organisation. I also considered it inadvisable for conspiracy-related reasons to use Colonel MAJEWSKI on the Soviet side, since we knew nothing about that area. I said that first we had to send a young officer there, to acquaint himself with the situation, and only then would I agree to send Colonel MAJEWSKI there. The same applied for Białystok, where Major BANASZKIEWICZ²³ was supposed to

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²⁰ Wanda Dziewońska, before 1939 in the Women’s Association for Civil Labour, from the first half of 1939 in RG PWK; from autumn 1939, a coder at the ZWZ Base “Romek”; and a contact unit employee; in 1940 organiser of the transfer of the KG ZWZ outpost.

²¹ This may refer to “Poland’s Servants,” a group active within the Polish Theosophical Association.

²² The Polish Theosophical Association was established on 15 January 1920.

²³ Presumably Feliks Banasiński (born 1895), officer in the 36th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Legion’s Infantry Regiment, and the 53rd Infantry Regiment; from 1924 in the 2nd Unit of the General Staff. Retired by 1932 (major); in 1937 removed from the officer corps and stripped of his rank. From October 1939 to August 1940 the Commander of SZP/ZWZ in the Białystok District; arrested, disappeared without trace.
go. The general staff suggested I send him. We sent a young officer there instead of him.

Testimony was taken by:
Senior operating officer of the 13th Department of the 2nd Unit of GUGB NKVD
KOZHUSHKO

_HDA SBU, F. 861185, pp. 113–123._
_Copy, typescript._
_Document in Russian._
No. 18
8–9 February 1941, Moscow. Indictment against Stefan Korybut-Włoch de Górski, Markian Dederczuk and Bartłomiej Barski

“I approve”
Head of the Special Unit of GUGB NKVD USSR
Major of State Security
(−) MIKHEYEV

“I approve the indictment
Send the case for further examination by
Military Jury of the Supreme Court.
Deputy to the General Military Prosecutor
(−) 11 February 1941

Indictment

in the investigation case No. 1293, charging KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI Stefan, son of Władysław, with crimes listed under Art. 58. items 6, 8 and 11, of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR; DEDERCZUK Markian, son of Dmitry; and BARSKI Bartłomiej, son of Jan; with crimes under Art. 58, p.p. 8 and 11, of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

1 Anatoly Nikolaievich Mikheyev (1911–1941), from August 1940 to 12 February 1941 Head of the Special Unit (OO) of the GUGB NKVD USSR, from February to July 1941 Head of the Board of the 3rd People’s Commissariat of Defence of the USSR, 3rd Rank commissar for state security in 1941.

2 According to the NKVD’s files, also known as Kornbut Wloch or Bloch, and Wloch de Górski, de Górski, Korybut-Wloch or Stefan Bloch. His testimony during the investigation (not published here) should be treated with the utmost caution. According to them, he was a lieutenant in the French, German and British army, and a Polish Army cadet. He spoke Polish, German, Ukrainian, Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish. He testified, inter alia, that he was a collaborator with Polish and British intelligence. He also declared that he had been recruited by the Polish Border Guard in the Free City of Gdańsk to observe German actions against the Westerplatte from 1938 to August 1939. He referred to his connections with generals Tokarzewski, Bortnowski, Boltuc, Żeligowski and Czuma, who sent him to work against the USSR; that is allegedly why he came to Lviv. Perhaps he was providing this information in an attempt to make the Soviet military counter-intelligence interested in his person. Moreover, he testified that members of his family lived in the United States, France, Germany and Poland; he studied in Brussels, Grenoble, Paris, Berlin and Gdańsk. He also claimed to be the world champion in trampoline jumping and parachute jumps, and a German intelligence agent. He repeatedly changed his testimony. In each successive testimony he would state that previously he had been lying. He initially testified that the attack was to be carried out by Dederczuk (of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists – OUN and a collaborator with German intelligence, who in 1938 had transferred Ukrainian fighters to Poland), himself being an observer on behalf of Polish intelligence; in the end, he admitted that he was a ZWZ member and had personally executed the assault. Dederczuk adopted a similar tactic; he was initially mixing up his testimony, and finally revealed that he had allegedly been operating as a Polish intelligence collaborator in Carpathian Ruthenia since 1938 and after 17 September 1939 he was smuggling people across the border to Hungary.
On the night of 7 to 8 July 1940, in the pool house of the Red Army garrison in Lviv, during a festivity attended by Red Army commanding personnel and their family members, an act of terrorism was executed, as a result of which 3 people were killed and 27 injured. (vol. 3 pp. 662–668–693–695 and evidence file pp. 1–4, 12–22).

During the preliminary investigation, it was found that KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI Stefan, son of Władysław, participated in the terrorist attack; he was arrested on 16 July 1940.

During the interrogation, KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI testified that he executed the terrorist attack in the DKA Lviv garrison swimming pool with the cooperation and help of employees of the swimming pool: DEDERCZUK Markian, son of Dmytry, and BARSKI Bartłomiej, son of Jan.

DEDERCZUK and BARSKI were arrested and have investigated thereafter as defendants.

During the interrogation, the following facts were established:

KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI, being a member of a Polish nationalist organisation named Związek Walki Zbrojnej (ZWZ), carried out the terrorist assault by order of the commander of the terrorist unit of that counter-revolutionary organisation – DASZKIEWICZ (vol. 1, pp. 180, 256; vol. 2, p. 471; vol. 4, pp. 950, 951).

While executing DASZKIEWICZ’s task, KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI established a terrorist group near the Red Army of the Lviv garrison, to which he recruited the manager of the pool DEDERCZUK and a carpenter working at the pool, BARSKI, with whose help he conducted the terrorist act (vol. 1, pp. 256, 257; vol. 2, pp. 499–501; vol. 3, pp. 785–799, 808–818; vol. 4, pp. 961–963–971).

KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI testified:

“[...] I conducted the terrorist attack with the cooperation of DEDERCZUK and BARSKI. Approximately two weeks before the terrorist attack, I do not remember exactly when, by order of the commander of the terrorist unit of the Polish nationalist insurgent organisation ZWZ (Union of Armed Struggle) DASZKIEWICZ, I went to the swimming pool of the Lviv garrison, to the manager of the facility, DEDERCZUK, to organise the terrorist attack [...].

I told DEDERCZUK, that the organisation had instructed me to organise and conduct a terrorist attack at the premises of the swimming pool against the Soviet military men... then I asked DEDERCZUK to help me in organising it, and he agreed [...].

At the end of June, I do not remember exactly when, I informed BARSKI that I was a member of the terrorist unit of the ZWZ organisation and I told him, as I told DEDERCZUK, about the objectives and tasks of the organisation in the fight against the Soviet authorities and I suggested he might join this organisation, which BARSKI willingly agreed to. After that, I told him that the organisation had
instructed me to make a terrorist attack at the swimming pool, and he should help me. BARSKI agreed [...].”


The testimony of KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI concerning the organisation and conduct of a terrorist attack finds full confirmation in the testimony provided by DEDERCZUK and BARSKI (vol. 2 pp. 500, vol. 3 pp. 815, 816).

“[...] On the first day, upon his arrival at my place, GÓRSKI told me at night that he visited me at the swimming pool by order of the Polish terrorist organisation in order to organise and conduct a terrorist attack at the premises of the swimming pool against the Red Army commanding personnel and their family members [...].”

(Interrogation protocol of DEDERCZUK of 1 October 1940).

“[...] De GÓRSKI indeed involved me in helping him with the execution of the terrorist attack in the swimming pool in the last days of the month of June, in DEDERCZUK’s apartment, where he lived [...].

When de GÓRSKI told me that he had been instructed to execute a terrorist attack at the swimming pool and required me to help him therein, I willingly agreed. I also granted my consent because in the presence of DEDERCZUK, de GÓRSKI explicitly informed us that after he threw the grenade at the swimming pool, we would be given a considerable amount of money [...].”

(BARSKI’s testimony during confrontation with KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI of 30 October 1940).

The terrorist attack was conducted in the following circumstances:

Upon his arrival on 7 July 1940 at 11:20 p.m. at the premises of the swimming pool of the Lviv House of the Red Army, where the festivity was taking place with the participation of the executive personnel of the Lviv garrison, KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI left documents in DEDERCZUK’s room and went to the counter, then to a film show.

Upon having stopped behind the screen near the fence, at 00:10 on 8 July, he threw the grenade into the audience.

After throwing the grenade, KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI went to DEDERCZUK’s room, took his documents and left the premises of the swimming pool via the ladies’ rest room (vol. 1 pp. 269–272, 303; vol. 2 pp. 509–511, 581; vol. 3 pp. 744, 745, 748, 752, 755, 757, 785–799, 808–818 and the evidence file pp. 5, 8, 9).

The terrorist attack had been conducted using a French-type defensive grenade, manufactured in Poland, produced with the fuse type “WZ-GR-31,” which KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI received from DASZKIEWICZ (vol. 1 pp. 264, 328, 329 and the evidence file pp. 23–30, 35).
Apart from terrorist activity, KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI was involved in spying operations against the Soviet Union (vol. 1 pp. 89–90, 92, 95–97, 101, 102, 105–108, 282; vol. 4, pp. 934–940, 942–951).

The defendants KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI, DEDERCZUK and BARSKI pleaded guilty.

They were charged based on witnesses’ accounts and the evidence gathered in that case.

Based on the above, the following charges are laid against:

1. KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI Stefan, son of Władysław, born in 1918 in Gdańsk, son of an engineer, a Pole, single, no member of any party; until 1938 he was a citizen of Gdańsk, then of Germany, but had no documents; as he says, he graduated from the military-topographical faculty at the Technical University of Gdańsk, from November 1939 to February 1940 he worked as a skiing inspector at the Stanyslaviv district committee for physical culture and sport.

   Prior to arrest, had no fixed employment –

   – that he was a member of the counter-revolutionary Polish nationalist organisation named ZWZ, by order of which during the night of 7 to 8 July 1940 he conducted a terrorist attack on the premises of the swimming pool of the Red Army of Lviv’s garrison.

   While staying on Soviet territory, he was involved in espionage operations against the Soviet Union, which is a crime under Art. 58, items 6, 8 and 11 of the CC of the RSFSR.

2. DEDERCZUK Markian, son of Dmitry, born in 1921 in a village of Vorokhta, Yaremcha region in Stanyslaviv district, of peasant descent, a Ukrainian, citizen of the USSR, no member of any party, basic education, single.

   Prior to his arrest, manager of the DKA swimming pool of the Lviv garrison –

   – that upon having been recruited by KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI to join the terrorist group by the Lviv DKA, he participated in the preparation and conduct of a terrorist attack on the night of 7 to 8 July 1940, which is a crime under Art. 58, pp. 8 and 11 of the CC of the RSFSR.

3. BARSKI Bartłomiej, son of Jan, born in 1913 in the village of Plautsha in Ternopil district, of peasant descent, a Pole, citizen of the USSR, until 1939 a member of the “Strzelec” Polish military organisation, basic education.

   Prior to his arrest, a carpenter at the DKA swimming pool of the Lviv garrison –

   – that upon having been recruited by KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI to join the terrorist group by the Lviv DKA, he participated in the preparation and conduct of a terrorist attack on the night of 7 to 8 July 1940, which is a crime under Art. 58, pp. 8 and 11 of the CC of the RSFSR.
Under the provisions set forth in Art. 208 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR, I hereby order the submission of investigation case No. 1293 charging KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI W., DEDERCZUK M. D. and BARSKI B. J. to the General Prosecutor of the USSR, to bring the defendants before the Military Jury of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

Drawn up on “а-8-а” February 1941, city [of] Moscow.

Investigating officer OO GUGB NKVD USSR
Junior Lieutenant of State Security
(–) PAPKO

“I approve”
Deputy to the Head of the OO GUGB NKVD USSR
Major of State Security
(–) OSETROV

Notice: 1. Defendants were arrested: KORYBUT-WŁOCH de GÓRSKI W. – 16 July 1940, DEDERCZUK M. D. – 25 July 1940, BARSKI B. J. – 12 September 1940, they remain under guard in the Lefortovo Prison of NKVD USSR.
2. Evidence has been attached to the case documentation in a separate volume.³

Investigating officer OO GUGB NKVD USSR
Junior Lieutenant of State Security
(–) PAPKO

HDA SBU,Lviv, 54686, pp. 992–996.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

³ On 25 February 1941, Stefan Korybut-Włoch de Górski, Markian Dederczuk and Batłomiej Barski were sentenced to death by the Military Chamber of the USSR Supreme Court. The sentence was carried out on 2 April 1941.
CHAPTER IV

The Poles and the Ukrainians: between two totalitarian systems 1942–1945
The period of World War II and the first postwar years were very special for Polish-Ukrainian relations. The bloody conflict that broke out at that time was imprinted on the collective memory of both nations, and whenever it has been mentioned, it has provoked vivid emotional reactions. Most of all, the reason for this is that both Poles and Ukrainians have been enjoying freedom of speech for a short period of time, since in the past raising this issue was either forbidden or was subject to strict ideological interpretation.

The events that took place in Volhynia in 1943 have been presented in various, often completely differing ways in Polish and Ukrainian historiography and journalism. This is visible in the vocabulary used by the respective authors. Describing the situation in Volhynia in 1943, Polish authors more often talk about “massacres,” “extermination,” “genocide” or “the OUN and UPA anti-Polish action.” Ukrainian authors, on the other hand, write about the “Volhynian tragedy,” “tragedy of Volhynia,” “mutual bloody massacres.

Nothing can bring us closer to the historical truth than the disclosure and publication of all the archive materials that have so far been unavailable. This subject is too important for Poles and Ukrainians to hide any relevant documents. Nothing is as crucial for Truth, Forgiveness and Reconciliation as complete openness. Such openness was declared in July 2003 by the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine. In the same year, in his special message to the Polish and Ukrainian nations, Pope John Paul II expressed his position on the necessity of historical reconciliation between the Polish and Ukrainian nations. He called for good-neighbourly relations, and also talked about the necessity to admit the mistakes of the past by both nations, as well as deep repentance for all the evil done.

Undoubtedly, historical dissertations and attempts to create common interpretation of the complex events will also support the creation of this fundament.

Władysław Filar has been dealing with the problem of Volynia for years. At this point, some of his works are worth mentioning: “Burza” na Wołyniu. Z dziejów 27 Wołyńskiej Dywizji Piechoty Armii Krajowej. Studium historyczno-wojskowe (Warsaw, 1997); Eksterminacja ludności polskiej na Wołyniu w drugiej wojnie światowej (Warsaw, 1999); Wołyń 1939–1944. Eksterminacja czy walki polsko-ukraińskiej. Studium historyczno-wojskowe zmagań na Wołyniu w obronie polskości, wiary i godności ludzkiej (Toruń, 2003). He also edited a collection of articles entitled Przed acją “Wisła” był Wołyń (Warsaw, 2000).

The cycle of seminars Polska – Ukraina: trudne pytania (vol. 1–9, Warsaw, 1996–2002), which were published for many years, are also very important. It is also worth mentioning the monographs of the 27th Volhynia Division of the Home Army written by former soldiers of this unit: Michał Fijałka, 27. Wołyńska Dywizja Piechoty AK (Warsaw, 1986) and Józef Turowski, Pożoga. Walki 27. Wołyńskiej Dywizji AK (Warsaw, 1990). The action of the Home Army in Volhynia has also been described by Wincenty Romanowski in ZWZ-AK na Wołyniu 1939–1944 (Lublin, 1993). The Volhynia self-defence was presented in Adam Peretiatkowicz, Polska samoobrona w okolicach Łucka (Katowice, 1995), and Wołyńska samoobrona w dorzeczu Horynia (Katowice, 1997). The activity of the Home Army in Eastern Galicia has also been discussed in a number of works by Jerzy Węgierski, W lwowskiej Armii Krajowej (Warsaw, 1989); Armia Krajowa na zachód od Lwowa (Cracow, 1994); Armia Krajowa na południowo-wschodnich przedpolach Lwowa (Kryspinów 1994); Lwowska konspiracja narodowa i katolicka 1939–1946 (Cracow, 1994); Armia Krajowa w okręgach Stanisławów i Tarnopol (Cracow, 1996); Armia Krajowa w Zagłębiu Naftowym i na Samborszczyźnie (Cracow, 1993); Armia Krajowa — oddziały leśne 19. pułku piechoty (Cracow, 1993).

Significant information on Eastern Galicia is also included in works by Grzegorz Mazur, Pokucie w latach drugiej wojny światowej (Cracow, 1994) and Grzegorz Hryciuk, Polacy we Lwowie. Życie codzienne (Warsaw, 2000) and “Kumityt.” Polski Komitet Opiekuńczy Lwów Miasto w latach 1941–1944 (Toruń, 2001). Valuable documents have been published in the collection entitled Archiwum Adama Bienia (1942–1944), edited by Jan Brzeski, Adam Rolinski (Cracow, 2001), as well as in Lucyna Kulińska’s work Dzieje Komitetu Ziemi Wschodnich na tle losów ludności polskich kresów w latach 1943–1947 (vol. 1–2, Cracow, 2002). It is also worth mentioning a collection of articles entitled Antypolska akcja OUN-UPA 1943–1944. Fakty i interpretacje, edited by Grzegorz Motyka and Dariusz Libionka (Warsaw, 2002). The events in the Lublin region have been presented, for example, in Zygmunt Mańkowski, Między Wisłą a Bugiem. Studium o polityce okupanta i postawach społeczeństwa (Lublin, 1978) and Grzegorz Motyka, Tak było w Bieszczadach. Walki polsko-ukraińskie 1943–1948 (Warsaw, 1999) etc. These are only some of the large number of titles that have been published in Poland describing this period.

In recent years, a wide range of publications on Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II has appeared in Ukraine. As a result, the tragic events in Volhynia are no longer being kept secret from the Ukrainian society of today.
Ihor Ilyushyn has made a great effort to investigate this complicated conflict.\(^2\)

A number of documentary publications have also been written by Volodymyr Serhiychuk.\(^3\) Publication which includes interviews with eyewitnesses of the events in Volhynia in 1943 was prepared by Mykola Zhulynsky.\(^4\)

In 2003, a special issue of an independent culturological magazine entitled “Ż” was published. It included the results of studies by Polish and Ukrainian researchers as well as those from other countries, and published documents related to Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II.\(^5\)

The Ukrainian press has made a great effort to present its public with the truth related to the events that took place in Volhynia. This was most apparent in a publication presented in the paper Дзеркало тижня.\(^6\)

Znaczny oddźwięk społeczny wywołały publikacje w gazecie День.\(^7\) In 2004, the same paper published a book entitled Війни і мир, або Українці-поляки: брать/вороги, сусіди, which includes materials on the events in Volhynia.\(^8\)

Other Ukrainian periodicals have also devoted special publications to the events in Volhynia.\(^9\)

\(^2\) І. Ілюшин, Протистояння УПА і АК (Армії Крайової) в роки Другої світової війни на тлі діяльності польського підпілля в Західній Україні (Кiev, 2001); idem, Волинська трагедія 1943–1944 pp. (Kiev, 2003).

\(^3\) В. Сергійчук, Трагедія Волині. Причини й перебіг польсько-українського конфлікту в роки Другої світової війни (Kiev, 2003); and his work Поляки на Волині у роки Другої світової війни. Документи з українських архівів і польські публікації (Kiev, 2003).

\(^4\) М. Жулинський, Поминаймо в скорботі, але не в гніві. Українсько-польський конфлікт на Волині 1943–1944 рр. (Lutsk, 2003).


\(^8\) Ю. Шаповал, Потенціал взаєморозуміння та історичний простір ненависті. Роздуми над нововіднайденими документами про польсько-українські відносини під час Другої світової війни, ін Війни і мир, або Українці-поляки: брать/вороги, сусіди (Kiev, 2004), 298–315.

As has already been mentioned, Polish and Ukrainian historiographies have presented different views on the events that took place in Volhynia in 1943. According to Polish historians, the responsibility for the bloody events lies principally with Bandera’s faction of the the OUN, and the associated UPA. Ukrainian researchers usually claim that there is no explicit and convincing answer to the question of who was first to start the bloodshed. They point out that the events that took place during World War II cannot be analysed separately from the context of the whole history of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

The main reason for the conflict of that time was a dispute over borders. During the whole period of the Second Polish Republic, some Ukrainian political circles aimed at creating an independent country that would have encompassed the territories that the Poles considered as their own.

In the period 1918–1939, there were more than 5 million Ukrainians within the Polish borders. They constituted 16% of all the citizens of the Polish Republic. However, within the territories that they occupied – especially in Volhynia – they were most often the majority. A great number of Ukrainians claimed that an independent Ukrainian country should be created, and so they treated their incorporation into Poland as occupation.

In the Second Polish Republic, the Ukrainian question was one of the most important problems which the reborn Polish state had to deal with. All Polish political groups claimed that the eastern territories of Poland should be permanently bound to Poland. To this end, it was necessary to convince at least some Ukrainian inhabitants of the validity of this idea. Two methods were considered: by state or national assimilation.

The supporters of the first method – the Piłsudski loyalists, the liberal intelligentsia, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and the Democratic Party (SD) – claimed that national minorities should be guaranteed full civil rights, and at the same time their cultural autonomy should be respected. The Polish Socialist Party also postulated that the Ukrainians should be granted territorial autonomy. It was presumed that this would evoke a feeling of connection with Poland. This idea was often accompanied by “Promethean” plans of dividing the USSR into separate nation states. To this end, the Ukrainian aspirations to create an independent state on the territory of the pre-war Ukrainian SSR was supported (though covertly) by providing help to supporters of Semyon Petliura in emigration. With the approval of the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Polish Army included a group of Ukrainian officers, the so-called “contract officers,” who, in the event of war against the USSR, were supposed to create a corps of officers of the reborn

“Волинська трагедія,” Столичні новості, 2–8 July 2003; Б. Козловський, “Поминаємо в скорботі чи зводимо порахунки? Думки з приводу відзначення зловісного “ювілею’ волинської трагедії,” Високий замок, 10 July 2003, etc.
army of the UNR. Strong supporters of the national assimilation policy included, Józef Piłsudski, Henryk Józewski and Tadeusz Hołówko.

The second position, i.e. a programme of national assimilation, was based on the total subordination of minorities to Polish dominance. In this vision of the country, the Poles were supposed to play the crucial role, and they were the only ones who could enjoy full citizenship rights. People of different nationalities, including the Ukrainians, were to become Polonised by means of administrative pressure. This alternative was supported by the national democrats, Christian democrats and a major part of the Polish People’s Party (PSL). They very often claimed that the Ukrainian nation does not exist; that it is an artificial entity, created as a result of German intrigues. According to this idea, apart from the Poles and the Jews, the borderlands were inhabited by Ruthenians, who had a positive attitude towards Poland.

The Constitution of the Second Polish Republic guaranteed equal rights to all citizens, regardless of their nationality. However, in practice, the rights of minorities – especially when power was held by supporters of national assimilation – were often violated. In the first half of the 1920s, a very serious problem was posed by the rejection of a proposal to grant autonomy to Eastern Galicia. National minorities perceived this fact as a violation of their constitutional rights. The postponed opening of a Ukrainian university in Lviv made the situation even worse. Moreover, according to an act of 1924, Polish was introduced as the language of tuition in most schools in Western Ukraine, which considerably limited the Ukrainian educational system in this region. Career opportunities for the Ukrainian intelligentsia were reduced. The fact that the territory was granted to Polish settlers evoked particular outrage.

Despite this, Ukrainian socio-cultural and political life developed in the Second Polish Republic. Representatives of the minority had their own parliamentary grouping. Numerous Ukrainian political activists strove to create the best conditions for Ukrainian social life. The most important representative of this trend was the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO).

It should be noted that the “Ukrainian cause” in Poland was cleverly exploited by the Communist, pro-Soviet forces, mainly the Communist Party of Western Ukraine.

Finally, nationalist organisations were very important in Ukrainian politics; the most important of them was the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)

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11 See R. Torzecki, Kwestia ukraińska w Polsce...; R. Torzecki, Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy 1933–1945 (Warsaw, 1972); M. Papierzyńska-Turek, Między tradycją...; J. J. Bruski, Petlurowcy...
established in 1929. It strove for the creation of an independent and united Ukrainian state by means of ruthless military action. Members of the OUN, who believed in an ideology of so-called integral nationalism, supported a parliamentary revolution rejecting any compromise. That is why they often perceived Ukrainians who sought agreement with the Poles as harmful for the national cause. The supporters of the OUN principally included Ukrainian youth, for whom the “occupiers” of Ukraine, i.e. Poland and the USSR, were the main enemies. In practice, the main impetus of the OUN was directed at Poland, which included terrorist attacks. The authorities applied the principle of collective responsibility for the activity of the OUN, imposing police restrictions on all Ukrainians, regardless of whether they sympathised with the nationalists or not. This was particularly visible in 1930, during the so-called pacification period.12

Mutual disagreements grew even worse after the death of Marshal Józef Piłsudski in 1935. The politics of the Polish authorities started to be directed clearly at national assimilation. They intended to Polonise the Ukrainians through gradual administrative pressure. Various actions aimed at “increasing Polishness” were organised, such as the destruction of “useless” Orthodox churches in the Lublin region, and the forced conversion of members of the Orthodox church to Catholicism in Volhynia. In practice, representatives of the Ukrainian minority became second-class citizens. As Ryszard Torzecki justly observed, this led to “a consolidation of the national movement of the Ukrainians and an enhancement of the nationalistic feeling, which was hiding an ominous harbinger of revenge.”13

Despite this, due to the forthcoming war, in August 1939, the National Committee UNDO made a significant declaration: “The tensions in the current international relations has reached its peak, and there is a threat of armed conflict. [...] Ukrainian society should remain calm and balanced, even in the toughest moments. [...] We should not carelessly put people’s lives at risk. [...] At the moment, we do not see any outside power that would strive to solve the Ukrainian problem. That is why the propaganda that makes us wait for external help is not consistent with the Ukrainian raison d’état. [...] We deplore various attempts to involve our society in sabotage operations as an activity of foreign espionage networks, since the Ukrainian society, and particularly our youth, is more important for us. [...] Without ignoring the national and political aspirations of the Ukrainian nation to become an equal and eligible member in the council of European nations, and without withdrawing from the political fight for full rights of the Ukrainian nation in Poland, the National Committee states that, unfortunately, we enter this historical moment – both for the Polish and Ukrainian nation – with an unsettled political score, and that from now on, Polish-Ukrainian relations will gradually become more and more tense, which is not our fault. The National Committee

13 R. Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraińcy. Sprawa ukraińska w czasie II wojny światowej na terenie II Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw, 1993).
believes that historical necessity will lead both nations, in their collective interest, to the settlement of their political disputes."\textsuperscript{14}

Similar declarations were made by the UNR, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky and, after the outbreak of the war, Vasyl Mudry, the Deputy Marshal of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland, as well as by Stepan Skrypnyk,\textsuperscript{15} a representative of the Volhynian Ukrainians.

* * *

During the Polish campaign of 1939, Polish soldiers of Ukrainian nationality fulfilled their duties very well. They fought near Mokra, in Pomerania and near Bzura. According to the findings of Professor Władysław Rezner, the Polish Army of one million soldiers included between 106,314 and 111,910 Ukrainians. About 7834 of them died on the battlefield, and over 15,000 were injured.\textsuperscript{16} Ukrainians often received decorations for their brave conduct; for example, Pavlo Shandruk received the highest military decoration, the Virtuti Militari cross.

On the other hand, on the German side, there was Colonel Roman Sushko’s legion consisting of 600 soldiers, but it did not participate in the fights. Ukrainians supporting nationalistic ideas counted on the help of the Germans, since they hoped that Eastern Galicia and Volhynia would be turned into something like a protectorate, where at worst, the Ukrainians would be treated as in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before World War I. Desertions from the army started after 10 September. Deserters ran away with weapons and often formed larger groups. In the same period, Ukrainians started to commit acts of sabotage and assaults. These were often organised by communists, and many of them were undoubtedly participated by OUN activists. Some of the attacks, especially those involving robbery, were carried out by people living on the margins of society. Altogether, acts of sabotage took place in 20 districts of Western Ukraine.\textsuperscript{17} However, Polish historians agree that this movement did not attract the masses, and the acts of sabotage were not coordinated, so the army could easily suppress them.\textsuperscript{18}

During World War II, the political situations of the Poles and Ukrainians were different. For the Poles, both the Germans and the Soviets were occupiers, with whom they had to fight. Supporters of the pro-Communist or pro-German options were in the minority. Even after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, the USSR was the “ally of our allies” for the Poles. From the perspective of Poland, the

\textsuperscript{14} The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London, A 9V/8a.
\textsuperscript{17} А. Русначенко, “Українсько-польське протистояння в роки другої світової війни,” Сучасність, no. 10, 90.
\textsuperscript{18} R. Torzecki, Polacy i Ukraińcy. Sprawa ukraińska...; W. Rezmer, Stanowisko i udział Ukraińców...
problem of Ukraine in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia was an internal affair of the Republic of Poland. The Poles did not want to trigger an open conflict with the Ukrainians, since they thought this would weaken the position of Poland in relation to its main enemies – the Third Reich and the USSR. In the Polish political environment, there was a clash of two concepts of dealing with the Ukrainians, which were a simple continuation of the pre-war divisions.

At the beginning of World War II, Ukrainian society was not homogeneous; in other words, the attitude towards Poland and the Poles was not the same in various parts of the Ukrainian SRR. For example, at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union in September 1939, some people approved of the declarations made by Vyacheslav Molotov (although they were against the law), directed against Poland. He said that Poland had collapsed under the attack of the German army and then of the Red Army. There were also people who claimed that Stalin and Hitler were in a murderous conspiracy. The question of how these events were perceived by the Ukrainians is a different matter. The entrance of the Red Army in autumn 1939 onto the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia made some people believe that their situation had improved, which was only an illusion. The significance of this temporary optimism should not be emphasised. It faded away very quickly, due to the realities of the repressive policies of the Communist regime.

The Directorate of the OUN claimed that with the help of the Nazis, it would be possible to build an independent Ukraine. Yet even those hopes did not survive the test of time. After 30 June 1941, the failed attempt in Lviv to proclaim the restoration of Ukrainian nationality by Bandera’s Ukrainian nationalist militants, which was and suppressed by the Germans, it became clear: the “partners” from the West (as well as the “brothers” from the East) would not allow the realisation of the ideals of the Ukrainian independence movement. The Ukrainian nationalists tried to manoeuvre for some time. Eventually, they moved to the underground and started to create conspiracy and military structures. In autumn 1942, they began to form the structures of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was supposed to carry out military operations and fight for an independent Ukraine with all their enemies at the same time – regardless of the consequences.

Various attempts were made between the Poles and the Ukrainians to reach an agreement. A number of talks were carried out. The Poles suggested that the Ukrainians support them in their aspirations, in return offering equal rights for the Ukrainian minority in a future Poland, but the Ukrainians could not accept this. The parties had nothing to offer to each other. This is also confirmed by the documents published in this volume, such as the testimony of Mykhailo Stepanyak (“Serhiy”), the head of the OUN’s Provid in ZUZ “Galicia.”

Local agreements were reached no earlier than in 1945 within the territory of the present Poland. As a result of the agreement in Siedliska (29 April 1945) and in Ruda Różaniecka (21 May 1945), both parties undertook to suspend military action, avoid unnecessary bloodshed and cooperate in the fight against the NKVD and the UB (Office of Public Security). In the Lublin powiat, the soldiers of the
AK-WiN (Home Army – Freedom and Independence) even supported military cooperation against the Communists. As a result, at least two military operations were conducted, during which the railway station in Werbkowice and Hrubieszów were captured. WiN also fought against the displacement of Ukrainians.

* *

Many Ukrainian historians claim that the UPA operation in Volhynia was a consequence of previous anti-Ukrainian activities by the Polish underground in the Chelm region. Polish historians do not agree with this opinion. They claim that the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in this region was principally the effect of the German displacement operation carried out in the years 1942–1943 in the Zamość region. The Germans planned to displace the Poles from this area and replace them with German settlers. During this operation, in some displaced Polish villages, Nazis settled Ukrainians (who were also forcibly displaced) in such a way that the villages inhabited by them formed a kind of “rampart” that would protect the German colonists from the attacks of the Polish guerrillas. The provocation was successful, since some of the Polish attacks were indeed directed against the Ukrainian population.

The documents published below provide a wider picture of these events. It turns out that the Ukrainian population was also repressed at the turn of 1942. This was caused by the Germans, who were carrying out an operation aimed at fighting the Soviet guerrillas and were searching for Jews looking for shelter to avoid extermination. However, the pacification operations were harmful both for the Ukrainians and for the Poles. They were carried out by Nazis in such a way to make the Poles think that the Ukrainians shared the responsibility for what was happening, and to make the Ukrainians believe that it was the Poles’ fault.

Undoubtedly, the joint responsibility of the Germans and the Soviets for the Polish-Ukrainian conflict is a matter that deserves special attention. After the occupation of Ukraine in 1941, the option to treat Ukrainians ruthlessly prevailed among the leaders of the Third Reich. This was a decision by Adolf Hitler, who preferred using brutal occupation politics. He granted power over the Reichskommissariat Ukraine to Erich Koch, who immediately started to apply the principle of ruthless force. He had used the same strategy on the Polish territory included in the Third Reich. Any signs of public opposition were immediately suppressed. Active nationalists, especially those connected with OUN-B, were repressed.

Within all the occupied territory, the Germans tried to turn the Poles against the Ukrainians, and the Ukrainians against the Poles. They did not by any means try to bring about fights or killings between those two nations (such chaos would have disorganised the base of the front), but they wanted to make them keep an eye on each other. On 7 November 1942, at a conference of administration officials in the General Government, SS-Obersturmbannführer Alfred Kolf stated: “As far
as the Poles are concerned, the Germans came here as enemies, therefore the Poles will employ any measures to regain freedom. [...] That is why more coercive measures have to be used against them; they would not do the things they are doing at the moment if we did not impose pressure on them. [...] As regards the Ukrainians, they are disappointed, since they expected something else from the Germans. [...] The outcomes are visible – this has given rise to an opposing attitude, yet, a different one than in the case of the Poles, since the Ukrainians’ willingness to cooperate with the Germans has not yet entirely disappeared.”

It must be admitted that the Germans cleverly exploited Ukrainian hopes. Without granting them any political concessions, they could artfully use them to their advantage. The Ukrainians were easily admitted to various support and police groups. They were even turned into front divisions, the most well-known of which is the SB “Galizien” division. This was a terrible situation, since some of the Ukrainians who served in such divisions were used by the Germans to participate in bloody pacifications.

At the beginning of 1943, in Volhynia, the UPA initiated wide-scale guerrilla operations. To replace Ukrainian police officers that had deserted to the UPA, the German administration started to enlist the Poles. The Polish police was formed from the local population (1500–2000 persons). From the General Government, Schutzmannschaftsbataillon 202 was drafted in. This included Volksdeutsche from the Wielkopolska and Silesia regions. All these troops were used for brutal anti-guerrilla and pacification operations. Massacres of Polish population were not advantageous to the Germans, since it would disorganise the front base. That is why they often turned a blind eye to Polish self-defence, or even delivered weapons to them. However, it must not be forgotten that in Volhynia, the Nazis fought battles with both the Ukrainian and the Polish underground movements. In summer 1943, they arrested a great number of underground activists in towns and cities. Some of the people captured at that time were executed by firing squad a few months later.

The shift of the OUN and UPA actions to Eastern Galicia led the Germans to react with mass repressions against Ukrainians in this region. Yet these were not so extreme as the ones in Volhynia. Regardless of the repressions, due to the approaching front, the Germans became interested in establishing contact with the Ukrainian underground. At the beginning of 1944, the Germans and the Ukrainians entered into talks on possible cooperation. These were carried out simultaneously with the Wehrmacht and the Security Police. They also included issues related to the Poles.

Available materials indicate that the Germans did not favour massacres of the Polish population. However, in some cases, they not only turned a blind eye to them, but also cooperated in such operations. Informal agreements between UPA and the Germans were reached no earlier than at the point when only scraps of land inhabited by the Ukrainians were held by the Germans. In return for weapons

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19 As quoted in M. Wróblewski, Służba Budowlana (Baudienst) w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie 1940–1945 (Warsaw, 1984), 207.
and ammunition, the UPA was supposed to carry out sabotage and intelligence operations against the USSR.\(^{20}\)

The outbreak of the German-Soviet war showed to what extent the Poles and the Ukrainians had had enough of Communism, with which they had become familiar in the period 1939–1941. Popular reluctance prevented the formation of Soviet guerrilla troops. As a result, the first Soviet parachute troops redeployed to Volhynia and Eastern Galicia were quickly eliminated by the Germans.

Regular Soviet guerrilla troops appeared in Volhynia in autumn 1942. These came mainly from eastern Ukraine and Belorussia. At first, the Soviets wanted to enter into an alliance with anyone who could help them fight the Germans.

That is why they established contacts and carried out talks with both the Poles and the Ukrainians. At the same time, they perceived Polish and Ukrainians “nationalists” as enemies, and collected intelligence materials on them. For example, the Soviet guerrillas prepared lists of people supporting the Germans, ZWZ-AK or the OUN and UPA, for further use by the NKVD.

At the end of February 1943, Panteleimon Ponomarenko, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia, ordered the guerrillas to carry out operations aimed at incorporating Western Belorussia into the USSR. As a result, in April-May, they started to attack Polish conspirators in the Navahrudak region. Over the next few months, a specific Polish-Soviet guerrilla war was waged on these territories.\(^{21}\)

The situation in Volhynia was different. Once the UPA started the anti-Polish action, thousands of Poles sought protection with the Soviets. This enabled them to build up Polish communist guerrilla troops. Their members were put through an ideological “processing.” In one of the Polish reports, the situation is presented as follows: “The guerrillas are eager to enrol the Poles in their troops. They were supervised by a political commissar. Ruthless murders, on the other hand, are committed against those Poles, who are perceived as the so-called ‘Sikorski’s nationalists.’ They include all members of the intelligentsia.”\(^{22}\)

In Eastern Galicia, the Soviet guerrillas appeared in the summer of 1943 during a raid by Sydir Kovpak’s group. He created operation opportunities for other troops, although the Soviet forces were weak in this region. Their possibilities were limited not only by the Germans, but also by the reluctance of the local population and the activities of the UPA.

One of the problems that have been bothering researchers for years is the question of whether the Soviets brought about the outbreak of Polish-Ukrainian clashes. Undoubtedly, the Soviets were interested in initiating the Polish-Ukrainian conflict. Importantly, since they perceived the “Polish and Ukrainian nationalists”

\(^{20}\) R. Torzecki, *Polacy i Ukraińcy. Sprawa ukraińska...*, 244.


\(^{22}\) The Polish Underground Movement Study Trust (SPP), Ministry of Interior (MSW), 263/II, Social Division, Situational reports on the Polish territories, pp. 34–35.
as enemies, their aim was to eliminate both groups with the help of others. The problem is that no evidence confirming the hypothesis of the Soviet inspiration has so far been found.

* *

According to Polish authors who have analysed the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the period from 1943 to 1945, both parties knew that the events of 1918, i.e. the failure of Germany and Russia, could be repeated, and that the outbreak of a Polish-Ukrainian war was possible. In Polish historiography, the conviction exists that the leaders of OUN-B had taken a decision to remove (and even massacre, as was the case in Volhynia) all the Poles living in the territory that was under dispute, in order to make it an “ethnically clean” area prior to the beginning of possible peace negotiations.

Today, there are no doubts as to the reality of this decision and the subsequent operation carried out by OUN-UPA. The anti-Polish cleansing started with a massacre in Parošla village in 1943. In March of the same year, such operations were continued in north-eastern Volhynia. In July 1943, the anti-Polish actions in Volhynia reached their peak. 11 July 1943 was a particularly black day, since on that date at least 99 villages were attacked and destroyed, together with their inhabitants. These included Poryck (Pavlivka), where in 2003 the Polish and Ukrainian presidents met to take part in mourning ceremonies.

The anti-Polish operation in Eastern Galicia started in February–April 1944, and by June it had spread through all the districts of the region. The Ukrainians strove to create strong bases in the Carpathian Mountains, to surround Lviv and block the corridors joining Lviv with Lublin and Przemyśl, along which the AK intended to send a relief force. In many instances, the UPA troops destroyed villages with all their inhabitants.

In March 1944, the AK troops initiated a guerrilla offensive in the Chelm region, burning out more than 20 Ukrainian villages. In the following days, several UPA kurins from Volhynia and Eastern Galicia entered the area and began anti-Polish cleansing. This caused the creation of a 100 km-long Polish-Ukrainian front, with a no man’s zone of several kilometres.

According to Ukrainian historians, the events of 1942 in the Chelm region were a trigger for all the subsequent events; in their opinion, we should not ask who was first to start using violence, but acknowledge that it was the conditions of war that stimulated mutual violence. In contemporary Ukrainian historiography, however, the role of Berlin and Moscow in the Polish-Ukrainian conflict has been revealed. It has been revealed that, especially after the German police in Volhynia and Polesie was abandoned by around 5000 Ukrainians, who went into the forests, the Germans recruited new police officers, mostly from among the local Poles. Semyon Rudnev, a guerrilla commissar, stated in his diary that the Germans
created the Polish police not to defend the Poles, but to “fight the nationalists and red guerrillas.”

The Germans used the anti-Polish operations of the UPA to dislocate the Polish police units of the Central Government to Volhynia, in order to get them involved in the actions against the UPA and the local Ukrainian population. However, Poles were present not only in the police, but also in other structures; in Lutsk, for example, Poles were in charge of all the German offices.

According to Ukrainian researchers, this was the trigger for the initiation and continuation of the anti-Polish operation in Volhynia in 1943–1944. The leaders of the Ukrainian political movement were worried by the fact that local Poles were trying to enter the administrative, economic and commercial bodies of the occupation authorities, in order to establish conditions that would enable them to preserve the influence they had in this area. In spring-summer 1942, such a situation was also observed by the well-informed Soviet intelligence and sabotage units, German officials, and representatives of the local Ukrainian population.

As regards the decision of the OUN’s and UPA’s leaders to start the anti-Polish operation, Ukrainian researchers indicate that so far, neither the contents of this order nor a document confirming its existence have been found.

According to Polish researchers, in the period from 1943 to 1947, between 80,000 and 100,000 Poles and 15,000 to 20,000 Ukrainians were killed within all the territories engulfed by the conflict. The greatest number of Poles, around 50,000-60,000, died in Volhynia. According to Polish estimates, 2000-3000 Ukrainians were killed in this region.

According to Ukrainian historians, the range of the conflict must be investigated, since discrepancies exist between the reported figures related to the number of victims. In materials published in Ukraine in 2003, the following data was reported: between 18,000 and 80,000 Polish victims and between 18,000 and 100,000 Ukrainians. As Ukrainian researchers point out, neither of these figures is definitive or reliable. Besides, a great number of Poles left Volhynia, and so it is practically impossible to find out who was a victim and who fled.

* * *

To conclude, it should be noted that revealing even the most painful facts of the common history will not harm to Polish-Ukrainian neighbourly relations. In order to find out the historical truth, we need a constructive dialogue between Poland and Ukraine, a joint effort by historical researchers. In order to reconstruct the events of the past, they should continue their cooperation using all sources available. Only this will allow for the creation of a common memory of one of the most dramatic episodes in the history of Poland and Ukraine from the period of World War II.

No. 1
5 July 1943, Kalach. Report by the People’s Commissar of National Security of the Ukrainian SSR, Sergei Savchenko, regarding relations between Ukrainian nationalists and Poles

Top secret

Sent to:
Comrade Khrushchev
– “– Merkulov
– “– Korotchenko
– “– Sudoplatov
– “– Fitin
– “– Strokach
– “– Reshetov
– “– Tsvetukhin
– “– Medvedev

Report
regarding relations between Ukrainian nationalists and the Poles on the territory of Western Ukraine and the enemy-occupied General Government

In the whole history of Poland, the territory of Ukraine has always been the target of its political and economic aspirations, and the Ukrainians have been


3 Pavel Andreyevich Sudoplatov (1907–1996), lieutenant-general; in 1942–1945, head of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD-NKGB USSR; then, successively, the head of the “F,” “S” and “DR” Divisions of the NKVD-MGB USSR. Arrested in 1953 along with Beria.

4 Pavel M. Fitin (1907–1971), major-general; in 1939–1945, the head successively of the 5th Division of GUGB NKVD USSR, the 1st Directorate of NKGB-NKVD USSR.

5 Timofey Strokach (1903–1963), lieutenant-general; in 1941–1946, Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR; in 1942–1945, the head of Staff of the Ukrainian Guerrilla Movement; from 1946 to 1956, Minister of the Interior of the Ukrainian SRR.

6 Fiodor Andreyevich Tsvetukhin (born 1904), colonel of national security; in 1939–1940, head of the 1st Special Division (URO) NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR; in 1941 head of the 2nd Division of NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR; in 1943–1947, head of the UNKGB-UMGB (Ukrainian NKGB-Ukrainian MGB) of the Rivne region.

7 Dmitry Nikolaievich Medvedev (1898–1954), colonel of national security, Hero of the Soviet Union; the commander of the NKVD special guerrilla troop in Volhynia.
treated as a nation that was supposed to act as a subject to Polish lords and magnates. The Polish governing circles have not yet given up these aspirations.

Such an attitude by Poland towards Ukraine has caused the Ukrainians to be full of profound national hatred for the Poles, and whole generations have been raised in this atmosphere. Hatred was the main drive for the liberation struggles of the Ukrainian nation against Poland.

For the whole period of their existence, Ukrainian nationalist elements, united in various political parties, organisations and groups, particularly in the UVO-OUN, have striven for the creation of a nationalistic spirit in the Ukrainian masses, taking advantage of the national hatred for the Poles that had been shaped over centuries.

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a sabotage organisation, has been severely persecuted by the Poles for its terrorist activity directed against Poland.

The colonial policy of Poland in respect of the Ukrainians from the western districts of Ukraine has enhanced the nationalist conflicts between the Ukrainians and the Poles.

It is enough to mention the open terror of the Polish government against the Ukrainians in the years 1930–1931, known as “pacification,” which caused a series of retaliatory assassinations of representatives of the Polish population and authorities by the Ukrainians. It also forced the OUN to perform numerous acts of terror (the murder of *HOŁÓWKO*, a department director at the ministry of foreign affairs, or of *PIERACKI*, minister of foreign affairs).

In 1939, after the division of Poland by Nazi Germany, the Hitlerites took the Ukrainian nationalists that escaped the liberated territory of Western Ukraine “under their wings,” and gave them all possible privileges. They often used them in their fight with the Poles within the General Government. The Nazis, who were preparing for a Soviet-German war, began to use [the Ukrainian nationalists] as spies, saboteurs and terrorists, promising an “independent” Ukraine in return.

The turn of subsequent events proved that until the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the Germans not only did not meet the promises made to the Ukrainian nationalists, but on the contrary – they began a systematic and methodical elimination of those who were persistently demanding the fulfilment of the promises given to the Ukrainian nationalists, e.g. *BANDERA’s* OUN group.

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8 Bronisław Pieracki (1895-1934), colonel; political activist, in 1931–1934 minister of the interior; murdered on 15 June 1934 by H. Matseyka, a member of OUN; posthumously promoted to the rank of brigadier-general.

9 Stepan Bandera (1909–1959), since 1933 *providnyk* (leader) of the state executive of the OUN, sentenced to death after the attempt on the life of Pieracki, the death penalty was commuted to life imprisonment, and he was released in 1939. From 1940 the head of the OUN-B; in 1941–1944 held prisoner by the Germans in Sachsenhausen; after the war, he headed the ZCz OUN in Western Germany; murdered in 1959 by a KGB agent.
This time, in their fight with the Ukrainian nationalists, the Germans started to exploit those Polish elements that were eager to cooperate with them in the fight against the Ukrainians. In return, they offered them various privileges, such as positions in the administrative and economic apparatus, free commercial activity, etc.

This strategy by the German invader suddenly exacerbated relations between the Ukrainians and the Poles, who, at the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, started to kill each other in various areas.

Taking advantage of the Ukrainians’ hatred for the Poles for their past oppression, as well as their present tendency to compromise and betrayal, the OUN, in particular Bandera’s militants, initiated clashes between Ukrainians and Poles in all possible situations.

The Poles, on the other hand, took revenge on Ukrainian nationalists for their active participation in crushing Poland together with the Germans, as well as for their terrorism against the Polish population.

In contrast to the supporters of MELNYK, who acted legally within the German intelligence service, Ukrainian nationalists – members of the OUN acting in the conspiracy, so-called “Bandera’s militants”– have organised anti-German and anti-Polish operations, forming armed groups.

We have a document prepared by Bandera’s supporters leading the OUN, entitled “A brief review of the political, social, cultural and economic situation on ‘ZUZ’ [Western Ukrainian Lands] for the year 1942.” This document exhaustively explains the complexity of the Polish-Ukrainian relationship.

In the aforementioned document, the Polish cause in those conditions was perceived by the Ukrainian nationalists as the most important and the crucial one. The document includes the following statements:

“The Polish cause within the West Ukrainian Territories is a particularly important issue in the area of administration, transportation, communication, finance and economic activity.”

The Ukrainian nationalists justify the significance of the Polish cause and the role of the Poles by the following factors:

“The Poles possess fixed property. The Poles are employed in various institutions, public enterprises, financial institutions, which often brings them the possibility of shifting the burden of the German economic and financial policy onto Ukrainian society.

Thus, they make lives of the Poles easier, and can even exploit the situation to their own advantage.”

Perceiving Polish elements as clearly conciliatory, the Ukrainian nationalists wrote:

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10 Andriy Melnyk (1890–1964), colonel in the UNR army; since 1921 in UVO, a close collaborator of Yevhen Konovalets; after his death a providnyk (leader) of the OUN. From 1940, head of the OUN-M; in 1944 held prisoner by the Germans in Sachsenhausen, emigrated after the war.
“On the territory of Western Ukraine, particularly in Lviv, the Poles are pursuing peace policies towards the Germans, they are perceived as exemplary and loyal citizens, they do not have any demands and complaints. The ‘only thing’ they want to do is work.

Some of them managed to get quite good positions within the governing bodies.

In a short period of time, in the spring and summer (of 1941–1942), Polish elements took over the most important positions. They say that they ‘[want] to work, in order to live’.”

Similar activity by Polish elements against Ukrainians was carried out both in western regions of Ukraine and within the territory of the General Government.

This strategy by the Poles evoked outrage and hatred from Ukrainian nationalists. They list the following facts to confirm the Poles’ anti-Ukrainian activity:

“The Poles put German-Ukrainian relations under a cloud in which they hide and carry out their activities.

If getting a position in economic, state and administrative life, from which the Ukrainians are to be excluded, depends on the Poles, they can do it in such a way that would not seem like a battle against Ukrainians.

It should be noted that Polish elements reveal a hostile attitude to the Ukrainians wherever they feel confident and where it cannot be evidenced.

In towns and cities, particularly in Lviv, Polish housing administrators, together with the Polish Labour Office, have created large lists of so-called economically inactive women, mainly Ukrainian women, who have been forcibly sent to Germany [...].”

“[...] The Poles try to drive the Ukrainians to commit anti-German activity, and then they accuse them of doing so.

In Dobrzanić village, in the Peremyshlian district, the Poles wrote an anonymous letter to the village administration in Przemyśl, in which they stated that the only reason why they did not go to Germany was the fact that the Ukrainians prevented them from doing it. They also gave the names of several Ukrainians.

In Kalush, *CHYZHEVSKY* was arrested. He was denounced by *OKOŃ-SKI*, a Pole, who keeps an eye on all the officials of the company, where he works as a cart driver.”

According to Ukrainian nationalists, the outrage of the Ukrainians is caused most of all by “economic pressure,” which is used by the Poles to enhance their own position, for example:

“Lviv receives commodities from Warsaw, which are supplied to Polish enterprises and agencies of Polish trading and transportation enterprises, including a large number of full-time officials.

The town is more and more often visited by various Polish officials, engineers, office workers, who want to settle in Galicia, and particularly in Lviv.”
Revealing the treacherous role of the Poles towards the Ukrainian nation, the Ukrainian nationalists provide the following facts to confirm their statements:

“The sabotage operations of the Polish conspiracy groups did not involve mass participation. They hide their real intentions and aims, and they try to direct the attention and vigilance of the Germans towards the Ukrainians, thus shifting onto them the whole responsibility for the fight against the regime and order.”

It is further stated as follows:

“Sometime the Poles try to present the Ukrainians as unskilled and unprofessional. When such arguments are not convincing, some secret materials (or facts) from the German police bodies appear. No matter how they were obtained, by way of provocation or otherwise, they use them to ruin people’s lives, but they claim it’s not because they are Ukrainian, but because they are villains, criminals, thieves, NKVD officers, conspirators – Communists and true supporters of *BANDERA*, i.e. enemies of Germany.

The Poles ‘find them,’ and the Germans carry out investigations.

It is obvious that, seemingly, this is about serious crimes, while in fact their aim is to eliminate the Ukrainian nationalist movement.”

Moreover, Poles also performed terrorist actions against Ukrainians.

“On 9 August 1942, *KUSZNIR* Józef, a Pole from Żurawica village near Przemyśl, shot a student – VOVCHYSHYN Ivan – (KUSZNIR has not been dismissed from work as of now).

On 27 August at 5 p.m., in Chartorya village near Ternopil, a serious accident happened – 18 persons were injured, 6 of them seriously. Secondary school students were going to a concert in Mikuliniec on a truck from the Ternopil municipal authorities. The driver was a Pole.”

The Ukrainian nationalists also state that in everyday contacts with the Ukrainians, Polish elements trample on their national dignity, using physical force.

The document includes the following information:

“Poles managing properties, their assistants, level crossing attendants etc., make the Ukrainian peasants feel the power of their iron fists.

On every occasion, they say: There you have your Ukraine.

The active anti-Ukrainian activity of Poles working in the “Polish police” created by the Germans is presented by the Ukrainian nationalists in the following way:

“The Polish police instigate Germans against the Ukrainians. We know the results – people are arrested and shot by firing squads. The villages of Tarnawatka and Majdan Sopocki have been destroyed.

In Kundki [!] village, some criminals kidnapped a Ukrainian teacher, and took him away with all his belongings. No one knows what happened to him. People say they also kidnap children.

In Mołodziatycze village, a *starosta* was shot on his way to work. After the funeral, the police surrounded Berestki village and shot 7 Ukrainians, who were allegedly connected with the criminals.

This is a smear campaign by the ‘Polish police’ against the Ukrainians.”

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This anti-Ukrainian activity by the Poles makes it easier for the Germans to carry out the fight against the most aggressive Ukrainian nationalists (Bandera’s militants) with the minimum use of their own forces.

Analysing the situation, Bandera’s militants have expressed the following opinion:

“Due to this tactic, the Poles have won the favour of the German administration in Galicia. a-FRANK-a11, the General Governor, stated openly that he is content with the loyalty of the Poles and their attitude towards the German authorities.

The Germans are aware of the fact that they will not be able to do much with the help of the Poles, but they know that they can assist them, at least to some extent, by disorganising the attempts of the Ukrainians to fight against the colonial policy.”

Confirmation of the situation described above can be also found in another document – a supplement to a memorandum from the Ukrainian nationalists from OUN, submitted to a-ROSENBERG-a, the Reich commissar for eastern regions, signed by a well-known member of the OUN – a-ANDRIYEVSKY-a12.

The memorandum includes the following statement:

“Attentive observers of Polish-Ukrainian relations claim that this impression is related, to some extent, to the fact that German institutions tend to cooperate with people of foreign nationality and hostile attitude towards the Ukrainians (the Poles in the western Ukrainian territories, the Russians in the eastern Ukrainian territories, and even Jews, as was the case, for example, in the economic office in Verba).

The activity and influence of these elements makes it hard to establish good German-Ukrainian relations. Instead of bringing order, they cause tensions between the Germans and the Ukrainians.”

Apart from the aforementioned facts indicating the hostile attitude and treacherous role of some Poles, it should also be pointed out that Ukrainian nationalists are trying to convince the masses that the Polish fight against them involved cooperation with “bands of Bolsheviks.”

In “A brief review of the political, social, cultural and economic situation on ‘ZUZ’,” the following facts related to this issue are presented:

“The Communists have made alliances with the Poles. Since the spring, Polish-Bolshevik bands have been roaming around.

The sabotage movement of the Polish-Bolshevik bands have spread from Polissya and the Chelm region to Belz, Sokal, Rava-Ruska and deep into Galicia, to the territories of the following areas: Przemyśl (Jarke village13), Drohobych (Zhdana Tuga14), Stryi, Rohatyn – Berezhany, Zolochiv – Brody.

11 Hans Frank (1900–1946), member of the NSDAP and SA; from 1930 a member of the Reichstag; from 1935 Reichsminister without portfolio; in 1939–1945 General Governor of the GG within Polish territory. In April 1945, he was captured by the Americans; he was tried by the IMT in Nuremberg, sentenced to death and executed.

12 Dmytro Andriyevsky (1892–1976), engineer, columnist, OUN activist; in 1928 a member of the Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists, from 1940 in the OUN-M; after the war, he emigrated to West Germany.

13 A not established village.

14 A not established village.
In Chełm region, the Polish-Bolshevik sabotage is mainly directed against our people (members and supporters), that is, against conscious and active Ukrainian citizens, the following of which have been killed: a-BOYKO, a peasant from Ludryn village in the Hrubieszów powiat; the starosta of the Maladzyechna village; and others.

Groups of 2–3 persons attack by day and at night. In Przemyśl region, they attack Ukrainian ‘grocers’ associations’ and police. In other regions, they attack individual citizens.

The bands continue their activity, and they even carry out battles in which innocent Ukrainians are killed. This happened, for example, in Parinishche village. These villages were burned down by the Germans, and numerous peasants were shot.”

Due to the aforementioned facts, the Ukrainian nationalists have come to the following conclusions:

“All these facts provide grounds for claiming that we are dealing with an extensive Polish-Bolshevik action.

The directive on the state of emergency confirms the difficulties that prevail within the western Ukrainian territories.

One of the captured Poles had an order from the heads of an underground organisation to register former soldiers of the Polish Army and mobilise material and technical resources.

This is evidence of illegal preparations for fighting and extensive military action.

An organised activity within the [underground] movement is observable.”

The opinion of the Ukrainian nationalists on the plans of Polish elements in Western Ukraine is the following:

“The basic plans of the Poles related to the ZUZ are already clear. The Poles want to create a revolutionary and political base in this area for the clashes against the Ukrainians.

This situation causes tensions in Polish-Ukrainian relations on the western Ukrainian territories. Apart from the attempts at quick Polonisation of the western Ukrainian territories made by the Germans, there is another danger, which has not been taken into account so far – the Poles. Although at first it seemed that the source of danger was in Cracow, in fact, it turned out that it was in Warsaw.”

“[...] It is no wonder that the following atmosphere prevails among the Ukrainians: What are they doing now? They had better let us ‘roam’ for a few hours, as we cannot stand it any longer [...]”

Based on the aforementioned facts, we can conclude that the Ukrainian nationalists were to some extent accurate in their assessment of the situation, activity and policy of Polish elements on the territory of Western Ukraine.

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b- – As in the original.
15 A not established village.
16 A not established village.
By worming their way into the state, administrative and commercial apparatus of the German authorities, the Poles are even now trying to form a base for themselves, which would let them preserve their dominance in Western Ukraine after the defeat of Nazi Germany.

There is a possibility that the Poles’ political line is guided by their underground leaders, who are trying to secure their future.

The situation of the Poles in Western Ukraine is different from the situation of the Poles living on the original territory of Poland.

Even the nationalists see this difference. They mention Chelm region and Lublin – the areas in which the Poles were particularly affected by the terror of the German invaders.

Using Poles from Western Ukraine against Ukrainian nationalists, the German invaders are at the same time treating them ruthlessly on the territory of the General Government, using Ukrainian nationalists for this purpose.

“The feeling of Poles is pessimistic in many areas. It has resulted in numerous arrests of Polish people in the General Government.

In Lviv, Krynica and other towns and cities, Poles have also been arrested, although in smaller numbers.

On 26 August 1942, all Poles from [...] Szkocka were arrested, and so were Poles in the Tax Office. It happens that the Poles are dismissed from work (Kalush, Kolomyia).

In September-October 1942, in various Polish towns, military uprisings by the Poles were organised, and they were suppressed by the Ukrainian Cossacks and police.”

Numerous pieces of information we have received indicate that a great number of Poles living on the territory of former Poland have a positive attitude towards Soviet citizens, and they help them in all possible ways. They have the same attitude towards our guerrilla troops.

That is why Ukrainian nationalists want to set the Ukrainian population against “Bolshevik Moscow,” pointing to guerrilla troops and presenting them as “Polish-Bolshevik bands.”

Driven by hatred of the Poles, the Ukrainian nationalists, particularly Bandera’s militants, have killed Poles in many areas since 1942 until now.

Based on information obtained from the occupied areas, in April 1943, the Staff of the Ukrainian Guerrilla Movement reported as follows:

“There are discrepancies between the Poles and the Ukrainian nationalists as regards their impact on Western Ukraine.”

“Ukrainian nationalists terrorise the Polish population.

In the villages of Volodymyr-Volynskyi region and Vysotsk region, in Stepan, Derazhne, Rafalovitse 17 and other villages, 200 farms were burned down and all the people, including old people and children, were slaughtered.

Thousands of Polish men are hiding in the forests with their families.

17 A not established village.
In regional centres, such as Sosnove, Kostopil and other areas of Rivne oblast, armed nationalists groups are concentrated. (They are led by one of the leaders – known as “Taras BULBA”\(^{18}\)).

They murder the Polish population.

Bandera’s militants, located in the Lutsk region, pursue the same strategy. The Poles escape to Rivne and Cracow.

The Germans take advantage of this situation and enlist the Poles in the police service, to make them fight the nationalists and guerrilla troops.”

Looking for a way to resolve the situation, with no hope for help from the Germans, the Poles sent a delegation of local people to our guerrilla troops, asking for help and offering accommodation in their villages.

From a document that we found in February 1943 in the former quarters of the Kharkiv Gestapo, we found out that Poles have created an underground organisation, the “Defenders of Poland,” in order to protect the lives and rights of the Polish population.

This organisation has expanded its influence among young Poles to a great extent.

[Note]

As relations between Poles and Ukrainians on the territories of Western Ukraine and the General Government are of particular importance to us, we are closely observing the further development of the situation.

People’s Commissar for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR

Commissar for State Security

SAVCHENKO\(^{19}\)

“c-5-c” July 1943
No. c-88/gb-c
Kalach, Voronezh oblast

\(^{18}\) Taras Borovets (1908–1981), nom de guerre “Bulba,” founder of the Polissian Sich and later of the UPA; held prisoner by the Germans in 1943–1944; in 1945 served in the UNA (Ukrainian National Army); emigrated after the war.

\(^{19}\) Sergei Romanovich Savchenko (1904–1966), in 1941–1943 Deputy People’s Commissar of the Interior of the Ukrainian SSR; in 1943–1949, People’s Commissar for State Security, Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, then deputy chairman of the Information Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the USSR.
II. Due to developments in Volhynia, the Poles have become highly active. There are many Polish fugitives from Volhynia, especially in the border districts: Sokal and Radekhiv. The Poles, irritated by the operations of the Ukrainians, are burning with hatred and are consumed by vengeful lust. They are already preparing active operations against Ukrainians on the terrain of the oblast (a murder of a Ukrainian in Radekhiv district, attempted assaults in Zhovkva district). In such conditions, it is difficult to apply [the adopted] tactics to the anti-Polish section, mainly due to its collapse on the terrain of Volhynia, as well as the chauvinist attitude of Polish police, which is still dreaming of an imperialist Poland, and which does not want to notice the growth in the strength of Ukrainian nation in the ZUZ. It would be convinced [only] by violence.

Stopover, 30 July 1943
III. Murders perpetrated by Ukrainians on the Polish population of Volhynia intensify. In the period from 13 to 18 July, mass carnage took place in Górowo [!], Górowo Duże [!], Górowo Małe [!], Wygnance, Zdziry, Zablotka, Sadowa³ Nowiny, Zagaje, Poryck, Oleń⁴ and Orzesz.⁵ In Lutsk diocese, since 11 July this year, 40 priests have been murdered. Waves of fugitives are arriving in Lesser Poland [Małopolska]; e.g. in Sokal, 4000 Poles from Volhynia found refugee.

487 groups

(–) Sobol

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¹ Władysław Banaczyk (1902–1980), nom de guerre “Orkan”; a lawyer, popular activist; from 1939, member of RN SL (Supreme Council of the People’s Party); in 1942–1943, deputy president of the National Council of the Republic of Poland (London); minister of interior of the Government of the Republic of Poland in Exile; returned to Poland, from 1945 in the Polish People’s Party (PSL), then in the United People’s Party (ZSL).
² Should be: Zdzary
³ Probably: Sadowa.
⁴ Should be: Olesk.
⁵ Should be: Orzeszyn.
After 22 August [1943], [Tysmenytsia]. Report by the parish priest of Tysmenytsia for the Polish underground

Report by the parish priest from Tysmenytsia

On 22 August this year, public meetings of Ukrainians were held in localities of the Stanyslaviv voivodship, at which it was decided to slaughter all the local Poles. This is meant to be the culmination of all previous repressions against Poles. In this locality, as in other places, Poles are being hunted at every step and at any opportunity, ruthlessly and fiercely, since the very beginning of the Ukrainians’ rise to power.

Only Poles are selected by the Ukrainian authorities to be taken away to Germany. Everywhere Poles encounter open hatred on the part of Ukrainians. It is impossible for any Poles, even the most skilful, to hold any office. All official, communal, educational, judiciary, and municipal documents are issued in Ukrainian, and this is the language demanded from Poles in speech and in writing. Ukrainians speak Polish perfectly, but they either don’t respond at all to questions asked in Polish, or answer them reluctantly in Ukrainian.

Polish schools have been closed (Drohomirchany, Ksaverovka, Pshenichniki, Markovtse, etc., etc.).

The Ukrainian militia have monitored Polish houses closely. Poles encounter open aversion from Ukrainians everywhere. Both at night and in broad daylight, Ukrainians rob Polish households, taking carriages, cattle, crops, and fruit, and they are not embarrassed at all, and respond to Polish comments with insults. The biggest “contingents” are to be provided only by Poles. Murders of Poles are frequent and normal. Not so long ago, Ukrainians slaughtered a bookkeeper, Mr Tyczyński, in Posyech. Near Kolomyia, they brutally murdered a couple of Polish families. Mr Borzemski, a forest officer, fell victim to Ukrainian thugs near Horodenka. There are more and more victims. Every day we hear only: “We will slaughter Poles.”

It should be stressed that the aforementioned phenomena take place in the whole of Eastern Lesser Poland [Malopolska Wschodnia]. And thus, for example, three weeks ago Poles in one locality near Gródek Jagielloński received a letter from an organisation of independent Ukrainians, in which they threatened the Poles that unless they leave the locality voluntarily within 14 days – all 500 of them – the same will happen to them as happened to the Poles in Volhynia.

IPN, MBP, AK 605, p. 15.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
An illegible initial under the text.

380
No. 5
24 November 1943, [no place given]. Report by “Donsky,” a commanding officer of the UPA districts of Liuboml raion, regarding the field situation

Report on the situation in Liuboml

6000 of Polish population stayed on the land. During the operation, only one settlement was liquidated, and the remaining Polish population was left alone. For some time, the Poles have been organising themselves. In Rymche village, a self-defence unit has been organised. The activities of [Polish] self-defence were spreading.

“Voron’s” sotnia then operated on this terrain after “Chumak”¹ was broken up by the Poles near Boltuny village.² This caused the people’s spirit to wane. The threat to the Ukrainian population in the area increased. Shortly beforehand, “Chumak’s” sotnia, which had been organised in Liuboml raion, retreated. The area was left without protection and the Poles freely extended their operations.

The Poles burned down Vysotsk village, and took control of the area of Binduha, Vysotsk, Boltuny and Terekhy villages. Aside from weak self-defence, no-one opposed them. The Ukrainian population fled from these villages, leaving all their belongings behind. The Poles burned, killed, and robbed. Discontent began to spread among the Ukrainian population due to the commencement of the anti-Polish campaign. Poles arrived from various areas, even from Rozyshche. On the south side of the railway [line], Poles took control over the areas of Binduha, Vysotsk, Terekhy, Boltuny, Rakovyets, Berezts, Zamlinye and Terebeyki villages and reached Shtun, Vishniov and Kotsury villages. Most recently, they burned down the khutirs [farmsteads] of the villages mentioned above.

Presently, the Polish forces decreased as a result of clashes with the Germans, but they are still operating. Our units have started activities, but unsuccessfully. Firstly, the military operation failed because of a lack of good leaders. Then, our units attacked Romovod [!] village and burned down a part of it, but the Poles were not defeated. Now they are attacking more and more often, as our population loses its strength. They carry out operations with forces of fixed units of about 15–30 persons; they launch minor assaults in groups of 5–10 persons. They kill, they rob, and no actions are taken on our part. We have still not conducted any successful operations. The Polish threat significantly lowers the morale of our population. People lose their faith. They say: “What are we [the insurgents] worth, if we cannot

¹ Probably Fedir Khavchun, nom de guerre “Chumak.”
² The encounter took place on 7 September 1943 during dense fog; “Voron’s” sotnia was crushed by OP AK (Guerrilla Squad of Home Army) “Korda,” returning from an operation in Ukrainian Vysotsk. During the struggle, “Voron” (who probably originated from GG) was killed, and a dozen or so of his people along with him; the “Korda” partisans captured a mortar, a light machine gun, a dozen or so assault rifles, a camp with ammunition, uniforms, clothing and food, and also documents and maps concerning the deployment of UPA forces in the area.
even resist a couple of Poles?” Such moods are disseminated and maintained by our enemies. They said that the army is hiding, without any intention to protect population, seizing everything for themselves. It is very hard to work in such conditions, the more so as gossip is spread that Polesie would not be defended from the Volodymyr-Volynskyi raion, and support may be needed. The Poles take advantage of such mood, and try to liquidate our activists and disperse the masses. Poles have killed many persons from among our activists in the field – two stanichnys and one agitator; they also wounded the head of a kushch and two messengers, and killed many other people. Besides, the Poles promise that they will leave people alone if they give away the activists. There are a thousand fugitives in the area, and the Ukrainians also suffer from poverty. There are 2 families in nearly every house, and everyone fears the Poles; they are without any protection. The Poles try to divide this mass; they promise to leave people alone, if they return and tell them everything or become informants. Reportedly there are cases that some Ukrainians have already joined Polish guerrilla units (this has not been confirmed).

Numerous fugitives who expected that the Poles would be destroyed by the UPA are presently returning to their villages and beginning to serve the Poles. It is necessary to have at least a part of the armed forces in the area. Firstly, it would cause Polish operations to cease, and secondly, it would raise the morale of the population.

Glory be to Ukraine! Commanding officer of the rear Stopover, on 24 November [19]43
de Liuboml raion

Certified true copy:
(−) Arkady

_HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 376, T. 34, p. 52._
_Certified copy, typescript._
_Document in Russian._
No. 6
25 November 1943, [no place given]. Information from NKGB
4th Directorate of the Ukrainian SSR, concerning Polish operations
against Ukrainians

Top secret

Information

To “VALERY,” via Correspondent 1011, a cryptogram of 24 November [19]43
was served (incom. no. 138) with the signature “PETROV,” which contains
information that according to data from agent groups, in the area of Rafalovka in
Rivne oblast, a Polish unit of Piłsudskiites is located, which on 13 November this
year organised a “bloody Saturday,” slaughtering the Ukrainian population in
Kolodya and Sobieschitse villages in Rafalovka raion. Similar units, whose
deployment was not determined, also remain in other raions of the Rivne oblast.

In conformity:
Operating Officer of the 4th Directorate of NKGB of Ukrainian SSR
Senior Lieutenant of State Security
(–) ZYKOV

[...] November 1943
kz./wt

HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 985, p. 8.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Endorsements on the document: Cmdr Makarov, report to Kiev to People’s Commissar, 26 November [19]43 Sidorov and: Cmdr Kravyets, prepare information as regards the issue of Polish counte-
revolution and send telegram to Kiev to People’s Commissar. 26 November [19]43 (Makarov).
No. 7
20 January 1944, [Moscow]. Special report by Yakov Serebryanski to the People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, Sergei Savchenko

Top secret

NKGB USSR “4”
Directorate “a-20-a” January 1944

Special report
People’s Commissar of State Security of Ukrainian SSR
Comrade SAVCHENKO

Distribution:
Cmdr. Merkulov
  “ Kobulov
  “ Fedotov
  “ Savchenko

Head of “4”
Directorate
of NKGB USSR
(–) SUDOPLATOV

From Rivne raion. Ukrainian SSR.
“Recently, the Poles inhabiting the following localities: Rafalovka, Przebraże and Rozyszche have significantly changed their attitude towards Soviet guerrillas and totally subjected themselves to the Germans. A Polish police force has been created in Lutsk and Rozyszche, which meticulously obeys German orders in the scope of extermination of the Russian and Ukrainian population in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR. Poles go to Ukrainian villages, burn them, murder the inhabitants and steal their belongings. Lastly, Poles burned down Trotsianets and Omelno villages, and robbed Khopnievo and Klimentovka.

In Przebraże, Germans formed a unit of Poles numbering up to 1200 [persons], equipped with two 45 mm cannons, heavy and light machine guns, and rifles.

The Poles disseminate provocative rumours among the population about the murders of Polish populations allegedly committed by local Soviet guerrilla forces.

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Filled in by hand.
Underlined by hand.

1 Bogdan Zaharovich Kobulov (1904–1953); in 1938–1941 head of GEU NKVD USSR (Central Economical Directorate of NKVD USSR), member of Special Collegium; then deputy People’s Commissar of the USSR; executed with Beria by firing squad in 1953.
The organisers of repressions against Ukrainians in Przebraże are: the district governor ZYDKEVICH\textsuperscript{2} and commanding officer RALINOFSKY, and the Poles CYBULSKI, WASILEWSKI,\textsuperscript{3} VRASCHALOV and KESLIVAPOLKO.

PANAS”

Head of the group of 4th Directorate of NKGB USSR

\textit{\textendash\textendash\textendash SIEREBRANSKY\textsuperscript{4}}

\textit{HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. […]}, p. 22.

Original, typescript.

Document in Russian.


\textsuperscript{2} Possibly Franciszek Żytkiewicz.

\textsuperscript{3} Albert Wasilewski, \textit{nom de guerre} “Orzech,” the ADC of the commanding officer of self-defence in Przebraże.

\textsuperscript{4} Yakov Itzaakovich Sierebransky, originally Bergman (1892–1956), colonel of state security; in 1919–1921 and 1923–1938 in VCheKa-OGPU-NKVD (\textit{nielegal} “Yasha,” \textit{inter alia} in Palestine, Belgium, France and the USA). Arrested in the end of 1938 and in 1941 sentenced to death; released in August 1941 and rehabilitated; since October 1941 returned to the USSR NKVD; in 1942–1945 head of the group of 4th Directorate of the USSR NKVD-NKGB and officer of 4th Directorate of USSR NKGB ZSRS consecutively; in 1953 once again arrested, dies in Butyrki.
Retaliatory actions:

On the night of February 3/4, the “Siromantsiv” unit performed a retaliatory action on a Polish village, Hanachov, in Peremyshliany district. Around 160 Poles were killed, 200 were wounded, and the rest died in fire. The village was burned down in [...]% of its original size. Only bricked houses and the church remained.

The people resisted strongly: they fired three machine guns, submachine guns, rifles, grenade launchers, hand grenades were thrown. Many defended themselves with rakes, axes, etc.

We did not capture their [weapons]. All were burned down. 734 rounds and one grenade were used on our part. No casualties. I will send the protocol.

On 5 February, a retaliatory action on Poles was performed in Slobodka Bolshovhietska village, Rohatyn district. Twelve men were killed, and 9 wounded. The Poles from this village had betrayed a regional commanding officer, who was executed by firing squad on that day in Stanyslaviv. This will be described in a separate protocol.

Stopover, 9 February 1944

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*a* Underlined by hand.

*b* Illegible number.

1 In 1942, in the area of Dolina, the “Tihry” OUN Military Personnel Academy came into being. It became a training base for the “Siromantsiv” sotnia of Dmitry Karpenko, nom de guerre “Yastrub.” The sotnia was formed in 1943 in the Carpathian Mountains, and it was subordinated to the VO of “Lyson.” In spring of 1944, it was redeployed in Lubaczów region. It participated in the attacks on Hanachov, Huta Pieniacka and Wielkie Oczy, among others. In autumn 1944, it returned to the VO of “Lyson” (Ternopol region) and was transformed into a kurin (hence the literature often erroneously mentions a “Siromantsiv” kurin as early as spring 1944).
No. 9
2 March 1944, [no place given]. Interrogation protocol of Zbigniew Szeliński by the SB OUN

Case of “P” band

Interrogation protocol of Pole Zbigniew Szeliński from Berbeki, Kamianka powiat

Zbigniew Szeliński, son of Jan and Maria (maiden name Rochadowska) from Lviv, born 18 February 1902 in Lviv, secondary education, NCOs’ school in Lviv, professional Polish non-commissioned officer.

On 2 March 1944 in Mazyarnya Gogolova village, a group of armed men murdered 3 armed Ukrainians from Yazienitsa Ruska village. The victims of the murder were Volodymyr Rudy, born 20 January 1905 in Yazienitsa Ruska; and Mykhailo and Ivan Labay from Yazienitsa Ruska. When people heard screams, they went towards them. As a result, Zbigniew Szeliński, who was armed, was apprehended. Szeliński opened fire, but when wounded in the hand was forced to cease fire. He had on him a Mauzer rifle and 20 rounds, two grenades, the documents of the murdered Labays, and his own personal documents.

The man who was apprehended was a member of a Polish armed group, “Zawisza” that was based in Berbeki. He has been a member of the Polish Armed Forces since 1940, a professional non-commissioned officer. He helped the commanding officer of the “Zawisza” armed group and the commanding officer of Roza’s okrug (who Roza is, I am unable to say). The task of the “Zawisza” armed group was the liquidation of the active Ukrainian element and the military training of Polish youth.

Szeliński participated in the assault on the Ukrainian villages of Nivitse and Troytsa. The following Poles took part in the attack: [from] Adamy, Shlozaki [], Werkholy [], Budki Nieznanowskie, Berbeki, Yazienitsa Polska, Mazyarnya Vavrkova and from Stary Maydan. In Nivitse, Szeliński was wounded in one leg, and the would has not healed well as of today. In Troytsa, his colleague from Mazyarnya Vavrkova, Corporal Stanislaw Poźniak, was killed; and in revenge for his death, his brother Józef threatened that he would destroy all adjacent Ukrainian villages. Who shot Rudy – he does not know. He himself hacked to death Mykhailo Labay, who had been tied up. He also took the documents of both Labay brothers. Where the corpses were buried, he also does not know, because he went to participate in ambushes into the forest, where he was captured.
According to Szeliński’s testimony, 19 Ukrainians were murdered in Berbeki and in Mazyarnia Gogolova.

HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 376, T. 34, p. 215.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
No. 10
13 March 1944, [no place given]. Command of the OUN authorities

Glory to Ukraine!                          Glory to the Heroes!

Companion [...]                          [...] 

It is hereby ordered to proceed with the unconditional liquidation of all elements hostile to us, informants, residents (informers) of various nationalities, whether Ukrainians, snitches, Poles or other “easterners” taken into captivity. It is in particular ordered to liquidate all the “easterners” on our territory. Even if they are not spies – reconnoitre scouts, they will take the side of Bolsheviks when they come, and they will have materials concerning us. It is also emphasised that “easterners” in the ranks of the OUN should not be liquidated; they should dig dugouts and hide.

It is unconditionally ordered to cease all retaliatory operations against Poles; executing or killing Poles is strictly forbidden. Only Poles who were or are informants should be executed. For breaching this order in relation to Poles, perpetrators will be punished by death.

This order was issued by the chief authorities of the OUN. Issued on 6 March 1944.

[...]

This directive should be destroyed after usage. Prepare yourself well for Bolshevik occupation.

Headquarters. 13 March 1944.

Translated by: Major MISHURA  
22 May [19]44

In conformity: deputy head  
Major (–) STRELNIKOV

HDA SBU, F. 71, op. 9, Spr. 22, T. 3, p. 341.  
Certified copy, typescript.  
Document in Russian.
No. 11
14 March 1944, [no place given]. Special report from the head of the UPA’s kurin on developments in Pidkamin

Lviv oblast
UPA

Special report

A UPA kurin has moved onto my terrain. It was stationed in Chernitsa village (Brodovsk). Some drunk Germans who were there started to shoot at our people. Our people disarmed them and wounded the officer. Then they dressed his wound and took him to Brody with a letter of explanation. Next, the Germans visited the head of the kurin, in Chernitsa village. They had a white flag on the car. And negotiations started, led by a liaison officer. They reached an agreement that the Germans and the UPA will not shoot at each other. Germans proposed that the kurin take Pidkamin and protect this area against armed bandits, because the armed forces which had been stationed there were being sent to the nearby front line. The head of the kurin agreed to that. Passwords were set in order not to shoot at each other. During the talks, the head of the kurin demanded weapons and determined the contingent: 10 pieces of PM M1910 [Maxim’s machine gun model 1910], 60 machine guns, 60 rifles, 15 light mortars, 4 heavy ones, 100 finka submachine guns,\(^1\) 20 pistols, 2 light cannons, 10 binoculars and maps. The Germans immediately handed out 200 rifles, 2 mortars, 6 pieces of PM M1910, 20 ammunition belts, 2 light machine guns, 12 drum cartridges, 32,000 pieces of ammunition and maps. The head of the kurin sent only two chotas; the rest of them were hidden. He only showed the Germans the stopover place, but he did not have all his people there either. The Germans pointed out that they could not give out all the weapons, as they did not have them at hand. They also said that they would take all the young men with them. They were going to use them immediately to dig trenches at the old Russian border. The head of the kurin opposed this, and the Germans agreed not to take men for work. The head of the kurin wants to enlist them into his own units. This policy is being implemented by General Prützmann\(^2\). If any one of our people gets arrested, he will admit that he is a Ukrainian partisan, and make reference to the general and the head of the kurin, and he will be released by the Germans. There have already been cases when the Germans released 3 riflemen and 2 messengers in this way.

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\(^1\) This refers to PPSh-41 submachine guns.

\(^2\) Hans Prützmann (1901–1945), SS Obergruppenführer, General der Waffen SS und Polizei; in 1941–1944, Senior Commander of Police and SS, firstly “Ostland und Russland-Nord,” and then “Russland-Süd.” In May 1945 he was captured by the British and committed suicide.
In two districts, Zolochivskyi and Brodovsky, the Germans forbade Ukrainian police and German units to touch our units or shoot at them when they pass by. The Germans want to establish contacts with the UPA and OUN in all localities.

This kurin has organised an operation on Polish villages. The Germans made available 4 light cannons and a mini-tank to our people. During this operation, the kurin committed a faux pas [!]. 300 Poles were shot dead. Including women. Then our people performed an action on a monastery in Pidkamin, where 700 Poles from Volhynia were staying. But they escaped during the night. 150 Poles were killed. The Germans wanted to deploy available planes and two sotnias of Germans for the purposes of this operation. The head of the kurin refused. In the monastery, they seized enormous supplies of provisions, medicines and much more.

14 March 1944

HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 376, T. 68, p. 244.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Chelm [Region]
Report on the assault by a Polish band on Miętkie village, Miętkie gmina, 9 March 1944

Before the attack, on the night of 8/9 March, a larger band was noticed, approaching from Tyshoviets the forest near Miętkie village. Overnight and during the next day, the band stayed in this forest. Those who noticed it went to Sahrin.

On 9 March, at approx. 4 p.m., an attack was started from the forest. Incendiary shells were fired. At the same time, the village was surrounded. People ran along the open road to Sahrin, because it was easier from that side.

40 people were killed. The band went through the burned village and fields a couple of times, finishing off the wounded. People hid in the ashes of burned houses and pretended to be dead. Some saved themselves in this way. If someone had good clothes, they were ripped off, and if it turned out that that person was still alive, they were killed. Most people from Miętkie were killed in Sahrin, because they only escaped that far. The total number of casualties numbers 100.¹

Reported by Petro Danyluk

¹ See a different description of these events from the Polish side: Związek Walki Zbrojnej – Armia Krajowa ..., 173–183; J. Markiewicz, Partyzancki kraj (Lublin, 1985), 152–153.
Interrogation protocol on 11 April 1944, Stara Huta village

I, the assistant to the operational officer of Ludvipol RO NKGB [Regional Department of the People’s Commissariat of State Security], junior Lieutenant of State Security Vorobyov, interrogated today as a witness:

Karol Kaletyński, son of Rafał, born in Klecka Mala village of Mezhirichi raion, Rivne oblast, a Pole, a peasant, citizen of USSR, no member of any party, with a family, literate, no criminal record. He presently resides in Stara Huta village in Ludvipol raion, Rivne oblast, and works at a local self-defence establishment.

I was informed about the responsibility for misrepresentation, provided for in Art. 89 KK USSR (Penal Code of Ukrainian SSR):

(-) Kaletyński

Question: Do you know Yosip Kovalsky? What are your mutual relationships? Do you have any personal matters to settle between each other?

Answer: Yes, I know Yosip Kovalsky well, more or less since 1935. He then lived in Ludvipol, Rivne oblast. My relationships with Kovalsky were and are normal, I did not and do not have any personal matters to settle with him.

Question: Describe in detail what you know about the criminal activity of Yosip Kovalsky.

Answer: I had known Kovalsky before 1939, but we were not close friends. During Soviet rule, that is in 1939–1941, I saw him a couple of times in Ludvipol, as I used to go there quite often. Mostly, I saw him a few times at the market, but where he worked and what he was doing there, I don’t know...

During the German occupation I saw Y. Kovalsky for the first time in June 1943, which was when Bandera’s bands started to organise in the Ludvipol raion. I went to my father, to Klecka Mala village, and on the way I saw that he, Kovalsky, was riding on a carriage towards Topcha village in Mezhirichi raion. Aside from Kovalsky, 4 more Bandera men, whom I did not know, were riding on the carriage. Yosip Kovalsky and the other Bandera men were armed with rifles.

On August 1943 in the Pozarelo settlement of Kharoukh Selsoviet in Mezhirichi raion, a squad of Bandera men surrounded this settlement, which was inhabited only by Poles, to liquidate them. At this moment, I went out to a neighbour’s garden and started to pick cherries. When I was there, Yosip Kovalsky
approached the garden, but he did not recognise me. Kovalsky was armed with an SWT semi-automatic rifle, a revolver and one grenade. He turned to me: “Come here, companion.” When I approached him, Kovalsky asked: “What’s your name?” I did not reveal my real name to him, because he would have killed me. I gave the name of a neighbour, an immigrant, and a Ukrainian. “Bantsanski.” In the meantime, the Bandera men surrounded my place and I heard voices: “Stop, stop, don’t run!” Then Kovalsky cast a look towards my place and, turning to me, asked my first name. I said it was Leo (the first name of the neighbour whose surname I had provided). Then Kovalsky set off to my place, and I, seizing the opportunity, hid in the bushes growing nearby. The Bandera group stayed at my place for 15–20 minutes, then they left, got on horse carts and rode towards Khmielowka village. There were approximately 10 Bandera men in Kovalsky’s band, all armed with rifles. After they had left the village, I got back home. My wife and mother-in-law (mother of my wife) said that when the Bandera group had entered the house, they asked my mother-in-law where my wife and I were. She said we had gone to church. The leader of the Bandera group turned to her, pointed to my wife and asked: “Who is this?” My mother-in-law answered that this was a fugitive from Adamovka village. “She’s Ukrainian,” she added. Then the leader of the Bandera group turned to my mother-in-law and said that Banderovites would only kill those who stood against “Independent Ukraine” – “There is no need for your son-in-law to hide.” My mother-in-law and wife did not know Kovalsky, but when they described what the leader of the Bandera group was wearing and how he was equipped, I was strengthened in my conviction that it was Kovalsky who had asked them round.

On the next day, that is, 3 August 1944, two horse carts arrived in our settlement with a group of 7 Bandera men. One of the carts came to a halt at my neighbour’s place, and a second one approached my house. So I came out from the house to the garden and stood behind the wall, and my wife went out to the yard. Kovalsky approached her and asked where Karol and his wife were. She answered that they had gone to work in the field. I heard this talk between Kovalsky and my wife quite well, because I was very close to them. Kovalsky entered the house, inspected it and made for the horse cart, and the Bandera group set out for the field. When they left, I entered the house and told my wife to go fetch my mother-in-law. My child was staying at my mother-in-law’s place. She was at a neighbour’s. When my wife went to bring her, the Bandera man who was at the neighbour’s place did not allow my mother-in-law to return. But he knew my wife as a fugitive from Adamovka, as he had been in the settlement with Kovalsky on 2 August.

After 15–20 minutes, the cart with Kovalsky [and bandits], who had gone out to look for me in the field, returned. They drove to my place again, and again I went out and took cover in the garden. Kovalsky entered the house, apparently in search for my wife and me, looked into the barn, but as he found no one, he got on
the wagon and went to the neighbour’s place. I saw with my own eyes as he entered my house and went to the neighbour’s. I also saw that Kovalsky and his band commanded citizens of Polish nationality from our village to get onto the carts, and they gathered them in the house of the neighbour Piotr Kołosiński. These were: Piotr Kołosiński, aged 45–48, his wife Zofelka Kołosińska, and a 9-year-old boy who was staying at Kołosiński’s, his first name was Stasik; Feliks Kołosiński, born in 1909, Franciszka Boczkowska, aged 40–42, and her child aged round 2; my mother-in-law Maria Bronowicka and my daughter Danusia Kaletyńska, aged 2. They took them to the house of a resident of our village, Jan Klimaszewski. At Jan Klimaszewski’s place, the Bandera group gathered the Poles: Antonina Klimaszewska, aged 45, Bronisława Wieśniewska, aged 20, Stefan Klimaszewski, born 1912, Filipina Klimaszewska, aged 50, Włodzimierz Klimaszewski, born in 1918–19, Anielka Klimaszewska, born in 1920, their 2-year-old child, and Jan Klimaszewski, aged 55–60. They separated all the above-mentioned citizens gathered in Klimaszewski’s house into two groups, and slaughtered them. When the Bandera group were killing the assembled Poles, we heard screams and moans coming from the house. Aside from that, when they were killing these people, I heard three shots fired by the Bandera group in Klimaszewski’s house. When the people in Klimaszewski’s house were dead, the Bandera group robbed and burned down the houses of the murdered Poles. Six houses and all the farm buildings were incinerated in such way. Then the bandits took the cattle (7 cows) and clothing, got on the horse carts, and set off towards Shchekichin village.

The protocol was drafted in accordance with my words and read to me:

(–) Kaletyński²

Interrogators:
Assistant to the operational officer of Ludvipol RO NKGB
Junior Lieutenant of State Security
(–) Vorobyov

HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 985, pp. 93–99.
Original, manuscript.
Document in Polish.

² During the court hearing of Kovalsky (21 August 1945) the witness Kaletyński was absent for unknown reasons.
On 11 April, 1:00 p.m., two trucks with 15 people in German uniforms came to Kopanki village. The vehicles stopped by the cemetery, and these people began a mass cannonade on the house which was a contact point. The peasants started to run to the forest. The aggressors turned their weapons on them, killing 8, and wounding 7 persons. 26 Ukrainian households were burned down.

At 3 p.m. The aggressors left towards Kalush, taking the stolen property with them, and leaving behind 5 people whose task was to prevent the residents from extinguishing the fire.

None of our units able to help the peasants were present in the vicinity at that time.

On 13 April, a group of 100 Poles again attacked Kopanki village and started to load the stolen belongings on carriages, and then they set the village on fire once again. This time, an armed group of our people appeared, consisting of 23 men. Our boys divided themselves into two groups and set an ambush. When the Poles were leaving the village with the stolen property, our boys caught them in crossfire. 80 Poles were killed (many of them drowned in the river), and the others ran in all directions.

After an hour, the outpost reported that new units of Poles were approaching from Kalush. Our boys did not even manage to redeploy themselves when the Poles started shooting at them with machine guns and grenade launchers. Also some Hungarians were there with the Poles. Against the overwhelming forces of the enemy, the armed group retreated to the forest. The Poles robbed the village yet again and killed 7 persons.

On 14 April, Poles attacked the village once again, took away many belongings and set fire to some houses.

On 15 April, Poles and Hungarians again arrived at the village in cars. A fight with our group started, as a result of which one vehicle was burned down and a couple of men in Hungarian uniforms were killed.
No. 15
4 May 1944, [no place given]. Note, “From the reflections of an elderly OUN member”

From the reflections of an elderly [OUN] member
(conveyed by letter)

1. The issue of anti-Polish operations.
   According to him, the operations which are now being conducted against Poles will not lead to the extermination of the Poles, but of the Ukrainians themselves. As in the case of the Germans, who did not solve the Jewish issue in Europe with anti-Jewish campaigns, but on the contrary arraigned all the world against themselves, the campaigns taking place in Galicia will not bring about the desired effect, but rather the contrary.
   To banish Masurians to the west, those colonists which were settled on our soil by the Polish government, to burn them out with fire and iron, unless they are willing to leave voluntarily – that is all right. To destroy leaders who hide in towns or purely Polish villages; in return for the assaults on our people which they organise, a few or a dozen Polish heads, to repay them, and strictly by execution – this is also right. For murdering our people in Chełm region, sending a strong armed group there – they should fight with the Polish group. Appropriate actions with regard to Poles should be conducted here, and not just to get even – they kill our priests, teachers, counsellors, commune heads, intermediaries, etc., and here they kill the poor, who never participated in political life – it is blind man’s bluff. To kill people only because they are Roman Catholics, whether they are women, children, or elderly, and at the same time allow the Polish element, capable of fighting and replete with hatred of everything that is Ukrainian, to gather in cities – this is insane. He described the utterly shocking scenes which have taken place during such operations.

   In his opinion, there is still time to abandon this path. For everything that has happened so far – pin the blame on Germans, Bolshevik guerrilla groups, war, etc.
   2. The issue of the “easterners.”
   It is true that there are still a lot of them in Galicia, or that a lot of them have even joined organisations as agents provocateurs and even as NKVD spies; quite a lot have committed betrayal now, before the coming of Bolsheviks, in order to save their lives. Things will be worse when the Bolsheviks come. But this does not justify generalising the issue so that all the “easterners” who are in our country are “treated with lead.”
   If this approach to the issue is maintained, more valuable individuals will perish as culprits, to be sure. It is just horrible that Ukrainians, who for 25 years have evaded bullets of the NKVD or the Cheka underground [!], who saved themselves from deportation to Siberia or Solovki, would now die from the bullets of their
Galician brother. But the essence of things here is not that valuable individuals will die. This approach will deepen the chasm on the border between Galicia and the Eastern districts. Ukraine is not Galicia.

In his opinion, such policy makes enemies not only abroad, but also within the Ukrainian nation, as is visible now in Germany.

The issue is painful for him not only as a citizen and a Ukrainian, but also as a father who has sent three sons to do their duty for a cause which will lead to the annihilation of the whole Ukrainian Nation.

These are his reflections – he talked and he wept.

4 May [19]44.

*HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 376, T. 34, pp. 268.*
*Copy, typescript.*
*Document in Russian.*
No. 16
6 May 1944, [no place given]. Protocols from the Ukrainian underground of 6 May 1944, on anti-Polish operations in the Drohobych district

Drohobych Obl[ast]

Ukrainian anti-Polish retaliatory operations

Protocol
concerning anti-Polish operations
conducted in Zady village [!], Drohobych district

Part 1

On 10 April 1944 at night, an armed group of 25 men liquidated a Polish village, Zady, as a punishment for the denunciations of Ukrainian citizens by local Poles (we have an original copy of the denunciation letter to the Gestapo in Drohobych).

The operation started at 11.30 p.m. with an attack from four sides; at the same time, a fifth group with the commanding officer of the whole group went into the village. In the village, 25 (young) people barricaded themselves in a house, and they did not open the door. With a burst of fire from a *finka*, the commanding officer shot down some of them, and the rest took cover. The house was set on fire, and we heard shouting from the attic: “Give me a pitchfork! Take axes!, etc.” After another burst of fire, all of them started to come down and they were all shot dead.

The women and children were taken to the village. All the armed groups which surrounded the village emptied the indicated houses from all sides. There were cases of active resistance on the part of the women; they were liquidated (5). When the village was set alight from all sides, the Poles started to jump out of houses and talk in Ukrainian. When the commanding officer asked them whether they were Ukrainians, they started to shout: “We are Poles to the core!” They were all liquidated. A Polish teacher, Badecki, and his two daughters, defended themselves the longest. One of the daughters, during hand-to-hand combat with a bandit, shouted: “Don’t be afraid, Daddy! The Ruthenians are murdering us, but their time will come too. The Polish nation will avenge our death. Let Ukraine perish!” Both of them were shot, and the teacher, who was wounded twice, ran for his life.

The operation was accomplished at 2:30 a.m. All the Polish households (52), a school and an office were burned down. a-30 men and 5 women were killed* (during active resistance). An unknown number of men were burned [to death] in the fire.

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*a Underlined by hand.
On the way back, a Pole was captured from an adjacent village, Voloshcha; he was riding on horseback to Drohobych, to alarm the Gestapo. He was executed.

Protocol  
part. 2

On 18 April 1944, our armed group arrested all the active Poles (men) from Maynich village in Sambir district. There were 13 of them, and all were liquidated. The houses and buildings were not burned down due to the Ukrainian households which bordered them.

Protocol  
part. 3

On 3 April 1944, a unit from the military school for youth, on the way to the camp, together with a local armed group, destroyed Polish settlements near Zulin and Syemiginov villages in Stryi district. The houses and buildings were burned down, and a dozen or so men were killed.

Protocol  
part. 4

On Sunday in the evening of 9 April 1944, in the Polish village of Krekhovka, the “Yavir” group carried out a pacification action against the local Polish population. During the operation, 20 households were burned down, 10 persons killed and 3 seriously wounded. Among those burned [to death] and killed were Poles who had arrived from Korchunk Dashavsky. For the time of the operation, all the Poles moved to Korchunk Dashavsky; they only visit the village in daylight. They all enter a house which has not been demolished; it belongs to a certain Volksdeutsche. Their armed group also stays in this house.

On 20 April, Germans arrived in a car to burn Krekhovka; they brought two Ukrainian boys from Sulatyche village with them. From Krekhovka, they took 5 Poles and one woman, who had bayonets and grenades with them. They were taken to Sulatyche village, left as prisoners under the supervision of a 17-year-old interpreter (probably Ukrainian), and the local population, and the Germans went to the telephone station. When they returned, the Poles were no longer alive. All had been murdered by the local Ukrainian population and the interpreter. The interpreter explained the homicide of Poles as an attempt to escape, and so the Germans said nothing. They left immediately, releasing the two men from Sulatyche village whom they had taken with them when going to Krekhovka. The Poles who have moved to Korchunek have openly declared that Sulatyche will meet the same fate as them.

Protocol  
part. 5

On 11 April 1944, the “Yavir” group and a local armed group carried out a pacification action on a Polish village, Sokolov. During the operation, a dozen or
so houses were burned down, and about 10 persons were killed. No casualties among our people. The Polish peasants’ belongings were confiscated. During the operation, some of the Poles left to Stryi, others to Korchunk Dashavsky.

Stopover, 6 May 1944

HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 376, T. 34, pp. 257–258.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
25 August 1944, [no place given]. Extract from a record of the interrogation of Mykhailo Stepanyak, regarding the third conference of the OUN held in February 1943

A record of interrogation of the accused STEPANYAK Mykhailo, alias Dmytro\(^1\) of 25 August 1944

STEPANYAK Mykhailo, alias Dmytro, born in 1905, in Dzvinyach village in Solotvyn raion in Stanyslaviv oblast, lived in the town of Lviv, a Ukrainian, politically non-aligned, citizen of the USSR, higher degree in law, from serednyaks (middle-income peasants), a former lawyer’s assistant, then without a permanent occupation.

Question: What was your OUN activity based on in practice?
Answer: Since I joined the OUN in April-May 1940, I have performed the following OUN activities:

In summer 1940, upon the order of the National Provid of the OUN, I prepared a plan for the “Structure of the state governing bodies” of the so-called “Independent Ukraine” (my version [of the plan] was approved), which was approved for implementation. In the first phase of the war between Germany and the USSR, the Ukrainian state governing bodies were organised according to my design.

 [...] 

From the end of 1941, I was a member of the Central Committee of the OUN Provid, I participated in Provid meetings. I delivered speeches at the National ZUZ Provid as well as at the meetings of district providnyks for ZUZ, and I performed numerous tasks upon the order of the OUN providnyk “Maksym Ruban.”

In the years 1942–1943, I carried out talks with activists from various parties and organisations which were not included in the OUN, or disregarded Bandera’s movement.

In mid-1942, I carried out negotiations with representatives of Polish underground organisations, the so-called “democratic left,” and in autumn 1943 with representatives of the “Polish Government-in-Exile in London.”

\(^1\) Mykhailo Stepanyak (born 1905), noms de guerre “Leks,” “Serhiy”; an activist in the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, from 1939 in the OUN; in 1941–1943, OUN-B providnyk for the ZUZ (Galicia); in 1942–1943 a member of the CP OUN, participated in talks with the Polish underground. Captured in July 1944 by the Soviet security services; sentenced to death; the death penalty was commuted to 25 years in a labour camp; released in 1961.
In July 1944, I participated in two conferences, at which a decision was taken to replace the OUN with a new organisation – the NVRO [Revolutionary People’s Liberation Organisation].

[...]

At the 2nd conference of the OUN, the issue of relations with the Poles was also considered. The attendees took a decision on the necessity to:
1. establish an alliance of the so-called “nations oppressed by the USSR”;
2. make an agreement with the Poles to fight together against the USSR or, at worst, on Polish neutrality in the OUN’s fight against the USSR.

[...]

Question: Provide some precise evidence related to the 3rd conference of the OUN.
Answer: The 3rd conference of the OUN was held in February 1943, in Terebizh or Valuiky village, near Olesko in Lviv oblast, in a house of a peasant whose name I do not remember.

It was attended by:
1. LEBED’ Mykola – “MAKSYM RUBAN”;
2. SHUKHEVICH Roman – “TUR”;
3. OKHRYMOVICH Vasyl – “BAR”;
4. “HARMASH” – “VOLODYMYR”;
5. “KOSAR,” “TARAS”;
6. “MATLA” – “DNIPROVIY”;
7. “PETRO”;
8. I – STEPANYAK – “SERGEI.”

The conference was also chaired by “MAKSYM RUBAN.” STEPANYAK, was a clerk.

2 Mykola Lebed’ (1909–1998), noms de guerre “Jaropelk,” “Maksym Ruban,” an OUN activist; in 1936 sentenced to death for organising the assassination of Minister Pieracki; from 1940 second deputy to the providnyk of the OUN-B, and an SB commandant; after the arrest of Stepan Bandera, acted as providnyk of the OUN-B; in 1943 forced to resign as head of the OUN foreign affairs department; since 1944 a foreign affairs secretary at UHVR; emigrated after the war; remained in opposition to Bandera.


4 Vasyl Okhrymovich (1914–1954), noms de guerre “Gruzin,” “Bar,” “Kuzma”; a member of the CP OUN-B; from 1944 a member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine, from 1946 in exile. In 1951, parachuted into the Ukrainian SSR by the Americans. Arrested by the Soviet security services; in May 1954 sentenced to death by the Military Tribunal of the Kiev Military District, and shot by firing squad.

5 Matla Zinovy (1910–1993), nom de guerre “Dniprovy”; a member of the OUN; in 1941 commander of the southern marching troops of the OUN, in 1942–1943, a member of the CP OUN-B; from 1943 to 1945 held prisoner in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp; emigrated after the war, remained in opposition to Stepan Bandera.

6 This probably refers to Roman Kravchuk (1912–1951), nom de guerre “Petro”; a member of the CP OUN, in 1942–1951 the head of the organisational department of the CP OUN; in 1943–1951, a national providnyk of the OUN for the ZUZ (Galicia); Kravchuk died in a battle with the Soviet security services.
The main issues considered at the conference included:
1. assessment of the international situation;
2. assessment of the internal situation;
3. assessment of the OUN’s strategy, due to the changes in both the international and internal situation of Ukraine.

All the attendees participated in the discussions.

In my report, I described the international situation and [discussed] the possible influence of the victories of particular countries, and the position that the OUN should adopt in each situation.

I explained that the USSR would probably win the war, yet as it would still remain the main enemy of the “Ukrainian independence” which the OUN is fighting for, the organisation should do anything that is necessary to carry out an effective fight against the USSR.

I said that there is a Ukrainian government in the USSR; that the USSR is fighting a tough war, and that the Ukrainian masses are convinced that the USSR is the only power protecting Ukraine from German bondage. That is why we need evidence proving that the Ukrainian cause in the USSR has not yet been resolved, and that the Ukrainian nation is not satisfied with the USSR’s policy towards Ukraine.

That is why it is in the OUN’s interest to portray the USSR as the “aggressor and oppressor for the Ukrainian nation.”

Taking into account the fact that the Germans, although they are still in Ukraine, have in fact been already defeated and that the Bolsheviks will come to Ukraine, I made an analysis related to the factors that could show [in such a situation] the power of the Ukrainian “independent” movement led by the OUN, and, on the other hand, prove that Ukraine can break free from the Germans without the help of the USSR. In such a case, entering Ukraine, the USSR would be treated as an imperialist.

I concluded that the only factor that could make us achieve this aim was an uprising in Ukraine, and insurgents commanded by the OUN taking power, without the help of the Red Army.

I recommended that in the event of a successful outcome for such an uprising, a “Ukrainian government” or something of the kind should be immediately established. I pointed out that the existing contradictions between England and America on the one side and USSR on the other should be taken into account. I suggested that, sooner or later, these contradictions will lead to a serious conflict, even more so because the allies do not want the Soviet authorities to derive any political benefits from their victory over Germany.

I said that should the uprising succeed, England and America would be forced to consider the substantial anti-Soviet forces existing in the country. Moreover, this factor would also facilitate the clash between the USSR and its present allies, since England and America could then justify a change of policy towards the USSR to their nations, expounding that USSR nations lived in captivity and the USSR had demonstrated aggression towards people, depriving them of the possibility of deciding on their own fate.
What forces could start such an uprising? I believed that since there were also other nationalist formations apart from OUN, such as UNDO, USRP,\(^7\) UNR (Ukrainian National Republic) activists\(^8\) and others, which were rather weaker than OUN but nevertheless capable of exerting influence on a certain number of their supporters, we should join forces, establish joint authorities which would lead everyone, and have sufficient influence on that part of the soldiers which did not want to join OUN. This was particularly applicable to old military specialists – UNR activists.

I also claimed that the creation of such a common representation of various nationalist formations was also necessary to demonstrate the unity and consolidation of Ukrainian forces to the Ukrainian nation and the rest of the world. This could facilitate relationships with England, America, and other states in the fight against the USSR, as the OUN had “earned” its negative opinion as a fascist organisation under the influence of the Germans.

I also proposed the creation of a “Ukrainian Military Committee,” which would direct the military actions of the uprising, and I argued that the OUN’s military department could not handle work on such a grand scale alone.

All the delegates agreed with the analysis I presented, as well as the undertakings I had put forward, which was reflected in a resolution passed at the conference.

Still, under the influence of one member of the Central Provid and then a member of the Provid’s bureau – SHUKHEVICH (“TUR”) –, the route marked out at the conference was rejected, and the organisation’s policy in matters of armed combat was reduced to fighting against the red guerrilla bands and the Poles – a policy which was virtually already being implemented in Volhynia by “KLYM SAVUR” as the commanding officer of the UPA.

[...]

At “the 3rd Special Grand Meeting,” “RUBAN’s” position deteriorated, in the following circumstances.

Not only did “RUBAN” fail to protest against calling the conference a congress, that is, a “Grand Meeting,” but he even agreed to this renaming despite the fact that the statute had thereby been breached – [that is], not all the district OUN leaders had been invited, many national principals were absent, and only their deputies present, which according to the statute constituted a breach.

“RUBAN” abstained from his right to present a report to the congress on the activity conducted under his leadership. Nor did he demand that the congress examine the matter of regularity of ousting him from the OUN’s leadership. And thus the situation arose that the most prominent members of OUN, for various reasons, opposed “RUBAN,” not to mention started feeling resentment towards him as the leader.

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\(^7\) The Ukrainian Socialist Radical Party (USRP) – a Ukrainian political (socialist) party which came into being from a merger of the Ukrainian and Russian Radical Party (RURP) and part of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries Party (UPSR); it cooperated with the PPS.

\(^8\) This refers to supporters of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, mainly officers from Petliura’s army.
Before the “Special Grand Meeting,” “OKHRIM” had started to unify the dispersed armed groups in his country to create a uniform military force, thereby broadening his influence not only in his own country, but also in other countries. In this way he was actually in command of all the OUN armed forces, and thus he announced the establishment of the UPA, designating himself as the commander in chief, under the pseudonym of “KLYM SAVUR.”

He then issued his first order, in which he announced that the supreme sovereign authority of Ukraine was the leadership of the UPA, and he actually subordinated OUN to the latter, within the area of the UPA’s operation.

Since this was an unlawful action on the part of “OKHRIM” – “KLYM SAVUR,” “MAKSYM RUBAN” sent his representatives to “Okhrim” in order to straighten out the situation on site, and include representatives to the UPA authorities, so that the UPA remained under the influence of the Central Provid.

“KLYM SAVUR” sent back the people “RUBAN” had sent, and ceased thereby to be subordinate to the Central Provid, arguing that “it remained off the beaten track, and that he, „KLYM SAVUR” must take the lead and unify the armed forces which had spontaneously came into being and in some cases started to fight against the Germans, as there was a risk that they would be exploited by the red guerrilla groups.

Thus, “MAKSYM RUBAN” did not manage to come to an agreement with “KLYM SAVUR,” and so he decided to bring him to account; and when “Klym Savur” learned about this, he became even more ill-disposed towards “RUBAN.”

When he sent his representatives “HALYNA”9 and “HORBENKO” to the congress, he instructed them to act against “RUBAN” in favour of SHUKHEVICH and other persons appointed to the bureau.

[...]

Question: Where and when was “the 3rd Special Grand Meeting” held?
Answer: “The 3rd Special Grand Meeting” was held in August 1943 in khutirs within a distance of 2–3 kilometres from Zolotaya Sloboda village, Kozova raion, Ternopil oblast.

Question: Who attended “the 3rd Special Grand Meeting”?
Answer: On the basis of the old statute, approved by “the 2nd Grand Meeting,” “the Grand Meeting” should be attended by: members of the Central Provid, members of “the Great Council,” and active national and district leaders.

[...]

Question: What did the discussions related to the UPA and “KLYM SAVUR” amounted to?
Answer: The discussion on this topic was conducted mainly in terms of practical UPA operations under the lead of “KLYM SAVUR,” who had eliminated

9 Yakov Busel (1910–1945), nom de guerre “Halyna,” propaganda manager for OUN-B in Volhynia; member of the national provid of OUN-B Volhynia–Polesia; deputy commander of UPA-North of “Klym Savur”; killed in combat with the NKVD.
the Polish population in large numbers, as well as on the UPA’s role in establishing “the independent Ukrainian state.”

“HORBENKO,” “HALYNA,” “IVANIV” and SHUKHEVICH defended the conduct of “Klym Savur” towards the Poles especially strongly. “RUBAN” and I expressed criticism.

As all the bureau of the Provid had defended “KLYM SAVUR,” “the Great Meeting” justified his operations, even if this was not reflected in the official resolutions of the congress.

All those who defended “KLYM SAVUR” also defended the proposition that the UPA constituted the main centre of combat for the „Ukrainian state”, which was confirmed by the meeting’s resolutions.

There were [also] opponents of this proposition, who held the view that the UPA was compromised due to its criminal operations against the Polish population, and could not became the main centre of combat for “Ukrainian independence,” even if for no other reasons than these.

Such persons, among whom “RUBAN” and I numbered ourselves, commented that the main method of combat for „Independent Ukraine” should be political activity, that is, political – and not military – organisation.

[...]

The protocol was drafted in accordance with my words read to me, and I hereby confirm its reliability with my signature:

STEPANYAK

Interrogators:
Director of Investigation Department, UBB [Struggle Against Banditry] of Ukrainian SSR NKVD
Mayor of State Security
SPIVAKOVSKY

In conformity:
*Manager of the group with KGB Chairman at the SM of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant Colonel (–) Kirpichenko

Note: original copy of the interrogation protocol is contained in the files of intelligence case “Berloga,” vol. 1, page 121–a.

_HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 372, T. 1, pp. 21–59._
_Certified copy; typescript._
_Document in Russian._

*a- -a Handwritten.*
From an operational report

23 November [19]44

Below, I am going to quote from memory the contents of the speeches of the attendees of the first military conference of the OUN held in October 1942 in Lviv, as well as the significance of its resolutions.

The conference was attended by:
1. Providnyk of the OUN “OREST” – Mykola LEBED’.
2. Military clerk to the OUN Provid “DUB.”
3. Officer for special assignments to the military clerk of the OUN „LEHENDA Yevhen” – KLYMIV Ivan.¹
4. State military clerk for the OUN of the “West” state “VOVK” – PAVLYSHYN Luka.²
5. State military clerk for the OUN of the “North” state “SOM” – IVAKHIV Vasyl.³

Note: There was no representative of the “East” state, since the OUN was just starting its activity there, and was not able to make preparations for a military operation.

The conference was opened by the providnyk of the OUN “OREST” – Mykola LEBED’, who stated that he had called the conference at the insistence of the OUN’s military clerks.

Such a conference was held for the first time, as until then, the military activity of the OUN had not been subject to much attention.

At the moment, we are dealing with a world war, and it is obvious that the Germans will be defeated. Despite the fact that they are the greatest military power in the world, acting rapidly, they have reached a dead end, although they have managed to get to Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad.

[...]

¹ Ivan Klymiv (1909–1942), nom de guerre “Lehenda,” member of the OUN; in 1940–1941 was a state providnyk of the OUN for ZUZ. Arrested in 1942 by Gestapo, died during the investigation.
² Luka Pavlyshyn, nom de guerre “Vovk,” an OUN-B activist, one of the founders of the UPA.
³ Vasyl Ivakhiv, nom de guerre “Sonar,” “Som,” lieutenant; in 1942 a military clerk at the OUN-B in Volhynia; in 1943 head of the UPA-North staff; died in May 1943 in a battle with the Germans.
The speech of the *providnyk* of the OUN “OREST” – LEBED’

“OREST” expresses his gratitude to the organisers of the first military conference of the OUN, during which he found out many new things and saw that the military clerk for the “West” had begun serious work in the area of military training, and he had made great achievements in this field, although he had to overcome a lot of obstacles. He calls on the military clerks not to be afraid of difficulties, and he for his part will take up any measures to overcome them. At the same time, he provides them with guidelines related to the formulation of detailed theses, on which the future military activity of the OUN will be based. He will analyse the theses himself and approve them.

Next, the OUN *providnyk* “OREST” – LEBED’ Mykola leaves the conference.

The military clerk to the OUN *Provid* “DUB” suggests that during the conference – here in Lviv or, in the event of difficulties, somewhere in the countryside – the attendees should start to work on theses that would explain all the military and political aspects of our fight.

The commission consisting of: 1. “Lehenda” – KLYMIV Ivan, 2. “Vovk” – PAVLYSHYN and 3. “SOM” – Ivakhiv Vasyl started to work on the theses (the programme), which took them almost two months.

[...]

Demands of the military command of the OUN *Provid* in respect to the foreign sector

The High Command of the Ukrainian Military Forces puts forward the following demands to the OUN *Provid*:

1. Due to the fact that England and America will undoubtedly win the war, representations must be established in these countries with the help of influential members of the OUN and its supporters. The representatives will use any means to carry out campaign for “Independent Ukraine.” The basic argument should be that “Independent Ukraine” is the main factor that would weaken Russia. Thus, Russia will be unable to compete with the English and the Americans in Asia. Having the same rights as other countries, Ukraine will become a purchaser of English goods.

2. To carry out a campaign among Ukrainian emigrants in America, who have their representatives in the parliaments of [individual] states and in the federal parliament.

3. With the help of OUN propagandists, draw the Poles’ attention to the fact that Germany, which is gradually colonising the Polish territories, is their mortal enemy. Promise Galicia and Volhynia to the Poles, in order to weaken their orientation towards the East. Draw the Poles’ attention to the mortal threat to themselves and the Ukrainians from their eastern and western neighbours. As a result, the Poles, fighting with the Germans, who have already colonised Polish territories up to Łódź, will no longer be such a fierce enemy of the [Ukrainians].

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The organisation of internal security

The demands of the main military command on state military commands:
Upon commencement of military activities for “independence,” the issue of ethnic minorities must necessarily be solved. In order to solve the problem, representatives of ethnic minorities – the enemies of the people – must be eliminated.

1. Representatives of the Russian minority should be left alone, since they are mixed with the Ukrainian population, and they do not pose any threat. They (mainly peasants) are affected by political events in the same way as the Ukrainians. Eliminate Russian activists fighting against the Ukrainians after recording them in the register, especially in small towns, since they are enemies.

2. Do not eliminate Jews, but displace them from Ukraine, giving them the possibility to take some of their belongings. We should respect the Jews, since they have influences in England and America.

3. Displace all Poles, giving them the possibility of taking some of their belongings, since they will also be defended by England and America. Eliminate those who do not want to go away. Eliminate more fierce enemies, including all members of anti-Ukrainian organisations, one day before the announcement of mobilisation. Before this, they will be recorded in the register by regional and district military commands. The elimination will be carried out by military police, and, in exceptional situations, by the “SB.” It is forbidden to use army soldiers for this purpose.

4. The Hungarians, Czechs and Romanians must be left alone, bearing in mind the liquidation of the western front.

5. Representatives of other ethnic minorities of the USSR must also be left alone. Treat Armenians the same as the Jews, bearing in mind the fact that they are loyal to Russia.

About prisoners of war

Prisoners of war must be treated decently, since they are living propaganda. The Spanish, Belgians, Dutch and French serving in the German army must be treated best and released quickly. After liberation, they will do more for Ukraine than thousands of propagandists.

Pay particular attention to Russians and Jews. Eliminate Jewish political instructors. Separate officers from privates. Privates must be urged to resist Communism. Use them for work, and, as far as possible, feed and dress them properly, since this will bring nothing but benefits to our country. Do not release any Russian prisoners before the end of the war.

If the Hungarians, Czechs and Romanians remain neutral during the war, release them after urging them to [support an] “independent country.” Accept all of those that want to serve in the Ukrainian army.
Release all representatives of ethnic minorities of the USSR, except Armenians, after urging them to [support an] “independent country.” Accept all of those that want to serve in the Ukrainian army.  

[...]

On the security of the army command

Security of all army troops and the military command is provided by the head of the intelligence service at every registered military headquarters. They can use military police for this purpose. During military activity, enemies may also be eliminated by military troops, and, before the commencement of military operations, only the military police or the intelligence services can order “SB” bodies to do this.

All military headquarters, beginning from stanichny, should prepare lists of enemy elements, foreigners and Ukrainians who have a hostile attitude to the OUN. Particular attention should be focused on German agents and informers, as well as Polish minions. Stanichny and regional military commandants should submit the list of enemies to district military commandants, who, with the help of a military police platoon, will carry out methodical elimination. According to the guidelines, this should be done one day before the beginning of mobilisation. Moreover, this elimination must be kept secret from the real enemies. The results must be hidden immediately, in order not to leave any signs.

The head of a district intelligence service can order the “SB” or lower-ranking military commandants to do this. This can be done in exceptional circumstances, mainly in a situation when general mobilisation is underway. We must remember that the enemy is not asleep, and, when they realise what is going on, they will start to resist. That is why the registers should be made in absolute secrecy – only a district military commandant, the second-in-command and the head of the intelligence service [must be informed]. Apart from preparing the lists, enemy elements should be constantly and closely observed.  

[...]
No. 19
1 December 1944, Nove Siolo. Extract from the minutes from the interrogation of Bohdan Pichukha

Protocol of interrogation
1 December 1944
Nove Siolo village

I, senior operational [officer] of NKVD Directorate of Novosielsk, Uryev, today interrogated the detainee Bohdan Pichukha, son of Semyon.

The interrogation started at 10:00 a.m.
The interrogation ended at 3:00 p.m.

[...]

Question: We have information that you personally participated in executing 27 persons in Dobromirka village on 7 October 1944, so I strongly recommend you confess.

Answer: Yes, I have not confessed to that, I admit. I was afraid of responsibility and I lied. I took part in shooting 27 persons, and also other residents of our village participated with me.

Question: Tell in detail about the execution of 27 persons in your village.

Answer: It was like this – on 7 October, a band from Volhynia arrived in Dobromirka. It was led by a bandit whose nom de guerre was “Mech.” I did not know and do not know the people from “Mech’s” band. At this time, apart from “Mech’s” band, “Askold’s” band also stayed [in the village]. I have provided the composition of this band’s personnel above. On the same day, early in the morning, an OUN member, Ivan Bitz, the [manager for] economic issues of Dobromirka village, told me that I had to take care of work consisting of the battle with and liquidation of Poles from the village. By his order, as a member of OUN and a committed nationalist, I took my rifle, which I have had since 1943, and started the “work.” 4 men from “Mech’s” band were put at my disposal, and I went with them to the Polish families which I brought along to execute them. All the Poles I brought along were executed by firing squad.

Question: List the Poles who were brought along for execution by you.

Answer: I brought Dmitry Kravchuk, his wife Sabina Kravchuk, daughter Stefania, son Volodymyr and yet another girl from Lisiechynse, who was staying the night with them, whose first and last name I don’t know; Adam Rudziel, Anna Rudziel, Hela Rudziel, Adam Dzinowski and his wife Praskowia Dzinowska. In total, I brought 10 persons, that is 3 entire families. I led them to Drobnicki’s barn. Then, from the barn they were driven into a cellar and all of them were shot with a machine gun. Then, a grenade was tossed on them.
Question: Who else participated in the execution, and who brought the other 17 Poles?
Answer: Another 17 persons were brought by Myroslav Moroz and Myroslav Zayats. The following persons from our village took part in the execution: Stepan Kotseval, Roman Hlovan, Volodymir Oleynik, Pavlo Voyzitsky, Myroslav Moroz and Myroslav Zayats. I do not know the others, they were from a different band.

Question: Who specifically executed those persons?
Answer: When all 27 persons were driven into the cellar, they were executed at once with a machine gun. I cannot say who was shooting, but it was a man from “Mech’s” band. It was him.

Question: Why were the above 27 persons shot?
Answer: They were shot because they did not deserve the trust of the Ukrainian nation, and they supported the actions of Soviet authorities.

Question: Tell us, where else did you participate in murders and when?
Answer: I participated in killing yet once again in 1943. [Then], we killed Józef Buzdan, because he was allegedly a communist. He was killed for that. Pavlo Litvinchuk, Ivan Drahan, and I participated in his homicide. I didn’t kill him personally, I was just on guard in the street, and he was killed at home.

Question: What did you do with all the belongings of the murdered Poles?
Answer: We left it all there. The bandits only took necessary items, such as shoes and usable clothing. The rest of the belongings were taken away by the residents of Dobromirka village.

Question: Among the residents who took away the belongings, who do you know and what did they take?
Answer: I know that after murdering Dmitry Kravchuk, Pavlo Popovich took one horse, hens, and crops; and Mykhailo Nikitiuk also took one horse from Kravchuk’s belongings. What and who took from the others, I don’t know.

Question: What else can you add to your testimony?
Answer: Nothing, the protocol was read to me and it was drafted according to my words, which I hereby confirm with my signature:

(–) Pichukha

[Interrogated by:]
Senior operational officer of Novosielskie RO NKVD
(–) Yuryev

Original, manuscript.
Document in Russian.
No. 20
6 January 1945, [no place given]. Extract from the interrogation protocol of Vasil Horbatyuk

Interrogation protocol of
6 January 1945

I, a senior investigator of the OKR (counter-intelligence Agency) “SMERSH”\(^1\) of the 6th Army, Kolosov, interrogated today Vasyl Horbatyuk, son of Ivan.

The interrogation commenced at 10:20.

Question: Complete your testimony as regards the name of the village where in spring 1943 members of the “UPA” carried out a manhunt and murdered Poles.

Answer: In 1943, in spring, members of the “UPA” murdered Polish people in Boleslavovka village in Volodymyr-Volynskyi raion, Volhynia oblast, situated near Horichov village. Boleslavovka is a Polish-Jewish settlement. Its buildings extend to Horichov itself. Thus, everybody call in their own way: Boleslavovka, Zofiovka, or Horichov.

Question: Describe how the Polish population in Boleslavovka settlement was murdered.

Answer: Perhaps in May 1943, I do not recall on what day, stanichny (village leader) Hordiyuk came to my flat in Horichov and told me to get dressed and go with him. So I got dressed quickly and went out onto the street, where a pair of horses were standing, hitched up to a cart. Hordiyuk, Radyuk, “Dubovy” and three unfamiliar men were sitting on the cart. I joined them and we went to Boleslavovka settlement. When we arrived, about 100 people from various Ukrainian villages were already there. The settlement were already surrounded ahead of our arrival. Here “Dubovy” took out a rifle from the cart and gave it to me. Some of the men were armed with rifles, and others variously: with shovels, some with pitchforks.

“Dubovy,” Hordiyuk, Radyuk and someone else (I don’t remember who) went into the settlement. After a couple of minutes, we heard people scream. The moment we heard it, bandits charged in from all around toward the buildings and the fight started. The defenceless Poles were unable to resist. They were beaten with whatever the bandits had in their hands, in the street, in houses, barns etc. I personally killed two Poles – men aged from 25 to 30. The fight lasted for approx. four hours, and then we left the settlement and headed towards our homes.

\(^1\) “SMERSH” (Russ. Smert’ shpionam, “Death to spies”) – operated between 1943 and 1946 to bolster the counter-intelligence protection of the Soviet Army. SMERSH was the Chief counter-intelligence Directorate of the USSR People’s Commissariat of Defence and consisted of special NKVD units.
Question: How many people were killed there by your band?
Answer: This time our band killed approximately 40 Poles.

Question: Were there women, old people, and children among the killed?
Answer: Personally I didn’t see women, old people and children among the killed, but people who appeared the day after to bury the corpses said that there were women, old people and children among the murdered.

Question: How many times and where else did manhunts and slaughter of Polish population take place?
Answer: Aside from the manhunt I provided testimony to above, I don’t know anything and didn’t hear anything from anybody.

Question: Did you participate directly in the burning of houses belonging to Poles in the Boleslavovka settlement?
Answer: Yes, I participated in setting fire to the houses in the Polish settlement of Boleslavovka. It was like this. In May 1943, on the third day of the brutal slaughter of Poles in Boleslavovka settlement by our band, at night, *stanichny* Hordyiuk called me, Anton Androshchuk, Vasyl Yukhimiu, Yakov Strizachuk, Anani Kisluk, Anani Dubchok and Yosip Lashchuk. We went to Boleslavovka settlement, where we burned down more or less 30 houses. I personally burned down three of them.

The interrogation was ended at [time] 2:00 p.m.

The protocol from the interrogation was drafted in accordance with my words and read back to me:

(–) Horbatyuk

Interrogators:
Senior Investigator of OKR “SMERSH” of the 6th Army
(–) Kolosov

_HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 985, pp. 130–133._

*Original, manuscript.*

*Document in Russian.*
Interrogation protocol

Town of Liuboml

The interrogation started at 11:00 p.m.

I, the operational officer of Liuboml RO NKGB, lieutenant of State Security Kobelev, interrogated the apprehended Stanisław Wawrzycki, son of Jan.

[...]

Question: Tell us how you joined Filipowicz’s armed group and who recommended you?
Answer: I joined the Polish nationalist group of Filipowicz in September 1943, when it had just been formed. No recommendation was necessary in order to join it.

[...]

Question: Did German law enforcement and military forces assault your group’s stopover site?
Answer: The Germans did not attack us. On the contrary, sometimes our quarters were located no more than 200 metres from German ones. The Germans knew well that a Polish armed group was stationed here, but they never attacked.

Question: How many assaults on Ukrainian villages were carried out, how many people murdered and who helped in slaughtering the population?
Answer: The assaults on villages took place irregularly and just a couple of times. Members of the Filipowicz group totally destroyed Rivne, Przekurki, Polapy, Sokol, Zapole, Shtun, Vysotsk, Stavki, Stavechki and a number of other Ukrainian villages. How many people were murdered in these villages – I don’t know. Significant support in destroying Ukrainian villages and liquidating the population who did not manage to take cover during the assault was given at the beginning of 1944 by a more numerous Russian armed group. Later on, German military police from the Matseyiv raion also went with us.

Question: What were the armaments and uniforms of the Filipowicz group?
Answer: As for armaments, the Filipowicz group had various machine guns, automatic pistols, rifles and grenades. There was also a 60-sabre cavalry. All of them had only German uniforms. Each member had a Polish peaked cap with an eagle.

Question: Who were the Filipowicz group supporting – the Red Army or the Germans?
Answer: In my opinion, it was like this: to provide any support to the Red Army in fighting Germans, we had, as real partisans, to conduct subversive
activities at the German rear. But our group was not a guerrilla unit; we were rather a criminal nationalist group, whose aim was to liquidate the Ukrainian and Jewish population on the territory of Poland, and – as far as possible – establish the Polish State. Thus the Germans helped Filipowicz, and his group supported the Germans in fights with Soviet partisans.

Question: Why then, being aware of this national hatred, did you belong to the criminal Filipowicz group?

Answer: When I joined the Filipowicz group, I thought that it had been created in order to protect the country and fight the Ukrainian insurgents who assaulted our villages. While later, when I saw everything that was happening with the group, and the criminal assaults on peaceful Ukrainian villages, I was unable to leave the group. I was afraid I would be shot by my companions.

Question: Was there any enforcement body in the Filipowicz group, and who was in charge of it?

Answer: Yes, there was such an enforcement body in the Filipowicz group; they called them MPs. The whole operation of the MPs was directed by Filipowicz. The composition of the body included five persons of the group – Adam Żur, Stanisław Krawczuk, “Kszemil” whose first name was Albin, someone from Lutsk, whose name and pseudonym I do not know, and Filipowicz.

Question: What were the tasks of the MPs in the Filipowicz group?

Answer: The MPs examined the cases of deserters who wanted to resign from membership in the group, and performed all surveillance activities for the group.¹

The interrogation was interrupted at 3:05 p.m.

My words were written down truthfully, the protocol was read to me and I confirm the truthfulness of the above:

(–) Wawrzycki
7 January 1945

Interrogators:
Operational Officer of RO NKGB
Lieutenant of State Security
(–) Kobelev

HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 1020, pp. 117–121.
Original, manuscript.
Document in Russian.

No. 22
12 January 1945, Lutsk. Interrogation protocol of Fedot Desyatnichuk

Interrogation protocol

12 January 1959

Town of Lutsk

An investigator of the Investigation Unit of UKGB at the SM of the Ukrainian SSR of Volhynia oblast, lieutenant Chernomord, interrogated defendant Fedot Desyatnichuk, son of Vasil, born in 1913.

The interrogation started at 10:40 a.m.

The interrogation was interrupted at 2:00 p.m. [and resumed] at 3:30 p.m.

The interrogation was closed at 7 p.m.

Question: During interrogation on 31 December 1958, you testified that in July 1943 you took part in the liquidation of Soviet citizens of Polish nationality. Describe this in detail.

Answer: Yes, in July 1943, on St. Peter’s Day, I participated in the liquidation of Soviet citizens of Polish nationality. The circumstances were as follows:

I remember that on Sunday, the day before St. Peter’s Day, a member of the OUN Koroluk Kuzma, son of Oleksandr, came to me (he was killed in February 1945); he conveyed an order to me from the OUN stanichny of Lukoviche village, Halan Yefrem, to come to the house of Demian Mukha, with an axe. We were supposed to go and fulfil the task ordered by OUN, but I did not know what we were supposed to do, and Koroluk did not say another word about it.

In the evening on the same day I appeared with an axe in front of Demian Mukha’s house, along with many OUN members from Lukoviche village, who had also gathered there then. [...].

Either Demian Mukha, son of Mikhail, or Kuzhel Semyon ordered the gathered OUN members to get on carriages and go. Before our departure, Demian Mukha was armed with a Russian-type rifle, and all the remaining participants of the gathering, including me, had axes with them.

In the night, all the persons indicated above who had gathered by the house of Demian Mukha went on horse carts to Lysov village. Among the drivers, I remember Petro Kuzhel, son of Danilo (he died in the front line), and Yevtukh Yepifan (who died in the village).

In Lysov village, we were joined by groups of OUN members from Lysov, Bushkoviche and Oryshche, also armed with axes.

From Lysov village, we went through Bermieshov and Kolona to Zahorovsky Forest, where a couple of groups from local villages was also assembled.

From Zahorovsky Forest, I was transferred along with other OUN members to Stary Zaharov village, to which we were transported on horse carts (from Novy Zaharov village), but I did not know the drivers.
In Stary Zaharov village, near the Orthodox church, all those who had come from Lukoviche, Oryshche, Lysov, Bushkoviche and Bermieszov, were arranged in a row and divided into groups. I was assigned to the group of Mykola Kovalchuk, son of Kalistrat (born in Oryshche village, killed in 1944; in the OUN he was a deputy to the “SB” commanding officer of Lokatski raion), and then I was incorporated into the subgroup of a member of OUN, Zakhar (he lived in Oryshche, I’ve heard he was killed on the front line). [...]

Before the OUN members were divided into groups, Petro Pasos, son of Yakov (killed in 1944) told me that they had gathered us there in order to liquidate Poles.

Then, [on the order of] Mykola Kovalchuk, all our group got on carriages and we went to the edge of Stary Zahorov. When we stopped near a windmill, Kovalchuk pointed out a house to Zakhar, then we got off the carriage and Zakhar explained to me, Andrey and Hryhory, that we were going to murder Poles.

Under Zakhar’s lead we went to the house indicated by Kovalchuk, we looked at it, and then entered it, but we did not find any Poles inside – the whole family must have been hiding somewhere. So we went out to the yard, and it was then when we were called to another house, located within 100 metres of the one we visited. We approached the second house. Mykhailo, born in Galicia, a resident of Lysov village (his wife, born in Oryshche village, daughter of Opolon; her first husband Lashch Tykhon was killed by Poles in 1939), and Dmytro from Lysov village (his father Sidir had a windmill in Lysov), and yet another man from Zahorov village, were already there. Someone said that there were Poles in that house. Zakhar ordered us to surround the house to thwart the escape of the Poles, and he entered the room alone and commanded all who were there to lie on the ground. Then he asked the women where their husbands were. The women said that they were in the barn. Then Zakhar left the room and told us to break the windows and kill all the Poles. At this moment, a man who lived in this house approached us, told us he was Ukrainian, and asked us not to break the windows (either he was renting a room at the Poles’ place, or they were renting it from him). After giving the order to murder the Poles, Zakhar ran up to the barn, shouted to the men to come down from the attic to the ground, and fired one round. I came up to the barn and saw one Pole who went down from the attic. Zakhar ordered him to lay on the ground, and Mykhailo (from Galicia), who was standing next to him, hit the Pole with the head of his axe in the head. After two strokes from Mykhailo the Pole was still alive, but despite that Mykhailo ripped off his shoes. I did not want to kill Poles and I went away behind the barn, but Zakhar noticed me and started to shout at me, demanding I go to the room and kill the Polish women. I went into the room and saw a couple of women and children on the floor; some of them were still alive. With the axe which I had with me I hit a woman once or twice, and ran out of the house again. Then Hryhory fell into the house and pierced the Polish women with a bayonet. Zakhar caught one woman in an orchard, brought her to the yard, when someone (I did not remember who) killed her. Two women who were in this house managed to escape. In total, we killed about 8–10 persons there (I do not remember exactly). After slaughtering the Poles,
Zakhar ordered the man – the Ukrainian living in this house – to bury the corpses of the dead in the cellar. In my presence the Ukrainian emptied the cellar of the barrels, weights and other stuff, and then the corpses of the women, two men and one youngster aged 15–16 were thrown inside. I remember that the youngster was dragged to the cellar when still alive, and Zakhar ordered me to finish him off with the axe, but I refused to. Then Zakhar told Mykhailo (from Galicia) to finish off the boy. Mykhailo killed him by the cellar with an axe stroke. Then Zakhar took me with him and we went on the road, where the corpses of two women whom he had shot with the rifle should have been lying. As we did not find the corpses of these women, we went to the house where Mykola Kovalchuk was. Zakhar reported the liquidation of the Poles to Kovalchuk, who immediately commented that we should kill the Poles, throw their corpses to the barn, and then set fire to it and burn them in it. We slaughtered the Poles on St. Peter’s Day in the morning, after sunrise.

Mykola Kovalchuk gathered his group. He said that we should go to Horokhovka settlement and help another group of OUN members to liquidate Poles. We went there, but we came across only one woman, while all the remaining inhabitants of Horokhovka settlement were hiding from us. This was the reason we did not kill anybody in this settlement. From Horokhovka we dispersed to our villages.

Question: And did other groups of OUN members participate in the liquidation of Soviet citizens?

Answer: Yes, they did. Other groups of OUN members participated in the liquidation of Soviet citizens.

Question: Describe this in detail.

Answer: A couple of groups liquidating Soviet citizens of Polish nationality operated in Stary Zaharov village. I knew members of the group led by Mykola Kovalchuk. This included Kuzma Koroluk; he had an axe with him and said that he had killed one Pole with his own hands; Ivan Yevtukh, son of Yepifan (killed in the front line), killed one woman with a sawn-off shotgun in my presence; Yakov Mazurok (a resident of Oryshche village, killed in 1945 as a criminal), he had a rifle, he had reportedly killed one man; Prokop Piatokha, son of Taras (sentenced by the Soviet authorities), told me that he had killed a Pole with an axe; Mykhailo Zyla, son of Yosip (he lives in Lukoviche village). The group liquidated a couple of persons in total on that day – two families – and burned down one house. In the windmill, Mykhailo Zyla took a uniform from a murdered Pole (I was told that by Kuzma Koroluk). I often saw Zyla in this uniform in Lukoviche village. Mykhailo Zyla had my axe with him. He took it from the cart in the Zahorovsky forest, and I killed Poles with an axe belonging to Prokop Piatokha.

The group which included Prokop Lubluk, son of Petro (he lives in Lukoviche village) and Kalistrat Kovalchuk (he used to live in Lukoviche, but was killed in 1947 or 1948), [is responsible] for killing one Pole or a whole family of Poles from Zashchytovy village. When the group approached the house, the farmer fired one shot from a Nagant revolver. Because of that, the members of the group that were
liquidating the Poles did not find courage to enter the house, but only set fire to it
from outside. The Pole who fired at us was burned inside, and maybe his family
also. I was told that by Prokop Lubluk.

In Zamliche village, the group that included Mykola Piatokha, son of Mikita
(he lives in Lukoviche village), Petro Pasos, son of Yakov (killed in 1944), and
Shipel, whose first name and father’s name I do not know, from Stary Zaharov or
Novy Zaharov village, liquidated a few families of Soviet citizens and burned down
up to 8 houses. Who participated in it and to what extent, I don’t know.

Mykhailo (from Galicia) did not leave Zahorov village together with us, but
stayed there for boozing. He caught up with us in Kolona village with a cart taken
from a Pole (from what village, I don’t know). Later, OUN members approached
him, wanting to take the horse and cart away from him, but he would not hand
them over, saying: “I killed the Poles, so I captured the cart and horse for myself.”

Where Ivan Pasos, son of Sava (from my village, sentenced by the Soviet
authorities), Stepan Nedbaylo, son of Serhiy (he lives in Lukoviche village), Petro
Patoka, son of Ivan (he lives in Lukoviche village), and Yevstakhy Mikhalchuk,
son of Mykola (sentenced by the Soviet authorities, he allegedly died) operated –
I don’t know.

From what Yefrem Halan was saying I know that Ivan Lubluk, son of Andrey,
and [Yevstakhy] Mikhalchuk, son of Mykola, escaped somewhere on the way to
Stary Zaharov.

Question: Were Soviet citizens in Lukoviche village also murdered on that
day?

Answer: On this day, in Lukoviche, Piotr Ludwikowicz, son of Antoni, and his
10-year-old herdsman were killed. I don’t know who participated in this murder.
From what Kuzma Koroluk had said, I know that Ludwikowicz’s belongings were
taken away by Yefrem Halan, Petro Pasos, and Mykhailo Zyla.

The protocol was read to me and it was drafted in accordance with my words
(illiterate).

Interrogators:
Investigator of Investigation Department of UKGB operating at the SM of the
Ukrainian SSR, Volhynia oblast. 
Lieutenant (—as) Chernomord

The following persons participated in the interrogation:
Deputy Prosecutor of Volhynia oblast
—as Krasnooky

Original, manuscript.
Document in Russian.
No. 23
12 February 1945, [Lviv]. Extract from interrogation protocol of Hryhory Prishlak

Interrogation protocol of

Hryhory PRISHLAK, son of Vasil, born in 1913 in Novosiolky village in Milatin Novy raion, L'viv oblast, a Ukrainian, no member of any party, a USSR citizen, subject to obligatory military service, unmarried. In 1938, he was sentenced by a Polish court to 5 years of imprisonment for nationalist activity. Education: 3 classes of lower secondary school and a three-year technical night school. Profession: electrician and plumber. Before detention he worked in the military-assembly industry of the town of Lviv as a plumber. He resided at 12 Zulinskiego St., flat no. 10.

12 February 1945

[...]

In summer 1942, but mostly in autumn, illegal OUN activists and unorganised Ukrainian youth began to gather in forests, and in villages – the so-called self-defence groups were coming into being. The reasons for going underground and for creating “self-defence” groups were as follows:

In the first half of 1942, Germans started to mobilise Ukrainian youth to work in Germany and muster them into the German army. As it was important to include Ukrainian personnel, and especially young people, guidelines were issued to avoid going to Germany, and to join the army by going underground and fleeing to forests. Apart from that, due to repression against OUN members, many people who were entered into Gestapo records were forced to go underground and join illegal groups which were spontaneously arising. Then, under the protection of these groups, they continued work on bringing up Ukrainian youth in a spirit of nationalism.

In order to provide the groups of illegal activists with more organised structure, they were subjected to military training and gathered weapons, although they did not conduct any combat operations for the time being.

In the end of 1942 in Chelm region (Poland), Polish armed groups undertook a number of repressive measures against Ukrainians, accusing them of cooperation with Germans, where repression was carried out not only against the OUN members, but also against the unorganised Ukrainian population.

In reaction to Polish repression against the Ukrainian population, groups of illegal activists in Volhynia who had hidden themselves in forests started retaliatory
actions against the Polish population; at first these were individual cases, but later these armed attacks transformed into systematic assaults on Polish villages, and spread out from Volhynia to other districts of Western Ukraine. Poles were also accused of cooperation with Germans and betraying OUN members [to them].

The Poles were ordered to leave western Ukrainian land and go to Poland, and if they refused, their houses would be burned, their households robbed, and the Poles themselves killed.

The Germans used the fights between Poles and Ukrainians to their own ends, because it diverted the population’s attention from common tasks consisting in combat against the Germans, and made it possible to introduce repression against Ukrainians for their attacks on Poles, and in fact to liquidate the population on the occupied territory.

In order to defend Polish land against assaults by OUN activists, the Poles created armed groups that offered armed resistance during attacks on the villages, and which themselves committed criminal assaults on Ukrainian villages; this in turn caused the creation of so-called “self-defence” groups in Ukrainian villages.

In autumn 1942, a guerrilla group in Carpathian Mountains started under the leadership of KOVPAK. The Germans were disturbed by this operation and took a favourable stance towards the existence of “self-defence” groups of Ukrainians, and also towards Polish armed groups, as these formations were under the influence of German and nationalist propaganda, were hostile towards Soviet guerrilla groups, and, under the pretence of protecting the villages against the assaults of Kovpak’s activists, they conducted armed combat against the partisans, which was to the benefit of the Germans.

The Central Provid of the OUN issued a directive to start the concentration of military subunits and move them in an organised way to the Carpathians, to prevent Soviet guerrilla groups from seizing the mountains, which were a very favourable position for them in tactical terms, and also as a place where OUN units were able to conduct military training with a lower risk of being detected.

In September 1943, I once again left for Berezhany district to attend a conference of the national Provid of the OUN, which was also attended by: “PYLYP,” the OUN provid director; “REN,” the deputy director and organisational director; “STEPOVY,” the director of military affairs, and I – “MIKUSHKA” – the director of the “SB,” as well as director for youth, economy, and propaganda. I had never seen the latter three before, and I did not know their names.

The meeting was held in a khutir near Tseniov village, Berezhany raion.

The following issues were discussed at the conference:

1. Strengthening anti-Soviet propaganda among the population in relation to the approaching front line.

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1 Sidor Artemovich Kovpak (1887–1967), general; in 1942–1944, commanding officer of Soviet guerrilla concentration, two-time Hero of the Soviet Union; from 1947 deputy president of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR.
2. Relationships with Poles. Opinions were uttered about the purpose[less]ness of fighting with members of Polish armed groups, as it created [an additional] necessary front line for the UPA and led to a weakening of forces, whereas Polish armed men were hostile towards Soviet authority, and in fact shared goals with the OUN.

[...] 

When I arrived at Zakomarze village and found the messenger I needed, I met “HRYHOR,” who wanted to know whether I had passed contact with the district managers of the “SB” over to a new man. I answered that for the time being I was maintaining contacts with the “SB” district managers myself, and that I knew I had been dismissed from the position of the national director of the SB.

“Hryhor” said that I had been dismissed from the post of national director of the SB in connection with the transformation of the national provid and the appointment of new personnel to it, because thanks to the activities conducted by members of the national provid of the OUN, they were known to the Germans and might be arrested. Besides, because the Soviet army was approaching, a new command of the provid should be zakonspirować even towards OUN members. As many persons had become acquainted with me during my work, I should abandon it.

“HRYHOR” instructed me to occupy myself with intelligence and informational work, and declared that a group of agents who were working on exposing the Polish underground would soon be conveyed to me.

When organising further work in September 1944, I determined two main directions of counter-intelligence [activity]: on the one hand – collecting data about NKVD-NKGB officers and militia, obtaining information about their agent groups, environment, way of living, place of residence, time of arriving at and leaving work, type of work carried out, and personal features; [also] collecting data about employees of other administrative and party bodies; and on the other hand, penetrating the Polish underground in order to learn about its plans and detect its command. In connection with the above, the whole group of agents was once again instructed, and they were told to gather the above data.

As most agents worked in Soviet institutions and did not have much spare time to collect the data that interested [us], I provided them with guidelines stating that they should obtain such data during conversations with acquaintances and residents of Lviv, as well as by way of their own observations in their free time.

[...]
The protocol was drafted in accordance with my words, and read to me, which I hereby confirm with my signature:

Interrogators:
Head of Ukrainian NKGB of Lviv oblast
3rd Rank Commissar for State Security
VORONIN

Deputy Head of Investigation Department
Ukrainian NKGB of Lviv oblast
Captain of State Security
RETS

In conformity: [...]”

“a Lieutenant-Colonel (–) Kirpichenko a

Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

a - a Filled in by hand.

No. 24
15 February 1945, Rozyshche. Interrogation protocol of Lucjan Szot

Interrogation protocol of [Lucjan Szot]
on “15” February 1944, Rozyshche town

I, the assistant to the operational officer of Rozyshche RO NKGB, Zelenov, today interrogated the accused:

Lucjan Szot, son of Ignacy, born in 1928 in Retovka settlement of Rozyshche raion of Volynia oblast, a Pole, of serednyak family, education: 4 grades, no member of any party, a USSR citizen, unmarried, according to him has no criminal record. A resident of Retovka settlement of Rozyshche raion, Volynia oblast. He worked in the individual household of his father, and he was a soldier of a istriebitelny batalion under Selsoviet in Elżbiecin.

Question: Tell us your backgrounds
Answer: I, Lucjan Szot, son of Ignacy, was born on 27 June 1928 in Retovka settlement of Rozyshche raion, Volynia oblast into the family of a serednyak. My father Ignacy Szot, son of Michal, owned 9 acres of land, and worked on an individual agricultural farm. When I was seven, I went to a school located in Elżbiecin village of Rozyshche raion, Volynia oblast, where I learned for three years. After Red Army units arrived in the Rozyshche raion in 1939, I continued my education at school.

During the German occupation in 1941–1944 I lived in Retovka settlement in Rozyshche raion, Volynia oblast, and I worked on the individual agricultural farm of my father. I am a soldier of an istriebitelny batalion. At present, my father and mother live in Retovka settlement in Rozyshche raion, Volynia oblast, and they work on an individual agricultural farm. My relatives from my mother’s side live abroad, in Poland, in the Maszki settlement of Lublin województwo; I do not know their last names, first names or the names of their fathers, as I have never seen them.

Question: The investigation department has information that during the German occupation in 1943 you were a member of a Polish outpost. Is that correct?
Answer: Yes, during the German occupation in 1943 I was a member of an outpost.
Question: When and by whom were you enlisted to the Polish outpost?
Answer: At the beginning of spring 1943 I joined the outpost to which I was enlisted by its commanding officer, Stanisław Cichus,² son of Teodor. Now he has been sentenced by Soviet bodies as a traitor to the motherland.

Question: What kind of outpost is that, and what are its tasks?
Answer: The Polish outpost comprised men of Polish nationality. All of them were armed. Members of the outpost were subordinated to their commanding officer. And in general, the outposts were subject to a German “SD” law enforcement body, from whom the commanding officer received all weapons and ammunition. Polish outposts, together with the German-Polish police and the Gestapo, under the pretence of liquidating pro-Bandera groups, went on armed criminal actions aimed at murdering the Ukrainian population and robbing their property.

Question: Tell us about your activity at the outpost.
Answer: Under the pretence of combat with the Bandera groups, along with other members of the outpost, I went to sorties in order to murder and rob the Ukrainian population, as I hated the Ukrainian nation. I went on operations to the following Ukrainian villages: Slavatyche, Khopniov, Susk, Svoz, Kulchin in Kiversky raion, Volhynia oblast. We went to Slavatyche village on horse carts in a group of 70–80 persons. This was in summer 1943. When we drove up to the village, we opened fire at the houses, so that people would abandon their households and escape. In the meantime we took their property, crops, and clothing, and then set fire to their houses and left the village. As a result of the aforementioned criminal assault, we took a lot of cattle, crops and property. Policemen from the German-Polish police also took part in the operation. One week later, the commanding officer of the outpost, Stanislav Cichus, son of Teodor, gathered up to 100 men and we went to attack Chopniov village in Kiversky raion, where we also robbed and burned Ukrainian houses.

Apart from that, in summer 1943, I do not remember in what month, we – the members of the outpost, along with the German-Polish police – went on the armed criminal operation to Svoz village in Kiversky raion, Volhynia oblast. During this assault, I and other Poles, among whom was also my brother, Waclaw Szot, son of Ignacy, captured a Ukrainian, Nadya Ivanyiuk, daughter of Serhi, to finish her off. On our way, when we were leading her, she said to me: “Ledik, why are you taking me away, you do know me, don’t you?” I answered she was a Bandera supporter, and we led her on. We brought N.S. Ivanyiuk to a group of Poles. They started to asked her if she was Polish or Ukrainian. The girl spoke Polish, and, to save her life, answered: “I’m Polish.” But I knew she was Ukrainian, I hated her and told everyone she wasn’t Polish, but Ukrainian, and I struck her hard in the head with a pitchfork. Ivanyiuk was released upon request of one of the Poles, a resident of

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² Stanisław Cichus, nom de guerre “Dąb” was a deputy commanding officer of subsection Elzbiecin – Retovka – Vasilovka belonging to AK Section Rozysche; the commanding officer was Józef Cichus, nom de guerre “Orzel.”
the Elzbietsin commune, Jan Sieczka. He told them to let her go, because he knew her very well and he knew that the girl had nothing to do with the Bandera groups.

As a result of the criminal assault on Svoz village, in which I also participated, nearly the whole of Svoz village was burned down, many cattle were seized and a couple of totally innocent Ukrainians were killed. I personally helped in robbing the civil population, because I put out the pigs from the pigsty of a certain farmer, which were then caught by policemen. After the assault, I personally delivered the stolen cattle to Rozyshche town for the German-Polish police.

Question: We have information that during the assault on Svoz village, Kiversky raion, on 29 July 1943, a certain woman, a Ukrainian, was personally murdered by you.

Answer: I did not murder any woman during the assault on Svoz.

The interrogation ended at 3 p.m.

The protocol was read to me in understandable Russian and drafted in accordance with my words:

(−) Szot

Interrogators:
Assistant to operating officer of Rozyshche RO NKGB
Junior Lieutenant of State Security
(−) Zelenov

HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 1020, pp. 1–4.
Original, manuscript.
Document in Russian.
No. 25
28 February 1945, Chortkiv. Special report from the head of RO NKGB in Skala to the head of Ukrainian NKGB of Ternopil oblast

Head of the Ukrainian NKGB of Ternopil oblast
Commissar of State Security
Comrade Malinin

Town of Chortkiv

Special report

On 26 February 1945, a group of operational employees of the RO NKVD and the RO NKGB as well as 20 soldiers of istriebitelny batalion, while carrying out operational-Cheka tasks in Tsygany village, Skala region, were fired at before they arrived in the village, at about one or one and a half kilometres from the village, by a band of 30–40 persons, armed with rifles and automatic pistols. Around 8 bandits were killed in the fight (it is impossible to determine the exact number, as the band retreated in a hurry on horse carts into the forest).

One soldier of the istriebitelny batalion, Severin Potsenmayl, son of Ilia, was wounded, and he is presently being treated. Six carts with their harnesses were captured. After carrying out the task, the group returned to the raion centre.

On the night of 26/27 February [19]45, the band returned from the forest to Tsygany village and brutally slaughtered the Polish population residing there. 8 Polish families were shot and slaughtered, including:

1. family  Mikołaj Kołodiczuk (father’s name not known), born in 1875
           Wiera Szekulska, daughter of Mikołaj, born in 1909
           Anna Szekulska, born in 1940

2. family  Michał Puźniński, son of Grzegorz, born in 1880
           Stefania Puźnińska, daughter of Michał, [born in] 1930
           Anna Puźnińska, daughter of Michał, [born in] 1933
           Józef Puźniński, son of Michał, [born in] 1937

3. family  Józef Olechowski (father’s name not known), [born in] 1880
           Maryna Olechowska, daughter of Józef, [born in] 1890

4. family  Stefan Martyniuk son of Antoni, [born in] 1930
           Weronika Martyniuk daughter of Antoni, [born in] 1928

5. family  Aniska Junik (father’s name not known), [born in] 1912
           Kazimierz Junik son of Stefan, [born in] 1931

6. family  Anna Żolińska (father’s name not known), [born in] 1888
           Halina Żolińska, daughter of Włodzimierz, [born in] 1913
           Antonina Żolińska, daughter of Antoni, [born in] 1943

7. family  Antoni Martyniuk (father’s name not known), aged 62
           Weronika Martyniuk daughter of Antoni, aged 45
8. family  Polina Nieszczuk (father’s name not known), aged 28
  Janka Nieszczuk daughter of Trochim, aged 11

Maria Puzińska, daughter of Michal, was wounded and she is presently being treated.

Despite the fact that Tsygany village and forest were searched on 27 February [19]45 by the istriebitelny batalion and officers of the RO NKVD and the RO NKGB, the band was not found. During a meeting with the security office apparatus, it was determined that the band had set out towards Chernihiv raion.

After arriving at the crime site, a raion committee composed of the following persons: the chairman of raion council Com. Kirilov, the secretary of RK KP(b)U Com. Troshenko, and the physician of the outpatient clinic Com. Nikolosov, a Greek-Catholic clergyman Derevianko; a priest of Tsygany village church Dvornitski; a clergyman from Tsygany village’s Greek-Catholic church Drehomiretski, and the director of the NSzS from Tsygany village Com. Faladin, determined that all the residents had been killed with the use of firearms and blunt instruments.

We enclose a copy of the protocol.¹

Head of RO NKGB in Skala
Senior Lieutenant of State Security
(–) Vielichko

28 February 1945
no. 81

¹ Not published.

HDA SBU, F. 73, op. 1, Spr. 82, pp. 57–57 a.
Original, manuscript.
Document in Russian.
Secret directives of OUN, UPA and Security Services on the general physical liquidation of the whole Polish population.

In June 1943, a representative of the Central Provid of OUN, “Klym Savur,” conveyed to me by word of mouth a secret directive from the Central Provid of the OUN on the general physical liquidation of the whole Polish population inhabiting the western districts of Ukraine.

In August 1943, in the course of implementing the directive of the OUN’s Central Provid, along with a formation of the UPA criminal group, I slaughtered over 15,000 Poles in the Kovel, Siedlishche, Matseyiv and Liuboml raions of Volhynia oblast, whereof I reported separately in detail in my testimonies of 23 February 1945.

On 29 and 30 August 1943, with a squad of 700 armed bandits, in accordance with the order of “OLEKH,”1 who was in charge of the district, I slaughtered all the Polish population in the area of Holobia, Kovel, Siedlishche, Matseyiv and Liuboml raions, stealing all of their possessions and burning down all their property.

In total, in these raions, during 29 and 30 August 1943, I slaughtered and shot more than 15,000 civilians, with elderly people, women and children among them.

We did this in the following way: after driving all the Polish people into one place, we surrounded them and started the carnage. When there was no longer anyone alive, we dug deep holes, threw all the corpses inside, covered them with soil and, to cover the remnants of this horrible grave, we set large fires on it and went on our way.

And so we went from village to village, until we eliminated the whole population – more than 15,000 persons.

We took all the cattle, valuables, property and food, and we burned the buildings and other properties.

There was also a secret directive from the OUN’s Central Provid, conveyed to us by word of mouth from “KLYM SAVUR” via the SB line, to physically liquidate all Soviet captives remaining on the territory of western Ukrainian districts as an element conducive to the dissemination of Bolshevism.

There was [also] a secret directive from the OUN’s Central Provid in UPA on the physical liquidation of all UPA members of Russian nationality. In the directive, it was proposed that the liquidation be implemented under the pretence of sending them to special “Russian legions.”

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1 Mykola Yakimchuk (Kovtonyuk), nom de guerre “Olekh,” head of the organisation-mobilisation department of UPA staff, then a deputy manager for military affairs in Volhynia’s OUN-B.
I am aware of yet another secret directive from the OUN’s Central Provid via the SB, in which the physical liquidation of all family members of people suspected of an anti-OUN attitude was recommended, including babies, women and old people.

And further on the OUN summits:

The second summit, which took place in 1941 in Cracow, after discussing the conduct of OUN-M activists, excluded them from the organisation, and approved Bandera as the leader of the OUN.

The third summit, which took place in 1943 in Lviv, approved the UPA organisation on the basis of UNS (Ukrainian National Self-Defence), supporting the tactics of armed struggle against Soviet rule, and planning undertakings related to preparing the OUN and UPA to go underground in conditions of Soviet rule.

(Excerpt from the testimony of Yuriy STELMASHCHUK² son of Oleksandr of 28 February [19]45).

In conformity:
Head of 1st Division of 1st Department of the UBB NKVD of Ukrainian SSR
Captain (–) VINNICHENKO

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No. 27
9 March 1945, [Kiev]. Interrogation protocol of of Tadeusz Bąkowski

Interrogation protocol
of the defendant Tadeusz BĄKOWSKI, son of Jan

Tadeusz BĄKOWSKI, son of Jan, born in 1921 in Stryi town, Drohobych oblast, a Pole, a USSR citizen, secondary education, unmarried, without permanent place of residence and work.

Of 9 March 1945

Question: Where did you live, and what were you doing in the period of German occupation of western districts of Ukraine and thereafter?

Answer: I lived in Stryi town, Drohobych oblast, and worked as a vulcaniser at a garage. After the Germans were squeezed out of Ukrainian territory, I was conscripted into Polish Army, but I evaded the enlistment and remained underground until the day of my detention.

Question: What made you evade military service?

Answer: I belonged to a Polish underground military nationalist organisation, the so-called “Home Army,” directed by the Polish emigreemigre “government” from London, which opposed the formation of BERLING’s army on the territory of the USSR.

In 1944, after the Germans were driven out of Ukraine and the Soviet authorities had issued the conscription of appropriate persons of Ukrainian nationality to the Red Army, and persons of Polish nationality to the Polish Army, the central headquarters of AK issued guidelines, forbidding AK members to serve in the Polish Army. There was a recommendation to undertake activities aimed at maximum concentration of military organisations of the “Home Army” at the rear of the Red Army.

As I was bound by an oath to faithfully serve the Polish emigreemigre “government,” I evaded enlistment to the Polish Army.

Question: Who personally gave you the instruction to evade service in the Polish Army and go underground?

1 Zygmunt Berling (1896–1980), major general. Until July 1939, commanded the Legions’ 4th Infantry Regiment, then retired. In 1940–1941 was interned in an NKVD-owned villa in Malakhovka near Moscow. In 1941–1942, was Chief of Staff of the 5th Infantry Division of General Anders’s army, then commander of the evacuation base in Krasnovodsk; deserted and remained in the USSR; in 1943 to 1944 held successive commands of the Tadeusz Kościuszko 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Corps of the Polish Armed Forces in the USSR, and the First Army of the WP; in 1949 to 1953 was commander of the General Staff Academy.
Answer: I received the recommendation to evade the conscription to the army from the commanding officer of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate, “USZKA,”2 I do not know his name. The guidelines from “USZKA” was confirmed by Janina TARNAWSKA,3 who later provided me with false papers.

Question: Who is TARNAWSKA?

Answer: TARNAWSKA was a member of the staff of AK Stanyslaviv Military District.

Question: Since when have you been a member of the Polish nationalist underground, and what position did you have in it?

Answer: At the end of 1939, after the western oblast of Ukraine had been incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR, I met my old school friend from gimnazjum [lower secondary school] in Stryi town, Alojzy MILLER. During our conversation about the incorporation of Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR, he told me about a Polish nationalist organisation operating in Galicia that had assumed the task of preparing an armed uprising against Soviet rule in order to restore Poland within its boundaries of 1939. Also, Alojzy informed me that a substantial number of Polish university youth, and even professors, belonged to this anti-Soviet nationalist organisation. They suggested I join the organisation, to which I agreed. Alojzy did not provide the exact name of the organisation to me, and he didn’t mention anything about its composition.

At the beginning of 1940, the organisation was detected by NKVD bodies, and as a result Alojzy and a number of other persons in Stryi were arrested. I have never seen any members of this organisation again.

In the period of German occupation, in about February 1942, I was recruited by a resident of Stryi town, Tadeusz ŚNIEŻYK, to a Polish military organisation called the Home Army. After swearing an oath of fidelity to the Polish emigre “government” residing in London, I received the nom de guerre “DĄB,” which I then changed to “ORSZA.”

After I joined AK, ŚNIEŻYK appointed me commander of a squad in his platoon. I carried out the duty of squad commander until March 1944. In March 1944, in accordance with the order of the commanding officer of the “GLOBUS”4

2 Unclear information. Michał Wilczewski (1907–1945), nom de guerre “Uszka,” reserve captain; during the September campaign, he was commanding officer of 2nd company I/54 infantry regiment; he got across to France through Hungary, and then to Great Britain; parachuted into Poland in October 1943; from December 1943 to July 1944, the head of 8th Department (of sappers and Kedyw [Sabotage Command]) for the AK Stanyslaviv District; he poisoned himself when arrested by Soviet security bodies on 14 February 1945.

3 Janina Tarnawska (1916–1945), nom de guerre “Eleonora”; in 1943, Head of the V Department of the AK Stanyslaviv District command; from June 1943 to July 1944, a speaker of the WSK (Women’s Military Service) of AK Stanyslaviv District; she poisoned herself when arrested by Soviet security bodies on 14 February 1945.

4 Władysław Ludwik Herman (1901–1981), noms de guerre “Adam,” “Doktor,” “Felczer,” “Globus,” “Junosza,” “Kudak,” “Portier,” “Strzelecki,” “Wrzos,” “Żuraw”; Reserve 2nd lieutenant of infantry/Lieutenant-colonel of the Polish Army; Professor at Lviv University of Technology, and of Life Sciences at Warsaw University (SGGW); in 1911–1914 a scout in Lviv, later a member of a scouting group in Zakopane; fought in the Battle of Lviv (1918); fought in the 5th Infantry Regiment of the Polish Legions
district, I was appointed to special tasks with the commander of the AK’s Stanyslaviv Inspectorate, and in fact, I was his first deputy, and I directed the liaison of the AK’s Stanyslaviv Inspectorate with the district staff.

At the beginning of April 1944, a former commanding officer of AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate, SĄSIADÉK, whose first name and father’s name I do not know, and whose organisational pseudonym was “AGA,” appointed me commanding officer of a liquidation squad of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate. In November 1944, in the place of “AGA,” a captain of the Polish Army with the organisational pseudonym “USZKA,” whose first and last name and father’s name I do not know, was appointed commanding officer of the AK’s Stanyslaviv Inspectorate. Subsequently, “USZKA” appointed me as his deputy. I carried out this duty until the day I was arrested.

Question: What are these liquidation squads, and what was their function?
Answer: The liquidation squads were terrorist groups of well-armed AK members, entrusted by the AK command of the district with the following tasks:
1) To perform acts of terror upon political opponents of the AK, by order of the AK inspectorate.
2) To physically liquidate the Ukrainian population, and perform armed assaults on Ukrainian villages.

I do not know about any other tasks of these squads.

Question: How many liquidation squads were there in the AK’s Stanyslaviv Inspectorate?
Answer: Before the German occupiers were driven out from the territory of Western Ukraine by the Red Army, there were 10 liquidation squads of 5 to 20 persons each in the Stanyslaviv Inspectorate.

Question: Who were regarded as political opponents by the AK?
Answer: As political opponents, the AK considered persons who were German agents, and persons, irrespective of their nationality, who in any way whatsoever criticised the activity of the Polish emigre “government” in London, and showed favour towards the Soviet Union.

It was then that “AGA” informed me that organising assaults on Ukrainian villages should be explained by private members of the AK as revenge for assaults on Polish villages, carried out by pro-Bandera groups.

Question: How many assaults on Ukrainian villages were carried out in Stanyslaviv district by AK liquidation squads, and how many Ukrainians were killed in that time?

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and later in the Polish-Soviet war (1919); commanded an improvised battalion of the 40th Infantry Regiment in the September Campaign (1939); member of the Union for Armed Struggle (ZWZ) from December 1939; appointed commanding officer of the Home Army, Stanyslaviv district (February 1943); appointed commanding officer of NIE (Niezpodlegalość), Stanyslaviv district, after the Red Army invasion of Lviv. Arrested and imprisoned in Lviv without prosecutor’s authorisation (13 February – 5 March); later transported to Moscow and testified in the trial of General Leopold Okulicki; sentenced by the Special Board (OSO) to 3 years in a correctional labour camp (ITL); released and returned to Poland (1946).

Answer: In 1944, upon the coming of the Red Army, large number of assaults were carried out in Stanyslaviv district, but who organised them and how many civilians were killed – I don’t know.

Personally, I carried out two assaults together with my liquidation squad, in May 1944, together with Hungarian soldiers: one on Posyech village, and the other on Lisyec village in Stanyslaviv district.

During the assault of my squad and Hungarian soldiers on Posyech village, almost 300 persons – civilians – were killed. This was when over 40 households belonging to Ukrainians were burned to ashes.

During the assault on Lisyec village, a large number of the Ukrainian population were also killed, but I did not have detailed information about the results of this attack, as the commanding officer of AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate participated in it and calculated the results personally.

Question: Who issued the orders to perform criminal attacks on the civilian population of Ukrainian villages, and how was the extermination of the Ukrainian population justified?

Answer: In April 1944, when I was appointed commanding officer of the liquidation squad, a former commanding officer of Stanyslaviv Inspectorate, “AGA,” explained while instructing me in organising attacks on Ukrainian villages that in connection with the approaching front line and the perspective of Western Ukraine being liberated from German occupation, the AK should liquidate as many Ukrainian civilians as possible and in this way facilitate the restoration of Poland within its borders from 1939, should it turn out that the Polish population living there constituted the majority.

Question: How did you organise attacks on Ukrainian villages?

Answer: Attacks on Ukrainian villages were carried out according to detailed plans. A Pole from the village which was to be attacked was included in the liquidation team as a guide. The squad entered the village at night. Grenades were thrown through the windows of certain houses inhabited by Ukrainians, other houses were set on fire. When the residents ran out from the burning houses, the members of the liquidation squad shot at them with automatic guns and rifles.

Question: What were the relationships between the AK command with the Hungarians? On what grounds did Hungarian soldiers, together with AK liquidation squads, take part in attacks on Ukrainian villages?

Answer: After I was appointed commanding officer of the liquidation squad, the inspectorate put 20 persons – AK members – at my disposal, in order to use them for terrorist activities.

The squad was equipped by Zygmunt K nieżatko, who then lived with his father in Stanyslaviv town, at 15 or 17 Dombrowskiego St. Presently he serves in the Polish Army. The father of Zygmunt K nieżatko, whose first name and father’s name I do not remember, was an engineer by profession; during the occupation he worked in a distillery, and was the armaments quartermaster of the AK’s Stanyslaviv Inspectorate.
When the squad was ready to carry out the tasks entrusted to it, I encountered difficulties in executing attacks on Ukrainian villages, as there were units of Hungarian army stationed in many of them.

In connection with this situation, I turned to the commanding officer of the inspectorate “AGA,” for advice. He told me that we could agree with the Hungarians to conduct assaults on Ukrainian villages, and proposed that I come with him to Stary Lisyec village in Stanyslaviv district, to the HQ of the Hungarian forces.

In Stary Lisiec, “AGA” found an AK commanding officer, nom de guerre “NADZIEJA,” and through him he contacted representatives of the Hungarian command, with whom talks were held about conducting joint criminal attacks on Ukrainian villages. The talks were held at the beginning of May 1944, I do not remember the exact date, in Stary Lisyets, Stanyslaviv oblast, in the house of the commanding officer of the rural AK organisation, nom de guerre “NADZIEJA.”

The following persons participated in the talks: on behalf of the AK – the commanding officer of the AK’s Stanyslaviv Inspectorate, SĄSIADEK, whose organisational pseudonym was “AGA,” and the commanding officer of the rural AK organisation of Stary Lisyec – “NADZIEJA”; and on behalf of the Hungarian command, 3 officers, whose names I do not know. I wasn’t admitted to participation in these talks, as I was not commissioned. I was in another room of “NADZIEJA’s” house.

I learned from “Aga” and “Nadzieja” only that under the agreement concluded between the AK representatives and the Hungarians, the AK liquidation squads were allowed to conduct an unlimited number of criminal assaults on Ukrainian villages.

After these talks, the Hungarian soldiers also participated directly in the assaults on Ukrainian villages, and robbed the Ukrainian population together with the AK members.

Question: During talks with the representatives of Hungarian command, did they know that “AGA,” “NADZIEJA,” and you represented the Stanyslaviv Inspectorate of the “Home Army”?

Answer: Yes. When we approached the representatives of Hungarian command, “AGA,” “NADZIEJA,” and I informed them in detail about our affiliation with the Home Army.

Question: Did the command of AK Stanyslaviv District know about the agreement of the Stanyslaviv Inspectorate with Hungarian command on the joint extermination and robbing of the Ukrainian population?

Answer: As far as I know, the commanding officer of the Inspectorate, “AGA,” reported the agreement reached between the representatives of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate and the Hungarian command, related to joint assaults on Ukrainian villages, to the commanding officer of AK district, “GLOBUS,” after a couple of days.

In relation to the report by the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate about their agreement with the Hungarians, at the end of May 1944, a representative of AK
Stanyslaviv Military District staff, nom de guerre “KARAŚ” (I don’t know his first and last name or his father’s name), arrived in Stanyslaviv in order to continue the talks with the Hungarians.

Subsequently, the talks with the Hungarians took place at the staff headquarters of some large concentration of the Hungarian army, on Belwederska Street.

The following persons participated in the talks on behalf of the AK:

1) the representative of AK Stanyslaviv District staff, nom de guerre “KARAŚ”;

2) the head of information of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate, OSTROWSKI (I do not know his first name or his father’s name), organisational pseudonym “STASZ Jak.”

To conduct talks on behalf of the Hungarian command, a captain of the Hungarian army, GADE, was authorised.

During these talks I stayed personally at the front of the staff, but I wasn’t allowed to participate in the talks for the same reason as last time – I was not commissioned.

After the talks, “KARAŚ” went to Lviv with a report for the commanding officer of the AK’s Stanyslaviv District, “Globus.”

Question: What decisions were taken during the talks between the AK representatives and Hungarian command?

Answer: From what the commanding officer of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate “AGA,” and the head of information OSTROWSKI said, I know that during the talks with the Hungarians, agreement was reached in the following cases:

1) Representatives of AK committed themselves to detecting and conveying to the Hungarian military authorities any persons, irrespective of their nationality, who in any way whatsoever expressed a hostile attitude towards the Hungarian occupying authorities.

2) Representatives of the Hungarian command agreed not to interrupt AK liquidation squads in carrying out an unlimited number of assaults on Ukrainian villages, and should the need arise, would also provide armed support to them.

After these talks, the commanding officer of AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate, “AGA,” received a pistol as a gift, and a permit to use this gun.

Question: What other terrorist acts were committed by the liquidation squad you commanded?

Answer: Aside from the two attacks on the Ukrainian villages, my liquidation squad did not commit any further terrorist acts, because in connection with the retreat of the German and Hungarian forces and the approach of the Red Army, the situation for possible new attacks on Ukrainian villages became unfavourable.

Question: We are showing you a letter addressed to the commanding officer of the okrug dated 23 January 1945, and entitled “Report on Conspirational Activity.” There is the signature “ORSZ” at the end of the document. The following text is contained in the document: “We have burned down about 20–40 buildings, many buildings were damaged in grenade explosions, we counted up to
300 killed and wounded. We did not determine who they were – children, women, old people, we made them all wait until kingdom come.” Who is the author of this document?

Answer: The document presented to me was prepared by me. It is my report on the terrorist activity of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate liquidation squad, which I was in charge of. The document was signed by me; I used the organisational pseudonym given to me, “ORSZA.” In January 1945, I sent this document to the commanding officer of the AK Stanyslaviv Military District, who was known to me under the pseudonym “GLOBUS.”

Question: In the document presented to you, dated 23 January, there are three words written on the first page: “Europe,” “Asia,” “Africa.” Explain what they mean.

Answer: For conspirational purposes, the localities which are situated in the area covered by the operations of the AK’s Stanyslaviv Inspectorate had codenames: “Europe” was Stanyslaviv city, “Africa” the localities of Stanyslaviv district in accordance with the administrative division from before 1939, “Asia” was Stryi town in Drohobych oblast.

Question: In the document presented to you, it is stated that at the beginning of 1944 you tried to cross the front line, to the regions where Red Army units were deployed. Who sent you there and what was your task?

Answer: More or less in the first half of March 1944, the commanding officer of the AK Stryi Inspectorate, whom we knew under the pseudonym of “JAREMA,” instructed us to cross the front line and turn to the command of the Red Army with a request to airdrop weapons for us, so that we could organise guerrilla operations at the rear of the German forces. In fact, we wanted to supplement armaments for the liquidation squads conducting terrorist activity consisting in the liquidation of Ukrainian population and persons sympathising with the Soviet Union, with weapons which we could have obtained from the Red Army.

Question: Did you establish contact with the command of Red Army as regards obtaining such weapons?

Answer: No. I was unable to cross the front line.

Question: What activity was in fact conducted by the AK during Soviet rule?

Answer: In August 1944, a couple of days after squeezing the German occupiers out of the territory of the Stanyslaviv district, I drove from Stanyslaviv to Lviv. As a result of a car accident, I was injured, and until 6 November 1944, I was staying in the hospital in Lviv.

When I recovered and returned to Stanyslaviv, the former Polish Army captain, whom I knew under the pseudonym “USZKA,” had already been appointed commanding officer of the Stanyslaviv Inspectorate. Also in November 1944, “USZKA” appointed me his deputy for Inspectorate matters.

“USZKA” appointed me his deputy on the basis of an order from the commanding officer of AK Stanyslaviv District, “GLOBUS.” When appointing

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me to the post, “USZKA” announced that the Inspectorate should adopt the following methods of operation:

1) to conduct increased propaganda among generations of Polish nationality eligible for conscription, so that those persons subject to conscription to the Polish Army would not appear at the rallying points, but hide themselves in Polish villages or undertake work at various plants, where it is possible to obtain weapons, and thus evade the recruitment;

2) not to return weapons at the disposal of the AK Inspectorate to Soviet authorities, and to store them in specially organised storehouses;

3) pursue destructive activity among the Polish population, to prevent them from going westwards. To that aim, to use various forms of agitation, frightening Polish population with reports of the hard situation in Poland, and putting particular emphasis on the fact that the issue of Poland’s future borders had not yet been settled, and that after the war, with the support of England and America, Poland will maintain its borders from before 1939.

Question: Could it be that the AK did not involve itself in terrorism and sabotage?

Answer: More or less at the beginning of December 1944, “USZKA,” informed me during a meeting that he had received an instruction from the AK Stanyslaviv District to personally organise sabotage-terrorist groups on the model of those existing during the German occupation.

As “USZKA” explained, the Soviet authorities’ policy towards Poland did not reflect the interests of the emigre Polish government and thus, the Home Army had to draw its sword against the Soviet rule, with a view to rebuilding Poland within its 1939 borders.

By the order of the AK Stanyslaviv District [command], the commanding officer of the AK Inspectorate “USZKA” handled the organisation of the sabotage-terrorist forces personally. Thus, where and in what number he created these units, I don’t know.

I know that “USZKA” quartered AK members enlisted to sabotage and terrorist activity in the Polish villages of the Sub-Carpathian regions, and fixed them up with work extracting of crude oil and natural gas, mainly in the Bitkov locality, Stanyslaviv district.

Whether the AK sabotage-terrorist units created by “USZKA” commenced activity in practice, I don’t know.

Question: Who do you know of the members of the AK sabotage-terrorist units?

Answer: On 18 December 1944, I rode on a train from Lviv to Stanyslaviv. On the same train from Lviv to Bitkov, there were “USZKA” and Lviv citizens, Jan STAŃSKI and Józef KOWALSKI. “USZKA” told me then that he had found former members of liquidation squads in Lviv, operating during the German occupation in the area of the Stanyslaviv district, STAŃSKI and KOWALSKI, and that he directed them to Bitkov in order to fix them up with work on extracting crude oil and natural gas. He added that he had accommodated some of the people
he enlisted to sabotage-terrorist activity in Polish villages in the Sub-Carpathian regions.

Apart from STAŃSKI and KOWALSKI, I do not know any other people “USZKA” enlisted to sabotage-terrorist activity.

Question: As the deputy commanding officer of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate, you were entrusted with a number of serious tasks in the scope of active anti-Soviet operations. Tell us what the execution of these instructions of AK command looked like in practice.

Answer: Despite the fact that I was appointed a deputy commanding officer of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate in November 1944, I did not actually proceed to complete my tasks. Due to the absence of certain people who would have been able to fulfil the duties of liaison officers between the district staff, until the day of my detention I was used by the commanding officer, “USZKA,” as a liaison officer between the AK Stryi Inspectorate and AK Stanyslaviv District staff.

During this time, I went to Lviv 5 times with correspondence, which I conveyed to Janina TARNAWSKA, residing in Lviv at 4 Jablonowskich St., and I received the outgoing correspondence from the AK Stanyslaviv District staff, addressed to the commanding officers of the Stryi and Stanyslaviv Inspectorates.

Question: Tell us about the contents of the documents you received from “USZKA” in order to convey them to the district staff, and the outgoing documents from the district staff.

Answer: The contents of the documents which I received in the district staff to convey then to AK Inspectorates, and the documents directed to the district staff, are not known to me, as they were always given to me inside a sealed envelope.

Question: List the places used for the storage of weapons at the disposal of AK Inspectorate.

Answer: After the Germans were squeezed out, and Soviet rule was re-established in the Stanyslaviv area, the command of the AK Stanyslaviv District, in order to fake the dissolution of the AK military subunits, ordered unusable weapons to be handed back to Soviet authorities, while the usable armaments, especially automatics, were to be conveyed to the AK Inspectorate’s quartermaster for armaments, for storage in special storehouses.

In the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate, the quartermaster for armaments was PRZYBYLSKI, I don’t know his first name or his father’s name; aged 40–42, residing in Stanyslaviv at 114a Zosina Wola St. PRZYBYLSKI’s nom de guerre was “BURZA” [Storm]. PRZYBYLSKI’s quartermaster was Engineer KNIEŻAT-KO, I don’t know his first name or his father’s name, aged 50–55, residing in Stanyslaviv at 15 or 17 Dombrowskiego St. PRZYBYLSKI and KNIEŻATKO occupied themselves with storing armaments the equipment of AK Inspectorate.

There is an AK member, Jacek KASTAŃSKI, aged 40, nom de guerre “UPARTY” [Stubborn], who lives in Mariampol village; Stanyslaviv region. 70 weapons, automatic guns and rifles, are stored in a dug-out under one of his barns. Also grenades, pistols, rounds, and other military equipment are stored there, but I don’t know exactly in what amounts. Where the weapons stores are, I do not know.
Question: How did you live, while you were underground?
Answer: During the German occupation, I received a remuneration from the AK command to the amount of 700 zloty per month; and during Soviet rule, the commanding officer of the Inspectorate paid me 1000 roubles each month.

Question: Where did the Inspectorate’s money come from?
Answer: The AK’s Stanyslaviiv Inspectorate received funds each month from the AK’s Stanyslaviiv District, but from whom and how much, I don’t know.

Question: List the AK members known to you.
Answer: Of the AK’s members, I know:

1. Tadeusz ŚNIEŻYK, nom de guerre “ISKRA” – an officer of the former Polish Army of the rank of second lieutenant, deputy of the commanding officer of Stryi Inspectorate. I knew ŚNIEŻYK personally from my work in the AK, before my departure to Stanyslaviiv. A description of ŚNIEŻYK: born in 1923, medium height, robust, black combed-up hair, clean-shaven, he wore high-top shoes. He resided in Stryi at the corner of Magazynowa St. and Kopernika St., I do not remember the number of the building.

2. Nom de guerre “ANDRZEJ,” a lieutenant colonel of the former Polish Army, a commanding officer of the AK Stryi Inspectorate. I did not know “ANDRZEJ” and I never saw him. I’ve learned that “ANDRZEJ” was a member of AK from ŚNIEŻYK.

3. Jerzy SKIBIŃSKI, enlisted to AK by ŚNIEŻYK. Most recently he resided in Stryi. What his position in the AK was, I don’t know. I was not personally connected with him when acting in the AK. In Stryi, he resided at 57 (or maybe 47) Kołosowa St., ground floor. A description of SKIBIŃSKI: aged 20–21, short, average build, skinny, pale, short up-combed hair, normal nose.

4. Zdzisław MALENDA, enlisted to AK by SKIBIŃSKI, as he told me personally. What was his position in the organisation, I don’t know. In Stryi he resided at 7 Blacharska St. A description of MALENDA: aged 20, tall, slim, black, long hair combed up, normal nose.

5. KLIMCZAK, nom de guerre “REGENT,” an officer of the former Polish Army, a commanding officer of the AK Stanyslaviiv Inspectorate. After arriving to “USZKA” in Stanyslaviiv, KLIMCZAK became his deputy and the commanding officer of AK for Stanyslaviiv town. Most recently he resided in Stanyslaviiv and acted in the AK. In relation to my activity with the AK, I contacted him personally. A description of KLIMCZAK: aged 38–40, tall, slim, bald, long and big nose.

6. Nom de guerre “AGA,” an officer of the former Polish Army, lieutenant; he administered armaments in the Stanyslaviiv Inspectorate, and at the same time he was the leader of an AK sabotage-terrorist group; later on he became the commanding officer of the AK Stanyslaviiv Inspectorate. “AGA” left Stanyslaviiv and went west at the same time as the Germans.

7. Nom de guerre “USZKA,” an officer of the former Polish Army in the rank of captain; the commanding officer of the AK Stanyslaviiv Inspectorate. “USZKA” should be in Stanyslaviiv now.
8. Marian JENORIK, a director for the inspectorate’s technical communication. He had a radio receiver in his flat. In Stanyslaviv, he resided at 8 Asnyka St. In December 1944, or maybe in January 1945, he was arrested by the NKVD.


10. Maria OLSZEWSKA, *nom de guerre* “BRZOZA,” she directed the work of the women members of the organisation with the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate. In Stanyslaviv, she resided at 7 Króla Jana St. A description of “BRZOZA”: aged 28–30, tall, average build, black, long and styled hair; big and pronounced eyes, black eyebrows, long nose.

11. Józef LEWICKI, *nom de guerre* “SAWATOWSKI.” Before he was arrested by the NKVD, he administered all the information of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate.

12. PRZYBYLSKI, *nom de guerre* “BURZA,” a deputy commander of the AK Stanyslaviv Inspectorate for rural areas. As I stated above, he administered armaments. He should have all the data about the weapons and ammunition storages.

13. Stanisław RÓŻANSKI, *nom de guerre* “Kruk” [Crow], he worked for “BURZA,” but I don’t know the nature of their cooperation.

14. Knieżatko, an AK member, an engineer by profession, he worked at the distillery in Stanyslaviv, resided in his own house, no. 15 or 17 at Dombrowskiego St. His son, Zygmunt Knieżatko, *nom de guerre* “AMI,” also an AK member, is presently serving in the Polish Army. There was an AK weapons store at Knieżatko’s. The organisation’s gunsmithery was also in his flat. Apart from the son, Zygmunt Knieżatko, also a colleague of Zygmunt and an AK member, *nom de guerre* “FININ,” worked at the workshop. He was enlisted in the Polish Army along with Zygmunt Knieżatko. A description of engineer Knieżatko: aged 50–52, tall, strongly build, stout, with big belly, grey hair combed to the side, long, wide nose.

15. Wróblewska, an AK member, a physician by profession; she worked at the municipal outpatient’s clinic in Stanyslaviv. I’ve learned from “REGENT” that Wróblewska was a member of the AK. I did not contact Wróblewska personally in relation to AK activity. I don’t know her at all.

Question: Give the addresses and owners of the underground AK premises in Stanyslaviv which are known to you.

Answer: I know the following owners of underground AK premises in Stanyslaviv:

1. Marianna G DRYKA – she resided at 8 Asnyka St.


3. PRZYBYLSKI, *nom de guerre* “BURZA” – 144a Zosina Wola.
The protocol was drafted in accordance with my words, which I hereby certify with my signature: 

(–) BĄKOWSKI

The arrested was interrogated by:
Deputy Head of Ukrainian SSR NKVD Directorate for Fight against Banditry
Lieutenant Colonel of State Security
(–) ZADOYA

HDA SBU, Lviv, Spr. 19159, pp. 19–45.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

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Excerpt
Warsaw, 20 May 1948

Interrogation protocol
of the accused

Marian Krawczyński, lieutenant, investigation officer of the Ministry of Public Security in Warsaw, interrogated in Warsaw:

Onyshkevych Myroslav
(personal data in files)

Question: Please describe your activity in the Ukrainian nationalist movement during the occupation.

Answer: When the Polish-German war began in [19]39, I was staying at home in Uhniv. In October [19]39, when the Soviet-German border started to settle, my father exchanged households with a citizen of Jewish nationality, I do not remember his name, and we resided in Hubinek, Tomaszów Lubelski powiat, on the German side in the GG [General Government]. In 1940, during the summer months I worked in a cooperative in Tarnoszyn as a bookkeeper, and then I stayed at my father’s farm, helping with the work; it was like this until 1942. From the end of 1939 to the end of [19]42 I did not actively work in the OUN, I didn’t have any contacts with the OUN, I only received OUN literature a couple of times from my brother Taras, who at that time was an active OUN member, but where – I don’t know, he was rarely at home. At the end of [19]42, my father sent me to a bookkeeping course to Lviv, because he needed a bookkeeper for the Ukram-Bank in Uhniv. He was the president of this bank. I stayed in Lviv at my friend’s, Izydor Masinek on Krasińskiego or Kraszewskiego St. and I went on a three-month bookkeeping course, I do not remember the street, which was organised in a building of the Ukrainian cooperative union. During the course, at the turn of 1943, I met my friend from Ujnov, Piotr Duzi, an active OUN member, who contacted me with someone, whose pseudonym was “Andreyenko,” I don’t know his name, a military manager of a higher provid, but I don’t know what terrain was covered by his activity. Before Piotr Duzi introduced me to “Andreyenko,” he said that they needed a military director; he would introduce me to “Andreyenko” who

would give me a work in a military director’s office, to which I agreed. When I got in touch with “Andreyenko,” he gave me a contact to a district OUN provid commander of Lviv oblast, nom de guerre “Skala,” and said that I would assume the function of mob. organiser in this district. Then he provided me with guidelines about the scope of work of the mob. organiser, and ordered me to organise military commands in the oblast, in okrugs and powiats. Four okrugs were then included in the Lviv oblast: 1) Lviv okrug, 2) Zolochivskyi okrug, 3) Rava-Ruska okrug, 4) Sokal okrug. This conversation took place in the spring of [19]43. At that time I started to work actively, organising org. mob.s (organisational-mobilisation personnel) in okrugs, whom I instructed to organise org. mob.s. [...]. Because of the death of my father in June 1943, I returned to Uhniv. In July 1943 I had already organised org. mobs in okrugs and powiats. At the end of July 1943, at a meeting in Lviv with “Andreyenko,” he instructed me to organise military units, the so-called UNSs (Ukrainian National Self-defence), and provided me with instructions and guidelines as to how the sotnias should look, what their composition should be, etc. I asked “Andreyenko” to dismiss me from this position, and he said he would think about it. After some time I met “Andreyenko” again in Lviv and he told me that I should not resign from org. mob. and that I should organise the UNSs, and the military people who need to be organised will take care of the training. Additionally he announced that a Carpathian OUN UNS sotnia would come from Lviv oblast, and it would provide a model for the newly-created UNSs in the Lviv oblast. As I tried to excuse myself with my lack of professionalism in the military field, “Andreyenko” instructed me to stay in Lviv. On the next day, “Andreyenko,” at a prearranged meeting, put me in contact with Lieut. “Yarema,”2 and stated that “Yarema” would be the commander of all the UNSs in Lviv oblast, and I would be deputy to him. After a couple of days, that is in August [19]43, I went with “Yarema” from Lviv to the OUN oblast provid head, “Skala,” who was staying in Bóbrka powiat, and we presented him with the task of organising the UNS. “Skala” gave us contacts to OUN okrugs, and said that he would inform the okrug OUN provid heads, so that the [officer] org. mob. were granted any help in organising the UNS. From “Skala,” I returned to Lviv again, with “Yarema.” On our way back I asked him to assign the north okrugs to me to organise UNS, as it was where my family lived and I knew this terrain. “Yarema” gave his consent and instructed me to organise UNSs in the Rava-Ruska and Sokal okrugs, and said he would take care of organising UNS in the remaining two OUN okrugs. He also said then that when the Carpathian OUN sotnia came, he would assign part of it as a framework for the newly organised ones. After this conversation I went to Rava-Ruska okrug, where with help of the okrug [officer] org. mob. I started to organise the UNS. Then I went to Sokal okrug and discussed with the provid head “Pavur” the possibility of organising the UNS there. In October of November [19]43 “Yarema” sent a chota from the “Trembita” sotnia to Rava-Ruska okrug with the commander

2 Ostap Lynda (1914?–1944?), nom de guerre “Yarema,” member of OUN; in 1941 in “Nachtigal” battalion; in 1943 oblast commander of the UNS in Lviv oblast, in 1943–1944, commanding officer of the WO UPA “Bukh”; died in combat.
of the Carpathian sotnia whose pseudonym was “Volodko, a khorunzhyi of the “Bradziagi” sotnia, pseudonym “Trebita, by the [officer] org. mob. in Rava-Ruska okrug, “Chaychuk.”3 The khorunzhyi called “Volodko” informed me about professional forces in military matters [1], and with “Volodko” and the [officer] org. mob. “Chaychuk” I determined that the commander of the “Bradziaga” sotnia, choita head “Petrenko and [officer] pol. wych. “Charmomorets” would stay in Rava-Ruska okrug and would organise the UNS until the end of December [19]43, and that “Bradziaga” would take care of training this sotnia. As a framework for this sotnia, I provided two roys [for] it, and the other two roys would be used in Sokal okrug as a basis for the sotnia under formation, whose organisation I was supposed to take care of along with “Volodko. After this conversation, I gave “Volodko” a contact to the OUN provid head of Sokal okrug, whose nom de guerre was “Pavur. After this conversation, “Volodko” went to the commander of the “Bradziagi” sotnia and informed him of the tasks which I had instructed him in. I personally went to the provid head of Sokal okrug, “Pavur, with whom I discussed the issue of organising the UNS in his okrug. I agreed with “Pavur” that command over the newly-created UNS sotnia would be assumed by “Korsak, a former platoon commander from the Polish Army.

After a couple of days I was put in touch with “Korsak,” with whom I personally discussed the issue of organising and training the UNS sotnia. I held this conversation with “Korsak” in November 1943, in Sokal okrug. After some time, “Volodko” arrived and reported me that my instructions had been carried out by “Bradziaga.” Before the arrival of “Volodko,” two UNS roys from “Bradziaga” arrived, constituting the framework of the sotnia under formation. At the end of December 1943, or maybe at the beginning of January 1944, two UNS sotnias were organised and trained under the command of sotnia heads “Bradziaga” and “Korsak” in the Rava-Ruska and Sokal okrugs, and all of that was under my direction. During January-February of [19]44 these sotnias stayed in the forest near Belz, where they were trained. Also in this period, that is at the end of February or the beginning of March 19[44], my brother, nom de guerre “Halayda,” an oblast commander of SB armed groups in Lviv oblast, assembled SB armed groups for military training, and organised [them] in a sotnia [numbering] over a hundred people, and started to train them near Kamionka, in the vicinity of Rava-Ruska. At the beginning of March 1944, an organisational briefing took place in Rava-Ruska okrug, attended by me – “Bogdan,” my brother Taras – “Halayda,” the okrug provid head “Pavur,” “Karpo,”4 the okrug provid head of Rava-Ruska, and “Volodko.” At this briefing, we decided not to wait for orders from the senior...

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3 “Chaychuk, probably Mykhailo Hrytsyna.
4 Pavlo Pylypchuk (1914–1944), nom de guerre “Karpo,” senior bulavny/lieutenant of the UPA; commanding officer of the “Vovki” sotnia; during the German occupation, commanding officer of a Ukrainian police post in Grabowiec (Hrubieszów powiat); from 1943 he led the group of OUN-UNS in Bereś; died on December 21, 1944 in Kuzmin settlement near Modryniec (Hrubieszów powiat) in combat with the NKVD.
command, and we joined all the UNS *sotnias* in the Miren [!] battalion, which I would take command of [to] start armed operations against the Polish guerrilla forces. In the second half of March 1944, on my order, the UNS “Bradziaga’s,” “Korsak’s” and “Halayda’s” *sotnias* were joined in a *kurin*. In the last days of March [19]44, the combined *sotnias* numbering 450 people led by me and “Halayda,” carried out an armed assault on Ostrov village near Belz. As a result of this operation, the village was partially burned down, and units of the Polish guerrilla forces were defeated. Some of them got together in the brick church in Ostrov, from where they resisted. We did not capture the church with the Polish guerrillas and the population, as we needed to retreat. During this operation, my brother Taras, *nom de guerre* “Halayda,” was heavily wounded, and died after a couple of hours. What losses were incurred by the Polish population and the guerrillas, I don’t know, but the fact is that there were casualties. After the death of “Halayda,” I took overall command of the UNS *kurin*. The assault of Ostrov was not entirely successful, as the UNS’ task was to pick up Polish partisans and liquidate them. From the vicinity of Ostrov we went to Chełm region, and quartered in Ulhówek. In April 1944, two armed operations were performed by the UNS, whose task was to crush the stuff of Polish guerrilla quartering in Posadów, Tomaszów Lubelski *powiat*. The first operation was aimed at probing the enemy forces ("to strike – to recon – to fight"). For this purpose, two *sotnias* were sent under the command of “Halayda,” [!] or rather he was the commanding officer of this *sotnia*, but its organisers were “Halayda” and “Korsak” [!], whose task was to go through Rzeczyca, Hubinek, Łubcze, Podlodów, Żerniki villages and join forces, at the station in Rokitna, with “Bradziaga’s” *sotnia*, who received support for Posadów. These two *sotnias* fought Polish guerrillas in Podlodów settlement near Podlodów village and Żerniki farm, as a result of which the settlements and farm were burned down. At the same time, “Bradziaga’s” *sotnia* fought Polish guerrillas near Posadów. The combined *sotnias* retreated from Posadów to Ulhówek. After a week, via “Zen,” the *okrug provid* head in Chełm region, I established contact with the UNS *sotnia* of “Yagoda,” which was newly organised. At the same time, four UNS *sotnias* carried out an assault on Posadów, where the Polish guerrilla command were situated. The local population called these units “Krakusy”. The fight lasted one day, and a couple of days later, the UNS burned down buildings in Posadów.5 After the assault on Posadów, at the end of April [19]44, I, “Bogdan,” along with a weak *sotnia* [!] “M,” 6 retreated to the vicinity of Karov, “Bradziaga” stayed in the area of Ulhówek, and “Holub,” who had assumed command after “Korsak,” stayed in Przewodów. In Karov, “Yastrub’s” *sotnia*  

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6 Probably Dmytro Pylyp (1910–1944), *nom de guerre* “Em,” “Evashan,” “M-22,” member of OUN; in 1941 he served in the “Nachtigal” battalion; in 1944 commanding officer of a UPA *sotnia* (took command after the death of “Halayda”), and then of a *kurin*; fatally wounded during a fight with the NKVD.
joined me and we went together to the area of Bełżec, where I demobilised some of Morozenko’s various collected sotnias. Then, with two sotnias, “M’s” and “Yastrub’s,” after the fight with the Germans which I had had near Karov, I went from the area of Bełżec to Monasterek, Verkhrata and Dakhany [!], Lubaczów powiat. This was in the middle of May 1944.

When moving with the sotnias near Hrebenne village, I contacted the OUN provid head of Rava-Ruska okrug, nom de guerre “Karpo” who put me in contact with “Shelest,” introducing him as his superior on the UNS line. With “Shelest” we went to Dakhany, where he reviewed the UNS units, providing them with guidelines and instructions. I reported the number of UNS sotnias and their operations to him. “Shelest” then told me that he had been appointed the deputy commander of VO2, that is Lviv oblast, and that the new sotnia of “Zhelezniak” had been subordinated to me. “Shelest” stayed for a week in Dakhany. In the meantime, I together with “M” and “Yastrub” carried out an armed assault on Polish guerrilla outposts near Narol, Lubaczów powiat, where the fight lasted half a day, and then we retreated to Dakhany. This was at the end of May 1944. After “Shelest” had left at the beginning of June [19]44, “Yastrub” and “M’s” sotnias under my command carried out an armed attack on Polish guerrillas near Bełżec. The fight took half a day and as a result of it, a Polish village, Chlewiska, was partially burned down.

In June [19]44, Soviet partisans marched through the forests near Hrebenne to Biłgoraj forests, where Polish guerrillas and Soviet parachutists had their quarters. On my order, the sotnias under “Bradziaga” and “Yastrub” set ambushes between Dakhany and Monasterek. I know that weapons and ammunition had been captured from Soviet guerrilla groups, and many of them were killed and wounded in the operations. After this action, Soviet partisans were picked up in villages and killed. After the operation I received information that in June 1944, in the vicinity of Karov, a second group of Soviet guerrillas was due to pass by. I and a part of “M’s” sotnia went to Karov, and in a hamlet of this village known as Bożenka, I set an ambush for Soviet partisans. In the early morning, a group of 20 Red Army soldiers came by and we attacked it, and as a result of the attack one partisan was killed, 14 were taken into captivity, including a deputy commanding officer of the group. The deputy was conveyed to the SB, and the rest of the Soviet partisans, after interrogation, stayed in Karov village, in the houses of farmers. After this operation, I returned to Dakhany, where I remained with “Yastrub,” “Bradziagi,” “M” and “Zhelezniak’s” sotnias from the beginning of July 1944. At the beginning of July 1944 I moved with “Zhelezniak” and “M’s” sotnias into the vicinity of Monastyrek

7 Ivan Shpontak (1919–1989), nom de guerre “Zhelezniak,” head of UPA sotnia; from October 1941 in Ukrainian supporting police; from 1944 commanding officer of “Mesnyky” kurin, and at the same time commanding officer of TW (Tactical Section) 27 “Bastion”; appointed head of staff of WO VI “Sy’an,” at the beginning of November 1947 got through to Czechoslovakia; apprehended in December 1958 and in October 1959 handed over to Polish authorities; sentenced by the District Court in Przemyśl on 8 March 1961 to death, commuted to life imprisonment, and then in 1970 to 25 years of imprisonment; released in 1981, returned to Slovakia.
village, south-west of Rava-Ruska, where the front line was passing on 18–20 July [19]44. During the passage of the front line, “Holub” and his sotnia stayed near Niemirov, “Yastrub” stayed in the vicinity of Wielkie Oczy, “Bradziaga,” or rather “Skala,” who took over the command of the sotnia after “Bradziaga,” also stayed near Niemirov, “Yagoda” stayed near Lokoshin, “Lys” near Rzeczyca. From field reports, I know that on 21 June 1944, the sotnias of “Yagoda,” “Lys” and “Holub” fought with Polish guerrillas near Rzeczyca, Posadów, Rzeplin and Stare Sióło. I do not remember the other operations against Polish and Soviet guerrillas. I would like to add that until the end of May 1944, that is the period of the UNS, they assumed the name of UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), on his instructions.

In the first half of [19]44, I was informed by “Shelest” that the commanding officer of UPA in Lviv oblast, “Yarema,” had been dismissed, and that “Vorony” had been appointed in his place. A couple of days before the front line passed through, that is on 14–15 July, I contacted “Vorony” near Monastyrek; at that time he came to me for a patrol of UPA units. After three days, “Vorony” left.

The protocol was drafted in accordance with my testimonies, which I confirm, after reading it, with my signature.

Interrogator: Marian Krawczyński
Interrogated: Myroslav Onyshkevich

In conformity: K. I.

IPN, 0192/336, T. 25, k. 62–64.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.

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8 Vasily Levkovich, (born 1920), nom de guerre “Vorony”; member of OUN marching groups; in 1943 in sequence he was commanding officer of a chota, sotnia, kurin in the WO “Zakhrava” in Volhynia; in 1944–1946 commanding officer of WO UPA “Bukh”; captured by MGB USSR; sentenced to death, commuted to 25 years in a corrective labour camp (ITL).
No. 29
28 September 1949, Ternopil. Extract from interrogation protocol
of Lev Yaskevich

Interrogation protocol in
Ternopil town, 28 September 1949

I, the division commander in the Investigation Department of the UMGB of Ternopil oblast, Lieutenant Colonel Shadchin, interrogated the accused Lev Yaskevich, son of Mykola.

The interrogation started at [time] 11:10 a.m.
The interrogation ended at [time] 4:30 p.m.

Question: When and where did the UPA band of “Kruk’s” kurin participate in the elimination and robbing of the Polish population?
Answer: The UPA band of “Kruk’s” kurin participated directly in the liquidation and robbing of the Polish population in the following villages of Shumsk raion: Zabara, Mosty and Kuty.

Question: Who liquidated and robbed the Polish population in Stara Huta and Zaluzhe in Shumsk raion, and in Maydan village of Mizochan raion, Rivne oblast?
Answer: The most active UPA group in Maydan, Zaluzhe and Stara Huta was the group of “Berkut’s” kurin. It is that very band that preoccupied themselves with the direct liquidation of population and robbery in the said villages.

Question: Who issued the order to liquidate and rob the Polish population?
Answer: As far as I know, the liquidation and robbing of Polish population was conducted at the order of the “Kruk” kurin’s commander, and “Kruk” received orders directly from “Eney.”

Question: When did the UPA band of “Kruk’s” kurin carry out the liquidation and robbing of Polish people?
Answer: The UPA band of “Kruk’s” kurin exterminated and robbed the Polish population in April 1943.

Question: What was your personal contribution as a deputy commander of “Kruk’s” kurin to the liquidation and robbing of the Polish population?
Answer: The liquidation and robbing of Polish people in Zabara, Mosty, and Kuty villages were directed by “Kropiva,” the deputy commander of “Kruk’s” kurin for military training, and by me personally, as the deputy commander of “Kruk’s” kurin for economic issues. Under our command were approximately 30 UPA bandits who, on the orders of “Kropiva” and me, partly exterminated (by firing squads) the Polish population in the said villages, took their belongings and burned down the villages. I remember that only in Zabara village, Shumsk raion, we slaughtered 10 or 15 Polish families. How many were killed in other villages, I don’t remember. I would say that all the people who did not make it out of the
village on time were killed. Neither children nor old people were excluded from the extermination of the population, they were all killed to the very last one – from the youngest to the eldest.

The same took place in Stara Huta and Maydan. But personally I did not participate.

Question: During the confrontation with witness Żuryk you testified that Maydan village was also burned down by you. Today you are not saying so. Specify your testimony.

Answer: In fact, Maydan village, which was inhabited only by Poles, was burned to the ashes by UPA bandits, but it was “Berkuta’s” kurin who did that, “Kruk’s” kurin did not participate in killing and robbing the Polish population in Maydan village. So, nor did I. During the confrontation I also said that Maydan village was destroyed, completely burned, but by “Berkuta’s” kurin, and I was not there.

[...]

The protocol was drawn up in accordance with my words and personally read by me:

(–) Yaskevich

Interrogators:
Head of Department of Investigation Division
Lieutenant-Colonel (–) Shadchin

_HDA SBU, F. 13, Spr. 1020, pp. 214–220._
_Original, manuscript._
_Document in Russian._
On 28 February 1944, at about 5–6 o’clock in the morning, Ukrainian nationalists, together with forces of the SS-Galizien division, surrounded Huta Pieniacka village, in Pidkamin raion, Lviv oblast, inhabited by Poles, opened fire on the village and then marched in. All the residents of the village were gathered on the square in front of the Orthodox church, divided into groups and led in these groups to barns, which were locked, then doused in a flammable fluid and burned, with the people inside. Those who tried to seek safety by fleeing were shot and thrown into the fire.

In such way, more than 700 persons of Polish nationality were shot and burned, 120 houses with farm buildings were destroyed, the cattle were led away, and the crops and other items taken.

A resident of Huta Pieniacka, Franciszek Kobielański, son of Józef, said: “On 28 February 1944, early in the morning, a signal was shot from the forest – two signalling flares, and then the cannonade began. Soon after that, our village was completely surrounded by Germans and civilians. They were armed with automatic pistols and rifles. They entered the village from all sides and they started shooting. After entering the village, the Germans and civilians rounded up all the residents on the square in front of the Orthodox church. When they gathered men, women, old people and children, they took the residents of our village, 20–30 persons each time, and hustled them into barns, which were then locked and set alight with the people inside. Those who tried to escape were killed. In this way 680–700 persons were killed and incinerated, and all their cattle, shoes and clothes were taken away.”

Below, a statement by a resident of Huta Pieniacka village: “Early in the morning on 28 February 1944, our village came under fire. Soon after the firing, ‘SS’ forces with Germans entered the village, but Germans were few – there were many men – civilians on horse carts. The SS members were Ukrainians, they walked around the houses and took all the old people, children and youth to the square by the Orthodox church, some of the people were forced into the church. Then a SS commanding officer who spoke Ukrainian directed the groups of the elderly and children into barns. They were locked there, and the barns were set on fire, and burned with the people inside.

I was in the church and afraid to go out. An SS member called me out of the church. We were gathered in a group of about 40–50 people, with children, old men and women among us, and we were led to one of the barns. When we approached the barn we saw the other ones on fire, where people were screaming
in inhuman voices. Then it got through to us we were going to be burned alive. People started to run, and the SS members shot them with automatic guns. I fell among the stones and survived. Then those who survived were again gathered in the barn, which was then locked and set on fire. When the barn was burning, I broke off two planks, ran out of the fire and into the woods. All the others died in the fire.”

A member of the UPA band, Yustin Dovhan, son of Vasil, testified: “I don’t remember the date exactly, but I know for sure that at the end of February of 1944, in the early morning, Ivan Melnyk, son of Zakhar, came into my flat and told me to appear quickly by the house of Yakov Yakimov, where I would be given a gun.

Then he informed me that the whole UPA band along with [the band] from Volhynia and the German SS-Galizien forces would promptly attack Huta Pieniacka village.

I appeared at the above mentioned place, where Yakov Yakimov handed a Russian rifle to me, with 15 rounds of shot. Ivan Melnyk, Yakov Yakimov, and the leader of the Volhynian UPA band announced to all participants that we would promptly attack Huta Pieniacka village, to its residents, as they were helping the red guerrillas.

After conveying this brief statement and making preparations, the German SS-Galizien forces numbering 200 men set off on horse carts. In the lead, on a sledge, went the district governor of Seluprava, Yosip Kavech, son of Maksim, with the leader, a German captain. The second sledge, also in the lead, was occupied by Vasyl Zarkovsky, son of Ivan, and Stepan Zarkovsky.

After the Germans, about 15–20 minutes later, our band, together with the Volhynian UPA band, headed for Huta Pieniacka. As soon as we started to approach the village, the Germans opened fire from two cannons and machine guns, surrounding the village from all sides at once.

The members of the UPA band who had arrived at that moment, in the order of Ivan Melnyk, son of Zakhar, and Petro Zarkovsky, and the leader of the Volhynian band, also surrounded the village and did the same as the Germans did; that is, they set fire to the houses and other buildings, and escorted the residents to the church. Those who tried to hide were shot on the spot. Heavy machine gun fire was opened on those who tried to escape.

When the ring around the village was tightened, and the operation was close to the end, the people from the church were escorted to barns and houses. These were then locked and set on fire. The residents of Huta Pieniacka village were hustled into 4 or 5 barns, where, in total 700–750 persons were contained. All of them were burned.

The pogrom of the above village lasted from 8 in the morning to 2–3 in the afternoon. Subsequently, the German forces first of all took away all the cattle – cows, horses, sheep, pigs, and crops, – and the members of the UPA band took the clothes, poultry and other things, and then, together with German forces, they returned to Zarkov village, where Germans sold some of the cattle, mainly cows, to the residents – for vodka.
More or less 2 weeks after the destruction of Huta Pieniacka, our band along with the Volhynian UPA band, and the UPA bands from local villages, committed an assault and pogrom on Huta Verkhobuska village in Olesko raion, located within 5 km of Huta Pieniacka village. The reason for the pogrom of this village, as I testified above, was that its residents were also maintaining contacts with red guerrillas.

As a result of the pogrom in Huta Verkhobuska village, about 60–70 houses with farm buildings were burned down. About 100 residents were also killed during attempts to escape. The UPA band robbed the belongings and cattle of the victims of the pogrom.”

In conformity: (–)

Certified copy. typescript.
Document in Russian.
CHAPTER V

Operation “Sejm”: 1944–1946
INTRODUCTION

On crossing the eastern border of the 2nd Polish Republic in January 1944, the Red Army were confronted with extremely impoverished Polish residents, often living in utter poverty, and considerably reduced in numbers. The dramatic situation of the Polish people was the result of the two occupations – Soviet and German – which had both pursued genocidal policies. Still, this community was well-organised, both in military and administrative terms, thanks to the operations of the Headquarters of the Home Army (KG AK)¹ and the Government Delegation for Poland (DR) which had performed the tasks assigned them by the Polish Government-in-Exile.²

The Home Army (AK) was responsible for all the Soviet-occupied territories of the 2nd Republic of Polands. The Lviv Region of the Home Army comprised the oblasts of Lviv, Stanyslawiv, and Ternopil. Until September 1942, it had also included the Volhynia Home Army District, which was later directly subjected to Home Army Headquarters. In 1944, the total Home Army forces in the Lviv Region and Volhynia District numbered 20,000 soldiers, including around 6000 in the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home Army, whose turbulent story has been told in many publications.³

The Home Army’s operations were based on recruiting people who wanted to take up armed resistance, swearing them in, equipping them with weapons, and maintaining communication with the headquarters in Warsaw and the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief in London. The Home Army soldiers were committed to serving the Homeland, which meant taking up armed resistance against the occupiers. In November 1941, Operation “Wachlarz” (“Folding Fan”) was launched with the primary objective of securing a future uprising from the East. Furthermore, sabotage actions were organised and carried out by Kedyw (the Home Army Directorate for Diversion). Other goals included keeping up the spirits of the Polish public, protecting Polish citizens, and preparing for Operation Tempest. All these actions were intended to ensure the appearance of the Home Army as “our allies’ ally.” It must be remembered that the Polish Government-in-Exile was not recognised by the Soviet government.

¹ The Home Army (AK) was an integral part of the Polish Armed Forces (PSZ). It was founded in occupied Warsaw on 27 September 1939 as the Service for Poland’s Victory (SZP), before being renamed the Union for Armed Struggle (ZWZ) in 1939, and finally the Home Army in February 1942. Its structures encompassed the entire occupied territory of the Second Polish Republic. It is estimated that over 300,000 underground soldiers served in the Home Army.

² The Polish Government-in-Exile appointed the Government Delegation for Poland (DR) to represent it in occupied Poland. The Government Delegate for Poland had the rank of deputy prime minister. In terms of administration, the structures of the Government Delegation included the entire pre-war territory of Poland. These structures and their functions have been described in great detail in a book of key importance written by W. Grabowski, Polska tajna administracja cywilna 1940–1945 (Warsaw, 2003).

³ For more on the fighting by the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home Army, see J. Turowski, Pożoga. Walki 27 Wołyńskiej Dywizji AK (Warsaw, 1990), M. Fijalka, 27 Wołyńska Dywizja Piechoty AK (Warsaw, 1986); and others.
The Polish underground faced immediate and strong German countermeasures from the outset. By arresting a huge number of hostages, the occupier wanted to eliminate any members of the Polish intelligentsia who could have played a leading role in the underground. In some areas, such as Stanyslaviv, arrests were so widespread between 1942 and 1943 that a special unit was set up in February 1943 to rebuild the underground in the area. After being arrested and interrogated extremely brutally, Polish underground soldiers were either executed or sent to concentration camps.4

Simultaneously, Ukrainian nationalists started operating. In their attempt to create an independent Ukrainian state, they turned against the Poles still living in these regions. Anti-Polish actions were initiated in November 1942 and intensified in February 1943.5 The first cases of armed resistance against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) were recorded in March that year. Trying to find shelter from annihilation, the Poles gathered in the most durable buildings, such as churches, although these failed to provide adequate protection. Therefore, the residents of villages and towns organised civil self-defence units supported by the Home Army, which sent in military experts, firearms and ammunition. Some self-defence units operating in the Volhynian forests were supported by Soviet partisans.

It is hard to establish the exact number of Polish self-defence units in Volhynia. Of the 745 villages or settlements which existed there at the time, 178 units managed to perform their defensive task.6 In fact, only major self-defence units, such as the one in Przebraże, stood any chance of survival. Ironically, the vast majority of Home Army soldiers who had actively supported the Self-Defence in Przebraże, were arrested and subjected to repressions by the Soviets in the spring of 1944.7

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With the Eastern Front approaching the Polish borderlands, apart from organising self-defence groups, the Home Army were preparing for Operation

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7 The Self-Defence in Przebraże was founded in March 1943 and, supported by the Home Army Inspectorate in Lutsk, operated until 2 February 1944, when these areas were reached by a strong advance detachment of the Soviet 1st Cavalry Army. The members of the Self-Defence were disarmed and arrested, and some young soldiers were enlisted in Berling’s Army. See *Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945* (vol. IV: *Uzupełnienia*, London, 1989), Doc. 1811; H. Cybulski, *Czerwone noce* (Warsaw, 1977); J. Sobiesiak, *Przebraże* (Lublin, 1973); J. Turowski, *Pożoga...*; M. Fijałka, *Wołyńska Dywizja...*, W. Siemaszek, E. Siemaszkia, *Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939–1945* (Warsaw, 2000); and others.
In January 1944, Volhynia became the direct logistical support base for the German front. The commander of the Volhynia District of the Home Army announced the mobilisation and concentration of units in the western part of the district to form the 27th Volhynian Infantry Division of the Home Army. The Division carried out the objectives of Operation Tempest by engaging the Germans in heavy fighting as support for the Red Army, not only around Kovel, Liuboml and Volodymyr-Volynskyi, but also in the Shatsk Forests in Polesie, and later in Lublin województwo.

The Home Army also fought the Germans in cooperation with the incoming Soviets in other districts in the Lviv Home Army Region, and especially in July 1944 during the battle of Lviv. However, the collaboration between the Polish underground army and the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army (RKKA) was short-lived. Pursuant to orders from Moscow, once the Polish troops had completed their operations in the fighting, they were disarmed and arrested, with the lucky ones being enlisted in Berling’s army. The significant fact is that the Soviet invasion, followed by the arrests and destruction of radio transmitters and receivers, virtually prevented any communication between Home Army Headquarters and the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief.

* * *

Operation “Sejm” was conceived as early as 1943, before the German occupiers had been driven out of Ukraine. An instruction dated 6 November 1943 from the People’s Commissar of State Security, Sergei Savchenko, to the local NKVD emphasises that “although the planned uprising is doomed to failure, which even the POW leadership admits, they nevertheless maintain that it should be carried out to show the entire world the ‘unwillingness’ of the population of the former Poland to accept the Soviet system of government.”

The leaders of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR were aware that the Polish Government-in-Exile in the United Kingdom had sent emissaries to Western Ukraine to lead the Polish underground and carry out subversive operations. In his

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9 J. Węgierski, W lwowskiej Armii Krajowej (Warsaw, 1989).

10 Armia Krajowa w dokumentach 1939–1945 (vol. III, London, 1976), Doc. 696. The repression of Home Army soldiers and their conscription into Berling’s Army are also confirmed by certain documents in this volume.

11 Properly known as PZP-AK.

12 HDA SBU, Kiev, F. 65, Spr. 765, p. 12.
next instruction, dated 24 November 1943, Savchenko stressed the importance of collecting intelligence data on former Polish citizens who had settled in Ukraine’s eastern oblasts, as there could be Polish underground agents among them. The instruction demanded that agents of the Polish underground and other foreign intelligence services be exposed.\footnote{Ibidem, pp. 13–14.}

There can be no doubt that Savchenko’s instructions were inspired by Moscow. This is evidenced by the document quoted below.

\begin{quote}
Top secret

To the People’s Commissars of State Security
of the Ukrainian, Belarusan and Latvian SSR

cc: Head of the counter-intelligence Unit of the People’s Commissariat for State Security “SMERSH.”

The NKGB of the USSR has certain information that illegal nationalist organisations have been established in the western oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia and the Vilnius oblast of the Lithuanian SSR by the so-called Polish Government-in-Exile in London in 1941–1943. The backbone of these groups are members of Polish bourgeois parties, military groups (“People’s Party,” “National Party,” “OZON,” Polish Military Organisation (POW), Polish Socialist Party (PPS), Union for Armed Struggle (ZWZ), etc.), and former officers of the Polish army.

It is known that some units of these organisations are engaging in military struggle with Soviet partisans and in active anti-Soviet agitation in the local community, on the instructions of the Polish Government-in-Exile.

As the Red Army advances into the western oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia, as well as those regions of the Baltic republics inhabited by Poles, Polish national organisations, directed by the government in London through emissaries sent to these areas, are promoting their anti-Soviet activities and preparing for an armed uprising against the Red Army.

Bearing in mind our experience in combating the Polish nationalist underground in 1939–1941, as well as the anti-Soviet nature of the activities of Polish nationalist organisations in the previous period, the NKGB of the USSR submits the following propositions to deal with the Poles:

1. Uncover and keep a register of all illegal Polish nationalist organisations in the liberated territories, and actively work on exposing them using intelligence techniques.

Create registry files of all the leaders of these organisations, as well as their emissaries, messengers and anyone who has come here illegally, and create an operational register of all the members of the uncovered organisations, along with
their surrounding support (Catholic clergy, officers, members of former political parties, close relations of people repressed by the NKGB, etc.).

2. The first individuals to be arrested in the uncovered organisations should be their leadership, as well as any individuals who have engaged in active struggle with Soviet partisans, who are preparing for armed activity against the Soviet authorities, or who are participating in any other active anti-Soviet activity.

All emissaries detected, and anyone here illegally, must without exception be captured and by recruiting anyone who can be relied upon to work scrupulously at fulfilling our tasks.

3. Should any plans for armed action by these or any other Polish organisations and groups be exposed, they must be prevented by resolutely suppressing every single attempt in that direction.

4. Whenever a nationalist organisation is exposed, steps must be taken to uncover their command centres and channels of communication with London.

Special attention must be paid to finding illegal radio transmitters/receivers, weapons arsenals and printing houses, and to uncovering liaisons and clandestine lodgings.

The potential operational application of any radio devices discovered to our own goals must be investigated.

5. Recruit an adequate network of agents, firstly to uncover the managerial staff of these nationalist organisations, then to find their liaisons and the owners of any premises they use for clandestine purposes.

Ensure that all German and English agents in these organisations are exposed; intercept their communication channels, and infiltrate their management structures in both liberated and occupied Soviet territories, as well as in Poland, especially Warsaw.

6. Reinstate communication with the agents in the territories temporarily under German occupation. Carefully scrutinise their behaviour and lines of communication while under occupation, and look for opportunities to infiltrate the Polish nationalist underground.

7. Bearing in mind that the Poles are capable of bearing arms, and will be enlisted in the Polish formations in the USSR, measures should be taken to ensure that neither any emissaries of the government in London nor any members of the nationalist underground are admitted into the mobilised groups.

8. With the aim of centralising all information on the Polish nationalist underground, draw up a centralised file codenamed “Sejm” in order to collect all materials on all nationalist organisations which are uncovered (with a separate chapter for each).

Pursuant to the above, you are required to prepare and submit a specific operational plan for gathering intelligence on the Poles, and to submit it for approval by the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR by February 10 this year.
Deputy People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR, Commissar of State Security 2nd Rank – Kobulov

In conformity: Deputy Head of 7th Department of the Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR
Colonel of State Security (Kondratiuk)
25 January 1944
N 250/i

On 29 February 1944, Savchenko issued a further instruction that referred to Operation “Sejm” as current. It is obvious that by initiating Operation “Sejm,” the Soviet leadership was seeking to solve at least two problems. First, they wanted to counteract the policy of the Polish Government-in-Exile. Second, the Kremlin intended to eviscerate those Polish political forces trying to keep Poland out of the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence and prevent the Communists from taking power in Poland. A comprehensive instruction entitled “On Polish Political Parties and Organisations,” approved by Savchenko in April 1944, is one of the documents that corroborates this.

The documents included in this chapter allow for a more precise understanding of the fact that it was not merely because the Soviet Union was a major military power that it could act without restraint towards Poland, the Polish underground organisations, and the dangerous Home Army in “Western Ukraine” and the Polish lands liberated from the Germans. This freedom of action was equally assured by the attitude of the West. The Polish government was trying to keep as many Poles as possible in these areas in order to justify its claims to “Western Ukraine.”

The documents reveal that the Soviet special services carried out certain preemptive strikes against the Polish underground during the initial stage of Operation “Sejm.” Many people were arrested, as is evidenced by a report written by Fiodor Tsvetukhin, Head of the NKVD Department for Rivne oblast, and dated 7 June 1944, which concerned the arrests of Poles who had not been directly engaged in any actions against Communist organisations but who were awaiting instructions to do so. As the Soviet Army advanced westwards, however, the actions of the Soviet secret services became increasingly intensive.

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14 Borys Kobulov, general, adviser at the Soviet Embassy in Berlin (1939); member of the troika, a commission that from 5 March 1940 took decisions on executing Polish officers and policemen held prisoner in the Kozelsk, Kharkiv and Ostashkov camps (1940); later became a deputy of Lavrentiy Beria and shared his fate. After Beria’s arrest in 1953, Kobulov was arrested and executed in December that year.
16 Cf. Doc. 1 in this volume.
17 HDA SBU, Kiev, F. 65, Spr. 765, pp. 113–141.
At the turn of 1944, the State National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, KRN) was founded, and field branches set up. The 1st Polish Army was advancing from the east with the Soviet Army. In July 1944, the executive body of the Polish pro-communist forces, viz. the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), was established and its Manifesto issued to the Polish people. The PKWN’s political conception differed drastically from the one proposed by the Polish Government-in-Exile. Naturally, the pro-Communist PKWN proclaimed an alliance with the USSR as the central plank of its foreign policy; an agreement was signed to make the “Curzon Line” the new Soviet-Polish border, and to formalise the relationship between the Soviet Supreme Command and the Polish administration.

The Soviet envoy to the PKWN, Gen. Nikolai Bulganin, was vested with broad powers. His main task was worded as follows: “No recognition should be granted to any administrative bodies, including those of the ‘Government’ in Exile, on the territory of Poland; those who hold themselves as representatives of these bodies are to be treated as impostors and arrested as adventurers [...]”. He was also ordered to “clear the Soviet Army’s rear of the various kinds of groups and formations of the ‘Government’ in Exile and armed units of the so-called Home Army [...]”.

Operation “Sejm” unwaveringly followed the measures described in detail. The vast majority of the documents cited deal with the suppression of the armed struggle waged by Polish underground units. The Moscow leadership was particularly concerned that Polish partisans were killing Red Army soldiers and people collaborating with the Soviet militia.

Of particular importance are those documents that illustrate the emergence, the activities, and the destruction at the hands of the state security organs of those military and political organisations that had emerged after the Home Army had been formally disbanded (19 January 1945) and whose members had belonged to it. This primarily concerns the “Independence” (“Niezależność,” codename NIE) and “Freedom and Independence” organisations (“Wolność i Niezawisłość,” WiN), as well as the Military Union for Self-Defence (Wojskowy Związek Samoobrony, WZS). In July 1945, the NKVD in Belorussia disclosed an order from its Bilo-Podlasky branch to the effect that the WZS was to replace the Home Army and

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19 The State National Council (KRN) was a self-proclaimed Polish parliament founded to form the basis of authority in post-war Poland. The KRN represented Communist and leftist groups and was intended by Moscow to counterbalance the activities of the Polish Government, in, Exile. The KRN was declared to be widely representative of anti-fascist democratic movements in Polish society, but in practice was dominated by pro-Soviet and pro-Communist activists of various parties.

20 The Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN) was a post-WWII provisional body of executive power in Poland convened in Moscow. The decision to form the PKWN was taken in Moscow between 18 July 18 and 20 July 1943, and the name was approved by Stalin himself. The Committee was officially proclaimed in Chełm on 22 July 1944, and set up its head office in Lublin on 1 August. The Soviet Union transferred power in the Soviet-controlled voivodships of Lublin, Białystok, Rzeszów and part of Warsaw. On 31 December 1944, the PKWN was transformed into the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland (Rząd Tymczasowy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej).

assume its functions. Archival sources confirm that after the Polish-Ukrainian resettlement agreement was signed on 9 September 1944, the Polish underground was faced with the pressing task of hindering the resettlement process. One of the secret service’s crucial tasks was to carefully investigate all cases of Poles refusing to move to Poland. The People’s Commissar of the Interior, V. Riasnoy, gave this problem special attention in his instruction of 11 December 1945.

Archival sources show that, as had been the case in previous years, the Soviet special services were especially concerned about the prospect of the Polish and Ukrainian underground movements settling their differences.

The information materials and statistics presented in this publication are of great significance. Not only do they show the scale and dynamics of Operation “Sejm,” they also make it possible to pinpoint specific key points in the activities of the Soviet special services. In August 1946, Pavel Medvedev, Head of the 2nd Directorate of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, issued information on collecting intelligence on Poland and operational work for the period from 1944 to 1 September 1946. This document underlined the fact that between 1944 and 1946, 168 anti-Soviet Polish organisations were eliminated and around 4000 persons arrested.

We have so far failed to locate any document which would provide an unambiguous and balanced summary of Operation “Sejm”; perhaps other researchers will be more successful. Still, the available sources give sufficient grounds for dating the final stage of the operation in 1946. Another important issue, however, remains. The documents published in this volume leave no doubt that all the key issues related to organising and carrying out Operation “Sejm” were dictated by Moscow. The existing sources make it clear that the NKVD and NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR were strictly following orders from Moscow. As is known, Moscow’s policy towards Poland changed during the war, but one aspect remained constant: the Polish underground state, its structures, and everyone connected with it, had to be destroyed.
DOCUMENTS
No. 1
29 February 1944, [Kiev]. Instruction from Sergei Savchenko to the Heads of the UNKGB of the western oblasts of Ukraine, concerning the institution of Operation “Sejm”

Top secret
29 February 1944

To the Head of the UNKGB of Oblast..........
for national security
Code. ..........
C[ity]. of ..........

According to information from the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, in 1941–[19]43 the Polish Government-in-Exile established illegal, nationalist organisations in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, Belorussia and Vilnius oblast on the basis of the bourgeois parties and organisations that existed in the former Poland until its defeat:

POW (Polish Military Organisation)

An influential mass Polish military and political organisation established by Piłsudski in 1913, on the eve of the World War I, in order to organise underground military units in Russia, and to conduct intelligence and sabotage.

The organisation has maintained this character until recently.

The POW was a legal organisation in Poland, but its activities remained clandestine. Its primary internal objective was to keep power in the hands of the Piłsudskiites.

Such important bodies as Section II of the General Staff, the State Police, and the Ministry of the Interior were in the hands of the POW. All ministers and the majority of the senior and long-serving leadership were connected with the POW.

Currently, the POW has set itself the objective of restoring the pre-1939 borders of Poland by means of armed struggle with the Red Army, should it enter the territory of the f[ormer] Poland, and with Soviet partisans operating behind German lines.

The Warsaw headquarters of the POW serves as a command centre for its provincial branches inside the territory of the f[ormer] Poland, including a number of cities and oblasts in Western Ukraine.

We have reliable information that there is a POW branch in Sarny, Rivne oblast, that numbers 50 members and which maintains radio contact with Warsaw.1

1 The independent Home Army District of Sarny, code name “Staw,” was responsible for Sarny district and was tactically subordinate to the Home Army Inspectorate of Kovel; the district commander was Władysław Rydzewski, nom de guerre “Kobus.”

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The branch leader is a former Polish Army captain, KŁEMBICKI Jan.

There is an armed POW branch in the region of Klesiv, Rivne oblast, which numbers 650 members, under the command of former Polish Army captain,_BUŁAT. According to information from our agents, the branch maintains contact with English and German intelligence.

The weapons, equipment and even members of BUŁAT’s branch have been air dropped from England. The branch is being supplemented by recruitment among the local Polish community.

BUŁAT’s branch has a number of supporters in the Klesiv and Sarny regions of Rivne oblast, who are well-armed and awaiting the call to rise up against the Red Army and Soviet authority.

The National Party (the endeks)\(^2\)

It is common knowledge that this party has existed in Poland for more than 40 years and draws its support from medium land owners, kulaks, medium and small urban bourgeoisie, and the bulk of the Catholic clergy.

The National Party has set itself the goal of establishing a Greater Poland “from sea to shining sea.”

It has been established that the National Party’s headquarters is currently based in Warsaw, and it is led by a certain SOSNKOWSKI.\(^3\)

The National Party publishes its own press organ Walka [“Struggle”] illegally in Warsaw, and is actively supported by the Polish government in London.

The ND formed armed “Home Army” (AK) [!] units to fight the Germans and our partisan units. These units are known to be operating inside the territory of the General Government in Lublin województwo, where they are actively engaged in operations against partisans and Polish patriots.\(^4\) The Home Army units are commanded by one Andrzej NIEZNANY, who claims to be a Polish general [!].

Camp of National Unity (OZON)\(^5\)

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\(^2\) The National Party (SN) – Polish political party founded in 1928 to consolidate the operations of a number of previously established national and democratic groups. It mainly attracted intelligentsia and land owners who regarded the national interest of Poland as the greatest measure of all political values. The Party recognised faith, civilisation and the state as the basis of national existence. With 200,000 members, the National Party was the strongest party in Poland in 1939. During the World War II its members were found in the structures of the Polish Government-in-Exile and in the “underground state.”

\(^3\) Factual error. From 1943, the president of the Main Board of the National Party (ZG SN) was Stanislaw Jasiukowicz (1882–1950), a member of the Political Consultative Committee (PKP), a deputy government delegate, and a member of the Council of Ministers for the Interior (KRM) between 1943 and 1945. He was sentenced in the “Trial of the Sixteen” and died in a Soviet prison.

\(^4\) The author is probably referring to Soviet partisans and the People’s Army of Poland (AL).

\(^5\) OZON was the colloquial name for the Camp of National Unity (OZN), a Polish political party which attracted supporters of the post-May government in Poland (the Sanacja regime). Its programme included weakening the opposition’s political influence, strengthening the Commander-in-Chief’s role, installing a strong presidency and diminishing the role of the Parliament while consolidating the position
This party was founded in February 1937 to replace the dissolved Nonpartisan Bloc [for Cooperation with the Government] (BB). OZON is the ruling party of Polish fascism. It was founded by the Piłsudskiites to create a broad social base.

The founder and chief ideologist of OZON was Col. KOC, a former Minister of the Treasury. Before the war, OZON was led by Gen. SKWARCZYŃSKI.

The purpose of OZON was to bring anyone willing to work with the state, whether they were party members or not, into the government camp.

According to our agents, OZON has been reactivated in Poland, as has the National Party.

The party organisations of OZON and other Polish nationalist organisations and formations have set themselves the task of restoring pre-war Poland.

It has been established that OZON is creating armed units known as “Miecz i Plug” [“Sword and Plow”].

These units have been observed operating in the forests of Janów, Józefów and Lubartów in the General Government. OZON units operate in conjunction with Home Army (AK) units set up by the National Party.

The People’s Party (the ludowcy)

A large kulaks’ and peasants’ party founded in 1931. Its structures in the former territory of Poland are currently the strongest and most influential among the Polish community.

The party has its headquarters in London, and is led by the current prime minister of the Polish government, Stanisław MIKOŁAJCZYK. The party has

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6 Adam Koc (1891–1969), Polish Army Colonel (1924); in 1937–1938 OZN leader; Minister of Industry and Trade (1939); in 1939–1940 Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade; did not return to Poland.

7 Stanisław Skwarczyński (1888–1981), Brigadier General in Polish Army (1931); in 1938–1939 OZN leader; taken prisoner by the Germans and did not return to Poland.

8 “Miecz i Plug” – an underground political and military organisation founded in Warsaw in 1939 by Christian nationalists, including Fr. L. Poeplau (nom de guerre “Wolan”) and A. Białobrzeski; Home Army counter-intelligence exposed some of its leaders as Gestapo agents (1943), which led to their elimination.

9 The People’s Party (Stromictwo Ludowe, SL) – a peasants’ party founded in 1931, by merging the Polish People’s Party “Piast” (PSL-“Piast”), the Polish People’s Party “Wyzwolenie” (PSL-“Wyzwolenie”), and the Peasant Party (Stromictwo Chłopskie). The Party opposed the Sanacja government and organised peasants’ strikes. It operated as an underground organisation during WWII.

10 Stanisław Mikolajczyk (1901–1966), Polish politician and popular movement activist; left Poland after the September Campaign (1939); in 1939–1940 Deputy Chairman of the Polish National Council (RN); in 1940–1943 Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile; from July 1943 to November 1944 Prime Minister; returned to Poland to take up the position of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture (1945); member of the State National Council; member of the Polish parliament (1947); co-founded the Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stromictwo Ludowe, PSL) and led it until, facing arrest, he left Poland and settled in the United States (October 1947); in 1947–1966 Chairman of the Polish People’s Party in exile.
set itself the task of restoring democratic Poland “through struggle towards victory.”

The People’s Party (whose members are known as *ludowcy*) has its own armed groups known as Peasants’ Battalions (BCh). Their operations have been observed in the Lubartów and Tuń *powiats* of the General Government. The BCh have been supplied with weapons and radio equipment by air drops from England.

The Party of Polish Socialists (PPS, *Partia Polskich Socjalistów*)

Founded in 1893. Currently represented in England by two factions. The right wing, led by CIÓŁKOSZ and Adam PRAGIER, is strongly anti-Soviet and effectively in alliance with the Piłsudskites.

The left wing is represented by Jan SZYREK, who has come out with radical demands to fight the Piłsudskites and the members of the National Party (endeeks) by way of normalising relations with the USSR. This faction nevertheless aggressively opposes Communism in the USSR.

Active work is being carried out by the district delegations of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, as well as by former Polish Army officers in these delegations, and Polish parties and other organisations operating within the territory of the former Poland.

We have exposed the Secret Polish Army (TAP) in the western *oblasts* of the Ukrainian SSR. Their gangs, acting on instructions from the Polish government-in-exile, are collaborating with certain units of Polish nationalist organisations, engaging Soviet partisans in armed struggle, and spreading anti-Soviet agitation among the local communities. The TAP operates in agreement with the organisations included in the POW and pursues the same goals.

With the knowledge of the Germans, armed (“self-defence”) units have been established in those districts of the former Poland that have a Polish population to fight Ukrainian nationalists. These units [include] a spy network from English intelligence and the Polish Government-in-Exile.

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11 The Peasants’ Battalions (*Bataliony Chłopskie*, BCh), armed units of the Polish People’s movement (1940–1945); signed a partial integration agreement with the Home Army (AK) (1943); numbered around 160,000 soldiers in 1944; nearly 80% of BCh forces were concentrated around Cracow, Kielce, Lublin and Warsaw.

12 Actually the Polish Socialist Party (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*, PPS).

13 Adam Ciołkosz (1901–1978), activist of the Polish Socialist Party–Liberty, Equality, Independence (PPS-WRN); imprisoned in Bereza Kartuska after the Brest Trials; in 1939–1941 and 1942–1945 member of the National Council; later emigrated.

14 Adam Pragier (1886–1976), Polish Socialist Party activist; in 1942–1944 member of the National Council; Minister of Information and Documentation (from 1944); emigrated after the war.

15 The Secret Polish Army (*Tajna Armia Polska*, TAP), founded 9 October 1939; numbered around 19,000 members in the mid-1940s, including at least 129 officers and officer cadets, and 323 NCOs; mainly a military organisation. Joined the newly-established Confederation of the Nation (28 September 1940).
As the Red Army enters the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, Polish nationalist organisations, led by emissaries from the Polish government in London, are stepping up their anti-Soviet activities in preparation for armed resistance against the Red Army.

During the German occupation, the emissaries of Polish nationalist organisations infiltrated the staff of various German companies on Soviet territory temporarily occupied by Germany, and stayed there after the liberation in order to organise anti-Soviet operations behind our lines.

In order to expose anti-Soviet Polish groups and eliminate their hostile activity against the USSR,

I hereby order the following:

1. Uncover and register all illegally acting Polish nationalist formations, whether founded during the occupation or after the liberation of territory from the enemy, and start exposing their spying activities immediately.

2. Immediately arrest the exposed leaders of these groups and their active participants, as well as any rank and file members engaged in active struggle with Soviet partisans in preparation for armed resistance against the Soviet authorities. Once arrested, they are to be thoroughly interrogated so as to expose and eliminate all existing Polish underground organisations running anti-Soviet operations.

3. Remove all exposed nielegalis and emissaries [...].

4. Immediately arrest any activists of the anti-Soviet Polish underground who have been inciting and organising armed resistance, so as to nip any initiative of this kind in the bud.

5. Whenever a nationalist organisation is exposed, steps must be taken to uncover its control centre and channels of communication with the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.

6. Special attention must be paid to exposing illegal radio transmitters and receivers, weapons arsenals, and printing houses, as well as the liaisons and safe houses used by these organisations.

   In case radio equipment is discovered, its potential operational application to our objectives must be determined. Comments concerning each particular case must be submitted to the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR.

7. Recruit an appropriate network of agents to expose the leadership of these nationalist organisations, along with their messengers and the owners of safe houses and transfer points.

8. Install our trained agents into the self-defence units established in the Polish districts to expose English and Polish intelligence.

9. Through the professional work of the newly-recruited agents, ensure that all the members of these organisations are exposed, including their German and English agents; intercept their communications channels and use them to infiltrate

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b- b Corrected from: by the Polish Government-in-Exile.
the control centres of these organisations in the liberated and occupied territories, and in the traditionally Polish areas, especially [in] Warsaw.

10. After suitable verification, establish communication with those agents dealing with Poles in those territories of the USSR temporarily under German occupation, especially in the western oblasts. Carefully scrutinize their behaviour and communications while under occupation, and determine every agent’s opportunities to infiltrate the Polish nationalist underground.

11. The heads of the UNKGB in the eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, with the support of the visa and registration departments of the militia, are to compile a register of all Polish nationals, especially Poles who came from the territory of the General Government during the German occupation, and are still living [here] after the liberation of the area.

All exposed people of Polish nationality are to be subjected to vigorous interrogation in order to expose any emissaries of Polish nationalist organisations and English intelligence agents among them.

12. The heads of the UNKGB in the Rivne and Volhynia oblasts are to take all necessary precautions to prevent emissaries of the Polish Government-in-Exile and Polish nationalist formations operating in the western oblasts from infiltrating the Polish units being formed in the USSR while the Poles are being mobilised.

13. With the aim of centralising all intelligence and investigative materials on the Polish anti-Soviet groups, a centralised file codenamed “Sejm” is be established in order to collect all operational materials, with a separate chapter on each exposed or eliminated nationalist organisation.

One or two trained operatives should be assigned to carry out these actions concerning the Poles.

A written report on intelligence and operational work concerning the Poles must be submitted by 15 March. An operational intelligence plan, as well as information on active agents and their work in this area, are to be attached to the report.

People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar of State Security
(–) SAVCHENKO

“c-29-c” February 1944
No. c-338/S-c

HDA SBU, Kiev, F. 922, Spr. 74, T. 1, pp. 64–75.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

<–< Filled in by hand.
No. 2
23 May 1944, Kiev. Information from Pavel Drozdetsky for the UNKGB Oblast heads, concerning the operations of the Polish underground in areas occupied by the Red Army

Top secret

To the Head of the UNKGB of .......... Oblast ..........of St[ate] Security
Comrade ..........
C[ity]. of ..........

On the basis of data gathered by the USSR NKGB’s agent network, it has been established that General SOSNKOWSKI and his followers, together with a group of right-wing Polish Socialist Party (PPS) activists led by CIOŁKOSZ, have devised a strategic plan for their organisations concerning the preparation for the Red Army’s entry into Poland.

In accordance with this plan, the following instructions on preparing for the entry of the Red Army have been sent to the leaders of illegal organisations in Poland, mostly Piłsudskiites:

a) The leaders of the illegal organisations are expected to present themselves as pro-Soviet, and to appoint individuals to “cooperate” with the Red Army and “join” the partisan units;

b) Another part of the best-prepared people are to be assigned deeply clandestine operations.

People “cooperating” with the Red Army are supposed to win the trust of the USSR so that they can install their own people everywhere.

Provocative attempts to establish an independent Polish administration are planned for when the Red Army is on Polish territory.

It is predicted that these attempts will be suppressed by the Red Army, and that this in turn will give the Poles in London an opportunity to make a fuss about the USSR meddling in Poland’s internal affairs.

The Piłsudskiites are planning to infiltrate every pro-Soviet body, form pseudo-Soviet organisations, and exert an influence on the Slavic Committee.

SOSNKOWSKI and his supporters intend to maintain all the underground Polish organisations and armed forces, in order to use them to establish their own authority once the Red Army leaves Poland.

Since overt armed intervention brings the risk of ending in defeat, a more “tacit” kind of takeover is preferred.

At the same time, the Piłsudskiites are planning to change their tactics in England. The Polish press is going to discontinue their anti-Soviet speeches, and certain officers close to SOSNKOWSKI will publicly announce the necessity of establishing cordial relations with the USSR. After that, once SOSNKOWSKI has
“distanced himself” from them, they are to continue their pro-Soviet line and look for ways to contact high-ranking Soviet officials.

As a counterpoise to the line taken by SOSNKOWSKI, a PPS representative (whose name could not be determined) who had come to London from Poland spoke at one of the most recent PPS leadership sessions, and warned of the danger of the PPS taking an anti-Soviet stance, saying there was strong support for rapprochement with the USSR among Polish socialists.

This information on Polish ventures directed against the USSR has been corroborated by intelligence and investigative materials gathered previously while eliminating the Polish military organisation, the Polish Insurgent Union (PZP), commanded by Gen. SOSNKOWSKI from London, in the oblasts of Volhynia, Rivne and Ternopil.

I hereby order the following:

1. In the course of intelligence and investigative work, expose and eliminate Polish nationalist organisations; attempt to gather information on the recent instructions from SOSNKOWSKI concerning the development of destructive work against the USSR.

2. Should any information on anti-Soviet or provocative actions planned by Polish anti-Soviet groups or organisations be gathered, resolute measures to disrupt them are to be taken immediately. Elimination plans are to be coordinated with the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR on a case by case basis.

3. Increase efforts to establish a network of trained agents and organise their appropriate utilisation.

Direct well-tried and committed agents to expose anti-Soviet elements among those Poles trying to carry out their destructive work by infiltrating the leadership of the Soviet apparatus or having themselves placed in the most sensitive positions in industry, transport and communications.

Should any such information be received, these people must be denied, on any pretext, the positions they are eager to occupy in the Soviet apparatus, and are to be thoroughly investigated.

You are required to notify me immediately of any new information collected in relation to this order.

Dep[uty] People’s Commissar
of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
People’s Commissar of State Security
DROZDETSKY¹

¹ Pavel Drozdetsky (born 1903), Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank, Lieutenant-General. Head of the 3rd Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR (1941); in 1944–1946 Deputy People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR; from 4 May 1946 Head of the 5th Directorate of the MGB of the USSR.
“23” May 1944
No. 841/s
City of Kiev

In conformity:
Deputy Head of Dept. 2 of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Mast[er] Lieutenant of St[ate] Security
YAROSLA VSKY (—)

a-26 May [19]44-a

Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

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a- → Handwritten.
No. 3
2 June 1944, Kiev. Report by Sergei Savchenko

to Leonid Reichman, concerning the number of arrested Poles

Top secret

Comrade Reichman

Report on the number of Poles arrested by the units of the NKGB
of the Ukrainian SSR

The total number of Poles arrested by the NKGB in Ukraine – 181 people.
These Poles were arrested in the following oblasts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Volhynia</th>
<th>112</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– “ –</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ –</td>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ –</td>
<td>Stanyslaviv</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ –</td>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The arrested Poles have been classified in terms of their particular crimes as follows:

a) Members of the Polish anti-Soviet military organisation, the PZP
   (Polish Insurgent Union) – 117
b) Members of the Polish anti-Soviet organisation, the PSC
   (State Civil Service) – 3
c) Gestapo agents – 14
d) German and Romanian intelligence agents – 6
e) Police and military agents – 6
f) Police officials in command positions – 3
g) Traitors – 16
h) Active collaborators with the occupier – 7
i) Policemen – 9

Among the arrested members of the Polish anti-Soviet underground are 27 persons [belonging to] the organisers and leaders of this conspiracy.

The following items were confiscated during their arrest: 5 weapons arsenals, 1 radio transceiver, a printing house, and a number of anti-Soviet documents from the organisations.

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In particular, it is worth pointing out that a total of 2231 persons were arrested by the NKGB in the above oblasts (including the 181 Poles specified above), including:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Number (Persons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From Volhynia oblast</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Rivne oblast</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Ternopil oblast</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Stanyslaviv oblast</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Chernivtsi oblast</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of arrested Poles in relation to the total number of arrestees is a mere 8%.

People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank
SAVCHENKO

a- For Cdr. Reichman
Transferred by: Ostapchenko
Accepted by: Milovanova
3 June [19]44, [time:] 3:00-a

“b- 2-b” June 1944
City of Kiev
b- No. 917/s

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 3, Por. 9, pp. 80–81.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

b- * Filled in by hand.
No. 4
21 July 1944, Kiev. Information from Sergei Savchenko, concerning Operation “Sejm”

“Approved”

a- Dep[uty] a Peop[le’s] Commiss[ar]
of St[ate] Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar of St[ate] Security 3rd Rank
(–) SAVCHENKO
"b-22-b" July 1944

Information
on Operation “Sejm”

Concerning the Polish anti-Soviet organisation, the State Civil Service (PSC), which has been exposed and eliminated in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR:

On the basis of material obtained by our agents and during the course of investigations while working on exposing and eliminating the Polish anti-Soviet underground, the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR has established that, apart from creating military and insurgent groups such as the Polish Insurgent Union [Polski Związek Powstańczy, PZP], the Polish Government-in-Exile in London has formed a anti-Soviet organisation known as the State Civil Service [Państwowa Służba Cywilna, PSC].

The PSC, also known as the Government Delegation [Delegatura Rządu, DR], is a territorial “civic” organisation that, like the PZP, encompasses the entire area of the former Poland, including the western oblasts of the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSRs.

The PSC-DR operates according to the principles of a close-knit conspiracy. The organisation has a specially trained staff of underground leaders, weapons, its own illegal printing houses, radio communication devices, and other underground technical resources.

Generally, the PSC-DR is directed by the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. The PSC-DR has its National Headquarters on the territory of the former Poland. This can be found in Warsaw, and is referred to as the Government Delegation for Poland.

The entire territory of the former Poland has been divided by the organisation into voivodships or districts, in which PSC-DR branch offices come under central offices known as województwo or district government delegations.

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a- -a Handwritten.
b- -b Filled in by hand.
These voivodships, or districts, are subdivided into PSC-DR Inspectorates comprising 3–5 powiats. The powiat units of the PSC-DR are referred to as district government delegations (PDR).

The main political objective of the PSC-DR is to prepare an armed insurgency to establish a “Greater Poland” within its pre-1939 borders and with Silesia, Pomerania, Gdańsk and Western Prussia attached, and to forge a union (led by Poland) with neighbouring states against Russia, which is regarded as the eternal enemy.

To realise this task in practice, the PSC-DR is:

a) recruiting and training staff for local government and judicial bodies in case of a transfer of power;

b) providing day-to-day, practical assistance to PZP organisations by replenishing their personnel, weaponry, and specialist staff for PZP leadership positions;

c) acquiring and creating depots to store weapons, ammunition, equipment and medicines;

d) conducting intelligence and counter-intelligence operations;

e) actively distributing anti-Soviet propaganda and educating the Polish community in a nationalist spirit.

These tasks have been carried out by special departments of the PSC-DR delegations.

We have established that the following departments existed in the district government delegations:

Information – managing intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

Security (self-defence) – supplying the local Polish community with weapons, arranging hiding places, teaching them to use weapons, and arranging sanitation.

Social welfare – offering material assistance to Polish refugees, sick people and children.

Education – selecting teachers and organising the education of Polish children in a nationalist spirit.

Propaganda in support of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, publishing and disseminating anti-Soviet literature and papers.

On the basis of investigative materials and documents confiscated, it has been established that the PSC-DR is an anti-Soviet organisation, actively preparing an armed insurrection against the Soviet Union in accordance with the directives of the Polish Government-in-Exile.

The anti-Soviet nature of the PSC-DR was established as early as 1943, i.e. before the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR had been liberated from the Germans by Red Army units.

The operational groups of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR operating in the rear of the enemy have obtained documents proving that struggle against the Soviet Union was one of the PSC-DR’s key objectives.

The proclamation of the Volhynia District Government Delegate entitled “To the People of Volhynia,” dated 28 July 1943, says:
“...the Polish nation and government has answered: ‘Hands off!’ to the Muscovites. Hands off our land! We shall not let you have it! We will fight the invader with all our might until we have won...”

This document basically contains slanderous fabrications concerning the Soviet Union and its policies.

For instance, it reads:

“...The destruction and annexation of Poland will open the way for the Muscovites to enslave Europe, and then finally to clap the entire world in their Asiatic irons.

The extermination of Poland in Eastern Europe is tantamount to the destruction of liberty, equality and the dignity of man and nations for centuries to come...”

While outwardly announcing its simultaneous struggle with the German occupier, in fact neither the PSC-DR nor the PZP are fighting the Nazis, but rather protecting and preparing their staff for struggle against the Soviet Union.

Our agents have determined that the directives from London emphasise the fact that the main objective of the PSC-DR was to:

“...Restore the independent Polish state with its pre-1939 borders.

In fact, the re-establishment of Poland is meant to be achieved by means of armed insurrection in the rear of the Red Army once it has crossed the Bug River, and by drops of paratroopers from England.

We count on the Red Army being dramatically weakened from fighting the Germans and therefore easy to defeat...”

The Polish community has been categorically prohibited from rendering any assistance whatsoever to the Red Army in its fight with the German occupier:

“...At the moment of our most serious struggle with the Germans, the treacherous Muscovites stabbed [Poland] in the back and seized half our land...”

“...Collaboration with the Bolsheviks is... a crime. Joining Soviet partisan units – a crime. No Pole should be found there...”

(from the proclamation of the Volhynia District Government Delegate of 28 July 1943).

On the basis of confessions from arrested active PSC-DR members and confiscated documents, it has been confirmed that the Polish Government-in-Exile in London is heavily subsidising the anti-Soviet operations of the underground PSC-DR.

The PSC-DR leaders, whether in control centres or on the ground, are supported by resources from London, and are additionally receiving significant funds to prepare an armed insurrection against the Soviet Union (collecting weapons, publishing illegal papers and leaflets, conducting intelligence and counter-intelligence operations).

One of the arrested leaders of the Krzemeniec PSC-DR (later transferred to a leadership position in the PZP), SKOWRONEK Jan,¹ confessed under interrogation that:

¹ Jan Skowronek, Dipl. Eng., Cmdr., Home Army (AK), Kremenets District.
“...The Government Delegation (DR) organisation has established as its fundamental objective the struggle to create a great, independent Poland that will include the territories that were severed and made oblasts of Western Ukraine in 1939.”

The anti-Soviet nature of the DR organisation is further confirmed by the following factor: the DR organisation has its own press published in the territories across the Bug River. Papers like *Rzeczpospolita*, *Przez Walkę do Zwycięstwa* and *Polska Narodowa* publish anti-Soviet articles quite frequently...

The leader of the Zdolbuniv PDR-DR, KOCHAŃCZYK Jan, testified as follows on the tasks of the PSC-DR:²

“...We had to conduct propaganda campaigns on the necessity of fighting for the restoration of Poland within its 1939 borders, support the Polish government-in-exile, set up and lead self-defence units, organise the raising and education of children, offer material help and other assistance to Poles, and gather information.

Should Poland be rebuilt, the Volhynian DR and PDR would become temporary centres for state authorities and administration...”

Another arrested leader of the Kremenets PDR-DR, WISZNIEWSKI, admitted:

“...Our organisation operates under the direction of the Polish Government-in-Exile, which assumes a hostile position towards the Soviet Union, and has an anti-Soviet relationship with the USSR. Our enmity towards the Soviet Union is confirmed by the fact that we do not recognise the annexation of Western Ukraine, Belorussia, or the oblast of Vilnius to the corresponding republics of the USSR. Our organisation is fighting for the 1939 borders of Poland.³

After the liberation of Kremenets from German occupation, our organisation still existed illegally; disregarding special orders by the Soviet military authorities, we did not hand in our weapons to the Soviet authorities, but kept them stored illegally...”

An active member of the Zdolbuniv PSC-DR, ROGOWSKA, who ran an underground printing shop, confessed that the key objective of the organisation was:

“...to fight for the restoration of Poland with its 1939 borders by means of armed struggle with the Soviet Union with the support of England and the USA...”⁴

During the elimination of the Lutsk Inspectorate of the PZP, Order No. 135, signed by the leader of the organisation, “ADAM,” and the leader of the Lutsk Sub-district of the Government Delegation, “MATEUSZ,” was confiscated. The order urged Poles to undermine mobilisation into the Red Army and the Polish

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² Jan Kochańczyk, *nom de guerre* “Świda,” arrested 8 January 1945; sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the MVD for the Rivne oblast to 10 years in a correctional labour camp on 14 September 1946; died 21 March 1952.
³ Michał Wiszniewski held the position of District Commander of the Peasants’ Battalions (BCh), in addition to that of a District Government Delegate.
⁴ Maria Rogowska, arrested 22 December 1944; sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the MVD for Rivne oblast to 10 years in a correctional labour camp on 14 September 1946; died 9 November 1950.
armed forces in the USSR under the command of Gen. BERLING, not to hand in
their weapons to the Soviet authorities, and not to travel into the heart of Russia.5

As the Red Army was approaching the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR,
the representative of the Warsaw central office of the Government Delegation,
“NIKITA,” issued an instruction to PDR leaders dated 3 January [19]44 in which
they are ordered:

“...With respect to the approach of hostilities towards Poland, I hereby order:
...2. Put even more energy into increasing and intensifying our intelligence
service with a view to acquiring detailed data on the question of Polish-German,
Polish-Ukrainian, and Polish-Soviet relations, and pay special consideration to the
Soviet army’s behaviour towards Poles and Ukrainians when they enter Polish
territory...

4. Once the Soviet army enters Volhynia, do not reveal your information
gathering network. On the contrary, use it to distribute carefully selected
information to turn the Polish community against the Soviet authorities ...”6

As a result of the investigation into the matter of arrested PSC-DR and PZP
members, and the information gathered by our agents, it can be confirmed that
both organisations had been working closely together in preparation for an armed
insurrection against the USSR and an assumption of power.

For instance, the leader of the Lutsk Sub-district of the Government
Delegation, “MATEUSZ,” maintained regular and personal contact with the leader
of the Lutsk Inspectorate of the PZP, “ADAM,” with whom he exchanged
instructions received from head office. They jointly issued orders and
proclamations, and introduced underground members to each other in order to
facilitate the work of the junior members of their organisations.

At the end of 1943, an authorised representative of the PSC-DR central office
in Warsaw, “NIKITA,” a former member of the Polish parliament (Sejm), illegally
visited the town of Lutsk to inspect the operations of the local PSC-DR and hold
a joint instruction meeting for “MATEUSZ” and “ADAM.”

The cases of PZP and PSC-DR members (SKOWRONEK, ŻÓŁNIEWSKA)
transferring from one organisation to the other, without even changing their noms
de guerre, have been confirmed.

The PSC-DR, with the assistance of the Germans, created the so-called “Self-
Defence” units during the German occupation.

As has been established on the basis of intelligence and investigative materials,
the Self-Defence units were in fact an armed wing of the PSC-DR which was to
be used for anti-Soviet purposes.

These units possessed a large quantity of arms and ammunition, some of which
they had received from the Germans. The Polish members of these units were given
military training.

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5 Bolesław Haber, *nom de guerre* “Mateusz,” Inspector of the 2nd Lutsk Inspectorate of the Volhynia
District Government Delegation.

6 The author may be referring to Czesław Zadrożny (*nom de guerre* “Mykita”), Head of the Security
Department in the Volhynia District Government Delegation.
The NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, with the assistance of its agents and investigations, has exposed and is currently eliminating the organisations of the Government Delegation, the PSC-DR, in a number of cities in the Ternopil, Volhynia and Rivne oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR (cities: Lutsk, Kremenets, Zdolbuniv, Shumsk, Uhorsk, etc.).

By applying intelligence and operational methods, we managed to locate and arrest the hidden leader of the Lutsk Sub-district of the PSC-DR, –

HABER Boleslaw, son of Józef, organisational nom de guerre “MATEUSZ”; born in the town of Olsztyn, Kielce województwo, in 1913; Polish; no member of any party; secondary education; profession – accountant; no steady employment; no fixed address.

HABER “Mateusz” confessed that he had been recruited to the PSC-DR in July 1943 by the leader of the Lutsk Sub-district, STRUSIŃSKI Zygmunt, organisational nom de guerre “Szeliga.”

In August 1943, after STRUSIŃSKI had been arrested by the Germans, the representative of the Volhynia District Government Delegation, “Tadeusz,” came to the town of Lutsk to appoint HABER Inspector of the Lutsk Sub-district of the PSC-DR.

HABER also confessed that the main task of the PSC-DR was to prepare an armed insurrection with the support of the military organisations of the PZP [in order to] restore the pre-1939 borders of Poland.

Self-defence units were set up with this objective, a widespread anti-Soviet nationalist propaganda campaign was conducted among the Poles, and the administrative apparatus prepared itself for the uprising.

The PSC-DR organisation directed by HABER received special resources from London.

The Kremenets District Government Delegation, commonly known as the I-P-4, was incorporated into the Volhynia District Delegation, and carried out active nationalist, anti-Soviet operations among the Polish community; and prepared insurgents and established secret stores of arms and ammunition jointly with the PZP.

The leader of the Kremenets PDR whom we arrested –

WISZNIEWSKI Michał, son of Józef, organisational nom de guerre “Frusik”; born in the village of Oryniets, Kamianets-Podilskyi oblast, 1904; Polish; no member of any party; graduate of the Warsaw University of Technology; power plant manager in Kremenets during the occupation and prior to his arrest; confessed to having been recruited to the DR organisation in the town of Kremenets in 1942 by the official representative of the Warsaw central office, one RUMSZEL, and ordered by him to lead the district government delegation.

7 Zygmunt Strusiński, official representative of the National Security Corps (PKB) in the Lutsk Inspectorate of the Home Army (AK).
8 Proper name: Orynyn.
9 Probably Rumel Zygmunt, nom de guerre “Krzysztof Poręba.”
The Kremenets PDR maintained contact with the Volhynia District Delegation and the Warsaw central office of the PSC-DR through representatives [residing here] illegally – “Nikita” and “Tadeusz.”

After the development of PSC-DR operations, on various occasions WISZNIEWSKI received an overall amount of around 600,000 roubles in German marks, Ukrainian roubles and US dollars.

The sums mentioned above were provided by the PSC-DR inspector for Volhynia and spent on purchasing arms and food, and providing material assistance to the Polish community. The Inspectorate merely received accounts of the particular amounts issued.

WISZNIEWSKI confessed that special, secret warehouses were being set up to store weapons, ammunition and medicines.

During the liquidation of the Kremenets PSC-DR, 4 rifles, 13 handguns, a machine gun ammunition belt with 1000 rounds, 12 German grenades, 2 radio receivers, 2 radio transmitters, and 3 medical kits were confiscated.

In the flat of the arrested PSC-DR members TKACZYŃSKI and BITNOWSKA, two large medical kits with various medications and poisons were confiscated.

WISZNIEWSKI also testified that “Tadeusz” from the Volhynia District Government Delegation had come to the town of Kremenets in December 1943 to supervise the organisation’s operations. As the front line was approaching, he ordered that a special instruction from PSC-DR central office was to be strictly followed.

In the confiscated instructions mentioned above, signed by the representative of Warsaw central office, “Nikita,” [with a cover letter] from the representative of Volhynia central office, “Mateusz,” the organisation was ordered as follows:

“...as the front line is approaching and the Red Army has invaded Volhynia, the organisation must go underground and become clandestine, and not reveal itself pending further special orders. The Polish community should stay put, as they are on Polish soil, and not retreat with the Germans...”

An identical District Government Delegation has been exposed and partially eliminated in the town of Zdolbuniv, Rivne oblast.

The leader of the Zdolbuniv district Government Delegation was found and arrested –

KOCHAŃCZYK Jan, son of Tomasz, born in the town of Koniecpol, Radomsko powiat, 1888; Polish; no member of any party; worked in the Siemfond office during the occupation; leader of the Zdolbuniv District Government Delegation; organisational nom de guerre “Świda.” Confessed that the PDR, which he led, published its own paper Wołyniak [“The Volhynian”]; maintained regular contact with the central offices in Volhynia and Warsaw; and had in his possession radio equipment and copiers on which leaflets were printed.

According to KOCHAŃCZYK’s testimony, the members of the powiat organisation of the PSC-DR in the town of Zdolbuniv are armed. Measures have already been taken to confiscate their weapons.
It was established during the investigation that the Zdolbuniv District Government Delegation received a monthly subsidy of 30,000 marks to acquire weapons and meet the organisation’s other needs.

KOCHAŃCZYK himself received a monthly salary of 200 marks, while the departmental heads and other active members of the Government Delegation were paid 100 marks a month.

An analysis of the documents acquired by the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, during the course of intelligence and investigative operations aimed at eliminating the Polish anti-Soviet organisation the State Civil Service (PSC), has proved that by creating an anti-Soviet underground in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, the Polish Government-in-Exile in exile depends not only on the personnel of the PZP military organisation for its destructive work, but has drawn in a large circle of the Polish civilian population by means of local government delegations, thereby preparing the administrative machinery for the future government of the country after the insurrection against the USSR and takeover of power anticipated in Polish fascist circles.

From the incomplete data in our possession, the Zdolbuniv PDR appears to have numbered approximately 600 members, and the Kremenets PDR over 200.

Our special assignment at present is to continue to expose the underground PSC-DR organisations, [...] intercept their communication channels, expose their members, uncover existing secret arsenals of weapons, and confiscate illegal literature and propagandist & other documents concerning the operations of the PSC-DR.

Head of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant Colonel of State Security
(—) MEDVEDEV

“oub-21-b” July 1944
City of Kiev

HDA SBU, F. 9, Spr. 75, T. 2, pp. 14–24.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

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10 Pavel Medvedev (born 1905), Colonel of State Security, in 1943–1948 Head of the 2nd Department of the NKGB, then the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR.
No. 5
3 August 1944, Kiev. Telegram from Vasily Riasnoy to Lavrentiy Beria, concerning the liquidation of the Lviv District Government Delegation

Top secret

Telegram
Moscow

To the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security
Comrade BERIA L. P.

A Polish nationalist organisation is being eliminated in the town of Lviv. The Polish Civil Service, PSC (State Civil Service) for short, was formed in 1941 by order of the Polish Government-in-Exile.

During the German occupation of Lviv, the PSC was illegal but maintained direct radio contact with Warsaw and London, from where it received its instructions.

The leaders of what was known as the Lviv Regional Government Delegation, which comprised the oblasts of Lviv, Stanyslaviv, Drohobych and Ternopil, were found in Lviv.

The organisation was led by OSTROWSKI Adam, son of Franciszek, nom de guerre “Tomasz.”

He went to Warsaw in June this year, and returned two days before the liberation of Lviv.

OSTROWSKI maintained direct contact with the leader of the Polish military insurgent organisation PZP (the Home Army), FILIPPOWSKI Adam, nom de guerre “Ludwik,” a brigadier-general of the former Polish Army.2

1 Adam Ostrowski (1911–1977), nom de guerre “Tomasz Niedziela,” lawyer; PPS-WRN (from 1943); from March 1944 District Government Delegate. Arrested by the NKVD 31 July 1944; interrogated, agreed to work with the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) and released. In the PKWN, deputy head of the Workers’ Press Agency (RAP); from February to March 1945 Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Public Administration (MAP); later wojewoda of Cracow; in 1945–1950 Polish Ambassador to Stockholm and Rome; author of historical publications.

2 Actually Władysław Filipkowski (1892–1950), nom de guerre “Cis,” “Janka,” “Orkan,” “Stach,” “Ludwik”; Colonel of Polish artillery, member of the Riflemen’s Association (Związek Strzelecki); served in the Polish Legions and then the Polish Army; last rank commander of 1st Infantry Division of the Polish Legions (1 DPLeg); Home Army HQ inspector for Lviv District from 1940 to the end of July 1943; in 1943–1944 Commander of the Home Army, Lviv District; after the Battle of Lviv went to Zhytomyr as leader of the Home Army delegation to meet General Rola-Żymierski (31 July 1944). Arrested with the other delegation members (2–3 August 1944); imprisoned in Kiev, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ryazan-Diaghilev, Gryazovets and Brest; released and returned to Poland (November 1947); presented as a general in talks with Soviet commanders by order of the Commandant-General of the Home Army; posthumously promoted to brigadier-general 1994.
The purpose of this organisation was to restore Poland to its pre-1939 borders, recruit new members, educate them in a spirit of nationalism, and prepare them to take power.

This organisation was not engaged in any active fighting with the Germans. The conviction that Lviv should be a Polish, not a Soviet town, was strongly held by the Polish community.

During the first days of the liberation of Lviv, the members of this organisation, armed with rifles, revolvers and grenades, conducted illegal searches, raids and arrests among the Ukrainian community.

Isolated cases of arbitrary executions of Ukrainians took place.

The Polish community is now being told that once the war ends, the question of whether Lviv belongs to Poland or the USSR will be resolved by means of a plebiscite.

As a result of the operation to seize the leaders of the organisation carried out in the night of July 31/August 1, the UNKGB arrested 12 active members, including:

1. OSTROWSKI Adam, son of Franciszek, born in the town of Lviv in 1911; Polish; member, Polish Socialist Party (PPS) from 1941; former assistant at Lviv University. In the organisation, he was a delegate of the Polish government in London for the Lviv area.

2. WACHSMAN Mieczysław, son of Leon, born in the city of Cracow in 1902; Polish; education: higher, legal. In the organisation, he was head of the intelligence and counter-intelligence unit. His nom de guerre was “Sebastian.”

3. WAJDA Mikołaj, son of Michał, born in Rozwadów in 1907; Polish; graduate, pilot school in Dęblin. Between 1940 and [19]41, he worked as an instructor in a British air force school. In the organisation, he was a battalion commander, nom de guerre “LIS.”

The “SMERSH” of the 1st Ukrainian Front arrested a brigadier-general of the former Polish Army, FILIPPOWSKI.

The majority of the Home Army commanders went underground.

The operation is ongoing.

---

3 Mieczysław Wachman, PPS activist; head of the Watch Committee (Straż Samorządowa) (1943); deputy District Government Delegate in Lviv for the Stanislawiv województwo (February 1944); defendant in the trial of the Lviv delegation (16–22 January 1945); sentenced to 20 years in a correctional labour camp; returned to Poland 1955.

4 Actually Mieczysław Borodej (1914–1983), noms de guerre “Lis,” “Osmoza,” “Ścigacz,” “Wojciech”; pilot officer of the Polish Army after the outbreak of the war, evacuated with the entire Air Force Officer Cadet School in Dęblin; fought in the Battle of Lviv; escaped to France and then the UK; served in Polish Fighter Squadron No. 301; shot down over Bremen (1941); imprisoned in Stalag VIII-B Lamsdorf; escaped and returned to Lviv; from November 1942 commander, Military Intelligence, Lviv Inspectorate; Home Army Lviv District (April 1944); from July 1944 commander, Home Army Reserve Group, intelligence and counter-intelligence services during Operation Tempest. Arrested 31 July 1944; sentenced to 20 years’ penal servitude (29 January 1945); sentence increased to 25 years for attempted escape; returned to Poland (1955).
During the investigation and elimination of the organisation (the State Civil Service), the NKGB confiscated three arms and ammunition arsenals in the following amounts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar missiles</td>
<td>26 crates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy machine guns</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light machine guns</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various rifles</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>298 and 10 crates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR [Soviet anti-tank rifles]</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automatic rifles</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle rounds</td>
<td>10 k and 161 crates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTR rounds</td>
<td>1 crate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German rounds</td>
<td>99 crates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese rounds</td>
<td>12 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austrian [rounds]</td>
<td>21 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian [rounds]</td>
<td>60 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detonators</td>
<td>75 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petards</td>
<td>5 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primers for RGD grenades</td>
<td>7 boxes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primers for mortar missiles</td>
<td>13 crates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The arrestees have limited their confessions to disclosing the names of various members of the organisation, without providing any more information, expressing the hope of being released with the support of the Polish Government-in-Exile led by MIKOŁAJCZYK.

The organisation members have voluntarily handed in the following items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Light machine guns</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-aircraft machine guns</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTRs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawn-off shotguns</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various grenades</td>
<td>2218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortar missiles</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rounds</td>
<td>5 crates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>150 kg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank
(–) RIASNOY5

“a-3-a” August 1944
No. a-1840/sn
City of Kiev
[…]

b-Transferred by: Diemura
Accepted by: Sidorova
4 August [19]44/6.00

Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Added by hand on first page of document: to the case.

Instruction on
the course of operations aimed at arresting the Polish counter-revolutionary,
nationalist element in the town and oblast of Lviv

1. Pursuant to the instructions of the NKGB and the NKVD of the Ukrainian
SSR, between December ‘ ’ and ‘ ’, the Polish counter-revolutionary, nationalist
and criminal element in the town of Lviv is being arrested.

2. The operation is being carried out by the Directorate of the NKGB and
NKVD, with the use of the operational and military forces of the NKVD.

3. People liable to arrest shall be directly apprehended by the operational
groups, including an operative, i.e. the group leader, and two soldiers.

4. Before commencing the operation, the group leader shall carefully study the
place of residence of the target in the utmost secrecy, and learn all the entries to
and exits from the house/apartment building of the target. If the exact address is
unknown, the leader shall determine the number of the apartment building, bearing
in mind that entrances to buildings a are normally closed a between 8 and 9 p.m.
and can only be opened by the caretaker.

b Therefore b the caretaker’s address, and some way to call him/her at night,
[must be] established.

5. The group leader has a responsibility to familiarise himself with the
operational profile of the target and analyse it in terms of potential armed resistance
to arrest.

6. The operational group shall commence the operation on the order of the
head of the sector.

When entering the target’s apartment, the group must act quickly and with no
undue noise, b body-search the arrestee, thoroughly search the apartment, and
prepare the appropriate reports. All weapons, poisons and documents must be
confiscated. b

a Every person living in the same apartment or room [with] the arrestee is to
be assembled in a single room and guarded by one soldier. The other soldier is to
assist in the search. Nobody is to be allowed to leave the apartment during the
search. The search and arrest must proceed in the following order a:

a) Present the warrant and order the arrestee to sign it.

b) Body-search the arrestee immediately “ b.”

---

a - handwritten.
b - crossed out by hand.
c) Advise the arrestee to dress appropriately for the season, and tell him/her that he/she is allowed to take the following items:

1. two changes of underwear;
2. two towels;
3. a flannel or cloth quilt;
4. a sheet;
5. an enamel bowl;
6. an enamel cup;
7. an aluminium or wooden spoon.

d) All weapons, ammunition, poisons, material evidence, correspondence, identification documents and valuables must be included in the search report. A copy of the report is to be submitted to the arrestee or members of his/her family against confirmation of receipt. The search report must be made in two copies, to be signed by the person performing the search, the arrestee and the witnesses. Items of low value (gold accessories [!], etc.) must not be taken. No items other than material evidence are to be taken.

e) Once the arrestee has been delivered to the sector, the weapons and valuables must be submitted to the person on duty, such as a financial clerk, and an appropriate receipt must be taken.

f) The arrest warrant, the 1st copy of the search report, the identification documents of the arrestee, correspondence, and receipts for deposited valuables, weapons and ammunition must be submitted to the person on duty in the sector of Department “A.”

g) The arrestee, [along with] the warrant, is to be delivered to the head of the sector.

h) The property inventory and the report concerning the official sealing of the vacated premises (each in 3 copies) should be prepared on the day after the arrest.

i) The registered property must be left for safekeeping by the arrested person’s family members or the house manager/caretaker against receipt. Should it not be possible to safeguard the property, a proper report must be prepared for the Head of Department “A,” and the property temporarily entrusted to the individuals specified above.

j) The 1st and 2nd copies of the property inventory and the report of the official sealing of the vacated premises, the receipt, and the report of failure to secure the property (if applicable) must be submitted immediately to Department “A,” Comrade GORBAN – room no. 131.

The third copy of the property inventory and the report of the official sealing of the vacated premises must be handed to the person to whom the property has been entrusted.

7. The identification papers of every person present in the apartment owned by the arrestee(s) must be inspected. Any suspects must be apprehended and delivered to the sector for verification.

8. After the arrest, the oper[ational] group shall deliver the arrestee to a predetermined meeting place and wait for the car. If the distance to the sector is short, the group should escort the arrestee on foot.
9. In the case of armed resistance from the subject, firm and fast measures must be taken and side arms used.

10. The decision to release an arrestee during an operation must be taken solely by the UNKGB Chief of Staff, after the documents have been appropriately collated and verified.

11. The first persons to be apprehended are terrorists, saboteurs, leaders of anti-Soviet nationalist organisations and enemy agents.

   In order to arrest these groups, the heads of the sectors shall assign their most experienced operatives to the oper[ational] groups.

   If any information exists concerning potential armed resistance by a person or group to be arrested, [it is advisable] to reinforce the oper[ational] groups with reservists.

12. In order to load the arrestees into the car, meeting places should be arranged somewhere within the operations area to which the arrestees [are to be] escorted from the neighbouring streets.

   The car’s route of the must be determined in detail, and the streets from which the arrestees are escorted on foot must be indicated.

   All operatives and assigned soldiers must be reminded to exercise the utmost vigilance and discipline while the operation is being carried out.

   Head of the NKVD Directorate of the Lviv Oblast
   Commissar of St[ate] Security 3rd Rank
   VORONIN

   “  ” December 1944

HDA SBU, F. 71, Doc. 9, Spr. 64, pp. 18–20v.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
No. 7
4 January 1945, Chortkiv. Telegram from Pyotr Pugach to Sergei Savchenko and his deputy Pavel Drozdetsky, concerning the elimination of the Home Army (AK) in the Ternopil oblast

Top secret

To People’s Commissar of St[ate] Security of the Ukrainian SSR
People’s Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank
Comrade SAVCHENKO
City of Lviv

To Dep[uty] People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
People’s Commissar of State Security
Comrade DROZDETSKY
City of Kiev

Telegram
concerning the results of eliminating the Polish criminal and reactionary
Home Army organisation in Ternopil oblast

By way of carrying out your instructions of 3 January 1945, an operation targeting Poles was carried out on the night of 3–4 January, during which the following was accomplished:

1. The “Konspiratorzy” [“Conspirators”] operation in the town of Ternopil, during which 13 members of the Home Army organisation were arrested, including 7 leaders, viz.:
   - ANTONIAK – District Commander of the Home Army;
   - DOWRZAŃSKI – Commander of the Home Army Internal Security Unit;
   - JASIŃSKI – Commander of the Home Army Communications Unit;
   - ŻARNOWSKI – Deputy District Commander of the Home Army organisation and Commander of the organisation in Ternopil;
   - SZCZĘŚNY – Commander of the Home Army Armaments Unit;
   - TARCZYŃSKI – Commander of the Home Army Financial Unit;
   - KINCZEL – Head of the Organisational Unit.

In the town of Buchach, the intelligence case “Krety” [“Moles”] was partially concluded, with 2 Home Army leaders arrested.

In the town of Monastyrskra, RASTYCKA, the Home Army messenger involved in the case of Operation “Mędrcy” [“Sages”], was arrested.
The total number of the Home Army members arrested in the course of the operation, as of 4 January this year, is 16, including 10 leaders.

Deputy Head of the UNKGB of Ternopol Oblast
Lieutenant Colonel of Sta[te] Sec[urity]
(–) PUGACH

“30.4” January 1945
No. ..... 
City of Chortkiv

Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Added on the reverse of the document: Note transferred at 8:15 p.m. on 4 January [1945] by Korobkov. Accepted by: Ushakov – Lviv. Accepted by: Yegorova – Kiev.

\textsuperscript{1} Pyotr Pugach (born 1905), Colonel, State Security, in 1943–1944 Deputy Head of the UNKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Dnipropetrovsk oblast; from May to August 1944 leader of an operational group of the UNKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Drohobych oblast; in 1944–1949 Deputy Head and Acting Head of the UNKGB-UMGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Ternopil oblast.
No. 8
9 January 1945, Lviv. Report by Alexandr Voronin to Sergei Savchenko, concerning the arrests of Polish underground members in the city and oblast of Lviv

Top secret

To the People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
People’s Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank
Comrade SAVCHENKO
City of Lviv

Report
on the results of the operation concerning the detention
of the Polish anti-Soviet element in the town of Lviv [and] the Horodok,
Novi Yarichiv and Vinnitsia regions of Lviv Oblast
as of 8–9 January 1945

Following the detention of the Polish anti-Soviet element on 8–9 January by the NKGB Directorate:

Arrested: – 227 people
of which: urban – 174 people
        regional – 50 people

Breakdown by affiliation:

Home Army members ............................................................... – 92 people
National Party members ............................................................ – 4 people
National Civil Service – Government Delegation
(PSC-DR) members........................................................................ – 4 people
Volksdeutsche ........................................................................... – 10 people
Gestapo agents........................................................................... – 2 people
Suspected spies.......................................................................... – 6 people
[Suspected] saboteurs................................................................. – 2 people
Traitors and collaborators with German occupiers.............. – 15 people
Miscellaneous............................................................................ – 92 people
Breakdown by social group:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total:</th>
<th>Including women:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers/Educators</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painters</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arrestees:
- Married.......................................................... 188
- Single ........................................................................ 39

Breakdown by family members:
- Adults........................................................................... 345
- Children 16 y[ears] and under.................................... 157

The following items were confiscated during the arrests: 2 American automatic guns, 2 rifles, grenades, and a spare barrel for a heavy machine gun.

Two typewriters, six radio receivers, several dozen copies of the illegal newspapers *Słowo Polskie* and *Komunikat*, a few sets of rubber printing typeface, the Polish bi-color national flag and emblem, anti-Soviet literature and fascist leaflets, 16 kilo[grams] of silver, 54,000 roubles in the Soviet currency and 6000 in Polish zloty.

Forged seals and stamps of Soviet institutions and organisations, counterfeit signatures of army commissars, and [materials] of German bodies from the occupation period.

The most noteworthy arrestees were:

BLACHARSKI Tadeusz – born in 1888, higher education, priest in the village of Stare Selo, Bibrka region, Lviv oblast. He was under investigation in relation to the “Kapelani” [“Chaplains”] intell[igence] operation, as leader of the National Democracy organisation in the town of Stare Selo.

During BLACHARSKI’s arrest, 4 copies of a late-December issue of the illegal paper *Słowo Polskie*, a Polish flag and emblem, a field telephone with a Morse code key, and a supply of disposable and rechargeable batteries were all confiscated.
KAŁUCKI Stanisław, son of Wincenty, born in 1902, unemployed at the time of arrest, former member of the Union of Polish Legionaries [ZLP], participated in the 2nd and 3rd reunions of the Polish legionnaires.

The following were confiscated while searching KAŁUCKI’s apartment: forged seals and stamps of the Dist[ict] Mil[itary] Department and Regional Mil[itary] Departments of the town of Lviv for military service release documents; identification card, counterfeited by KAŁUCKI to confirm his service in the German police, prevent his being sent to Germany as a labourer, and allow him to move freely about the town during the German occupation of Lviv.

KAŁUCKI resisted arrest and tried to destroy the discovered documents and seal matrices.

When this attempt failed, he feigned an attack of madness.

KAŁUCKI is being thoroughly examined.

The following members of the Home Army organisation were arrested while carrying out an operation in the Novi Yarichiv region: BIGAS, head of the village council of Verkhnyaya Bilka, Novi Yarichiv region; his deputy PACZKOWSKI; the village council secretary, JASZUMBA; and the commander of a sabotage battalion, SIŃKOWSKI.

During the elimination of the group, which numbered 17 persons, the following items were confiscated: two automatic rifles of American manufacture, two rifles, grenades, a spare barrel for a heavy machine gun, and 60 rounds of ammunition.

All the arrestees were escorted from their regions to the UNKGB’s internal prison.

There were no disturbances or other incidents while the operation was being carried out.

Special groups of collaborators for the UNKGB operational and investigative departments were formed in order to carry out the arrests.

Head of the NKGB Directorate for Lviv Ostoblast
People’s Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank
VORONIN

No. .....  
“ ” January 1944
City of Lviv

HDA SBU, F. 71, Doc. 9, Spr. 64, pp. 83–84v.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

1 This is an error; it should read 1945.
No. 9
1 March 1945, [no place given]. Letter by Vasily Riasnoy, concerning the attempted assassination of the Polish government representative Bolesław Żegadłowski

Top secret

To the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine
Comrade KHRUSHCHEV N. S.

To supplement my report No. 201/SN of 26 February this year, concerning the serious injury sustained by the representative of the Polish Provisional Government’s Regional Representative responsible for the evacuation of Polish citizens, ŻEGADŁOWSKI Bolesław, son of Jan, I am forwarding a copy of the report prepared by the Commander of the Drohobych Inspectorate of the Home Army, “Juhas,”[1] for the commander of the Stanyslaviv District of the Home Army, “Kudak” concerning the attempted assassination of ŻEGADŁOWSKI.

The aforementioned document was discovered among other documents we confiscated in an apartment owned by a member of the Stanyslaviv District staff of the Home Army, SAWICKI.

Steps have been taken to prevent the act of railway sabotage planned by “Juhas.”

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR

RIASNOY

“sa-1-a” March 1945
No. +230/SN-a

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Added by hand in upper left-hand corner: Case no. 16.

[1] Tadeusz Miczyk (1913–1968), noms de guerre “Juhas,” “Lach”; reserve 2nd infantry lieutenant; in 1939–1940 involved in the underground around Stryi; appointed Commander of Kedyw in Stryi, served as a Deputy Inspector and Head of Kedyw in the Stryi Inspectorate of the Home Army (spring 1944); appointed Commanding Officer of the Drohobych Inspectorate of the Home Army (15 June 1944); ); published the underground paper Podhalanin [“The Tatra Highlander”] in Sambir oblast (spring 1944); publication of Podhalanin ceased mid-December 1944. Tried by the Military Tribunal of the NKVD for Drohobych oblast and sentenced to 15 years’ penal servitude (24 December 1945); returned to Poland in September 1955.
No. 10
April 1945, Lviv. Excerpt from information on the result of operational work carried out by the UNKGB in Lviv oblast, concerning Operation “Sejm”

Top secret

Information
on the results of intelligence and operational work by the NKGB Directorate in Lviv oblast concerning the belopolskiye underground.
As of 1 April 1945
City of Lviv

Top secret

Information

Re: Intelligence Operation “Sejm”

On 31 July 1944, on the basis of the operational materials and the confessions of the arrestees, the NKGB Directorate of Lviv oblast launched the intelligence operation codenamed “Sejm” against 301 active members of the belopolskiye underground who were being investigated for the fundamental purposes of uncovering and exposing the criminal, nationalist activities of the Home Army (AK) and the State Civil Service[-Government Delegation] (PSC-DR), and eliminating and disabling the command centres of these organisations.

The nationalist organisations of the Home Army and the Government Delegation were founded by the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, which supports these massive and growing organisations with material and technical means of communication, and has set them the primary objective of preparing an armed insurrection behind Red Army lines, with the aim of abolishing Soviet authority in the western oblasts of Ukraine and restoring the Polish state within its pre-1939 borders. Members of various Polish political parties and military units founded before the Polish-German war, i.e. before 1939, make up the backbone of these organisations.

Over 140 activists of the nationalist Home Army and Government Delegation have been arrested as part of Operation “Sejm.”

Among those arrested, the following persons are especially noteworthy:

1. OSTROWSKI Adam, son of Franciszek, born 1911; resident of Lviv; Polish national; no member of any party; USSR citizen; higher education; graduate, Faculty of Law, Lviv State University (1939), majored in jurisprudence; proofreader at Ukrnatsmienizdat before the war; clerk at the Anti-Typhus Institute during the occupation.1
OSTROWSKI had previously been a member of the PPS (Polish Socialist Party). He was appointed leader of the Lviv District Government Delegation in March 1944, and was given the *noms de guerre* “Gabriel,” and later “Tomasz.” OSTROWSKI was arrested by the NKGB Directorate for Lviv oblast in August 1944.

During the investigation, he confessed and gave evidence against those members of the Government Delegation known to him, mainly the leadership of the organisation, and also concerning its structure and tasks.

[...]

2. GRZĘDZIELSKI Władysław, son of Władysław, born in the village of Grimalov, Ternopil oblast in 1904; Polish; USSR citizen; no member of any party; from a family of clerks; higher education; graduate, Faculty of Law, University of Lviv; claims to have no criminal record; lived in Lviv during German occupation; worked for the *Lwowski Dezynfektor Artel* (cooperative) prior to arrest.

GRZĘDZIELSKI joined the anti-Soviet military and insurgent organisation, the Home Army, in 1942. He was known in the organisation under the *noms de guerre* “Eustachy” and ran the BIP (Bureau of Information and Press). In 1943, he began working in the Government Delegation, and changed his organisational *noms de guerre* to “Głowacki.” He was an assistant to the Government Delegate for the Lviv District and managed the office of the Government Delegation. As DR office manager, GRZĘDZIELSKI ran and supervised the operation of all Government Delegation branches, and administered the organisation’s financial and other resources. These he distributed to cover salaries, maintenance, and the purchase of weapons. He set up and maintained contact with the central office in Warsaw, and between the Government Delegation departments.
GRZĘDZIELSKI additionally ran Department 2 of the Government Delegation; that is, he was engaged in intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, managed staff, and gathered and submitted political information to Warsaw central office for forwarding to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.

After Lviv had been liberated from German occupation by Red Army units, GRZĘDZIELSKI continued his anti-Soviet and nationalist activities, hiding a radio transmitter, printing shop, funds, etc. from the Soviet authorities.

Having gone deeply underground, he took all necessary steps to make this nationalist organisation even more resilient and energetic in its struggle against the Soviet authorities by liaising with the belopolska organisation, the Home Army.

GRZĘDZIELSKI was arrested by the NKGB Directorate of Lviv oblast for nationalist activities. During the investigation he confessed to his criminal activities, and on 15 January this year was sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 20 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

3. NIEZABITOWSKI Czesław, son of Jan, born in Kolomyia, Stanyslaviv oblast, in 1890; Polish national; from a family of clerks; higher education; graduate, Lviv University; served in the Austrian army from 1915 to 1918; unemployed at the time of his arrest; last resided at Apt. 1, 4 Gosiewski Str., city of Lviv.

NIEZABITOWSKI was at one time a member of the People’s Party. In 1941, he joined the nationalist organisation Underground Resistance [Walka Podziemna]⁵ He adopted the nom de guerre “Jerzy.” He was one of the leaders, and then the head of Department 13, of the Government Delegation and the Underground Resistance. Apart from that, he was a prosecutor and headed a tribunal, as well as the execution/legalization and intelligence departments. As the leader of the Underground Resistance, he organised operations during which Soviet citizens were tailed and killed by special departments known as Wywiad [Intelligence] and Egzekutywa [the Executiven].

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⁴ Czesław Niezabitowski, nom de guerre “Doctor,” “Jerzy,” “Patek,” activist of the People’s Party, prosecutor of the Special Court of the Government District Branch; in spring 1944 was head of the Underground Directorate; editor of the Za Wolność i Niepodległość weekly (“For Freedom and Independence”), the mouthpiece of the Lviv delegation. Arrested on 10 August 1944; tried in the Lviv delegation on 16–22 January 1945; sentenced to 20 years of correctional labour camps (ITL); released in 1956, returned to Poland and settled in Lublin, where he died in 1961.

⁵ Proper name: Directorate of Underground Resistance (Kierownictwo Walki Podziemnej); a few months after the founding of the complementary Directorate of Covert Resistance (Kierownictwo Walki Konspiracyjnej) and the Directorate of Civil Resistance (Kierownictwo Walki Cywilnej), the Directorate of Underground Resistance (KWP) was established by merging the two institutions in 1943. It was decided that the leader of the KWP would be Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army, with the Home Army CS as his deputy, and that the leadership would also include the heads of particular central office units and the existing head of the Directorate of Civil Resistance (KWC) as a representative of the Government Delegate. An identical structure was created at district headquarters. Command of the individual district units was personally assumed by the commanding officers of the Home Army districts, in conjunction with the district representatives of the Government Delegation (DR).
NIEZABITOWSKI was directly engaged in the killing of more than 15 Soviet citizens, whose elimination had been legalized by the organisation’s tribunal in the name of the Polish government in London.

After the Red Army entered Lviv, NIEZABITOWSKI went deeply underground, increased his anti-Soviet, nationalist activities, liaised with the leadership of the Home Army, and recruited new members to the nationalist organisation with the aim of actively fighting the Soviet authorities in the new operating conditions.

The intelligence and counter-intelligence units intensified their activities under NIEZABITOWSKI’s command. These units conducted surveillance on Soviet institutions, individual Soviet activists, and Party officials. On Niezabitowski’s orders, weapons and ammunition depots were set up, and two radio transmitters, a manual printing machine, a rotator, and various intelligence documents and registers from the previous period were hidden.

NIEZABITOWSKI was arrested by the NKGB Directorate of Lviv oblast. He confessed under examination to his criminal and nationalist activities, and on January 15, 1945, he was sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 20 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

4. WACHSMAN Mieczysław, son of Leon, born in Cracow 1902; Polish national; citizen of USSR; higher education; graduate, Faculty of Law, Lviv University; served in Polish Army as First Lieutenant; posted to Border [Protection] Corps⁶; claims to have no criminal record; last resided at Apt. 9, 39 Na Bajkach St., Lviv.

WACHSMAN has been a member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) since 1929. In 1943, he joined an anti-Soviet nationalist organisation under the nom de guerre “Sebastian.” He was the first deputy of the head of the Watch Committee [Straż Samorządowa, SS] for Lviv district, and the deputy to the head of Department 13 of the Government Delegation, NIEZABITOWSKI.

WACHSMAN was engaged in recruiting new members to the organisation, purchasing weapons and ammunition with Government Delegation funds to arm the Watch Committee, and maintaining close contact with a Home Army intelligence representative. He also liaised with underground headquarters in Warsaw. He made his department available to couriers from Warsaw who delivered funds, mail, and anti-Soviet literature to the belopolskiye underground in Lviv.

⁶ Border Protection Corps (Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza, KOP) – a military formation established on 12 September 1924, whose purpose was to protect the eastern border of inter-war Poland (with USSR, Latvia and Lithuania), later also the southern border (with Romania, Hungary, and finally with Slovakia); in 1938 it numbered some 30,000 soldiers, recruited mainly from the western województwa of Poland; as regards personnel, organisational and training matters, it was subordinate to the Ministry of the Military; as regards financing and border security, it was subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, and from 1938 also to the General Inspector of the Armed Forces (intelligence and tasks in the future war).
WACHSMAN was arrested, and on 15 January 1945 sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 20 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

5. PIWOŃSKI Jerzy, son of Emil, born in the city of Lviv, 1915; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; secondary education; claims to have no criminal record; profession: watchmaker; worked at the gasworks and resided at Apt. 5, 10 Supiński St. prior to arrest.

PIWOŃSKI joined the Polish nationalist organisation, the Home Army, in 1942 under the nom de guerre of “SIEMIDZUP.” He broke with the organisation that same year, as he had been targeted by the Gestapo’s agent recruitment procedure.

PIWOŃSKI formalised his collaboration with Gestapo with his own signature and committed himself to handing Soviet citizens over to German law enforcement authorities and informing them about underground members engaged in the struggle against the German occupation authorities.

After Lviv had been liberated by Red Army units, PIWOŃSKI renewed contact with the underground nationalist organisation, the Government Delegation (DR), and made his apartment available [for] an organisation known as the Watch Committee (SS). He also offered his watchmaker’s workshop as a safe house for the head of Department 13, NIEZABITOWSKI, who held illegal councils and meetings there.

As deputy to the head of Department 13, NIEZABITOWSKI, and acting under his orders, PIWOŃSKI, hid a manual printing machine, a radio transmitter and receiver, weapons, and ammunition from the Soviet authorities.

PIWOŃSKI was arrested by the UNKGB of Lviv oblast and on 15 January 1945 sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military Area to 10 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

6. POKRYSZKO Emanuel, son of Jan, born in the city of Warsaw 1909; Polish national; USSR citizen; nonparty; higher education; graduate, Faculty of Law, Lviv University; claims to have no criminal record; worked in the Gorpishtchetorg bakery and resided at Apt. 1, 12 Stefczyk St. prior to arrest.

POKRYSZKO joined the Democratic Party (SD) in 1936 and was actively engaged in the [operations of] Żegota, an organisation set up by leftist parties to [provide] aid to Jews persecuted by the German occupation authorities, by 1941.

In April 1944, he joined the anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, the Government Delegation, where he was head of the Legalization Department and prepared forged papers for organisation members.

7 Żegota – was a nom de guerre for the Polish Council to Aid Jews coordinated by the Government Proxy (Delegate) for Poland. The organisation was founded in 1942.
POKRYSZKO was arrested by the UNKGB and on 15 January 1945 sentenced by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military Area to 10 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

7. ŚWIRSKI Władysław, son of Kazimierz, born in Zbarazh, Ternopil oblast, 1894; Polish national; USSR citizen; higher education; claims to have no criminal record; last resided at Apt. 5, 7 Pełczyńska St., town of Lviv.

ŚWIRSKI was once a member of the National Party (ND). He was recruited to the military and insurgent organisation, the Home Army (AK), where he was known by the nom de guerre “RYSZARD,” in 1942. In the Home Army he worked as a clerk, gathering and collecting information on industrial enterprises and food supplies destined for the Home Army.

ŚWIRSKI joined the Government Delegation in 1943 and managed the Administrative Department. ŚWIRSKI was a potential deputy of the head of the Lviv District Government Delegation, and served as chairman of the Military Council set up to coordinate the operations of the Government Delegation and the Home Army.

As head of the Administrative Department of the Government Delegation, ŚWIRSKI managed and provided assistance for the local [structures] of nationalist organisations and was also engaged in recruiting new members.

ŚWIRSKI was arrested by the UNKGB, and sentenced on 15 January of this year by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 20 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

8. CHŁADUŃSKI Wacław, son of Bronisław, born in Zolochiv, Lviv oblast, 1909; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; higher education; graduate, Cracow Academy of Fine Arts; claims to have no criminal record; worked as a painter at the Lviv Opera House, and resided at Apt. 1, 3 Chmielowskiego St. prior to arrest.

CHŁADUŃSKI joined an anti-Soviet nationalist organisation in 1942 and was given the noms de guerre “S K” and “SKIBA.”

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8 Władysław Jan Świrski (1894–1971), doctor of law, journalist; noms de guerre “Bonawentura,” “Romuald,” “Ryszard”; independence activist; member of ZET; in 1917–1918 joint organiser of Polish military units in Ukraine, and a volunteer in Polish 2nd Corps; fought in the Polish-Soviet war (1920); lived in Cracow after the war; member of the National Populist Union (Związek Ludowo-Narodowy); editor of many dailies and periodicals; moved to Lviv to continue his journalistic and political work (1925); member of the National Party (SN); later an activist in the Association of Poles in the Czerwień Region (Związek Polaków Ziemi Czerwińskiej); finally member of the Labour Party (SP); edited the periodical Wytrzymy (“We shall endure”) during Soviet and German occupations; deputy head of Department 9 at Branch Headquarters of the Union for Armed Struggle-Home Army (ZWZ-AK), head of the regional branch of the Military Department at 1st Lviv District Headquarters (1942–1943); from autumn 1943 District Government Delegate deputy. Arrested by NKVD (August 1944); defendant at the trial of the Lviv delegation, sentenced to 20 years in a corrective labour camp (16–22 January 1945); returned to Poland (7 December 1956); lived in Wroclaw; author of numerous publications.
He was head of the Information Department (counter-intelligence) in the Government Delegation.

After Lviv had been liberated by Red Army units, he continued his anti-Soviet activities by organising the surveillance of Soviet authorities and individuals.

CHŁADUŃSKI was arrested by the UNKGB, and sentenced on 15 January of this year by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 18 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

9. NIEZABITOWSKI Andrzej, son of Czesław, born in the city of Lviv 1924; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; student at the Lviv Forestry Institute; resides at Apt. 1, 4 Gaszyńskiego St.

NIEZABITOWSKI joined an anti-Soviet nationalist organisation under the nom de guerre “Bronisław” in January 1943. He was an intelligence agent for Underground Resistance and later Department 13 of the Government Delegation in this organisation.

Being trusted by the head of the Department 13, NIEZABITOWSKI Czesław (his father), NIEZABITOWSKI supervised the operations of the leaders of the intelligence units and was involved in recruiting new members, particularly CZURUK Stanisław (arrested).9

NIEZABITOWSKI was arrested for his nationalist activities, and was sentenced on 15 January this year by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 10 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

10. DĄBROWICKA Maria, daughter of Józef, born in Boryslav 1921; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; 10th-grade education; librarian; worked at the Institute for Geological Scientific Research; last resided at Apt. 3, 11 Kalecza St., city of Lviv.

DĄBROWICKA was recruited by an anti-Soviet nationalist organisation in 1943 and took the nom de guerre “IRENA.” She worked as a liaison between the Underground Resistance (Walka Podziemna) leader NIEZABITOWSKI, his assistant FLAK, and the head of the Watch Committee.

After Lviv had been liberated by Red Army units, DĄBROWICKA continued her anti-Soviet activities. She was a secretary for the Watch Committee and was paid a monthly stipend of 1700 zloty by the Government Delegation.

DĄBROWICKA was arrested for her nationalist activities, and was sentenced on 15 January this year by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 10 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

9 Stanisław Czuruk was involved in investigative proceedings at the Government Delegation prosecutor’s office, and worked with the legalization unit. He was a defendant at the trial of the Lviv Delegation (16–22 January 1945) and sentenced to 10 years in a corrective labour camp. He returned to Poland in 1955 and lived in Zgorzelec.
11. FLAK Augustyn, son of Franciszek, born in the village of Chatoluk [!], Lubaczów region (Poland), 1912; Polish nationality; no citizenship; peasant origin; higher education; unemployed physician; last resided at Apt. 8, 38 Zyblikiewicza St., town of Lviv.

FLAK joined the People’s Party in 1937. He was recruited by NIEZABITOWSKI Czesław to a nationalist organisation, and given the nom de guerre “Zdzisław.” From May 1944, he was head of the executive unit of Department 13 of the Government Delegation, and involved in recruiting candidates [suitable for] carrying out terrorist acts. After the city of Lviv had been liberated by Red Army units, he continued his anti-Soviet activities. On NIEZABITOWSKI’s orders, he set up an arsenal, and, as one of NIEZABITOWSKI’s closest collaborators, carried out his special instructions.

FLAK was arrested by the UNKGB, and was sentenced on 15 January of this year by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 18 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

12. KASSEK Zygmunt, son of Aleksander, born in the city of Lviv 1916; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party, secondary education; employed as an accountant at the Lviv tram trust; last resided at Apt 1.3 Bernsteina St., Lviv.

KASSEK was recruited by the Polish anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, the Government Delegation, in 1943. He served as the Commander of Section 2 of the Self-Government Service of the Government Delegation, where his duties included organising the intelligence and counter-intelligence services, gathering various kinds of information, and training rank and file members of the Watch Committee to carry out police functions.

KASSEK was arrested by the UNKGB, and was sentenced on 25 December 1944 by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 20 years’ penal servitude and confiscation of property.

13. STRAŻAŁKOWSKI Tadeusz, son of Hieronim, born in the city of Lviv where last resided, 1890; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; failed to complete secondary education; worked as a mechanic at the water and sewage system trust during and after the German occupation.

STRAŻAŁKOWSKI was recruited to the anti-Soviet national organisation, the Government Delegation, in May 1944, and assumed the nom de guerre “WODOWSKI.” In this organisation, he was Commandant of Section 3 of the Watch Committee of the city of Lviv, recruited new members, and was engaged in intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, distributing underground nationalist papers, and providing weapons for the organisation.

STRAŻAŁKOWSKI was arrested by the UNKGB, and was sentenced on 25 December 1944 by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 15 years’ penal servitude, and complete confiscation of property.
14. CHORKO Michał, son of Grzegorz, born in the village of Stavchany, Horodok raion, Lviv oblast, 1902; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; working-class background; worked as a fitter at the tram trust and resided at Apt. 14, Stebelińskich St. prior to arrest.

CHORKO was recruited to the Polish anti-Soviet national organisation, the Government Delegation, in March 1942, and assumed the nom de guerre “TOMASZ.” He was Commandant of Section 7 of the Watch Committee. He was also involved in recruiting new members.

CHORKO was arrested for his nationalist activities, and was sentenced on 25 December 1944 by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 15 years’ penal servitude, and complete confiscation of property.

15. BRZEZICKI Marcin, son of Stanisław, born in the village of Zhornitsa, Vinnytsia oblast, 1901; Polish national; USSR citizen; primary education; poor peasant social background; served in the Polish Army between 1922 and 1927; worked at the tram trust as a tram driver during and after the occupation.

BRZEZICKI was an active member of the Polish anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, the Government Delegation, and went by the nom de guerre “TOMASZ.” He served as Commandant of Section 4 of the Watch Committee of the Government Delegation.

BRZEZICKI was arrested by the NKGB Directorate for Lviv oblast. He was recently released and dispatched to Poland.

16. STUS Włodzimierz, son of Marcin, born in the village of Prievozhets, Kalush raion, Stanyslaviv oblast, 1897; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; working family social background; worked as a fitter in the steam engine repair shop at Lviv R[ail] during and after the occupation.

STUS was an active member of the Polish anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, the Government Delegation, under the nom de guerre “JANOW.”

STUS was Commandant of Section 11 of the Self-Government Service of the Government Delegation.

STUS was arrested by the NKGB. He was recently released and dispatched to Poland.

17. ŻYGULSKI Kazimierz, son of Zdzisław, born in the town of Borysław, Drohobych oblast, 1919; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; 4th-year student, Faculty of Law, Lviv University; last resided at Apt. 4, 1 Na Skacze St.

ŻYGULSKI joined a Polish anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, taking the nom de guerre “BALTAZAR,” in 1943. In this organisation, he worked as a cryptographer for the Head of the Government Delegation for the District of Lviv. In 1943, he was additionally a member of the Government Delegation Tribunal, and sentenced Soviet citizens to death as enemies of the Polish state in the name of the Polish government. ŻYGULSKI was directly involved in handing down over 15 such sentences.
ŻYGULSKI was arrested by the NKGB and was sentenced on 15 January this year by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 15 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

18. WAWRO Józef, son of Karol, born in the village of Skawina, Cracow województwo, 1910; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; secondary education; painter; claims to have no criminal record; worked in the opera theatre as a model maker, and resided at Apt. 8, 1 Staszica St., Lviv prior to arrest.

WAWRO was recruited to an anti-Soviet nationalist organisation by CHŁADUŃSKI, under the nom de guerre “DĄB-2.” He was an informer and an agent for Department 2 (counter-intelligence) of the Government Delegation. He was in direct contact with the head of the Information Department.

WAWRO was arrested by the UNKGB of Lviv oblast, and was sentenced on 15 January 1945 by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 10 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

19. KUCHARSKI Leopold, son of Wojciech; a.k.a CZACZKES Dunin, son of Hieronim, born in the town of Lviv 1915; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; secondary education; claims to have no criminal record; unemployed and resident in the town of Lviv prior to arrest.

In October 1943, KUCHARSKI, a.k.a. CZACZKES, was recruited by a Polish anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, where he served as a liaison between Warsaw headquarters and the Government Delegation for Lviv District. He was additionally a liaison between the leaders of the Government Delegation in Lviv and various local organisations, to which he delivered illegal nationalist newspapers, correspondence, and orders from the leadership.

After the Red Army entered Lviv, KUCHARSKI-CZACZKES continued his anti-Soviet nationalist activities, offering his services to the head of the Watch Committee (SS), WACHSMAN, under whose orders he managed the organisation’s economic affairs.

KUCHARSKI-CZACZKES was arrested by the NKGB Directorate of Lviv oblast, and was sentenced on 15 January 1945 by the Military Tribunal of the Lviv Military District to 10 years in a corrective labour camp, 5 years’ revocation of public rights, and confiscation of property.

20. FILIPKOWSKI Władysław, son of Dominik, born in Filipów, Suwałki powiat, 1892; Polish national; USSR citizen; no member of any party; landowning background; higher education; former colonel in the Polish Army, held a number of responsible positions; deputy commanding officer of the 1st Division during the Polish-German war; taken prisoner by Germans at the end of September 1939; escaped in obscure circumstances; moved to Warsaw and later Lviv.

FILIPKOWSKI was one of the outstanding leaders of the belopolskiye underground. His noms de guerre were “STACH,” “GRANIT,” “JANKA,” and
recently “Cis.” In 1941, he was recruited to the Polish anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, the Polish Insurgent Union-Home Army (PZP-AK), by “GROT.”

He was summoned by “GROT” to Warsaw in June 1942, and appointed inspector of the Lviv Branch of the PZP-AK. As inspector, he was involved in supervising and training the various local organisations that made up the Lviv branch of the PZP-AK in every aspect of their anti-Soviet activities and assignments.

He was appointed Commandant of the Lviv Region of the PZP-AK by Warsaw headquarters in late June or early July 1943. His activities, aimed at restoring Poland to its pre-1939 borders, were coordinated with the Government Delegation of the Lviv area.

FILIPKOWSKI was arrested by the NKGB for his active anti-Soviet and nationalist activities. He confessed to his criminal activities during interrogation, and gave valuable evidence concerning the command centres of the belopol’skiiye underground operating in the town of Lviv and [Lviv] oblast, as well as in other Western Ukraine oblasts.

21. Czerwiński Stefan, son of Ludwik: born in the village of Marchwacz, Kalisz powiat, Poznań województwo, 1895; Polish nationality; peasant background; higher education; former Polish Army colonel; resided in Warsaw and later Lviv.10

Czerwiński escaped from German captivity and went to Warsaw where, in 1940, he was recruited to the anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, the Polish Insurgent Union-Home Army (PZP-AK), by a certain General Rowecki, and adopted the nom de guerre “LUŚNIA.” He completed a 3-week PZP-AK training course in Warsaw in 1943.

When he had completed his training courses at the end of January 1944, Czerwiński was appointed Deputy Commander of the Lviv District of the PZP-AK. He made contact with the District Commander-in-chief, “JULIAN,”11 in
a safe house by using a password. He was given practical instructions concerning his duties and assignments. Two weeks later “Julian” was summoned to Warsaw by PZP-AK Headquarters, and CZERWIŃSKI was appointed Commandant of the Lviv District of the PZP-AK. As such, he continued his anti-Soviet nationalist activities until he was arrested.

As commander of the Lviv District of the PZP-AK, CZERWIŃSKI founded a division at the end of April 1944, and modelled its type and structure on the former 5th Polish Division stationed in the town of Lviv before the Polish-German war. This division numbered approx. 15,000 soldiers and was equipped with weapons, ammunition, and material and technical communication resources.

CZERWIŃSKI was arrested by the NKGB for anti-Soviet nationalist activities. During interrogation, he confessed to his own activities and gave evidence about those of the belopol’skije underground leadership.

22. STUDZIŃSKI Franciszek, son of Aleksander, born 1896 in the village of Kotlice, Tomaszów Lubelski powiat, Lublin województwo; Polish national; from an officer’s family; secondary education; claims to have no criminal record; formerly Polish Army colonel; lived in Ternopil, and later Lviv during and after the occupation.12

STUDZIŃSKI was recruited by the Polish anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, the PZP-AK, at the end of 1940, and was known by the noms de guerre “Kotlina,” “Skiba,” “Skawa,” and “Rawicz.”

STUDZIŃSKI was appointed Commandant of the Ternopil district of the PZP-AK in October 1941. He came to the town of Ternopil, which was directly subordinate to Lviv District Headquarters. He stayed in Ternopil until March 1944, i.e. until the town was surrounded by Red Army troops. After that, he fled to Lviv where he continued to command the Ternopil District of the PZP-AK.

As PZP-AK Commandant, STUDZIŃSKI exercised de facto leadership over all sub-units, and was additionally involved in recruiting new members to the PZP-AK. He [personally] recruited over 100 people during the time he held the position of PZP-AK Commandant.

as a witness in the Trial of the Sixteen; sentenced by the OSO to 5 years in a corrective labour camp (12 January 1946); released 27 April 1950; remained in exile 4 more years; returned to Poland 23 March 1956.

12 Franciszek Studziński (1893–1964) alias Andrzej Radwan, noms de guerre “Kotlina,” “Radwan,” “Rawicz,” “Skawa,” “Skiba”; Polish Army colonel, infantry; in 1914–1917 served in the 1st Infantry Regiment of the Polish Legions; served in the Polish Military Organisation (POW) as commandant of the Pińczów-Olkusz oblast, later Pińczów-Olkusz district; in 1919–1924 joined the 25th Infantry Regiment, fought on the Polish-Soviet front, commanded the Combined Cavalry Unit battalion and various infantry units, commanded the Sosnowiec garrison; fled to Hungary after fighting in the September Campaign and worked in the redeployment centre at the Polish consulate until January 1941. Arrested while crossing the border; escaped from penal camp 6 months later; dispatched to the Lviv Region (September 1941); from December 1941 Acting commandant of the Ternopil district; appointed deputy commandant of the Lviv Region of the Home Army (March 1944). Arrested by Soviet counter-intelligence; held in detention camps; returned to Poland 4 November 1947.
The sub-units of the Ternopil district of the PZP-AK numbered over 15,000 privates and officers. The District had sufficient weapons and ammunition; the soldiers were armed with automatic guns, rifles, grenades, and heavy and light machine guns.

These weapons were acquired from supplies abandoned by Red Army troops during their retreat in 1941, or purchased from German soldiers. Significant quantities were also supplied from London by the Polish Government-in-Exile.

STUDZIŃSKI was arrested by the NKGB for his anti-Soviet activities. During interrogation, he confessed to his criminal operations and gave valuable evidence concerning the belopolskiye underground leaders known to him, as well as concentration points and communication channels.

During the partial break-up and elimination of the belopolskiye underground’s leadership centres in the town of Lviv and [Lviv] oblast, the NKGB Directorate confiscated 8 radio transmitters and receivers, one radio [equipment] repair shop, 6 printing shops, over 16 kilograms of typeface, two grenade launchers, 6 machine guns, 63 rifles, over 10,000 rounds of ammunition of various kinds, a Home Army Carpathian Infantry Division banner, and the archives of Department 2 of the Government Delegation.

[...] The investigation of these ringleaders as part of Operation “Sejm” is continuing in order to uncover and expose criminal acts, primarily perpetrated by the leaders of the belopolskiye underground of the Home Army and the Government Delegation, and to find their concentration points and channels of communication with the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.

Separate intelligence files have been created for the following underground organisations which are in the process of being uncovered by means of intelligence [operations] and investigations: NOW,¹³ NSZ,¹⁴ and KON).¹⁵

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¹³ The National Military Organisation (Narodowa Organizacja Wojskowa, NOW) was an underground organisation of the Polish National Party, initially opposed to integration with the Union for Armed Struggle (ZWZ). Merging the two organisations and subordinating the NOW units to the C-in-C. of the Home Army (AK) only took place in 1942. The NOW numbered around 70,000 well-trained and well-organised soldiers.

¹⁴ The National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne, NSZ) was the military organisation of the National Party based on the Lizard Union (Związek Jaszczenicy, ZJ), which was founded in 1940. The NSZ was created in early 1942 as a reaction to the National Party’s decision to place the National Military Organisation (NOW) under the command of the Home Army. The military commander of the NSZ was the Polish Army colonel, Czesław Oziewicz (nom de guerre “Czesław”). The NSZ units had a radically nationalist character; the leadership conducted an intense and unscrupulous campaign against the Home Army.

¹⁵ The Convention of Independence Organisations (Konwent Organizacji Niepodległościowych, KON) – an organisation similar in character to the Piłsudskiites; founded 15 October 1942 by Zygmunt Hempel and activists centred around his periodical Myśl Państwowa [State Thought].
Dep[uty] Head of Department 2-“A” of the UNKGB
of Lv[iv] Obl[ast]
Major of state security
VOROBYOV

“ ” April 1945

HDA SBU, F. 71, Doc. 9, Spr. 58, pp. 1–18.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
No. 11
[20] April 1945, Lviv. Information for the Head of the UBB of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Zadoya, on the arrests by the NKVD and NKGB of members of the Polish underground as of 20 April 1945

Top secret

Information on the arrests of the Polish anti-Soviet element by the NKVD and NKGB of Western Ukraine as of 20 April 1945

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrested in total:</th>
<th>By the NKVD</th>
<th>By the NKGB</th>
<th>Total:</th>
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<td>2606</td>
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<td>4023</td>
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<td>1073</td>
<td>1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Stanyslaviv obl[ast]”</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Ternopil obl[ast]”</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Volhynia obl[ast]”</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>409</td>
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<tr>
<td>“Rivne obl[ast]”</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Chernivtsi obl[ast]”</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>3980</td>
<td>3905</td>
<td>7875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Breakdown by status/affiliation:

By the NKVD

- Crossing the border ........................................... 27
- *Volks- and Reichsdeutsche* .................................. 1807
- Home Army (AK) .............................................. 710
- Gestapo collaborators ........................................ 17
- Policemen ...................................................... 108
- German collaborators ........................................ 138
- German police agents ....................................... 22
- PZP AK ......................................................... 1292
- PSC DR ......................................................... 134
- National Democracy ......................................... 99
- KON ................................................................ 2
- “Młoda Polska” [“Young Poland”] ......................... 5
- OZON ............................................................. 8
- Spies ............................................................ 14
- Traitors of the Homeland ...................................... 230
- Red Army draft dodgers ....................................... 128
- Polish army deserters ......................................... 27
- Other anti-Sov[jet] elements ................................ 668

By the NKGB

- German counter-intelligence. agents and operatives Romanian intelligence agents .................. 257
- Romanian intelligence agents ............................... 257
Total: ..................................................... 3880
  Traitors ............................................. 154
 traitors of the Homeland ........... 143
  Volks- and Reichsdeutsche.......... 44
  Other anti-Sov[iet] elements ..... 1263
  Total:........................................... 3905

“ ” April 1945
City of Lviv
Lieutenant Colonel ZADOYA

Deputy Head of the UBB of the NKVD
of the Ukrainian SSR

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.

1 These figures do not tally. Cf. “Arrested in total” by the NKVD (3980) vs. “Breakdown by status/affiliation” (3880).
No. 12
22 May 1945, Moscow. Telegram from Bogdan Kobilov to Vasily Riasnoy and Sergei Savchenko, on documenting the killing of Soviet soldiers by members of the Home Army

Moscow, 23 May [19]45
[Time] 3:00
Telegram

To the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank
Comrade RIASNOY

To the People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar of State Security 3rd Rank
Comrade SAVCHENKO

By order of the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Comrade BERIA, and the People’s Commissar of State Security of the USSR, Comrade MERKULOVOV, you are required to mobilise all your resources immediately and carefully document within 24 hours all the facts on the killing of Red Army and NKVD soldiers by members of the Home Army and other Polish criminal groups.

A separate document must be drawn up for each individual case where a Red Army officer or soldier has been murdered, and must be supported by witnesses or other documents (reports from military units or Soviet bodies) that specify who was killed, where, when, by whom, and under what circumstances. The following details are mandatory: position, rank, last name, first name, otchestvo [patronym], and, if available, any other details of the person killed.

All materials and documents must be delivered by plane to the Investigative Unit for Cases of Special Importance of the NKGB of the USSR.

Signed by:
Dep[uty] People’s Commissar of State Security
People’s Commissar of State Security 2nd Rank
KOBULOV

22 May 1945
Provided by – RODOS

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Added by hand in upper left-hand corner: To the case and an illegible initial.

a In the original: Kobilov.
Members of the belopolskiye underground are being investigated [as part of] a centralised intelligence operation, codenamed “Sejm,” which encompasses intelligence operations against individual belopolskiye groups launched in particular oblasts.

As the result of these investigative activities, the following belopolskiye organisations were exposed and eliminated in 1944–1945:

1. The Polish sabotage, terrorist and insurgent organisation, the PZP-AK (Polish Insurgent Union – Home Army).
2. The PSC-DR (Polish Civil Service – Government Delegation), a Polish civic organisation that worked closely with the PZP-AK.
3. Organisations included in the Home Army (AK): NSZ (National Armed Forces), NOW (National Military Organisation) and KON (Convention of Independence Organisations).
4. “Młoda Polska.”
5. Offshoots [!] of Polish anti-Soviet groups and parties – the National Democrats, OZON, POW, PPS and others.
6. The belopolskiye youth organisations “Strzelec”¹ (“The Riflemen’s Association”) and “Orlęta” (“Eaglets”).

All these belopolskiye underground organisations were directed by the Polish Government-in-Exile in London. Their objective was to detach the Western Ukraine and Belorussia oblasts from the USSR to create “a Greater Poland from sea to shining sea”; undermine our fight with the German occupier; organise active

¹ “Strzelec,” proper name “Związek Strzelecki” (“The Riflemen’s Association”), a large state paramilitary social and educational organisation that derived its name and traditions from the riflemen’s movement of the period of partitions (founded December 1919); mainly attracted youth of working class and peasant backgrounds who were too young to be conscripted; also included the children’s divisions Orlęta (“Eaglets”) and Strzelczyki (“Little Riflemen”); numbered over 500,000 members in 1939.
struggle with the Soviet authorities and the Red Army by means of espionage, 
sabotage and terror; create armed groups for insurgent operations, disseminate anti-
Soviet, nationalist propaganda and hatred towards the Soviet Union by any means 
possible; instigate international incidents against the USSR; and actively sabotage 
the economic and political undertakings of the Soviet authorities.

These organisations were, by their very nature, deeply clandestine, 
underground groups backed by significant financial and human resources, ample 
armaments, and illegal radio transmitters/receivers, printing shops and other 
technical equipment.

Other provocative belopolskiye underground organisations, founded by the 
Gestapo and collaborating directly with the Germans (such as “Orzel Bialy” [White 
Eagle], “Miecz i Plug”), were uncovered as well.

Several PZP-PSC centres in Ukraine (the Lviv Branch of the PZP-AK 
commanded by Gen. FILIPKOWSKI; the Lviv Government Delegation led by 
OSTROWSKI; the Lviv, Ternopol, and Stanyslaviv PZP-AK districts, the Lutsk, 
Rivne, Drohobych, Vladimir and other PZP-AK inspectorates and districts, several 
powiat Government Delegations; and numerous local units of various belopolskiye 
underground organisations) were broken up during the course of these operations 
to expose and eliminate the belopolskiye underground. The communications 
channels between these organisations and foreign centres (Warsaw, Lublin, 
Cracow, London, etc.) were intercepted, and significant quantities of firearms, 
illegal radio transmitters and receivers, printing shops and other communications 
and technical equipment were confiscated.

Broken down by oblast, the following units were eliminated in 1944–1945 
(including the work carried out by the official apparatus and oper[ational] groups 
of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR):

Volhynia oblast had PZP-PSC inspectorates, and their successor groups 
(reinstated after the first elimination), in the cities of Lutsk and Volodymyr-
Volynskyi. Preparations for biological sabotage by belopolskiye underground 
members were uncovered. “Orzel Bialy” [White Eagle], a provocative group set 
up by the Gestapo, was eliminated.

According to incomplete figures from Unit “A” dated 1 May 1945, 33 
belopolskiye underground organisations and groups were eliminated in Volhynia oblast.

According to incomplete operational figures dated 20 August 1945, a total 
of 347 Poles were arrested in Volhynia oblast (including uncovered enemy agents, 
German collaborators and various anti-Soviet elements).

Rivne oblast had PZP-PSC inspectorates and powiat organisations in the cities 
of Rivne, Dubno, Zdolbuniv, Sarny, Ostroh and Kostopil, as well as couriers from
PZP-PSC headquarters in Warsaw, etc. Intelligence and investigative information was also obtained on biological sabotage planned by belopolskiye underground members.

According to incomplete figures from Unit “A” dated 1 May [19]45, 8 belopolskiye organisations and groups were eliminated in Rivne oblast.

According to incomplete operational figures dated 20 August [19]45, a total of 277 Poles were arrested.

Ternopil oblast contained the district leadership of the PZP-AK, as well as a number of local PZP-PSC organisations, PZP-PSC inspectorates (in the town of Kremenets), OZON (the town of Terebovl) and “Młoda Polska” (town of Ternopil) groups.

According to incomplete figures from Unit “A” dated 1 May [19]45, 8 belopolskiye organisations and groups were eliminated in Ternopil oblast.

According to incomplete figures dated 20 August [19]45, a total of 285 Poles were arrested.

Drohobych oblast contained the PZP-AK inspectorate and oblast leadership (in the cities of Drohobych, Sambir, and Stryi), and the belopolskiye youth organisations “Strzelec” and “Orlęta” (the intelligence operations “Spiskowcy” [“Conspirators”], “Dwulicowcy” [“the Two-Faced”], and “Młodzi” [“Youth”]).

According to incomplete figures from Unit “A” dated 1 May [19]45, 58 byelopolskiye organisations and groups were eliminated in Drohobych oblast.

According to incomplete operational figures dated 20 August [19]45, a total of 1073 Poles were arrested.

Lviv oblast contained the PZP-AK leadership for Lviv region and Lviv district, the Government Delegation [with] its Political Council, service heads and section commanders, NOW-NSZ city organisations, National Democracy, KON, members of OZON, POW and other groups, and a number of AK-NOW-NSZ sabotage and terrorist groups, including paratroopers dropped into Poland from England (the intelligence operation “Janusy”).

The Gestapo materials [concerning] the Polish nationalist underground that have been uncovered confirm that the National Armed Forces (NSZ) and “Miecz i Pług” collaborated directly with the Gestapo on the basis of a special agreement.

The prospective operations entitled “Janusy” (aimed at the Home Army District leadership, sabotage and terrorist groups, and English agents among the belopolyaks), and “Bred” (aimed at the Horodok organisation of NOW) are ongoing.

According to incomplete figures from Unit “A” dated 1 May [19]45, 37 belopolskiye organisations and groups have been eliminated in Lviv oblast.

According to incomplete operational figures dated 20 August [19]45, a total of 1547 Poles were arrested.
Chernivtsi oblast contained eliminated PZP-AK groups in the town of Chernivtsi in contact with foreign belopolskiye centres (Romania and Turkey; intelligence operation “Polska kuchnia” [“Polish cuisine”]). The intelligence operation “Niezadowoleni” [“The Dissatisfied”], aimed at a group of belopolskiye students, is ongoing.

According to incomplete figures from Unit “A” dated 1 May [19]45, 2 byelopolskiye groups were eliminated in Chernivtsi oblast. According to incomplete operational figures dated 20 August [19]45, a total of 80 people were arrested.

The intelligence operations “Dominikanie” [“Dominicans”] and “Bieżeńcy” [“Refugees”] are ongoing in Kamianets oblast. These are aimed at anti-Soviet Polish groups in contact with the byelopolskiye underground in Poland and the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, and engaged in destructive anti-Soviet work.

According to incomplete figures, 59 Poles were arrested in Kamianets oblast in 1944.

Anti-Soviet Polish groups connected with the clergy, active German collaborators, and Gestapo agents (intelligence operations “Leśnicy” [“Foresters”] and “Obumarli” [“The Withered”]) were uncovered in Zhytomyr oblast.

According to incomplete figures, 88 Poles were arrested in Zhytomyr oblast in 1944.

A number of German agents and active individuals with anti-Soviet attitudes were eliminated from the Polish community in Vinnytsia oblast.

According to incomplete figures, 31 people were arrested in 1944.

In Odessa oblast, attempts by the clergy to organise the belopolskiye (intelligence operation “Jezuici” [“Jesuits”] aimed at priests Leoni and Nikola) were exposed, as were a number of active German agents and collaborators among the Polish community.

According to incomplete figures, 23 people were arrested in 1944.

In Kiev oblast (including the operations by the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR units), a number of active German agents and collaborators were uncovered among the Polish community, as were contacts from Pol[ish] consulates and individuals who wanted to communicate illegally with the belopolskiye underground in Poland and the western oblasts of Ukraine. According to incomplete figures, 29 people were arrested and an investigation concerning two groups [amounting to] 50 people was conducted.

There were only a few arrests of anti-Soviet elements among the Polish community in the other eastern oblasts.
It should be stressed that operations resulting in the arrest of Roman-Catholic clergy connected with the belopolskiye underground (e.g. the Lutsk archbishop SZELĄŻEK\(^2\) and a number of priests in the western and eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR) were carried out as well.

H[ead] of Department 6, 2nd Directorate, NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Major MAZIN\(^3\)

Department H[ead], 2nd Directorate
Captain VOLKOV\(^4\)

"a-25-a" August 1945
City of Kiev

\(\text{HDA SBU, F. 1, Op. 87 (1954), Spr. 5, pp. 141–144.}\)
\(\text{Copy, typescript.}\)
\(\text{Document in Russian.}\)

\(^{a-a}\) Filled in by hand.

\(^2\) Adolf Szelążek, arrested on the night of 3–4 January 1945; deported to Poland by the decision of the OSO at the MVD of the USSR (6 May 1946); according to another source, released from a Kiev prison through the efforts of the Holy See.

\(^3\) Konstantin Mazin (born 1903), Colonel of State Security, in 1943–1944 deputy head of Dept. 1, 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR; in 1944–1947 acting head, then head of Dept. 6, 2nd Directorate of the NKGB-MGB of the Ukrainian SSR; in 1947–1949 Head of Dept. 3, 2nd Directorate of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR.

\(^4\) Nikolai Volkov (born 1905), Major of State Security, in 1944–1946 head of Dept. 2, 6th Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR; in 1946–1947 Acting Deputy Head of Dept. 2-A of the UNKGB–UMGB of the Ukrainian SSR for Lviv oblast; in 1947–1948 Deputy Head of Dept. 2 of the UMGB of the Ukrainian SSR for Lviv oblast.
No. 14
28 August 1945, Kiev. Excerpt from a report by Vasily Riasnoy, concerning the uncovering of the organisation NIE and the intensification of the struggle with the Polish underground

Top secret

To the Heads of the NKVD Directorates
of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR
To the addressee......................
To[wn]...........................

The NKVD made significant progress towards eliminating the Polish nationalist underground in the western oblasts of Ukraine during the first half of 1945. However, its destructive operations have not been completely paralysed, and it still remains extremely active.

There have recently been increasing signs of terrorist activity on the part of the Home Army execution squads in Lviv and other oblasts, and Home Army organisations are still recruiting Poles and waiting, guns at the ready, for an opportunity to come out against the Soviet authorities. Furthermore, an illegal weekly, Wytrwamy, is currently being published and distributed among the Polish community in the town of Lviv by Polish nationalists.

During the investigation and trial in the case of OKULICKI¹ and other Polish nationalist underground leaders, it was established that as early as the summer of 1944, under the guise of announcing the formal dissolution of the Home Army, the former Commander-in-chief of the Home Army, “BÓR” – KOMOROWSKI,²

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¹ Leopold Okulicki (1898–1946), noms de guerre “Kobra 2,” “Niedźwiadek,” “Termit”; brigadier general; NCO, Riflemen’s Association and Polish Legions; from 1918 standing officer in the Polish Army; from 1936 Head of the “East” Dept.; from April 1939 Head of the Situational Department and Deputy Head of the 3rd Operational Dept. in the Staff of the C-in-C. During the September Campaign of 1939, served as Operations Officer of the Warsaw Office of the Headquarters of the C-in-C; later Staff Commander of Warsaw-West Section; commander of a group bearing his own name in Wola during the Siege of Warsaw. From the end of September 1939, Service for Poland’s Victory-Union for Armed Struggle (SZP-ZWZ); Voivodship Commander of the SZP in Łódź; from January 1940 ZWZ commandant, Łódź District; from September 1940 ZWZ HQ Inspector; ZWZ commandant, Soviet occupation (October 1940). Arrested in Lviv (January 1941); released from prison (August 1941); CS, Polish Army in the USSR; Cmdr, 7th Infantry Division; commandant, Base 10, Ostuni near Bari, Italy; parachuted into Poland (21–22 May 1944); COPS and 1st deputy CS, Home Army HQ (from 3 June); from 27 July commandant NIE; due to this post, remained underground after the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising; from 6 September Acting CS, Home Army HQ; last Home Army Commander after capitulation of uprising (only formally appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland 21 December 1944); ordered disbandment of Home Army (19 January 1945); State Military Commander, otherwise referred to as the Commander of the Home Army in liquidation. Arrested by NKVD in Pruszków (27 March 1945); sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment at the Trial of the Sixteen; died in Butyrka prison, Moscow (24 December 1946).

and then OKULICKI, had started to form a new, deeply clandestine military and political organisation, NIE (Niepodległość [Independence]), from the most tried and tested Home Army officers and troops.

The order to found NIE stated that the headquarters of the new organisation was to consist of three people who were to appoint województwo commandants, who would, in turn, appoint powiat commandants.

Each commandant was to have a group of three people with an illegal administration consisting of armed struggle, propaganda, intelligence and judicial committees.

The NIE program provided for:

1. centralising the organisation’s staff, storing weapons for illegal activities, and preparing for an uprising against the USSR;

2. creating armed units each numbering up to 60 people, training saboteurs to carry out acts of sabotage, and setting up execution squads to perpetrate terrorist acts against the enemies of the Home Army and representatives of Soviet Military Command;

3. carrying out military intelligence and counter-intelligence operations, arranging for printed and oral propaganda against the USSR, storing radio transmitters and receivers, and ensuring effective communication between London and the NIE leaders in Poland.

In order to instruct the branch and district commanders on how to carry out the NIE program, Gen. FIELDORF, “Nil,” went to Western Ukraine in the summer of 1944 by order of ‘BÓR” KOMOROWSKI. 3

According to the testimony of the former commander of the Lviv Branch of the Home Army, JANSON (“Karmen”), over 7000 persons had been recruited to NIE in Lviv, Drohobych, Stanyslaviv and Ternopil oblasts by February 1945.

Centre (CWK); Commander of section defending Vistula River during September Campaign (1939); joined ZWZ-AK; from 1941 Deputy C-in-C; from July 1943 C-in-C and Commander of the Home Army; fought in Warsaw Uprising; officially appointed C-in-C of the Polish Armed Forces (PSZ) (30 September 1944); interned in Germany (until May 1945); in 1945–1946 emigrated; C-in-C; in 1947–1949 Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-Exile.

3 August Emil Fieldorf (1895–1953), noms de guerre “Lutyk Sylwester,” “Emil Wielowiejski,” “Walenty Gdanicki,” “Nil,” “Maj,” “Jordan” and “Weller”; brigadier-general, 1944; 1st Brigade, Polish Legions; from 1918 officer of the 5th and 1st Infantry Regiments of the Legions; fought for independence; from 1932 deputy commander, 1st Infantry Regiment, Polish Legion; Combined Cavalry Unit; commander, 51st Infantry Regiment (1939); on the Staff of the Union for Armed Struggle (ZWZ) in France after the September Campaign; courier from London to Poland (1940); ZWZ-AK HQ; co-founded and commanded Kedyw (until March 1944); founder and commander of NIE; Deputy C-in-C of the Home Army after the Warsaw Uprising. Arrested by NKVD (March 1945); taken to USSR; released (1947); returned to Poland seriously ill. Arrested again (9 November 1950); tried and sentenced to death; executed at Mokotów prison, Warsaw, 24 February 1953.
The task of creating NIE was carried out separately from the formal dissolution of the Home Army in order to make it clandestine, but the dissolution itself was used as a “cover” for the new organisation. By operating in parallel with the Home Army, and often within it, NIE managed to remain unknown to the majority of ordinary Home Army members who had not been recruited to it.

Recruits to NIE take a new oath, as all Home Army members were released from the previous one when the Home Army was disbanded at London’s orders. While investigating OKULICKI and others, it was further established that in February 1945 a resolution was passed during a meeting of the “Underground Council of Ministers” in the town of Milanówek (near Warsaw) concerning the foundation of the Political Centre for NIE, with representatives of illegal political parties (the People’s Party, the National Party, the Polish Socialist Party, the Labour Party and the Association of Democrats [Związek Demokratów]), united in their anti-Soviet activities, both in the town centre and the country.

All this corroborates the fact that the anti-Soviet operations of the Polish nationalist underground are well-organised, deeply clandestine and unscrupulous, and that the NKVD Directorates in the western oblasts of Ukraine have made little headway in exposing these underground structures. Consequently, neither NIE nor these Polish political parties have been uncovered.

I hereby order the following:

1. The work of the NKVD directorates and field units in uncovering and eliminating the Polish nationalist underground, especially the management and leadership centres of NIE and the anti-Soviet political parties, is to be substantially improved.

   [...]  

3. More decisive steps are to be taken towards refining and applying existing materials to investigations, confessions of arrestees and isolated intelligence leads.

4. Polish nationalist underground members are only to be arrested on the basis of carefully verified information.

5. There is to be a maximal improvement in the political and educational work undertaken by the local soviets and party units among the Polish community, particularly young people, to encourage them to get involved in current economic and political ventures, and thereby negate the influence of the anti-Soviet underground while creating favourable conditions for its elimination.
6. Operational files are to be put in order, and any materials on Polish nationalists in the possession of the OBB are to be compiled and implemented. All information provided to the UBB on the course of investigative operations in progress and on actions concerning the struggle with the Polish groups is to be kept up to date.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant General
(–) RIASNOY

“а-28-а” August 1945
No. ..... 
City of Kiev

Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

* * *
Filled in by hand.
No. 15
25 June Kiev. Report by Sergei Savchenko to Pyotr Fedotov, on the exposure and elimination of the Polish underground by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR

C[opy]-3

To the Chief of the 2nd Directorate of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR
Lieutenant General
Comrade FEDOTOV P. V.

Report on the intelligence and investigative operations of the Polish Section of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR

The consolidation of Soviet authority in the western oblasts of Ukraine, and the increasing Chekist operational strikes by the MGB units of the Ukrainian SSR, have meant that, since 1946, what remains of the Polish anti-Soviet organisations and groups have gone deeply underground, and have been trying to carry out sabotage, terrorist and intelligence work on the orders of reactionary foreign centres.

It is known that trained leaders for Polish nationalist organisations were being sent to the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR by the Polish Government-in-Exile in 1945 [!]. The government was also equipping them with weapons, ammunition, radio devices, printing resources, anti-Soviet literature, and ample funds to carry out destructive acts on Ukrainian territory.

The materials gathered during the course of eliminating the belopolskiye underground also confirm that the English government, having taken in reactionary Polish émigrés, has created favourable conditions for its own intelligence to select, train and redeploy special emissaries to the Ukrainian SSR, not only as Polish nationalist underground leaders, but also as English agents.

As a result of the intelligence and operational actions aimed at destroying the belopolskiye nationalist underground conducted by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR in 1944–[19]45, over 90 intelligence cases were closed and 600 register questionnaires filled in, with 160 Polish anti-Soviet organisations and groups either completely exposed or partially eliminated. On this basis, 3949 of their members were arrested.

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\(^{a}\) Series “K”
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\(^{b}\) Handwritten.

\(^{c}\) Filled in by hand.

\(^{d}\) Added by hand in left margin, next to paragraph: V.
During the same period, while Polish anti-Soviet organisations were being eliminated by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, 20 illegal warehouses were discovered and the following items confiscated:

Radio transmitters and receivers (including portable ones) ............ 28
Grenade launchers ................................................................. 5
Heavy machine guns .............................................................. 2
Light machine guns ............................................................... 21
Automatic rifles .................................................................... 56
Rifles .................................................................................. 148
Pistols .................................................................................. 86
Grenades ............................................................................... 597
Mines of various kinds ....................................................... 35
Bombs .................................................................................. 5
Live rounds of ammunition ........................................... 75,435
Explosives ............................................................................. 35 kg
Printing shops ..................................................................... 7
Rotator and copiers ................................................................ 8
Time fuse detonators ......................................................... 6
and other special technical [equipment]

Despite smashing the basic leadership centres of the belopolskiye underground, and the dramatic decrease in the Polish community due to the resettlement and repatriation of former Polish citizens to Poland, the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, during the course of further intelligence and operational activities, has obtained information confirming that there are still active Polish nationalist organisations in the western, and many eastern, oblasts of Ukraine, including the Polish Insurgent Union–Home Army (PZP-AK) and the National Civil Service (PSC-DR).

In their earnest anti-Soviet and anti-democratic activities, the remnant of the deeply clandestine Polish underground take their inspiration from foreign reactionary circles, primarily from England, and are directed by belopolskiye centres in Warsaw, Lublin and Cracow. They are counting on the outbreak of war between the Soviet Union, England and America, in which they claim the USSR will be defeated, and the revisionist political and territorial aspirations of the Polish Sanacja movement realised.

In order to eliminate the remnant of the belopolskiye underground, in 1946 the intelligence and operational work of the Polish Section of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR is being directed towards the following:

a) exposing and eliminating the command centres of the Polish anti-Soviet underground, finding and confiscating their material and technical resources, and using intelligence measures to intercept the communications channels between the belopolskiye and their foreign leadership centres;

b) establishing and investigating operational files on Poles suspected of being affiliated with English, German and other foreign intelligence services;
c) organising intelligence and operational work among repatriates and immigrants, i.e. former Polish citizens returning to Poland pursuant to an agreement between Lublin and Moscow.

As of 1 June this year, on the basis of closed intelligence cases, the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR units arrested the Polish anti-Soviet element numbering 200 persons, including 130 in the western oblasts. The MGB Directorate for Stanyslaviv oblast, while performing further intelligence, operational and investigative activities on the partially eliminated Polish anti-Soviet organisation, PSC-DR (intelligence operation “Sejm”), additionally exposed and arrested members of the district management of the Government Delegation carrying out destructive work against the USSR in April this year.

Nine members of the PSC-DR leadership were arrested in this case, including:
HENISZ Aleksander, son of Karol, organisational nom de guerre “Henryk,” leader of the Stanyslaviv district organisation of PSC-DR;¹
WIRTH Ferdynand, son of Karol, nom de guerre “Zygmunt,” head of the Security Department of the district organisation of PSC-DR;²
BIEŁOUS Tadeusz, son of Antoni, nom de guerre “Sęp,” head of the Provisions Department of the district organisation of PSC-DR; and others.³

All those arrested made confessions confirming their membership in the Polish nationalist underground and their anti-Soviet activities.

On the basis of the investigation and documents confiscated during the arrests, it was established that the Polish anti-Soviet organisation, the PSC-DR for Stanyslaviv district, had been set up during the German occupation by the former Polish Government-in-Exile in London, to train and prepare local government administrative staff in the event of the Polish reactionaries taking power in Poland.

Members of this organisation were engaged in active anti-Soviet agitation supporting the restoration of the Polish bourgeois state with its borders from before September 1939, in collecting confidential information on the political, economic and military potential of the USSR, and preparing for armed struggle against the Soviet Union in order to sever the western oblasts of Ukraine from the USSR.

The investigation continues.

Detailed specific information on this case was sent to you on 3 June this year: Ref. no. 1980/s.

¹ Aleksander Henisz (1886–21 October 1947), arrested 5 November 1945; tried by the Military Tribunal of the MVD for Stanyslaviv oblast; sentenced to 10 years in a corrective labour camp (30 June 1946); died in a penal institution.
² Ferdynand Wirth (born 1913), arrested 13 January 1946; sentenced to 10 years in a corrective labour camp; released 15 June 1955.
³ Tadeusz Biełous (born 1916), arrested 31 January 1946; sentenced to 8 years in a corrective labour camp; released 31 January 1954.
The UMGB of Stanyslaviv oblast has also partially completed the operation codenamed “Stryjscy,” launched in 1945 to investigate the Stryi Inspectorate of the Home Army.

Eight people were arrested in this case, including:

POLAK Edward, son of Michał, organisational nom de guerre “AUGUST,” Commander of the Stryi District of the Home Army Inspectorate;

CACAJ Józef, son of Marcin, owner of a flat used as a safe house by the leadership of the Stryi Inspectorate of the Home Army; and others;

It was established through intelligence and investigative methods that the Stryi Inspectorate of the Home Army was clandestine, and was preparing for armed struggle against the Soviet authorities, recruiting new members, collecting weapons and ammunition, and performing acts of sabotage and terrorism against Soviet officials.

During the elimination of the Stryi Inspectorate of the Home Army, weapons, ammunition, and technical resources for communication were confiscated, including:

- Radio transmitters .......................................................... 1 pie[ce]
- Grenade launchers .......................................................... 1 pie[ce]
- Machine guns .................................................................... 2 pie[ces]
- Automatic guns ............................................................... 10 pie[ces]
- Rifles .............................................................................. 54 pie[ces]
- Revolvers ......................................................................... 10 pie[ces]
- Rounds ........................................................................... 4280 pie[ces]
- Mines ................................................................................ 10 pie[ces]

In January this year, the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR launched a centralised operation codenamed “Pajęczyna” (“Cobweb”) in which the belopolskiye underground, commanded by the Lviv district of Home Army South, is being uncovered in the oblasts of Lviv, Rivne, Kamianets, Zhytomyr and Kiev.

Seventeen people are being investigated in this case, including:

“Stary” (first and last names not established), approx. 40 years old, illegal resident of Lviv, leader of the Sabotage and Terrorist Unit of the Lviv district of the Home Army;

“Stach” (first and last names not established), approx. 30 years old, a nielegal (illegal resident), deputy of “Stary”;

ŁUBCZYŃSKI Stanisław, son of Jan, no steady employment, lives in the town of Lviv, courier for Home Army command;

TERNOPOLSKA Izabella, daughter of Stanisław, lives in the town of Lviv, owns premises used as a safe house by Home Army command;

NIEWMIERZYCKI Stanisław, lives in the town of Dubno, Rivne oblast, owns a flat used as a safe house by the Home Army in Dubno; and others.

The Home Army members being investigated in Operation “Pajęczyna” organise illegal meetings to discuss the issues involved in their anti-Soviet
activities. They are armed and have explosives, funds, and technical equipment capable of producing forged documents.

It has been established through intelligence and operational activities that members of the Home Army in the cities of Dubno (Rivne oblast), Slavuta, Shepetivka, Proskurov, (Kamianets oblast), and Zhytomyr are in contact with the leaders of the Lviv District of Home Army South, who are currently taking steps to prepare and carry out acts of sabotage and terrorism against the Soviet authorities.

The subjects of the operation are still being investigated. Measures have been taken to specify and locate the nielegalis “Stary” and “Stach.” To this end, LUBCZYŃSKI has been included in the intelligence operation and placed under surveillance, as he is in direct contact with them.

The UMGB of Lviv oblast launched operations codenamed “Komendantura” [“Headquarters”] and “Okruchy” [“Scrubs”] in February and March this year. These have been included in the partially closed, centralised operation “Sejm.”

Operation “Komendantura” is aimed at a group of active Home Army members who appear in the contacts of the Lviv District Home Army Commandant, ORŁOŚ, who escaped to Poland in 1945.

Seven people are being investigated in this case, including:
- KOLESA Stanisław, son of Józef, the form[er] leader of “Sokół” [“Falcon”], the military and sporting association of the Piłsudskiites in Lviv, and a non-commissioned officer of the form[er] Polish Army;
- CHOLEWA Władysław, son of Wiktor, Polish, resides in the town of Lviv, a bricklayer by trade; and others.

During the course of further intelligence activities, it was established that one of the subjects of the operation, KOLESA, had been in close contact with the form[er] commandant of the Lviv District of the Home Army, ORŁOŚ (who has escaped to Poland) and with the Home Army commander in the village of Zimna Woda (a Lviv suburb), KURCZYŃSKI.

On the basis of the intelligence gathered, it has been established that KOLESA and KURCZYŃSKI obtained an evac[uation] permit for ORŁOŚ and helped him escape to Poland.

During the course of the investigation, it was established that the subjects have an illegal printing shop for publishing and distributing the Polish anti-Soviet paper Wytrwamy, and that they have been in contact with the Home Army underground in Poland.

The investigation continues.
Operation “Okruchy” is aimed at a group of members of the Polish military insurgent organisation, the Home Army (AK).

Ten people are being investigated in this case, including:
- JAKIMOWICZ-DOBROWOLSKA Antonina, daughter of Mikołaj, lives in Lviv, no steady employment;
- KRYSA Dora, nurse, works in a Lviv hospital;
- KWITYŃSKI, student at the Lviv University of Technology;
- NIEMIEC Janina, daughter of Kazimierz, works as a caretaker, lives in Lviv; and others.

During the course of surveillance it has been established that the members of this Polish anti-Soviet organisation receive radio dispatches from London, write anti-Soviet articles for the underground anti-Soviet papers *Wytrwamy* and *Słowo Polskie*, distribute these among the Polish community, recruit new members to the organisation, and maintain contact with the Home Army underground in Poland.

JAKIMOWICZ-DOBROWOLSKA one of the organisation’s leaders, has 6 liaisons, of whom four, viz. “Ziuta,” “Lila,” “Róża” and “Palma,” have left for Poland.

According to information from our intelligence network, JAKIMOWICZ-DOBROWOLSKA worked as a commandant of three Home Army outposts during the German occupation.

The investigation continues.

The course of resettling and repatriating former Polish citizens to Poland

Former Polish citizens were resettled and repatriated from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR to Poland in 1945–[19]46, pursuant to an agreement concluded between Lublin and Moscow.

The repatriation of Polish citizens from the eastern *oblasts* of Ukraine was completed on 15 May this year.

In connection with the completed repatriation, the representative of the Main Directorate of the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) for the Ukrainian SSR, b Prijma b, left for Moscow on 17 May this year, along with other ZPP activists. He is to leave for Poland once he has submitted his report to the Main Directorate of the ZPP.

This repatriation may be illustrated by the following figures:

Persons who submitted declaration of renunciation of Soviet citizenship...... 35,266

of whom:

a) received evac[uation] papers ............................................................ 30,837
b) refused entry to Poland................................................................. 1,395
c) declined to depart after arranging the documents ......................... 322

Entitled to enter Poland but failed to submit applications ................. 590

Departed for Poland ............................................................................ 34,766

including children ................................................................................ 11,474
A separate report concerning the results of repatriating former Polish citizens to Poland is attached.

The resettlement of Polish citizens from the western oblasts of Ukraine is in progress.

The course of the resettlement operation as of June 1 this year may be illustrated by the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total registered Polish citizens</td>
<td>838,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of resettlement applications submitted</td>
<td>877,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received evacuation papers</td>
<td>655,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused entry to Poland</td>
<td>1,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declined to depart after arranging the documents</td>
<td>6,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entitled to enter Poland but failed to submit applications</td>
<td>24,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departed for Poland</td>
<td>725,422</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant General SAVCHENKO

No. b-2262/s-b
"b-25-b" June 1946
City of Kiev

Prepared in 3 cop.
1 – for the addressee
1 – for the Secretary’s Office of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR
1 – for the 2nd Directorate of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Prep. by Vlasov – Department 6
Basis: b-Centralised operations codenamed “Sejm” and “Pajęczyna” [...] of the UMGB of the oblasts regarding work on the Polish Section for 1945-b
Copied by Helman

a-In conformity: a (-)

_HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 7, Por. 4, T. 14, pp. 83–93._
_Certified copy. typescript._
_Document in Russian._
No. 16
20 July 1946, Kiev. Report by Sergei Savchenko

to Viktor Abakumov, on eliminating the Polish Civil Service-Government Delegation (PSC-DR) in Stanyslaviv oblast

Top secret

C[opy] No. a-3-a

To the Minister of State Security of the USSR

Colonel General

Comrade ABAKUMOV V. S.¹

Report

on eliminating the anti-Soviet nationalist organisation, the Polish Civil Service – Government Delegation (PSC-DR), in Stanyslaviv oblast (intelligence operation “Sejm”)

As a result of the intelligence and operational activities concerning the elimination of the Polish anti-Soviet, military and insurgence organisation, the Stanyslaviv Inspectorate of the Home Army, the MGB Directorate for Stanyslaviv oblast has acquired information on the existence of another Polish anti-Soviet citizen’s organisation operating in parallel with the Home Army, viz. the PSC-DR (Polish Civil Service, otherwise known as the Government Delegation).

On the basis of well-verified materials on the anti-Soviet operations of the PSC-DR for the Stanyslaviv district, the following members of the organisation were arrested:

HENISZ Aleksander, son of Karol, born in 1886 in the village of Kudryntsi, Borschchiv raion, Ternopil oblast; Polish; USSR citizen; diploma as machine designer; no steady employment; last resided in the town of Stanyslaviv; leader of the district PSC-DR organisation; nom de guerre “HENRYK”;

ROSIAKIEWICZ Tadeusz, son of Józef, born in Solotvyn, Stanyslaviv oblast, in 1894; Polish; USSR citizen; higher education; worked as a animal laboratory worker at Oblziemotdiela in the town of Stanyslaviv; leader of the Department of Security of the PSC-DR in 1944; nom de guerre “OLBROMSKI”;

WIRTH Ferdynand, son of Karol, born in Stanyslaviv, in 1913; Polish, higher education (legal); former officer of Department 2 of the Polish Main Staff; recently led the Department of Security of the District Government Delegation (DR); nom de guerre “ZYGMUNT”;

¹ Viktor Abakumov (1908–1954), general, in 1943–1946 Head of “SMERSH”; from August to November 1944 Deputy Representative of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR on the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN); in 1946–1951 Minister of State Security of the USSR; Commissar of State Security, 2nd Rank (1943).
GRABOWSKI Romuald,\textsuperscript{2} son of Marceli, born in the town of Stanyslaviv, 1896; Polish; USSR citizen; agronomist; no steady employment; head of military and political intelligence; and others, 11 people in total.

During the arrests of the Stanyslaviv District Government Delegation, lists of organisation members, instructions, information and financial reports, anti-Soviet proclamations, illegal nationalist papers, a typewriter, ciphers, codes, and other items were confiscated.

During the investigation, it was established that the Stanyslaviv District of the PSC-DR had been set up by the former Polish Government-in-Exile in London in 1942, to prepare administrative staff in the event that reactionary parties succeeded in taking power in Poland.

Regarding contact between the leaders of the Stanyslaviv Government Delegation and the former Polish Government-in-Exile in London, the arrested HENISZ testified that the Government Delegation for Poland, including a representative of the government in question, is operating in the city of Warsaw.

The Government Delegation for Poland commanded a widespread network of PSC-DR branches in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR via the Lviv office of the Government Delegation for the so-called Lviv Region of the PSC-DR (eliminated between 1944 and [19]45 by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR).

All those arrested in the case admitted to being members of the Polish nationalist underground and that, as leaders of the Stanyslaviv District Government Delegation, they had carried out anti-Soviet operations aimed at:

a) preparing a state administration in the event that the Polish Government-in-Exile took power;

b) running anti-Soviet propaganda supporting the restoration of the Polish state with its pre-1939 borders;

c) gathering intelligence information on the military and economic potential of the USSR, and forwarding it to the Polish government in London;

d) establishing contact with the leaders of the Home Army (AK) as part of the fight against the Soviet authorities;

e) providing material assistance to members of the Polish nationalist underground and their families, especially those being persecuted by the Soviet authorities.

Following these instructions from the Polish Government-in-Exile, the arrested leaders of the Stanyslaviv oblast (województwo) of the PSC-DR set up the following Departments within the organisation:

Administration;
Propaganda;
Security;
Industrial;
Land;

\textsuperscript{2} Romuald Grabowski (1896–21 February 1948), arrested 1 December 1945; sentenced to 8 years in a corrective labour camp; died in a penal institution.
Communications;
Local government;
Health Care;
Legalisation;
Judicial and Executive;
Financial;
and an illegal local administration in the oblast, appointing powiat, municipal and village delegates who were to be made mayors or district governors once power had been taken.

The leaders and members of the Stanyslaviv oblast PSC-DR were actively engaged in nationalist propaganda targeted at the local Polish community, in order to unite and educate it in an anti-Soviet spirit. They sabotaged the economic and political initiatives of the USSR government and the Polish Government of National Unity [Rząd Jedności Narodowej], and particularly the resettlement of Poles to Poland; and instead disseminated calumnious fabrications concerning Soviet reality.

The leaders of the Stanyslaviv District PSC-DR printed and distributed anti-Soviet leaflets, underground papers, a bulletin, and other anti-Soviet literature provided by the national leadership of the Government Delegation (DR). They obtained weapons and ammunition, and were actively carrying out political, economic and military intelligence operations against the USSR.

ROSIAKIEWICZ and WIRTH admitted that the Department of Security they led was engaged in counter-intelligence work against the MVD-MGB, and they had spent significant financial resources on hiding anti-Soviet elements and providing assistance to repressed PSC-DR members.

The fact that the PSC-DR and the Home Army were united in their mutual struggle with the Soviet authorities was corroborated by the evidence given by the leader of the Stanyslaviv District of the Home Army, HERMAN Władysław, noms de guerre “GLOBUS” and “KUDAK.”

During his interrogation, HERMAN confessed that from 1944 until the day of his arrest he had maintained working contact with the leader of the Stanyslaviv District Government Delegation, ŹRAŁKO, nom de guerre “PRAWDZIC”3 (arrested). They kept each other informed about the results of the anti-Soviet activities of the PSC-DR and the Home Army, sent reports to the District Home Army and the Government Delegate for Poland, and provided assistance to arrested members of the Home Army and their families with money illegally transferred to the Government Delegation and Home Army.

HENISZ corroborated HERMAN’s evidence by confirming that, after “Prawdzic” had been arrested, he continued to maintain working contact with the

---

3 Józef Zabokrzecki-Źrałko (born 1891), noms de guerre “Hilary,” “Prawdzic”; served in the Stanyslaviv Government Delegation (1943); left for Lviv to escape arrest; appointed Stanyslaviv wojewoda. Arrested by the NKVD (14 February 1945); tried by the Military Tribunal of the NKVD for Kiev Oblast; sentenced to 10 years in a corrective labour camp (23 January 1946); released (7 September 1954); died in exile.
deputy commander of the Stanyslaviv District of the Home Army, “WIKTOR,” the head of the Home Army Inspectorate, “USZKA,” and others regarding joint anti-Soviet activities.

Working contact between the PSC-DR and the PZP-AK was established by order of the Polish Government-in-Exile. This was confirmed by the belopolskiye underground documents confiscated during the searches.

Attention should be paid to HENISZ’s statement that the Government Delegation was actively using the Stanyslaviv branch of the Union of Polish Patriots [Związek Patriotów Polskich] and “the Polish Committee of Mutual Help” [Polski Komitet Pomocy Wzajemnej], by placing Government Delegation members, e.g. BUJALSKI, BLECHARSKI, CZUSZKIEWICZ and others, in these organisations as part of its anti-Soviet activities.

On the basis of the evidence given by HENISZ concerning the membership of the Lviv Region of the PSC-DR, the UMGB of Lviv oblast managed to find and arrest the owner of a flat used as a safe house by the PSC-DR, BILKIN Maria, daughter of Karol, who confessed that she had made her flat available for illegal meetings between HENISZ and WISZNIEWSKA Irena, an active PSC-DR member who left for Poland in October 1945.

A significant number of members of the Lviv Region of the PSC-DR were arrested by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR between 1944 and [19]45, while others took shelter in Poland.

b- According to information from the UMGB for Lviv oblast, it is known that between 1944 and [19]45, after the arrests of the PSC-DR leadership, the organisation in the town of Lviv was commanded by Prof. Czyżewski Julian, noms de guerre “Nowicki,” and “Orzechowicz,” who illegally left for Poland in the autumn of 1945. 

While the UMGB for Stanyslaviv oblast was searching for other PSC-DR members, they discovered the following persons:

BANIEWICZ Edward, son of Jan, born in Stanyslaviv oblast in 1876; Polish; USSR citizen; higher education; retired.

During interrogation, BANIEWICZ confessed that he had been recruited to the PSC-DR at the beginning of 1943 by the then leader of the Stanyslaviv District Government Delegation, DUSZNIAK, nom de guerre “MARIAN,” and that by

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b- Added by hand in left margin next to paragraph: V.

4 Julian Czyżewski (1890–1968), noms de guerre “Marian,” “Marian Orzechowicz,” “Nowicki”; reserve infantry captain; professor of geography; head of the youth independence movement while at school; member of the Union of Active Struggle (ZWC) and the Combat Organisation of the Polish Socialist Party (OB PPS) (from 1908); served in the Polish Legions and the Austrian army during WWI; joined Polish Army; fought in the battle of Lviv and the Polish-Soviet War (1920); worked at John Casimir University (UJK) and the Academy of Foreign Trade (AHZ) in Lviv; District Government Delegate in Lviv (late 1942–15 March 1944); re-appointed to this position 1944–1945; from August 1945 Professor at the University of Wrocław.

5 The name may be false. The author is referring to Leon Kochański.
order of HENISZ, he had become head of the Department of Propaganda. He withdrew from his PSC-DR activities at the end of 1943 on account of his health and age.

The case was closed and transferred to the Military Tribunal of the MVD.

We shall keep you informed about the outcome of the trial and any further operations aimed at exposing and eliminating other new members of the Stanyslaviv and Lviv PSC-DR organisations.

Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant General SAVCHENKO

No. a-2523/s-a
“a-20-a” July 1946
City of Kiev

prepared in 3 cop.
1 – for the addressee
1 – for the Secretary’s Office of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR
1 – for the 2nd Directorate of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Prepared by Vlasov, Department 6
Basis: a-Written report by the UMGB of Stanyslaviv oblast on Operation “Sejm” No. 18/496 of 16 April 1946 and Report w/o No. of 27 June 1946-a
Copied by Helman

In conformity:
Oper[ational] off[icer] of the 2nd Unit of Dep[artment] 6
of the 2nd Directorate of the MGB of Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant-c (–)

_Certified copy, typescript._
_Document in Russian._

*–c Handwritten.*
After 1 September 1946, Kiev. Excerpt from information provided by Pavel Medvedev, concerning the results of the operational work of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR aimed at the Polish underground between 1943 and 1946

Ministry of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Top secret

Information
concerning the results of the intelligence and operational work of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR on Polish issues for the period from the liberation of Ukraine until 1 September 1946

The MGB of the Ukrainian SSR have exposed or partially eliminated the following anti-Soviet groups, created by the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, in the western oblasts of Ukraine:

1. The military sabotage, terrorist and insurgent organisation, PZP AK (Polish Insurgent Union–Home Army);
2. The civic organisation, PSC-DR (State Civil Service-Government Delegation);
3. The organisations included in the Home Army: NSZ (National Armed Forces); NOW (National Military Organisation); and KON (the Convention of Independence Organisations);
4. “Młoda Polska”;
5. Offshoots of anti-Soviet groups and parties – the National Democrats, OZON, POW, PPS, and others;
6. The youth organisations “Strzelec” and “Orłęta.”

The goal of all these belopolskiye groups was to sever the western oblasts of Ukraine and Belorussia from the USSR, and to restore a “Greater Poland from sea to shining sea.” They were actively engaged in fighting the Soviet authorities and the Red Army by means of espionage, sabotage and terror, and created armed groups for insurgence purposes, doing everything in their power to foment hostility towards the Soviet Union. They instigated international incidents against the USSR, and actively undermined the economic and political initiatives of the Soviet authorities.

The underground organisations mentioned above had funds, staff, weapons, radio transmitters and receivers, printing shops and other technical resources.

Belopolskiye underground organisations which were created by the Gestapo for provocative purposes and which collaborated with the Germans (“Orzel Bialy,” “Miecz i Plug”) were also exposed.

While exposing and eliminating the belopolskiye underground in 1944–1946, the PZP-PSC centres in Ukraine (the Lviv Region of the Home Army commanded
by Gen. FILIPKOWSKI; the Lviv Government Delegation led by OSTROWSKI; the Stanyslaviv District Government Delegation led by HENISZ, the Lviv, Ternopil and Stanyslaviv Home Army districts; the Lutsk, Rivne, Drohobych, Vladimir, Stryi, and other inspectorates and districts of the Home Army; the District Government Delegations; and many basic cells of the belopolskiye underground organisations) were broken up.

Communications between these organisations and their foreign centres (Warsaw, Lublin, Cracow, and London) were intercepted.

Significant quantities of weapons, ammunition, illegal radio transmitters and receivers, bio[logical] sabotage resources, printing shops and technical [measures] were confiscated.

Twenty five PZP-AK and PSC-DR leaders were arrested, including:
FILIPKOWSKI Władysław, son of Dominik, born 1892; general in the form[er] Polish Army; commandant of the South-Eastern armed forces of the Home Army and commander of the Lviv Region of the Polish Insurgent Union (PZP).

OSTROWSKI Adam, son of Franciszek, born 1911; delegate of the Polish Government-in-Exile for the Lviv Region and head of the Government Delegation.

WACHSMAN Mieczysław, son of Leon, born 1902; commander of the intelligence and counter-intelligence units of the Lviv Region of the Government Delegation.

POHOSKI Henryk,1 son of Bogdan, born 1909; chief of staff of the Lviv Region of the PZP-AK.

HENISZ Aleksander, son of Karol, organisational nom de guerre “Henisz” a-; head of the Stanyslaviv District Government Delegation; and others.

FILIPKOWSKI and CZERWIŃSKI were affiliated with the Polish Insurgent Union (PZP) Headquarters in Warsaw, well-known Home Army leaders such as Generals ROWECKI (“Grot”) and KOMOROWSKI (“Bór”), and the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, from whom they received instructions concerning their destructive work against the USSR.

The Lviv Regional PZP-AK, which comprised the Lviv, Stanyslaviv and Ternopil PZP-AK Districts, attracted as many as 30,000 belopolskiye underground members, published an illegal paper Biuletyn Ziemi Czerwieńska, had 10 illegal radio transmitters and receivers (6 in Lviv, 1 in Stryi, Drohobych oblast, and 1 each in the towns of Ternopil, Zolochiv and Mostyska), and was funded by Polish

---

1 Henryk Pohoski (1909–1987), assumed names: Jan Jodelko, Henryk Lach, Józef Modzelewski, Kazimierz Stasiuń, and Antoni Wróbel; noms de guerre “Adolf,” “Siwek,” “Stawisz” and “Walery”; Lieutenant-Colonel of Polish infantry; operational officer, 1st Infantry Division of Polish Legions during the September Campaign (1939); taken prisoner by the Germans but managed to escape; joined the Service for Poland’s Victory (SZP) (October 1939); joined ZWZ/AK; posted to Warsaw Regional Headquarters; from September 1941 to July 1944 Head of Department 2, Lviv District Headquarters; Chief of Staff, District Headquarters (end of July 1944). Arrested by NKVD, 2–3 August 1944; escaped to Poland (12 September 1944); died in Warsaw.
reactionary circles in Warsaw and London with a monthly subsidy of up to 5,000,000 zloty.

Materials obtained while investigating the underground confirm that the English government, having taken in reactionary Polish émigrés, was creating favourable conditions for its own intelligence to select, train and redeploy special emissaries to the Ukrainian SSR, not only as leaders of the Polish nationalist underground, but also as English agents.

Members of the belopolskiye underground in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR were included in the investigation as part of the centralised intelligence operation “Sejm.”

As a result, between 1944 and 1946, over 90 intelligence cases were closed and 600 information records completed, on the basis of which 168 Polish anti-Soviet organisations and groups were completely exposed or partially eliminated.

During this period, over 4,000 people were arrested, including:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lviv oblast</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>1,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drohobych – “–”</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>873</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanyslaviv – “–”</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volhynia – “–”</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivne – “–”</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ternopil – “–”</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernivtsi – “–”</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakarpattia – “–”</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>2,802</td>
<td>3,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the eastern oblasts of Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in the Ukrainian SSR:</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>2,974</td>
<td>3,949</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the same period, 22 illegal warehouses were found and the following items confiscated:

Radio transmitters/receivers and radio stations ................................................... 29
Radio receivers ........................................................................................................ 50
Printing shops ......................................................................................................... 7
Rotators and copiers ............................................................................................... 8

2 Incorrect calculations.
3 Incorrect calculations.
Grenade launchers with grenades (mines) .......................................... 6
Heavy and light machine guns ........................................................... 25
Automatic guns and rifles ................................................................... 268
(Hand) grenades .................................................................................. 602
Pistols ................................................................................................. 96
Ammunition ........................................................................................ 79,715
Explosives .......................................................................................... 35 kg
Typewriters and other spec[ialist] technical resources 44 pie[ces]

The most typical intelligence operations among those concluded in 1945 include:

In the intelligence operation “Janusy,” the leaders of the Lviv Region of the Home Army (AK) were investigated by the UMGB of Lviv oblast.

The 18 persons arrested in the case confirmed their leadership in the Home Army and admitted to their sabotage and terrorist activities.

The arrestee KOSSAK, who served in the Polish Armed Forces of the Government-in-Exile in England at the beginning of 1943, is a graduate of the Intelligence Service School. With a group of 12 people he [arrived] by *English plane* and was dropped near the town of Kielce (Poland). Using a password provided by English intelligence, he contacted the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Army, and 5 months later was dispatched to the town of Lviv where he served as commander of the Sabotage and Terrorist Unit of the Lviv Region of the Home Army until the day of his arrest.

The arrestee SKORUPA also gave evidence that he was affiliated with English intelligence.

A significant quantity of weapons and ammunition was confiscated while winding up the case.

In the intelligence operation codenamed “Beznadziejni” [“Hopeless”], the UMGB of Rivne oblast arrested 30 members of the underground Rivne district of the Home Army.

On the basis of intelligence and investigative materials, it was established that the commander of the Rivne Region of the Home Army, NEUMAN, by order of Lviv headquarters, created the Rivne, Sarny and Ostroh regions of the Home Army,

4 Wiesław Skorupa, real name Jerzy Kowalski (born 1916), *noms de guerre* “Alfa,” “Baba,” “Jurek”; Lieutenant of Sapper company in the Polish Army; 4th Sapper Regiment during September Campaign (1939); trained in sabotage in the UK; *cichociemny* (“unseen and Silent”) paratrooper; parachuted into Poland (16–17 March 1943); assigned to Kedyw [Directorate for Diversion] in the Lviv Region of the Home Army; deputy commander of Kedyw for the region; fought in the battle of Lviv (July 1944). Arrested by the NKVD (1945); returned to Poland (1955).

5 Henryk Neuman, arrested 15 February 1945; tried by the Military Tribunal of the NKVD for Rivne Oblast; sentenced to 10 years in a corrective labour camp (5 January 1946); retracted his testimony and the case was forwarded for reconsideration; released by a decision dated 7 March 1946 of the military prosecutor of the NKVD (11 March 1946).
and used their members to carry out intelligence operations inside Red Army units; recruited new soldiers to the Home Army; acquired weapons; and prepared the underground units under his command for armed struggle against the USSR.

Weapons, a radio transmitter and anti-Soviet literature were confiscated.

The UMGB of Volhynia oblast exposed and eliminated the Volhynia Inspectorate and the Lutsk, Vladimir, and Liuboml Regions of the Home Army.

64 people were arrested in 1945, including 22 members of the underground leadership.

The Volhynia Inspectorate of the Home Army was engaged in anti-Soviet activities along with the PSC-DR. Twelve members of the two organisations were arrested.

The arrested leaders of the Volhynia Inspectorate of the Home Army, MACHNIEWSKI, and the PSC-DR, RADZIEWANOWSKI, were engaged in anti-Soviet nationalist activities aimed at disrupting the resettlement of Polish citizens to Poland. They formed 11 platoons in the oblast, numbering as many as 250 soldiers.

The chief of staff of the Lutsk Oblast of the Home Army, GŁUCENKO–PŁUCIENNIK, maintained contact with the Lublin headquarters of the Home Army and received instructions to mobilise sabotage and terrorist activities, and to prepare for an armed uprising against the Soviet authorities in order to restore Poland to its pre-1939 borders.

The UMGB of Lviv oblast eliminated the Communications Department of the Lviv Region of the Home Army. This had ensured radio communication with the Polish government in London and Home Army Headquarters in Warsaw. 47 people were arrested in the case.

The arrestee WIKTOR, nom de guerre “CIEKAS”⁶, confessed that as head of the Radio Communications Department on the staff of the Lviv Region of the Home Army, he had acquired 18 English-made radio transmitters and receivers since 1945, and that these were used to maintain contact with the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.

The arrestee WYSOCKI, nom de guerre “OPACZ,” was recruited to the Home Army in London where he completed the radio intelligence school of the

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⁶ Julian Stefan Wiktor (1910–1953), noms de guerre “Daj,” “Maciej,” “Neon,” “Organ,” “Rybak,” “Adam,” “Ciekas.” 2Nd Lieutenant of the WP artillery; in September 1939 was called up to the 12th heavy artillery division; in January 1940, was drafted into Lt. Col. Sokolowski’s organisation. After the reorganisation of the ZWZ-AK in the Lviv area, he joined the Lviv District Command’s headquarters; from October 1943 was commandant of communications in the Area 5 Division. After Operation Tempest, became head of Division V in NIE. Arrested on 10 June 1945; on 22 September 1945, sentenced to 20 years in hard labour camps by the Military Tribunal of the NKVD’s Lviv Military District. Died 7 May 1953 in an accident in a coal mine in Vorkuta.

⁷ Roman Władysław Wiszniowski (1920–1989), assumed names: Ludwik Bielik, Roman Wisznia, and Zbigniew Wysocki; noms de guerre “Harcierz,” “Irys,” “Joasia,” “Orion,” “Tarcza” and “Opacz”; reserve command lieutenant in the Polish Army; Polish scouts instructor; last served in the Podhale Rifles Regiment in the September Campaign (1939); captured by the Germans; escaped to Stanyslaviv and joined the underground. Arrested by the NKVD while crossing the Hungarian border on 4 December 1939; sentenced to 5 years in a corrective labour camp; released; volunteered for the Polish Army on 20 September
Intelligence Service, and in 1944 was dropped by plane near the city of Warsaw. He got to the town of Lviv and was appointed deputy head of the Radio Communications Department of the Lviv Region of the Home Army. He was awarded the Silver Cross of Merit by the Polish government in London for his anti-Soviet work.

The other arrestees include 28 owners of flats used as safe houses, 9 radio operators, and 8 Home Army liaisons and couriers.

Eighteen English-made radio transmitters and receivers were confiscated, along with 4 radio receivers, a storehouse of electric batteries, archives, radiograms, codes, gold coins and foreign currency.

At the beginning of 1946, the remnants of the Polish anti-Soviet organisations went deep underground. They have been trying to revive their sabotage, terrorist, insurgence and intelligence work on orders from London.

In 1946, the MGB of the USSR launched, partially closed or continued to investigate the following intelligence operations against the Polish anti-Soviet underground:

As regards the case of the Polish anti-Soviet organisation PSC-DR, which was partially eliminated in 1945 (intelligence operation “Sejm”), the UMGB of Stanyslaviv oblast arrested another 9 leaders of the oblast organisation of the Government Delegation in April this year, including:

1. ŚMIGIELSKI Stanisław, son of Leon, nom de guerre “Wiktor”; member of the Government Delegation from 1943; head of the Elimination Department;
2. WIRTH Ferdynand, son of Karol, nom de guerre “Zygmunt”; head of the Security Department of the oblast organisation of the PSC-DR; and others.

On the basis of the investigation and the documents confiscated during the arrests, it was established that the Stanyslaviv District PSC-DR had been created by the Polish Government-in-Exile during the German occupation, in order to prepare local government staff in the event that Polish reactionaries managed to take power in Poland.

The members of this organisation engaged in anti-Soviet agitation to restore the Polish bourgeois state to its borders from before September 1939, collected intelligence on the USSR, and prepared for armed struggle to sever the western oblasts of Ukraine.

The investigation continues.

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1941; 7th infantry division. of the Polish Army in the USSR, later in the UK where he was trained in radiotelegraphy; became a cichociemny paratrooper; parachuted into Poland (14–15 September 1943); posted to Dept. 5 of the Lviv Region of the Home Army as a radiotelegraph operator and instructor, later commander of the “Opacz” radio communications unit; head operator of the NIE radio station after Operation Tempest. Arrested (5 June 1945); sentenced to 20 years in a corrective labour camp by the Military Tribunal of the NKVD of the Lviv Military District (22 September 1945); released (22 September 1955); settled in Lublin.

8 Stanislaw Śmigielski, nom de guerre “Wiktor” (1888–30 April 1947). Arrested 4 November 1945; sentenced to 10 years in a corrective labour camp; died in a penal institution.
The UMGB of the Stanyslaviv oblast have partially concluded the intelligence operation codenamed “Stryjskie,” in which the Stryi Inspectorate of the Home Army (AK) was under investigation.

Eight people were arrested in the case, including:

POLAK Edward, son of Michał, organisational nom de guerre “AUGUST”; oblast commandant in the Stryi Home Army Inspectorate;
PACAJ Józef, son of Marcin, owner of a flat used as a dead-letter drop by the leaders of the Stryi Home Army Inspectorate; and others.

During the elimination of the Home Army Inspectorate, the following items were confiscated:

Radio transmitters ............................................................. 1 pie[ce]
Grenade launchers .............................................................. 1 pie[ce]
Machine guns ...................................................................... 2 pie[ces]
Automatic guns and rifles .................................................. 64 pie[ces]
Revolvers ............................................................................ 10 pie[ces]
Ammunition ........................................................................ 4,280 pie[ces]
Mines .................................................................................. 10 pie[ces]

While exposing the organisers of the anti-Soviet work among the Polish community, in order to get them to renounce Soviet citizenship and depart illegally for Poland, an intelligence operation codenamed “Nielegalni” [“Illegals”] was launched and then concluded by the UMGB of Zhytomyr oblast. Seven people were arrested, including:

DROHOMIRECKI Anatol, son of Antoni, born in 1914; Polish; of kulak peasant origin; left for Poland with forged papers in 1945 and returned to the USSR; leader of an anti-Soviet Polish group;
SZCZYRSKI Paweł, son of Jan, born in 1916; member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(b)]; Polish; in the Polish Army from 1946; member of an anti-Soviet Polish group;
SZCZERBAKOW Jefim, son of Fiodor; born in 1897; Russian; member of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [VKP(b)]; representative of the Council for Religious Cults at the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Zhytomyr oblast; and others.

During the investigation it was established that the members of this anti-Soviet group were engaged in destructive work among the local Polish community (of USSR citizens) in Zhytomyr oblast, offering forged permits to leave for Poland in exchange for bribes.

The investigation is being continued in order to discover the affiliation of the above individuals with the organised Polish anti-Soviet underground.

As part of the centralised intelligence operation codenamed “Pajęczyna,” the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR is investigating 17 members of the belapolkskiye underground in the Lviv, Rivne, Kamianets, Zhytomyr, and Kiev oblasts, whose anti-Soviet activities are being directed by the Lviv District of the Home Army South, including:
“Stary” (first and last names not established), approx. 40 years old; illegal resident of Lviv; leader of the Sabotage and Terrorist Unit of the Lviv District of the Home Army;

“Stach” (first and last names not established); approx. 30 years old; in hiding; deputy to “Stary”;

ŁUBCZYŃSKI Stanisław, son of Jan, no steady employment; lives in the town of Lviv; liaison for the Home Army command; and others.

The members of the Home Army under investigation convene illegal meetings and provide weapons, explosives, funds, and technical resources to produce forged papers.

The number of Home Army organisational contacts with the leaders of the Lviv District of the Home Army South in the cities of Dubno (Rivne oblast), Slavuta, Shepetivka and Proskurov (Kamianets oblast), and Zhytomyr is being determined.

The objects of the operation, “STACH,” ŁUBCZYŃSKI and NIEWMIE-RZYCKI, were found and arrested in July this year.

The investigation continues.

A group of the Home Army members is under investigation by the UMGB of Lviv oblast in an intelligence operation codenamed “Okruchy [!]”, including:

JAKIMOWICZ-DObROWOLSKA Antonina, daughter of Mikołaj: lives in Lviv; no steady employment; group leader; commanded three Home Army outposts during German occupation;

KRYSA Dora, nurse; works in a Lviv hospital;

KWITYŃSKI, student at the Lviv University of Technology; and others.

Organisation members receive radio messages from London; write anti-Soviet reports for the underground anti-Soviet papers Wytrwamy and Słowo Polskie, which they distribute; recruit new members to the organisation; and maintain contact with the Home Army underground in Poland.

JAKIMOWICZ-DObROWOLSKA was secretly taken away and arrested during her attempted departure for Poland with a transport of Polish resettlers. The inquiry is ongoing.

The investigation continues.

As of 7 July [19]46, the following Polish anti-Soviet element has been arrested by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR in the concluded intelligence operations:

Western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR ......................... 135 people
Eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR ......................... 80 people
Total in the Ukrainian SSR ............................................ 215 people
The course of the resettlement and repatriation of former Polish citizens to Poland

Between 1945 and 1946, former Polish citizens were resettled and repatriated from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR to Poland, pursuant to an agreement concluded between Lublin and Moscow.

The repatriation of the Polish citizens from the eastern oblasts was completed on 15 June 1946.

The repatriation may be illustrated by the following figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Polish citizens</td>
<td>35,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Polish citizens who submitted declarations renouncing Soviet citizenship, inc. those who</td>
<td>34,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) received evacuation papers (in this number and requiring permission)</td>
<td>37,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) were denied permission to depart for Poland</td>
<td>1,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) refused to depart after obtaining evacuation papers</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are entitled to depart for Poland but failed to submit applications</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved as having contact with agents who departed for Poland</td>
<td>37,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total departures for Poland</td>
<td>11,389</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The resettlement of Polish citizens from the western oblasts is in progress.

According to figures dated 1 July 1946:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Polish citizens</td>
<td>838,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filed resettlement applications</td>
<td>877,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received evacuation papers</td>
<td>837,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were denied permission to depart for Poland</td>
<td>1,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declined to depart after arranging the documents</td>
<td>3,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entitled to enter Poland but failed to submit applications for Poland</td>
<td>7,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved as having contact with agents who departed for Poland</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departed for Poland</td>
<td>77,544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The vast majority of our agents have left for Poland in connection with the resettlement and repatriation of former Polish citizens. The rest are continuing to investigate the remnants of the belopolskiye underground.
Measures are being taken to reinforce our intelligence structures with new agents.
The work on exposing and eliminating the remnants of the belopolskiye underground continues.

Head of the 2nd Directorate of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Colonel (–) MEDVEDEV

“а-10-а” August 1946

HDA SBU, F. 1, Op. 25, Spr. 37, pp. 1–17.
Original, typescript on a form.
Document in Russian.
CHAPTER VI

Resettlement of Poles and Ukrainians in 1944–1946
INTRODUCTION

While Polish historians tend to focus on the relocation of Polish people from the Ukrainian SSR to Poland and the struggle of the Polish security services and Armed Forces against the Ukrainian underground in 1944–1947, Ukrainian researchers (including émigré scholars) are mostly concerned with the resettlement of Ukrainians from Poland to the Ukrainian SSR in 1944–1946 and from Poland’s south-eastern województwos to the “Recovered Territories” in 1947.\(^1\)

It is only recently that works have been published which encompass the entire subject of the 1944–1946 resettlements, based on documents from Polish, Ukrainian, and also Russian archives.

For a long time, the only major work in this field was a monograph by Antoni Szczęśniak and Wiesław Szota entitled *Droga do nikąd.*\(^2\) This was based on archival materials, and was the first account of the activities of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in Poland’s south-eastern województwos, in particular during the 1944–1946 resettlements and Operation “Vistula,” as well the military and political struggle of the security services, the Internal Security Corps, and the Polish Armed Forces against the Ukrainian underground.

Among Polish historiographical works published in the 1980s and concerning the relocation of Poles from the Soviet Union, of particular interest is a book by Jan Czerniakiewicz which attempts to determine the scope of the migration process during the repatriation of Poles, including the demographic, social, and professional structure of the resettled population.\(^3\)

Since the beginning of the 1990s, when it suddenly became possible to access Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian documents that had long been locked away in special archives and stamped “Top Secret,” both Polish and Ukrainian researchers have been able to explore the resettlements in much greater detail. Some of the most important contributions in this field have been made by Eugeniusz Misiło, whose works include two seminal books: *Akcja Wisła* and *Repatriacja czy deportacja.*\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Recovered Territories: an umbrella term encompassing Silesia, the Lubusz area and part of Western Pomerania up to the Oder–Neisse Line, as well as the southern part of East Prussia and Gdańsk. These territories formerly belonged to Germany and the Free City of Danzig, and became incorporated into Poland as a result of the Potsdam Conference of July–August 1945. The legitimacy of Polish sovereignty over these territories was recognised by the GDR in 1950 and the FRG in 1970. In 1945–1949, the territories were administered by the Ministry for the Recovered Territories, headed by Władysław Gomułka.


The gap in the publication of resettlement-related documents from Ukrainian archives has been substantially filled by Prof. Volodymyr Serhiychuk. Importantly, Prof. Serhiychuk has published collections of documents from the Central State Archive of Public Organisations of Ukraine (TsDAHOU, the former Party Archive of the Institute of Party History, attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine) and from the Central State Archive of the Higher Authority Organs of Ukraine (TsDAVOU). A considerable part of these materials throws light on the reactions of the Ukrainian and Polish armed underground to forced relocations.

Ivan Bilas and Mykola Buhai are also worth mentioning, as they have found several documents and other materials concerning the resettlements in the Russian archives and brought them to the attention of academics. It was they who first attempted an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms of the repression and penal systems in Ukraine, especially as these were implemented during the relocations of 1944–1946 and the struggle against the Ukrainian liberation movement.

For several years now, the Ivan Krypiakevich Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in Lviv has been publishing documents, memoirs, and other materials concerning repressions, deportations, and resettlements during World War II. These works elucidate some important aspects of the history of establishing the totalitarian regime in Western Ukraine and forcibly relocating Ukrainians from Poland.

Another selection of documents concerning the relocations of Poles from the USSR was published by Stanisław Ciesielski. This work mostly contains materials from Polish archives: the Central Archives of Modern Records, the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Central Military Archive.

The substantially broadened base of source documents has made it possible to release new monographs which provide an in-depth knowledge of the subject, and also raise many questions crucial to understanding the resettlement problem. Such as the extent to which the existence of Ukrainian and Polish armed underground organisations, and their struggle with the Communist authorities and each other,

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5 В. Сергійчук, Трагедія українців Польщі (Тернопіль, 1997); idem, Десять бурених літ. Західноукраїнські землі у 1944–1953 роках. Нові документи і матеріали (Київ, 1998); idem, Депортація поляків з України. Невідомі документи про насильницьке переселення більшовицькою владою польського населення з УРСР в Польщу в 1944–1946 роках (Київ, 1999).


contributed to the relocation operations of 1944–1947. On the basis of archival sources, Polish and Ukrainian historians have also been able to offer some crucial statistical data on both Ukrainian people relocated from Poland and Polish nationals relocated from Ukraine.

Several monographs detail the progress of the relocations and the response of the local people in particular geographical areas, and discuss underground resistance to resettlements in those territories. Some argue that the term “transfer” best describes these processes of population exchange accompanied by change of citizenship status under international treaties in the 1940s.

Substantial attention has also been given to the process of settling the relocated people in new territories. These issues have been analysed both by Polish historians and by expatriate Ukrainian researchers.

The Polish historians Grzegorz Motyka and Rafał Wnuk have taken up a new line of research by focusing on attempts at co-operation between Ukrainian and Polish underground organisations during the war and in its aftermath. While the cooperation agreements concluded in 1945–1947 between the Home Army, the Freedom and Independence Movement, and the OUN-UPA in several south-eastern areas of Poland to jointly fight the Communist authorities could do nothing to alter the general picture, they nevertheless saved the lives of many residents of Ukrainian and Polish villages. Motyka and Wnuk’s book affords a new perspective on the problem of resettlements and the resistance directed against them.

Resettlements have also been the subject of several international academic conferences, including “Poland and Ukraine after World War II,” held in Rzeszów in June 1996, where many important insights into the matter were presented. Another major conference, entitled ‘Deportations of Poles and Ukrainians: From Late 1939 to the Early 1950s – On the Fiftieth Anniversary of Operation “Vistula” was convened in Lviv in May 1997.

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10 E.g., О. Гайдай, Б. Хаварівський, В. Ханас, Хто пожав Бурю ’? Армія Крайова на Тернопіллі 1941–1945 років (Ternopil, 1996); С. Ткачов, Польсько-український трансфер населення 1944–1946 рр. Виселення поляків з Тернопілля (Ternopil, 1997).


The government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) concluded a treaty in Lublin, 9 September 1944, concerning the evacuation of the Ukrainian population from Poland and the Polish population from the Ukrainian SSR. The document was signed by the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, Nikita Khrushchev, and by Chairman of the PKWN, Edward Osóbka-Morawski.

The treaty provided for the resettlement of all Polish citizens of Ukrainian origin from the districts of Chełm, Hrubieszów, Tomaszów, Lubaczów, Jarosław, Przemyśl, Lesko, Zamość, Krasnystaw, Biłgoraj, and Włodawa to the Ukrainian SSR. The treaty also offered relocation to Ukrainians residing elsewhere in Poland but willing to move to the Ukrainian SSR. Likewise, all Poles and Jews who had held Polish citizenship prior to 17 September 1939 were to be resettled from the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR to Poland, if they were willing to do so. It was stressed that the evacuation was to be voluntary and that neither direct nor indirect coercion would be used. The evacuation was to take place from 15 October 1944 to 1 February 1945. Upon the request of either party, this period could be extended with the other party’s consent.

Some researchers have raised the question of why Poland signed the treaty with Ukraine rather than the Soviet Union. According to Dr. Yuriy Slyvka, this is very telling “because in other similar cases the Soviet Union did not trust Ukraine with signing similar treaties, e.g. in 1945 the treaty concerning Transcarpathian Ukraine was concluded by the governments of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. A scheme was hatched, which is still going on today. This treaty gave the appearance that the Ukrainian and Polish nations were settling their borders, with Moscow ostensibly remaining on the sidelines. The Soviet Union additionally left itself some room to manoeuvre – had the anti-Nazi alliance countries proven too high-principled, they could have said ‘it was not us who signed the treaty, but Ukraine.’ At the same time, the Kremlin actually initiated an exacerbation of Polish-Ukrainian relations without legally bearing any responsibility for fuelling a new civil war.”

In order to put the treaty into effect, on 19 September 1944 the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine (CC KP(b)U) passed a resolution, to form a suitable apparatus in the Ukrainian SSR and Poland and to draw up all the documents necessary to formalise the relocation procedures. N. Podgorny was appointed Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR for the relocation of Ukrainians from Poland, based in Lublin (succeeded by M. Romashchenko in 1946), and A. Tsokol was appointed Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR for the resettlement of Polish nationals from

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15 *Ibidem*, 11. This opinion is shared by R. Torzecki, who also blames Kremlin for straining Polish-Ukrainian relations during World War II and in its immediate aftermath. See R. Torzecki, „Wisła zaczęła się w Moskwie,” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 20 May 1997, 23.
the Ukrainian SSR, based in Lutsk. S. Pizło was designated PKWN Chief Commissioner for the evacuation of Polish citizens from the Ukrainian SSR, based in Lutsk, and M. Rogalski was appointed Chief Representative for the evacuation of Ukrainian nationals from Poland, based in Lublin (succeeded by J. Bednarz in May 1945). Deputy chief commissioners and chief representatives, regional commissioners, regional representatives, and their deputies were also appointed.

In order to arrive at a set of uniform formal procedures for population resettlement, the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the CC KP(b)U drew up and adopted a special instruction concerning the implementation of the treaty. This instruction was delivered to the Polish authorities by the USSR government’s representative at the PKWN, General N. Bulganin, on 22 September 1944. Lublin decided that the proposed instruction did not meet all the requirements of the resettlement commissions which were to operate in Poland, so an additional instruction was drawn up by the Polish authorities at the end of December 1944.

In October that year, the office of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR was established in Lublin, and 11 regional commissioners’ offices were set up throughout Poland (another 4 offices were set up after the final liberation of eastern Poland). In addition, the office of the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR was established in Lutsk, and 18 regional representatives’ offices were set up in the Ukrainian SSR (in April 1945 an additional representative office was opened in Chernivtsi). These posts were filled by the Personnel Department of the CC KP(b)U with responsible officers of narkomats as well as central and district organisations and institutions of the republic. From 5–10 October 1944, the Chief Commissioner and Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, along with their regional commissioners and representatives, started their field work. Special services officers were appointed as their deputies.

The delay in creating the offices of the Chief Commissioner and the regional commissioners of the PKWN, and in preparing Polish citizens to be relocated from the Ukrainian SSR to Poland, can be explained by the fact that the people to be resettled had nowhere to go, as a large part of the country was still under German occupation.

Archival documents also reveal the patriotic attitudes of many Polish people inhabiting the Eastern Borderlands who tried to sabotage the resettlements. Their motivations include defending the rights of the Polish State to the territories of Western Ukraine, anticipation of a war with England and America against the Soviet Union, as well as a rejection of the PKWN by the Polish people.

On 29 September 1944, Nikita Khrushchev informed Joseph Stalin that “Polish people, especially in the town of Lviv, and in particular the intelligentsia connected to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, are spreading rumours that the question of the borders has not been conclusively settled and that Poles should not leave. We know that the Polish Government-in-Exile in London has issued a directive to its organisations in Lviv and other cities in Western Ukraine stating
that Poles should refrain from evacuation, promising that it will ensure the incorporation of Lviv and the other cities into the territory of the Polish state at the peace conference.”

In response, Khrushchev proposed that the following policies be adopted in Western Ukraine: “At all universities and high schools, exclusively Ukrainian and Russian course books are to be used and classes are to be taught in Ukrainian and Russian only. In the Soviet Union, some schools have been organised for Polish children where classes are conducted in Polish and according to Polish curricula. Thus, the children are being educated in the spirit of the Polish bourgeois-democratic state. Polish people have demanded such schools in the town of Lviv as well. Their request has been refused, and it has been proposed that classes should be taught in accordance with curricula approved by the Narkom of education of the Ukrainian SSR in all Ukrainian and Polish schools. We also find it necessary to cancel the directives of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR ‘On the prohibition to mobilise Polish people in the western oblasts beyond the borders of the region from working in industry in the eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR and other republics of the Soviet Union.’ Polish people should be required to perform all the duties imposed on the other residents of Soviet Ukraine. This means that we will be mobilising Polish people, both men and women, inhabiting the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR to work in industry, construct defence structures, and participate in other ventures on equal terms with Ukrainians.”

The Commissioner of the PKWN came to Lutsk together with a 10-strong staff on 23 October 1944. By 1 November the Polish authorities had only established a regional commissioner’s office in Lutsk, while Kovel, Rivne, and Volodymyr-Volynskyi had only seen the arrival of regional commissioners with their deputies. Upon the request of the Chief Commissioner of the PKWN, the CC KP(b)U provided assistance in supplying all the 18 regions in the western oblasts of Ukraine with regional commissioners. Many of these offices were filled with Polish people residing in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR.

Soon afterwards, Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, National Security Colonel I. Grebchenko, in his special report No. 075 dated 27 January 1945, informed the Secretary of the CC KP(b)U, D. Korotchenko, that the majority of regional commissioners’ offices were “infested” with the nationalist element, members of the Home Army, and other people hostile to Soviet rule. After operational verification by the NKVD and NKGB, many of the officials were dismissed and arrested for anti-Soviet activity.

The first transports of Ukrainians went from Poland to the Ukrainian SSR at the beginning of November 1944, but the transports of Polish people fell behind schedule and did not start until December 1944. With the onset of winter, the number of people willing to evacuate dropped dramatically on both sides. At the same time, it was gradually becoming clear that the Lublin Treaty had not won the popular support of either the Ukrainian or Polish population.

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16 Депортації поляків та українців: кінець 1939 – початок 50-х років..., 11.
This forced the Ukrainian and Polish authorities to delay and postpone the end of the resettlement operation several times, and to begin employing universal coercion in the early autumn of 1945.

These experiences led to the conclusion, on 6 July 1945, of an agreement between the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity (TRJN) and the government of the USSR to conduct relocations throughout the entire territories of both countries, thus extending the previous resettlement operation beyond the regions overseen by the commissions formed under the treaty signed by the Ukrainian SSR and the PKWN on 9 September 1944. The agreement included those Polish citizens who had been deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan in 1940–1941 and transported to Ukraine from eastern Russia under the resolutions adopted by the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR on 5 April and 11 July 1944.

On 20 September 1945, at a meeting in Kiev, Ukrainian government officials, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars N. Khrushchev, the Narkom of Foreign Affairs D. Manuilsky, representatives of the Polish TRJN, Deputy Minister J. Berman, Deputy Minister W. Wolski, and the Vice-President of the Polish State National Council S. Grabski signed a protocol supplementing the treaty of 9 September 1944 to extend the deadline for people registering for relocation to 31 December 1945. The protocol did not specify a completion date for the resettlement operation.

Another protocol supplementing the treaty of 9 September 1944 was signed by representatives of the governments of the Ukrainian SSR and Poland in Warsaw on 14 December. This extended the completion date for registration to 15 January 1946, and set a deadline for population resettlement conducted under the treaty of 15 June 1946. The protocol was signed by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, M. Bazhan, and by Edward Osóbka-Morawski on behalf of the Polish government.

A protocol summarising the effects of relocations conducted under the treaty of 9 September 1944 was signed in Warsaw on 6 May 1947. The Ukrainian and Polish authorities found to their satisfaction that the relocation of Polish citizens from the Ukrainian SSR to Poland and of Ukrainian citizens from Poland to the Ukrainian SSR had been carried out and completed in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and agreement. The protocol was signed by Deputy Prime Minister A. Korzycki for the Polish government, and by Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V. Starchenko for the Ukrainian government.

An official communiqué from the Polish and Ukrainian governments concerning the completion of the resettlements was issued on 7 May 1947. It stressed that: “Now, as the evacuation work has been completed, both governments believe that the evacuation of Polish citizens from the Ukrainian SSR and of Ukrainian citizens from Poland is an important factor for both sides which will be beneficial for the further strengthening of friendship, mutual understanding, and cooperation between our fraternal nations.”

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17 Quoted in E. Misiło, Akcja “Wisła”,..., 231.
The degree to which the concluded operation actually served the “strengthening of friendship, mutual understanding, and cooperation” between the Ukrainians and the Polish people can be gauged by the firm reaction to the resettlements on the part of the Ukrainian and Polish anti-Communist armed underground, with Polish and Ukrainian organisations operating both in Poland and Ukraine. It is fully understandable that the resettlement operation was vigorously resisted by Polish underground organisations, especially the Home Army, in Ukraine, and by the OUN and the UPA in Poland, with the Ukrainian resistance lasting much longer.

As has already been mentioned, Polish opposition to resettlement in 1944–1945 was mostly driven by people’s reluctance to leave the lands they had long inhabited, and by their hopes that Western Ukraine would be returned to Poland by a post-war international conference. Initially, the Home Army was convinced of the necessity of postponing the relocations of Poles from the Ukrainian SSR for as long as possible. However, the Polish underground’s resistance began to wane once the Soviet-Polish border agreement was concluded between the USSR and the Republic of Poland on 16 August 1945, and the Soviet authorities began stepping up repressions related to resettlement. By the end of 1945, the underground structures of the Home Army were practically non-existent in Western Ukraine, although arrests of Polish underground members continued into 1946, as evidenced by the documents contained in this volume.

The Polish government’s intention to accelerate the evacuation, on account of the necessity of populating the Recovered Territories granted to Poland at the Potsdam Conference, seems to have been an important factor in the final stage of relocating Polish people from Ukraine.

The Soviet-Polish border agreement had very different ramifications for the sort of resistance the OUN-UPA was putting up to resettlement. As is known, the Ukrainian underground was subjected to extremely severe repressions once Ukraine had been liberated from German occupation. At the same time, the Polish government fuelled the resistance when it deployed the Polish Army to begin widespread forced resettlements of Ukrainians from Poland to the Ukrainian SSR in September 1945. The UPA ranks in Poland were then bolstered by UPA units from the Ukrainian SSR.

Holding Lemkivshchyna, Nadsanie, Chełm Land, and Podlachia, which remained within the Polish state, to have always been ethnically Ukrainian territories, the UPA fought to defend the rights, and later the lives, of the local Ukrainian population. UPA units began destroying relocation commissions, sabotaging railways and roads, attacking smaller military and militia stations, and burning deserted villages on a massive scale. After concluding cooperation agreements, some Polish underground troops joined in these operations.

This gave the Polish authorities additional justification to use force to resettle the Ukrainians, and the command of the Polish Armed Forces was handed a pretext to use repressive measures against civilians suspected of helping the UPA. However, the combined efforts of the Polish and Ukrainian security services and regular army troops did not bring about the expected results in 1945–1946.
Despite being defeated time and again, the sotnias somehow managed to keep regenerating their forces with the assistance and support of villagers sympathising with the UPA.

Some 200,000 people of Ukrainian nationality continued to inhabit south-eastern Poland at the end of 1946, despite the forced resettlement operation. This meant that the Ukrainian problem had not been solved. The next step was Operation “Vistula,” which began in the spring of 1947.

*       *

Some of the published documents concern Polish people who were transported from Siberia to Ukraine in 1944, and subsequently resettled to Poland. Although these constitute only a small proportion of the materials, they throw some light on the situation of the Polish population in the former Soviet Union during World War II. The archival documents primarily reveal the role of the special services in organising, implementing, and overseeing the relocations. For example, the instruction of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the CC KP(b)U regulating the resettlement process was supplemented by the Ukrainian NKVD with several special provisions, including the appointment of its officers to positions such as Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR in Lublin and regional commissioners and representatives – a total of 31 posts.

The special services kept the authorities informed of reactions to the conclusion of the treaty of 9 September 1944, the prevailing political attitudes, and the living conditions of the relocated population. NKVD, NKGB, and MGB materials contain many dramatic accounts of the situation of Polish groups, which was very different from that presented in the official reports and releases produced by the authorities which had effected the resettlements.

Documents reporting abuse during the resettlement process are also instructive, in that they make it possible to recreate a true picture and explain the causes of many of the problems encountered by the relocated population.

While working in the archives, special attention was paid to those documents that were relevant to reconstructing the statistical dimensions of the 1944–1946 Polish-Ukrainian resettlements. The documents selected present figures concerning the successive stages of the resettlement operation at the oblast and województwo levels, as well as global figures for both countries.

The Soviet MGB documents (no. 27 and 28) are of particular interest as they detail the numbers of people relocated from Ukraine to Poland, and from Poland to Ukraine. As of October 1946, 812,688 Polish citizens had left Ukraine, while a report from March 1947 states that 472,635 Ukrainians had been evacuated from Poland.

Many extant documents in the special services’ archives attest to anti-resettlement resistance, and show how the Polish and Ukrainian authorities
countered that effort. At the same time, it should be stressed that the NKVD, NKGB, and MGB fought both the Polish underground and the Ukrainian resistance movement.

For example, a report on the Ukrainian NKGB’s intelligence and operational activity concerning the liquidation of the Polish underground and the repatriation and relocation of Polish citizens to Poland recounts the arrest of 3017 people, many of whom were members of the Home Army, the Polish Government Delegation for Poland, and the Polish Armed Forces (document no. 22).

Unfortunately, we have not been able to find all the documents that should be included in this volume. It would seem, however, that whatever materials we have managed to obtain so far point to an urgent need to continue research on the Polish-Ukrainian resettlements of 1944–1946.
DOCUMENTS
No. 1
19 September 1944, Kiev. Letter from Vasily Riasnoy to Vasily Chernyshov, reporting on an instruction concerning resettlement procedures

Top secret

To the Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Commissar 2nd Rank of State Security
Com[rade] CHERNYSHOV¹

We enclose the treaty concluded between the government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation [PKWN] on evacuating the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and the Polish population from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

In order to put the treaty into effect, the SNK [Council of People’s Commissars] of the Ukrainian SSR and the CC KP(b)U have drawn up an instruction including the following points:

1. People evacuated from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR onto the territory of Poland are required to hand over their identity cards and other documents proving their identity, except copies of birth certificates, to the regional deputy of the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR or his assistant. In return, they will be given evacuation certificates by the regional deputies of the Chief Commissioner of the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

2. All citizens evacuated from Poland to the Ukrainian SSR are to be given evacuation certificates issued by the regional deputies of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR.

3. An evacuation certificate entitles the holder to travel to the designated place of residence, and is issued to all citizens 14 years and over evacuated onto the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. Children 14 years and under are entered onto the evacuation certificate issued to the head of the family.

4. Evacuees are to be allowed through the checkpoints on the basis of their evacuation certificates and lists compiled by the regional deputies of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR. The escort must hand over one copy of the list at the checkpoint and the other to the executive committee of the Council of Workers’ Deputies in the settlement areas designated for evacuees.

5. Identity cards and other documents proving identity handed over by evacuated citizens, together with evacuation certificates, must be entered in a register (a specimen is attached).

6. Evacuees who have received evacuation certificates are required to leave the territory of the Ukrainian SSR within 15 days of receiving the certificate.

7. Any identity cards and other documents proving identity that have been handed over must be sent by the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR to the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR along with the list.

[8.] In areas subject to the passport regime,² citizens evacuated from the territory of Poland onto the territory of Ukraine are required to report to organs of the militia in order to obtain identity cards, and to register within 3 days of arriving at the place of settlement. If they arrive in a place that is not subject to the passport regime, they are required to report to the Village Council (Settlement Council) to submit their evacuation certificates and register on the list [of residents] of the settlement. The Village Councils (Settlement Councils) are required to send evacuation certificates to militia organs.

9. Militia organs in areas subject to the passport regime are to issue identity cards to the evacuees, pursuant to the appropriate regulations, and register them for permanent residency on the basis of their evacuation certificates.

For the evacuation work, the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR has designated one officer as a deputy of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR in the [city] of Lublin, one officer as a deputy of the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR in the [city] of Lutsk, and competent regional commissioners and representatives – a total of 31 officers.

People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security
RIASNOY

“sa-19-at” September 1944
²No. 2363/SN²
Kiev

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 7 (1951), Spr. 4, pp. 161–162.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Annexes not published.

²²Filed in by hand.
² The passport regime came into force in the annexed territories by a resolution of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR dated 30 December 1939, following the decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 29 November 1939 “On granting Soviet citizenship to the inhabitants of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSRs.” In the territories incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR, passports were issued from February to May 1940. The obligation to hold this document applied to permanent residents of cities and workers’ estates, people living in the 7.5 km strip along the border, and persons employed in the transport industry, in sovkhozes, and on new building sites. People without passports were forbidden to enter areas subject to the passport regime. These regulations (the violation of which was a criminal offence) also applied to Polish people who involuntarily became Soviet citizens. See A. Glowacki, Sowieci wobec Polaków na ziemiach wschodnich II Rzeczypospolitej 1939–1941 (Łódź, 1998), 78–85.
Resolution No. 1237/69 of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and CC KP(b)U
19 September 1944
City of Kiev

on implementing the treaty concluded between the Government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation, on evacuating the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

In order to implement the treaty concluded between the Government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation on evacuating the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR and the Central Committee of the KP(b)U resolve to:

1. Approve Comrade Podgorny N. V.1 as Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR in Lublin and
   Comrades Kalnenko T. S.2 and Romashchenko M. A.3 as Deputy Chief Commissioners of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR.

2. Approve Comrade Tsokol A. A. as Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR in Lutsk.
   Approve Comrades Grebchenko I. K.4 and Mogila A. O. as deputy Chief Representatives of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR in Lutsk.

3. Approve the instruction concerning the evacuation (Annex No. 1).

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1 Nikolai Podgorny (1903–1983), in 1944–1946 Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR for the resettlement of Ukrainians from the territory of Poland to the USSR; in 1946–1950 permanent representative of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR to the government of the USSR.
2 Timofey Kalnenko (born 1904), state security colonel, Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal affairs of the Ukrainian SSR in 1943–1953 (deputy minister from 1946); from 1944, Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR for the resettlement of Ukrainians from the territory of Poland to the Ukrainian SSR.
3 Mikhail Romashchenko, from 1944 Deputy Chief Commissioner; from 1946 Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR for the resettlement of Ukrainians from the territory of Poland to the USSR.
4 National Security Colonel Ivan Grebchenko.
4. Approve regional commissioners and their deputies and regional representatives and their deputies (Annex No. 2).

5. For the purpose of evacuation, set up a Directorate attached to the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR, and departments for the evacuation and resettlement of Ukrainians and Polish people attached to the Oblast Executive Committees in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR.

Appoint the Deputy Narkom of State Control of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade Ivanov as Head of the Directorate by combining his duties. Designate 8 rooms for the Administration Bureau of the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR to provide accommodation for the staff of the Directorate.

6. Order Comrades Korotchenko, Kirichenko, Starchenko to consider and approve:
   a) the posts of Chief Commissioner, Chief Representative, regional commissioners and representatives;
   b) the posts of Members of the General Directorate for evacuation attached to the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR and the departments for evacuation attached to the Oblast Executive Committees.

7. Obligate the Narkom of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade Riasnoy, to ensure appropriate protection for evacuees and all personnel involved in evacuation.

8. [Order] the Narkom of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade Riasnoy, to arrange itineraries for the evacuees with the Chief Commissioner and the Chief Representative, and to set up transit checkpoints.

9. Obligate the Oblast Executive Committees and Oblast Committees of the KP(b)U in the western oblasts to ensure that the belongings the evacuees leave behind and the buildings they vacate are fully registered and protected. In order to put this into effect, appoint people responsible for protecting the property left in the cities, raions and villages where the evacuation is to be conducted.

10. [Order] the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture and the People’s Commissariat of the Economy to submit a plan to settle people arriving from Poland to the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR and the CC KP(b)U for approval by 10 October.

11. [Order] the Commissioner of the USSR Narkomat for Supplies attached to the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade Kalashnikov, to secure the collection of agricultural products handed over by citizens evacuated to Poland and the disbursement of goods to citizens evacuated from Poland.

12. [Order] Comrades Savchenko and Butenko to prepare and present measures aimed at ensuring that land is allocated to citizens evacuated from Poland to the Sovnarkom of the Ukrainian SSR and the CC KP(b)U by 10 October.

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5 Aleksei Kirichenko (1908–1975), in 1944–1945 Secretary of the CC KP(b)U for Personnel; in 1945–1949 1st Secretary of the Oblast Committee of the CC KP(b)U in Odessa.
6 Vasily Starchenko, from 1946 Deputy Prime Minister of the Ukrainian SSR.
7 G. Butenko, Minister of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR (1946); from 1947 Minister of Agricultural Economy of the Ukrainian SSR.
13. Obligate the Oblast Executive Committees and Oblast Committees of the KP(b)U in the western oblasts to receive and accommodate workers, craftsmen, doctors, artists, scientists, clerks and other town dwellers evacuated from Poland in cities, and help them find jobs.

14. Obligate the Oblast, Municipal and Raion Committees of the KP(b)U to assign communist agitators to the settlement points to conduct mass political work among the citizens arriving from Poland.

15. Obligate the Chief Commissioner, Comrade Podgorny, the Chief Representative, Comrade Tsokol, and the Narkom of Finances of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade Sakhnovsky, to prepare a preliminary estimate of the costs of maintaining the offices of the Chief [Commissioner], regional commissioners, Chief [Representative] and regional representatives for the evacuation of the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, and submit it to the Sovnarkom of the Ukrainian SSR for approval by 1 October 1944.

Obligate the People’s Commissar of Finances of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade Sakhnovsky, to approve the budget; advance payments to meet the urgent requirements of the Chief Commissioner and the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR are to be financed from the Republic budget on an as-needed basis.

16. Designate 10 cars in good working order and 4 trucks with drivers for the Chief Commissioner and regional commissioners, and the Chief Representative and regional representatives.

Order Comrade Korotchenko to deploy these vehicles from the narkoms and central organisations of the Ukrainian SSR.

Obligate the Ukrainian Bureau for Oil Supplies (Comrade Zavadsky) to supply the vehicles with a sufficient amount of fuel from the resources of the Ukrainian SSR.

17. Obligate the Civil Aviation Board (Comrade Grebnev) to designate one U-2 aircraft for the Chief Commissioner in Lublin and one U-2 aircraft for the Chief Representative in Lutsk.

18. Obligate the Chief of the Ukrainian Staff of the Partisan Movement, Comrade Strokach, to assign mobile radio sets with radio operators-cryptographers to the Chief Representative and the Chief Commissioner.

19. Obligate the Commissioner of the People’s Commissariat of Communication of the USSR attached to the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade Sadovnychy, to ensure the necessary telephone contact between the regional representatives and the Chief Representative.

20. Deploy 5 typists with typewriters for the Chief Commissioner and 3 typists with typewriters [for] the Chief Representative (Annex No. 3).

21. Obligate the secretaries of the Oblast Committees, the secretaries of the Raion Committees of the KP(b)U, and the Chairmen of the Oblast Executive Committees and Raion Executive Committees to provide the Chief Representative, regional representatives and their staff, and the Chief Commissioner of the Polish
Committee of National Liberation, regional commissioners and their staff, with offices and living quarters in their places of deployment.

Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR
N. KHRUSHCHEV

Secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U
D. KOROTCHENKO

HDA SBU, F. 16, Op. 3 (1948), Spr. 5, pp. 23–27.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Annexes not published.
No. 3
3 October 1944, [no place given]. Circular from Stanisław Kotek-Agroszewski to the local authorities, on the assistance to be provided to Polish and Ukrainian personnel assigned to conduct resettlement

Polish Committee of National Liberation
No. A.P. 360/44
3 October 1944

Circular letter

To
Chairman of
the Powiat People’s Council
In .........................

In connection with the implementation of the treaty between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the government of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic on evacuation, it is hereby communicated that the powiat representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Commissioners of the Ukrainian SRR with their deputies shall arrive at the aforementioned places in early October 1944 to commence work connected with the evacuation of the Ukrainian population.

In view of the foregoing, a citizen—a chairman, starosta, gmina heads, and village leaders—are requested to render every assistance in carrying out the tasks connected with implementing the aforementioned treaty, and first and foremost to ensure the security of the representatives and commissioners, and their deputies and staff; to provide the Polish representatives and Ukrainian commissioners, and their deputies and office personnel, with office premises and living quarters; and to provide full board for the aforementioned commissioners, representatives, deputies and personnel, i.e., to arrange for canteens to serve breakfast, dinner and supper to the aforementioned personnel.

The aforementioned personnel must also be provided with every kind of office assistance, as well as unfettered access to typewriters, office and household equipment, and means of transport for as long as the aforementioned personnel do not have their own means of transport.

* Underlined by hand.
Above all, it is necessary to remember that the representatives, commissioners, and their staff are performing important work, and represent either the authorities of Poland or a friendly neighbouring state. They are therefore to be offered every aid and assistance.

Head of Department
Department of Public Administration
Stanisław Kotek Agroszewski¹
(−) p.p. Adam Ostrowski, M.A.

A MSWiA, PKWN RAP 6, p. 1.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Document published (based on another copy) in E. Misiło, Repatriacja czy deportacja..., 63–64.

¹ Stanisław Kotek-Agroszewski (1905–1985), from July to November 1944 Head of the Department of Public Administration of the PKWN; in 1944–1952 member of the State National Council (KRN) and the Legislative Sejm; member of the Peasants’ Party (SL); in the underground organisations SL “Roch” and the Peasants Battalions (BCh) during WWII; from February to September 1944 Deputy Chairman of the Management Board of Wola Ludu [The People’s Will]; in 1945–1949 member of the National Council and Chairman of the National Council of the SL; removed from politics but returned after 1956; in 1961–1962 Chairman of the Warsaw Committee of the United Peasants’ Party (ZSL).
No. 4
6 November 1944, Kiev. Special report on the situation in Poland and the attitudes of the Ukrainian population regarding resettlement, submitted by Pyotr Burmak and Artashes Tier-Grigoryan to Vasily Riasnoy

General Staff of NKVD Border Troops, Ukrainian District

““a-6-a” November 1944  No. 5/00* 386-a  City of Lviv
Top secret
Series “K” “KN”
Copy No. 1

To the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security
Comrade RIASNOY

Special report
on the attitudes of the Ukrainian population living on the territory of Poland
to planned resettlement to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR

(As a supplement to [letter] No. 5/00296 dated 7 October [19]44)
State of affairs as of 4 November 1944

I hereby report that:

According to data collected by the foreign spy network set up by the 98th NKVD Border Unit, the reactionary and nationalistic part of the Polish population, especially Home Army members, in response to the resettlement treaty concluded between the government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation, claim that all Ukrainians living in Poland will be expelled to the USSR “with empty hands.”

These claims are reflected in increasing robberies among the Ukrainian population perpetrated by the Home Army. For example, in the month of October 1944, 7 cases of robbery perpetrated by Home Army bandits against Ukrainians were reported in the 98th Border Unit section, during which 17 families suffered losses.

The Ukrainians living in the border strip in the powiat of Chełm are fearful of Home Army terror. They are still undecided, and for the most part have not applied for evacuation.

According to information collected by the spy network organised by the 90th NKVD Border Unit, specially delegated to the villages around the town of Hrubieszów (including Husynne (3608), Moroczynb (3606), Strzyżówc (3890), and

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a = Filled in by hand.
b Was: Morogin.
c Was: Styżów.
others), the majority of the Ukrainians living in these villages intend to resettle to the Ukrainian SSR.

At the same time, some individuals among the residents of the aforementioned villages are unwilling to resettle, claiming that the Soviet authorities are going to confiscate all the grain owned by the resettled people, and that the Ukrainian resettlers will be repressed and sent to Siberia.

Information obtained from the first group of people relocated from Hrubieszów powiat to the town of Volodymyr-Volynskyi on 26 October 1944 clearly indicates that provocative rumours about Soviet repressions against Ukrainians relocated to the Ukrainian SSR are being spread in Hrubieszów powiat by Polish nationalists, who openly claim that every Ukrainian who resettles to the Ukrainian SSR will be sent to Siberia.

It should be noted that a large number of Ukrainians are under the influence of this agitation, and so far have not made a final decision to resettle, even though they are not against it.

Over the borderline, the 89th NKVD Border Unit section (around the city of Przemyśl), persistent rumours are being spread among the Ukrainians that the borderline between the USSR and Poland will be established along the River San, so it is not necessary to resettle to the Ukrainian SSR.

Consequently, despite the official announcement that applications for relocation could be filed until 31 October 1944, not a single application had been received from the village of Kalniki (3274) by 30 October 1944.

Commander of the NKVD Border Troops, Ukrainian District
Major General
(−) BURMAK

Commander of Department 5 of the UPV NKVD, Ukrainian District
Lieutenant Colonel
(−) TIER-GRIGORYAN¹

¹ Artashes Tier-Grigoryan (born 1905), lieutenant-colonel, in 1943–1944 commander of Department 5 of the Command of the NKVD Border Troops, Ukrainian District.
Handwritten note in upper right hand corner: 8 November [19]44, Ref. No. 44; in left hand corner: Wch. 3789, 15 November [19]44; handwritten note in left margin Comrade Loburenko.2

2 Ivan Loburenko (born 1906), Militia Commissar 3rd Rank, Deputy People’s Commissar (Deputy Minister from 1946) of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR; from 1948 head of the administration of the NKVD-MVD Corrective Labour Camps and Corrective Labour Colonies of the Ukrainian SSR.
No. 5

7 November 1944, Lublin. Circular letter on relief for Ukrainians willing to leave Poland, sent by Mieczysław Rogalski to the Heads of PKWN departments

Polish Committee of National Liberation
Department of Foreign Affairs
No. 222/44 B/M

Lublin, 7 November 1944

To Citizens Heads of Departments of
1. Public Administration
2. National Economy and Finances
3. PKWN Commissioner for War Relief in Lublin

Pursuant to Article 3 of the Treaty concluded between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the government of the Ukrainian SSR on 9 September 1944 on evacuating the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland, it is requested that you order all subordinate organs and competent authorities in the powiats specified below to grant the people resettling to Ukraine the relief provided for in the said Treaty.

This relief includes the following:
1) cancellation (forgiveness) of all debts arising from in-kind contributions;
2) cancellation of all tax arrears;
3) cancellation of all insurance arrears (contributions).
Along with the arrears, current taxes due, in-kind contributions, and insurance payments should likewise be cancelled.

The arrears and current payables shall be cancelled upon request of the Regional PKWN Representative for evacuation and the Regional Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR.

Cancelling in-kind contributions includes exempting relocating Ukrainians from the obligation to supply horses with harness and carts set forth in the Order on the Partial Mobilisation of Horses and Carts of 6 October 1944.

The relief stipulated in the Treaty for Ukrainian nationals opting for relocation should be applied in the powiats of Lublin, Chełm, Hrubieszów, Tomaszów, Lubaczów, Jarosław, Przemyśl, Lesko, Zamość, Krasnystaw, Biłgoraj, and Włodawa, as well as other powiats where applications are made.

Undertlined by hand.
Given that the resettlement operation is already under way, it is requested that
this issue be treated as urgent to avoid delay and/or obstruction in implementing
a treaty of international significance.

Chief Representative of PKWN
(–) Consul ROGALSKI

*MSWiA, PKWN RAP 6, p. 19.*
Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.

Paper with a letterhead; in the top left hand corner above the heading, the national emblem and a
handwritten note: Deputy Minister Ostrowski; a handwritten number under the heading: a.II.71/44;
a handwritten note in the top right hand corner: Received 13 November 1944, N A. P. 598/44 and an
illegible signature.

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1 Mieczysław Rogalski (1889–1952), diplomat; consul of the Republic of Poland in Marienwerder
(Kwidzyn) in 1935; in 1936–1939 vice-consul in Elk; from 1944 in the PKWN; Chief Representative of
the Government of the Republic of Poland for the Evacuation of the Ukrainian Population from Poland
(until 30 April 1945); Director of the Consular Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of the
KRN, member of the SD; member of the Presidium of the General Board of the SD (1944).
17 November 1944, Lublin. Information on economic irregularities that occurred in the Lublin region during the resettlement of Ukrainians, submitted by Kazimierz Sidor to the Presidium of the KRN and the PKWN

Lublin Wojewoda

Lublin, 17 November 1944
Top secret

To
Presidium of the State National Council
Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin

With reference to my report dated 2 November 1944, I hereby provide the following additional information.

When the distribution of in-kind contributions (grain and meat) was determined, the entire area of Lublin województwo was taken into account, including powiats partially inhabited by the Ukrainian population.

As I have already mentioned, due to their generally positive attitude towards the German occupation, Ukrainians were granted substantial reductions on their quotas. Moreover, in the regions [powiats] of Hrubieszów, Zamość, Biłgoraj and Tomaszów, where Polish nationals were persecuted and displaced en masse, all their property was appropriated by Ukrainians, with the consent of the Germans, and is still retained by them.

Due to the incorrect interpretation and ill will of the local Ukrainian population, they are not handing in their quotas at all. Consequently, it is only Polish villages, which were severely impoverished during the occupation, that are burdened with in-kind contributions. Moreover, [residents of] Ukrainian villages who have resolved to leave for the Ukrainian Soviet Republic are breaking the treaty by selling grain, possessions and equipment meant to be left for Polish people resettled from the territory of the Soviet Union. This situation is endorsed by the local Soviet military authorities, who applaud anything the Ukrainian population does to disadvantage the Polish population. In some cases, settlements left by Ukrainians who have moved to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic have been burned down maliciously.

Things have gone so far that in the areas inhabited by the Ukrainian population, the Ukrainian Repatriation Committee has put up posters announcing that Ukrainian nationals are exempted from the quota. Grain and possessions left in villages from which Ukrainians have been relocated are being moved by the Red Army to designated places, and are considered the property of the Soviet Union.

Given the difficult situation in the Lublin region (the burden of providing food supplies for the Red Army, the Polish Army and civilians has fallen exclusively on this area), and the fact that the repatriates who are going to arrive here from across the Bug River will not only not have any grain or possessions, but not even
the most necessary equipment and clothes, I propose that Ukrainian repatriates only be allowed to cross the Bug with that quantity of cattle, grain and equipment that we receive from over there.

Otherwise, given the decimation of livestock by the occupier, a mass outflow of property with the resettling Ukrainians will cause our farming and husbandry sector to break down.

Wojewoda

(–) K. Sidor

A MSWiA, colonel, RAP 6, p. 25.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Handwritten note in the top left corner: II Sp. (Citizen Sznek).

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*Next to the signature, an illegible word, probably Lieutenant-Colonel

1 Kazimierz Sidor (1915–1981), *noms de guerre* “Kruk,” “Hardy,” colonel, member of a PPR district committee during the German occupation; from 1943 deputy commander of the Lublin District of the GL; left for the USSR (March 1944); in 1944–1945 Lublin *wojewoda* and Chairman of the WRN in Lublin; in 1944–1947 member of the KRN.
No. 7
27 November 1944, Kiev. Report on implementing the Treaty of Lublin on resettling the Ukrainian population from Poland and Polish citizens from the Ukrainian SSR, submitted by Nikita Khrushchev to Joseph Stalin

To the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Union of the SSR
Com[rade] STALIN J. V.

On implementing the treaty concluded between the Government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation, on evacuating the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Pursuant to the treaty concluded by the government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation “On evacuating the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR” signed in the city of Lublin on 9 September 1944, the Sovnarkom of the Ukrainian SSR and the Central Committee KP(b)U appointed a Chief Commissioner and a Chief Representative of the government of the Ukrainian SSR, an efficient apparatus was set up in the Ukrainian SSR and Poland, and a special instruction was prepared on implementing the said Treaty, including all the documents necessary to comply with the formalities related to the evacuation of the respective populations.

In Poland, the office of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR was established in Lublin, and 11 [offices] of Regional Deputies of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR were established in the towns of Włodawa, Chełm, Hrubieszów, Tomaszów, Lubaczów, Jarosław, Przemyśl, Lesko, Zamość, Krasnystaw and Biłgoraj.

On the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, the office of the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR was established in Lutsk, and 18 [offices] of Regional Deputies of the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR were established in the towns of Kovel, Volodymyr-Volynskyi, Lutsk, Rivne, Dubno, Kremenets, Brody, Rava-Ruska, Lviv, Sambir, Drohobych, Stryi, Khodoriv, Stanislav, Ternopil, Zolochiv, Kamianka-Buzka1 and Chortkiv.

The offices of the Chief Commissioner and the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR and Regional Commissioners and Representatives have been filled with senior officers from narkoms and central and oblast organisations and enterprises of the Republic.

The instruction on implementing the Treaty between the Ukrainian government and the Polish Committee of National Liberation includes basic guidelines and

1 Prior to 1944 Kamianka Strumilova.
requirements concerning the procedures for the following questions: evacuating and allotting land; writing off tax arrears arising from in-kind contributions, taxes due, and insurance payments; the handover and collection of agricultural products by evacuees; granting loans; the transportation of property by evacuees; completing formalities related to property left by evacuees; organisation and completion dates for evacuation; the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Regional Deputies of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Regional Deputies of the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR; and notifying the Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, and Ruthenians living on the territory of Poland of the options and procedures for evacuating to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

Moreover, the following documents are specified in the instruction:
1) an application form for expressing one’s willingness to evacuate;
2) a form for listing evacuated families (households);
3) a form for the notification of writing off tax arrears arising from in-kind supplies from evacuated households;
4) a form for document specifying the agricultural products collected from the evacuated households;
5) a form for describing the property left by evacuated households;
6) a list of standards for assessing the value of buildings;
7) a specimen evacuation card;
8) a specimen certificate of evacuation to the Ukrainian SSR;
9) a logbook for registering the documents [of the people] evacuated from the Ukrainian SSR to Poland.

As the documents stipulated in the instruction for implementing the Treaty between the government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Polish Committee of National Liberation on evacuating the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR have been fully acceptable to the Polish side, the instruction was adopted in toto by the Polish Committee of National Liberation. This makes the evacuation work considerably easier.

The Chief Commissioner and the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, along with the Regional Commissioners and Regional Representatives, arrived on site on 5–10 October 1944 to commence the practical work of implementing the Treaty.

It should be noted that at the initial stage of implementing the Treaty, the Polish Committee of National Liberation’s efforts to organise the evacuation and prepare the evacuees were conducted in a very inefficient manner, and they only began work on filling the administration staff positions of the offices of the Chief Commissioner and the Regional Deputies of the Chief Commissioner of the Polish Committee of National Liberation after a considerable delay.

According to information from the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, the Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Polish Committee
of National Liberation only arrived in the town of Lutsk on 23 October 1944 with a staff of 10 people. By 1 November 1944, only Kovel, Rivne and Volodymyr-Volynskyi had received Regional Deputies of the Chief Commissioner of the Polish Committee of National Liberation.

According to information from the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, the Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Polish Committee of National Liberation explains the poor performance of the Regional Commissioners of the Polish Committee of National Liberation in notifying and preparing Polish citizens for evacuation from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR to Poland by saying that the people to be evacuated have nowhere to go, as a large part of Polish territory is still under German fascist occupation.

In order to accelerate the work on preparing Polish citizens for evacuation from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR to the territory of Poland, at the request of the Chief Commissioner of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the Central Committee of the KP(b)U has provided the Chief Commissioner of the Polish Committee of National Liberation with assistance in filling the offices of the Regional Commissioners, as well as a significant portion of their administrative staff, in all 18 regions of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR where Polish citizens are resident.

The chief commissioner of the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR are notifying Polish citizens residing in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR about the opportunities and procedures for evacuation by displaying special announcements, [running] announcements in oblast and raion newspapers and, as far as possible, [broadcasting] announcements on the radio.

According to information from the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, Polish nationalist organisations operating in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR are running a propaganda campaign against evacuation. The following facts have been reported:

In Sambir, the majority of announcements displayed on posts and building walls were torn off and put up again upside down on the same night. In Zolochiv, some leaflets printed in Polish, in the Polish alphabet, were attached to all the announcements, with the following message:

“The announcements on the voluntary evacuation of Polish and Jewish people to the west are invalid.”

In Issue No. 63 of Słowo Polskie, a Polish underground nationalist newspaper published in Lviv, dated 22 October 1944, the following (more or less) was reported:

“Mikołajczyk refused to accept the Curzon Line\(^2\) at a conference in Moscow. The Polish Committee of National Liberation consists entirely of Jews, and

\(^2\) The Curzon Line was a proposal for a Polish-Soviet demarcation line put forward by George Curzon, the British minister of Foreign Affairs, in 1920. It was suggested that Polish troops should withdraw to this line after signing a truce with Soviet Russia. At the Tehran and Yalta conferences in WWII, the Curzon line was recognised as the basis for demarcating Poland’s post-war eastern border.
Osóbka-Morawski is an enemy of the Polish nation. The Committee is run by Bulganin and the NKVD.”

The Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR on the Soviet side of the border informs us that Polish nationalists are waging a propaganda campaign among the Polish population in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR against evacuation, spreading malicious anti-Soviet rumours:

“The Bolsheviks are lying to you. They are going to put you on trains and send you to Siberia.”

“After victory over Germany, war is bound to break out between the Soviet Union, England and America, and Poland’s borders may be expanded to the Dnieper.”

“Lviv has always been a Polish city and it is going to stay Polish.”

“The Polish state cannot exist without Drohobych oblast, and London will never agree to let Drohobych oblast remain in the hands of the Bolsheviks.”

“The Treaty of Lublin is not valid because it was not signed by Stalin.”

The Chief Commissioner of the government of the Ukrainian SSR and the Chief Representative of the Polish Committee of National Liberation are notifying Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians and Ruthenians living in Poland of the opportunities and procedures for evacuating to the Ukrainian SSR by displaying special announcements, [running] advertisements in powiat newspapers, and holding talks with individuals and groups of citizens at meetings.

According to information from the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR in Poland, an anti-evacuation propaganda campaign run by Polish nationalist organisations and Ukrainian nationalists has been observed in Lubaczów powiat. On the night of 31 October 1944, a Ukrainian-German nationalist courier was arrested with 160 anti-evacuation leaflets.

On the territory of Poland, there have also been instances of violence, including murder, against households opting to evacuate to the Ukrainian SSR.

On 30 October 1944, an armed band (Home Army) of 75 people attacked peasants in Krasne settlement, Włodawa powiat (Poland), who had attended a meeting at a house of one of the villagers, citizen Pachuta, to listen to a talk about evacuation given by the Regional Deputy of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR.

As a result of this bandit assault, 8 of the 11 people who had attended the meeting were killed and 1 was wounded. Among those killed was a clerk of the Regional Deputy of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, Comrade TARASOV.

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3 Edward Osóbka-Morawski (1909–1996), socialist activist; cooperative member; PPS member (from 1928); member of various different underground socialist organisations during WWII; appointed Chairman of the PKWN and Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs (July 1944); Head of the Department of Agriculture and Agricultural Reforms (October 1944); from December 1944 to February 1947 Prime Minister; Minister of Foreign Affairs (until May 1945); from February 1947 to January 1949 Minister of Public Administration.

4 According to MSWiA RP data, the action started at 8 pm and resulted in the following fatalities (apart from Danil Tarasov), the Soviet war commandant of Uścimów commune (name unknown); a Red
Despite the anti-evacuation campaign by the Polish nationalists, despite the acts of violence and intimidation, and even isolated cases of terrorism against Ukrainians who have applied to evacuate to the Ukrainian SSR, the notification and application efforts are proceeding with satisfactory results.

The vast majority of the Ukrainian population on the territory of Poland are actively interested in evacuation matters, and are requesting the Chief Commissioner and Regional Commissioners of the government of the Ukrainian SSR to immediately effect their evacuation from the territory of Poland to the Ukrainian SSR, and only to kolkhozes.

For example, 2,280 families in Biłgoraj powiat applied for evacuation to kolkhozes in Zaporizhia, Kherson and Dnipropetrovsk, and only 4 families opted for evacuation to Volhynia oblast.

According to information from the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, those wanting to evacuate to kolkhozes in the oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR offer the following explanations:

“We do not want to live in the borderland any more. Resettlement to the border strip would be like moving from a room to a corridor.”

“We want to move to oblasts where we and our children will no longer suffer from Polish oppression.”

“We want to live and work in kolkhozes because life there is not bad. We know this because we saw how determined the kolkhozniks were to defend their kolkhozes on the front line.”

As of 1 November 1944, 11,594 families, or 45,431 persons, had applied for evacuation from Poland to kolkhozes in the oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, by powiat:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powiat</th>
<th>Number of applicant families</th>
<th>Total number of persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biłgoraj</td>
<td>2,373</td>
<td>9,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Włodawa</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>4,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hrubieszów</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>5,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamość</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>2,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnystaw</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>2,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesko</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubaczów</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Przemyśl</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomaszów</td>
<td>2,575</td>
<td>10,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chełm</td>
<td>2,329</td>
<td>8,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarosław</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>11,594^a</td>
<td>45,431^a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^ Either one of the figures or the total is incorrect.
According to preliminary data provided by the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, about 87,700 families, or 350,500 persons, have been registered for evacuation from Poland.

As at 1 November 1944, the distribution of registered Ukrainians residing in Poland, by powiat, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Powiat</th>
<th>Total number of families to be evacuated</th>
<th>Total number of Ukrainian nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Biłgoraj</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>22000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Włodawa</td>
<td>6200</td>
<td>24600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hrubieszów</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>40000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamość</td>
<td>5500</td>
<td>22000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krasnystaw</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>5500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesko</td>
<td>7500</td>
<td>30000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubaczów</td>
<td>8800</td>
<td>35000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Przemyśl</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>62200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomaszów</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>40000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelm</td>
<td>7300</td>
<td>29200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarosław</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>40000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>87,700</td>
<td>350,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1–11 November 1944, 995 families (3,605 persons) were relocated from Poland to oblasts in the Ukrainian SSR: 452 families to Zaporizhia, 60 to Dnipropetrovsk, 68 to Mykolaiv, 55 to Kherson, 10 to Drohobych, and 350 to Ternopil.

As at 15 November 1944, 226 Ukrainian families had arrived in Zaporizhia oblast, including:

On 5 November, 56 families arrived and were quartered in kolkhozes around area of Kuybyshev;

On 10 November, 68 families arrived and were quartered in kolkhozes in the rural area of Zaporizhia;

On 12 November, 102 families arrived and were quartered in kolkhozes in the rural area of Zaporizhia.

On average each family brought one horse or one cow.

All the evacuated families that arrived in Zaporizhia oblast were quartered in kolkhoz houses and in the homes of kolkhozniks.

Due to the shortage of houses, the kolkhozes are now renovating empty residential houses (primarily roof repairs and window glazing), so that the evacuated families temporarily quartered in the homes of kolkhozniks can settle there permanently.

In the western oblasts of Ukraine, 4,965 Polish families, or 17,150 persons, had applied for evacuation to Poland by 1 November this year.
According to information from the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, it is proposed that evacuation of the first group of Polish citizens from the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR to Poland, consisting of 4,965 families, be conducted in the following manner: 30%, i.e. 1,489 families, by horse transport and 70%, i.e. 3,476 families, by train. To transport such a number of people, 1,159 rail cars, including 869 passenger and 290 freight cars, are required in November 1944.

The Narkom of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR has assigned special units to ensure the security of the office staff of the Chief Commissioner of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, the Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Regional Commissioners and Representatives, and to escort them during travel.

To provide favourable conditions and accommodation for the evacuated Ukrainians arriving at kolkhozes, the Sovnarkom of the Ukrainian SSR and the CC KP(b)U have issued directives for the executive committees of Oblast Workers’ Councils and Oblast KP(b)U Committees in the settlement areas to take appropriate steps to receive the evacuees at destination stations and kolkhozes, and to make residential houses available or provide accommodation in kolkhozniks’ homes if separate residential houses cannot be provided.

Moreover, directives have been issued concerning the accommodation of groups of evacuated Ukrainians in kolkhozes, admitting them as kolkhoz members and allotting them garden plots in accordance with the standards stipulated by the rules of agricultural production cooperatives adopted by particular kolkhozes.

With the evacuated Ukrainians arriving at the settlement areas, the Sovnarkom of the Ukrainian SSR has taken steps to distribute agricultural products to the Ukrainians evacuated from Poland as compensation for the agricultural products they have relinquished in Poland.

The main agents purchasing agricultural products in Poland are the supply organs of the Red Army.

Competent officials from narkoms and central organisations of the Ukrainian SSR have been delegated to those oblasts where evacuees are settling in to carry out an inspection and provide assistance to oblast and raion organisations and kolkhoz boards.

Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR

N. KHRUSHCHEV

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Handwritten note at the top of the first page: U/P 27 November [19]44; handwritten, illegible notes in the left margin.
No. 8
28 November 1944, Lublin. Circular letter on establishing border checkpoints, sent by Mieczysław Rogalski to the Heads of PKWN departments

Polish Committee, of National Liberation
Department of Foreign Affairs
No. 506/44/B/M

Lublin, 28 November 1944

To Civ[izens] Heads of Departments of:
Public Administration
Public Security
National Economy and Finances
Polish Committee of National Liberation
in place

During the course of implementing the Treaty concluded on 9 September this year between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the government of the USSR on evacuating Ukrainian and Belarusian people from the territory of Poland, an extremely important issue has emerged, viz. establishing inspection bodies at the border points designated for the people who are relocating.

Pursuant to Art. 3 of the said Treaty, it is prohibited to take gold, silver, currency, jewellery, works of art, historic objects, and amounts of over 1,000 Polish zlotys or roubles out of the country.

The lack of control on the part of the official Polish authorities at the border points raises legitimate concerns about the effectiveness of the relevant regulations of the Treaty. Notwithstanding the short-term nature of the evacuation operation, this question is crucial for the security of Poland’s economic interests with regard to future border traffic, while the border organs established in connection to the resettlement movements may constitute the foundations for establishing permanent organs in this respect.

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* Underlined by hand.
In the light of the above, we recommend holding a joint conference at our office at 9 Pierackiego Street on December 4th at 10 o’clock to discuss the directives that should be adopted.

Chief Representative of the PKWN
(−) Consul ROGALSKI

A MSWiA, PKWN RAP 6, p. 21.
Original typescript.
Letterhead paper; the national emblem over the heading; in top left hand corner, a rectangular RAP PKWN date stamp and a handwritten reference number: A.P. 892/44 and a date: 1 December 1944; handwritten note in left margin Urgent; handwritten, partly illegible note under the text: II Sp Dir[ector] Sznek, can you please attend the conference. Before [...] with me, please. 2/12 and an illegible signature.

\[b\] Corrected by hand, originally 1.
\[c\] Fragment marked with a vertical, handwritten line in the left margin.
No. 9
1 December 1944, [no place given]. Minutes of the interdepartmental conference on protecting Poland’s eastern border

Minutes
of the second interdepartmental conference
on protecting State borders
1 December 1944

In attendance:
Representatives of the Department of National Economy and Finances (RGNiF)
Cit[izen] Dąbrowski Konstanty¹
– Dep[uty] Director of the RGNiF
Cit[izen] Birenzweig Henryk
– Director of the Dep[artment] of Organ[isation] and [Administration]
Representative of the Department of National Defence
Cit[izen] Lieut. Colonel Duszyński²
Representative of the Department of Public Security
Cit[izen] Lieut. Braude³
Representative of the Department of Public Administration
Cit[izen] Burski
Representative of the State Repatriation Office
Cit[izen] Wolski⁴

Cit[izen] Wolski presented the situation on the eastern border of the country in connection with the repatriation operation. The border is manned on the Soviet side, but not on the Polish side. Ukrainians and Belarusians are taking unlimited quantities of everything out of Poland, because there is no control on our side. They tear out window frames and stove plates; they take livestock and transport it

¹ Konstanty Dąbrowski (1906–1975), PPS activist; from November to December 1944 Deputy Director of the RGNI PKWN; from December 1944 to 1950 Minister of the Treasury; in 1950–1952 Minister of Finance; in 1952–1956 Minister of Foreign Trade; in 1957–1969 President of the NIK; in 1944–1956 and in 1961–1972 member of the KRN, member of the Legislative Sejm and the Sejm of the PRL during its 1st and 3rd–5th terms.
³ Zygmunt Braude (born 1903), lieutenant-colonel, member of the KPP, PPR and PZPR; in 1945–1948 Deputy Director of the Office of the Minister of Public Security.
⁴ Władysław Wolski, birth name Antoni Piwowarczyk (1901–1976), member of the SDKPiL, KPP, PPR and PZPR; in the USSR (inc. Secretary General of the MOPR) before WWII; sentenced to 10 years in a labour camp (1933); in 1943–1944 in Soviet partisan forces; Deputy Director of the RBP PKWN (1944); from October 1944 to 1949 Director of the PUR; in 1945–1949 Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Public Administration, Government Commissioner for Repatriation; in 1949–1950 Minister of Public Administration; in 1947–1950 member of the Legislative Sejm.
on trains. The interventions of the administrative authorities are ineffective due to the lack of border protection. The Polish population relocating to the country is falling prey to abuse on the border. The last party of resettlers that came to Hrubieszów had been robbed of all their possessions. At the very least, the eight border points with the greatest border traffic should be manned immediately.

Cit[izen] Braude reports that due to the present state of war, everything seems to weigh in favour of manning the eastern border with the armed forces, irrespective of how the issue will finally be settled.

Cit[izen] Duszyński states that the High Command of the Armed Forces holds a negative opinion on manning the border with military forces, but the High Command is ready to provide weapons for border guard units.

Cit[izen] Birenzweig inquires whether the Department of Public Security would be able to deploy sufficient forces within the next several days to man the borders, given the negative opinion of the military authorities.

During the discussion, the strength of a unit required to man 8 border points was determined to be 1 battalion.

Cit[izen] Braude states that irrespective of whether the Department of Public Security is capable of deploying such forces, it would take a long time to train and mobilise them.

It was generally accepted that due to the urgent nature of the issue and the need to start manning the border immediately, this mission should be delegated to the Department of National Defence, as it already has organised military forces at its disposal.

Due to the difficulties that have arisen, it was decided that the minutes of the present conference should be forwarded to the Chairman of the State National Council and to the Directors of the relevant departments.

Duszyński
Braude
Burski

Dąbrowski
Birenzweig
Wolski

A MSWiA, PKWN RAP 6, p. 23.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
No. 10
5 December 1944, Drohobych. Report on the progress of resettling Poles from Drohobych oblast, on the Polish counteraction, and on the intensification of the activity of NKGB organs, submitted by Vladimir Maistruk to Sergei Savchenko

Top secret

To the People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security
Com[rade] SAVCHENKO
City of Lviv

Report
on the progress of preparing for the evacuation of the Polish population to the territory of Poland

Pursuant to the treaty of Lublin of 9 September 1944 on exchanging the Polish and Ukrainian populations, four points have been arranged in Drohobych oblast where the Soviet-Polish Commissions can work.

The approved points for the work of the commissions are the cities of Drohobych, Stryi, Sambir and Khodoriv, and their respective oblast raions have been assigned to them.

The following border points have been designated for the exchange of the Ukrainian and Polish populations: Medyka, Nizhankovichi, Liskowate and Ustianowa.

The Ukrainian Government Commissions commenced work at all the designated points on 15 October this year.

The Polish did not arrive until after 20 November this year, and began forming commissions with local Poles who had expressed a willingness to relocate to Poland.

During the course of preparing for evacuation, it was ascertained that the majority of Poles did not want to relocate to Poland.

As a result, as at 30 November, of the established total of 88,030 Poles living in Drohobych oblast, only 567 applications for relocation to Poland had been filed, including:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drohobych</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sambir</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stryi</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khodoriv</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

—- Underlined by hand.
The fact that so few Poles have applied for relocation to Poland can be put down to the extensive campaign recently being waged among the Polish population, and the persistent belief that they should stay put rather than go anywhere until a decision has been made on restoring Poland.

As has been determined, this attitude is inspired and instigated by the nationalist, anti-Soviet Polish underground, and in particular by members of the so-called Home Army, who are vigorously pursuing activities aimed at preventing the relocation of Poles to Poland.

The basic arguments employed by the Polish nationalists to justify their subversive activities designed to break the Lublin Treaty are their claims that the western oblasts of Ukraine supposedly belong to Poland, for historical reasons, and that Poland would not be able to function as an independent state in national, political, military and economic terms if these oblasts were lost. The Polish nationalists are calling on Poles not to relocate to Poland under any circumstances, and not to abandon the territory of Western Ukraine because, as they say, “This is our land. This was, is, and will be Poland.”

In their spoken and printed anti-Soviet propaganda, Polish nationalists proclaim the future existence of Poland with its borders from before 1939, express their hope for the defeat of the Red Army as a result of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union against England and the USA, and are counting on the political and military support of the latter for the restoration of a “Greater Poland.”

It should be noted that the leadership of the Polish underground, in their recent subversive activities against the relocation of Poles to Poland, have, in addition to all their ethnographic and other “claims of [the] inseparability” of the Western Ukrainian territories and the Polish state, resorted to threatening Poles with “horrifying hunger” and poor living conditions in those regions of Poland to where people will be moved.

It should be particularly stressed that we have noted instances of Poles relocating unofficially from the territory of Poland proper, especially to the raions of Khodoriv and Mostyska, where they are settling down as permanent residents.

There is reason to believe that this phenomenon – albeit it is not as yet widespread – is the result of the instructions of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, which, by pursuing these practices, is striving not only to break the Lublin Treaty, but by sending emissaries and active Polish nationalist elements from the territories of Poland proper to Western Ukraine in order to establish and reinforce the anti-Soviet underground there, to expand the sabotage, terrorism and insurgency (of this underground), and to obtain additional “proof” of their international intrigues and their designs on the western Soviet Ukrainian territories.

To corroborate the above, we hereby quote the most representative facts and documents at our disposal:

GWÆL and MARKOWICZ, two members of the Polish underground organisation, the Home Army, crossed the San River to Mostyska raion and settled there.
They explained their border crossing by saying that they had been given an assignment by the commander of the organisation, “Sulima” who had fled to Poland, to assess the situation of Poles on Soviet territory, return to the city of Jarosław, and pass the information to “Sulima.”

According to data from our agents, GAWEŁ returned to Mostyska, on the orders of this “Sulima,” to get involved in the underground organisation’s anti-Soviet work and take part in an armed insurgency against the Soviet rule.

GAWEŁ and MARKOWICZ came to our territory with weapons, which were seized by border guards as they were crossing the border. GAWEŁ and MARKOWICZ were arrested by us.

According to data from the agents of the Khodoriv RO NKGB, substantial numbers of Poles have recently been coming and settling in the raion, and are conducting hostile activities among the Polish people [telling them] not to relocate to Poland, claiming that the western oblasts of Ukraine belong to Poland. At the same time, they are spreading rumours that there is a shortage of bread in Poland and that living conditions are very tough.

In the same Khodoriv raion, KOZŁOWSKI Szczepan, son of Józef, a priest from the village of Brzozdowce who wields considerable influence over the Polish population, is systematically waging a campaign against resettlement among them. KOZŁOWSKI frequently travels to Lviv and brings back anti-Soviet literature to distribute among the Poles. At the same time, in the village of Brzozdowce, we detected an anti-Soviet grouping of Poles. A former resident of the village, PIENDYK, whose first name and patronymic have yet to be determined, and who now lives in the city of Lviv, often comes to the village to see his father-in-law, DĄBROWSKI, to whom he brings anti-Soviet literature calling on Poles not to leave for Poland.

In turn, DĄBROWSKI distributes this literature to trusted people, who hand it out among the Polish population.

People hostile to Soviet rule are waging an anti-Soviet nationalist campaign among the Polish population in an attempt to frustrate the efforts being made in connection with resettling Poles.

For example, a resident of the town of Drohobych, housewife, MANDRYKA Helena, daughter of Michał, tells her acquaintances:

“You’d better keep your Polish money, because you’re going to need it soon. The Polish government is now holding talks with the Soviet government, and when the war ends, the Poles are going to make the Soviet authorities give Poland back

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\[b-b\] Text marked in the margin with a double vertical line and annotated by hand: Inform the UNKGB in Lviv 12 December [19]44 and an illegible signature.

\[c\] Was: Bieriezdowce.

\[1\] Possibly Capt. Witold Szredzki (1911–1968), nom de guerre “Sulima,” combatant in the September Campaign; commandant Home Army Inspectorate, Western Region Lwów; commander of the Home Army grouping “San” during Operation Tempest; joined the Home Army unit “Warta” in the Rzeszów area after being disarmed by the Soviets; commanded a WiN region in Lower Silesia. Arrested 1 June 1946; sentenced to death, commuted to 15 years’ imprisonment; released 1956.
its territory with its borders [from before] 1939. The Polish people will never surrender the cities of Lviv and Vilnius to the Soviet Union.”

A resident of the village of Biskowice, Sambir raion, the kulak BORODACZ Borys, said:

“There are going to be changes in establishing the borders between the USSR and Poland soon. Drohobych and Lviv oblasts, and perhaps all the Western Ukrainian oblasts, are going to be transferred to Poland, because England and America have presented this matter to the Soviet government and they do not recognise the Polish government established in the USSR. In Poland, we’re going to have the real Polish government, which is now in London.”

KRUSZELNICKI Janek, a resident of the city of Stryi, says:

“This land has belonged, and will belong, to Poland, so I’m not going anywhere.”

A peasant from the village of Uherce [Zaplatynske] in Sambir raion, DROZDECKI Władek, has told other villagers:

“We, the Polish people, were born here, are going to die here, and are never going to leave Sambir raion. Soviet rule is going to end here soon, because England and America have ordered the Soviet Union to return all territory up to the River Dniester to Poland. That’s why no Pole is going to leave this place.”

LIWIŃSKI Józef, senior teller at the Gosbank oblast branch in the town of Drohobych, has been spreading rumours among his colleagues, saying:

“They said over the radio from Switzerland that the Soviet Union and Poland have signed a treaty to the effect that Poland will be restored with its borders from before 1939. If so, then why should we leave for Poland?”

A resident of the city of Sambir, a worker at a cooperative, J DROWSKI Borysław, has been telling other workers:

“Polish people are now waiting for help from England and America. The Polish government in London says that Polish people should not relocate, and that this government is going to take power into its hands and govern Poland again.”

A metal worker employed in the No. 2 oil refinery in the town of Drohobych, MIELNIK Konstanty, in a conversation with other workers, has stated:

“You should not move to Poland now, because according to a decision by a special commission, Poland is going to remain within the borders in which it existed until 1939.”

A resident of the city of Sambir, KOŁBUS Wanda, a housewife, comments on resettlement:

“The relocation of Poles from the territory of Western Ukraine is unfair, because this land has always belonged to Poland and Polish people have nowhere to go from here.”

The same statement was made by the zavkhoz in the lespromkhoz in Drohobych, W ŻYNIAK Józef, who works in the town of Drohobych:

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d Was: Wiskowicze.
“Why should I leave for Poland? There’s going to be a war between the Soviet Union and England and America. Refinery No. 2 in Drohobych belongs to English people [!], so this is going to be Poland and I have no reason to go.”

A resident of the city of Sambir, WASIUTYK Maria, also states:

“Even though the Soviet army has cleared the entire territory of Western Ukraine and reached Hungary, Russia will nonetheless retreat from Polish territory to the border [from before] 1939, and Poles have no reason to leave.”

The majority of the nationalist Polish population has reacted to resettlement in a similar way.

Furthermore, in the second half of October this year, certain unidentified anti-Soviet persons placed the slogans “We shall never leave here. We will be in Poland here.” Over many of the posters in the town of Stryi explaining the principles of resettling Poles.

On the night of 24 November 1944, anti-Soviet, nationalist leaflets calling on Poles not to leave for Poland were displayed on Mickiewicza Street in the town of Drohobych.

As a result of secret service work undertaken to identify the author of the anti-Soviet leaflets and the people distributing them, a female resident of the town of Drohobych, DIUG Janina Wanda, daughter of Franciszek, was detected and arrested on charges of having authored and distributed anti-Soviet leaflets. A typewriter with Polish characters, a copy of the recently printed anti-Soviet newspaper Podhalanin, and 10 sheets of used carbon paper were found and confiscated during a search of her residence. From the deciphered marks on the carbon paper, which were translated into Russian, it was discovered that the carbon paper had been used for typing anti-Soviet materials entitled “The issue of Poland’s southern border,” which contained vile, mendacious attacks on the Soviet government and its policy towards Poland.

DIUG admitted to having copied the materials.

Concurrently with the arrest of DIUG, an active member of the Polish underground youth organisation “Orlęta,” IOCHMAN Janusz, son of Franciszek, an 8th-grade schoolboy attending a Polish school, was arrested. During a search of his residence, a typewriter with Polish characters, and an anti-Soviet leaflet containing a call to the Polish people not to leave for Poland were confiscated.


In light of the facts presented above, which show an increase in the activity of the Polish anti-Soviet underground, we have taken the following measures:

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2 Probably a relative of prison guard Stanisław Diug, who was arrested on 11 April 1940 and executed shortly afterwards.

3 Podhalanin was a weekly published in Sambir between September and December 1944 by the Sambir branch of the organisation NIE, and edited by Władysław Korcz and Janina Wysoczańska.

4 Actually “Orlęta Podhalanśkie,” an underground youth organisation active in Drohobych and Sambir.
1. We have issued directives to the heads of the GO, RO NKGB to intensify their intelligence and operational activities against Poles.

2. We are actively working to recruit new high-quality agents to deal with Poles, and who would be capable of uncovering the Polish nationalist underground in the town of Drohobych.

3. Paying particular attention to the fact that Poles are unofficially arriving from the territory of Poland proper to Drohobych oblast, we have issued instructions to the heads of the GO, RO NKGB to urgently take intelligence and operational steps to disclose and actively investigate anyone in this category, in order to detect German agents and emissaries from the Polish Government-in-Exile in London sent to our territory to carry out subversive, intelligence, sabotage, and terrorist activities.

4. As the aforementioned persons have exhibited anti-Soviet attitudes, they have been recorded in our files and are being investigated by our agents. We shall report on the results.

Chief of the NKGB of Droh[obych] Oblast
State Security Colonel
(–) MAISTRUK

“e-5” December 1944
No. e-2/11/908
T[own] of Drohobych

HDA SBU, F. 1, Op. 87 (1954), Spr. 2, pp. 17–22.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

5 Vladimir Maistruk (born 1903), State Security Colonel, Deputy Head of the UNKVD-UNKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Voroshilovgrad oblast (1943–1944); Deputy Head of the UNKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Ternopil oblast (May–October 1944); in 1944–1948 Head of the UNKGB–UMGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Drohobych oblast; in 1948–1952 Head of the UMGB of the Ukrainian SSR, Lviv oblast; (1944).
No. 11
22 December 1944, Lublin. Circular letter from Edward Ochab to wojewodas on implementing the agreements between the PKWN and the governments of the Belarusian and Ukrainian SSRs

Department of Public Administration

PKWN

No. AP....../44

Lublin, *22 December*† 1944

Participation of starostas in the resettlement operation

Circular letter No. ......

To

Citizens wojewodas

I. With regard to implementing the resettlement agreement of 9 September 1944 signed by the PKWN and the government of the Ukrainian SSR, and the agreement of 9 September 1944 signed by the PKWN and the government of the Belarusian SSR, I order the following:

1. Starostas should personally, or through the representatives whom they appoint, participate in the work of the Resettlement Commissions.

2. Starostas should either personally, or through their subordinate organs, ensure that the aforementioned agreement is enforced with regard to:
   a) real estate being left in an appropriately orderly and undamaged condition by people leaving the territory of the Republic of Poland on the basis of, and in accordance with, the aforementioned agreements;
   b) the vacated real estate being protected;
   c) not exceeding the set amount of 2 metric tons of real estate that may be taken to the USSR under the aforementioned agreements;
   d) evacuees handing over all excess crops not covered by section c) to officers of the Main Administration and Supplies Section of the Red Army.

3. Starostas, or the representatives appointed by them, participating in resettlement work should ensure that the commissions do not issue permits to any persons applying for evacuation who are found by the general administration authorities not to have fulfilled their obligations, or to have acted contrary to the regulations in force in this area.

4. The starostas shall request the local public security organs for assistance with implementing the above instructions.

II. To avoid any future misunderstandings, the supply of in-kind contributions by Ukrainian and Belarusian people is subject to the following conditions:

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*† Filled in by hand.*
1. Anyone who has registered for repatriation shall be exempt from all in-kind contributions, local governmental and municipal taxes, and insurance premiums.

2. The state authorities should impose, in consultation with representatives of the Belarusian and Ukrainian Resettlement Commissions, an obligatory delivery of in-kind contributions on any Ukrainians or Belarusians who have registered for repatriation but refuse to leave within the time limit fixed by the local resettlement commission.

3. Ukrainian and Belarusian people who have not expressed readiness to resettle to the USSR shall not be exempted from in-kind contributions under any circumstances.

III. It is to be remembered that pursuant to the circular of the Department of Public Administration No. AP 860/44, members of the Repatriation Commission have exactly the same entitlements to food cards, allocations of food, clothing and footwear, and use of the local canteens at state-regulated prices, as personnel from the starosta’s office.

All the personnel and office expenses of the Resettlement Commissions shall be covered directly by the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Dep[uty] Head
of the Department of Public Administration
Lieut. Col. Edward Ochab

A MSWiA, PKWN RAP 6, p. 50.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.

1 Edward Ochab (1906–1989), brigadier-general, from 1929 in the KPP; later in the PPR; 1st Secretary of the CC PZPR (1956); in the USSR during WWII; co-organiser of the ZPP; in 1943–1944 in the Polish Army in the USSR; from July to November 1944 deputy commander for political and educational affairs of the Polish First Army; subsequently Deputy Head of the RAP PKWN; Minister of Public Administration (1945); in 1949–1950 Deputy Minister of Defence; Head of the GZP of the Polish Army (1950); in 1957–1959 Minister of Agriculture; in 1964–1968 Chairman of the Council of State; in 1944–1969 member of the KRN; member of the Legislative Sejm and the Sejm of the PRL during its 1st–4th terms.
No. 12
11 January 1945, Moscow. Information based on Bogdan Kobulov’s cryptogram to Sergei Savchenko, containing an instruction to arrest Poles resisting the resettlement operation

T[op] secret

Information

11 January [19]45 from Kiev to Lviv – an encrypted telegram has been received from NKGB Moscow for Com[rade] Savchenko.

The materials that have come to the NKGB of the USSR show that the resettlement of Poles from the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, Belarusian SSR and Lithuanian SSR to Poland has been proceeding in an unsatisfactory way.

The main cause for the dilatory resettlement of the Poles is the subversive activity of Polish nationalist organisations and individuals campaigning against relocation to Poland.

In order to halt the hostile activity of the Polish nationalists who are disrupting the resettlement of Poles, we hereby order that:

1. Intelligence activities aimed at detecting people campaigning against the resettlement of Poles to Poland and spreading all sorts of provocative rumours are to be escalated.

2. Anyone campaigning against the resettlement of Poles, or disrupting the process in any way, is to be immediately arrested.

3. This matter is to be investigated forthwith post haste.

You are to report on January 25 on the progress of resettling Poles and making arrests.

No. 14
Kobulov
To Com[rade] Medvedev

Narkom’s resolution. Issue the UNKGB directives for 11 January [19]45 (Savchenko)

Prepared 12 January – Volkov


HDA SBU, F. 1, Op. 87 (1954), Spr. 1, p. 39.
Copy, manuscript.
Document in Russian.

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1 Mikhail Khayet (born 1904), State Security Major, in 1944–1947 Head of Unit 5, 2nd Directorate of the NKGB-MGB of the Ukrainian SSR.
No. 13

22–23 January 1945, Drohobych. Report on arresting Poles in Drohobych oblast, and on the contribution of this operation to an increase in the number of persons registering to relocate to Poland, submitted by Vladimir Maistruk to Sergei Savchenko

Top secret

To the People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Commissar 3rd Rank of State Security
Com[rade] SAVCHENKO
C[ity] of Lviv

Report
on the progress of resettling Poles and conducting arrests of members of the Polish nationalist underground

Following your instructions, the Directorate of the NKGB of Drohobych oblast has conducted arrests of anti-Soviet elements among the Poles residing in the oblast, in order to stop the hostile activity of the Polish nationalist underground and anti-Soviet elements.

*a As of 20 January 1945*, we had arrested a total of 935 persons, including:

- Members of the Home Army – PZP – 330 persons
- Traitors – 44 –
- Accomplices – 33 –
- Enemy agents – 65 –
- Traitors to the Fatherland – 75 –
- Anti-Soviet elements – 388 –

*b From an operational standpoint, the most interesting arrestees include:*

1. **Zygmunt Barszcz**, s[on] of Feliks, born 1909; originally from Dnipropetrovsk; a Pole, no member of any party; working-class background; worked as a bookkeeper for Gossorfond in the town of Sambir prior to arrest. In the organisation, he held the post of Home Army Commandant, Sambir oblast.

2. **Karol Wiliński**, s[on] of Karol, born 1906; a Pole; USSR citizen; originally from the town of Berezhany, Ternopil oblast; born into a family of office workers; higher education; postmaster in the town of Drohobych until 1939; stoker at a saltworks at time of arrest; resided in the town of Drohobych. In the organisation, he was commandant of the intelligence and counter-intelligence department in the “Home Army,” Drohobych oblast.

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*a* Underlined by hand.

*b* Crossed out.

1 Zygmunt Barszcz, *nom de guerre* “Stach,” reserve second lieutenant; commandant in the Home Army, Sambir region, later Sambir oblast.

2 Karol Wiliński, lieutenant, commandant, Home Army, Drohobych City Region.
3. ŁOGIŃSKI Tadeusz, s[on] of Franciszek, born 1905; a Pole; USSR citizen; originally from Drohobych; secondary education; married; no criminal record; worked as a bookkeeper with the staff of the MPWO in the t[own] of Drohobych prior to arrest. In the organisation, he was commandant of the intelligence and counter-intelligence of the Home Army, Drohobych region.

4. KORCZ Władysław, s[on] of Maciej, born 1913; resident of the town of Sambir, also born there; a Pole; USSR citizen; actor by profession; worked in the drama theatre in the town of Sambir prior to arrest. In the Home Army organisation, he was the editor of the Polish nationalist newspaper *Podhalanin*, published by the Sambir oblast of the Home Army organisation.

5. DRABIK Michał, s[on] of Jan, born 1912; originally from the town of Sambir; Polish nationality; priest in a church in Sambir; worked as a clerk in the information department of the Polish nationalist newspaper *Podhalanin*, published by the Sambir oblast of the Home Army underground organisation.

6. MALIK Włodzimierz, s[on] of Andrzej, born 1912; a Pole; USSR citizen; resident of the village of Railiv, Stryi raion, Drohobych oblast, also born there; manager of a brickworks prior to arrest. In the Home Army organisation, he was the owner of a weapons depot of the Home Army, Stryi Inspectorate.

During the arrests of the Polish nationalist underground, we found and confiscated at the residence of a member of the Home Army organisation, MALIK Włodzimierz, s[on] of Andrzej, in the village of Railiv, Stryi raion, a weapons depot with 5 machine guns, 6 assault rifles, 15 rifles, 108 grenades and various kinds of live ammunition, of which you were notified in our special report.

In the town of Sambir, after arresting the Home Army organisation member Father Drabik Michał, s[on] of Jan, we confiscated a hoard of medicines weighing about 12 poods in total in the Sambir church.

During the operation, 16 typewriters and 7 radio receivers were also confiscated from the arrested individuals. Moreover, the typewriters had repeatedly been used for anti-Soviet purposes by members of the Polish nationalist underground, and the radio receivers were used for listening to communiqués from the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.

As was previously determined, the underlying cause of the unsatisfactory state of affairs regarding the resettlement of Poles to the territory of Poland is the subversive activity of members of Polish nationalist organisations and individual persons campaigning against the relocation of Poles to Poland. As a result of the operational strike against the Polish nationalist underground and people campaigning for not leaving for Poland, the number of Poles expressing willingness to leave for Poland has increased considerably.

While only 3,219 persons had registered for relocation to Poland as of December 20, 1944, the number of people registered increased significantly after

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\(^a\) Text marked with a handwritten vertical line in the margin.

\(^3\) Władysław Korcz, *nom de guerre* “Tatar.”

\(^4\) Rev. Michal Drabik, *nom de guerre* “Liwiusz,” contributor to the underground paper *Podhalanin*; monitored radio broadcasts (among other things).
the arrests made among the Polish population, and as of 18 January 1945, 12,109 persons had registered for relocation to Poland.\(^c\)

While the average number of people registering was 30–35 a day prior to the arrests of the Polish nationalist underground, the average was around 300 persons after the operation.

The number of Poles in Drohobych and Stryi raions who registered to relocate to Poland has recently increased so much that there were lines of 400–500 persons in the commissions, and some villages have had all their residents register.

It is particularly noteworthy that many of those registered for relocation are not waiting for organised transport; they collect the relevant documents from the commissions and leave on their own, using any means of transport available.

It should be stressed that even though the number of Poles registered for relocation has increased to a significant degree, considering that the total number of citizens of Polish nationality living in the oblast is 124,000 persons, registration for relocation “is still proceeding in an unsatisfactory manner.

The situation with relocating the Poles is even worse\(^a\). The total number of people who had left the oblast as at 18 January 1945 was only 2,118. This is due to the railway administration not providing the necessary means of transport; even when rail carriages are provided, they stand at the stations waiting for engines.

For example, a transport stood at Dubliany station for 5 days for want of an engine. At Drohobych station, the rail carriages supplied for the evacuees had "no doors," and some had "no roofs."

Apart from the arrests of Polish nationalist underground members and anti-Soviet elements campaigning against resettlement to Poland, another important factor which has led to many Polish nationals registering for resettlement is the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government, and the liberation of the territory of Poland from the Germans as a result of the successful offensive of the Red Army.

To corroborate this, we will quote the reactions of the Polish population which we have available.

An official working at the cereal purchase point in the town of Drohobych, a Pole, BIELIŃSKI Wiktor, stated to his colleagues:

“It’s really good that the Polish Committee of National Liberation has been transformed into the Provisional Government. Now Poland has both legislative and executive authorities in the persons of the ministers and the president. I’m convinced that the new government will make every effort to see that the Polish nation does not suffer, but rather has a good life. I’m going to register for relocation to Poland tomorrow, and I’ll be leaving on the first transport to depart, in order to participate in building a democratic Poland.”

KRUŻYŃSKI Emil, a Pole, no member of any party, an inspector at the town department of finances, says:

“I’m going to go to Poland. Now we, the Polish people, have a provisional government of the Republic of Poland. For a long time, my only desire has been for a democratic Poland. I do not have, and never have had, any claim to a ‘Greater
State.’ The allies are going to make an agreement with the Polish government in Lublin to create a democratic Poland up to the Oder River.”

A resident of the town of Drohobych, IWANCEW, no member of any party, a Pole, asserted the following, among his Polish neighbours:

“And now at last we finally have a people’s government. Now we’ll have a government that takes care of the people, and the Government-in-Exile in London is going to break its neck.”

An engineer in the oil industry in the town of Boryslav, a Pole, RODŁOWSKI Adam, no member of any party, has been expressing himself in these terms among his friends:

“The Lublin government is a legal government; it was formed on Polish soil at a time when the Polish nation was going through great ordeals in its struggle against the fascist reactionaries for a democratic Poland. The Government-in-Exile in London cannot be legal, because it hasn’t done anything useful for Poland; it has been just sitting behind the backs of the English.”

In connection with the successful outcome of the military operations of the Red Army on the front of the Great Patriotic War and the resulting liberation of Poland, a resident of the town of Drohobych, PAUSTOWSKI Feliks, an oil refinery worker, says this among his friends:

“We have finally come to see a bright day for Poland, as the Red Army has started to quickly free Poland from the Germans. The cities dearest to the Polish people, the heart of the Polish nation, Cracow and Warsaw, have already been liberated. Once Warsaw, Cracow, Częstochowa, and other cities are liberated, everybody will go there, because the living space in Poland has expanded, and, most importantly, many Polish people came from there, and were just waiting until the Germans were driven out of those places.”

In connection with our operation of arresting [members] of the Polish nationalist underground, a dispatch worker at a bakery, PAWLISZYN, a Pole, no member of any party, stated to his co-workers:

“‘The Soviet authorities are arresting Poles to force them all to go to Poland. The arrests will continue unless Polish people register for relocation to Poland.’”

KLIMOWICZ Wiaczesław, s[on] of Seweryn, a Pole, train dispatcher at the station in the town of Stryi, expressed himself in these terms among other Poles:

“‘The Soviet authorities are arresting Poles and persecuting them in various ways to make them go to Poland as soon as possible.’”

A musician with the town theatre in Drohobych, POKUS, no member of any party, a Pole, stated to his friends:

“‘Now they’re arresting Poles to make them leave Ukraine soon, and if they don’t go, everybody will be arrested.’”

RUDKIEWICZ Józef, s[on] of Adolf, resident of the town of Stryi, railway worker, says:

“‘I don’t want to go to Poland, but the Soviet authorities don’t want Polish people to live here and are arresting them, so I’ll have to go.’”

PAWOS Wanda, no member of any party, resident of the town of Stryi, stated:
“Now I’m preparing winter clothes for travel to Poland, there’s no other option for us but to go immediately, otherwise they’ll arrest [us] no matter what. This is the policy of the Soviet authorities.”

An inhabitant of the village of Miertiuki in Stryi raion, CZAPONIA, a Pole, no member of any party, states among her friends:

“They’re going to arrest everybody, so I want to leave for Poland as soon as possible, but there’s no way I can register, because the lines for registration at the commission are so long.”

A resident of the village of Volche in Turka raion, GONDAR M.A., a Pole, says this among her fellow villagers:

“Our government in London will reach an agreement with England and America for the territory of Western Ukraine to be Polish, so that there will be no Soviet rule here and no Polish Provisional Government.”

A musician with the Stryi Drama Theatre, Pole, LEGAL Włodzimerz, has publicly stated:

“Why should I go to Poland; there is no real government there, but rather the same NKGB as here?* If I go to Poland, they can also arrest me there.”

In order to ensure the implementation of all measures related to resettling Poles and quenching the anti-Soviet activity of members of the Polish underground and individual persons campaigning against relocation to Poland, we are continuing with our arrests. We have ordered our network of agents and information services to detect persons engaging in hostile activities.

At the same time, we are summarily concluding our investigations of significant cases involving people arrested for campaigning against the resettlement of Poles, so that they can be prosecuted in court.

We will keep you informed on the progress of the resettlement.

Head of the Directorate of the NKGB DO
State Security Colonel
(–) MAISTRUK

“d-22–23-d” January 1945
No. d-1199/11-d
Town of Drohobych

Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Handwritten note in left margin, above the body of the report: Com[rade] Volkov, use in next report, 24 January, and an illegible signature.

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* Filled in by hand.
No. 14
4 March 1945, Lviv. Telegram from Pyotr Burmak and Ivan Grushetsky to Nikita Khrushchev, reporting on murders committed against Ukrainians in Poland

T[op] secret
Kiev, KC KP(b)U

Telegram

To Comrade Nikita Sergeyevich KHRUSHCHEV

According to recent intelligence, the Polish authorities and Polish Army troops are terrorising the Ukrainian population living in Poland, carrying out mass murders on Ukrainians, burning down their villages, stealing their property, and taking their cattle.

1. In Hrubieszów powiat, in the v[illage] of Łuszków (4296), a group of policemen attacked Ukrainians ready for evacuation – they injured 4 persons, took two cows, one horse, and stole personal property.

26 February [19]45, v[illage] of Horodło (4492) – the Polish commandant of the village and a policeman named MARCIJAK killed a Ukrainian, POLITIY, and stole his two horses.

27 February [19]45, v[illage] of Kułakowice (4498) – some policemen wrenched the arms and legs of an evacuating priest and his wife, and then shot them and stole their property and cattle.

2. In Lubaczów powiat, Polish soldiers shot 51 Ukrainians as bandits and burned down the village of Monastyır (7474).


26 February [19]45, v[illage] of Kosienice (2822) – 6 Ukrainians were killed.

27 February [19]45, v[illage] of Belwin (2220) – 7 Ukrainians were killed.

2 March [19]45, v[illage] of Zieliski3 (5660) – the village was completely burned down by Polish soldiers, and the Ukrainian residents were shot.

We report the above; please notify the Polish government and demand that they stop murdering and robbing the Ukrainian population.

---

1 Probably Ruska Wieś.
2 Probably Siedliska.
3 Was: Podbukowinka.
No. 023  BURMAK  GRUSHETSKY

Commander of the NKVD Border Troops  Secretary of the KP(b)U Lviv Obkom
Ukrainian District  GRUSHETSKY
Lieutenant-General

4 March 1945
20:40  Received by Polonskaya (stenographer), CC KP(b)U
4 March [19]45  Sent by Assistant to Duty Operational Officer, Major Shaldin
Certified true copy: (–)

TsDAHON, F. 1, Op. 23, Spr. 1465, p. 32.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Handwritten date above body of document: 4 March 1945. Handwritten note, in upper left hand corner, over the text: Sent by “High-Frequency” cable” to Comrade Shatilovov. Comrade Khrushchev gave directives to Comrade Shatilovov over the telephone, Grushetsky’s signature and date: 14 March. At the bottom of the page, an illegible number and a date: 5 March [19]45.

3 Ivan Grushetsky (1904–1982), in 1944–1951 1st Secretary of the KP(b)U Lviv Oblast Committee.
March 1945, Lutsk. Report on arresting members of staff of the Chief Commissioner of the RTRP by NKGB and NKVD organs, submitted by Ivan Grebchenko to Demian Korotchenko

T[op] secret

To Secretary of the CC KP(b)
of Ukraine
Com[rade] KOROTCHENKO D. S.
C[ity] of Kiev

In my special report No. 075 of 27 January 1945, I informed you that most of the regional commissioners of the Polish Provisional Government’s apparatus for evacuating Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR has been contaminated by the Polish nationalist element, Home Army members, and other persons hostile to Soviet rule.

Following an appropriate inspection by the NKVD and NKGB organs of the western oblasts with a view to cleansing the Polish regional commissioners’ offices of people hostile to us, I put to Dep[uty] Chief Commissioner of the Polish Provisional Government, PIZŁO,¹ the question of dismissing a number of people who are not quite politically reliable, and replacing them with loyal people from Polish circles. The majority of those dismissed have subsequently been arrested by NKGB organs for actively participating in the Home Army and other anti-Soviet activities.²

The following were arrested in the c[ity] of Lviv: Regional Commissioner, ROGER Alojzy, s[on] of Ignacy, for active participation in a Polish nationalist underground organisation and for sabotaging the evacuation of Polish people from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR; clerk CZAJKA Władysław, s[on] of Piotr, and OJAK Stanisław, s[on] of Józef, as active Home Army members; statistician STAWSKA Stanisława, d[aughter] of Ilia, for actively supporting the German occupiers when the town of Lviv was occupied by German forces.

The following were arrested in the c[ity] of Rivne: Regional Commissioner NEJMAN Henryk, s[on] of Henryk; statistician PARAT Nadzieja, d[aughter] of Kazimierz, inspector KĘCIK [Henryk] and senior secretary STANEK [Mieczysław] as active Home Army members, carrying out hostile activity in order to thwart the evacuation of the Polish population. Another wanted active member

¹ Stanisław Pizło (1901–1976), colonel, political and educational officer of the Polish Army in the USSR; attached to the RSZ PKWN; in 1944–1945 Acting Chief Commissioner for Evacuation from the Ukrainian SSR in Lutsk; in 1945–1951 deputy, acting, and full director of Dept. 6 (Penitentiary System) of the MBP; in 1951–1960 held various executive positions in the MBP and the MSW.
of the Home Army, the Deputy Commissioner for Rivne raion, BARANOWSKI, has gone into hiding for fear of prosecution.

In Drohobych, NITKA Józef, s[on] of Teodor, and typist DIUG Janina were arrested as active Home Army members.

On the night of 11 January [19]45, inspector KRASUCKI Jan, s[on] of Jan, completely destroyed all the regional commissioner’s documents on work connected with the evacuation, and went into hiding.3

In the town of Rava-Ruska, inspector KOTOWICZ Zdzisław, s[on] of Aleksander, was arrested as an active Home Army member.

Other persons arrested as active Home Army members, or for conducting hostile activity with a view to thwarting the evacuation of the Polish population, include: Deputy Commissioner of the Polish Provisional Government for Stanyslaviv raion, BLICHARSKI Kazimierz, s[on] of Kazimierz; and a clerk of the commissioner for Ternopil raion, SOWIŃSKI Julian, s[on] of Jan.

In Lviv raion, legal adviser RAJZLER, clerks FORST, KOGUB, and statistician NOJTLER Barbara were dismissed for bribery and for not being politically trustworthy.

In Stryi raion – Dep[uty] Regional Commissioner SZYJKOWSKI, being the son of a former general of the Polish armed forces, with a landowner backgrounda.4

In Zolochiv raion – Regional Commissioner FALSBERG for providing assistance to the Germans during the Occupation.

I also put to the Dep[uty] Chief Commissioner of the Polish Provisional Government, PIZŁO the question of dismissing the Polish Provisional Government Commissioner for Lutsk raion, LASKOWSKI Jan, s[on] of Roman; his deputy ZIENOWICZ Władysław, s[on] of Kazimierz, and the Deputy Commissioner for Volodymyr-Volynskyi raion, KOKORUZA Paweł, s[on] of Aleksyb, who are, according to our sources, active members of the so-called Volhynia Liberation Committee, and are conducting hostile activities in order to thwart the evacuation of the Polish population from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR.

However, PIZŁO categorically refused to dismiss the above persons, citing a directive he had been given by the Chief Commissioner of the Polish Provisional Government for Evacuation, WOLSKI, not to dismiss any staff member of the apparatus of the Polish Commissioner without his – WOLSKI’s – consent.

---

a Was: Szejkowski.
b Was: KOKORUZA Piotr, s[on] of Aleksander.
3 See document 38.
4 Son of Brig. Gen. Leopold Szyjkowski (born 1859).
The question of dismissing the designated persons will be put to WOLSKI himself.

Dep[uty] Chief Representative of the Government of the Ukrainian SSR for the evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR
Colonel GREBCHENKO

Maksimenko
No. 101
... March 1945
Lutsk

TsDAHON, F 1, Op. 23, Spr. 1465, pp. 18–19.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
4 September 1945. Rzeszów. Report on organising the resettlement of Ukrainians from Rzeszów województwo with the participation of the armed forces, submitted by Jan Mirek to the Ministry of Public Administration

Rzeszów wojewoda
Rzeszów, 4 September 1945

L: II/42438*/45

Confidential

Report on the operation of resettling Ukrainian people

To the Ministry of Public Administration in Warsaw

In connection to my attendance at the conference held at the Ministry on the subject of resettling Ukrainians from the eastern parts of Rzeszów województwo, I hereby report that:

On 25 August this year, I held a conference at the Rzeszów województwo Office, to which I invited the Commander of the 9th Division of the Polish Army (WP), which is stationed in Rzeszów, and summoned the starostas of Lubaczów, Jarosław, Przemyśl, Lesko, Sanok and Brzozów powiats, as well as the Commandant of the Voivodship Citizens’ Militia Command (KW MO).¹

All those invited and summoned attended.

To begin with, I explained to the attendees that pursuant to the agreement between the Government of the Republic and the Government of the Ukrainian SSR, Ukrainians were to be resettled from the territory of Poland to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. In line with the above, it is necessary that the administrative and military authorities discuss and organise the resettlement action. The latter are supposed to safeguard the work of the evacuation authorities and quota commissions.

After Col. Popko,² Commander of the 9th Division of the WP, had presented his opinion on the matter, and after obtaining information from the powiat starostas and the Commandant of the KW MO, I determined and decided as follows:

An operation to resettle Ukrainians from the eastern and south-eastern territories would commence on 3 September this year. Three WP divisions would be involved: specifically, the 3rd division would work in Lubaczów powiat, the

¹ This post was held by Franciszek Księżarczyk at the time.
² Vitaly Popko (born 1917), in the Red Army from 1935; attached to the Polish Army (August 1944); from 1944 commander of the 28th infantry regiment, 9th infantry division; from May 1945 to October 1946 commander of the 9th infantry division; recalled to Moscow (November 1946); Colonel.
9th in Przemyśl [powiat], and the 8th in Lesko [powiat]. A military company would be assigned to each village.

The task of the armed forces would be firstly to smash the Ukrainian bands terrorising the Ukrainian and Polish populations, and then to help the resettlement and quota commissions perform their duties.

The military operation would use surprise tactics to prevent the Ukrainians gathering in particular villages.

Should armed resistance be encountered, the resistance points will be eliminated.

Should the Ukrainian population take to the woods, anyone escaping with weapons in their hands will be eliminated, while those who are unarmed will be handed over to the security organs.

I have listed a whole range of activities to be assigned to the powiat starostas to facilitate the operation.

Assembly points, to which evacuees would be brought, and from where the Ukrainian population would be securely escorted to transit points on the Polish-Soviet border, were designated in specific powiats.

Specifically, the following assembly points (by powiat) were designated:

a) Przemyśl – Bircza, Stubno, Przemyśl;
b) Jarosław – Laszki, Sieniawa, Jarosław;
c) Lubaczów – Lipsko, Horyniec, Wielkie Oczy;
d) Lesko – Stuposiany\(^b\), Dolina, Stefkowa;
e) Sanok – Zagórzany\(^3\);
f) Brzozów – Bircza.

The operation began in Przemyśl powiat on September 3 this year.
The 3rd and 8th divisions will start work on September 5 this year.
The starostas, in line with their instructions:

a) prepared a list of gminas and gromadas controlled by the Bandera groups;
b) ensured that the Citizens’ Militia (MO) stations were adequately staffed, and called up a Citizens’ Guard in every gromada. These were placed at the disposal of village leaders and gmina heads in consultation with powiat MO commandants;
c) selected people to hold the posts of village leaders and gmina heads in the evacuated villages;
d) selected appropriate personnel for the gmina offices;
e) designated appropriate premises for the gmina offices;
f) secured school buildings and ensured their prompt renovation;
g) prepared a procedure for collecting in-kind contributions by convening gmina and gromada committees;
h) prepared a procedure for collecting overdue taxes on site;

\(^b\) Was: Stokosiany.
\(^3\) Probably Zagórz.
i) organised fire brigades and secured fire equipment;

j) arranged for the opening of post offices;

k) arranged for a dressing station to be opened in every gmina;

l) organised gmina and gromada social protection committees;

m) arranged to supply the soldiers involved in the operation with food products from the collected quotas.

The authorities and committees that have been set up are taking up their positions and commencing work concurrently with WP units.

Prior to commencing the operation, the starostas contacted the respective division commanders and finalised action plans with them.

On 3 September this year, planes dropped [printed copies of] the appeal by the Rzeszów wojewoda over the operational areas. These were addressed to the Ukrainian and Polish populations in both the Polish and Ukrainian languages.

The Citizens’ Militia and the Security [Services] are also involved in the operation.

As the militia are below strength in some powiats, the militia units have been reinforced with members of political parties.

The military authorities have provided more weapons to the inadequately-armed Citizens’ Militia units.

Acting Wojewoda

(—) J. Mirek

A MSWiA, MAP 304, pp. 43–44.

Original, typescript.

Document in Polish.

Handwritten reference number in upper left hand corner, above the heading: II P. 1818/45; partially illegible handwritten note under the heading: Dep. Pol. II, for the files [...] repatr. of Ukrainians. W. 9 October 1945 and an illegible signature; under the text, a round seal with the state emblem in the centre and the circumscription: Rzeszów Wojewoda.

4 Jan Mirek (1900–1971), member of the PPS; from August 1944 director of the Department of Labour and Social Protection of the WRN in Rzeszów; deputy wojewoda and acting wojewoda; from 1947 wojewoda; member of the Legislative Sejm.
No. 17
8 September 1945, Kiev. Telegram from Pavel Drozdetsky to Bogdan Kobulov on the results of resettling Polish citizens from the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR; position as of 1 September 1945

Telegram
Moscow NKGB of the USSR for Comrade KOBULOV B. Z. to No. 2/7/34283

In the western oblasts of Ukraine, 786,413 Polish citizens had been listed as subject to resettlement to Poland under the Lublin Treaty, 677,824 persons had registered for relocation, and 411,486 persons had actually relocated, by 1 September 1945.

In particular oblasts, the situation is as follows:
- Stanyslaviv oblast – subject to resettlement – 82,039, registered for relocation – 78,428, actually relocated – 49,613.
- Drohobych oblast – subject to resettlement – 124,000, registered for relocation – 88,400, actually relocated – 37,141.
- Chernivtsi oblast – subject to resettlement – 1,423, registered for relocation – 9,347, actually relocated – 1,663.

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\[a\ As in the original.\]
A special report on the resettlement’s progress will be [...] sent by mail.

DROZDETSKY

Dep[uty] People’s Commissar of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant-General
(–) DROZDETSKY

“<8-<” Sept[ember] 1945
C[ity] of Kiev
Prep[ared] by Volkov c No. 2033/s Received by Naumova sent by Dolgova c

HDA SBU, F. 1, Op. 87 (1954), Spr. 4, p. 41.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Under the text, on the left hand side, illegible initials.

b Crossed out: additionally.
c = Filled in by hand.
No. 18
19 September 1945, Lublin. Situational report on the results of resettling Ukrainians from Rzeszów województwo with the participation of the armed forces, and on a village burned down by the UPA, submitted by Józef Bednarz to the Ministry of Public Administration

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chief Representative of the Government of the Republic of Poland for Evacuation
L. dz. Pf. 146/45/Kob/M

To the Ministry of Public Administration
Attention: Citizen Minister WOLSKI in Warsaw

In connection with the military operation in Rzeszów województwo, based on material gathered on 14–17 September 1945 by the District Inspector of the Chief Representative of the Government of Poland for Evacuation, Citizen Wójcik Waclaw, and on reports by some regional representatives of the Government of Poland for evacuation, I hereby present the following situational report:

The military operation began in Przemyśl powiat on 9 September this year, and by 14 September this year had the following results:
1) 1,156 families (4,719 persons) were transported to border points and transferred to the authorities of the Ukrainian SSR;
2) 1,107 families (4,852 persons) are waiting at train stations near the border;
3) an additional 2,456 families (9,824 persons) are waiting for their documents to be prepared.

This makes a total of 4,719 families (19,395 persons). The operation covers 7 gminas with several villages and part of the city of Przemyśl.

Due to the lack of sufficient number of railway cars and the huge numbers of Ukrainians at train stations, it was decided, after consultation with the general administration authorities and military representatives, to slow down the evacuation operation in Przemyśl powiat for the time being. Thus, one WP operational group remains in Przemyśl powiat, while the other was deployed to Lesko powiat on 15 September this year. It was further proposed that the Ukrainian population first be evacuated from the town of Przemyśl.

Generally speaking, the evacuation operation in Przemyśl powiat has so far been proceeding with substantial difficulty and with great material losses, as only

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*A* Underlined by hand.
629 of the 4,700 farms left by Ukrainians have been repopulated, while 981 buildings have been burned, mostly by Ukrainian bandit groups.

Furthermore, cases of malfeasance on the part of certain WP and Red Army units have been confirmed. These concern the requisitioning of a quota without issuing receipts, a lack of respect for the local gmina administration, and various small disputes.

The Polish population residing in the area subjected to the operation has also been affected, as people have been forced to flee from Ukrainian bandit groups in some places. Two village leaders have been killed by pro-Bandera groups, etc.

In Lesko powiat, the military operation did not commence until 16 September this year and has so far produced no concrete evacuation results. The beginning of this operation, however, indicates that the task is going to be quite difficult in Lesko powiat, because the Ukrainians have taken to the woods in some villages, and the WP is fighting the Bandera groups in the north of the powiat.

No significant changes have been observed in the other powiats of Rzeszów województwo.

Generally, it can be said that the military commenced the operation prematurely, that they acted on their own without discussing the operation with the powiat starostas, and that this has lead to a situation where the starostas’ offices have been unable to collect all the due quotas and secure the crops and real estate vacated by the Ukrainians.

Moreover, it would seem that the army is not up to strength, and as a result, cannot station garrisons in the villages vacated by the Ukrainians; and it is therefore not protecting the abandoned property, making it possible for relatively small groups of bands to quickly move from place to place and burn down abandoned villages or villages inhabited by the Polish population.

Chief Representative of the Government of the Republic of Poland for Evacuation
(–) J. BEDNARZ

A MSWiA, MAP 304, p. 65.
Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.

Paper with the national emblem of the Republic of Poland over the letterhead; in the upper part of the page a handwritten note: Citizen Grabowski. Dept. I, 25 September and an illegible signature and a note in a different hand: aa 3 October [19]45 with an illegible signature, next to which is a handwritten reference number: II P.2072/45.
No. 19
After 15 December 1945, Kiev. Information from Nikolai Volkov on preparations for resettling the Polish population from eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR; position as of 15 December 1945

Top secret

Information on the progress of repatriating former Polish citizens from the eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR pursuant to the Moscow Treaty of 6 July [19]45: position as of 15 December [19]45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Oblast</th>
<th>Subject to repatriation</th>
<th>Relocation documents prepared</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>2,499</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>3,275</td>
<td>625</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>^total 1,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>2,075</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>-“ – 2,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>4,614</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>-“ – 4,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>2,680</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>-“ – 3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-“ – 2,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Kamianets-Podilskyi</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>202</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Vinnytsia</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Stalino</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td>570</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>2,983</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
<td>2,344</td>
<td>276</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>3,036</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>-' – 3,280^a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Voroshilovgrad</td>
<td>1,833</td>
<td>104</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                      | 31,293 | 6,241^b |

^a- Handwritten. Information unclear.
^b Either the total or the figures are incorrect.
Head of Department 2, Unit 2 of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Captain VOLKO

“...” December 1945
City of Kiev
2/Cs.

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
5 January 1946, Kiev. Summary from Borys Ivanov on the results of the resettling the Ukrainian population from Poland, and Polish citizens from the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR; position as of 1 January 1946

Confidential

*NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR to Com[rade] Medvedev*

Evacuation of the Ukrainian population from Poland, and of Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR; position as at 1 January 1946

I. Evacuation of Ukrainians from Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For the entire period of evacuation</th>
<th>Of which</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>To western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Applications made</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of households</td>
<td>46,003</td>
<td>43,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total number of persons in households</td>
<td>174,967</td>
<td>169,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepared for evacuation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of households</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total number of persons in households</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent from Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of households</td>
<td>42,344</td>
<td>41,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total number of persons in households</td>
<td>161,792</td>
<td>162,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrived in the USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>number of households</td>
<td>39,663</td>
<td>34,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total number of persons in households</td>
<td>150,450</td>
<td>135,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Filled in by hand.
B. Kolkhoz members admitted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage of households relocated to the eastern oblasts</th>
<th>Of which</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For the five-day reporting period from 25 December [19]45 to 1 January 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27,668</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Evacuation of Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR to Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For the whole period of evacuation</th>
<th>Of which</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of households</td>
<td>Number of persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application s filed</td>
<td>264,038</td>
<td>753,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepared for evacuation</td>
<td>259,461</td>
<td>743,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent to Poland</td>
<td>207,485</td>
<td>612,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Farm animals brought by the Ukrainian population from Poland, and by Polish citizens from the Ukrainian SSR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>83,856 Ukrainian households brought from Poland</th>
<th>207,486 households of Polish citizens brought from the Ukrainian SSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horned cattle</td>
<td>75,140</td>
<td>72,090(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>31,457</td>
<td>32,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>15,094</td>
<td>7,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep and goats</td>
<td>24,274</td>
<td>22,583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 January [19]46\(^a\)

Head of the Directorate for Evacuation attached to the SNK of the Ukrainian SSR

(–) B. IVANOV

\(^b\) As in the original. The figure given in the Annex (Table VIII) is: 79,090.
Information on the progress of evacuating the Ukrainian population from Poland and Polish citizens from the territory of the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR; position as of 1 January 1946

I. Evacuation applications filed by Ukrainians in Poland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of oblast to which they requested evacuation</th>
<th>Number of households that filed applications</th>
<th>Total number of persons in households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Voroshilovgrad</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>7,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>6,717</td>
<td>24,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>9,875</td>
<td>35,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>11,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>4,601</td>
<td>16,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>8,071</td>
<td>29,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>2,126</td>
<td>8,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Stalino</td>
<td>3,187</td>
<td>13,771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>3,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>4,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>5,090</td>
<td>19,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal:</td>
<td>45,930</td>
<td>174,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>5,165</td>
<td>17,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Drohobych</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>16,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>10,810</td>
<td>41,526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>1,976</td>
<td>7,647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Stanyslaviv</td>
<td>4,925</td>
<td>18,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>16,928</td>
<td>69,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal:</td>
<td>43,920</td>
<td>169,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other oblasts</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>89,923</td>
<td>344,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepared for evacuation</td>
<td>84,223</td>
<td>325,412</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note:
1) The increases in the number of households that applied for evacuation, and in the total number of persons, is a result of the following:
   a) rectification of data by regional commissioners in eastern oblasts;
   b) an actual influx of applications during the five-day reporting period in western oblasts.
2) The decrease in the number of households prepared for evacuation, and in the increase in the number of persons, is a result of a rectification of the data obtained from regional commissioners.

II. Ukrainians sent from Poland to oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR; situation as of 1 January 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rail cars</td>
<td>Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Voroshilovgrad</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>1,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Dnepropetrovsk</td>
<td>2,885</td>
<td>6,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>4,367</td>
<td>8,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>2,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>2,264</td>
<td>4,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>3,673</td>
<td>7,391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Stalino</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>3,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>2,721</td>
<td>5,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>20,323</td>
<td>42,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>4,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>3,463</td>
<td>10,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>1,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Stanyslaviv</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>3,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>6,073</td>
<td>16,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>14,122</td>
<td>41,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other oblasts</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>34,454</td>
<td>83,856</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note:
1) The increase in the number of households and persons sent from Poland to the eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR is a result of a rectification of the data obtained from regional commissioners; to the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR – from the actual number of [persons] sent during the five-day reporting period.

2) In Ternopil oblast, the inconsistency of figures concerning the number of railway cars and households sent in the column “Of which sent from 25 December [19]45 to 1 January [19]46” is due to a rectification of the data obtained from regional commissioners.

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III. Ukrainians who arrived at their places of destination in the Ukrainian SSR; situation as of 1 January 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rail cars</td>
<td>Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Voroshilovgrad</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>1,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>2,687</td>
<td>5,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>4,485</td>
<td>8,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>2,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>2,220</td>
<td>4,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>3,638</td>
<td>6,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>1,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Stalino</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>3,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>3,004</td>
<td>4,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal:</td>
<td>21,371</td>
<td>39,657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Vohlhynia</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>3,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Drohobych</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>4,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>3,010</td>
<td>9,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>1,038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Voroshilovgrad and Stalino oblasts the data was changed due to a rectification of the information from the raions of the oblasts.

In Ternopil oblast, the inconsistency of figures concerning the number of households and persons that arrived, in the column “Of which arrived from 25 December [19]45 to 1 January [19]46” is due to a rectification of previously presented data.

### IV. Farm animals brought by the Ukrainian population, to 1 January 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of oblast</th>
<th>Farm animals brought from 1 November [19]44 to 1 January 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Horned cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Voroshilovgrad</td>
<td>1,268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>4,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>7,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
<td>2,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>3,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>5,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>1,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Stalino</td>
<td>2,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>3,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal:</td>
<td>34,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>3,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Drohobych</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. Households admitted as *kolkhoz* members; situation as of 1 January 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of <em>oblast</em></th>
<th>Total families arrived</th>
<th>Families admitted as <em>kolkhoz</em> members</th>
<th>Garden plots allotted to families</th>
<th>Houses with farm buildings allotted to families</th>
<th>Percentage of collectivisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Voroshilovgrad</td>
<td>1,348</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>5,810</td>
<td>4,731</td>
<td>4,157</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>8,568</td>
<td>6,949</td>
<td>3,418</td>
<td>1,790</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>4,139</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>6,820</td>
<td>5,513</td>
<td>6,624</td>
<td>4,352</td>
<td>80.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Stalino</td>
<td>3,044</td>
<td>2,525</td>
<td>2,080</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>4,670</td>
<td>2,982</td>
<td>2,867</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subtotal:</td>
<td>39,657</td>
<td>27,668</td>
<td>24,380</td>
<td>13,566</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other <em>oblasts</em></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>39,663</td>
<td>27,668</td>
<td>24,380</td>
<td>13,566</td>
<td>69.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:

1) The figure on families in Voroshilovgrad *oblast* who were allotted residential houses was reduced, due to a rectification of the data. The information presented previously (252) took families into account who had been temporarily allotted residential houses.
vacant houses that were not designated for resettler use. Raifinotdels settled accounts with 187 families for the houses they were given.

2) The figure on families in Sumy oblast who were allotted garden plots was reduced, due to 23 families who had been temporarily allotted gardens being excluded.

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VI. Applications for evacuation from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR to Poland filed by Polish citizens; situation as of 1 January 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of oblast</th>
<th>Number of households that filed applications</th>
<th>Total number of persons in households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>21,752</td>
<td>66,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Drohobych</td>
<td>39,205</td>
<td>108,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>76,230</td>
<td>193,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>22,952</td>
<td>71,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Stanyslaviv</td>
<td>29,199</td>
<td>83,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>71,531</td>
<td>218,601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>10,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>264,038</td>
<td>753,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepared for evacuation</td>
<td>259,461</td>
<td>743,596</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VII. Sent to Poland; situation as of 1 January 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of oblast</th>
<th>Number of railway cars</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Total number of persons in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>3,304</td>
<td>20,405</td>
<td>63,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Drohobych</td>
<td>5,927</td>
<td>28,662</td>
<td>81,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>8,280</td>
<td>53,980</td>
<td>136,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>4,802</td>
<td>21,422</td>
<td>66,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Stanyslaviv</td>
<td>4,636</td>
<td>21,019</td>
<td>65,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>13,155</td>
<td>59,486</td>
<td>190,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>2,511</td>
<td>8,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>40,797</td>
<td>207,485</td>
<td>612,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VIII. Farm animals brought by Ukrainians from Poland and by Polish citizens from the Ukrainian SSR; situation as of 1 January 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Type of livestock</th>
<th>83,856 households of Ukrainians departed from Poland</th>
<th>207,485 households of Polish citizens departed from the Ukrainian SSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Horned cattle</td>
<td>75,140</td>
<td>79,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>31,457</td>
<td>32,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>15,094</td>
<td>7,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Sheep and goats</td>
<td>24,274</td>
<td>22,583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IX. Farm animals and crops handed over to the Red Army by Ukrainians in Poland and to *Upolnarkomzag* organs by Polish citizens; position as at 1 January 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Kind of livestock or crop</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>83,856 Ukrainian households in Poland handed over</th>
<th>207,485 households of Polish citizens in the Ukrainian SSR handed over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Horned cattle</td>
<td>head</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Sheep and goats</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Pigs</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Grains</td>
<td>metric tons</td>
<td>7,392.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>51,506.0</td>
<td>255.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>417.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Various beets</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>1,713.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Hay</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>35,250.0</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Straw</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>177.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Grass seeds</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Slaughter livestock</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Oil plants</td>
<td>“</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Note:
The figure on the amount of oil seeds relinquished was decreased as a result of a rectification of previously presented information.

X. Property vacated; situation as at 1 January 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>By Ukrainians in Poland</th>
<th>By Polish citizens in the Ukrainian SSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of farms</td>
<td>68,948</td>
<td>74,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total worth (thousand roubles)</td>
<td>469,889.0</td>
<td>180,311.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which, buildings</td>
<td>409,085.0</td>
<td>177,835.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Head of the Directorate for Evacuation attached to the SNK [Council of People’s Commissars] of the Ukrainian SSR

(−) B. IVANOV

HDA SBU, F. 1, Op. 87 (1954), Spr. 3, pp. 139–147.
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
In the upper corner of the first page a handwritten note: 573, 7 January [19]46; below, a note: Comrade Yovenko.¹ Use in the report, 8 January, and an illegible signature.

¹ Andrey Yovenko (born 1913), Captain of State Security, Senior Operational Officer, Dept. 2, Unit 6, 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR (1943–1947)
No. 21

9 February 1946, Moscow. Directive on intensifying operational work in connection to resettlement, issued by Sergei Ogoltsov to the People’s Commissars of State Security of the Republics, the Heads of NKGB krai and oblast directorates, and the Heads of NKGB transport and water units

T[op] secret

*Copy 2*—

To the People’s Commissars of State Security of the Union and Autonomous Republics, the Heads of Krai and Oblast NKGB Directorates, and the Heads of NKGB transport and water units

The special commissions established by the decision of the SNK of the USSR of 10 November 1945, which were attached to oblast [and] krai ispolkoms and [to] the SNKs of the ASSRs and Union Republics (not divided into oblasts) with a view to registering former Polish citizens and other people subject to resettlement to Poland pursuant to the Soviet-Polish treaty of 6 July 1945, have generally concluded their work.

The commission attached to the SNK of the USSR has sent detailed instructions to field units concerning the procedures for organising the relocation of these people to Poland.

The NKVD of the USSR has provided the local organs with the necessary instructions concerning the formalities connected to issuing relocation documents and the measures to be taken to prevent anyone ineligible under the treaty of 6 July 1945 from illegally renouncing Soviet citizenship in order to relocate to Poland.

The NKGB of the USSR has received information that some Polish citizens, who for various reasons fear being refused the right to relocate to Poland, are illegally acquiring travel documents without waiting for organised resettlement, and are leaving for the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, Belarusian SSR, and Lithuanian SSR, from where they have been availing themselves of the simplified procedures for departing for Poland and crossing the border.

At the same time, it has been found that some Soviet citizens not subject to the treaty on repatriation have acquired various counterfeit documents and entered into fictitious marriages with Polish citizens.

---

*Filled in by hand.*
It is possible that in this way anti-Soviet elements, OUN and Home Army members and other persons who, not without good reason, fear reprisals from the Soviet authorities, are trying to move to Poland.

An investigation into the cases of people detained for attempting to illegally relocate to Poland has shown that Polish representatives in the Soviet-Polish repatriation commissions, officials of the directorates of the Union of Polish Patriots, and, in some instances, officers of local militia organs, have been offering assistance to former Polish citizens and people ineligible for relocation to Poland in acquiring counterfeit documents and in moving from the eastern to the western oblasts of the USSR.

The materials sent to the NKGB of the USSR by the local organs also show that a certain number of former Polish citizens eligible to renounce Soviet citizenship and relocate to Poland have not registered, in order to remain in the Soviet Union. It is possible that this category of person includes individuals who remain on the territory of the USSR with hostile intentions.

In order to ensure that the decision of the SNK of the USSR concerning the repatriation of former Polish citizens is implemented, and to prevent attempts at illegal relocation from the Soviet Union to Poland by people who are not covered by the Soviet-Polish treaty of 6 July 1945, I hereby order the following, so as to extend and supplement Directive No. 82 of the NKGB of the USSR dated 25 July 1945:

1. Increase the intelligence surveillance of the on-site Polish representatives in the Soviet-Polish mixed commissions for repatriation and the officials of the directorates of the Union of Polish Patriots. Thoroughly check all materials on people assisting in the illegal acquisition of documents for relocation from the USSR, documenting instances of unlawful acts, and urgently report on them to the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR, so that decisions can be made on bringing the perpetrators to justice.

2. Detain anyone trying to leave the USSR illegally. Carry out a careful investigation in every such case, and make a decision on bringing a criminal case against the detainee.

3. Identify all persons who are eligible for renouncing Soviet citizenship and relocating to Poland but who have not registered. Record them in our files, and determine their motivation for refusing to repatriate through intelligence or, if necessary, through personal interrogation.

Place former Polish citizens with dubious motives for refusing to repatriate under intelligence surveillance.
Submit special reports on the progress of the repatriation and the activities undertaken pursuant to this directive and Directive No. 82 to the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR every ten days.

Dep[uty] Narkom for State Security of the Union of SSR
Lieutenant-General S. OGOLTSOV

No. 11
9 February 1946
C[ity] of Moscow

Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

On the first page of the document, a diagonal handwritten note: [Inspection] Comrade Kovryzhenko, Comrade Buldakov, Comrade Uglev. To be carried out. Provide the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR with supplementary materials as soon as possible; Bondarenko’s signature.
Top secret

Information

on the results of the intelligence and operational work of the NKGB
of the Ukrainian SSR on eliminating the belopolskie underground,
and on progress in repatriating and resettling former Polish citizens to Poland

Situation as of 1 March 1946

The organs of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR uncovered the following Polish nationalist organisations in the western oblasts of Ukraine in 1945–1946:
1. PZP-AK (Polish Insurgent Union-Home Army) – a Polish military organisation;
2. PSC-DR (State Civil Service-Government Delegation) – a Polish civil organisation operating in contact with the PZP-AK;
3. NSZ (National Armed Forces), KON (Convention of Independence Organisations) and others, forming part of the Home Army.

In 1945, the following investigations against members of the aforementioned organisations were completely or partially concluded:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Investigation Type</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence investigations</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Record cards</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary intelligence operations</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the cases completed in 1945, the most noteworthy include:

The intelligence case code name “Janusy” (UNKGB of Lviv oblast).
The Lviv Home Army District, including its radio-intelligence, sabotage-terrorist, and legalization units.

In this investigation, 18 people were arrested and tried.

Confiscated items:
- Mortars                        | 2
- Light machine guns             | 6
- Assault rifles                 | 35
- Revolvers                      | 26
- Radio sets                     | 10
- Ammunition                     | 30,000

Intelligence investigation “Mar” (UNKGB Stanislaviv oblast)
The Stanyslaviv Home Army inspectorate was eliminated twice. 21 people were arrested in the “Mar” and “Enemies” case.

In 1945 and in January to February 1946, 3,017 people were arrested, broken down by category as follows:

- Members of belopolskiye organisations  – 1,324
- Terrorists  – 7
- Agents of German intelligence organs  – 145
- Romanian intelligence agents  – 1
- German police agents  – 4
- Traitors and German henchmen  – 365
- Anti-Soviet elements  – 1,171
Total: 3017

In the intelligence investigation “Pajęczyna,” controlled centrally by the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR, we are conducting an operation against the Home Army District Lviv-South, which is organising the Home Army underground’s anti-Soviet activity in the Lviv, Rivne, Kamianets-Podilskyi, Zhytomyr, and Kiev oblasts.

The investigation has uncovered 19 Home Army members designated for elimination in the immediate future.

In accordance with the Moscow agreement, as of 1 March 1946, 35,225 people were registered, 28,874 people had completed the relocation formalities, 20,715 people had moved to Poland, and 14,620 people remained in the eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR.

These figures, broken down by oblast, are presented below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of oblast</th>
<th>Registered Poles</th>
<th>Formalities connected to relocation to Poland</th>
<th>Persons who left</th>
<th>Persons remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>1,537</td>
<td>1,195</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>2,890</td>
<td>2,752</td>
<td>2,838</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>2,123</td>
<td>1,112</td>
<td>1,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>1,244</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>1,168</td>
<td>2,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>4,583</td>
<td>4,583</td>
<td>2,749</td>
<td>1,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Vinnytsia</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, as of 1 March [19]46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of oblast</th>
<th>Subject to resettlement</th>
<th>Persons who left</th>
<th>Persons remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>234,537</td>
<td>142,749</td>
<td>91,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>237,760</td>
<td>193,156</td>
<td>34,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Drohobych</td>
<td>120,742</td>
<td>81,925</td>
<td>38,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Stanyslaviv</td>
<td>83,412</td>
<td>66,600</td>
<td>16,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>71,824</td>
<td>67,393</td>
<td>4,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>66,933</td>
<td>64,111</td>
<td>2,822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>11,602</td>
<td>8,529</td>
<td>3,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>816,810</td>
<td>624,463</td>
<td>192,347</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Work on resettling Polish citizens to Poland continues.

During the repatriation of Polish citizens, the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR uncovered the following acts of malfeasance: illegal acquisition of evacuation documents by persons ineligible for relocation to Poland; bribery of some of the Polish representatives in the Soviet-Polish repatriation commissions, of individual ZPP officials, and in some cases, of officers of militia organs issuing fictitious documents for relocation to Poland.

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*a As in the original. Either the total or the figures are incorrect.
We have informed the NKGB of the USSR in detail in separate reports about the progress of the resettlement, and about instances of malfeasance.

(−) Pavlenko¹

_HDA SBU, F. 1, Op. 87 (1954), Spr. 5, pp. 16–19._
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

¹ Alexander Pavlenko (born 1913), in 1944–1945 Deputy Head of Dept. 1, Unit 6, 2nd Directorate of the NKGB of the Ukrainian SSR; in 1945–1947 Deputy Head, Acting Head, and Head of Unit 6 of the 2nd Directorate of the NKGB-MGB of the Ukrainian SSR; in 1947–1954 Deputy Head of the Bureau of the MGB-MVD of the Ukrainian SSR; Colonel of State Security.
No. 23

11 May 1946, Lublin. Information from Stanisław Wójtowicz on progress with resettling Ukrainians from Lublin województwo; position as of 1 May 1946

Lublin Wojewoda

S.P.*II/713/46*-

To the Ministry of Public Administration
Political Department
in Warsaw

A schedule on the progress of evacuating the Ukrainian population and others to the Ukrainian SSR is presented below.

Situation as of 1 May 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>[No.]</th>
<th>Names of regional representative offices</th>
<th>Ukrainians and others subject to the evacuation agreement as of 1 October [19]44</th>
<th>Registered for evacuation</th>
<th>Evacuated</th>
<th>% evacuated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Powiat</td>
<td>Families</td>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>Families</td>
<td>Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Biłgoraj</td>
<td>4,818</td>
<td>18,005</td>
<td>4,687</td>
<td>17,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Chełm</td>
<td>9,414</td>
<td>34,840</td>
<td>8,965</td>
<td>33,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Hrubieszów</td>
<td>21,140</td>
<td>78,217</td>
<td>11,562</td>
<td>40,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Krasnystaw</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>3,315</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>2,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Tomaszów Lubelski</td>
<td>11,407</td>
<td>41,441</td>
<td>10,793</td>
<td>39,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Włodawa</td>
<td>5,418</td>
<td>19,581</td>
<td>4,296</td>
<td>14,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Zamość</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>5,845</td>
<td>1,648</td>
<td>5,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>54,917</td>
<td>201,244</td>
<td>42,904</td>
<td>153,964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wojewoda:
Head of the Social-Political Department
(−) St. Wójtowicz

A MSWiA, MAP 304, p. 182.
Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Under the text, a date stamp of the MAP with the date 14 May [19]46 and a handwritten reference number: II PD/1599/46.

* = * Filled in by hand.
No. 24

After 20 July 1946, Kiev. Summary information from the OVIR of the Directorate of the MVD Militia of the Ukrainian SSR, on the results of resettling Poles and Jews in the period from December 1945 to July 1946

Information on the work conducted in connection to evacuating Polish and Jewish families to Poland pursuant to the Soviet-Polish treaty of 6 June 1945 (for the period from the month of December 1945 to 20 July 1946)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of oblast</th>
<th>Applications filed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Families</td>
<td>Total persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Vinnytsia</td>
<td>1,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Voroshilovgrad</td>
<td>1,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dnipropetrovsk</td>
<td>1,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>3,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Zaporizhia</td>
<td>1,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Izmail</td>
<td>1,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kamianets-Podilskyi</td>
<td>923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>1,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kirovohrad</td>
<td>1,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>1,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>1,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>1,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Sumy</td>
<td>1,057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>2,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>1,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Stalino</td>
<td>1,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26,762</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chief of the OVIR UM MVD of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant-Colonel
TISHCHENKO

_HDA SBU, F. 1, Op. 87 (1954), Spr. 5, p. 24._
_Copy, typescript._
 _Document in Russian._
 There are many errors in the table.

---

*a As in the original, the actual date is 6 July.
b- b Handwritten.
1 Sila Tishchenko (born 1892), lieutenant-colonel, in 1946–1948 Head of the OVIR Directorate of the Militia MVD USSR.
According to information from the Ministry of State Security of the USSR, as of 15 July this year, 112,865 families of Ukrainians resellers, a total of 442,420 persons, have arrived on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR in the course of being repatriated from Poland, a substantial portion of whom find themselves in dire material, accommodation, and living conditions.

In Kirovohrad oblast, 111 of the 2,210 relocated families have been given accommodation, while the other resettlers have been quartered in kolkhozniks’ homes at 2–3 families per home. In Poltava oblast, the accommodation needs of only 648 of the 1,749 relocated families have been met, while the remaining families are staying in quarters unfit for habitation.

Raion party organisations and councils are not paying sufficient attention to constructing new homes for resettlers. In Novhorodkivskyi raion, Kirovohrad oblast, 275 homes were to have been built for resettlers by 15 July this year. In fact, construction has only commenced on 14 houses.

In Bolshe-Tokmak raion, Zaporizhia oblast, the resettlers have not set about building houses because the raion organisations are not giving them adequate assistance in obtaining construction materials. The resettlers are in dire need of clothing and shoes, which is why children are not going to school and adults are not going to work.

Over 360 resettler children are not attending school in the raions of Voroshilovgrad oblast, and 87 children are not attending in the Baltiskyi and Biliayivskyi raions of Odessa oblast.

An inspection conducted in 5 selsoviets in Ustynivskyi raion, Kirovohrad oblast, revealed that only 37 of the employable 630 resettlers there were actually working in kolkhozes.

The resettlers are expressing dissatisfaction with their situation in many of the letters they send abroad (these letters are being retained by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR).
For example, resettler SUCHOŃKOK S., residing in the village of Yamburg, Dnipropetrovsk oblast, wrote to his relatives in Poland:

"Life is miserable here. Dear Father and Mother, if you are thinking about leaving, don’t move but stay where you are.

If we had stayed with you, we might not be suffering such abject poverty.”

Resettler STIECHNY, residing in the village of Staro-Bishevo, Stalino oblast, told his friends in Poland:

"If you hear that they are going to resettle you, do not listen to anybody and keep your head.”

Female resettler FILAK M. G., who resides in the Antonov selsoviet, Ustynivskyi raion, Kirovohrad oblast, explains in her letter to the USA:

“We work in the fields, because they force us to and do not believe that I am ill. We work for nothing and do not have our own house, so we are fed up with life. They say that we should buy houses, but none of us wants to do this, because nobody likes this life – people just work, they don’t eat, they don’t make any money, and they go around barefoot and in rags.”

Resettler TRACHANOVSKY A. W., who resides in the Chapaev kolkhoz in Novohorodkivskyi raion, Kirovohrad oblast, wrote in a letter to Canada:

“Life is extremely miserable here. The life that we once had is gone and it’s not coming back. We knew what we were working for there, but here we work and don’t see any results of this kolkhoz work. People are leaving, they’re looking for a better place, many have gone to Volhynia.”

Resettler KOŃ M., who resides in the “Red Star” kolkhoz in Adzham raion, Kirovohrad oblast, stated in a letter to America:

“Out of our people, only two families have stayed, the others have escaped to Western Ukraine, because they do not have kolkhozes there. I’ve stayed and can’t leave because of my little children. Everybody is barefoot, shabby, and you can’t make enough to buy food or clothes, there are no shoes, either... I am not sure if our life is ever going to improve.”

Due to difficult material and living conditions, resettlers are fleeing from the eastern raions of Ukraine and moving to the western oblasts in order to get back to Poland from there.

As of 15 July this year, 1,700 resettler families have moved to the western oblasts of Ukraine from the raions of Zaporizhia oblast, 1,500 from Mykolaiv, and 1,160 from Kirovohrad, since the end of 1945.

As a result, larger groups of resettlers have congregated in some western Ukrainian oblasts. For example, 1,753 families have settled in Rivne oblast without permission since autumn 1945.

The unsatisfactory material and living conditions of the resettled families are being exploited by hostile elements in order to encourage resettlers to move back to Poland by illegally crossing the border.
Former OUN members DZIADOSH I. V., GLAVACH I. P., and KONYK P. I. are resettlers who arrived in Rovenky raion, Voroshilovgrad oblast, from Poland in May 1945, and who have been trying to create an anti-Soviet group among resettlers in order to organise an illegal return of resettlers to Poland.

DZIADOSH, GLAVACH, and KONYK have been arrested by organs of the MGB.

Resettler GROMCHEVSKY M. P. was an active OUN member while living in Poland and participated in operations against Soviet partisans. After arriving as a resettler in Zaporizhia oblast, GROMCHEVSKY tried to organise the OUN underground and encouraged resettlers to go back to Poland in order to organise resistance against the USSR.

GROMCHEVSKY was arrested and sentenced to 20 years’ penal servitude.

The Ministry of State Security of the USSR is continuing its work of exposing hostile elements among the resettlers from Poland.

(–) ABAKUMOV

Sent:
to Comrade Stalin
to Comrade Beria

Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Paper with the national emblem over the letterhead; in the upper part of the page a handwritten note, partially overlapping with the print: CC KP(b) of Ukraine, Comrade Khrushchev N. S. Please pay attention, 8–9 and the signature of Lavrentiy Beria; 4 seals at the bottom of the first page: an oval seal with a Russian inscription: Received. Office of Comrade L. P. Beria, with a handwritten inscription: [...] August 1946 and the number: 809; a rectangular seal with a Ukrainian inscription: Special Sector of the CC KP(b)U. Secret unit, with a handwritten reference number: 07/69 and a date: 19 August 1946; a rectangular seal with a Ukrainian inscription: To be returned to the secret unit of the Special Sector of the CC KP(b)U; a rectangular seal with a Ukrainian inscription: Department of Agricultural Economy of the CC KP(b)U, with a handwritten reference number: 5-2239, and a date: 16 September [19]46.
No. 26
23 August 1946, Kiev. Special report on the completion of the operation to resettle Polish citizens from the eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, from Sergei Savchenko to G. Utekhin

To Dep[uty] Chief of the 2nd General Directorate of the MGB of the USSR
General-Major
Comrade UTEKHIN¹

Special report
on the completion of the repatriation of former Polish citizens to Poland

In accordance with the Moscow agreement of 6 July between the governments of the USSR and Poland, the repatriation of former Polish citizens from the territory of the eastern Ukrainian oblasts to Poland has been completed.

The relocation of repatriated former Polish citizens to Poland began on 20 December 1945 and lasted until 15 June this year.

During this period, the ?great majority of former Polish citizens and people of Polish and Jewish nationality who were subject to the agreement were relocated to Poland in an organised way.

The completed repatriation of former Polish citizens to Poland may be classified according to the following figures:

– Total number of registered former Polish citizens ........... 35,295 persons
– Persons who applied to renounce Soviet citizenship......... 34,621 – «–
– Persons who received evacuation documents
  (including USSR citizens subject to the agreement) ........ 37,549 – «–
– Persons who were refused relocation to Poland .......... 1,394 – «–
– Persons who renounced relocation to Poland after completing the formalities .............................................. 322 – «–
– Persons who were entitled to relocate to Poland,
  but did not apply .................................................. 674 – «–
– Passwords issued to agents for contact abroad ............... 15 – «–
– Total number of people who relocated to Poland .......... 37,227 – «–
– Of which minors up to the age of 14............................ 11,389 – «–

After the repatriation was completed, many eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR still had individual or small groups of former Polish citizens who had failed

¹ G. Utekhin, major-general, Deputy Head of the 2nd General Directorate of the MGB of the USSR (1946); in 1949–1951 Head of the 1st Directorate of the MGB of the USSR.
to relocate by the fixed time limit, for a variety of reasons (illness, seeking relatives, etc.). These people are continuing to relocate on their own, on the basis of the evacuation documents they have already been issued.

After examining the reasons why former Polish citizens renounced relocation to Poland, it was found that most of them had stayed in the Soviet Union for family reasons (local husband or wife), or because they were attending higher education institutions.

The vast majority of repatriates relocating to Poland expressed their gratitude to the Soviet government and the Red Army for the help they had received during the difficult years of the war and for liberating their fatherland from the German fascist occupiers.

During the repatriation, however, several situations were observed where nationalist elements, taking advantage of failures in carrying out the repatriation – such as unpunctual arrival of railway cars, delays with formalities connected to evacuation documents, etc. – tried to disrupt the repatriation measures by spreading various provocative lies.

At the same time, Polish anti-Soviet elements in some eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR conducted subversive activities aimed at getting people who were not subject to repatriation to denounce Soviet citizenship and relocate to Poland illegally.

It was found that in the majority of cases this channel was attempted by unregistered elements among the local Poles, who were intending to illegally relocate to Poland.

The anti-Soviet activities conducted by the Polish nationalist element while the repatriation was being carried out were met with a decisive response from the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR and the UMGBs in the oblasts.

The MGB of the Ukrainian SSR and the UMGBs in some eastern oblasts (Mykolaiv, Poltava, Odessa, and others) exposed and eliminated anti-Soviet groups of Poles who were engaged in preparing various forged certificates and other documents which they supplied, upon receipt of pecuniary bribes, to Polish citizens and individual local Poles with anti-Soviet attitudes who were intending to illegally relocate to Poland.

For example, the UMGB of Mykolaiv oblast detained a group of 7 former Polish citizens attempting to relocate to Poland on the basis of counterfeit documents.

During the course of the investigation, it was found that forged documents were being produced in Mykolaiv oblast by the former Polish citizen WOTRUBA...
Halina, daughter of Michał, a member of the ZPP and representative of the ZPP in Varvarovsk raion, Mykolaiv oblast.

WOTRUBA produced fictitious documents for travel to Poland, on the basis of which interested persons were able to obtain passes from militia organs.

WOTRUBA took pecuniary bribes of between 500 and 5,000 roubles for preparing forged documents and taking care of formalities related to issuing passes.

During the repatriation, the MGB of the USSR discovered a number of frauds by particular ZPP officials, who were engaged in forging and selling counterfeit documents for travel to Poland in many oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR.

The organs of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR quickly managed to put an end to all these frauds committed by ZPP officials, thanks to which illegal migration of anti-Soviet elements to Poland was prevented.

Many Soviet citizens of Polish nationality, influenced by the anti-Soviet element, took advantage of the repatriation of former Polish citizens by applying to renounce Soviet citizenship and relocate to Poland. These applications were filed on a particularly massive scale in Zhytomyr and Kamianets-Podilskyi oblasts. We already informed you of this in No. 1412/s of 23 April this year.

Analysing why Poles filed applications to renounce Soviet citizenship on a massive scale, it was found that one major reason was that the anti-Soviet element had been spreading lies that the organs of Soviet rule were allegedly going to oppress Poles, due to which some Poles tried to leave for Poland.

As a result of intelligence and operational activities aimed at identifying the organisers of anti-Soviet activities among the Polish population, the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR and the UMGB of Zhytomyr oblast, after the repatriation of former Polish citizens had been concluded, intelligence data was obtained showing that an anti-Soviet group of 7 Poles, spearheaded by DRAGOMIRECKI and ŻURAWSKI, had been conducting anti-Soviet activities among the local Polish people in the city of Zhytomyr with a view to organising a mass filing of applications to renounce Soviet citizenship, and to supply anti-Soviet elements with counterfeit documents for relocation to Poland.

When enough reliable materials on the activity of the anti-Soviet group of Poles in the town of Zhytomyr had come to hand, an intelligence operation code name “Illegals” was initiated and soon completed.

As a result of active investigation, and through work on the “Illegals” case, the following individuals were arrested:

DRAGOMIRECKI Anatol, son of Antoni: born in the town of Zhytomyr in 1914; a Pole; a USSR citizen; no member of any party; no steady employment;
ADASZKIEWICZ-DRAGOMIRECKA Karolina, d[aughter] of Władysław: born in 1895 in the town of Konstantinovka, Stalino oblast; a Pole; a USSR citizen; sentenced to confiscation of property and 5 years in a corrective labour camp for anti-Soviet activity in 1928;

ŻURAWSKI Piotr, s[on] of Aleksander, born in 1910 in the village of Budkintse, Zhytomyr oblast and raion; a USSR citizen; no steady employment; and others (7 people in total).

During the course of our intelligence and investigative work, it was discovered that DRAGOMIRECKI A. A. had received counterfeit documents from SWIATOSŁAWSKI-SWIŻEWSKI in May 1945 and illegally moved to Poland, from where he returned to the town of Zhytomyr in obscure circumstances.

While living in the town of Zhytomyr, DRAGOMIRECKI, together with ŻURAWSKI, his mother ADASZKIEWICZ Karolina and others, all of whom harboured anti-Soviet attitudes, induced local Poles to move to Poland, and helped them in exchange for bribes to obtain fictitious certificates and complete the formalities related to the right to move to Poland.

Moreover, DRAGOMIRECKI began to regularly visit the main post office in the town of Zhytomyr in February 1946, presenting himself as a representative of the Polish side in the combined Soviet-Polish commission for the repatriation of former Polish citizens, and writing applications for local Poles intending to move to Poland, for which he charged huge fees.

Everyone arrested in this case confessed to anti-Soviet activities connected with forging counterfeit documents and selling them to anti-Soviet elements so they could depart for Poland.

We are conducting an investigation into this matter in order to fully expose their criminal, anti-Soviet activities, and to check whether they were in contact with the belopolskie underground.

We informed the MGB of the USSR about this case in No. 2393s of 6 June [19]46.

It should be stressed that substantial numbers of non-registered anti-Soviet elements departed for the territory of Poland during the repatriation of former Polish citizens.

We have regularly kept the MGB of the USSR informed on the progress of repatriating former Polish citizens to Poland; the exposure and elimination of anti-Soviet groups in connection with repatriation; and the organisers of various frauds, in separate reports.
Further intelligence and operational measures related to investigating other Polish anti-Soviet elements are aimed at exposing and eliminating agents of foreign intelligence services and remnants of the organised belopolskie underground, and at intercepting its contact channels with foreign centres.

We will keep you informed of our results.

Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
Lieutenant General
SAVCHENKO

No. a-2911/s-a
“a-23-a” August 1946
C[ity] of Kiev
3 copies print[ed]
1 – for the addressee
1 – for the files of the Bur[ea]u of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR
1 – for the 2nd Dir[ectorate] of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Prepared by Yovenko – Dep[artment] 6
Basis: a-UMGB reports and our special reports to the MGB for 1945–1946-a.
Typed by Gelman
a-Certified true copy (→)a

Copy, typescript.
Document in Russian.
Under the text, a very poorly impressed rectangular stamp with a handwritten date: 23 November [19]46.

\*\*\* Filled in by hand.
No. 27
10 November 1946, Kiev. General Information from the 2nd Directorate of the Ukrainian MGB; position as of October 1946

Top secret

General information on the state of the Polish colony, the existing intelligence and information apparatus and operational files in the oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR (according to UMGB data) as of October 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of oblast</th>
<th>Size of Polish population</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
<th>Recorded Element</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Lviv</td>
<td>27,111</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Stanyslaviv</td>
<td>8,736</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1/6</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Drohobych</td>
<td>27,485</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>2/10</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Ternopil</td>
<td>9,927</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Chernivtsi</td>
<td>2,345</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1/2</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Rivne</td>
<td>2,986</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Volhynia</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2/a-r</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Zakarpattia</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>1/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>8/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>K(amianets)-Podilskyi</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>8/45</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Vinnytsia</td>
<td>4,223</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1/3</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>5,620</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Izmail</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Number of cases / number of persons involved in the cases.
According to our data, prior to the resettlement and repatriation, the Polish colony numbered:

|                |    | 7 | 9 | 11 | 10 | 3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>855,392</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>178,507</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in the Ukrainian SSR</td>
<td>1,033,899</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Resettled to Poland from the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR**: 775,441
- **Repatriated to Poland from the eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR**: 37,227

Total 812,668

Note: According to our data, prior to the resettlement and repatriation, the Polish colony numbered:

- a) west[ern] ob[l]ast[s] of the Ukrainian SSR = 855,392
- b) east[ern] ob[l]ast[s] of the Ukrainian SSR = 178,507
- Total: 1,033,899 people

*Dep[uty] Head of Depart[ment] 6, Division 2 of the Director[ate] of the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR
Captain

“a-10-a” November 1946

(-) VLASOV

_HDA SBU. F. 1, Op. 87 (1954), Spr. 5, p. 12._
Original, typescript.
Document in Russian.

*Filled in by hand.*
Information on the situation of Ukrainian resettlers relocated from Poland under the Lublin Treaty

Under the Lublin Treaty of 1944, 118,724 Ukrainian families, a total of 472,635 persons, were resettled from Poland to Ukraine.

Substantial numbers of Ukrainian resettlers were directed to Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and other eastern oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR, while the rest settled in Western Ukraine.

The resettlers in Western Ukraine were successfully accommodated, as almost all had houses and farms formerly belonging to Polish people who had left the USSR made available to them.

The situation in the eastern oblasts is very different, as only some of the resettlers have been given houses and farms formerly belonging to German colonists, while most have been accommodated in kolkhozniks’ living quarters, at a cost of greater population density.

Due to insufficient preparation by local institutions for accommodating and employing the resettlers, the latter were often given one room for two or three families by way of living quarters. This has led to unfavourable reactions, not only on the part of the resettlers, but the kolkhozniks as well.

Having found themselves in difficult accommodation conditions, many resettlers have had to stay in sheds, barns, pigsties, stables, granaries, and other quarters totally unfit for habitation.

Apart from the unfavourable accommodation conditions, many resettlers have found themselves in a difficult material situation. This situation has been aggravated by the fact that due to a poor harvest, especially in southern Ukraine, many areas have been unable to obtain grain or potatoes in exchange for what they had relinquished to the Red Army forces on the condition that they would be compensated on arrival at their settlement destination.

A substantial part of the resettlers is made up of anti-Soviet elements, kulaks, bandits, and members of nationalist organisations, who started engaging in hostile activities upon arrival at their settlement destinations.
For example:

A group of youths – Ukrainian resettlers and OUN members OMIELANIUK, MASHKEVSKY, MISOIU and others (27 people in total) – were detected and arrested in Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv and Odessa oblasts in January 1946.

On the basis of the confessions of those arrested, it was found that, in connection to their resettlement to Ukraine, they had been ordered by the chief of an OUN district unit to foster nationalist activity at their place of settlement.

In carrying out this order, they worked hard to recruit new OUN members, undertook steps to purchase weapons, discussed insurgent and terrorist issues during their meetings, and published a handwritten newspaper.

During searches of the arrestees’ homes, OUN orders and directives, seals and stamps, a code used for correspondence between group members, and reports of group leaders concerning their work were confiscated.

An anti-Soviet, nationalist group of Ukrainian resettlers has been exposed, consisting of BODAN, CIUPKO and others (4 people in total) in Lysychansk raion, Voroshilovgrad oblast.

As Ukrainian nationalists, they had been active in the Ukrainian “Yednist” collective in Poland for a long time, and had conducted organised nationalist propaganda activities.

After resettling in Ukraine, these people held illegal meetings during which they slandered the Soviet government, vilified the kolkhoz system, discouraged settlers from joining kolkhozes and tried to persuade them to go back to Poland.

In the village of Petropavlovka in Amvrosiivka raion, Stalino oblast, a group of anti-Soviet resettlers was uncovered whose members refused to accept living quarters and grain in exchange for what they had relinquished in Poland. They also waged an anti-Soviet campaign among the resettlers, trying to convince them to go back to Poland.

During the lead-up to elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, they openly expressed their unwillingness to vote, stating that they intended to leave for Poland in the spring.

By exploiting the shortcomings in organising and arranging [adequate] living conditions for settlers, and because of the lack of large-scale awareness-raising work, the hostile elements conducted destructive activities among the settlers, persuading them not to join the kolkhozes.

The local authorities’ tardiness in providing assistance to the resettlers, together with the difficult situation on the kolkhozes on account of the crop failure, have strengthened the tendency to leave for Western Ukraine, where individual farming predominates.

By 1945, these tendencies had assumed the nature of a mass movement, and the resettlers were starting to quit work on the kolkhozes, taking the livestock they had contributed, selling their property, and leaving their places of settlement in groups, using various means of transport.

As of now, about 9,000 families have remained in the eastern territories of Ukraine.
The resettlers who have fled to the raions of Western Ukrainian (Ternopol, Lviv, Drohobych, and other oblasts) are experiencing serious difficulties because the local institutions are not in a position to ensure adequate living conditions for them. Some resettlers have managed to move back to Poland, where they are disseminating many slanderous rumours about the USSR.

Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR
SAVCHENKO

“ ” March 1947
City of Kiev
CHAPTER VII

Operation “Vistula” 1947
INTRODUCTION

The 1947 resettlement of Ukrainians within Poland under Operation “Vistula” was a continuation of the large-scale relocation plan that had affected Poles and Ukrainians alike in 1944–1946. With Stalin’s approval, the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) and the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) signed a treaty in Lublin on 9 September 1944 to evacuate the Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and Polish citizens from the Ukrainian SSR.

Nikita Khrushchev had attempted to incorporate Podlachia, Chełm Land and Nadsanie into the Ukrainian SSR in the summer of 1944, but did not gain the Kremlin’s approval. The new Polish-Soviet border was demarcated on 26 July 1944.

In these circumstances, the command of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) resolved to protect the Ukrainian population from being deported from the territory of the Republic of Poland. The Supreme Provid of the OUN defined a separate territory for organisational purposes, named “Zakerzonnia” in OUN documents at the end of March 1945. Yaroslav Starukh (“Stiakh”) was appointed Providnyk, his deputy being Vasyl Halasa (“Orlan”). The head of the Security Services for this area was Petro Fedoriv (“Dalnych”), and the UPA commander was Myroslav Onyshkevich (“Orest”). Some of the best known commanders of the UPA ground units were Yaroslav Kotsiolek (“Krylach”), Petro Mykolenko (“Baida”), Mykhailo Duda (“Hromenko”), Roman Hrobelsky (“Brodych”), Vasyl Shyshkanynets (“Bir”), Volodymyr Shchyhelsky (“Burlaka”), and Stepan Stebelsky (“Khrin”).

The Communist regime persecuted both the Polish and the Ukrainian pro-independence underground, which created opportunities for Polish and Ukrainian anti-Communist forces to form coalitions. This resulted in agreements at the local organisational structure level between the Polish armed underground and the UPA in Podlachia and around Rzeszów and the south-east of the Lublin area. While these contacts were not maintained at the highest level, local agreements lasted until the beginning of Operation “Vistula,” and even resulted in two joint armed operations in 1946.

The treaty of 9 September 1944 to resettle Poles and Ukrainians was not accepted by either the Ukrainian or Polish populations. It was therefore necessary to change and postpone the end date of the resettlement process many times. Starting from autumn 1945, coercion was applied.

None of the operations the Polish and Soviet organs of repression carried out against the UPA in 1945–1946 proved effective. The UPA carried out many operations against resettlement. Ukrainian peasants often supported the underground which was acting to protect them. Not even the involvement of the military in the resettlement operation could ensure that all the Ukrainians were deported. According to estimates based on various sources, 150,000 to 200,000 Ukrainians remained in the south-eastern territories of Poland at the end of 1946.
The activities of the UPA were spurred on by the hard line the Polish authorities had taken against potential “nationalists,” which now numbered the residents of practically every Ukrainian village.

The governments of the Republic of Poland and the Ukrainian SSR announced that the resettlement had been completed on 7 May 1945, but the Communist authorities continued to regard the Ukrainian question as unresolved. The “definitive solution,” i.e. the displacement of the entire Ukrainian population, was achieved through Operation “Vistula.”

* * *

Operation “Vistula” has been the subject of many works; those published in Poland include Akcja “Wisła” na tle stosunków polsko-ukraińskich w XX wieku edited by Janusz Faryś and Jacek Jekiel (Szczecin 1994), and Akcja “Wisła” edited by Jan Pisuliński (Warsaw, 2003). Both these volumes were compiled as a result of conferences devoted to Operation “Vistula.”

Eugeniusz Misiło, a Ukrainian historian living and working in Poland, published an invaluable collection of source documents entitled Akcja “Wisła”: Dokumenty (Warsaw, 1993), which has also been translated into Ukrainian and published in Ukraine (Акція “Вісла.” Документи. Edited by Yevhen Misilo (Lviv–New York, 1997).

Also worth mentioning is a series of seminars entitled “Poland–Ukraine: Difficult Questions,” organised by the World Association of Home Army Soldiers and the Association of Ukrainians in Poland. The papers presented at the seminars, as well as discussion transcripts, have been published in ten volumes (“Polska – Ukraina: trudne pytania,” vol. 1–10, Warsaw, 1997–2003). Of particular relevance is vol. 8, which is devoted to Operation “Vistula.” The fate of the resettled populations has been explored by Igor Hałagida, Roman Drozd and Maciej Hejger.1

To mark the 50th anniversary of the beginning of Operation “Vistula,” the Association of Ukrainians in Poland prepared a collection of memoirs devoted to the Ukrainian villages and towns in the Beskids, Nadsanie, Podlachia, and Chelm Land from which the Ukrainian population was evicted in the spring and summer of 1947 during the aforementioned resettlement operation.2 The progress of the resettlements in Podlachia has also been studied by Andrzej Tłomacki.3

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1 I. Hałagida, Ukraincy na zachodnich i północnych ziemiach Polski 1947–1957 (Warsaw, 2002); R. Drozd, Droga na Zachód: Osadnictwo ludności ukraińskiej na ziemiach zachodnich i północnych Polski w ramach akcji “Wisła” (Warsaw, 1997); idem, Polityka władz wobec ludności ukraińskiej w Polsce w latach 1944–1989 (Warsaw, 2001); M. Hejger, Polityka narodowościowa władz polskich w województwie gdańskim w latach 1945–1947 (Słupsk, 1998).

2 1947. Пропам’ятна книга, edited by B. Huk (Warsaw, 1997).

The military aspects of Operation “Vistula” are presented in greater detail in books by Feliks Sikorski, Antoni Szcześniak and Wiesław Szota and Grzegorz Motyka.\(^4\)

A collection of materials edited by Władysław Filar entitled *Przed akcją “Wisła” był Wołyń* (Warsaw, 2000) is devoted to the connection between the activities of the UPA and Operation “Vistula.”

Operation “Vistula” is also discussed by Ryszard Torzecki in his book *Polacy i Ukraińcy. Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie na ziemiac II Rzeczypospolitej w czasie II wojny światowej* (Warsaw, 1993). The 1947 deportation of Ukrainians is also discussed in a number of articles, including those by Tadeusz Andrzej Olszański (Jan Łukaszów), Ewa Siemaszko,\(^5\) and others.

Attempting to assess Operation “Vistula” continues to be an exceptionally divisive issue for Polish researchers. Some (including Zbigniew Palski and Ewa Siemaszko) argue that this operation should be viewed in the context of the anti-Polish activities of the Ukrainian underground, especially in Volhynia. They claim that the only way to stop the UPA was through the involuntary resettlement of the Ukrainian population. It was therefore inevitable, conducted under humanitarian conditions, and the Ukrainians were moved to territories with a higher level of civilisational development.\(^6\)

Other scholars, such as Tadeusz Andrzej Olszański, Bogdan Skaradziński and Grzegorz Motyka argue that it was not necessary to resort to resettlement to eliminate the UPA. It therefore cannot be considered justified, in this view, and should be treated as part of the new “communist order” in Central Europe.\(^7\)

Compared to Polish historiography, relatively few publications in Ukraine (or anywhere else in the post-Soviet sphere) have even mentioned Operation “Vistula,” let alone discussed it. A critical research work with source documents devoted to the 1947 resettlement of Ukrainians in Poland has been published by the Ivan Krypiakevych Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in Lviv.\(^8\) This work is exceptional in that it is the first time that documents and materials from Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian archives have been collected in a single publication.

An International Conference entitled “Deportations of Poles and Ukrainians: From Late 1939 to the Early 1950s – On the Fiftieth Anniversary of Operation


“Vistula” was held in Lviv in 1997. The conference proceedings, edited by Yuriy Slyvka, were published under the same title in Lviv in 1998 and are essential to the study of resettlement issues.

Volodymyr Serhiychuk has published a considerable number of documents, some pertinent to the subject matter of this volume.9

The issues related to the causes, execution, and consequences of this operation have been discussed by many scholars, including Ivan Bilas, Olha Butsko, Leonid Zashkilniak, Mykola Krykun, Bohdan Zabrovarny, Anatoly Kentiy, Yuriy Kyrychuk, Yuriy Shapoval,10 and others.

Over the past few years, increasing interest in Operation “Vistula” has been evident in Ukrainian periodicals.11

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The operation code-named “Vistula” began on 28 April 1947. Six Polish Army divisions encircled Ukrainian villages, while NKVD and Czechoslovak border troops sealed the eastern and southern borders. Over the next three months, more than 140,000 Ukrainians were deported from Nadsanie, the Lower Beskids, the Bieszczady, Chelm Land, and the southern part of Podlachia to Poland’s western and northern województwos. The documents presented in this volume allow the reader to form his/her own opinions on the objectives of Operation “Vistula” and the way they were realised. The plan for an operation originally code-named ‘East” clearly states: ‘Task: To resolve the Ukrainian problem in Poland once and for all.”12 This document also stresses the importance of actions directed against the UPA: “Simultaneously with the evacuation, offensive combat against UPA bands is to be carried out, and they have to be totally eliminated once the evacuation has been completed.”13

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9 Трагедія українців у Польщі (Ternopil, 1997) and Десять бурених літ. Західноукраїнські землі у 1944–1953 роках. Нові документи і матеріали (Kiev, 1998).


13 Ibidem.
In January 1947, Polish Army units stationed in Poland’s south-eastern województwos were ordered to prepare lists of Ukrainian families that had not been relocated in 1944–1946. A month later, General Stefan Mossor, Deputy Chief of General Staff, drew up a plan for resettling Ukrainians into the western territories which had been incorporated into Poland as a result of the agreements concluded at the Potsdam Conference, viz. the southern part of East Prussia, Silesia, Lubusz Land, and Western Pomerania – collectively known as the Recovered Territories. These were the areas where Ukrainians were to assimilate with Poles.

Other documents show that the Ukrainian underground was ready to resist resettlement. In an instruction dated 1 March 1947, it is stressed that “The previous resettlement operations initially excited an even stronger reaction, sometimes leading to panic, but our organisation has brought the situation under control and has waged combat on a larger scale. Combat is, and must always be, possible. For this reason, we will maintain our military and organisational personnel at full capacity. There is no cause for concern in the results of our combat with the enemy, or for our future existence or work.”

A propaganda campaign conducted among Polish soldiers and the Polish population was given high priority: “for them not to assist with the resettlement of Ukrainians, but rather to oppose [it]. This is of great importance. Cases where Polish civilians help deport Ukrainians will have to be punished, but always with an appropriate political-propaganda explanation.”

Many important details of Operation “Vistula” still require careful verification by researchers. For instance, Ryszard Torzecki of the Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences, claims that the decision to implement Operation “Vistula” was taken in Moscow in February 1947, and that its plans were drawn up by General Sergei Savchenko, the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, on the orders of Lavrentiy Beria and Georgy Malenkov. Following this, the appropriate decisions were made by the Politburo of the CC PZPR in March 1947 and by the Polish State Security Commission on 12 April. However, Torzecki does not cite any documents to corroborate his theory of the “Moscow origins” of Operation “Vistula.”

What is indisputable, however, is that Operation “Vistula” was coordinated at the highest levels of government in Poland and the USSR. At the end of March 1947, the USSR Ambassador to Poland, Viktor Lebedev, informed the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which in turn forwarded the information to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) of Poland’s intention to deport all Ukrainians from the Rzeszów and Lublin województwos. On 18 April 1947, the Polish Ambassador to the USSR, Marian Naszkowski, sent a note to the USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrey Vyshinsky, regarding the resettlement of Ukrainians. The note requested that necessary measures be taken to prevent “undesirable elements” from infiltrating the territory of the Soviet Union during Operation “Vistula.”

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14 IPN, MBP, UPA X/32, pp. 11–12.
15 Ibidem.
16 R. Torzecki, „Wisła zaczęła się w Moskwie”...
17 IPN, MSW III.1/1544, pp. 6–7.
It must also be remembered that the operations against the UPA were coordinated by regular Polish, Soviet, and Czechoslovak troops; that the Polish-Soviet and Polish-Czechoslovak borders were sealed; and that the government of the Ukrainian SSR refused to receive Ukrainians throughout Operation “Vistula.” These factors would suggest that the operation resulted from collusion between the then totalitarian regimes of Poland and the USSR. Whether there was any connection between Operation “Vistula” and Operation “West”, then being carried out in the Ukrainian SSR, remains an open question. The latter led to the resettlement of over 76,000 Ukrainians suspected of sympathising with the UPA to remote parts of the USSR in October 1947.

If Ryszard Torzecki is correct, some important corrections should be made to the way historians understand the motivations behind the Polish authorities’ anti-Ukrainian actions. This would mean that the assassination by UPA soldiers of the Polish Deputy Defence Minister, General Karol Świerczewski, on 28 March 1947 was not as important to the implementation of Operation “Vistula” as previously thought. However, even if the death of General Świerczewski was not directly connected to Operation “Vistula,” it nevertheless substantially hastened its onset.

Source documents corroborate the thesis that the assassination of General Świerczewski in a UPA ambush took place by pure chance. Still, further in-depth research is needed to arrive at a comprehensive explanation of the causes of Operation “Vistula.”

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The documents presented in this volume make it possible to reconstruct the way in which the resettlement operation code-named “Vistula” was conducted. All the basic decisions concerning the command of the Operational Group, the timetable of the operation, the methods used to combat the Ukrainian underground and the civilians suspected of sympathising with it (establishing field court-martials and a labour camp in Jaworzno), and the destinations where the evacuees were to settle, were made at the level of the Central Committee Polish Workers’ Party (PPR).

Command was entrusted to the Deputy Chief of the Polish General Staff, Brigadier-General Mossor, his deputies being Colonel Grzegorz Korczyński (Deputy Minister of Public Security), Colonel Juliusz Huebner (the future commander of the Internal Security Corps), and Lieutenant-Colonel Bolesław Sidziński. Fearing that individuals or even groups might escape to neighbouring countries during the operation, the Polish Defence Minister, Marshal Michał Rol-Żymierski, requested the defence ministers of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and the USSR to seal the eastern and southern sections of the Polish border. The resolution on Operation “Vistula” was adopted by the Polish Presidium of the Council of Ministers on 24 April 1947.

Operation “Vistula” was carried out by four infantry divisions (6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th), one Internal Security Corps (KBW) division, and three special regiments
(infantry, motor, and sapper units) of the Polish Armed Forces. The operation was additionally supported by the 3rd Infantry Division. The military were assisted by the Citizens’ Militia, and the Volunteer Reserves of the Citizens’ Militia, as well as powiat and województwo security offices. The operation involved 20,000 Polish soldiers, together with militiamen, public security troops, and border protection troops (WOP).

The Soviet command brought in one armoured division from Lviv oblast as well as special anti-partisan troops, while the Border Troops of the Ukrainian Division of the MVD sealed the Polish-Soviet border. The Czechs deployed a special operational group, and provided some motor vehicles to the Polish Army so that Polish units could regroup more quickly.

One of the Polish documents provides a general picture of the situation in the areas subjected to Operation “Vistula”: “The territory of the operational area is inhabited by a mixed Polish-Ukrainian population, with a prevalence of Ukrainians in the eastern and south-eastern parts of the area.

The Polish population in this outermost Polish region, which is far from the country’s cultural centres, displays poor political awareness and is additionally being terrorised by fascist Ukrainian bands.

The Ukrainian population, which is generally hostile, has either joined or is working closely with the bands, which enjoy a great deal of respect among the Ukrainian population...

Ukrainian people tend to believe that the UPA bands are fighting for a ‘Samostiyna Ukraine’ [Independent Ukraine]. The Ukrainian population supplies human and material resources to the bands, collaborates in organising acts of banditry, provides extensive intelligence through a highly elaborate civil network, etc.”

This document also describes the UPA structure at that time: “The UPA bands have an efficient military organisation. They are territorially divided into units, known as kurins, often commanded by former SS officers. On average, a kurin consists of 5–6 sotnias, which are 150–300 strong. A sotnia is further divided into two chotas, corresponding to our companies, and these in turn are subdivided into three riys, roughly equivalent to platoons.

All of these units are accompanied by an extensive political and educational apparatus, which not only operates within the units, but intensively agitates among the local population as well. Along with a strictly military organisational structure, these bands have their own civil administration authorities and a corresponding executive apparatus.

The bands are usually equipped with modern German, Russian, and Czech automatic weapons and machine guns with ample ammunition. Their uniforms vary. Some have German, Russian, or Polish uniforms, but most wear civilian clothes.

On the basis of intelligence information, gathered by every possible means, including radio and telephone intercepts, the bands usually prepare an operation

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by concentrating larger forces *ad hoc* for the duration of the operation. Once the operation is completed, they immediately disperse and return to their villages, where they work as ostensibly peaceful citizens doing their jobs. They typically conduct surprise attacks, ambushes, and sudden forays. They attack small military units, state and administrative offices, representatives of the authorities, Polish civilians, key buildings and industrial facilities; they also damage rail tracks and bridges. They protect themselves extremely well when stationary and mostly move by night. If they encounter larger military units, they do not engage but retreat in an organised way.”

These problems are reflected in the documents presented below. Most are kept at the Office for the Dissemination and Preservation of Archival Records of the Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw. Many of them come from the files seized from Myroslav Onyshkevich (“Orest”).

Onyshkevich was arrested by Polish security services in the village of Karczowiska, Lubin powiat, Wrocław województwo, on 2 March 1948. He was subsequently sentenced to death and executed in Warsaw on 6 July 1950. Onyshkevich commanded the 6th UPA Military District “Sian” in 1945–1947, and so his headquarters contained substantial information about the actions and living conditions of UPA bands. The documents included operational, intelligence, and organisational reports (including reports on the activities of the Security Service division), correspondence, instructions, extraordinary reports, proclamations, etc. These documents were included in Onyshkevich’s investigation records, and many of them bear his handwritten notes such as “Found in my files. Onyshkevich Myroslav” or “Found with me. Onyshkevich Myroslav.” These documents give a clear picture of the actual political situation in Zakerzonnia, and show the fierce confrontation and daily violence the local people were faced with. Some of the documents concern UPA activity in other areas.

Holding the Lower Beskids, the Bieszczady, Nadsanie, Chelm Land and Podlachia to be their lands, the Ukrainian underground took up arms to protect the rights and the lives of the local Ukrainian population. UPA units first embarked on a plan to liquidate Polish resettlement commissions and soldiers, and to burn down the evacuated Ukrainian villages to be settled by Poles (UPA documents refer to these villages as “post-Ukrainian”). Some Polish villages, long inhabited by Poles, were also burned down.

The Polish authorities, intent on resolving the “Ukrainian question” in Poland and supported by Moscow, obviously took an entirely different stance, arguing that their own violent measures were perfectly understandable given the “banditry” of the UPA. Documents produced by both sides all too often used the term “bandit.” The Poles reported on Ukrainian “banditry” and “terrorism,” while the Ukrainians

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19 Ibidem.
used the same terms to describe Polish actions. Similarly, both sides tended to overuse the word “retaliation.” These terms should therefore be treated with substantial caution.

In this context, Yuriy Kyrychuk aptly observes that “It is extremely difficult to assess to what extent the Polish-Ukrainian wartime conflict, which had led to an escalation of extreme Ukrainophobia among Polish society, and Polonophobia among Ukrainian society, provided some sort of moral indulgence for those politicians who carried out the operation designed to deport Ukrainians from Zakerzonnia. It is nevertheless true that Moscow and Warsaw could justify the deportations to the West as humanitarian actions and an attempt to put an end to Polish-Ukrainian feuds. Still, the causes of the resettlement lie much deeper. From Moscow’s point of view, the deportation of Ukrainians from Poland eliminated the threat of a new Ukrainian ‘Piedmont’ beyond the borders of the USSR. For Polish communists, displacing the Ukrainians was an opportunity to reconcile themselves with those segments of Polish society that harboured inimical attitudes towards them.”21

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Operation “Vistula” officially ended in July 1947, but resettlement continued into September, and even October of 1947. Some individuals, temporarily detained or separated from their families, arrived at the new settlement destinations in the western territories as late as January 1948. The last group of people to be relocated consisted of 32 families resettled from Nowy Targ powiat to Szczecin województwo between January and April 1950. These were mostly mixed families that had not received permission to stay in the border strip. In April 1947, in order to intimidate the population, the Politburo of the PPR established a labour camp in Jaworzno using buildings from the former Nazi concentration camp, Auschwitz. The labour camp held a total of 3,873 people, including 838 women, 22 Greek Catholic priests and 3 Orthodox Priests. Over 150 of the internees had died in the camp by the time it was closed in January 1949.22

Special actions were directed against Ukrainian partisans during Operation “Vistula.” The sotnias were relentlessly tracked and pursued; they were soon severely depleted and forced to break through to Ukraine or the West. If the UPA can legitimately be considered an army without a state, then Operation “Vistula” made it an army without a future in Zakerzonnia as well. Operational Order No. 011, issued by the staff of Operational Group Vistula on 22 July 1947, states that “the most belligerent core UPA units were “Baida’s” and “Ren’s” kurins, comprising “Burlaka’s,” “Krylach’s,” “Lastivka’s,” “Hromenko’s,” “Bir’s,”

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“Khrin’s,” “Stiakh’s,” and “Roman’s,” sotnias. All these sotnias were confined to the forests, were extremely militant, had the fiercest commanders and bandits, and had the most acts of murder, arson, and robbery on their conscience. Both these kurins have been completely destroyed, losing about 80% of their strength. Their remnants have escaped in several groups to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, where they are being eliminated by allied army units.” 23

From April to July 1947, OG Vistula carried out 357 military operations killing 1,509 UPA members and destroying 1,178 bunkers and hideouts.24 At the same time, almost 2,800 members of the civil OUN and UPA network were arrested.25 Operation “Vistula” is generally thought to have achieved its intended purpose. However, it should be remembered that during the same operation, the Polish Army and the KBW also launched actions against Polish underground independence movements (the WiN, NZW, and ROAK) in Cracow, Lublin and Rzeszów województwos, as evidenced by the Defence Minister’s announcements.

Documents and materials from the 1950s reveal that the resettlement of Poles and Ukrainians remained a bitter and painful problem during the post-war period, long after the relocation operation, not only for the Ukrainian population in Poland, but also for the entire Polish nation. After the onset of de-Stalinisation, the time was ripe for reassessing Operation “Vistula” and considering a possible return of the displaced Ukrainians to their former homes. The Ukrainians themselves often expressed their attitudes very simply – by going back. The greatest numbers of returnees were recorded in Lublin and Rzeszów województwos.

An extant “Report on the Ukrainian Population” compiled for official use in May 1956 is especially interesting. It states, inter alia, that “the situation of the Ukrainian population is quite difficult.”26 The document not only contains an assessment of the current state of affairs, but also gives prerequisites for improving the Ukrainians’ lot. It was critical of Operation “Vistula,” stating that “According to the MSW, Operation “V” was a mistake, and caused irreparable harm. The application of collective responsibility in the form of mass repressions (forced resettlement) towards an entire segment of the population for the activities of the bands represented a grave deviation from the principles of Leninist ethnic policy. Operation “V” caused not only economic damage (the loss and devastation of the deported people’s property), but also serious political damage that has yet to be remedied, viz. deep-seated resentment among those displaced and heightened nationalistic sentiments both among the displaced and the Polish population. Furthermore, this state of affairs is being reinforced through discrimination in various areas of life.”27

The report goes on to propose some measures for improving the situation of the Ukrainians, such as increasing material aid to the resettlers; overcoming their

23 E. Misiło, Akcja “Wisła”..., 348.
24 Ю. Киричук, Нариси з історії..., 218.
25 А. Кентій, Нарис боротьби ОУН-УПА..., 49.
26 IPN, MSW I/198, pp. 233–239.
27 Ibidem.
tendency to return to their original places of residence, and holding talks with the Ukrainian community in order to explain the government’s policy on reassessing Operation “Vistula” and its effects.

This approach, however, did not always meet with acceptance, as is reflected in the minutes of the MSW Council meeting of 5 June 1956, where opinions were divided. While some of the influential, high-ranking officials in attendance argued that Operation “Vistula” should be considered “a tremendous error in respect of the Ukrainian population,” others held that criticism was inappropriate because “this would be an unfair assessment, especially as it is not possible to offer full redress.”

On 3 August 1990, the Polish Senate unequivocally and categorically condemned Operation “Vistula.” This condemnation is found in the Joint Declaration of the Presidents of Poland and Ukraine, signed 21 May 1997. In a similar vein, the Polish president issued a letter in 2002 expressing sympathy “on behalf of the Republic of Poland” to all Ukrainians “who suffered as a result of those shameful actions.”

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29 Letter from the Polish President to the participants of the Operation “Vistula” academic conference (Krasiczyn, 18–19 April 2002), Teki edukacyjne IPN. Stosunki polsko-ukraińskie 1939–1947, Materiały dla ucznia (Warsaw, 2002), 39.
DOCUMENTS
No. 1
Spring 1947, Warsaw. Plan for Operation “East” formulated by the MON and the MBP

State Security Commission

Warsaw, ..... 1947
Top secret
Copy No. ..... 

Plan for Special Operation “East”

I. Task:
To resolve the Ukrainian problem in Poland once and for all.
To this purpose:
   a) In consultation with the State Repatriation Office, carry out an evacuation of all persons of Ukrainian nationality from the southern and eastern border strip to the north-western territories, resettling them with the widest possible dispersion.
   b) All shades of Ukrainian nationality shall be subject to resettlement, including Lemkos and mixed Polish-Ukrainian families.
   c) The main hotbed of bands in the south-eastern tip of the country (in the Sanok area) is to be totally evacuated, including the Polish civilian population, regardless of professional, social, or party affiliation. In the future, this area will be populated by military settlement.
   d) The evacuation operation is to be carried out within the shortest possible time (if possible, within 4 weeks), because the new settlers will need to sow the land in the areas of new settlement.
   e) Offensive combat is to be waged against UPA bands simultaneously with the evacuation. These bands must be completely eliminated once the evacuation has been completed.

II. Command:
Deputy Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Mossor has been appointed military commander and government representative for this operation. Gen. Mossor will be assisted by delegates of the ministers of security, public administration and communications, and a delegate of the Chief Director of the PUR [State Repatriation Office].

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1 Stefan Mossor (1896–1957), major-general, military theorist; Commander, 6th Regiment of Mounted Riflemen during the September Campaign (1939); in German captivity, later Deputy Chief of Staff, Polish 1st Army (1939–1945); in 1945–1946 Chief of Staff, Minister of Defence; in 1946–1948 Deputy Chief of General Staff; Commander, OG Vistula (1947); in 1948–1949 Commander, 5th Military District in Cracow; in 1949–1950 Chief of the Studies Office attached to the Ministry of Defence. Dismissed from the army, imprisoned (1950); partially rehabilitated, returned to the army (1956).
III. Central idea of the plan:
   a) The tasks are to be carried out in two phases:
      In Phase 1, concentrate most of our forces and resources on completely evacuating the Sanok area. This operation is to be coordinated with a simultaneous evacuation of the areas immediately to the west and north, and an evacuation in the Lublin Military District.
      In Phase 2, evacuate the Przemyśl–Lubaczów area, and the area between Wisłok and Nowy Sącz.
   b) Engage UPA bands in active combat from the very beginning of the operation. Reconnoitre and pinpoint their locations, so that these bands can be mopped up once the evacuation of the civilian population has been completed.

IV. Command Structure:
   The entire operation will be commanded by Operational Group East, which will initially be headquartered in Sanok, and later in Rzeszów.
   All army, security, and militia units, troops, and UB in the area of these operations will come under the command of the above OG. Furthermore, the commander of OG East shall have the right to:
      – issue operational orders concerning this operation to commanders of the 5th OW and 7th OW;
      – issue orders to civilian bodies in the area, with the authorisation of the ministers of public administration, communications and the Chief Director of the PUR;
      – issue orders to local post and telegraphic offices in the Włodawa–Lubaczów–Sanok–Lesko–Gorlice area, up to the Soviet and Czechoslovak borders, with the authorisation of the minister of postal and telegraphic services.

V. Political and educational principles of the operation.
   (Annex no. 1)

VI. Areas of operation.
   (See attached 1:500 000 map, Annex no. 2).
   The whole area of operation of the OG has been divided into 4 operational areas:
      – Region “S” (Sanok)
      – Region “R” (Rzeszów)
      – Region “L” (Lublin)
      – Region “G” (Gorlice).

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2 Actually Operational Group Vistula, an operational formation of the Polish Armed Forces established April 17, 1947 to eliminate the Ukrainian underground. Command was entrusted to Brigadier-General Stefan Mosso. The group was dissolved July 31 that year.
3 The 5th Military District (OW) in Cracow was under the command of Maj. Gen. Mikołaj Prus-Więckowski.
4 Annexes not published.
Operations in Region “S” will be personally directed by the Commander of OG East; Region “R” by the Commander of the 9th Inf. Div.; and Region “L” by the Commander of the 7th OW. Command of Region “G” will be appointed prior to the beginning of Phase 2 of the operation.

VII. Command Structure OG East.
(See Annex no.s 3, 3a).

VIII. Assessment of forces.
(See Annex no. 4).

IX. Command Structure in Region “S”
(See 1:100 000 map, Annex no. 5).

X. Transport routes for evacuation.
(See Annex no. 6).

XI. Transport routes for supply.
(See Annex No. 7).

XII. Principles of supply.
(See Annex no.s 8, 8a, 8b).

XIII. Principles and structure of communications.
(See Annex no.s 9, 9a and 9b).

Minister of Public Security
Radkiewicz\(^5\)
Brigadier-General

Minister of Defence
Żymierski\(^6\)
Marshall of Poland

\(^5\) Stanisław Radkiewicz (1903–1987), major-general; in the USSR during WWII; from July to December 1944 Minister of Public Security in the PKWN; in 1945–1954 Minister of Public Security; member of the CC PZPR (until 1957), expelled from the party.

\(^6\) Michał Rola-Żymierski, born Michał Łyżwiński (1890–1989), Marshal of Poland; demoted and expelled from the Polish Army for fraud (1927); in 1927–1931 imprisoned; left for France and began working with Soviet intelligence; from 1943 served in the People’s Guard (GL) as adviser to the CS, *inter alia*; Commander of the People’s Army (AL), later co-organiser of the People’s Army of Poland (LWP) (1944); in 1944–1949 Minister of Defence; in 1952–1955 imprisoned; later Vice-President of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) (until 1967); in 1981–1986 member of the CC PZPR.
No. 2

19 April 1947, [no place given]. Order No. 001 from Gen. Stefan Mossor, concerning the formation of OG Vistula and the tasks of its constituent units

Copy
Operational Group Vistula
Ref. No. ...... Top secret
Copy No. ..... Copy

Order No. 001/Op/Vistula
Staff of Operational Group Vistula
Sanok, 19 April [19]47
1:100 000 map

I. Formation of OG Vistula and its tasks.

By the order of the Minister of Defence, Operational Group Vistula has been formed in order to carry out the following tasks:

a) to eliminate the fascist UPA bands in the south-eastern part of the country;
b) to assist the State Office for Repatriation in resettling the Ukrainian population.

II. Guidelines for operations against UPA bands.

(See Annex No. 1) 1

III. Numbering of units, their combat composition and deployment.

A. In OG Vistula, combined infantry regiments deployed by divisions are numbered after the divisions that form them. The Security Troops 2 included in OG Vistula shall be named the “1st WBW Division” 3 with the brigades numbered: “the First, 4 Second, 5 and Third WBW Brigade.” 5

1 Annexes not published.
2 “Internal Security Troops” (Wojska Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) is an unofficial name of internal troops, used interchangeably with the Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, KBW), which was established on 25 May 1945 from the 4th Infantry Division and two blocking brigades to fight the Polish and Ukrainian armed underground. It was controlled by the MBP, and was under the command of Maj. Gen. Bolesław Kieniewicz. A dozen or so KBW commands were established at the województwo level.
3 Until the middle of May 1947, the division was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wincenty Rożkowski, and later under Col. Jewgienij Kuźmicz.
4 The First KBW brigade was formed in Zamość and consisted of Battalion Szczecin, Battalion Kielce, and a battalion deployed by the “Motorised Regiment.” Maj. Dionizy Panasiński was the commander.
5 Commanded by Maj. Stanisław Wolański.
6 Commanded by Maj. Franciszek Szymendera.
The special units have been given the following names:
“1st Motorised Regiment”
“5th Sapper Regiment”
“1st Aviation Squadron”

B. Command of OG Vistula

a) Command of 6 Inf. Div. 7 CP – Komańcza (6674)
The division includes:
6th Inf. Div. 7 CP – Osławica (6078)
2nd Inf. Reg. 8 CP – Wiślok Górny (7270)

b) Command of 7 Inf. Div. 9 CP – Kulaszne (7482)
The division includes:
7th Inf. Reg. 9 CP – Płonna (7880)
11th Inf. Reg. CP – Nowosiółki (7492)

c) Command of 8th Inf. Div. 10 CP – Lesko (8296)
The division includes:
1st Inf. Reg. CP – Grądziowa (9610)
8th Inf. Reg. 11 CP – Wańkowa (8606)
10th Inf. Reg. 12 CP – Tyrawa Wołoska (9298)

d) Command of 9 Inf. Div. 13 CP – Przemyśl (1628)
The division includes:
3rd Inf. Reg. 13 CP – Lubaczów (5850)
4th Inf. Reg. 14 CP – Żegatyń (1098)
5th Inf. Reg. CP – Krzywca (1810)
14th Inf. Reg. 15 CP – Maćkowice (2420)

8 Underlined by hand.

7 This was actually the 6th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tadeusz Pawelczak.
8 The combined 2nd Infantry Regiment was deployed by the 2nd Infantry Division (also from the 4th and 5th Infantry Regiments). The regiment was commanded by Col. Kazimierz Sikorski.
9 This regiment was commanded by Col. Józef Sobiesiak.
10 This division was commanded by Col. Józef Bielecki.
11 This regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Jan Gerhard.
12 On 9 May 1947, the combined 10th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Maj. Kryplewski, was transferred from the 8th Infantry Division to the combined 7th Infantry Division.
13 The combined 3rd Infantry Regiment was part of the combined 3rd Infantry Division, which was formed at the beginning of May 1947. It had earlier been deployed briefly with the 9th Infantry Division. The 3rd Infantry Regiment was formed from the sub-units of the 3rd Infantry Division (regular), with every regiment of the division providing a battalion. The combined 3rd Infantry Division, like the 6th, 7th, and 8th Infantry Divisions, was a tactical unit formed for the duration of Operation “Vistula.” The division consisted of staff deployed by the 3rd Infantry Division (regular) and combined regiments from particular Infantry Divisions (the 3rd Infantry Regiment was deployed by the 3rd Infantry Division, the 5th Infantry Regiment by the 5th Infantry Division, and the 14th Infantry Regiment by the 14th Infantry Division). All these units were disbanded after Operation “Vistula” and returned to their home garrisons.
14 This regiment joined the combined 7th Infantry Division in July, and was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Laszkow.
15 The combined 14th Infantry Regiment was initially part of the combined 9th Infantry Division, then the combined 3rd Infantry Division. The regiment was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Buczek.
28th Inf. Reg./16 CP – Brylińce (0818)
30th Inf. Reg./17 CP – Bircza (0606)
e) Command of a-1st WBW Division/a CP – a-Baligród-a (6694)
The division includes:
1st WBW Brigade Zamość CP – Cisna
2nd WBW Brigade Tarnów CP – Berehy Górne (4412)
3rd WBW Brigade Rzeszów CP – Ustrzyki Górne (4020)
f) Command of a-12th Inf. Reg.-a (Reserves)/18 CP – Sanok
g) Command of a-1st Motor Regiment/a CP – Olchowce (2088)
h) Command of a-5th Sap[er] Regiment/a CP – Zagórz (8892)/b-Doł.-b

IV. Areas of responsibility of particular divisions
6th Inf. Div. – see Diagram No. 1, Annex No. 4.
7th Inf. Div. – see Diagram No. 2, Annex No. 4.
8th Inf. Div. – see Diagram No. 3, Annex No. 4.
9th Inf. Div. – see Diagram No. 4, Annex No. 4.
1st WBW Division – see Diagram No. 5, Annex No. 4.

Due to the above,

I hereby order:

1. Immediately on arrival, march in a secure formation to reach the destination prescribed by this command; set up a CP; scout the area; and station troops with a view to future operations and full combat readiness.
   A list of stationed units with a sketch should be presented to me by 25 April [19]47.

2. Establish and maintain constant communication with the local security services, MO, and administration.
   Carefully reconnoitre the area, and quickly respond to any reliable intelligence about the bands.
   Set up your own intensive intelligence to gain information about the bands, and assign manoeuvre groups to eliminate them. Pursue every band with which contact has been made, until they have all been completely eliminated or captured. Under no circumstances must a band be allowed to break away and escape.

3. I [order] commanders of units to personally review the operational groups formed, and to check their combat readiness and ability to perform their tasks.
   I [order] commanders of divisions to continuously monitor the activities of operational groups, paying particular attention to the proper set-up and organisation of intelligence.

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16 This regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Wygnański.
17 This regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Andrzej Lisowski.
18 This combined 12th Infantry Regiment was the reserve of OG Vistula. The regiment was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Henryk Bąkowski.
4. Given the specific regional, ethnic and safety conditions, pay special attention to the attached “Guidelines for unit operations against UPA bands” (Annex No. 1).

5. Check the security of state-owned facilities (oil wells, bridges, communication lines, telecommunication facilities, etc.) in the assigned areas of responsibility. Use your own forces to arrange for the protection of important facilities that are poorly protected or not protected at all.

6. When planning each operation, pay special attention to:
   – the political training of the soldiers. For this purpose, discuss their combat assignment and the technicalities of implementing it with the officers and privates;
   – the need for absolute military secrecy and keeping the soldier’s oath by eagerly obeying orders to the letter.

7. Provide the following reports and lists:
   a) Daily combat reports, at 14:00 hours, including:
      1) political section;
      2) operational section.
   b) Extraordinary reports;
   c) Quartermaster’s and services’ reports and lists.

3 Annexes

Sidziński¹⁹
Lieutenant-Colonel

Commander of OG Vistula
Mossor
Brigadier-General

Chief of Staff
Chiliński²⁰
Colonel

1 copy made

Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Handwritten note in the upper right hand corner: Annex 1.

¹⁹ Bolesław Sidziński (born 1907), lieutenant-colonel; 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry (before 1939); in 1946–1947 Deputy Commander of the 5th OW for Political and Educational Issues; from April to July 1947 Deputy Commander of OG Vistula for Political and Educational Issues; later held the same post with the 7th OW (to August 1948). Arrested by the UB on 13 August 1948; released August 1951; later transferred to the reserve.

²⁰ Mikhail Khilinsky (born 1911), Red Army Colonel; brigadier-general, assigned to the Polish Army as an assistant to the Head of the Operational Division of the General Staff of the High Command of the Polish Armed Forces (1944); from 1945 Head of the Operational Division of the 5th OW; CS, OG Vistula (from April to July 1945); from 1947 Commander of the 9th Infantry Division, later Head of the 7th OW; Deputy Chief of General Staff and Chief of General Staff for Combat Training (1951); returned to the USSR 1958.
No. 3
[No date given], [no place given]. Instructions on the regulations for resettling the Ukrainian population

OG Vistula
Ref. No. ...... Confidential!
Copy No. ...... Instruction No. 1

Re: Rules for resettling the Ukrainian population

Civilians are to be relocated from the areas selected for resettlement by the PUR. The task of the military is to render as much assistance as they can in this resettlement.

Guidelines for drawing up a plan:
In order to properly carry out the task, unit commanders are to immediately draw up a resettlement plan. While developing the plan, the following issues should be taken into account:

1) Resettlement involves all Ukrainian families and “mixed” families.
2) Only strictly Polish families, against whom there is not the slightest evidence of collaboration or sympathy with the guerrilla bands, have the right to remain.
3) A list of people exempt from evacuation in petroleum industry areas will be provided by the UB authorities.
4) Cases where citizens have American ID cards will be decided by UB delegates.

When exempting Polish families, it should be taken into account that:

a) many Ukrainians have fake ID cards;

b) the administrative authorities, gmina and powiat offices have issued many certificates of Polish nationality.

When exempting Polish families, first go to the UB and Intelligence for information, then check pre-war documents evidencing religious denomination, e.g. school certificates, military service documents, etc. UB officers will decide any doubtful, difficult-to-determine cases.

5) During the evacuation, allow as much personal property as possible to be taken, with an emphasis on essential agricultural equipment, livestock and crops. The remaining food stock should be brought in a collective system to the dispatch points, and distributed among all the families at their new places of residence.

6) Start the resettlement operation simultaneously in all localities within the time frame specified by the Com[mand] of OG Vistula.

While drawing up the resettlement plan, intermediate stages – regimental assembly points – should be set up, bearing in mind that resettlers from villages will be coming to these points using their own road transport and on foot.

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\*\*\* Fragment marked with a vertical line in the left margin.
Transport from the regimental assembly points to the dispatch station will also be assisted by cars managed by the Division Staff.

7) Managing the assembly and dispatch points, and the technical side of organising transports, food supplies, and escorts from the place of dispatch to the destination, will be handled out by Division Staff in consultation with PUR delegates, the UB, and railway authorities.

*In the case of rail transport, 1 rifleman per 2 rail cars plus 1 officer per transport should be ensured.*

Unit commanders should bear in mind that officers of high moral and organisational values should be appointed as commanding officers and as deputies for political and educational affairs at the regimental assembly points, and especially at the dispatch points. Auxiliary personnel should be appropriately selected as well. To streamline work at the dispatch station, the functions of organising and dispatching transports should be separated from the function of ensuring security in the area.

Basic data must be collected and processed as accurately as possible to prevent an excessive accumulation of equipment, livestock and people at the dispatch points on the one hand, and unnecessary delays in railway transport on the other.

It is therefore necessary to set about organising and conducting reconnaissance to collect the following data:

a) an evaluation of the road conditions along the axis of resettler transports. This data will be the basis for determining the number of regimental assembly points and their sites.

b) a determination of the distance between particular settlements, regimental assembly points, and dispatch points. This will provide the basis for calculating the size of the groups at the dispatch points for each day, taking into account the marching time of columns with livestock, given an average of 2 kilometres per hour.

When planning marches from different areas, the difficulties of feeding livestock, as well as those of accommodating people, should be considered.

c) a detailed knowledge of the PUR’s technical procedures for record keeping and issuing resettlement cards.

In order to save time, auxiliary forces should be organised to perform this operation in consultation with political parties and state authorities. These data and the appropriate choice of personnel should be the basis for calculating the influx of people from regimental assembly points, and dispatching and ordering railway transports.

d) Detailed intelligence and collected information on the “morale” of Polish families who have not been subjected to resettlement will greatly facilitate the work of the commanders as well as the resettlement operation.

8) When organising an assembly point at the dispatch station, it should be remembered that this area is the most difficult to control. This place has the highest risk of resettlers “leaking,” and is most susceptible to the intense pressure exerted by elements seeking to bribe soldiers, steal, or take advantage of the resettlers’ naivety.
To illustrate the issue briefly:

A rail transport consists of 40 cars. An average of 3 families of 4 make 480 people per transport – 180 head of livestock and about 40 horse carts. There should be at least 2 groups to be boarded at the station – 1 group boarding, and the other completing the PUR formalities for resettlement. So the area has to be large enough for that. The plan should provide for the area to be fenced off, to allow easier control and more economic use of personnel. These actions should not be performed too early, but only on the starting date of the resettlement operation. The resettlers should be told that these restrictions are designed to protect them from being exploited by unscrupulous people.

Sanitary guidelines:

Given the possibility of resettlers carrying infectious diseases, dressing stations are to be arranged in which both patients and their families should be isolated. A sanitary rail car should be reserved for patients with non-infectious [diseases] in each transport.

Food supply:

The evacuees should stock up on food for the journey. 2 kg of bread shall be distributed to each evacuee when boarding, while supplies for both people and livestock will be provided by the PUR during the train journey.

Miscellaneous:

a) Unit commanding officers and their deputies for political and educational affairs are responsible for the safety of the entire resettled population and their property.

The regiment is responsible for the safety of the deported people and for escorting them to the dispatch points. The railway transport unit of the division is responsible for organising the dispatch points.

b) Should any foreign delegates arrive at the resettlement area, they must be assigned a UB officer or delegate, and referred to the Command of OG Vistula in order to obtain a pass to the resettlement area.

c) To avoid abuse – bribery during resettlement –, prevent any commercial transactions both on the march to the dispatch points and during rail transport.

d) It should be stressed that the problem of combating bands is a very important issue of nationwide significance, but resettlement is also a very important matter of national concern. Please note that hostile elements will meticulously note any negligence, mishandling, and especially inappropriate behaviour by soldiers towards the deported population, and will inflate mistakes or stupidity to proportions of sheer terror.

For these reasons, I demand that all personnel give due consideration and understanding to the importance of the task entrusted to us, and that they put their heart and soul, as well as all their abilities, into performing this task well.
I. Operational Group Assignment.

a) Liquidate UPA bands in the area around Sanok, Przemyśl, and Lubaczów, conducting offensive operations from the beginning until the bands have been completely eliminated. The first priority is to wage an all-out attack on the command centres of the fascist UPA movement.

b) In close consultation with the State Repatriation Office, carry out an evacuation of all persons of Ukrainian ethnicity from this area to the north-western territories, resettling them with the widest possible dispersion.

c) Resettle all persons of Ukrainian ethnicity, as well as mixed Polish-Ukrainian families that have collaborated with the UPA.

d) Carry out a complete evacuation in the south-eastern tip of the country, south-east of Baligród.

e) Carry out the evacuation operation in the shortest possible time.

II. Information on UPA bands and people in the operational area.

a) “Bir’s” sotnia was conclusively identified during the fighting in Sanok and Lesko powiats. Two other sotnias, those of “Khrin” and “Stach,”1 which had been operating in the area before, have allegedly moved out – the former to Czechoslovakia, and the latter to the south-west of the town of Przemyśl.

A major concentration of bands was found in the forest area between the bend of the River San and the Soviet border to the south-west of the town of Przemyśl. “Baida’s” kurin, consisting of the sotnias of “Burlaka,” “Lastivka,” “Krylach,” and “Hromenko,” operates in this region. “Zalizniak’s” kurin operates independently in the forests to the south of the town of Lubaczów.

The overall strength of the bands is about 2,000 men, well-armed and maintaining iron discipline.

b) 1. The tip of land south-east of the town of Baligród (6694) is generally sparsely populated; most villages have been burnt down.

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1 “Stach,” birth name not known; commander of the UPA “Udarnyky 8” sotnia, part of “Ren’s” kurin. The sotnia was about 80 strong and moved to the Ukrainian SSR, together with “Khrin’s” sotnia, in July 1947.
2. The following sections are quite densely populated:
   – the border strip between the Dukla Pass and the v[illage] of Jaśliska (8058) to the south of the t[own] of Krosno,
   – the whole area along the bend of the River San to the south-west of the t[own] of Przemyśl.

   The greater part of the population in both regions is Ukrainian, and very hostile.

3. A relatively high proportion of Poles, of rather dubious loyalty, can be found between these sections.

4. The strip of land between the wooded areas of Przemyśl and Lubaczów (south-east of Jarosław) has a mostly Polish population, and is generally free of guerrilla bands.

5. The population is mixed in the Lubaczów area, so it will be easier to detect the bands and carry out evacuation there.

6. The above information, both concerning the bands and people in the operational area, is uncertain. This information should be supplemented with new data during the course of the operation.

7. The Soviet-Polish border is tightly sealed on the Soviet side. The Polish-Czechoslovak border is still poorly manned.

III. The central idea.

   Carry out three parallel operations while executing the assignment:
   1. Fight the bands as soon as each unit has reached the prescribed area of concentration.
   2. Evacuate the civilian population, starting the evacuation in the entire operational area on the same day and hour.
   3. Seal the Czechoslovak border to prevent the penetration of bands and people. Destroy the command centres of the bands, clearing major cities in the rear, such as Sanok, Krosno, Przemyśl, Jarosław, and Rzeszów.

   To achieve these objectives, concentrate substantial forces in the bend of the River San to the south-west of the t[own] of Przemyśl and in the powiats of Sanok and Lesko.

IV. Decision
   2. Completely resettle the population from the south-eastern tip of Lesko powiat.

   3. Resettle the Ukrainian and mixed populations, as well as people of Polish ethnicity who are collaborating, or are suspected of collaborating, with the guerrilla bands from the remaining part of Lesko powiat and from Sanok and Przemyśl powiats.

   [...]

10. In the assigned areas of responsibility:
   a) Impose a curfew from 21:00 to 4:00, with the exception of the t[own] of Sanok, where the curfew is to remain unchanged (22:00).
b) Set up checkpoints on the outskirts of towns and at railway stations, and have them manned by UB, Information, and MO officers. Rigorously inspect the documents of the civilian population.

c) Patrol the villages where the troops are stationed, and detain all suspicious persons.

d) Immediately set about making lists of Ukrainian intelligentsia, especially Greek Catholic clergy, who are the core of the Ukrainian underground. Direct the network of agents and intelligence officers to focus on detecting Ukrainians pretending to be of Polish ethnicity.

11. Chief Commander of the SOK\(^2\) –

a) Protect the following sections of railway line: Stefkowa–Nowy Zagórz; Łupków–Zagórz; Zagórz–Jasło; and Nowy Sącz–Jasło.

To this purpose:

\(\text{– man railway stations, protect important transport facilities and railway bridges, and arrange for appropriate mobile patrols along railroads.}\)

b) Assign 1 armoured train to protect the railway lines and rail transport in the Nowy Zagórz–Jasło section. Assign 2 armoured trains, each with a crew of 40 + 15 people (assault platoons) to perform these tasks in the Zagórz–Łupków section.

12. Commander of the 5th OW

Your forces will protect the bridge over the Dunajec River to the west of the town of Nowy Sącz, and reinforce the temporary detour of the damaged tunnel around the village of Kamionka Wielka with permanent patrols.

VI. The date and time of the beginning of the evacuation operation will be specified in a special order.

VII. Commanders of all units shall use their spare time, outside the time devoted to carrying out their tasks, to secretly conduct a thorough census of the population in their units’ areas of responsibility, in close consultation with the UB, MO, and the administrative authorities. For the directive on population resettlement and detailed instructions on how to organise assembly points and dispatch stations, see Annex No. ... \(^3\)

\[\ldots\]

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\(^2\) The Railway Guard Service was under the command of Colonel Ignacy Robb-Narbutt (1912–1958).

\(^3\) Annexes not published.
Commander of Operational Group Vistula
(–) Mossor
Brig. Gen.

Dep[uty] Com[mander] for KBW affairs of OG Vistula
(–) Huebner
Lieut. Col.

Dep[uty] Com[mander] for security affairs of OG Vistula
Korczyński
Col.

Dep[uty] Com[mander] for political and educational affairs of OG Vistula
Sidziński
Lieut. Col.

Chief of Staff of Operational Group Vistula
(–) Chiliński
Col.

Certified true copy:
Chief of the Operational Division of Operational Group Vistula

IPN, MBP 743, pp. 69–76.
Certified copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Handwritten note in the upper left hand corner: Col. Korczyński Fragments concerning areas of responsibility of large units: 1st KBW Division, 6th Inf. Div., 7th Inf. Div., 8th Inf. Div., and 9th Inf. Div. have been omitted.

b Signed by someone else.
4 Juliusz Huebner (Hibner, Hubner) (1912–1994), brigadier-general; took part in the Spanish Civil War; from 1941 in the Red Army; from 1943 in the Polish Army in the USSR; in 1945–1946 Commander of the 32nd Infantry Regiment; Deputy Commander for KBW affairs of OG Vistula (1947); from 1949 Commander of the KBW, later Commander of the Internal Troops; in 1956–1960 Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs.
5 Wacław Kossowski (born 1919), Lieutenant-Colonel; Red Army officer; assigned to the Polish Army (1944); from 1946 on the General Staff; appointed chief of the Operational Department of OG Vistula (1947); returned to the USSR (October 1948).
No. 5
28 April 1947, Sanok. Col. Grzegorz Korczyński’s situational report for Stanisław Radkiewicz, Minister of Public Security

a-29 April 1947

MBP
Minister Radkiewicz

Situational report of 27–28 April [19]47

On 27 April 1947 the residents of many villages were informed of their imminent deportation. Many peasants ceased work on their land. There were rumours that mixed families would be resettled to the USSR and Polish families to the “recovered territories.”

On 28 April 1947, people generally accepted the news of resettlement calmly, and were glad of the opportunity to obtain former German lands and property in the “recovered territories.”

In carrying out the resettlement operation, the army has not met any armed resistance from the population. There have been no reports of any groups of people preparing for armed resistance. a-Today, 1,000 [people] were deported from Przemyśl powiat and 2,500 [people] from the powiats of Sanok and Lesko. a

Re: fighting the guerrilla bands and their civilian networks:


a-27 April [19]47, 7th Inf. Div.: destroyed some UPA bunkers near Bukowsko and in the forest around Łuków, a light machine gun with ammunition and a military overcoat were found.

a-27 April [19]47, 8th Inf. Div.: destroyed a bunker near Raków, five (5) bandits committed suicide. Some weapons were found, as well as copies of “Literatura Propagandowa” issued in 1947 a and a very extensive archive of correspondence on the assault on Gen. Świerczewski carried out by “Khrin’s” and “Stach’s” sotnias. I will provide details tomorrow. a

a-27 April [19]47, KBW Division b: three bandits were killed and 21 suspects arrested, including one found with 5 carbines, 800 rounds of ammunition and a grenade, and another one with a carbine and a hunting rifle. aFour bandits from “Myron’s” band were captured a.

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a- a-Filled in by hand.
b- b-The text 9th Infantry Division was changed by hand into KBW Division.
27 April [1947], 1st Inf. Div.: several residents who had been supplying bands with food were arrested. Rifleman Łojek committed suicide on 22 April 1947. Reasons unknown.¹

No information from the operational area of the 9th Inf. Div. on 27 April [1947].

The troops have suffered no losses so far in clashes with the bands. On 27 April 1947 Lesko Sotwiński, a PUBP worker was wounded in a skirmish with three Bandera guerrillas.

Sanok 28 April [1947]

Received by Bąk at 1:05 on 29 April [1947]

Sent by Choina Jan at 1:05, 29 April [1947]

IPN, MBP 743, pp. 111–112.

Original, typescript.

Document in Polish.

¹ Information unclear, probably a mistake. In the first version it was to be the 1st KBW Infantry Division, i.e. the 1st KBW Division, and the record should therefore be merged with the preceding part of the report concerning the activities of the latter.

Corrected by hand, previous version unknown.

Crossed out.

682
No. 6
29 April 1947, [Sanok]. Gen. Stefan Mossor’s cryptogram to Bolesław Bierut, President of Poland, and Władysław Gomułka, Deputy Prime Minister

To be returned to the Cryptography Department within 48 hours

Top secret!

Copy No. *a–1–a*

Copy No. **b–1–b**

Cryptogram No. 1520 OG Vistula
sent on 29 April [19]47 at 00:10, received on 29 April [19]47 at 05:30
Received by the Cryptography Department on 29 April [19]47 at 06:00 h[ours]

President of Poland
Cit[izen] Bierut Bolesław¹

Deputy Prime Minister
Cit[izen] Gomułka Wiesław²

I hereby report that to date I have been clearing the area of UPA bands and their civilian organisational network. This effort has resulted in the capture of hundreds of people.

The greatest difficulty lies in the fact that the UPA bands dispersed across the area as soon as the first KBW units started arriving, even before the arrival of the operational groups proper, and they do not engage in any fighting. They will have to be eliminated through a lengthy and tedious search of every part of the woods.

Altogether fewer than 40 UPA band members have been **b–**killed or captured,**b–** although the civil organisation is quickly becoming paralysed. The operation to

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*¹ Bolesław Bierut (1892–1956), a KPP activist; in 1925–1930 intermittently in Moscow; in 1930–1932 functionary of the Communist International; in 1933–1939 imprisoned; from 1943 PPR member, last post: Secretary General of the CC (officially no member of any party 1944–1948); from 1948 member of PUWP, in 1948–1954 Chairman, later First Secretary; Chairman of the CC Politburo Commission for Public Security (1949); in 1944–1947 President of the KRN; in 1947–1952 President of the Republic of Poland; in 1952–1954 Prime Minister; died in Moscow.

² Actual name: Władysław Gomułka (1905–1982), nom de guerre “Wiesław,” a KPP activist, imprisoned several times; from 1941 WKp(b) member; from 1942 PPR member, until 1948 Secretary General of the CC; in 1948–1949 CC PUWP member; in 1951–1954 expelled from the party and imprisoned; from October 1956 to December 1970 member of the Political Bureau and First Secretary of the CC PUWP; in 1944–1949 Deputy Prime Minister; in 1945–1949 Minister for the Recovered Territories; in 1957–1971 Council of State member. Found responsible for the use of armed force against workers on the coast in December 1970 and dismissed from all positions.
Resettle the Ukrainian population was very carefully prepared and launched today at 04:00, simultaneously across the entire area of OG Vistula. At the same time, planes are dropping leaflets which appropriately explain the purpose and manner of resettlement throughout the area.

The first transports will depart today. From tomorrow, six transports will depart every day.

The Polish population in the entire area of Przemyśl, Lesko, Sanok, Baligród, and Jaśliska numbers 15% at most, and the Poles are afraid to remain there after the Ukrainians have been resettled. The problem of deserted land therefore arises. In order to prevent this, I am going to concentrate the Poles in separate villages, protected by the ORMO.

I will send, by plane on 1 May, my plan to immediately settle these areas with landless and smallholder families from the purely Polish powiats of Rzeszów województwo.

At the same time, I hereby report that UPA bands have become more defiant in the areas not subjected to the operation: N[owy] Sącz, Gorlice, and Krosno and the Lublin region. These bands have prevented the Polish population from sowing in some areas around Lublin.

The Personnel Department has issued to me “Crosses of Valor” and “Medals for Merit on the Field of Glory” as a uniform type of combat decoration divided into three levels of importance.

I have so far posthumously awarded a “Cross of Valor” to one rifleman of the 8th Infantry Division who died in combat, and “Silver Medals for Merit on the Field of Glory” to two privates in the 7th Infantry Division who distinguished themselves during an assault on a UPA bunker.

As there are so few opportunities to fight, no more combat decorations will be awarded. I will, however, be putting some names forward for decoration with “Crosses of Merit” for operations against the bands.

The mood among the officers is excellent. No offences have been reported.
“2” copies made.
Copy No. 1 – President of the Republic.
Copy No. 2 – Deputy Prime Minister Gomułka Wiesław
Copy No. 3 ....

No. 41/42
Decrypted on 29 April [19]47 at 8:30
Decrypted by: Truss

Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Printed letterhead. A handwritten note across the cryptogram: Korczyc. Do not send cryptograms to the President or Prime Minister. Every two days the 3rd Operational Unit will draw up a message that will be sent by us. 4/29
and the signature of Marshal Żymierski under the seal of the Minister of Defence; on the right hand side a
handwritten note: 1) President, 2) Prime Minister, 3) Deputy Prime Minister, 4) Minister of Security, 5
Deputy Minister Wolski, 6) Gen. Spychalski. Below, on the left hand side, initials of General Korczyc and
Colonel Przoński and a handwritten date 29 April [19]47; at the end of the document, two illegible signatures
and a date 29 April [19]47.
Report No. 1
On the operational situation and activity of Oper[ational] Group Vistula and WP and WBW units in Rzeszów, Lublin, and Cracow województwos
on 2 May 1947
1:200 000 map

A. Activity of Operational Group Vistula

a) Operational activity.

Until 28 April this year, the constituent units of OG Vistula conducted field reconnaissance to determine: 1) sites where bandit groups were concentrated; 2) the number of inhabitants who should be subjected to the resettlement operation; 3) the capacity of the through roads, and possible repairs thereof.

OG Vistula began operations against the UPA on 28 April this year. There was direct contact with UPA bands in the area of the village of Wielopole (8 km south-east of Sanok), in the area of the village of Leszczyny (15 km south-east of Bircza), in the area of the village of Raków (14 km east of Sanok), and to the south and south-east of Baligród.

Five bunkers were detected in the forest near the village of Wielopole. The bandits opened fire from one of the bunkers. One bandit was seized and the corpse of the deputy commander of “Khrin’s” band, known as “Dolgoruky,” who had committed suicide during the fight, was found in the captured bunker. There were no bandits in the other four bunkers.

A bunker was captured in which five bandits had committed suicide after putting up a fight near the village of Raków. Documents of the band’s senior staff and a large quantity of propaganda materials were found.

The UPA bands have now dispersed and are avoiding combat.

b) Resettlement operation.

At 4:00 on 28 April this year, OG Vistula units, after previous careful preparation, began the operation of resettling the Ukrainian population.

By 28 April, a total of 8 transports had been dispatched with 2,429 people. Przeworsk, Załuż, Lesko, Piasarowce, Sanok, Zagórz, Łukawica, Olszanica, Kulaszne, Komańcza, and Łupków were designated as dispatch stations.

a- -a Filled in by hand.
As of 30 April, 6 shipments a day will be leaving the area of OG Vistula. The resettlement operation is proceeding as planned. There have been no instances of hostile demonstrations or resistance on the part of the population.

B. Major events

Lublin województwo –

On 25 April this year, the oper[ational] group of the 9th Inf. Reg.1 fought a UPA band in the v[illage] of Liwcze (39 km south east of Hrubieszów). After fighting for an hour, the band retreated into the forest, taking their dead and wounded, and dispersed. According to statements from local residents, 6 bandits were killed and 7 wounded. As a result of the fight, 65 buildings, in which the bandits had been defending themselves were burned down. Our losses: 3 killed, including 1 officer and 2 non-commissioned officers.

On 27 April, 68 rifles of various types were unearthed in the former Olszanka Estate in Krasnystaw powiat. These weapons had been buried in 1944 by an unidentified partisan unit.

C. General Statistics as of 2 May 1947

1. Our personnel losses:
WP soldiers killed.......................................... 4
WBW soldiers missing.................................... 1

2. Bands’ losses
Bandits killed.................................................. 28
Bandits captured............................................. 26
Suspects arrested for collaboration
    with guerrilla ........................................... 496
    bands

3. Captured weapons
HMGs...................................................... 1
LMGs....................................................... 3
Assault rifles............................................... 7
Rifles...................................................... 98
Pistols..................................................... 3
Grenades.................................................... 25
Ammunition................................................. 1428
Anti-tank mines.............................. 243

Minister of Defence
(−) Michał Żymierski
Marshal of Poland

IPN, MBP 743, p. 141.
Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Paper with the national emblem imprinted over the letterhead.

1 The 9th Infantry Regiment of the 3 Infantry Division This regiment was not part of OG Vistula.
No. 8
5 May 1947, Warsaw. Directive No. 7 for the Command of OG Vistula, issued by Michal Rola-Żymierski, Minister of Defence

Minister of Defence

No. *00165*a

Warsaw, *5-a* May 1947

Top secret Copy No. *3-a* Directive No. 7 for OG Vistula

Personally to Brig. Gen. Mossor

With reference to the action plan presented for Phase 2 and the plan for resettling the former Ukrainian lands, it is my order that:

I. The main task of OG Vistula is to fight and liquidate Ukrainian bands in the powiats of Sanok, Lesko, Przemyśl and Lubaczów, and to the north of Lubaczów powiat and west of Sanok powiat. The deportation of the Ukrainian and mixed populations from these areas is merely an ancillary operation in this fight to hinder the existence of bands in the area and destroy their material bases.

II. In view of the poor results of the struggle against the guerrilla bands in Phase 1, the resettlement of the Ukrainian population should not take prominence. Do not commit all the military forces to that task, as the primary purpose – the struggle against the guerrilla bands – would be pushed into the background.

III. In principle, I approve the action plan presented to me for Phase 2, but the operation should be extended to the southern areas of the Lublin region, where Ukrainian bands are becoming more active, and westward to the western border of Rzeszów województwo, south of Jasło, Krosno, and Gorlice.

IV. A copy of the operations order to be issued for Phase 2 is to be sent to me, and should indicate the places where the division commanders are to be stationed and the boundaries of the areas for which each commander is to be responsible.

V. Fast, mobile detachments are to be formed from the reserves of OG Vistula and used to strike wherever necessary, even beyond the boundaries of OG Vistula. Do not confine your combat tasks to Rzeszów województwo, but by creating mobile reserves, exterminate the Ukrainian bands wherever they are until they are completely defeated – what I have in mind are the southern powiats of Lublin województwo and the Subcarpathian highlands.

VI. The plan for resettling former Ukrainian lands has been generally approved by the government, but the plan should rather be carried out by administrative and Public Security organs – you should form a join management body together with the PUR, but do not organise a military command. Deputy Minister Wołski, who is responsible for the management of the resettlement operation, has undertaken to carry it out smoothly in every respect.

*Filed in by hand.*

688
VII. General, I order once more that this action be accomplished within the shortest time possible. It is extremely important to the government that this entire operation be completed within the prescribed period.

Minister of Defence
(–) Michał Żymierski
Marshal of Poland

8 copies made
Copy No. 1 – Citizen Bolesław Bierut, President of the Republic of Poland
Copy No. 2 – Citizen W. Gomułka, Deputy Minister
Copy No. 3 – Citizen Radkiewicz, Minister of Public Security
Copy No. 4 – Citizen Wolski, Deputy Minister of Public Administration
Copy No. 5 – Maj. Gen. Spychalski,¹ First Deputy Minister of Defence
Copy No. 6 – Lieut. Gen. Korczyc,² Chief of General Staff
Copy No. 7 – Brig. Gen. Mossor, Deputy Chief of General Staff
Copy No. 8 – archive

Prepared by Capt. Płoszczański
5 May 1947
BP No. 220

IPN, MBP 743, p. 145.
Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.


² Władysław Korczyc (1893–1966), lieutenant-general, Red Army officer, assigned to the Polish Army in the USSR (1944); consecutively Chief of Staff of the 1st Army, Chief of General Staff of the High Command of the Polish Armed Forces, and commander of the Polish 1st Army (by 1945); in 1945–1952 Chief of General Staff; Deputy Minister of Defence (1949); returned to the USSR (1954).
No. 9
5 May 1947, [Warsaw]. Letter from Col. Stefan Kuhl, Chief of the GZI, and Col. Ignacy Krzemień, Chief of Department 2 of the GZI, to Maj. Mikołaj Sajko, Chief of the Information Unit of OG Vistula, concerning the SB OUN’s intelligence activity against WP units

Top secret

To Chief of the Information Unit of OG Vistula
Maj. Sajko

In view of the fact that, as a result of intense operations against the UPA, it has been found that UPA intelligence and counter-intelligence organs are carrying out serious and strenuous efforts to collect all data concerning the WP and its deployment, I order that a detailed report on UPA activity against the WP be compiled by the end of the military operations of OG Vistula.

The report should include:
1. The structure of the UPA’s intelligence and counter-intelligence acting against the WP.
2. The methods and forms of activity used by UPA intelligence and counter-intelligence organs against the WP.
3. A list of UPA agents, their recruitment methods, and their methods of working with the network of agents.
4. The use of the UPA civilian network of agents against the WP: –
   a. collection of information and materials on the composition, arms, and structure of the WP;
   b. the use of this network for sabotage and terrorist work and for attempting to recruit captured WP soldiers.
5. UPA efforts to expose agents of WP intelligence organs, and incidents of WP agents being recruited by the UPA.
6. UPA activities and their taking advantage of soldiers who go on holiday to areas affected by UPA activities.
7. Any flaws and failures on the part of WP intelligence organs in their efforts to eliminate the UPA.
8. A question of particular importance is whether conscripts from the consecutive 1946 and 1947 drafts in areas infested with UPA banditry have infiltrated the ranks of the WP – any data or materials on the infiltration of WP ranks by Ukrainian youth with tasks assigned by the bands, and to what extent this action was inspired.
9. Any materials or evidence in our possession proving that the UPA have been spying on the WP, not only around Rzeszów, Lublin, and Cracow województwos, but also in other regions of Poland, such as the Recovered Territories, Greater Poland, Mazovia, Pomerania, etc.
10. Instances of UPA bands acquiring confidential information about the work of the WP Information organs.

11. Your conclusions, arguments, and proposals concerning the organisation of intelligence and operational efforts against the influence of UPA bands both in military units engaged in active combat with the latter, and in those military units which are not involved in active combat with the UPA.

Chief of the Main Directorate of Information of the Polish Armed Forces
(--) Kuhl,¹ Col.

Chief of Department 2 of the Main Directorate of Information of the WP
(--) Krzemień,² Col.

2 copies made.
1st copy for addressee
2nd copy to archive
Prepared by 19.

IPN, 835/173, p. 25.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Handwritten note on the document: 2/00 9067/19; 5 July [19]47.

¹ Stefan Kuhl, colonel, from 25 April (formally 6 May), 1947 to June 1950 Chief of the GZI, later Deputy Chief of the Personnel Department of the MON; after 1956 transferred to the reserve; criminal proceedings for alleged torture interrogations dismissed by the Supreme Military Court (October 1958).
² Ignacy Krzemień participated in the Spanish Civil War; from August 1945 was a lecturer on courses for officers at the School for Information Officers; in 1945–1950 Chief of Dept. 2; after 1957 posted to the Polish embassy in Sofia.
No. 10
11 May 1947, Sanok. Col. Grzegorz Korczyński’s report to Stanisław Radkiewicz, Minister of Public Security, for the period of 1–10 May

Sanok, 11 May [19]47
Top secret

To
Minister of Public Security
Citizen Radkiewicz, Brig. Gen.
in Warsaw

Report
by the MBP Branch attached to Operational Group Vistula
for the period 1–10 May [19]47

1:100 000 map

Military operations

The following operations were carried out in the operational areas of individual divisions:

The 1st KBW Division – Baligród operational area.

On 1 May [19]47, after the deportation of the village of Bereźnica (7402) by the Motorised Regiment, information was obtained from the civilian population that a six-strong band was staying in the nearby village of Myczków (7202). An operation was carried out under the command of Capt. Michniewicz, but without success.

On the same day, while searching the area of Połonina Wetlińska, Battalion “Łódź” 1 (2nd Brigade) discovered 1 bunker with various food products, as well as 1 “Pepesha” with 2 drum magazines, 35 rounds of ammunition and 1 attack grenade. In addition, backpacks were found with various propaganda leaflets, newspapers, summaries, and reconnaissance reports about the terrain.

Among other things, letters revealing that the WOP Border Guard was collaborating with the UPA band, and a document testifying to the collaboration of the WiN with UPA bands in an attack on Hrubieszów in 1946 were found. The document consists of three parts. The first part states that at a meeting of UPA and WiN members on 18 May [19]46, it was decided to attack the town of Hrubieszów, where the following [personnel] were thought to be stationed:

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1 Battalion Łódź was deployed by WBW Łódź and commanded by Capt. Józef Wieciech.
2 The attack on Hrubieszów was carried out on the night of 27–28 May 1946 by troops from the WiN Hrubieszów District, “Mlot’s” unit from Chełm powiat, and the UPA sotnias of “Duda,” “Davyd,” “Jar” and “Chaus” supported by SB hit squads.
3 The meeting took place in the Miętkie estate, but the operation was not approved until later, after consulting the commander of the 6th UPA OW and the national OUN-B providnyk.
1. NKVD forces – 250 men
2. UB – 60 "
3. Town Command – 40 "
4. “Szturmówka” – 20 "
5. PPR Com[mittee] – 20 "
6. Resettlement Commission – 20 "

The plan of attack is described in the second part. The operation was to be led by Lieut. “L. M.” for the WiN, and by “P-Va” for the UPA. The plan stated that UPA forces (sotnias – technical squads) would attack the block of the NKVD battalion. The WiN combat group, reinforced by the UPA combat group, i.e. the BSB (Security Service hit squad), together with the technical group, would attack the UBP block. The third combat group (UPA and WiN) would attack the private apartment of State Security personnel. The Polish Army troops, the MO Headquarters, and the “Szturmówka” were only to be isolated to prevent them from engaging in combat. Ambushes were to be laid in the directions of Chełm, Sokół, and Zamość.

The third part describes the course of the attack (based on excerpts from the bandits’ letters). The account indicates that the WiN group commanded by “L. M.” and the UPA group broke into the UB building and the PPR Committee, and murdered everybody. All the UB documents were burned, while the PPR documents were seized by the WiN commander. Finally, it stresses that the WiN hit squads went away, while the pursued UPA troops engaged in several skirmishes with the army. It also claims that the attack on Hrubieszów was of great propaganda value both for the UPA and the WiN.

On 2 May [19]47, while searching forests at an altitude of 1250 in the area of Suche Rzeki (5111) Battalion “Łódź” (2nd Brigade) found a hospital bunker with 100 kg of rye flour, about 50 kg of dried fruit, various medicines, and blood-stained bandages. An abandoned Mauser gun lay close to the bunker, and a barrel of clean linen underwear and a barrel containing 100 kg of meat were buried nearby.

On the way back, the battalion came across a UPA cemetery in area 1350.

In addition, Battalion “Poznań” (2nd Brigade), consisting of two rifle companies + an HMG platoon, conducted an operation in the area of the River Solinka.

At 12:00, 8 bunkers were discovered. All of them were destroyed. Shortly afterwards, a 15-strong band was encountered. The bandits were armed with 2 LMGs and 3 assault rifles, and the rest of the band was armed with rifles. The band had set an ambush on the left bank of the River Solinka in the village of Buk (5600), and fired from a distance of 300 m on our troops, commanded by Second Lieut. Fetter.

4 “L. M.” – probably Lieutenant Kazimierz Witrylak, nom de guerre “Hel” and “Druk,” deputy commander of the WiN Hrubieszów District.
5 “P-Va” – probably Yevhen Shtendera, nom de guerre “Prirva.”
6 I.e. the 98th Regiment of NKVD Internal Troops.
7 Battalion “Poznań” (WBW Poznań) was commanded by Captain Tadeusz Rozmysłowicz.
Second Lieut. Kalinowski, Com[ander] of the 1st Com[pany] was also fired at while going down to the river to drink water. After Lieut. Kalinowski retreated, the company under his com[mand] approached and fanned out in order to encircle the band. While surrounding the band, a gap emerged on the left flank, through which the band managed to get to the other side of the river, leaving behind a blanket, a backpack and 1 offensive grenade. While fleeing they set a pressure mine in Zawozie, which was, however, removed.

The 3rd Brigade conducted a search in the area of the Kiczera peak (4422), but with no success.

While Battalion “Wrocław”8 (3rd Brigade) was conducting reconnaissance in the area (5020), it encountered a 16-strong band (including one woman) armed with LMGs and assault rifles at 18:00. The band was pursued, but managed to escape, leaving 2 overcoats and 126 rounds of ammunition behind. In addition, 1 bunker was discovered in which l rifle was found.

On 2 May [19]47, while moving its place of deployment from the vil[lage] of Stuposiany to the tow[n] of Baligród, Battalion “Rzeszów” was sent, on the Com[mander]’s orders, in pursuit of a band which had attacked the village of Steżnica (6595) and stolen 8 cows on the night of 1–2 May.

During the operation, Battalion “Rzeszów’s” reconnaissance platoon encountered an advance party of a UPA band in the region (5696) near hill 1069. At the sight of the soldiers, the bandits fled, shooting and warning other bandits of the approaching forces.

In order to encircle the band, other troops were immediately called in and split into two groups. Maj. Konon, com[mander] of Battalion “Rzeszów,” and the Battalion’s Chief of Staff, Capt. Dzeń, took com[mand] of the groups.

As a result of the operation one bandit was killed, and 1 horse, 1 Mauser rifle, 2 grenades, 20 magazines of ammunition for a (Polish) LMG and 1 magazine for a “Pepesha” were seized. A barrel of meat was dug out near the fire where the bandits had been smoking meat.

The fleeing band headed for Dołżyca. The pursuit of the band was taken over by the Gdańsk Battalion.9

On 3 May [19]47, the 1st Brigade conducted a search for bands in the area of Kiczera (4222 [!]); 4 bunkers and 4 huts were discovered while sweeping the forest; 200 kg of oats unfit for use and 37 rounds of ammunition for a PTR were found in the bunkers. No band was encountered.

Battalion “Gdańsk” came across two bunkers in the area of Zawój (5804); there were 2 bandits nearby who tried to escape. They were killed during a chase. 1 Mauser rifle, 1 “Pepesha” gun, 3 magazines of ammunition and a field bag were captured; 30 kg of meat, 100 kg of flour, 25 kg of broad beans, 10 kg of groats and 100 kg of potatoes were found in the bunkers. The food and the bunkers were destroyed.

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8 Battalion “Wrocław” (WBW Wrocław) was commanded by Lieutenant Ryszard Tarasiewicz.
9 Actually Battalion “Gdańsk” (WBW Gdańsk), which became part of the 3rd KBW on 7 May. The battalion was commanded by Capt. Zdzisław Amanowicz.
During an operation, Battalion “Łódź” (2nd Brigade) encountered an advanced guard of a band in the area of the village of Nasiczne (5015). The ensuing clash resulted in one bandit, probably the commander, being killed.

During an operation conducted by the 3rd Brigade, 4 huts and 2 bunkers were discovered in area 6420. 1 usable rifle, 3 grenades, around 1000 kg of rye and 1000 kg of oats were found. The huts and bunkers were destroyed.

On 5 May 1947, following an operation carried out by the 2nd Brigade against a band which had come from the area of the 3rd Brigade, three bandits (including one woman) were killed in the forest area (5212). Two cows were captured. During the course of the operation, one of the soldiers stepped on a mine and lost his leg.

While a company of Battalion “Szczecin” was conducting reconnaissance in areas (5286), (4886), hill 785 (5082), hill 909 (5285), 1 rifle was found. During the operation, one of the soldiers stepped on a mine and was wounded in the leg.

On the same day, a member of “Bir’s band, alias “Yurko,” was captured by the Motor Regiment at the assembly point in Wołkowyja.

On 5 May 1947, in the town of Wołkowyja, a battalion of the Mot[or] Reg[iment] captured a deserter from a UPA band, who provided the bearings of 1 LMG and 2 carbines during an interrogation.

On 7 May 1947, 1 bandit from “Bir’s” band, “Karpov’s” unit, was captured in an ambush laid by the 2nd Brigade in the area of Kowale (5203).

By 5 May 1947, 23 suspects were detained by the blocking group and at Battalion “Kielce” checkpoints in Sanok, and were transferred to the UBP.

On 9 May 1947, all brigades conducted reconnaissance operations.

On 5 May this year, the Information Unit of the 6th Inf. Div. arrested 2 active associates of a UPA band. The forests in the 6th Inf. Div.’s area were combed, but without success.

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10 Battalion “Szczecin” (WBW Szczecin), commanded by Capt. Tadeusz Dąbrowski, part of the 1st KBW Brigade. Command was taken over by Captain Fabian Smagur in the middle of May.
11 Battalion “Kielce” (WBW Kielce) was part of the 1st KBW Brigade. It was commanded by Lieutenant Marian Wasilewski.
12 Probably nom de guerre “Makarenko,” names unknown, providnyk of the 1st kushch of the 4th raion of the “Beskyd” nadraion, 1st oblast of the OUN-B.
On 7–8 May [19]47, after the completion of the resettlement operation, units of the 6th Inf. Div. began intensive operations against bands across the entire 6th Inf. Div. area. These operations were to have been coordinated with a corresponding operation conducted by the Czechoslovak army. At the moment, there is no information on the results of these operations.

On 8 May [19]47, in the area of Jasiel (7066) – Kiczera (7466), the woods were combed in conjunction with a Czechoslovak battalion. The Polish and Czech units met at the border. The results of the operation were negative.

The 7th Infantry Division – Kulaszne operational area.

On 1 May this year, while combing the forests (7400) in the vicinity of the village of Bereska, the 3rd Battalion came across a patrol of a UPA band of about 7 men. The bandits managed to escape. Pursuit was unsuccessful.

In the area of the village of Nowosiółki, while combing the nearby forests, the 11th Inf. Reg. discovered a bunker in which they found an Orthodox cup, a communion tray, a bowl used for that purpose, and two printed pages in the Ukrainian language praising Ukrainian freedom fighters.

On 6 May the 11th Inf. Reg., while carrying out an operation in the area of the village of Sukowate Kamionki, found 7 bunkers, 17 huts, a hospital, and an ammunition bunker. The bunkers were destroyed; 4 rifles and 1 “Pepesha” were seized.

The operation carried out against “Khrin’s” sotnia on 5 May this year brought no results. Information was obtained that “Khrin’s” sotnia was hiding in the forest on [Mt.] Chryszczata.

On 3 May this year, while combing the woods (area 7296), the 11th Inf. Reg. came across and found 4 empty bunkers. The bunkers were destroyed.

On the basis of reports, the regiment arrested 10 people who had been collaborating with the UPA band.

On the basis of reports, the 6th Inf. Div. Information Unit arrested 3 people suspected of collaborating with the NSZ.

On 3 May, the 11th Inf. Reg. caught a bandit in the vicinity of the village of Bereska.

On 7–8 May [19]47, in the area of “Kniaż” forest, the 11th Inf. Reg. found and destroyed 3 bunkers and 7 huts. The ambushes laid in the evacuated villages yielded no results.

On 6 May [19]47, on the basis of testimonies by members of “Khrin’s” band, the 11th Inf. Reg. combed the woods, destroying 20 bunkers and huts and finding 4 carbines, 1 “Pepesha”, and a crate of ammunition.

On 7 May [19]47, a reconnaissance patrol of the 36th Inf. Reg. killed 3 bandits near the village of Lachawa (0096) in a skirmish with a 30-strong band. 370 rounds of ammunition were captured during the pursuit.
The 8th Infantry Division – Lesko operational area.

On 1 May this year, while combing the forests near the village of Margiel, the 36th Inf. Reg. encountered a group of 5 UPA bandits. After a pursuit, 1 Bandera guerrilla was killed. 1 carbine was captured.

Based on reports (Information Unit of the 8th Inf. Div.), 17 people belonging to the UPA civilian network were arrested.

On 2 May this year, the 2nd Battalion of the 8th Inf. Reg. carried out an operation to seize 6 UPA members who were said to be in the village of Dźwiniacz Dolny. As a result, 2 of them were killed, while the other bandits managed to escape.

The 1st Company of the 10th Inf. Reg. arrested 3 active UPA collaborators in the village of Rogatywko [!].

During an operation in the region of Lachawa, the 36th Inf. Reg. discovered 3 bunkers. Twelve quintals of rye were found in the bunkers. The bunkers were destroyed. Valuable documents – a list of people collaborating with the band and some nationalist literature – were found on a member of a UPA band killed on 1 May [19]47.

On 2 May this year, “Pimsta’s” UPA band stole food from the village of Zawadka. A pursuit was ordered, but it [was] unsuccessful. “Pimsta’s” wife, named Hryczyszyna, was arrested.

According to information from the local Polish population, 5–6 strong pro-Bandera groups are wandering around evacuated villages and taking away food.

The 8th Inf. Reg. raided the village of Zawadka, where there were supposed to have been pro-Bandera groups. Negative results.

On 2 May in the village of Dźwiniacz Dolny, notes were found on 2 killed bandits stating that there were 2 bunkers nearby with documents, nationalist literature, etc. These documents were found.

While conducting reconnaissance in the vicinity of the village of Lachawa, the 36th Inf. Reg. came across 5 UPA bandits in the woods and engaged them in combat. One bandit was killed and the others escaped.

On 5 May this year, 1 armed bandit surrendered to the 10th Inf. Reg.

On 4 May this year, the 1st Inf. Reg. seized a Bandera guerrilla from “Hromenko’s” sotnia. During interrogation it transpired that “Hromenko’s” and “Burlaka’s” sotnias were concentrating in the area of the 9th Inf. Div. in the villages of Witoszyńce and Brylińce. “Lastivka’s” sotnia was in the village of Jurencowo.14 The commander of “Baida’s” kuri was with “Lastivka’s” sotnia. Operation in progress.

On 5 May this year, while conducting an operation in the vicinity of the village of Romanowa Wola, the 8th Inf. Reg. found 13 bunkers. The bunkers were destroyed.

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13 Ivan Smarsh (Smarzh) (died 1950) nom de guerre “Pimsta,” providnyk of the 3rd kushch of the 1st raion of the Verkhovyna nadraion of the 1st OUN-B district; after 1947 in Germany; an OUN-B courier between Munich and Poland (1949); transferred to the Ukrainian SSR (1950).

14 Probably Jureczkowa.
The 8th Inf. Reg. seized Michał Bodnar, a pro-Bandera harchovy who had been actively collaborating with the UPA, in the village of Zawadka.

On 5 May this year, in the village of Ropienka, the 10th Inf. Reg. captured a member of a UPA band who revealed where “Stach’s” sotnia was hiding. While approaching the bunker, the bandit pulled out a grenade from under leaves and tried to throw it at the soldiers. The grenade failed to explode. The bandit was shot.

On 8 May, during an operation in the village of Zawadka, the 8th Inf. Reg. captured 2 members of a band. Stefan Babko, alias “Yagoda,” a riyovy in “Lastivka’s” band, was among the 9 bandits captured on 7 May [19]47.

Altogether 2 LMGs, 7 rifles, 350 rounds of ammunition, medicines, and a number of documents and propaganda papers were captured.

The 36th Inf. Reg. apprehended 5 bandits in a bunker in Kreców forest, acting on evidence from Jan Szczur, alias “Kit,” who was detained while checking documents in the village of Leszczata, but managed to escape after identifying the bunker.

On 8 May [19]47, 8th Inf. Div. units seized 8 bandits, captured 2 LMGs, 7 carbines and 120 rounds of ammunition, and destroyed 21 bunkers, during an operation.

On 9 May 1947, in area (8800), a 10th Inf. Reg. reconnaissance unit discovered a camouflaged dressing station in the forest.

The 9th Infantry Division – Przemyśl operational area

On 1 May this year, during an operation in the area of Jawornik Ruski, the 4th Inf. Reg. destroyed 4 bunkers and seized 1 assault rifle.

The 31st Inf. Reg. captured one Bandera guerrilla and 1 rifle.

The 40th Light Artillery Regiment destroyed 8 bunkers and seized nationalist literature and food supplies.

On 1 May this year, the following members of UPA bands revealed themselves in the 3rd Inf. Reg. area in Cieszanów, and surrendered their weapons:

1. Lozinsky Yosip, son of Karol, alias “Yavir,” turned over 1 rifle.
2. Kushel Ivan, son of Mikhal, alias “Syt,” turned over an AVT.
4. Lenko, alias “Zmyr,” turned over an SVT.

The captured bandits [are being] used for operational purposes.

On 3 May this year, a 28th Inf. Reg. patrol came across a 200-strong UPA ambush in the vicinity of the village of Hermanowice. The fight lasted about 30 minutes. Our losses include Second Lieut. Włodarczyk (seriously wounded) and one private. There were wounded and killed among the UPA band; they were taken away by their retreating comrades.

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15 Probably Leszczawa.
16 Probably the 30th Infantry Regiment
17 The 40th Light Artillery Regiment of the 9th Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Wincenty Gajbowicz.
On 3 May this year, the 14th Inf. Reg. arrested 3 people for collaborating with a UPA band. 2 assault rifles and 1 carbine were captured.

In the region of Cieszanów (the 3rd Inf. Reg.), 2 Bandera guerrillas surrendered voluntarily and gave up their arms.

The 5th Inf. Reg. found 2 Banderist bunkers with food.

The 14th Inf. Reg. captured 2 Banderists in Maćkowice, 1 of whom died during the night.

On 4 May this year, the 28th Inf. Reg. destroyed 4 bunkers in the area of Grochowce.

On 5 May this year, the 4th Inf. Reg. captured a member of ‘Hromenko’s band while on assignment in their area of operation. 1 rifle was seized.

On 6 May this year, the 28th Inf. Reg. discovered a bunker while on assignment in the area of Kniażyce and Brylińce. 1 LMG, 1 assault rifles, 2 typewriters and some valuable documents were captured.

The 26th Inf. Reg. captured two armed bandits while on assignment in the area of the village of Nienowice. 9 bunkers were destroyed.

On 8 May, in the village of Dąbrówka, the 4th Inf. Reg. captured Tadeusz Kłysz, alias, “Glaz,” a member of the WiN POW organisation, who served as a section man for this organisation. 1 LMG, 2 Sten guns, 4 “Pepesha” guns, 4 Mauser-29 carbines, 7 carbines, 1 flare pistol, and large quantities of ammunition were found during a search of his house. Investigation in progress.

On the night of 6–7 May, bandits burned down the villages of Nowe Sioło, Żuków, and Ułazów in the 3rd Inf. Reg.’s area of operation.

During an operation on 5 May [19]47, Platoon Sergeant Stanisław Pawlak was killed by UPA bandits. Investigation in progress.

On 9 May [19]47, the 26th Inf. Reg. captured 3 bandits and 3 carbines in the area of Stubno (3040).

12th Infantry Regiment – Żohatyn operational area.

On 1 May this year, the 1st Battalion of the 12th Inf. Reg. came across a UPA band consisting of 4 bandits during an operation in the village of Proszowka. A rifleman from the 1st Battalion was wounded in an exchange of shots. 1 bandit was hiding in a barn and blew himself up with a grenade as the soldiers approached. The others managed to escape. Nine bunkers were discovered during the pursuit. Four barrels of meat were found. There were beds and cupboards in another 150m bunker. The bunkers were destroyed.

On 1 May this year, the 12th Inf. Reg. apprehended 2 members of a UPA band belonging to “Hromenko’s” sotnia. One of the bandits revealed where he kept ammunition. 200 hundred rounds of ammunition and a 200 gram mine were found.

On 2 May this year, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, operating in the forest near Pruszewka, came across a 7-strong UPA band leading a cow. Following an
exchange of shots, one bandit was killed, and the others managed to escape. 1 rifle, 1 cow, 100 rounds of ammunition, and 1 grenade were seized.

On 1 May [19]47, the 1st Battalion arrested 4 UPA collaborators.

On 5 May [19]47, the 12th Inf. Reg. fought a skirmish with UPA bands in the area of the villages of Polchowa, Dubienka, and Sielnica. The fight resulted in 12 bandits being killed and 5 armed bandits captured. After being defeated, one band attacked again, and was repelled.

On 4–5 May [19]47, the 12th Inf. Reg. fought a group from “Hromenko’s” band (13 people) operating in the village of Piątkowa. The fight resulted in 11 bandits being killed and 2 taken prisoner. 12 rifles, 5 pistols, and several grenades were seized.

The 3rd Infantry Division – Lubaczów operational area.

The 3rd Inf. Div. units were deployed in Lubaczów powiat at the end of the reporting period without achieving any notable results.

On 7 May [19]47, a member of ‘Tucha’s band voluntarily came to the commander of the 3rd Inf. Reg. and surrendered.

Apart from that, the SOK Combined Regiment, responsible for protecting railway lines and facilities, is active in the area of OG Vistula.

On 10 May [19]47 the 12th Inf. Reg. searched the forest area (0690) – (1090) and captured 2 bandits, who revealed a forest bunker converted into a hospital. The 6 bandits in the bunker put up a fight. As a result of the operation, 3 bandits were killed and 5 taken alive.

A 7th Inf. Div. reconnaissance patrol came across a 17-strong band. 3 bandits were killed in a skirmish in the area of Rzepiedź (7278).

Following the operation [in the area] of Wola Wołodzka (0892), the 4th Inf. Reg. captured 2 pro-Bandera guerrillas on the 10th of this month.

The 28th Inf. Reg. reconnaissance platoon – of the 9th Inf. Div. – captured 1 pro-Bandera guerrilla in the area of Gruszów (0420).

**Statistical summary**

The combat efforts of OG Vistula troops resulted in

| Bandits killed | — 55 |
| — “captured” | — 30 |

160 people were arrested for collaboration with the bands.

Arms captured:

- HMGs — 1
- LMGs — 9
- “Pepeshas” — 22
- Pistols — 4

---

20 Probably Łubienka.

21 The SOK Combined Regiment was a temporary detachment formed by the Railway Security Guards, and deployed about 1000 people. It was disbanded after Operation “Vistula.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle ammunition</td>
<td>4527 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition for heavy weapons</td>
<td>10 machine gun drums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio sets</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio receivers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel[phone] exchanges</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel[ephones]</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double-barrelled shotguns</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A[nti]-p[ersonnel] mines</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flare pistols</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriters</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archives and instructions</td>
<td>found at 5 sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food storage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital storage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cows</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse carts</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyed [structures]:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huts</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our losses:
- Killed: officers – 2, non-commissioned officers – 1, privates – 5.
  In total, from 21 April [19]47 to 10 May [19]47, OG Vistula lost:
  - Killed: officers – 2, non-commissioned officers – 1, privates – 7.
  - Wounded: officers – 3, non-commissioned officers – 1, privates – 12.
  - Missing: 2 privates.

Reported equipment losses: 1 rifle – 60 [rounds] of ammunition.

General situation
- Due to the excessive use of the method of combing woods on hills (in Lesko and Sanok powiats), we have noted a decrease in fighting spirit among the soldiers as a result of physical and moral exhaustion, as the results of these operations were in most cases very poor and disproportionate to the invested effort.

- The morale of soldiers has also been affected by disruptions in the work of the political and educational apparatus, and difficulties in supplying food to troops stationed in remote areas.

- Despite this, however, we often receive information that soldiers voluntarily come forward to take part in raids against bands.

- In order to improve the results of our operations, unit command[s] have been ordered to abandon the tactic of combing woods and, with a view to maximising
the troops’ combat potential, primarily aim to eliminate the bands by encircling the enemy, having obtained intelligence on the bands’ whereabouts by reconnaissance. Therefore, in all units, from the battalion to the division inclusive, reconnaissance patrols armed with LMGs, grenades, and automatic weapons have been organised, and strong operating companies, equipped with means of transport, have been formed in the regiments and divisions for immediate field interventions.

The bands are avoiding combat with the troops. When encountered, they shoot and break into small groups of 3–5. Having a good knowledge of the terrain, they can quickly move around and eventually escape. The bands have a network of well-camouflaged bunkers, often in places which are difficult to access. In some cases, access paths to bunkers and roads have been mined by the bands.

Resettlement operation

The resettlement of the Ukrainian population was divided into four stages.

Stage 1. From the announcement of the decision to resettle a particular group, to the time when the resettlers are brought to the regimental assembly point established in the centre of the area to be resettled. A UB officer assigned to the commander of the Resettlement Group gathers preliminary intelligence on the hostile elements based on previously made lists. He recruits agents in order to expose the members and collaborators of the guerrilla bands.

Stage 2. Housing the resettlers at a regimental assembly point (PPZ) until their departure to a dispatch station. As many people as possible are put in tents or in buildings, because of the possibility that they will have to be accommodated for longer periods. While the resettlers are being housed at a regimental assembly point, transports are arranged to bring larger quantities of grain and foodstuffs from the abandoned farms. A UB officer is assigned to the commander of the PPZ. He receives the intelligence obtained concerning the resettlers and recruited agents from the UB officer assigned to the commander of the Resettlement Group. On the basis of his own intelligence materials on the groups of resettlers, and in conjunction with Information and Military Reconnaissance officers, the UB officer draws up a list of resettlers and carries out a selection according to signs arranged in advance. At the same time, the people assembled at the PPZ continue to be scrutinised and agents recruited.

Stage 3. The PPZ sends transports of resettlers to a dispatch station (Disp. Stat.) according to the lists. From there, the PUR starts work issuing resettlement cards and tickets for passage to transit stations (Lublin, Oświęcim).

The PUR’s responsibilities include feeding the resettlers during their stay at the dispatch station. A UB officer and 1–2 clerks are assigned to the commander of the dispatch station. When a transport arrives, they take over the materials (selection lists, agents, a list of identified band members, associates, etc.) from the UB officer assigned to the PPZ, and continue to gather intelligence on the people being transported. Once the PUR’s work is done, our man, using materials from all 3 stages, arranges for the resettlers to board the railway cars, following the
principle that dubious elements (who will be assigned to separate settlement areas) are not to be mixed with the peaceful population. Once the transport is arranged, the UB officer may, if he thinks fit, discreetly detain dangerous people or make a list of people to be apprehended at the destination station. Then, together with the com[mander] of the Disp. Stat., he writes a letter to the PUR officers working at the transit and destination stations.

Stage 4 (the final stage) begins when a transport boards the railway cars and continues until arrival at the destination station. The UB officer assigned to the transport com[mander] receives an extensive description of the transport, a list of agents, and guidelines for gathering further intelligence on the resettlers during the trip from the dispatching UB officer at the Disp. Stat., and is obligated to transfer those materials, and any others obtained, to the UBP in whose area the transport is unloaded. UB officers at all these stages work according to instructions obtained from the MBP Branch Office attached to OG Vistula.

The important data from the dispatching station are presented below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispatching Station</th>
<th>Number of transports</th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanok</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>3,408</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Przeworsk</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>5,989</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bełżec</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>4,027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagórz</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>4,861</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaluz</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>2,702</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Łukawica</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olszanica</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>4,991</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rymanów</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>[...]22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pisarowce</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Łupków</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulaszne</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komańcza</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>102</td>
<td>4,38323</td>
<td>35,005</td>
<td>9324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Altogether in total, the resettlers took 8,248 head of cattle and 4,066 horses at that time. Due to the completion of the resettlement operation by the 6th and 7th Inf. Divs., the Rymanów, Pisarowce, Łupków, Kulaszne, and Komańcza dispatch stations have now been discontinued.

Attitude of the military

Apart from a few incidents of an overly strict resettlement regime (e.g. the village of Raków) and a shortening of the preparation time for leaving the village,

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22 Illegible: 6 or 26.
23 According to the original version. The actual total is 4,388.
24 According to the original version. The actual total is either 112 or 132.
the behaviour of the troops in relation to the resettlers has been beyond reproach. The soldiers, appreciating the importance of the whole operation for the country, tried to gain the trust of the population, helping in the transportation of property, and starting conversations about their future life in the recovered territories. This sort of conduct broke the initial distrust of the local population towards the military.

The work of the PUR

Not all the officers delegated by the PUR to the Disp. Stats. were able to handle the responsibilities they were given. Incompetent work organisation in connection with drawing up lists resulted in delays in dispatching transports. Another general failure of the PUR’s work during the first week of operation was the lack of food supply for the resettlers during their stay at the Disp. Stats.

The sentiment among the population.

In general, the resettlement operation proceeded peacefully, except for one incident when a guerrilla band fired shots at a village. The fact of resettlement was met with indifference by the population in the areas covered by the operation. In conversations, farmers often said that they would finally be able to work peacefully. In some areas, it was necessary to combat hostile propaganda rumours stating that the transports would allegedly head for the USSR and camps.

General remarks.

The resettlement operation was characterised by a lack of thoughtful planning of how the resettler groups would move between the particular stages, and above all, by poor intelligence work among the population in the operational area. The work of the UB apparatus in the initial period of the operation was also very poor, due to serious personnel deficits on the one hand, and because of the size and diversity of the tasks facing the UB apparatus on the other. Detailed instructions were distributed through UB channels only after the resettlement operation had begun.

As a result of the above:

a) serious bottlenecks occurred at the PPZs and Disp. Stats., which in turn created difficulties in operating these points;

b) the first transports directed to the West were in many cases totally unprepared, unselected, and without inside agents;

c) during the first period of operation, great difficulties were encountered in arranging health care for the points;

d) presumably due to the large distances between the particular stages, and the various obstacles along the way that caused the convoys to stretch out along the roads, some resettlers broke away from the transports (mainly in Przemyśl powiat), while some escapees from UPA bands joined their families in order to settle in the west.
While there were only a few young men in the transports in the early stages of resettlement, our officers reported an increased percentage of young people of military age on the transports as of 4 May. It was also reported that some band members had thrown down their arms and left with their families. As this information was confirmed, appropriate instructions were issued.

Work of BP organs

UB delegates were allocated to the division and regiment staff, and to assembly and dispatch points; they were assigned the tasks of preparing lists of people subject to resettlement, and recruiting agents both in the field and on the transports.

Intelligence network.

During the ten-day reporting period, we recruited:

Informants on transports ........................................................... 93
- « – remaining in the field ......................................................... 6
Other agents in the field.............................................................. 1

On 8 May [19]47, a resident of the village of Komańcza was recruited as an agent. The man had worked for the “Polish Second Department” before 1939 and had carried out intelligence work in Czechoslovakia.

During the ten days, a number of valuable intelligence reports were received on the distribution of individual bunkers and the penetration of band members into resettlement transports.

Operations conducted.

Acting on data obtained by BP officers, we arrested:

Members of UPA bands .............................................................. 15
[Persons] suspected of collaboration with the bands ............... 72
[Persons charged with] illegal possession of weapons ............ 1

Special incidents.

On 1 May [19]47, in the area of the 26th Inf. Reg., 2 members of a band voluntarily came forward and surrendered their arms: 1 rifle and 1 Nagant-30 revolver. One bandit was from Michal Solita’s kushch, the other from “Kruk’s” sotnia.

On 2 May [19]47, 6 bandits from “Shum’s” sotnia reported to the commander of the 3rd Inf. Reg. in the area of Cieszanów and surrendered their arms. The bandits were set free in order to persuade other bandits they knew to come out. These bandits are being used operationally by the BP delegate attached to the 3rd Inf. Reg.

Liquidation of archives.

Based on information obtained from operational investigations, two sites with archives and literature were found.

On 6 May [19]47, acting on the materials collected by the Investigation Section of the MBP Branch Office attached to OG Vistula, the OG Staff arranged an operation in the forest south-west of Przemyśl, which was personally commanded
by Gen. Mossor and Col. Korczyński. During the operation, the 14th Inf. Reg. found a bunker with a number of very valuable documents and weapons: 1 LMG, 1 assault rifle, 830 rounds of ammunition, and 3 typewriters.

Destroying bunkers.

Acting on information obtained from BP delegates, several bunkers used by the bands were detected and destroyed.

On 5 May [19]47 the 8th Inf. Reg. conducted an operation in the area of the village of Romanowa Wola (8210) in order to destroy bandits’ bunkers and hiding places. Data on the distribution of these bunkers was obtained from investigations conducted by a BP delegate. During the operation, 13 bunkers were found. All of the bunkers had been destroyed. The bands’ recent presence was visible in the bunkers, as proven by fresh straw and remnants of food. The bunkers were mostly built under normal residential houses, and their entrances were often very well concealed.

Intelligence work.

Security officers, together with military reconnaissance patrols, are carrying out intelligence operations in the field. The patrols are tasked with detecting and determining where the bands are staying, which is then used in operations.

Protection of oil wells.

On 6 May [19]47, BP posts started work at oil wells in Ropience, Lesko powiat. As a result of improved security conditions, the mood among the workers, who had previously been threatened by the activities of guerrilla bands, is improving. Now that the Ukrainian workers have been deported, verification is being carried out, and people of Polish ethnicity are being issued certificates.

No incidents of sabotage have been reported.

On 7 May [19]47, oil production was 43,100 kg, i.e. 92% of the standard quota. This underperformance can be explained by the loss of the deported Ukrainian workers.

On 10 May [19]47, Jan Wolański, a worker at the oil well in Ropienka, was arrested. He admitted to having collaborated with UPA bands. On the basis of his testimony, 5 individuals collaborating with the bands were identified.

The Ukrainian population is generally willing to be deported, and no resistance has been reported. The deportation operation is proceeding quite efficiently. In general, except for the area of Lubaczów powiat and parts of Przemyśl powiat, where the PUBPs intend to deport all suspected elements in connection to the deportation of the Ukrainians, no major deviations from the operation’s assumptions and plans have been observed. A separate problem, to which we have yet to find a solution, is the issue of the Ukrainian population and mixed families living in towns, whose [number] we roughly estimate at 30,000; and in particular the urban intelligentsia, whose number we estimate at about 1,000 people together with their families. The deportation of this population is essential to resolving the Ukrainian problem.

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The attitude of the Ukrainian underground to the resettlement operation is roughly as follows: they generally do not oppose the resettlement, but the military and civilian networks have been ordered to remain on the ground in groups. Nevertheless, there is a feeling that some of the political network (often disguised as peasants) are leaving with their families in order to maintain organisational communication, and that this has been prearranged. The goal is clear: to maintain the spirit of Ukrainian chauvinism among the resettlers. There is also a feeling that members of guerrilla bands who do not want to part with their families are deserting their units and sneaking into the transports. We have therefore focused the entire burden of our intelligence work on the dispatch points, with the task of recruiting in 3 directions: 1) obtaining information about the mood of the resettlers and using this information in the new place of settlement; 2) picking out organisational elements trying to leave with their families; 3) infiltrating the existing underground. The results are poor at the moment, but it should be said that we have only just begun this work.

Even though not all the bands have been eliminated, the military operation has done enormous damage to the guerrilla bands. A huge quantity of bunkers, hiding places, and food stores have been destroyed. The bands are going hungry and their spirit is deteriorating by the day. Their communications have been damaged, the bunkers of some of the Ukrainian underground leaders, such as “Hryhor,”25 the oblovsky providnyk and “Mar,”26 the nadraion providnyk, and a courier depot, etc. have been taken and destroyed. Even better results should be expected in the coming days.

Command of OG Vistula

\textsuperscript{a}(\neg)\textsuperscript{a} Czaplicki,\textsuperscript{a}\textsuperscript{27} Col.\textsuperscript{a}
\textsuperscript{b}\textsuperscript{b} (\neg) Col. Korczyński\textsuperscript{b}

\textsuperscript{IPN, MBP 743, pp. 152–163.}
\textsuperscript{Copy, typescript.}
\textsuperscript{Document in Polish.}
\textsuperscript{Fragments of the document (another copy) published in E. Misilo, Akcja “Wisła.”..., 256–259.}

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{a}-\textsuperscript{b} Crossed out by hand.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{b}-\textsuperscript{b} Filled in by hand.}

25 Myroslav Huk (1912–1951), \textit{noms de guerre} “Hryhor,” “Kod”; from 1945 propaganda officer of the 1st OUN-B District, later the \textit{providnyk} of the 1st OUN-B District; moved to the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, captured by soldiers of the MVD Internal Troops, sentenced to death (late 1947) and executed.


No. 11
13 May 1947, Warsaw. Situational report No. 6 on the activity of OG Vistula, by Michał Rola-Żymierski, Minister of Defence

Minister of Defence No. Warsaw, a-13-a May 1947
a-00237/III-a

Report No. 6
on the operational situation and activity of Operational Group Vistula and WP and WBW units in Rzeszów, Lublin, and Cracow województwos
as of 12 May 1947
1:200 000 map

A. Activity of Operational Group Vistula

a) Operational activity.

On 8–10 May this year, the units of OG Vistula carried out pursuit operations against UPA bands in the following areas: the v[illage] of Lachawa (14 km north-east of Sanok), the v[illage] of Hołuczków (9 km east of Sanok), the v[illage] of Jabłonica Ruska (15 km north of Sanok), the v[illage] of Kniażyce (7 km south of Przemyśl), the v[illage] of Jawornik (16 km west of Baligród), the v[illage] of Kulaszne (12 km north-west of Baligród), the v[illage] of Jamna Górna (14 km south-east of Bircza), and the v[illage] of Stuposiany (33 km south-east of Baligród).

In the area of the v[illage] of Lachawa (14 km north-east of Sanok), the operational group of the 36th Inf. Reg. fought against a guerrilla band numbering about 30. As a result, 3 bandits were killed, and 3 assault rifles and 1 crate of ammunition were captured.

In the area of the v[illage] of Hołuczków (9 km east of Sanok), the operational group of the 10th Inf. Reg. discovered a bunker, in which 9 bandits with weapons and grenades were captured.

In the area of the v[illage] of Jabłonica Ruska (15 km north of Sanok), the operational group of the 12th Inf. Reg. fought a band in a bunker; 3 bandits were killed, 5 captured and 8 pieces of weapons, a radio set, grenades, ammunition, and some important documents were seized.

In the area of the v[illage] of Jawornik (16 km west of Baligród) a reconnaissance patrol unit of the 7th Inf. Div. encountered a 17-strong UPA band. 3 bandits were killed and 1, badly wounded, was captured during the fight. The band is still being pursued.

In the area of the v[illage] of Stuposiany (33 km south-east of Baligród), the KBW operational group discovered 2 bunkers in which they found 2 LMGs, 1 assault rifle, and 2 submachine guns.

* * *

Filled in by hand.
OG Vistula units seized a number of documents from UPA bands describing their situation, tactics, morale, etc. Example extracts from these documents are contained in Annex No. 1.

b) Deportation operation.
By 8 May a total of 90 transports had left with 30,275 persons.
On 9–10 May – 21 transports left with 7,202 persons.
A total of 111 transports left with 37,477 persons.
The resettlement operation is proceeding as planned. A list of places where the deportation operation has been completed is provided in Annex No. 2.

c) Settlement operation.
By 10 May this year, a total of 39 transports with 14,137 persons had reached their destinations, of which:

In Szczecin województwo – 21 transports with 6,335 persons
In Olsztyn – 18 – 7,802 –

B. Major events
in Lublin and Cracow województwos

Lublin województwo –
The manoeuvre group of the 9th Inf. Reg. is carrying out operations against UPA bands in the Uhrynów and Dołhobyczów woods (18 km south of Hrubieszów). Reports on the results of these operations have not arrived yet.

On 9 May this year, WBW operational groups commenced operations against “Młot’s” band in the area of Łosice–Sarnaki, Siedlce powiat, and against “Żelazny’s” and “Ordon’s” WiN bands in the area of Włodawa powiat. Reports on the progress of these operations have not arrived yet.

Cracow województwo –
The 6th Inf. Div. and KBW operational groups are carrying out a reconnaissance operation against “Smyrny’s” UPA band on the border between Nowy Sącz and Gorlice powiats.

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1 Mykhailo Fedak, nom de guerre “Smyrny,” providnyk of the 1st “Verkhovyna” nadraion of the 1st OUN-B District and commander of an independent UPA sotnia, formed on the basis of OUN-B and SKV. The sotnia was 70–100 strong and operated mainly in the powiats of Nowy Sącz and Gorlice. At the end of 1947, part of the sotnia went to Czechoslovakia, where it was broken up. The remnants returned to Poland and were active to 1948. After the sotnia was broken up, “Smyrny” escaped to Germany. He came to Poland in 1949 with a group of OUN-B couriers to make contact with Myroslav Onyshkevich, nom de guerre “Orest.” As “Orest” had been arrested, he returned to Germany and emigrated to Canada in 1957.
C. General Statistics, as of 12 May 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Our losses</th>
<th>By 9 May</th>
<th>As of 12 May</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP soldiers killed</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBW – “ – – “</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP soldiers wounded</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBW – “ – – “</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBW soldiers missing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. The guerrillas’ losses</th>
<th>By 9 May</th>
<th>As of 12 May</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandits killed</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandits captured</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Persons] arrested for collaboration with the bands</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Bandits who] surrendered voluntarily</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Captured weapons</th>
<th>By 9 May</th>
<th>As of 12 May</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank rifles</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMGs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMGs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault rifles</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>42,401</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>43,901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers destroyed</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minister of Defence
(–) Michał Żymierski
Marshal of Poland

Annex No. 1

Excerpts from documents of UPA bands

I. From a letter² from a superior com[mander] known as “Ya,” to a kurin com[mander] (probably the com[mander] of “Ren’s” kurin, known as “Roman”); letter dated April 2, [19]47:

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² This may be a letter from the commander of the 6th OW to “Ren.”
“Tactics for the troops for the summer:

1. Repair your shoes and clothes, carry out a collection among the Polish population, take cows and sell them for this purpose; expedite requisitions.

2. Do not conduct offensive combat, unless you need to get something, or from time to time to check the audacity and deployment of the enemy on the ground (then lay an ambush). Save ammunition!!! Sometimes you have to strike the enemy, so that the riflemen do not lose their fighting spirit, but choose a good place to strike without incurring casualties, and do not fire a lot of ammunition. But you should not always flee from the enemy in the field. In defensive combat, if you cannot defeat the enemy in combat – break away and disappear.

3. Instead of conducting political work among the Polish population, conduct ‘raids’ on Polish territory. Behave ‘correctly,’ do not carry out retaliatory or criminal actions. Do not stick to one forest area or region. Designate an area of activity on Polish territory for each unit. The unit must stay in this area often (as long as possible), and should only come to its own area for a rest. This year is going to be a year of ‘raids’ and political work among foreigners for the unit. We need to become intimately acquainted with the forests to the west and north of our area. Our partisans must move away from the ‘shelter’ – that is, they should not limit their activities to maintaining the spirit of the Poles, because they are not worth it. We are concerned about the international arena, the formation of an anti-Bolshevik opinion in the world; we intend to speed up the outbreak of war, to inform the world that it is boiling in the Soviet Union, that Truman is right to have the courage to implement his new policy (do you understand?). The point is that Polish territory is to be used as a base. If Indians lived there instead of Poles, we would be doing the same work among them.

Appropriate behaviour towards the population is necessary, because our people are waging a struggle abroad to get Western countries to recognise the U[krainian] I[nsurgent] Army [UPA] as legitimate. We have to let everybody know about us, but it is even more important that we show our political and cultural face, to finally dispel the fear that we might be a ‘band.’

We should set to work gradually. We should first send units into an area to a depth of 10 km, the next time to 20 km, and in this way, penetrate the terrain more deeply. As practice has shown, Polish territory will open up gates for us in this district (the winter operational area of ‘Burlaka’ over the River San, and of subunits, such as ‘Khrin’s’ [sotnia]). I will try to provide you with literature (it has already been printed). The paper entitled ‘Raids and political work among the Polish population,’ published in the autumn of 1946, describes obligatory tactics for ‘raids.’ Now ‘raids’ will be necessary. The enemy wants to lock us in the woods on our land and force us to [engage] in frontal combat. In the event of such attempts by the enemy (and most actions of this type should be expected this year), you have to manoeuvre – retreat to the rear of the enemy and expand the area of

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3 As in the original.
4 Harry S. Truman (1884–1972), in 1934–1944 American politician; senator; Vice-President (from January 1945) and President of the USA (April 1945 – January 1953).
operation, so that the enemy cannot block us in our small region. In addition, we have to arrange an event during this summer, the same event as in the spring of last year (when ‘Myron,’ ‘Korniy,’ ⁵ and ‘Bir’ took part in the operation).

Think about when, where and how it can be best carried out. Do you think that ‘Bir’ and ‘Brid’ are enough? ⁶ I am afraid to involve ‘Khrin’ for fear he might compromise us. Shall I send part of ‘Burlaka’s’ unit? What do you think? I think it is not the size of the units but the quality of their work that counts. If they trap a unit (probably against the border), then you have to go to the other side. You have to behave properly there. We should not be worried if they (the Communists) take armed action against us. We can strike them then – they will come out of this fight the same way that others who fight us do. There are forests there, and the population will give us food – it’s tough, but let them shoulder some of the load too – we want publicity – publicity in the international arena.

Foreign correspondents turn up and write about us after we leave. This is why we cannot provide them with materials to use against us. Our central authorities want the area penetrated with ‘raids’ as often and as deep as possible, because this gives better results than ten skirmishes won in our area.

Generally, this year (summer) we need to do as much of this work as possible. Everything should be done within the capacity of the riflemen – they cannot be overstrained. Do not join ‘combat’ units because the enemy will hound them continuously. What is the situation with ammunition? We have to save – maybe during the summer we will get something (according to the sketch I got from you), but this will depend on the situation in the world and in our area, so we cannot count on this.”

II. From a letter from the sotnia commander known as “Khrin,” to the commander of “Ren’s” kurin, known as “Roman,” his direct superior (letter dated 7 May 1947):

“I managed to get away from the enemy today, and I’m using this opportunity to write to you through a courier. We have a real Zaporizhian–Lemko Sich here, empty land with Świerczewski’s 2nd Army at large. ⁷ The Poles have about 20,000 men here. They have taken all the villages, and in addition, they are being stationed in the woods. They lay ambushes, conduct manhunts, and confiscate everything. They are also guarding the villages near woods, so that we cannot assemble. They search the edges of the forest for food. They have been given the order to ‘exterminate, pursue, pursue to the end.’ They have been pursuing me since 16 March, and this pursuit is no different from the ‘Stalinist broom.’ During this time I have had 4 fights, 7 skirmishes, and 12 ambushes. My losses: 8 killed, 11 wounded, 4 captured. The enemy has lost 92 and nearly as many wounded.

‘We have been praised by everybody. They’re now calling us the ‘knights of Lemkivshchyna,’ but these ‘knights’ look so [poor] that you could send them to

⁵ Probably the com[mander] of an unidentified sotnia, perhaps Yaroslav Yaroshevich.
⁶ Probably “Brodych.”
⁷ This refers to OG Vistula, which consisted of many tactical units of the Polish 2nd Army commanded by Gen. Karol Świerczewski.
scare people. We are all going around in rags. We have burnt our coats in campfires, because we no longer have any camp supplies (we have been defeated five times). Some of us do not have any shirts or long-johns. Nobody shaves, because there is no soap; we strike sparks into the tinder to start a fire and look for burning grass set on fire by the Poles. Lots of riflemen are going around in soft shoes made of cow hide. It is terrible, but true. I heard before Christmas that my neighbour, ‘Prince Roman Zavikostky,’ got a gift in the form of an ‘Anzug’ for ‘Khrin.’ I apologize for the boldness of my request, but I am so shabby that it can be a patched jacket, but in one piece, because we have nothing to patch with here.

‘I’m supposed to be providing clothes and shoes for two brigades today [!] – this is impossible, and that is why I’m asking you, my buddy ‘Roman,’ for help. The Polish villages have been cut off from us by an iron Siegfried line. The Polish Army is in every village, so there is no use thinking about any contact with the city (maybe in 2–3 months).”

“According to our intelligence, our [men] killed a Bolshevik dignitary in Sambor. For five days there were no newspapers. Our partisans are very strong there. The boys who have come ‘from over there’ tell scary things: they’re conscripting people into the Soviet army. There is news that Przemyśl, too, will be taken from Poland. Commander ‘Burlaka’ lost 2 chotoviys and all riyoviys. He has had 7 fights in three days. The Polish army went there as well. They have driven me into Czechoslovakia 4 times. We have been joking with each other ‘Ukraine, be at ease, because geroyom slabo [weakness to the heroes, a pun on geroyom slava, or ‘glory to the heroes’: ed.s]. Despite the encirclement and exhaustion from hunger, the soldiers are in good spirits, but for how long? Who knows?

The NKVD came to the villages and carried out mass arrests.”

Certified true copy: (–) Przoński,⁸ Col.

Annex no. 2

List of places where deportation of the Ukrainian population has been completed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number of deported</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number of deported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Morochów</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Paszowa</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Łukowe</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Brelików</td>
<td>370</td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Zwierzyń</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Leszczowate</td>
<td>243</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Zahoczewie</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Serednica</td>
<td>132</td>
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</table>

⁸ Michaił Przoński (born 1913), Soviet officer assigned to the WP in 1944; from February 1946 deputy head of Dept. 3 of the General Staff; in 1951–1955 commander of the WOP; returned to the USSR 1955.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number of deported</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number of deported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Olchowa</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Romanowa Wola</td>
<td>221</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Średnia Wieś</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Ropienka</td>
<td>312</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Łączki</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Jankowce</td>
<td>222</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Bachlowa</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Uherce Mineralne</td>
<td>553</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Huzele</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>Orelec</td>
<td>521</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dziurdziów</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Bóbrka</td>
<td>447</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Weremień</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Myczkowce</td>
<td>370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lesko-Gruszka</td>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>Dubieński</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Wielopole</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Moczary</td>
<td>75</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Tarnawa</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Wujskie</td>
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<td>Bereska</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>Załuż</td>
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<td>Mokre</td>
<td>401</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>Olchowce</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Tyrawa Wołoska</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>Bykowce</td>
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<td>Tapińska</td>
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<td>Rozpucie</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>Lachawa</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Hołuczków</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Dobrzanka</td>
<td>311</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Jureczkowa</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Wola Rustykalna</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Grąziowa</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Maława</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Wojtkowa</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Brzeżawa</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Wojtkówka</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Czeremcha</td>
<td>101</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Trzciniec</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Lipowiec</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Trójca</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Posada Jaśliska</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Łomna</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Daliowa</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Krajna</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Wola Wyżna</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Nowosielce Kozickie</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Polany Surowiczne</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Stańkowa</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>total:</td>
<td>17,401⁹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list will be continued when detailed reports have been received from the area.

(–) Przoński, Col.

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Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Report – paper with the national emblem imprinted over the letterhead.

⁹ As in the original. The actual total is 17,406.
No. 12
15 May 1947, Rzeszów. Bulletin No. 1 of the WUBP in Rzeszów, concerning public sentiment towards the resettlement operation

Rzeszów, 15 May 1947

To
Col. Korczyński, Chief of Staff in Sanok

Bulletin No. 1

On 2–10 May, the Spec-Groups of Dep[artment] “B” in Przemyśl, Jarosław, Sanok, Lesko, and Gorlice produced about 8,000 documents.

The material compiled here shows that the public in our województwo has been deeply affected by the resettlement operation. Nearly everyone is writing about the resettlement and reacting according to their personal interests and political attitudes.

Criminal elements are also using the mail service, as evidenced by the large number of operative documents that have been directed to the Staff for use.

Subject matter of operative documents:
In the above period, 103 documents pertaining to the following matters were directed to the Staff:

1. Denunciations of people of Ukrainian nationality – 5 docs.
2. Poles hiding Ukrainians – 14 “
3. Warning of impending resettlement – 5 “
4. Anti-government statements in connection with the resettlement operation – 21 “
5. Contacts with people wanted by the UB and MO – 7 “
6. Warning of impending arrest – 7 “
7. Offences committed by MO officers – 2 “
8. Suspicious contacts with foreign countries – 3 “
9. Information about Volksdeutsche – 6 “
10. The attitude of WBW soldiers towards the resettlement operation – 2 “
11. Disclosure of confidential information
12.[1] a) Hostile attitude of a radio operator
    b) Sending photographs of soldiers murdered by the UPA
    c) Notification of colleagues killed in action
    d) Disclosing the location and movement of troops – 1 “
12.[2] Fleeing west to escape resettlement – 1 “
13. Issuing Rom[an]-Cath[olic] certificates to Ukrainians – 1 “
14. Hiding radio sets – 2 “
15. Ukrainians resorting to bribery to protect themselves
16. Dissatisfaction of workers employed in the resettlement operation
17. Obtaining certificates from offices to avoid resettlement

The documents have been sent to:

1. The Staff in Sanok 41 documents
2. – “ – in Przemyśl 37 “
3. Chief of WP Information 13 “
4. WUBP Rzeszów 12 “
Total: 103 documents

As for public sentiment, the most striking thing is the utter confusion as to the cause, extent and purpose of resettlement. People do not realise the purpose for which the government is carrying out the operation, are even less aware of who is being deported, and do not know what is going to happen to people after they have been resettled.

The strong sense of unease and helplessness in these documents is palpable. People are repeating improbable rumours, which they themselves question, but which are no less damaging for that.

A woman from Jarosław writes: “No one knows why or what for; everyone just shrugs their shoulders. Various rumours are spreading around ... they say that a lot of people are going to be deported from the towns ... that everybody as far as Rzeszów is going to be deported ... that people from Poznań województwo are going to be resettled here, and we’re going to be resettled to Poznań województwo... in a word, there is going to be tremendous misery and exile.”

Anna Ziembowa from Sanok writes: “Rumour has it that the people from Sanok are to be deported, and worse, they are going to empty the eastern territories up to Gorlice ... everyone can see the danger, the horror is approaching with gigantic strides, the horror which seems intent on destroying everything.”

A woman from Przemyśl writes: “60% of the population is to be deported from Przemyśl, no one knows what awaits them in an hour ... The prices are extremely high.”

Józef Habko from Brzozów powiat writes: “There will not be a single man left in the powiats of Przemyśl, Lesko or Sanok, neither a Ukrainian, nor a [person of] mixed [race], nor a Pole, because everybody is being forced to leave for an unknown destination.”

[People] from Sanok are writing about who is going to be deported: “A mass of people are going to leave our city, everyone who came from the east and those who did not vote.”

Stach from Sanok writes on the same issue: “The disturbing news going around town is that they are also going to deport Polish families, the so-called ‘reactionaries,’ but no one knows who, because almost 90% of them are not Party members.”

[People] from Rzeszów write: “They’re deporting wealthy farmers from Rzeszów województwo; the same goes for merchants, speculators, and reactionaries.”
Jadwiga Werońska from Sanok powiat writes: “Only party members are going to be left alone.”

[People] from Przemyśl write: “Ostensibly, they are deporting Ukrainians, but Poles as well, they apparently want to populate this area with their own people.”

Pacuła from Przemyśl writes: “There was this situation in Żurawica, where a PPR party member had it in for a good Pole, and he has already been deported, and the wealthy can buy their way out for 3,200,000.”¹ An unidentified sender writes about the resettlement conditions: “In Lesko powiat, once the army had deported the people, they immediately burned down the villages, they only took the horses and cows, and the rest was burned down and they continue to burn down village after village...”

Kisielowna from Bystrowice writes on the same subject: “the resettlers in Przeworsk are on the ramp, the cows are grazing in grain fields, desperate peasants are throwing themselves under trains, babies are dying, and women are dying in childbirth.”

N. from Przemyśl writes: “People are committing suicide out of despair, because they’re being taken away without livestock or anything ... because there are a lot of people in Przeworsk, and people are dying from hunger and despair ... the cattle are grazing in the fields, and nobody knows where they are being taken ... they have driven our people out to suffer misery.”

Finally, Stefan from Przemyśl writes: “They’re saying around here that everybody as far as the a-Vistula-a is going to be deported, and that they’re going to be deported to Auschwitz, where they will be burnt in furnaces.”

Along with deportations, opinions about the resettlement are interspersed with war rumours. Marcela Sołotwińska from Lesko writes: “Lots of troops have been passing day in day out ... tanks, armoured cars, mounted troops, infantry, wagons, tampons,² it’s dreadful ... they say that they are after the Bandera groups, but as they are nowhere in sight ... it is not allowed to say that they are going to the Turkish border.”

Stanisław Nykiel from Szówsko writes: “They’re saying around here that war is a certainty this year, or revolution, because the country cannot survive this.”

Similarly, a certain Kłosowicz from Jedlicze, writes: “Lots of our troops went over to Russia ... Soviet officers took all the transports away, and our officers did not want to give up the troops, so they locked them up in Sanok ... 3 of our divisions went to Russia, because they expected fighting there, and they crushed that uprising.”

Maria Pankowska from Sanok writes on the same subject: “The news is that Zhukov³ and Rokossovsky⁴ are going to start an uprising in Ukraine.”

¹ As in the original.
² As in the original.
⁴ Konstantin Rokossovsky (1896–1968), Marshal of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Poland; in 1937–1940 imprisoned as “a Polish and Japanese spy”; Commander of the Bryansk, Don, Central, 1st, and 2nd
Certain opinions should be regarded as deliberately provocative because of their style or the person who wrote them. For example an undisclosed person from Jarosław writes: “Women are giving birth in the open air without any help; supposedly, there are dead people, too. This is the ‘treacherous’ Polish-Soviet friendship. This operation is also going to affect cities – the unemployed, smallholders with less than 2 hectares, repatriates, exposed people, the politically suspect, and Home Army members who made a fortune from the war.”

An unidentified priest from Przemyśl writes to Rev. Tomasz Sapet in Gliwice: “They are displacing the entire border strip ... especially the PSL, etc.; the PPR, the SL and the like are staying ... The Ukrainians can remain if they join the PPR ... For the most part, our town is also going, with the loyal minority staying ... general panic, despair and suffering of the people ... we can’t even write or complain about it, because they’re telling stories to the world that this operation is against the Ukrainians ... If God does not show mercy, we will all perish here...”

A letter to Rev. Leszczyński in England, signed by Lilka, reads: “They are currently deporting all non-PPR members from Przemyśl ... they are not only deporting people from Przemyśl but from other parts of Poland as well ... they have to leave everything behind, furniture, everything left behind is being confiscated or shipped to the depths of Russia or to the West ... they say that the families of those who are staying abroad are to be arrested and sent to Russia ...”

A man named Tadek, an intellectual from Przemyśl, writes to Mieczysław Wielobób, an engineer, in England: “Deportations have been going on for two weeks ... troops come at night and tell people to pack up within 20 min, of course, it is not allowed to take furniture ... 10,000 people are currently waiting for railway cars ... they are not allowed to take grain with them ... the troops are taking the grain and shipping it to the East, according to what the railway men say ... it’s the same with the cows ... it seems to me that the German resettlements were the same ... I have heard somewhere that a despairing farmer killed his wife and four children with an axe ... things like this have never happened before ... the slaughter of the Huguenots in France was terrible, but ... that lasted one night, while here it’s going on all the time ... the Bishop came here on a visitation recently, the starosta refused to provide him with a car and then his retinue was forbidden to approach him, and the car was shot at ... It is not true, as they say, that they are taking away the Ukrainians and mixed families. ‘They’ are only deporting inconvenient Poles and destroying their livelihood; this will facilitate the establishment of collective farms.”

Belorussian fronts during WWII; from July 1945 to November 1949 Commander of the Northern Group of the Soviet Armed Forces in Poland, later assigned to the Polish Army; in 1949–1956 Minister of Defence; in 1952–1956 Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Member of Parliament in the People’s Republic of Poland; in 1950–1956 member of the Politburo of the CC PZPR, jointly responsible for repressions in the WP; recalled to Moscow November 1956; served as Deputy Minister of Defence of the USSR, Deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

5 This was probably either Franciszek Bard, the Bishop of Przemyśl, or Suffragan Bishop Wojciech Tomaka.
There are also some, albeit very few, positive comments. For example, Sikora from Rzeszów writes about the situation following the deportation: “After the assassination of Gen. Świerczewski, the authorities have vigorously set about eliminating this plague. They have brought in a lot of troops. They are talking about resettling the local pseudo-Polish population to the West. There is no other way, this is the only way you can remove the UPA support base. Where are the rumours that this operation is the beginning of a war coming from? Where do people get these ideas? They even take these few transports going towards Jasło to be assistance for ... Greek partisans. These are sick, backward imaginings.”

The attitude of the troops towards the deportation operation should be regarded as rather positive, because we have not come across a single negative opinion, while [the soldiers] write quite extensively about the atrocities of the Bandera groups.

There are, however, complaints about inadequate food and hunger.

Particularly noteworthy is the large number of statements revealing military secrets, [e.g.] Jan Tomaszewski, a cadet, writes: “I’m a paramedic with the 2nd Battalion ... the whole regiment is an assault formation ... currently we are stationed in the village of Jureczkowa in the g[mina] of Wojtkowa, next week we will be moving to the town of Kalwaria.”

Władek, a serviceman from Sanok, writes: “My ESB radio set is out of order, the guys are using an RBN ... I am commander of the radio platoon.”

Antoni Stachnik from Rzeszów writes: “We have arrived in Sanok, we are [stationed] between Sanok and Przemyśl ... It’s 35 km to Sanok and 60 km to Przemyśl, 7 to the Russian border ... I have crossed the border 3 times in pursuit of UPA bands ... Dad, now I’ll give you more or less the balance of our successes and losses, around 30 of our men killed, 4 taken alive, about 40 Bandera men killed, 14 taken alive ... This is the balance of our division ... there are 7 or 8 divisions here ...”

Head of the WUBP Dep[artment] ‘B”
in Rzeszów
(–) Kuryło J., Second Lieut.

Dist[ribution list]
MBP – 1 copy
Chief of St[aff] – 1 copy
Archive – 1 copy

IPN, MBP 743, pp. 172–175.
Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Rectangular stamp in the upper left hand corner with the national emblem and inscription: Województwo Office of Public Security in Rzeszów, Department “B” No... Date...; the number 365/47 and date 15 May 1947 were filled in by hand.
No. 13
24 May 1947, Warsaw. Situational report No. 11 on the activity of OG Vistula, by Michał Rola-Żymierski, Minister of Defence

Minister of Defence
No. *00250/III*

Warsaw, a-24-a May 1947
Top secret
Copy No. ..... 

Report No. 11
on the operational situation and activity of Operational Group Vistula and WP and WBW units in Rzeszów, Lublin, and Cracow województwos as of 23 May 1947
1:200 000 map

A. Activity of Operational Group Vistula

a) Operational activity.
On 20–22 May this year, OG Vistula units conducted pursuit operations against UPA bands in the area of the v[illage] of Trójca (20 km south-west of Przemyśl), the v[illage] of Kobylnica Wołoska (17 km south of Lubaczów), the v[illage] of Cisna (14 km south of Baligród), the v[illage] of Nakło (15 km north-east of Przemyśl), the v[illage] of Koniusza (12 km south-west of Przemyśl), the v[illage] of Brylińce (10 km south-west of Przemyśl), the v[illage] of Ulucz (13 km north of Sanok), and the v[illage] of Krzeczkowa (12 km south-west of Przemyśl).

The oper[ational] group of the 12th Inf. Reg. established contact with “Hromenko’s” band in the area of the v[illage] of Ulucz (13 km north of Sanok). Four pro-Bandera men were killed and 1 captured during the fighting. Our losses: 5 privates killed. The operation to surround and destroy the band is in full swing.

The 30th Inf. Reg. carried out an operation against “Lastivka’s” band in the area of the v[illage] of Krzeczkowa (12 km south-west of Przemyśl). During the fighting, 5 bandits – liaisons – were killed, and 1 was captured.

In the area of the v[illage] of Brylińce, the oper[ational] group of the 11th Inf. Reg. killed 4 bandits and captured 1. Five rifles and 12 grenades were seized.

The 1st Inf. Reg. destroyed 23 empty bunkers in the area of the v[illage] of Trójca (20 km south-west of Przemyśl).

The 8th Inf. Reg. Platoon, operating together with a WOP1 unit, killed 1 bandit and captured 1 in the area of the v[illage] of Olszanica (18 km south-east of Sanok). A box with the band’s documents was seized.

The oper[ational] group of the 28th Inf. Reg. discovered the bunker of the UPA’s higher staff in the area of the v[illage] of Koniusza (12 km south-west of

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1 Filled in by hand.
2 Probably soldiers of the 36th Subunit of the 8th WOP Unit.
Przemyśl). One assault [rifle], 3 grenades, food, and many documents with the latest instructions for the bands were found in the bunker.

On 17 May an unidentified band of about 20 stole 6 head of cattle from the [village] of Chutor Mały2 (16 km east of Baligród), situated on the territory of the USSR and close to the KBW’s area of operation. The KBW [m]ander says that the robbery was perpetrated by a UPA band which, after coming to our side [of the border], fought against KBW units, leaving behind several guns and an overcoat as a result of the fight. The Soviet border authorities accuse the KBW group of having committed the robbery. Allegedly, the group withdrew after firing heavily on the [village] of Chutor Mały. The [m]ander of OG Vistula, in consultation with the USSR border authorities, has appointed a commission to investigate and examine the incident.

On 17–21 May this year, by the ruling of the Court Martial of OG Vistula, a total of 32 UPA band members were sentenced to death for crimes committed against the state and the local population. The sentences were duly carried out. The names of the bandits are given in Annex No. 1.

b) Deportation operation.

By 20 May this year, a total of 175 transports had left with 57,630 people. On 21–22 May – “ – “– “– 5 transports left with 1,426 “– “

A total of 180 transports left with 59,056 people

Resettlement operation is proceeding as planned.

c) Settlement operation.

By 22 May, a total of 150 transports with 50,327 people had reached their destinations, of which:

In Szczecin województwo – 103 transports with 32,501 people
In Olsztyn – “ – 45 transports – “ – 17,211 “ –

B. Major events

In Lublin województwo:

The manoeuvre group of the 9th Inf. Reg., while carrying out operations against UPA bands in the Uhrynów and Dolhobyćżów woods, discovered a total of 7 bunkers in which 3 rifles, approx. 4500 rounds of ammunition, and 1 trench telescope3 were found, in the area of the [village] of Mianowice (4 km north-east of Waręż) and the [village] of Wyżłów (6 km south-west of Waręż) Three people suspected of collaborating with the UPA were arrested.

The WBW oper[ational] group conducted an operation against UPA bands in the area of the [villages] of Ulhów–Rzeczyca (24 km east of Tomaszów Lubelski), resulting in discovering 4 bunkers stocked with wheat. Four head of cattle were requisitioned in the nearby farms belonging to the band members.

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2 Probably Chrewt. Similarly further on.
3 As in the original; the actual term is “trench binoculars.”
During field manoeuvres, a unit of the 18th Inf. Reg.\textsuperscript{4} captured 2 armed members of “Czarny’s”\textsuperscript{5} NSZ band and 3 people collaborating with the band, in the area of the village of Barwald Górny (6 km east of Wadowice).

C. General Statistics as of 23 May 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Our losses</th>
<th>By 21 May</th>
<th>As of 23 May</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP soldiers killed</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ – wounded</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBW soldiers killed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– “ – wounded</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBW soldiers kidnapped</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. The guerrilla’s losses</th>
<th>By 21 May</th>
<th>As of 23 May</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandits killed</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandits captured</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspects arrested</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Bandits who] voluntarily surrendered</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Captured weapons</th>
<th>By 21 May</th>
<th>As of 23 May</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank rifles</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMGs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMGs</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault rifles</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>53,799</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>58,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunkers destroyed</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minister of Defence
(–) Michał Żymierski
Marshal of Poland

\textsuperscript{4} The 18th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division was not part of OG Vistula.

\textsuperscript{5} This was actually “Czarny’s” ROAK partisan unit. All Polish underground units are frequently referred to as “NSZ bands” in reports.
Annex No. 1

List of names of bandits sentenced to death by the Court Martial of Oper[ational] Group Vistula on 17 and 21 May 1947 (the sentences have been carried out)

1. Kopko Antoni
2. Dudka Aleksander
3. Warchowicz Wasyl
4. Waczor Józef
5. Towarnicki Michał
6. Uszkowski Jan
7. Wieliczko Mikołaj
8. Ihnat Michał
9. Szymecz Koroman
10. Łojko Michał
11. Palamar Michał
12. Gedz Andrzej
13. Zagrodzki Stefan
14. Leszczawski Stanisław
15. Hyrez Aleksander
16. Kosmowski Jan
17. Dymytryszny Piotr
18. Dacko Michał
19. Kiłoszko Dymitry
20. Bobko Stefan
21. Sawko Stefan
22. Herman Teodor
23. Muzyka Michał
24. Miśko Rozalia
25. Bodnar Michał
26. Wojciechowski Jan
27. Sokolik Michał
28. Hałowaty Wincenty
29. Kosz Jan
30. Marczak Jan
31. Łubiński Józef
32. Waski Józef

(--) Przoński, Colonel

CA W, IV. 500. I/A 131, pp. 150–151.
Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Report – Paper with the national emblem imprinted over the letterhead.

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6 Names published in accordance with the original spelling.
No. 14
17 June 1947, Warsaw. Situational report No. 20 on the activity of OG Vistula, by Michał Rola-Żymierski, Minister of Defence

Report No. 20
on the operational situation and activity of Operational Group Vistula and WP and WBW units in Rzeszów, Lublin, and Cracow województwos
as of 16 June [19]47
1:200 000 Map

A. Activity of Operational Group Vistula

a) Operational activity.

On 13–14 June this year, OG Vistula units conducted pursuit operations against UPA bands in the area of the v[illage] of Młyny (26 km east of Jarosław), the v[illage] of Suché Rzeki (23 km south-east of Baligród), the v[illage] of Wielkie Oczy (14 km south of Lubaczów), M[ountain] Maguryczne (11 km south-west of Baligród), the v[illage] of Rzeczyca (11 km[1] east of Tomaszów Lub[elski]), the v[illage] of Dłużniów (22 [!] km east of Tomaszów Lub[elski]), the v[illage] of Werchrata (26 km north-east of Lubaczów), the v[illage] of Saraj [!] (20 km south-east of Baligród), and the v[illage] of Borownica (16 km north of Sanok).

In the area of the v[illage] of Rzeczyca (11 km east of Tomaszów Lub[elski]), while carrying out an operation against “Shum’s” band, 5th Inf. Reg. troops fought one of the chotas of this band. As a result, 9 bandits were killed, including the chota commander, known as “Lystok.”[2] Eight bandits and 9 members of the local civil OUN organisation were captured. Sixteen weapons and ammunition were seized, and a total of 14 bunkers were discovered. There were about 4.5 metric tons of grain in two of the bunkers. Our losses: 1 non-commissioned officer killed.

Units of the 8th Infantry Division fought “Burlaka’s” band (about 50 in number) in the area of the v[illage] of Borownica (16 km north of Sanok). Six bandits were killed. The bodies of the 4 bandits killed in the fight of 13 June, which the band had taken when they fled, were found during the pursuit.

During the resettlement operation, 4 active band members and 29 people suspected of collaborating with the UPA were captured by the operational group of the 3rd Inf. Reg. at an assembly point in the area of the v[illage] of Dłużniów (22 [!] km east of Tomaszów Lub[elski]).

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1[1] As in the original. It should be 21. Similarly further on.
2 “Lystok,” commander of the 2nd chota in “Shum’s” sotnia. After his death, a commander known as “Dym” took over the chota.
Units of the 10th Inf. Reg. cleared the area near the village of Werchrata (26 km south-east of Lubaczów). A total of 44 bunkers, mostly located under residential buildings, were destroyed.

The WBW group fought ‘Hromenko’s” band in the area of Mountain Maguryczne (11 km south-west of Baligród). Three bandits were killed and 3 weapons were captured. Our losses: 3 privates [killed], 1 wounded.

The 11th Inf. Reg. killed 2 members and captured 1 member of “Kruk’s” band in the area of the village of Wielkie Oczy (14 km south of Lubaczów).

In the village of Młyny (26 km east of Jarosław), the operational group of the 11th Inf. Reg. captured 15 residents as well as the village leader, who had been actively collaborating with “Kruk’s” band.

The WBW group, while pursuing “Bir’s” band in the area of the village of Suche Rzeki (23 km south-east of Baligród), killed 2 bandits. One female member of the band was captured.

Troops of the 4th Inf. Reg. arrested 19 people for returning to their old place of residence after being resettled and transported to the west of the country.

b) Deportation operation.
By 12 June, a total of 239 transports had left with 77,787 persons.
A total of 259 transports left with 83,058 persons.
A list of places in which the deportation operation has been completed is provided in Annex No. 1. The resettlement operation is proceeding as planned.

c) Settlement operation.
By June 15 this year, a total of 237 transports with 77,571 people had reached their destinations, of which:

- In Szczecin województwo – 119 transports with 37,304 people
- In Gdańsk – 7 – 1,969
- In Poznań – 8 – 1,902
- In Olsztyn – 94 – 34,121
- In Wrocław – 9 – 2,275

B. Major events
in Lublin województwo

On 13 June this year, 3 bandits armed with rifles stopped a National Museum car in Majdanek on a road near Lublin. They stole 200,000 złoty. The Lublin PUBP ordered a pursuit of the bandits.

On the night of 14–15 June this year, 4 armed bandits attacked the gmina office in the village of Huszcza (Biała Podlaska powiat). The bandits stole 22,700 złoty from the gmina safe and then fled in an unknown direction. The Biała Podlaska PUBP opened an investigation and ordered a pursuit. The results of the pursuit have not been received yet.

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3 As in the original. The actual direction is north-east.
While carrying out an operation in the area of the Zamołodycze forest (Włodawa powiat), the Oper[ational] Group WBW “Włodawa” encountered a UPA band, about 20-strong. As a result of the fight, 1 bandit was killed and 3 weapons captured, including 1 LMG. Our losses: 2 WBW priv[ates] killed. The band fled. Pursuit was unsuccessful. Ten people of Ukrainian ethnicity suspected of collaborating with the UPA and putting up resistance during the deportation operation were detained.

C. General Statistics as of 16 June 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Our losses</th>
<th>By 13 June</th>
<th>As of 16 June</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP soldiers killed</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBW soldiers killed</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBW soldiers wounded</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. The guerrilla’s losses</th>
<th>By 13 June</th>
<th>As of 16 June</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandits killed</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandits captured</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Persons] arrested for collaboration with the bands</td>
<td>1,061</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Bandits who] surrendered voluntarily</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Captured weapons</th>
<th>By 13 June</th>
<th>As of 16 June</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LMGs</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault rifles</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>65,053</td>
<td>3,010</td>
<td>69,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelters destroyed</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minister of Defence
(–) Michał Żymierski
Marshal of Poland

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4 As in the original. The actual total is 68,063.
Annex No. 1

List of places where
the deportation of the Ukrainian population has been completed
(continuation of the table of 11 June [19]47)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number of deported</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Number of deported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>488</td>
<td>Carried forward</td>
<td>69,200</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>Krzeczkowa</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>489</td>
<td>Mytarz</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>Zalesie</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>490</td>
<td>Folusz</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>Kruhel Wielki</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>491</td>
<td>Pielgrzymka</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>Prałkowce</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>492</td>
<td>Świątkowa Wielka</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>Olszany</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>493</td>
<td>Desznica</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>Bircza</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>494</td>
<td>Bartne</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>Tymce</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>495</td>
<td>Brzezowa</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>Lubaczow Miasto</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>496</td>
<td>Jaworze</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>Werchrata</td>
<td>645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>497</td>
<td>Skalnik</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>Puchacz</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>498</td>
<td>Hałbów</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>Krzywe</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>499</td>
<td>Świerzowa Ruska</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>Dziewieczierz</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>Kotań</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>Prusie</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>501</td>
<td>Krępna</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>Dahany</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>502</td>
<td>Grab</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>Huta Lubycka</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>503</td>
<td>Świątkowa Mała</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>Wol a Wielka</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504</td>
<td>Rozstajne</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>Brusno Stare and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>505</td>
<td>Żydowskie</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brusno Nowe</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>506</td>
<td>Wyszowadka</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>Radruż</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>507</td>
<td>Ożenna</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>Wólka Horyniecka</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>508</td>
<td>Nieznajowa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>Ruda Horyniecka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>509</td>
<td>Długie</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>and Trusze</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>510</td>
<td>Hyrowa</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>Horyniec,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>511</td>
<td>Nadole</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sioło Hory- nieckie,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>512</td>
<td>Jasionka</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Miasteczko</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>513</td>
<td>Wólka</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>Nowiny Horynieckie</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>514</td>
<td>Król ek Polski and</td>
<td></td>
<td>557</td>
<td>Sopot Mały and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wołoski</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Haran</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>515</td>
<td>Tylawa</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>Krowica Sama</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>516</td>
<td>Zawadka Rymanowska</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>Młodów</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>517</td>
<td>Trzciana</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>Borowa Góra</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>518</td>
<td>Barwinek</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>Basznia Dolna</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>519</td>
<td>Mszana</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>Basznia Górnna</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>520</td>
<td>Zyndranowa</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>Polesie</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>521</td>
<td>Posada Jaśliska</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>Źmijowiska</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>522</td>
<td>Daliowa</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>Wólka Źmijowska</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>523</td>
<td>Wilsznia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>Krowica Hołodowska</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>524</td>
<td>Polany</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>Krowica Lasowa</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>525</td>
<td>Myscowa</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>Bobie</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. Village</td>
<td>Number of deported</td>
<td>No. Village</td>
<td>Number of deported</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>526. Olchowiec</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>568. Bobie</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>527. Ropianka</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>569. Lisie Jamy</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>528. Brzeźawa</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>570. Korolówka</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>529. Brylińce</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>571. Butomierz</td>
<td>96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>530. Kopyśno</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>572. Opaka</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>531. Rokszycie</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>573. Borchów</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>532. Śliwnica, Nahorczyany</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>574. Szczutków</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>533. Krasieczyn</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>575. Kornagi-Dąbrowa</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>534. Tarnawce</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>576. Łukawiec</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>577. Nowa Grobla</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>578. Sople, Bihale</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total deported</td>
<td>74,408(^5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\) As in the original. The actual total is 74,398.

(--) Przoński, Col.

*IPN, MBP 743, pp. 222–224.*

*Original, typescript.*

*Document in Polish.*

*Report – Paper with the national emblem imprinted over the letterhead. A handwritten reference number on the cover letter: No. 00278/III.*
No. 15

Minister of Defence
Warsaw, 23 July 1947

Report No. 35
on the operational situation and activity of Operational Group Vistula and WP and WBW units in Rzeszów, Lublin, and Cracow województwos
as of 22 July 1947
1:200 000 map

A. Activity of Operational Group Vistula

a) Operational activity.
On 18–19 July this year, OG Vistula carried out pursuit operations against UPA bands in the following areas: the village of Szlatyn (17 km east of Tomaszów Lubelski), the village of Futory (8 km north-west of Lubaczów), the village of Dubiecko (28 km west of Przemyśl), the village of Bereska (9 km north-east of Baligród), the village of Niedzica (21 km south-east of Nowy Targ), and the town of Lubartów.

In the area of the village of Szlatyn (17 km east of Tomaszów Lubelski), the 5th Inf. Reg. captured 2 bandits from “Shum’s” sotnia, and, following their directions, captured 11 bandits from the same sotnia further on in the woods, seized 21 weapons, including 3 LMGs, and destroyed 11 of the bandits’ shelters. Our losses: 1 wounded.

In the area of the village of Dubiecko (28 km west of Przemyśl), units of the 9th Inf. Div. arrested 16 people who returned without permission after having been deported.

In the area of the village of Bereska (9 km north-east of Baligród), units of the 1st WBW Div[ision] found some correspondence of UPA bands, which showed that on June 26 this year, ‘Hromenko’s’ band had lost 40 people during the fighting, and not the 15 reported on the basis of the dead bandits found.

On July 16 this year, a UPA band burned down the village of Uhrynów (57 km south-east of Hrubieszów) despite [the presence of] 160 ORMO members who were unable to prevent the fire. About 100 buildings burned down.

b) Resettlement operation.
By 17 July this year, a total of 406 transp[orts] had left with 130,311 persons
A total of 425 transp[orts] left with 135,372 persons

*: *Filled in by hand.
The resettlement operation is still proceeding as planned. A list of places in which the deportation operation has been completed is provided in Annex No. 1

c) Settlement operation.

By 21 July this year, a total of 407 transports with 131,373 people had reached their destinations, of which:

- In Szczecin województwo – 137 transports with 44,126 persons
- In Gdańsk – 13 transports with 3,929 persons
- In Poznań – 28 transports with 7,345 persons
- In Olsztyn – 156 transports with 55,767 persons
- In Wrocław – 73 transports with 20,206 persons

B. Major events

in Cracow and Lublin województwas

Cracow województwo

On 16 July this year, a band of undetermined strength and name attacked the MO station in the village of Niedzica (21 km south-east of Nowy Targ), where they killed 3 policemen.⁠¹ A pursuit of the band was unsuccessful.

Lublin województwo

During operations conducted in the area of the town of Lubartów, units of the subgroup “Lublin” killed 2 bandits from the WiN band which had assassinated the MO chief in the village of Wieluń,² and captured 2 bandits in the area of Radzyń powiat.

C. General Statistics, as of 22 July 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Our own losses</th>
<th>By 18 July</th>
<th>As of 22 July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP soldiers wounded</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. The guerrillas’ losses</th>
<th>By 18 July</th>
<th>As of 22 July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bandits killed</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandits captured</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspects arrested</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Bandits who] surrendered voluntarily</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Captured weapons</th>
<th>By 18 July</th>
<th>As of 22 July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LMGs</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVTs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault rifles</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ These were: Michał Guszkowski (born 1908), PPR member, KPMO officer in Nowy Targ; Franciszek Marzec (born 1924), PPR member, chief of the MO station in Niedzica; and Franciszek Starzyk (born 1906), PPR member, MO officer in Niedzica.

² Probably Józef Dudzik (born 1923), PPR member, chief of the MO station in the village of Koziebrody, Sierpc powiat, who had been on holiday in the area of Lubartów.
### List of places where deportation of the Ukrainian population has been completed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Village</th>
<th>Number of deported</th>
<th>No. Village</th>
<th>Number of deported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/866. Carried forward</td>
<td>105,236</td>
<td>894. Łużki</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>867. Florynka</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>895. Goraj</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>868. Wawrzka</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>896. Zatyle</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>869. Kamianna</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>897. Netreba</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>870. Pioruńka</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>898. Jarczów</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>871. Polany</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>899. Werszczycy</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>872. Łosie</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>900. Chodywańce</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>873. Binczarowa</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>901. Zawady</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>874. Berest</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>902. Krzewica</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>875. Uhryń</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>903. Wasylów</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>876. Tylicz</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>904. Teratyn</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>877. Kotów</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>905. Hrubieszów</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>878. Bogusza</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>906. Mircze</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>879. Krzyżówka</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>907. [Kolonja] Ameryka</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>880. Czarna</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>908.Wiszińów</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>881. Muszynka</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>909. Radostów</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>882. Królowa Ruska</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>910. Tuczapy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>883. Mochnaczka Wyżna</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>911. Mołożów</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>884. Mochnaczka Niżna</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>912. Modryń</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>885. Chłopiatyn</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>913. Miączyn</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>887. Skierzyńce³</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>915. Horodło</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>888. Pawłowice</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>916. Husynne</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>889. Hołubie</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>917. Hrebenne</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>890. Dyniska</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>918. Jarosławiec</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>891. Rzeczyca</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>919. Sławęcin</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>892. Hrebenne</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>920. Trzeszczany</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>893. Ruda Lubycka</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>112,393</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³ Probably Siekierzyńce.
Accuracy of the statement confirmed by:
(--) Jargielło, Cpt.
23 July 1947

CAW, IV. 500. 1/A 131, pp. 78–79.
Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.
Report – Paper with the national emblem imprinted over the letterhead.
Operational Group Vistula

Rzeszów, 25 July 1947

Report

on the activity of Operational Group Vistula

for the period from 20 April to 31 July 1947

I. Tasks of Operational Group Vistula

a) In principle, Operational Group Vistula was given two parallel assignments, viz.:
– to eliminate the UPA organisation and fascist bands;
– to carry out an evacuation of the Ukrainian population and mixed families that had collaborated with the bands.

Both these tasks initially concerned the area of Rzeszów województwo, after which the activity of the Operational Group was extended to the eastern part of Cracow and Lublin województwo.

b) Once the operation got underway, it emerged that it was necessary to carry out a settlement operation in order to prevent large tracts of land from being left deserted following the evacuation of significant numbers of Ukrainians.

Both the settlement operation and the subsequent harvest campaign were secondary tasks, not assigned to OG Vistula. However, after a thorough survey of the terrain, it became apparent that without substantial involvement by the army in both operations, the results would be too poor, and the national economy would suffer significant losses.

Finally, on our own initiative, a special audit commission was sent to the northwestern areas in order to find out on-site how the settlement of the Ukrainian population evacuated by the Operational Group was being carried out in the new territories.

Pursuant to Order No. 00322 from the Minister of Defence dated 17 July 1947, I now turn over further command of the aforementioned operations in Rzeszów, Cracow, and Lublin województwo to the Commander of the 5th and 7th OWs, and present a three-month report of the activities of Operational Group Vistula.

II. Combat against UPA bands

A. The activity of UPA bands during the reported period went through three successive phases:
Phase 1. (About 6 weeks). Upon the arrival of OG Vistula units, the bands dispersed in small groups, entirely avoiding combat.

Phase 2. After the evacuation of the Ukrainian population, which resulted in the elimination of supply bases and the communications system, and in the complete suppression of the civilian network, weak, small groups of bandits, scattered over the area and unable to even secure food on their own, began to assemble into larger groups of several sotnias (e.g. those of “Lastivka,” “Krylach” and “Burlaka”).

Phase 3. The combined sotnias of “Ren’s” and “Baida’s” kurin, constantly pursued and beaten by the troops of the Operational Group, fought their way south into the Carpathians after many were killed and captured. A substantial portion of them (“Burlaka’s”, “Hromenko’s” and “Roman’s” groups) crossed the Czechoslovak border, while “Bir’s” and “Khrin’s” groups, with the remnants of “Stach’s” [group], crossed the USSR border, leaving intact their “Zakerzonnia” staff (leadership), clandestine “provodnyks,” kushches, and SB patrols on our territory.

B. UPA forces

At the beginning of the operation, 4 UPA kurins were active in the operational area of OG Vistula: “Berkut’s” (Hrubieszów and Tomaszów [Lubelski] powiats), “Zalizniak’s” (Lubaczów and Przemyśl powiats), “Baida’s” (Sanok and Lesko powiats), and “Ren’s” (Sanok, Jasło, and Krosno powiats).

The overall force of the kurins in action, together with the field personnel, amounted to around 2,400 men. In addition, the civilian UPA organisation comprised many thousands of members, and it is impossible to estimate it accurately. For a comparative table showing the number of band members at the onset of OG Vistula and at the final phase of the operation, see Annex No. 1.

C. Course of the operation:

1. In the initial period, the operational area of OG Vistula only covered the south-eastern part of Rzeszów województwo – the powiats of Lesko, Sanok, Przemyśl, and part of Lubaczów.

At that time, 2 types of bands operated in those areas:
   a) “Ren’s” and “Baida’s” kurins, the most numerous, belligerent and active;
   b) “Zalizniak’s” kurin, showing little or no activity in Lubaczów powiat or the northern part of Jarosław powiat.

On the basis of the information and experience it had gained, Operational Group Command came to the conclusion that the two most belligerent kurins, “Ren’s” and “Baida’s,” with the most murders and robberies on their consciences, were the main core of the military and civilian forces of the UPA organisation. During the first month of operations, the main effort was therefore directed at destroying those kurins. This operation was supposed to be, and in fact was, carried out continuously until the end of OG Vistula.

The elimination of “Zalizniak’s” kurin, the less belligerent, was left to a later date, and the reconnaissance and combat actions against it were carried out with smaller forces from the beginning of the operation.

“Baida’s” kurin consisted of 4 sotnias at the time (“Burlaka’s,” “Lastivka’s,” “Hromenko’s,” and “Krylach’s”) – 413 bandits altogether.
“Ren’s” kurin [consisted] of 4 sotnias (“Stach’s,” “Bir’s,” “Khrin’s,” and “Brodych’s”) with a combined strength of 393 bandits. In addition, the rai[on] and nadrai[on] personnel of both kurins [was] 558 men. Altogether, the two combat kurins, together with field personnel, numbered 1,638 men.

The Operational Group eliminated about 950 bandits from these two kurins. The rest – about 200 men – crossed the Czechoslovak border, where Czech troops, working closely with the Polish forces, eliminated over 45 bandits; and about 90 crossed the border of the Soviet Union. Soviet forces have so far eliminated about 50 bandits of this group.

At present, the remains of “Baida’s” kurin, constantly pursued by the Czechoslovak army, are fighting their way towards Austria. Judging from the actions the Czechoslovak forces have carried out so far, it would seem that these bandits will also soon be completely eliminated.

According to recent news, “Roman’s” band, a 40-strong group, which had been with “Baida’s”1 kurin in Czechoslovakia, has moved back to the Polish side, but is totally demoralised and broken up into small groups of 3–4 people wandering about the woods in the border strip in Nowy Sącz powiat, and only committing minor robberies in search of food.

In this way, 78% of the most belligerent and most active bands have been eliminated on Polish territory, while their remaining combat forces have fought their way abroad. These core ranks of UPA bands have therefore practically ceased to exist. It should be noted, however, that in Przemyśl, Lesko, and Sanok powiats, there still remain small splinters of these bands, their kushches and SB patrols – altogether some 80–100 men, including raion, nadraion, and okruha providnyks, who, as result of the good cover and attentive vigilance of the UPA organisation, have been difficult to catch.

Moreover, there are probably still some elements of the UPA leadership in the larger cities, where deportation was not ordered by the Ministry of Public Affairs. The security organs should eliminate those elements and apprehend the providnyks hiding in the area.

2. During the second month, the activity of the Operational Group was extended into the powiats of Jarosław, Lubaczów, and Tomaszów Lubelski in order to eliminate “Zalizniak’s” kurin and the other bands operating in that area. This kurin, due to its large territorial dispersion, has not been completely defeated, but has suffered very heavy losses, not only in combat, but through numerous desertions as well. The 3rd Infantry Division has completely eliminated “Shum’s” sotnia, while the other sotnias (“Kalynovich’s,” “Tuch’s,” and “Kruk’s”) now have no more than 14–25 men.

During the operation, “Berkut’s” kurin was discovered in the area of Hrubieszów and Tomaszów Lubelski powiats on the basis of intelligence. The

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1 “Roman’s” (“Brodych’s”) sotnia was initially part of “Ren’s” kurin. The group probably joined “Baida” in Czechoslovakia.
**kurin** consisted of small *sotnias*: “Yar’s,” “Chaus’s,” “Duda’s,”2 and “Davyd’s” – a total of about 150 men. The *kurin* has not yet shown any major activity and is still dispersed.

Altogether, out of a total of 1,038 men in the two *kurins* (789 bandits and 249 persons in local organisations), there remain about 402 bandits and about 70 people in *kushches* and SB patrols.

3. “Volodia’s” band was active in Włodawa *powiat* and the southern part of Biała Podlaska *powiat*. It initially had about 35 men, and was then bolstered with Ukrainian youth to reach about 110 men before evacuation. After the commander and several officers of “Volodia’s” band were killed, the band scattered and no longer shows any organised activity.

4. In total, the Operational Group has eliminated 1,509 bandits through military actions. This accounted for over 75% of the bands’ strength as of April 1947. Moreover, the civilian network has been completely eliminated, and thus the social and material bases of the UPA bands have been destroyed. Furthermore, 2,781 bandits from this network have been sent to the detention camp in Jaworznio.

It should be noted that there were 19 active UPA *sotnias* in Rzeszów, Lublin, and Cracow *województwo* at the time of OG Vistula’s arrival, while now there is not a single operational UPA band left.

For a detailed list of losses incurred by the bands and by their civilian network – see Annex No. 2.

Annex No. 3 provides a list of captured weapons and equipment.

Our losses: 61 killed, 91 wounded.

Conclusions:

a) As was mentioned, there is not a single operational UPA band left throughout the whole area of OG Vistula. It should be noted, however, that minor splinters of the bands as well as *kushches* and small SB groups still remain on all the former Ukrainian territories. These bandit units, numbering a few men each, can still perpetrate a lot of damage, so military and security troops should continue clearing the area without respite.

b) Rzeszów *województwo* and the entire Subcarpathian region have been almost completely cleared of bands.

c) Lubaczów *powiat* is a problematic spot at the moment, as our insufficient forces and the rather inefficient action of the 7th Inf. Div. have not made it possible to clear the area thoroughly. This area could become a hotbed of active bandit operations unless sufficient forces are left there.

d) A relatively large number of bands, albeit small and scattered, remain in the *powiats* of Tomaszów Lubelski and Hrubieszów, but the results achieved so far give cause to hope that the 3rd Inf. Div. will see this task through to the end.

---

2 Yevhen Yashchuk, *nom de guerre* “Duda,” senior *bulavny* in the UPA, commander of “Vovky 2” (code name “100”), which was part of “Berkut’s” *kurin* from the 2nd half of 1946. “Duda” was mortally wounded on 22 September 1947 while ambushing soldiers from the 9th Infantry Regiment in the village of Wereszyn near Hrubieszów.
e) In general, as a result of the actions of the Operational Group, the bands’ strength has been broken and shattered. Nevertheless, in line with the many reports issued both prior to the onset of the OG’s activity and during the course of that activity, I believe that it is extremely important to continue the operations against the remaining bandit groups until winter; as otherwise the operation aimed at bringing order and security to the south-eastern territories of our country cannot be regarded as definitely completed.

III. Resettlement operation

According to reports from early spring, the Ukrainian population in the south-eastern województwo was generally estimated at 20,000. Following the death of the 2nd Deputy Minister of Defence, the Ministry of Public Security took a deeper interest in this minority and estimated its size at about 80,000. However, about 140,000 Ukrainians have been resettled during the course of the evacuation operation, and there still remain a certain number of Ukrainian families with very elaborately forged Polish documents. Because these families will constitute hostile centres for the newly organised lives of the Polish population in this area, it is necessary that special inspection commissions examine the authenticity of these documents, and identify suspect families for possible deportation.

Some Ukrainians still remain in powiats located further from the border, and have not been subjected to the actions of the OG. However, they have not been seen to actively rebel or collaborate with UPA bands, and it does not seem harmful to leave them where they are.

The deportation operation, which was carried out quickly and efficiently, has greatly contributed to the elimination of banditry by clearing the south-eastern territories of elements hostile to the country and by completely liquidating, once and for all, the social and economic base for any major forces of the fascist UPA bands. In my opinion, there are no foundations left for the further existence of UPA bands on these territories.

In order not to waste the tremendous effort put into resettling the bulk of the Ukrainian population and in eliminating the UPA bands, the following proposals need to be laid down based on the experience that has been gained:
1. Place special emphasis on running an efficient civil administration in the areas from which the population has been deported;
2. Carefully select the heads of powiats, gminas, etc;
3. Organise and continuously reinforce the activities of the democratic bloc’s political parties;
4. Implement a denser network of security offices both in these areas, and in the north-western territories to which the Ukrainian population has been relocated, carefully selecting good and completely reliable elements for this service.

3 General Karol Świerczewski.
5. Do not only maintain the existing reinforcement of MO forces, but also expand them as much as possible, implementing a denser network of MO stations in this area.

6. Draw the special attention of both the authorities and political parties to the greatest possible development and reinforcement of ORMO.

IV. Settlement operation

The large-scale evacuation operation created the additional problem of settling the areas vacated by the Ukrainian population. This task, which is of such importance for the entire state economy, had to be performed within the shortest possible time due to the need to harvest crops and make economic use of these territories. However, the settlement operation proceeded quite poorly in the initial phase, because the local administrative apparatus was too weak and the official elements fragmented into too many competences. It needs to be stressed that if this operation has in fact been carried out and has brought good results, then all thanks are due to the PPR, which accomplished the main part of the task. On the other hand, the armed forces participated in this operation within their capacities and possibilities by ensuring support, protection and security, both for the official elements and for the settlers.

Commanders at all levels remained in close contact with the administrative authorities and settlement committees, and provided the greatest assistance to the settling population.

Currently, the operation is gaining momentum and is becoming more effective.

So far, 1,094 families from other powiats of Rzeszów województwo have settled, and 2,231 families have been resettled internally. Altogether, 3,305 families, or over 13,500 people, have settled.\(^4\)

The settlement operation is being conducted with a view to creating healthy households. At the same time, the organisation of security in the new Polish settlements is progressing by establishing strong MO stations and expanding the ORMO. Settling the completely evacuated south-eastern tip of Lesko powiat is a separate issue. This area should be subjected to a planned settlement operation next year, once state-owned forest areas, timber industry centres and mines have been deducted.

In line with several well-argued suggestions from OG Com[m]and, a special operational WOP battalion should operate in this area in order to ensure safety. Otherwise, the area could become a haven for the remains of the defeated bands still lingering in our area, as well as for those infiltrating from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

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\(^4\) As in the original. The actual total is: 3,325.
V. Harvest campaign

The harvest campaign, organised and managed by the Województwo Headquarters of Peasant’s Self-Help, with substantial assistance from the armed forces, has gained momentum and is generally proceeding in an efficient manner.

Thanks to the energy and hard work of the PPR, this is progressing much better in Rzeszów województwo than in Lublin województwo.

About 70% of the former Ukrainian cereals have been harvested so far. There is some concern that small quantities of unharvested cereals remain in the south-eastern part of Lesko powiat, but given that 500 PRW members are expected to participate, it is to be hoped that the harvest campaign will yield nothing but positive results.

VI. General assessment of the settlement of the Ukrainian population in the Recovered Territories

The operation was generally carried out in a satisfactory manner, with certain exceptions, e.g. Węgobork powiat, where it was downright dismal. Right now, Ukrainians constitute 48% of the total population in that powiat. Other powiats likewise have concentrations of more than 20% Ukrainians. Given that Węgobork powiat is also inhabited by 1,100 Germans, the percentage of uncertain elements comes to more than 50% of the total population of the powiat. In this way, some strong enclaves of the hostile Ukrainian population have been created, and these will soon be exposed to the propaganda of the clergy, intelligentsia and members of the OUN and UPA fascist organisations that have been smuggled there. Ukrainian education and conspiracy work will follow. It is therefore necessary to diffuse this kind of concentration (in winter).

The people’s attitudes are generally positive and are devoid of hostility at the moment. If the political parties and social elements arrange their work properly and there is material assistance in organising people’s lives in the new, relentlessly harsh conditions, then the people can be expected to adjust and become peaceful and creative elements.

Due to the difficult material conditions of these people, it is necessary to provide immediate aid from the state and the whole of society during the autumn sowing, throughout the winter, and in the spring.

Due to the fact that the newly-settled element is not known to the local security organs, it is advisable for the security organs in the south-eastern województvos to provide them with information materials concerning the work of the OUN and UPA organisations.

The audit only included Szczecin, Gdańsk, and Olsztyn województvos, but this issue should also be investigated in Lubusz Land and Białystok województwo.

---

5 Now Węgorzewo.
OG Vistula Com[mand] therefore proposes that a special joint committee, with representatives of the various ministries, be set up to audit and supervise the progress of the newly-settled Ukrainian households in the Recovered Territories, as this is important from a political standpoint.

Please find attached the detailed results of the conducted audit.

VII. Military training

During the 3-month period of the combat operations of the OG units, some basic faults in military training have been exposed, including the following:

1. When the results of the initial phase of the operations were unsatisfactory, this was not only because most efforts had been focused on the evacuation action; the main reason was the poor field training of the officers, non-commissioned officers and privates. In many cases, the officers, including some regimental com[mander]s, were not able to use a map or a compass. Nor were safety rules followed when marching or resting. Although some of those units had been operating in this area for a long time, others were completely ignorant of the principles of warfare in forested and mountainous areas.

2. Extremely serious deficiencies have been found in the training of individual soldiers, especially in maintaining and handling weapons. The Operational Group has therefore incurred significant losses as a result of accidents. During the first 3 months, losses due to accidents amounted to 29 killed and 97 wounded, as compared to general combat losses of 61 killed and 91 wounded.

3. Despite the fact that the 1st Mot[orised] Regiment performed all the tasks it was assigned by Group Command exceedingly well, it should be noted that inadequate driver training led to 11 road accidents in which 11 people were killed and 21 injured.

VIII.

On 23 July this year, the final Division Commander Briefing was held to issue instructions on concluding the work of Operational Group Vistula. The following orders were given:

1. Inform all soldiers and civilians that combat will be waged against the remnants of banditry persistently and incessantly until spring, or as long as it takes to fully establish and consolidate order and security in this area.

2. Do not cease the operation even for a moment, and plan the preparations for departure in such a way that the troops can operate on the ground for as long as possible.

3. All experience acquired should be transferred to the newly-arrived commanders, and recommendations should be made on adjusting work methods to the given area. Due to the decrease in personnel, advise that the mobility of the
ground troops be doubled in order to maintain and strengthen a sense of confidence and complete security among the Polish people, who are still terrorised by fears of a revival of the bands.

4. Maintain the pace and energy of the actions until the conclusion of the operation, and conscientiously fulfil the duties imposed by the state and the nation to the end.

On 26 July, further command of the operation in the Lublin region shall be transferred to the Commander of the 7th OW, and on 27 July in Rzeszów and Cracow województwos – to the Commander of the 5th OW.

On 28 July this year, a joint ceremony to decorate officers and privates with Polish and Czech combat distinctions will be held in the border v[illage] of Jaworzyna.

On 29 July this year, the Staff of Operational Group Vistula will be disbanded.

IX.

The combat conditions in which the units of Operational Group Vistula operated for three months were extremely difficult. The fact that the Group as a whole managed for the most part to fulfil the task it had been assigned was due to the enormous effort on the part of the WP and KBW privates, non-commissioned officers and officers, especially the frontline soldiers, and the UB and Information officers and deputies for polit[ical] and edu[cational] affairs, all of whom deserve the most sincere gratitude for their diligence and hard work.

For their combat services and dedication, 1,062 soldiers have been awarded decorations, including the hitherto delayed nominations of the past two years for the military, MO, UB and SOK forces that have been fighting UPA bands for a longer time. The number of decorations is fully justified, however, by the arduous and dangerous operations in this extremely difficult terrain.

Annexes: 3.

Commander of the Operational Group
(–) Mossor
Maj. Gen.

Deputy Commander of OG Vistula for KBW
(–) Huebner, Col.

Deputy Commander of OG Vistula for security affairs
Korczyński, Brig. Gen.

Deputy Commander of OG Vistula for polit[ical] and edu[cational] affairs (–)
Sidziński, Col.
Chief of Staff of Operational Group Vistula
(−) Chilliński, Col.

13 copies made
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Copy No. 2 – 1st Deputy Min[ister] of D[efence]
Copy No. 3 – Chief of Gen[eral] Staff
Copy No. 4 – 1st Deputy Min[ister] of D[efence]
Copy No. 5 – Minister of Pub[lic]
Secur[ity]
Copy No. 6 – Chief of the Main Dir[ectorate] of Inf[ormation]
Copy No. 7 – Chief of the Main Dir[ectorate] for Politics and Education
Copy No. 8 – Commander of the KBW
Copy No. 9 – Commander of the 5th OW
Copy No. 10 – Commander of the 7th OW
Copy No. 11 – Minister Wolski
Copy No. 12 – reserve
Copy No. 13 – archive

The original documents were signed by Deputy Commanders of OG Vistula, Brig. Gen. Korczyński and Col. Huebner

Certified true copy by:
Chief of the Operational Department of OG Vistula
(−) Sochacki, 6 Maj.

Prepared by S. Z. Maj.
Printed by: N. H. No. 402
26 July 1947

An additional, certified copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.

At the end of the document, next to Maj. Sochacki’s signature, there is a seal with the national emblem and the circumscription: Polish Armed Forces. Staff of Mil. Unit Vistula.

6 Zygmunt Sochacki (?born 1906), Major, 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry Reserve (1934); in 1945–1946 completed a course for regimental chiefs of staff; in 1946–1947 at the disposal of the Deputy Chief of General Staff, Chief of the Operational Department of OG Vistula; subsequently with the 8th Unit of the General Staff; resigned from the WP 1948.
No. 17
29 July 1947, [no place given]. OUN-B Report, concerning the course of deportations and the UPA’s activity against the WP

Glory to Ukraine!

Druh Providnyk [Comrade Leader]!

The enemy has completed deportations in our area. People have been deported from every village, from the major town of Hrubieszów to every town and village. The gminas of Hrubieszów, Mieniany, Poturzyn, Kryłów, Mircze, Dołhobyczów, Waręż, Chorobrów, Krystynopol, Belz, Tarnoszyn and Telatyn have been deported. They completed the deportation of Krystynopol gmina at the beginning of this week (20 July [19]47). There are 1 to 4 families left in the villages; there is no-one left in some villages, and a few more [people] left in others. Obviously, they have left some Poles returning from the West – an element hostile to us. They are deporting Ukrainians and Poles, and even PPR members from towns. Among the deported Poles there are many chauvinistic elements, hostile towards all things Ukrainian, and especially towards our liberation movement. Among [the above-mentioned Poles] there are some who were even very keen minions of the enemy. In our area, deportations began on 15 June 1947.

The enemy’s tactics

Troops were stationed in the area – in villages, every few kilometres, at good strategic locations – prior to the deportation operation. All these villages were within 5 kilometres of enemy operational bases. Then the WP started manhunts. At first, they mostly searched the villages where they were stationed. They would tightly cordon off a village, so that nobody could escape, and then conduct a search. At night, they would go around barefoot to eavesdrop. They usually arrested most men and interrogated them, obviously beating the detained brutally. In the homes of suspects or insurgents’ families, they would arrest most family members, or even entire families, and interrogate [them] using torture. At the same time, they would raid neighbouring villages at night and during the day, arresting the peasants and searching for shelters in suspected houses. They were quite efficient. If they had been informed about a shelter on a given farm, they would always find it. They searched empty, uninhabited farms and villages which somebody had denounced as the site of a “staff” or a larger UPA concentration. While looking for entrances to shelters, they would throw manure out of pigsties and straw out of barns, move woodpiles, haystacks, straw piles, sheaves, bricks, etc. This was what they did in villages about which they had been previously informed. In others, they mostly searched empty farms or those indicated [by informants]. They paid close attention
to tracks, paths, etc. After searching one village, they would move on to the next, and would be stationed there for the next few days.

The forests have also been searched, and tight manhunts conducted. They immediately blocked the woods by stationing themselves in nearby villages. They posted watchmen at night so that nobody could escape, and conducted manhunts during the day. When looking for people in hiding, they would usually begin by searching the above-ground part, the undergrowth – mostly thickets. Then, if they found any footprints or anything suspect, they would search for hiding places, [by dividing the area] into sections. One WP company (up to 60 soldiers) would search a small section of a forest during one day. They found a lot of hiding places, mostly poorly concealed or with footprints nearby, in the woods. They did not find too many well-concealed hiding places. Generally, we suffered our greatest losses through denunciations from individual UPA soldiers or peasants who had been broken by torture; in some cases, through the carelessness or inattention of our own personnel.

Once the enemy had intimidated people with the aforementioned ground operations – both our personnel and the residents – they started deportations. Initially, they started deporting people from Hrubieszów in the Chełm region. The troops that carried out the deportations were not the same as those that carried out the manhunts. They took people to the train station in Werbkowice, and from Tarnoszyn gmina to Bełżec.

The people’s attitude to deportations

Immediately before the deportations, people lost hope that this time they would be able to avoid being deported, even though some of them had decided to go into hiding and not leave. However, the unspeakable terror that preceded the deportation – the robberies, the beating of the suspects (and who wasn’t a suspect!) eventually broke the belief in the possibility and meaningfulness of resistance. When the armed forces finally came with the ultimate order to leave, the people left, even though nobody wanted to leave their homeland. Everybody knew that the situation was hopeless and that resistance was impossible. During the deportation, the WP bandits beat “suspects” brutally several times. They did not deport all the people together, but first took some to Waręż (from the territory of former Galicia), and others to Werbkowice (from the Chełm area). There, they were divided into different groups. They were segregated on the basis of information obtained from our broken [by torture] sympathisers or riflemen, and from local Poles who knew the situation and the people, or who had collaborated with the UPA and had knowledge [of who was who]. Initially, a few more families were left in some villages, and they only deported everybody from the villages located in thick woods, and from those that had been denounced. They later carried out deportations once again, and took away the rest.
Our combat against the enemy during the deportation operation

The enemy’s assault was so strong, concentrated and long-lasting that it was extremely difficult to counteract it. The most anybody could do was to protect their own personnel. The terror, denunciations, busted hiding places, etc. led to a situation where many of our men were left ‘without a roof over their heads.” Some of our groups were still on forays in Poland.

Now there are somewhat fewer WP [soldiers] on the ground. They are stationed in villages in low numbers (companies, sometimes battalions). They are now stationed in Tudorkowiec, Szychtory, Sawczyn, Waręż, Przemysłów, Dłużnów, Chłopiątyn, Zabuż, Belz, Krystynopol and at the WOP station, where they were before, and [at] the MO. In the Chełm region – in Hrubieszów, Terebiń, and until recently, in Wasylów. They are also in Chaszećew [!]. They are bringing new, armed Polish settlers-colonists. They have come to Uhrynów, Waręż, Leszków, Telatyn, Przemysłów, Werbiża [!], Chłopiątyn. I do not have any information about the burned villages in the Hrubieszów area. Colleagues are mostly working in the villages, and most of the time at night, because the WP and civilians are around [...] village during the day. They usually set up ambushes at the outskirts of villages near where paths and tracks cross [...] on the main roads. They also set up ambushes near abandoned houses of [...] families. They usually leave for their ambushes at night, after dark, and return early in the morning, when it is still dark. They try to sit ly in their ambushes, and also come and go quietly in order not to disclose their presence and tactics.

Our forces beat the colonists in Uhrynów, where about 40 armed ORMO [members] were staying, and drove them back into Polish territory. Some villages have been burned down, but some have been left (Note: wrong – this time you should burn as soon as possible [copyist’s note]). Twenty-four insurgents have died on the Field of Glory. Some are missing, but only a few. I’ve provided [information] below about those who died after dru[h] A. left. – On 20 June[!] 1947, Com[mander] “Davyd” died on the Field of Glory. He was ambushed near a house in the village of Szychtory. He was wounded in the knee. He crawled to a barn, where he was found by the WP in the morning. He managed to shoot one WP soldier, and then shot himself. On about 30 June, liaison “Yr” was killed. During a foray in Poland, leader Zakharchuk (“Levko”) was killed. About 30 June 1947, liaison “Yr” was killed. In the w[illage] of Żużel – “Hryć.” A rifleman from “Duda’s” unit, by the name of Chornota, was killed in the Dolhobycz forest. The wounded rifleman “Yavir” was captured while he was probably still alive. Hirniak and Smereka from BSB were killed in a manhunt in the Łypyna [!] forest near Wasylów. They were killed in a shelter after being denounced. In Oserdów, “Yurko” from BSB, who had hopelessly advanced tuberculosis, shot himself. He was no longer able to walk and had no-one to take care [of him] when the villagers

* Illegible fragment.
were deported. They took 12 [men] from the UPA units and field workers alive, as well as some others who used to work with us but who had not been active recently. Rifleman “Tsygan” from “Chaus’s” unit and to some extent “Mykola,” from the [department of] economy, broke down and started denouncing. Berezynsky from “Duda’s” unit and Zahulay from BSB surrendered to the enemy.

The enemy’s operation is continuing in full swing. (Subsequent fragments omitted for reasons of secrecy).

Glory to Ukraine!

— w

b- Best regards and [...]b-h

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IPN, MBP UPA X/9, pp. 139–141.
Copy, typescript.
Document in Polish.
No. 18

Minister of Defence

Warsaw, 31 July 1947

Report No. 38
on the operational situation and activity of WP and WBW units
in Cracow, Lublin, and Rzeszów województwos
as of 22 July 1947
1:200 000 map

A. Operational Situation

As most bandit activity had been eliminated and the operation to deport the Ukrainian population from Lublin, Rzeszów and Cracow województwos had been completed, Operational Group Vistula, having carried out the tasks entrusted to it, was disbanded on 28 July. The WP units that were assigned to OG Vistula from other OWs are returning to their permanent locations. Further struggle against the remnants of banditry and the final clearance of the above-mentioned województwos of the Ukrainian population will be carried on by Województwo Sec[urity] Com[mittee(s)].

a) Deportation action
By 27 July this year, a total of 431 transports had left with 136,900 people
On 28–29 July 4 transports left with 933 people
A total of 435 transports left with 137,833 people

The operation of deporting the Ukrainian population is being continued, in accordance with the existing agenda, by local WP units.

c) Settlement operation.

By 30 July this year, a total of 428 transports with 136,697 people had reached their destinations, of which:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Transports</th>
<th>People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Szczecin</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>46,118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdańsk</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poznań</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olsztyn</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>58,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrocław</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>20,938</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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B. Major events
in Rzeszów województwo

On the night of 27–28 July this year, an unidentified band burned down 25 buildings in the village of Liski (37 km east of Tomaszów Lubelski) and 10 buildings in the village of Przewodów (36 km east of Tomaszów Lubelski). The above villages were subject to the deportation operation.

C. General Statistics, as of 30 July 1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Our losses</th>
<th>By 28 July</th>
<th>As of 30 July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WP soldiers killed</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WP soldiers wounded</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBW soldiers killed</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WBW soldiers wounded</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Guerrilla losses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandits killed</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandits captured</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspects arrested</td>
<td>1,582</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Bandits who] surrendered voluntarily</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Weapons captured</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMGs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMGs</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-tank rifles</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault rifles</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>107,344</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>107,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelters destroyed</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Minister of Defence
p.p. (–) Spychalski
Major-General

*IPN, MBP 743, p. 242.*
*Original, typescript.*
*Document in Polish.*
*Paper with the national emblem imprinted over the letterhead. A handwritten reference number on the cover letter: No. 00334/III*
No. 19
1 August 1947, Warsaw. Instructions issued by the State Security Commission to the Commanders of the 5th and 7th OWs

State Security Commission
Ref. No. a-0340/III-a
a-4 August-a 1947

Warsaw, 1 August 1947
Confidential
Copy No. a-2-a

Commanders of Military Districts 5 and 7

The Ukrainian population and the mixed population that had been collaborating with the bands were deported from all southern and eastern powiats in the border area by Operational Group Vistula. There remain only a few considerations concerning the deportation of the Ukrainians from the areas adjoining the border region of Lublin województwo, i.e. from the Krasnystaw, Zamość, and Biłgoraj powiats.

In this respect, the following directives should be followed:

1. Generally, all Ukrainian families are to be deported from these powiats, irrespective of their degree of loyalty or party allegiance. Exceptions may be made upon the consent of the Minister of Defence and the Minister of Security.

2. The deportation of these people, who have generally shown loyalty towards Democratic Poland, should be carried out in a particularly careful manner, and they should be given every assistance in taking their property with them. They should be deported after harvesting and threshing cereals and unearthing potatoes between 15 and 30 September 1947. In particular cases, this time limit may be extended to 15 October [19]47.

3. As far as the immediate families of WP and Security officers are concerned, an encrypted inquiry should be sent to the Minister of Defence or the Minister of Security in every case.

4. The Ukrainian families of demobilised and active privates should be deported.

5. Deputy Minister Wolski should be presented with lists of families of the most distinguished soldiers (soldiers of the 1st and 2nd Armies decorated for bravery or wounded, former partisans, distinguished in the political struggle during the elections) by 15 August 1947. Following the directives of Deputy Minister Wolski, these families will be deported in separate transports to the best lots in Silesia designated from state-owned properties transferred by the Ministry of Agriculture.

* * *
Filled in by hand.
6. Some monitoring brigades should be maintained in every evacuated area on a permanent basis, to check every evacuated village and make sure that no Ukrainian or mixed family which could be capable of collaborating with the remnants of the UPA bands has remained there.

Minister of Public Security
p.p. (–) Mietkowski
Deputy Minister – Brig. Gen.

Minister of Defence
p.p. (–) Spychalski
Lieutenant-General

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Copy No. 7 – Commander of the 5th OW
Copy No. 8 – Commander of the 7th OW
Copy No. 9 – archive

Printed by: H. N. No. a-293a
1 August 1947

IPN, MBP 743, pp. 243–244.
Original, typescript.
Document in Polish.

1 Mieczysław Mietkowski (1903–1990), brigadier-general; KPP, PPR and PZPR member, CC PZPR (1948–1957), later expelled from the party; from October 1944 Deputy Director of the Ministry of Public Security; in 1945–1954 Deputy Minister of Public Security, responsible for illegal operations of the security services.